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1. Did the Business Court err in failing to value RAI as of 25 July 2017 
(the date the British American Tobacco plc and Reynolds American 
Inc. merger closed), as required by N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01 et seq.? 
 
2. Did the Business Court err in failing to conduct a valuation, as 
required by N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01 et seq.? 
 
3. Did the Business Court err in concluding that deal price was the 
appropriate measure of fair value given the lack of any market 
check and announced refusal of BAT to sell its stock at any price? 
- x - 
 
4. Did the Business Court err in concluding that the “adjusted” 
market price of RAI could serve as a “check” on the fair value 
derived from the deal price? 
 
5. Did the Business Court err by failing to account for the control 
premium, as required by N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01 et seq.? 
 
6. Did the Business Court err in concluding that Defendants-
Appellants’ DCF analysis was unreliable? 
 
7. Did the Business Court err in admitting, and relying on, Appellee’s 
expert’s testimony? 
 
8. Did the Business Court err in its determination of the statutory 
interest to which Defendants-Appellants are entitled? 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Reynolds American Inc. (“Reynolds” or “RAI”) was one of two 
domestic tobacco companies whose primary business was the sale of 
cigarettes in the United States.  British American Tobacco (“BAT’) was a 
UK-based international tobacco company that did not sell cigarettes in 
the United States.  BAT was a 42% shareholder of Reynolds and five BAT 
officers sat on the Reynolds board of directors (the “RAI Board”).  As a 
result of prior transactions between BAT and Reynolds, BAT was subject 
to a ten-year standstill that prohibited BAT from attempting to purchase 
additional RAI shares until 2014.   
In 2015 Reynolds engaged in a major acquisition, purchasing 
Lorillard Tobacco Company (“Lorillard”) (then the smallest of the three 
remaining US tobacco companies).  As a result of that transaction (the 
“Lorillard Transaction”), the second-largest US tobacco company 
(Reynolds) acquired the third largest (Lorillard) in a transaction that had 
a transformational impact on Reynolds.  The final integration of Reynolds 
and Lorillard operations occurred in the summer of 2016, and in July of 
2016, management prepared to share the results of the consolidation 
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with the RAI Board (including its BAT members) in a private, off-site 
two-day board meeting dubbed “Strategy Day.”  
Reynolds senior management had good news.  As a result of the 
Lorillard Transaction, Reynolds acquired strong new cigarette brands 
and divested several weak, underperforming brands.  In addition, 
combining the two companies resulted in staggering cost savings across 
all operations including manufacturing, sales and administration.  
Finally, despite overall slowing demand for cigarettes, Reynolds had been 
able to increase prices in amounts that more than offset slowing demand 
and therefore increased profits and margins.   In the words of Reynolds’ 
CEO, the change was “transformational,” and Reynolds projected high 
single-digit (7-8%) growth for the next ten years—well in excess of the 
long-term growth rates expected by public market analysts. 
Three months later, in October 2016, BAT made an unsolicited offer 
to buy the remaining shares of Reynolds it did not already own and 
simultaneously announced that it would not support another 
transaction—even at a higher price—and would not sell its shares to a 
competing bidder.  In light of this announcement, a subset of the RAI 
Board (the “Transaction Committee”) negotiated exclusively with BAT, 
- 3 - 
 
did not solicit any bids from other companies, and three months later, on 
16 January 2017 (the “Deal Date”), reached an agreement to sell BAT the 
remaining shares in RAI for $59.64 per share.  The merger consideration 
was comprised of cash and shares of BAT common stock. 
The transaction closed six months later on 25 July 2017 (the 
“Transaction Date”).  Between the agreement date in January and the 
closing date in July 2017, US equities soared in response to the 
expectation of substantially lower corporate tax rates and decreased 
regulation of tobacco and other regulated industries.  Between October 
2016 and July 2017, the S&P 500 rose 17% and the other remaining 
major US tobacco manufacturer, Altria Group Inc. (“Altria”), rose 20%.  
As a result, the value of the merger consideration rose from $59.64 in 
January 2017 to $65.87.  Every single shareholder of Reynolds who 
tendered their shares received $65.87 at the July 2017 closing. 
Appellants did not tender their shares and instead elected to have 
their shares appraised independently by the Business Court to determine 
the “fair value” of the shares using “customary and current valuation 
concepts and techniques,” as required by the North Carolina appraisal 
statute.  Rather than conduct an independent appraisal, however, the 
- 4 - 
 
Business Court below simply deferred to the value of the merger 
consideration negotiated by BAT in January 2017 and concluded that it 
was a “fair price.”  As a result, Appellants were awarded $59.64 per 
share—substantially less than even the $65.87 merger consideration 
paid to all other stockholders at closing. 
This case thus calls into question whether the appraisal statute 
enacted by the North Carolina legislature must be applied in accordance 
with its plain terms or can instead be ignored through application of a 
judge-made rule to dispense with conducting any valuation at all, 
deferring entirely to the deal price struck with an insider in the 
transaction at issue. 
As set forth in greater detail below, the North Carolina General 
Assembly provided appraisal as a remedy for stockholders of an acquired 
company who are unwilling to sell their shares at a deal price negotiated 
with an insider.  Although such stockholders are forced to surrender their 
equity position at the closing date of the transaction, they have the right 
to petition the court for an independent judicial determination of the fair 
value of their shares using customary and current valuation concepts and 
techniques.  In this respect, a stockholder appraisal remedy is akin to a 
- 5 - 
 
condemnation proceeding—the property is taken against the will of a 
property owner who is then entitled to a judicial determination of the fair 
value of the property.  Implicit in the statutory scheme is that a sale price 
negotiated with an insider should be measured objectively because, 
among other things, insiders invariably know more about the company 
than outsiders, and investors can reasonably rely upon “fair value” 
determined by an independent, neutral judge based upon customary 
valuation techniques. 
However, by simply deferring to a deal price negotiated by the 
insider and awarding a price set six months prior to the closing, the 
Business Court failed to carry out its statutory duty and made 
fundamental errors of law.  To start, it improperly borrowed from—and 
then extended—a judge-made rule in Delaware that is based upon a 
Delaware appraisal statute that is substantively different from the North 
Carolina appraisal statute.   Specifically, the Delaware appraisal statute 
applies to all mergers, not just mergers with insiders, and thus includes 
“arm’s length” sales to independent third parties after a robust auction 
or market check.  In these limited circumstances, the Delaware Supreme 
Court has recently penned a series of decisions that allow deference to 
- 6 - 
 
deal price because the existence of a real-world market check in the form 
of bids from other would-be purchasers can be evidence of fair value.  
However, here, there was no market check in the form of third-party 
bids—and there was no auction—because BAT foreclosed such a process 
by asserting that it would not support (with its votes) or sell its shares to 
any bidder who might come in with a higher bid to top its price.  In light 
of BAT’s position, Reynolds and its financial advisors concluded that 
there was no point in soliciting other bids and did not do so. 
Moreover, while the judicially-created exception to conducting a 
valuation might make sense under the Delaware statute—which applies 
to all mergers including mergers with unaffiliated, independent third 
parties who compete in an auction—the North Carolina statute applies 
only to mergers with insiders.  The limited scope of the North Carolina 
statue and its remedial purpose suggest that shareholders should not be 
forced to accept a price determined through such a transaction and 
should instead be permitted to have accepted valuation techniques used 
to determine fair value.  If the underlying deal price negotiated by the 
insider is itself sufficient evidence of fair value—as the Business Court 
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held—it is difficult to see what purpose is to be served by the appraisal 
statute.   
That the purpose of the appraisal statute is compromised by simply 
deferring to the price set in the underlying transaction was recently the 
law even in Delaware.  Just ten years ago, the Delaware Supreme Court 
correctly observed that “[r]equiring the Court of Chancery to defer—
conclusively or presumptively—to the merger price, even in the face of a 
pristine, unchallenged transactional process, would contravene the 
unambiguous language of the statute . . . . .”  Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. 
GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 218 (Del. 2010) (“Golden Telecom II”).   
Thus, here, the Court applied a judge-made rule of law forged in 
Delaware that is based on a Delaware statute that is substantively 
distinguishable from the North Carolina statute, and it then extended the 
rule—beyond the scope of Delaware decisions—to cover a transaction 
that had no market check whatsoever to support the deal price.  Such an 
approach has no place under the North Carolina appraisal statute.  This 
Court should reject deference to deal price in a transaction involving an 
insider and instead uphold the legislative intent as evidenced by the 
plain language of the North Carolina statute. 
- 8 - 
 
The approach used by the Busines Court also does violence to many 
of the clear, unambiguous requirements in the appraisal statute.  For 
example, the North Carolina statute clearly and unambiguously requires 
that “fair value” be determined “immediately before the effectuation of 
the corporate action as to which the shareholder asserts appraisal 
rights,” i.e., the closing date of the transaction.  That is the date on which 
shares are acquired.  Here, the closing date of the transaction was 25 
July 2017.  However, the court below never even attempted to determine 
the value of Reynolds as of that date.  Instead, the Court deferred to a 
deal price that was struck in January 2017. 
Yet much had changed over the intervening months prior to the 
closing in July 2017.  Among other things, RAI had another six months 
of operating results and freshly updated financial projections that had 
been prepared just a month before.  These financial results were never 
considered by the Business Court and (since they obviously were not yet 
in existence) could not be considered by the RAI Board, its Transaction 
Committee, or the financial advisors upon whom they relied.  In addition, 
impending tax reform was expected to substantially lower corporate tax 
rates and deregulation was expected to lower costs for highly regulated 
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companies and industries such as tobacco.  These macroeconomic 
changes resulted in a dramatic rise in both the S&P 500 and the value of 
Reynolds’ closest competitor—Altria—by 17% and 20% respectively.  The 
Business Court ignored these macroeconomic events even though they 
were reflected in the value of the merger consideration itself—which 
increased from $59.64 to $65.87 on the date of the closing.  In deferring 
to a deal price struck in January and failing to determine fair value on 
the date of the closing, the Business Court failed to obey to the plain 
language of the statute and committed clear legal error. 
By adopting the price negotiated by RAI and BAT, the court also 
failed to conduct an independent valuation using customary and current 
valuation techniques.  As noted above, until recently, the Delaware 
courts construing Delaware’s appraisal statute did not require courts to 
defer to deal price even if there was a “pristine” transaction.  Now, 
Delaware has allowed some deference to deal price, but only in 
circumstances where there is a reliable and robust market check—
whether in the form of an auction or other bidding process that elicits the 
views of other would-be purchasers.  This Court need not consider 
whether or not such market evidence would be sufficient to constitute a 
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“customary” or “current” valuation concept or technique under the North 
Carolina statute because, in this case, there was no market check.  BAT 
prevented such a check by refusing to support a sale to another bidder 
and refusing to sell its shares in such a transaction.  Without the support 
of the 42% owner, the RAI Board and its advisors concluded that it made 
no sense to solicit bids and did not do so.  Indeed, the lead financial 
advisor was informed that one bidder—who successfully outbid BAT in 
Reynolds’ 2016 sale of one of its major cigarette brands—was prepared to 
bid on Reynolds but decided against it given BAT’s stated position.   Since 
BAT intentionally blocked any market check, the price it negotiated could 
not be a “customary [or] current valuation concept[] [or] technique[]” and 
the failure to deploy such a technique was another clear violation of the 
statute. 
The failure to conduct a valuation based upon customary and 
current valuation techniques had a substantial negative impact on the 
determination of fair value because it meant Reynolds’ projected long-
term growth rates were ignored.  Indeed, in July 2016, BAT was given 
information about Reynolds’ projected long-term ten-year growth rates 
that was not known (and was never known) by public shareholders, 
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analysts, and the financial advisors who advised the Board—each of 
which were never provided the detailed projections that supported them.  
Those ten-year detailed projections were critically important because 
although tobacco is in long-term secular decline (with long-term growth 
rates at or near zero), Reynolds had just finished integrating its massive 
consolidation with Lorillard and was successfully increasing prices of 
cigarettes and other tobacco products.  As a result, despite the expected 
long-term secular decline in the cigarette industry, BAT knew Reynolds 
projected high single-digit (7-8%) growth over the next ten years and that 
Reynolds had created a detailed set of ten-year projections that supported 
that outlook. 
The financial advisors knew that ten-year projections were the most 
appropriate tool to use to value a tobacco company and had used 
Reynolds’ ten-year projections in prior work for Reynolds, including in its 
acquisition of Lorillard.  Accordingly, the financial advisors asked for 
RAI’s detailed ten-year projections, expected them, but never received 
them.  Instead, they were directed by management to use five-year 
projections followed by low 0-1% growth rates in years six through ten.  
For example, Lazard Freres & Co., LLC (“Lazard”) knew that RAI 
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prepared detailed ten-year projections in the ordinary course of business 
because it received them in connection with advising the Board in the 
Lorillard Transaction.  Expecting to receive detailed ten-year projections 
again, Lazard created a pro-forma ten-year cash flow statement, having 
every intention of performing a discounted cash flow (“DCF”) valuation 
of RAI based on ten years’ worth of projections.  Lazard used the growth 
rate projected by management in years six through ten and only after the 
tenth year did they reduce growth to the long-term rate of 0-1%.  
However, Lazard received “clear confirmation and direction from 
management” “to use a . . . five-year set of projections” and then imposed 
a low-growth 1% rate for years six through ten.  This meant that Lazard’s 
projected cash flow was substantially lower than Reynolds’ actual ten-
year projections.  J.P. Morgan Securities, LLC’s (“JPM’s”) standard 
preference is to use ten-year forecasts and they initially planned to use 
either “10-year projections based on management forecast” or an 
“extrapolation[] if necessary.”  Despite JPM’s explicit request for the 
detailed ten-year projections, RAI never sent them.   
As a result, both financial advisors used growth rates of 0-1% for 
years six through ten of the cash flow projections, instead of the 7-8% 
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growth rates in the detailed ten-year projections.  Relying upon these 
much lower growth rates—and never advising the RAI Board that they 
requested but were denied access to the detailed ten-year projections—
both financial advisors calculated substantially lower values for 
Reynolds.  Relying on those opinions, the Board concluded that the price 
BAT offered was fair.  Had any of the financial advisors used the growth 
rates contained in Reynolds’ detailed ten-year projections, they would 
have produced valuations virtually identical to the valuation of 
Appellants’ expert.  Of course, BAT (as an insider on the board) knew 
that the projected cash flows used by the financial advisors and presented 
to the Board reflected much lower growth rates than Reynolds actually 
expected after the completion of the Lorillard Transaction.  BAT’s own 
internal projections of Reynolds’ long-term growth rates were never 
disclosed—BAT refused to provide discovery of its own internal valuation 
of Reynolds and instead elected to hide behind the discovery protections 
provided by its UK citizenship. 
Had the Business Court conducted an actual valuation using 
accepted valuation techniques, it would have had to account for the 
actual growth Reynolds projected for years six through ten.  It is 
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undisputed that the failure to account for the expected growth in years six 
through ten reduced the fair value of RAI by $20 per share.   
The very rationale behind providing an appraisal for transactions 
involving insiders is that they have unfair advantages that may prevent 
the payment of fair price.  Here, BAT had at least two such advantages—
its 42% stake in Reynolds that prevented a bidding process that could 
elicit a market check, and its possession of inside, non-public information 
about Reynolds’ expected growth rates in years six through ten.  Both of 
those inside advantages had to have had an impact on the deal price BAT 
agreed to pay—and a “fair value” could have been ferreted out if the 
Business Court had done what the statute instructs and conducted an 
independent valuation using customary and current valuation concepts 
and techniques.  The DCF technique used by Appellants’ expert Dr. Mark 
Zmijewski is by far the most widely-accepted valuation technique in 
corporate valuation and produced a fair value meaningfully in excess of 
the price BAT agreed to pay.  That fair value determination specifically 
captured the actual growth projected by Reynolds for years six through 
ten. 
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Compounding its failure to abide the plain language of the statute, 
the Business Court fundamentally failed to understand the difference 
between its role in a statutory appraisal case and its role in a breach-of-
fiduciary-duty case.  The Business Court cited and relied upon Delaware 
breach-of-fiduciary-duty cases—not recognizing that the legal standard 
applied in such cases has nothing to do with statutory appraisal.  The 
Business Court ultimately rendered a decision rooted in the concept that 
the RAI Board had a sound basis for agreeing to the transaction.  But 
that is not the proper inquiry.  A board of directors has fiduciary duties 
of care and loyalty, and individual directors are personally liable for any 
breach.  The potentially ruinous reach of personal liability has been 
balanced with a broad judicial deference to board decisions.  If the board 
makes an informed “business judgment,” its decisions will not be 
subjected to judicial review.  The broad protection afforded by the 
business judgment rule may lead a board to deal exclusively with a 
preferred buyer or to conclude that an auction is too time consuming or 
unlikely to be productive.  They might conclude that in a consolidating 
industry, a combination makes good business sense.  These business 
judgments and will ordinarily not be second-guessed in a court of law to 
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impose personal liability on directors in a fiduciary duty litigation.  
However, the appraisal statute is not intended to provide a remedy for 
the breach of a fiduciary duty.  It pre-supposes that the decision to sell 
has been properly made, but provides investors with a different kind of 
remedy.  It allows them to have an independent remedy against the 
company (and indirectly the buyer) and to have a valuation conducted 
whenever the underlying transaction is with a corporate insider.  To 
confuse the two bodies of law is to undermine the statutory remedy and 
to leave shareholders with no protection at all where a price is negotiated 
by an insider who owns a substantial stake in the company.   
The danger of confusing statutory appraisal with breach-of-
fiduciary-duty law is manifest from this Court’s prior consideration of the 
very issue that gives rise to this case—BAT’s 42% ownership of Reynolds.  
In Corwin, this Court considered whether BAT’s 42% ownership of 
Reynolds created any fiduciary duties on the part of BAT to act fairly 
with respect to the remaining shareholders.  Corwin as Tr. for Beatrice 
Corwin Living Irrevocable Tr. v. British Am. Tobacco PLC, 371 N.C. 605 
(2018).  In that case, this Court concluded that although BAT’s 42% stake 
gave it leverage and advantages not shared by other shareholders, those 
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benefits were property rights that BAT owned and created no fiduciary 
duty to shareholders.  As a result of Corwin, BAT was given the “green 
light” to use the substantial leverage it had without any concern over 
potential liability to the other shareholders.  Given this Court’s ruling, 
the protection provided by the appraisal statute became even more 
important, because it provided the only legal remedy to Reynolds’ 
remaining shareholders to get a fair price for their stock when BAT 
exercised its leverage to buy RAI and stifle any competitive bids.  By 
simply deferring to the price BAT agreed to pay, the Business Court 
removed the only remaining protection realistically available to 
shareholders and contravened the expressed will of the legislature. 
Finally, the other “persuasive” evidence the Business Court relied 
on to justify its deferral to deal price was inconsistent with both this 
Court’s decision in Corwin and the plain language of the appraisal 
statute.  Among other things, the Business Court looked to the 
“unaffected stock price” of RAI stock prior to the offer by BAT and, based 
on analysis done by Reynolds’ expert Dr. Paul Gompers, “adjusted” that 
price to take into account the dramatic increases in the S&P 500 and 
tobacco stocks between the time of the offer and the closing date in July 
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2017.  The Business Court concluded that the unaffected stock price, even 
as adjusted, “would still have traded 7% to 10% below the deal price,” 
further evidencing the fairness of the deal price.  However, implicit in 
such an analysis is that the unaffected stock market price of RAI stock is 
indicative of its fair value to begin with.  That is surely not the case as 
the unaffected stock price does not include material nonpublic 
information that BAT had, but public investors did not (including 
knowledge of RAI’s 7-8% projected growth rate for years 6 through 10 and 
that the RAI Board had authorized the purchase of up to $2 billion of RAI 
stock at prices up to $65.  It also ignores the fact that the timing of BAT’s 
offer was “opportunistic” (in the words of RAI’s own financial advisors) to 
take advantage of a recent sell-off of RAI stock that decreased its public 
trading price by twelve percent.  But even putting these many issues 
aside, the unaffected market price of RAI stock does not include a control 
premium.  A control premium is the value that having “control” of a 
corporation conveys, including, for example, the right to withdraw cash 
from the company, change management, sell assets or even sell the 
company.  These are valuable rights that a buyer obtains when it 
purchases more than 50% of the outstanding shares of a corporation.  In 
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contrast, when an individual purchases stock on a public stock market, 
he or she purchases shares that do not confer control.  Accordingly, such 
shares trade with an inherent minority discount (i.e., without the value 
of control).  The North Carolina appraisal statute specifically directs that 
“fair value” must be calculated “without discounting for . . . minority 
status.”  This allows the court to use a valuation method (like DCF) that 
does not incorporate a minority discount (because the DCF represents 
the present value of future cash flows).  If the court instead uses the 
publicly-traded stock price to determine fair value, it has to add a control 
premium to eliminate the effect of the inherent minority discount.  In 
Corwin, shareholders argued that BAT had obtained control of RAI 
without payment of a control premium.  This Court disagreed and noted 
that while BAT owned 42% it did not have control and accordingly did 
not have to pay for it.  In this transaction, BAT undoubtedly gained 
control, but by simply using the unaffected stock price as further 
“evidence” of fair value, the Business Court did not make BAT pay for it.  
This was not only unfair but violated the plain language of the statute. 
For all of these reasons, and those that follow, the Business Court’s 
decision should be reversed. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants-Appellants Third Motion Equities Master Fund Ltd, 
Magnetar Capital Master Fund, Ltd, Spectrum Opportunities Master 
Fund Ltd, Magnetar Fundamental Strategies Master Fund Ltd, 
Magnetar MSW Master Fund Ltd, Mason Capital Master Fund, L.P., 
Blue Mountain Credit Alternatives Master Fund L.P., BlueMountain 
Summit Trading L.P., BlueMountain Montenvers Master Fund SCA 
SICAV-SIF, BlueMountain Foinaven Master Fund L.P., BlueMountain 
Guadalupe Peak Fund L.P., and the Barry W. Blank Trust (collectively, 
“Appellants”) are former RAI shareholders who exercised their judicial 
appraisal rights in connection with the $65 billion takeover of America’s 
second-largest domestic tobacco company, RAI, by UK-based BAT, 
through a merger effectuated on 25 July 2017 (the “Merger”).  (R p 11). 
This action was commenced by RAI’s filing of a complaint for 
judicial appraisal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30 on 29 November 2017 
(R pp 3-14), which required the Business Court to determine the fair 
value of Appellants’ shares on the Transaction Date.  This matter came 
on for trial before the Honorable Louis A. Bledsoe, III, Chief Business 
Court Judge, and was tried by the court, sitting without a jury, from 10 
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June 2019 through 25 June 2019.  (T pp 1-2041).  On 27 April 2020, the 
Business Court issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final 
Judgment, concluding, inter alia, that “the fair value of RAI’s shares as 
of the Transaction Date [was] no more than $59.64 per share.”  (R. 142-
314).  Appellants filed and served timely notices of appeal on 21 May 
2020.  (R. 331-43).  The record was deemed settled on 6 August 2020, filed 
in the Supreme Court on 21 August 2020, and docketed 24 August 2020.  
(R. 356-60).  
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STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
 Judge Bledsoe’s 27 April 2020 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Final Judgment is a final judgment, and appeal therefore lies to the 
Supreme Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(a). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. BAT’S OWNERSHIP AND INFLUENCE OVER RAI 
BAT is a large multinational tobacco company whose principal 
product is the manufacture and sale of cigarettes.  In 2004, BAT’s U.S. 
subsidiary Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation merged with U.S.-
based R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company (“RJRT”) to form RAI, and as a 
result acquired a 42% ownership interest in RAI.  (R p 175-76; T p 60:5-
21; App. 14).  Contemporaneous with that merger, BAT and RAI entered 
into a Governance Agreement that included a “standstill” that prevented 
BAT from seeking to acquire the balance of RAI’s shares for a ten-year 
period, gave BAT the right to appoint directors to the RAI Board, and 
afforded BAT certain veto powers and approval rights not available to 
public shareholders.  (R pp 176-79; see Doc. Ex. 5439, 5746).  At the time 
of the Merger, five RAI Board members were appointed by BAT and two 
were BAT executives.  (R p 177 ¶¶ 80-81; T p 146:6-14; App. 31).  As a 
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result, BAT was privy to material non-public information regularly 
shared at RAI Board meetings, including detailed management 
presentations relating to RAI’s long-term financial prospects and a 
summary of RAI’s ten-year projections presented annually at RAI’s 
Board “Strategy Day.”  (R p 177 ¶ 81; see, e.g., T pp 146:15-149:15 
(discussing Doc. Ex. 2070); 395:14-23, 405:2-19; App. 31-34, 69-70).1  
RAI publicly acknowledged that its 42% ownership, board 
appointments, and voting rights gave it substantial influence over RAI.  
(R pp 176-77 ¶ 79; see also, e.g., Doc. Ex. 3115-17 (disclosing, inter alia, 
that “BAT’s significant beneficial equity interest in RAI could be 
determinative in matters submitted to a vote by RAI shareholders” and 
that BAT’s ownership and influence “could have a negative effect on the 
price of RAI common stock”).  BAT’s position also provided it with a 
significant informational advantage over any other would-be buyer and 
made it virtually impossible for any other buyer to purchase RAI without 
BAT’s consent.  (T pp 1931:10-1935:8; App. 215-219).  If BAT determined 
                                                 
1 Three members of this Court have previously concluded that these facts supported 
a conclusion that BAT had actual control over RAI.   Corwin, 371 N.C. at 626. 
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to vote its 42% stake against any proposed transaction, it would require 
an overwhelming 88% of remaining shareholders to carry the vote—a 
practical impossibility since only 30% of eligible shareholders typically 
vote on any proposed transaction.  (Doc. Ex. 7379, 7617-18 
(acknowledging that, based on Broadridge data, “[if] BAT was not 
supportive of [third party acquirer], it would be very difficult for the third 
party to achieve the vote”); see also R p 177 ¶ 81).  BAT’s ability to deter 
other purchasers of RAI generated an “overhang,” depressing RAI’s 
trading price.  (T p 1901:5-18; App. 212).  Stated differently, while the 
stock of most publicly-traded companies trade with the expectation that 
there may one day be a competitive takeover bid for the company, RAI’s 
stock traded with a diminished expectation of any such competitive bid.  
The only likely bidder for RAI was BAT itself. 
II. THE U.S. TOBACCO MARKET 
The U.S. tobacco market is highly regulated, has specific 
restrictions on marketing, distribution and points of sales, and is subject 
to excise taxes.  (See R p 152 ¶ 21; T pp 1087:6-1088:15; App. 158-59).  
Among other restrictions, tobacco companies cannot advertise and are 
subject to regulation by the Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”).  (R p 
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165 ¶48; T pp 1087:6-1088:15; App. 158-59).  These restrictions act as 
significant barriers to entry, preventing competitors from entering the 
U.S. market to take away market share, and have created an oligopolistic 
marketplace with only three major U.S. tobacco companies.  (See R p 154 
¶ 25; see also T p 1087:4-1089:18; App. App. 158-60).  As a result, while 
cigarette volumes have been declining since 1982, and notwithstanding 
threats of enhanced regulation, the U.S. cigarette industry has remained 
highly profitable.  (See R pp 150-51; see also T p 1092:20-24, 1095:17-22; 
App. 161-62).  The inelasticity of demand for cigarettes—fueled in large 
part by nicotine addiction—has allowed the industry to raise prices, while 
cigarette consumers continue to pay those higher prices.  (See R p 158 ¶ 
32; T p 1101:11-17; App. 163). 
A. RAI’s Transformational Lorillard Acquisition 
Although BAT’s standstill agreement expired in 2014, BAT did not 
move forward with an acquisition of RAI at that time because RAI had 
entered into a $30 billion agreement to acquire Lorillard.  (R p 176 ¶ 78).  
At that time, RAI and Lorillard were the second and third largest US, 
tobacco companies respectively, and with Altria were the three dominant 
players in the U.S. tobacco market.  (See R pp 133 ¶ 8, 154 ¶ 25, 176 ¶ 
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78; T p 1156:14-20; App. 167).  In June 2015, RAI completed the 
acquisition and became the owner of Lorillard’s product, the premium 
menthol cigarette, Newport.  (R pp 154 ¶ 26, 176 ¶ 78; T p 120:10-22, 
130:17-19; App. 25, 28).2  Antitrust concerns over the proposed RAI-
Lorillard combination required RAI to divest certain brands to another 
company who might substitute for Lorillard as the third material 
competitor in the U.S. market.  (R p 176 ¶ 78 & n.20; T p 1114:3-21; App. 
164).  Thus, RAI acquired Newport, divested four weaker “tail brands” 
(Winston, Salem, Kool, and Maverick) to Imperial Tobacco Group 
(“Imperial”), and “traded up” to improve its overall product portfolio and 
growth profile.  (R p 176 ¶ 78 & n.20; T pp 259:9-260:10, 496:2-497:1, 
499:15-500:2, 1115:16-25, 1143:3-8; App. 47-48, 76-77, 79, 165-66; see also 
Doc Ex. 5334 (describing post-Lorillard Transaction performance as a 
“step change from pre-acquisition performance”)).   
To evaluate the Lorillard Transaction (and the value of RAI on a 
standalone and pro-forma, post-merger basis), RAI retained Lazard, who 
conducted, among other things, a discounted cash flow (“DCF”) valuation.  
                                                 
2 In connection with the Lorillard Transaction, BAT invested approximately $5 billion 
in order to maintain its 42% ownership stake.  (R p 179 ¶ 86; T p 192:13-18; App. 41). 
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(T pp 131:7-10, 134:17-23, 195:10-16; App. 29-30; Doc. Ex. 4749; see also 
R pp 151 ¶ 19 n.10, 211 ¶ 158).  In doing so, RAI management provided 
Lazard with a set of detailed ten-year projections that were prepared by 
RAI in the ordinary course of business.  Lazard relied on those projections 
as “the best currently available estimates and judgments as to the future 
financial performance of” RAI.  (T pp 260:20-24, 262:23-263:11, 364:8-
365:4; App. 48-49, 63-64; R p 211 ¶ 158; see also Doc Ex. 1435-36).  RAI’s 
ten-year cash flow projections also were published in the Company’s SEC 
filings for that merger.  (Doc Ex. 4999).   
The combination of Lorillard and RAI was “transformational.”  (T p 
684:4-6; App. 94).  Upon the merger close, RAI immediately realized $500 
million of operational synergies, and extracted another $300 million over 
the ensuing twelve months, and RAI emerged from the transaction with 
much stronger growth.  (T pp 677:16-678:4, 215:7-12, 259:9-24, 341:5-14, 
243:19-23, 496:2-497:1, 1114:8-15; App. 41-42, 47, 62, 76, 164; see also R 
p 156 ¶ 28).  And, despite the divestiture to Imperial, the U.S. cigarette 
market became more concentrated, with RAI and Altria accounting for 
about 85% of cigarette sales.  (R p 154 ¶ 25; T p 1089:21-25; App. 160).  
As a result, RAI emerged from the Lorillard Transaction with stronger 
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brands, greater pricing power and substantially reduced costs in 
manufacturing, sales and administrative costs. 
B. RAI Determines that its Stock is Worth at Least $65 
Per Share 
The Lorillard Transaction also resulted, indirectly, in an 
unexpected billion-dollar cash surplus for RAI.  In an effort to reduce a 
portion of the acquisition financing incurred in connection with the 
Lorillard acquisition, RAI decided to sell the international rights to its 
super-premium Natural American Spirit cigarette to Japan Tobacco 
International (“Japan Tobacco” or “JTI”).  (R p 181 ¶ 90; T pp 91:13-92:14, 
1812:7-20; App. 17-18, 207).  The proposed sale triggered a bidding war 
between BAT and Japan Tobacco in which BAT was ultimately outbid for 
a staggering and unprecedented $5 billion sale that closed in January 
2016.  (R p 181 ¶ 90; T p 64:12-18; App. 15).  The unexpected cash infusion 
allowed RAI to not only reduce the substantial debt RAI had incurred to 
finance the Lorillard Transaction, but left RAI with substantial excess 
cash.  (See R p 181 ¶ 90).  As a result, in summer of 2016, the RAI Board—
with BAT’s knowledge—authorized RAI management to use up to $2 
billion in excess cash to purchase RAI stock on the open market at a price 
of up to $65 per share.  (R pp 212-14; T pp 149:8-150:3; App. 34; Doc. Ex. 
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2072).  This same Board would—just months later—approve the sale of 
RAI to BAT at $59.64 per share.  In other words, BAT was allowed to 
purchase RAI stock at a price lower than RAI itself was willing to pay.3  
That is significant because a share repurchase program can only be a 
valid exercise of business judgment if the Company is buying the stock 
at a price that is lower than its real value.  If the Company is paying more 
for the stock than it is really worth, it would constitute a waste of 
corporate assets and a breach of fiduciary duty.  (See T p 128:11-18; App. 
26; Doc. Ex. 7692-93).   
C. RAI Reports a “Step Change” in Cash Flow Growth at 
Strategy Day 
As July 2016 approached, RAI had extraordinarily good news to 
report to BAT and the RAI Board.  RAI was flush with cash from the sale 
of Natural American Spirit to Japan Tobacco and had successfully 
extracted a final $300 million (of a total of $800 million) in synergies from 
the Lorillard Transaction.  (See R pp 155-56, ¶ 28, 181 ¶ 90).  It had 
lowered costs, increased market share, acquired strong new brands and 
                                                 
3 The Board derived its price ceiling from a “conservative” DCF valuation of RAI 
conducted by management that used management projections and assumed a 3.0% 
perpetuity growth rate.  (R p 214 ¶ 165, 215 ¶ 168; T pp 542:2-548:24, 149:8-15; App. 
82-88, 34). 
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had divested weak brands.  The bottom-line impact of these remarkable, 
game-changing transactions were presented to BAT and the Board for 
the first time at on off-site, two-day “deep dive” into RAI’s business 
outlook known as Strategy Day.  (R pp 201-05). 
  The results were remarkable:  RAI management reported at the 
July 2016 Strategy Day that RAI had experienced a “transformational” 
change.  (T p 684:4-6; App. 94).  Management presented, for the first time, 
the ten-year projected revenue and income growth for RAI after the 
Lorillard Transaction (with synergies fully captured).  (T pp 497:23-
499:14; App. 77-79).  Materials from that Strategy Day revealed to the 
RAI Board, including its BAT members, that the Lorillard Transaction 
was in fact game-changing, and created a “step change” in RAI’s projected 
ten-year, annual free cash flow growth of 7-8%.  (R pp 194 ¶ 121, 205 ¶ 
144; T p 499:15-500:14; App. 79-80; Doc Ex. 5334). 
The ten-year outlook presented to BAT and the other members of 
the Board at the July Strategy Day was the result of an exceedingly 
arduous, detailed process that RAI undertook in the ordinary course of 
its business and financial planning.  In October of every year, RAI 
prepared detailed five-year projections known as the “Operating Plan” 
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and in June of every year it prepared detailed projections for a ten-year 
“Strategic Plan”.  (R pp 195 ¶ 123, 198-205; Doc. Ex. 327-29; T pp 375:17-
24; App. 66).  RAI created each of those forecasts in a rigorous, bottoms-
up process that involved the input of hundreds of RAI employees.  (Doc. 
Ex. 7573-74 (Q. “So all ten years would be a brand-new bottoms-up 
forecasts?” A. “Yes.”), 7578-79 (“Many, many individuals [input data into 
system for forecasts] . . . .  I don’t now, 180 folks.”); T p 941:21-24; App. 
149).   
RAI also prepared monthly updates, which it called “Latest 
Estimates” or “LEs,” in which it typically updated the first three years of 
its forecasts.  (R p 198; T pp 374:23-375:12; App. 65-66; see also Doc Ex. 
330).  These forecasts were generated and discussed monthly by the RAI 
Financial Planning & Reporting Department, and variances from the 
plan were presented to RAI executive management and the Board.  (See 
R p 198; Doc Ex. 330).  Summaries of the ten-year Strategic Plan 
projections were presented to BAT and the Board at the annual “Strategy 
Day” in July, and the detailed ten-year projections themselves were used 
for long-term resource and capex planning by RAI management.  (See R 
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p 205 ¶ 143; see, e.g., Doc. Ex. 464-69; Doc. Ex. 5308-42).4   
Management projections, created by management in the ordinary 
course of business—and relied upon by management in the conduct of its 
business—are generally regarded as the best projections for purposes of 
business valuation.  (T p 884:2-16; App. 147).  That is because 
management is presumed to be in the best position to project its future 
business and financial performance.  In addition, because such 
projections are actually used to make business decisions, management 
has an incentive to “get it right.”  RAI spent enormous resources 
attempting to create reliable projections for use in its business and 
actually developed an entire financial planning process to develop the 
best projections possible.  (T pp 457:24-459:9; App. 73-75).  It dubbed the 
output of its financial planning and projection process the “one version of 
the truth.”  (T pp 458:25-459:9; App. 74-75). 
Knowing that its ten-year projections showed annual 7-8% growth 
                                                 
4 Importantly, RAI’s detailed financial planning and forecasting process did not come 
to a halt when its Board approved the BAT merger.  Between January 2017 and 25 
July 2017, RAI continued to prepare monthly LE forecasts based on Reynolds as a 
standalone entity.  (See, e.g., Doc. Ex. 1945-2069).  Accordingly, the most up-to-date 
management projections prior to the Transaction Date were RAI’s July 2017 LE 
(“July 2017 LE Forecast”) updated in the very month the Merger closed.  (T p 541:6-
16; App. 81).   
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in years six through ten, and that the Board and its financial advisors 
assumed growth of 0-1% in those same years, RAI attempted to disown 
its projections at trial.  In support of that argument, RAI argued that the 
projections failed to account for the possibility of enhanced regulation of 
menthol flavoring by the FDA.5  Arguing that there might one day be a 
“menthol ban,” RAI asserted that its projections assumed “business as 
usual” and were therefore unreliable.  (R pp 167-68, 254-55).  However, 
the evidence at trial showed that the threat of increased menthol 
regulation was unknowable, unquantifiable and entirely speculative. 
Before consummating a $30 billion acquisition of Lorillard, whose 
primary asset was a mentholated cigarette, RAI became comfortable that 
any risks of enhanced menthol regulation were manageable and unlikely 
to materialize in the near term.  (T pp 128:22-129:2, 130:10-25, 1048:14-
20; App. 26-28).  Indeed, prior to instituting any enhanced menthol 
regulation, the FDA must first engage in a comprehensive rulemaking 
process that could take “multiple years.”  (T pp 1083:25-1084:16; App. 
                                                 
5 The FDA began regulating tobacco in 2009 with the enactment of the 2009 Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (the “Tobacco Control Act”).  (R p 165 
¶ 48).  Having the Tobacco Control Act in place created the risk of regulation of flavors 
of tobacco product that might make tobacco products more attractive to the consumer, 
such as menthol.  (R p 166-67 ¶ 52). 
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156-57).  To justify regulation of menthol cigarettes, the FDA must 
produce scientific evidence of increased harm from menthol use (which 
does not yet exist), to be followed by hearings, debates, and likely 
litigation.  (Id.; see also T pp 1799:2-1800:6; App. 202-03).  Opposition to 
that regulation would come not only from the tobacco companies and 
consumers, but also from states who rely on excise taxes from the sale of 
tobacco products for revenue.  (T pp 1772:6-1773:3; App. 200-01). 
Ultimately, in preparing its projections, RAI management only 
quantified “upside” or “downside” risks that were knowable, quantifiable 
and not unduly speculative.  (See R pp 252 ¶246, 255, ¶252).  For 
example, the projections included increases in federal excise taxes which, 
although not yet levied, were reasonably likely to occur.  (T pp 975:20-
977:5; App. 152-54; Doc. Ex. 1685 (“In the long-term outlook, there is also 
a potential Federal Excise Tax (FET) . . . slated to occur in 2022.  At this 
time, there are no tangible indicators that this tax will come to fruition; 
however, we will continue to monitor this closely . . . .”); T p 969:3-23 
(discussing Doc. Ex. 1292-1358 (June 2016 LE) showing 7.7% volume 
decline in 2023 due to assumption of FET); App. 151).  For those potential 
risks or rewards that were unknown, unquantifiable and speculative, 
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RAI would identify them but would not attempt to project them because 
doing so would make projections less reliable.  The projections prepared 
by RAI management in the ordinary course—and relied upon in the 
conduct of its business—were the best evidence of expected future 
performance and were not driven by litigation.6   
D. RAI Prepares for a BAT Offer 
Knowing that BAT’s 42% stake would effectively deter any other 
bidders for RAI and that BAT’s standstill expired in July 2014, RAI 
management prepared for the possibility of an acquisition offer from 
BAT.  Although BAT’s standstill expired in July 2014, RAI and BAT were 
at that time coordinating the acquisition of Lorillard, which required 
BAT to make a cash infusion of more than $5 billion to maintain its 42% 
ownership.  (T pp 244:4-245:3; see id. 497:7-22; App. 43-44, 77).  RAI and 
BAT had to borrow heavily to fund the transaction and the transaction 
                                                 
6 T pp 377:23-378:5 (Forecasts “were intended to be the best estimate [of] the future 
performance based on the assumptions that [the Company] had.”); 963:16-24 
(Forecasts were RAI’s “best estimate, assuming that the industry remains . . . where 
it is.”); 701:18-22 (The forecasting “numbers at all times reflected the best estimates 
and the best judgments of the actual people in the business for putting them 
together.”); App. 67-68, 150, 95; Doc Ex. 7708 (“Our objective is . . . to provide the best 
estimate that we can, most accurate – ‘best’ meaning most accurate . . . with the 
information we have at hand.”); Doc. Ex. 7689-90 (The instructions to the forecasting 
team were to “take what information you have and do the best you can, at projecting” 
reasonable numbers). 
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itself had to clear antitrust hurdles.  (T pp 1804:12-1806:18; App. 204-
206).  Moreover, it was unknown whether the merger would transform 
RAI, produce expected synergies, or improve future growth.  (See T p 
497:7-22; App. 77). 
By the summer of 2016, however, the results were in.  Strategy Day 
2016 revealed to BAT that the Lorillard Transaction had positively 
transformed RAI’s brand portfolio and growth profile.  (T pp 497:23-
500:14; App. 77-80).  The multi-billion-dollar sale of Natural American 
Spirit to JTI allowed RAI to de-lever its balance sheet, and the Board had 
authorized RAI to buy up to $2 billion of its stock at prices up to $65 per 
share.  (R pp 181 ¶ 90, 214 ¶ 165, T pp 542:2-548:24, 149:8-15; App. 82-
88, 34).  Management announced a transformational “step change” in 
expected future growth and projected 7-8% for the next ten years.  From 
its insider position, BAT was privy to all of this material non-public, 
value-relevant information.  (See R pp 177 ¶ 81, 213 ¶ 164; T pp 496:7-
500:14, 541:23-543:19; App. 76-84; see also id. 1903:5-1904:22; App. 213-
14). 
  Immediately following Strategy Day—and the presentation of the 
ten-year growth rates, Reynolds’ CFO Andrew Gilchrist and then-CEO 
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Susan Cameron met with representatives from JPM to determine how 
much BAT could afford to pay for RAI.  (R p 183 ¶ 95; Doc. Exs. 552-71; 
T pp 1460:24-1470:13; App. 176-86)).7  In a September 2016 presentation, 
JPM explained: (i) what financing BAT needed to purchase RAI and (ii) 
that there were restrictions on BAT’s ability to borrow to fund the 
transaction.  (Doc. Ex. 559).  Ultimately, the amount the BAT could afford 
to pay—and not the value of RAI—would become the determining factor 
in the agreement to sell RAI.  (Doc. Ex. 7698).  
III. RAI’S STOCK PRICE DECLINES AND BAT’ MAKES ITS 
OFFER 
The Strategy Day presentations and the 7-8% ten-year growth rate 
for RAI after the completion of the Lorillard Transaction were not known 
to public investors.  Indeed, less than two months after Strategy Day, 
RAI stock suddenly experienced a sell off and precipitously declined by 
12%.  (Doc. Ex. 7200).  Almost immediately thereafter, on 20 October 
2016, BAT informed RAI that it would be making an offer to purchase 
the 58% of RAI it did not already own.  (R p 186 ¶ 103; T p 65:17-22; App. 
                                                 
7 After the expiration of the standstill, RAI management occasionally met with 
bankers to discuss, among other things, a potential transaction with BAT.  (R p 182 
¶¶ 92-93). 
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16; Doc. Ex. 5669).  In its public announcement of its bid, BAT stated that 
it would neither sell its shares to a higher bidder, nor support any 
alternative transaction.  (R p 188 ¶ 108; Doc. Ex. 5671).  Though it could 
have conducted an auction or insisted that it would not entertain the 
possibility of a sale unless BAT would agree to support a higher bid, if 
one materialized, the Transaction Committee (which consisted of the 
independent directors on the RAI Board) did not do so.  (R p 218 ¶ 174).  
Nor did the Transaction Committee authorize the three Financial 
Advisors—Goldman  Sachs Group, Inc. (“Goldman”) (retained on behalf 
of the Transaction Committee) and JPM and Lazard (retained on behalf 
of RAI and its Board)—to “solicit any expressions of interest from any 
other parties with respect to the sale of all or any part of the Company or 
any other alternative transaction.”  (Id.; Doc. Ex. 6333; see also id. at Doc. 
Ex. 6331, 6336).  One obvious potential bidder—Japan Tobacco—which 
had outbid BAT to purchase the Natural American Spirit brand for $5 
billion ten months earlier, was never solicited or invited to make a bid.  
This is true despite that JTI informed Goldman that “they would have 
made a play for RAI” but for BAT’s stated position.  (Doc. Ex. 1897; see R 
p 294 ¶ 340).  
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BAT offered a combination of cash and BAT stock and the 
negotiations between BAT and the Transaction Committee focused 
primarily on determining how much BAT could afford to pay.  The cash 
portion of any offer was severely limited by BAT’s borrowing constraints.  
Following tepid back-and-forth between RAI’s Transaction Committee 
and BAT,8 on 20 January 2017 the parties announced a merger 
agreement (the “Merger Agreement”), providing that BAT would acquire 
RAI for a mix of cash and BAT stock then valued at $59.64 per share.  (R 
p 218 ¶ 173).  The Merger Agreement included various “deal protections,” 
including a “no shop” provision and a $1 billion termination fee.  (R p 294 
¶ 341).  
Each Financial Advisor was given a financial incentive to support 
a sale to BAT.  The two “lead” advisors would be paid more than $40 
million each in fees only if the transaction with BAT was consummated.9  
                                                 
8 The negotiations were designed to extricate from BAT the most it was willing to 
pay, which was not much more than its initial unsolicited bid.  See T pp 95:16-96:10 
(With only one buyer, the Transaction Committee could do nothing more than “get 
the price [they] could out of BAT or not do the deal.”); App. 19; see also id. pp 617:2-
20, 1592:9-15 (“[BAT’s] ability to pay should not impact the value of the company . . . 
th[os]e are independent thoughts and ideas.”). 
9 The Financial Advisors received fees of $46.3 million (Goldman), $41.1 million 
(JPM), and $11.1 million (Lazard), nearly all of which was contingent upon the 
completion of the Merger.  (R p 193 ¶ 119 n.29). 
- 40 - 
 
Not surprisingly, they delivered “fairness opinions” to the Board (which 
relied principally on DCF valuations) opining that the price on the Deal 
Date was fair “from a financial point of view.”  (R pp 222 ¶¶ 183-84; see 
T pp 332:16-20, 896:20-22; App. 61, 148).10  As set forth in greater detail 
below, the Board was not told that the Financial Advisors assumed 
growth rates in years six through ten of 0-1%, rather than the 7-8% 
projected by management in its ten-year projections.  The Financial 
Advisors also failed to inform the Board that they asked for the ten-year 
projections and were not provided with them. 
A. RAI Management Withholds Its Ten-Year Projections 
from the Financial Advisors 
As noted above, RAI management had already met with the 
Financial Advisors—prior to BAT’s offer—to determine how much BAT 
could afford to pay for RAI.  Once BAT made its offer, RAI management 
made arrangements to retain the Financial Advisors to advise the Board 
and decided what financial information they should be provided.  
                                                 
10 As Maxence De Gennaro (a member of the Goldman deal team) explained, one does 
not generate a “point value” from, for example, a comparable companies analysis 
because “there’s a judgment element to it:”  “There’s some art to picking -- picking the 
peer set and then evaluating the information to arrive at a range for valuation 
purposes.  And that’s why we look at a range.”  (T p 332:16-20; App. 61). 
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Knowing what BAT could afford to pay, RAI management determined to 
provide only five-year cash projections.  Accordingly, RAI management 
gave the Financial Advisors the five-year Operating Plan (i.e., the 
October 2016 LE), as adjusted with certain “Top-Side Adjustments” or 
“Management Overlays” to account for updated information and high-
level financial decisions that had not yet been made public.  (R p 206 ¶ 
146).   Included in the adjustments were certain sales staff reductions 
that were of an obviously sensitive nature and had not even been 
disclosed to RAI employees.  (R p 206 ¶ 146).  Those adjustments had the 
effect of adding roughly $300 million in income before tax to each year of 
the October 2016 LE projections (or approximately $1.4 billion in total).  
(Id.)  Despite litigation-driven arguments that a potential “menthol ban” 
made RAI projections unreliable, RAI management represented to the 
Financial Advisors and to the public that its projections were the best 
estimates of RAI’s future performance.  (Doc. Ex. 6329-6337 (“[W]e have 
assumed with your consent that the Forecasts, including the Synergies, 
have been reasonably prepared on a basis reflecting the best currently 
available estimates and judgments of the management of the Company.” 
(emphasis added)); see also T pp 295:19-295:24, 710:15-19 (Q. But you 
- 42 - 
 
would never give the financial advisors projections that were – that you 
thought were unreliable . . . . A.  Well, no.  We’re going to be very 
transparent with everything we can.  We disclose all of this.”); Doc. Ex. 
7579 (No suggestion in the six months before merger closed that proxy 
projections unreliable). 
Although management gave the Financial Advisors only five-year 
projections, the evidence at trial made clear that the Financial Advisors 
asked for RAI’s detailed ten-year projections, expected them, but were 
never given them.  (See R pp 207-11).  The Financial Advisors needed 
detailed projections in order to calculate “cash flow” which is the critical 
metric for a DCF analysis—the most widely used and accepted corporate 
valuation technique. To calculate cash flow, the Advisors would start 
with earnings or EBITDA and make required adjustments to calculate 
cash flow.11 Lazard, for example, knew that RAI prepared ten-year 
projections because it received them—and used them to value RAI—in 
connection with the Lorillard Transaction.  (See R p 209 ¶ 153; T pp 
                                                 
11 EBITDA is an acronym for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization. To convert EBITDA to cash flow one must, among other things, 
subtract interest and taxes and add depreciation and amortization (which are non-
cash expenses). 
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262:10-263:11; App. 49-50).  Lazard wanted to use detailed ten-year 
projections again, so that it could calculate ten years of cash flow, and 
even created a pro-forma ten-year cash flow statement (based on 
“guesstimates” derived from the high-level Strategic Plan summary) for 
discussion with Mr. Gilchrist at a November 7, 2016 meeting.  (Doc. Ex. 
1513-35; T p 277:1-6; App. 51).12  In internal emails exchanged on the day 
of that meeting, it was clear that Lazard had every intention of 
calculating a DCF on ten years’ worth of cash flow projections; in fact, a 
junior Lazard team member was instructed to “run a DCF on the[] 10-
year plan” right before a fellow team member left for the meeting.  (Doc. 
Ex. 1536; see also Doc. Ex. 1537-39).  Later that day, Lazard’s junior team 
members were instructed (without explanation) that “[t]he [cash flow] 
models (standalone and merger) should be based on a 5-year set of 
projections.”  (Doc. Ex. 1538).  At trial, Mr. DeGennaro admitted on cross-
examination that the decision to abandon the request for ten-year 
                                                 
12 The plan summary indicated that the Lorillard transaction has created a “step 
change” and that growth in years six through ten would be 7-8%.  However, the 
summary did not contain the detailed information needed to project cash flow, which 
starts with EBITDA and then makes adjustments to derive actual cash flow.  That 
detailed information was, however, contained in the ten-year projections.  (T p 
1504:5-18; App. 189). 
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projections—and to calculate ten years of cash flow—and use only the 
five-year projections (and five years of cash flow) was because, at that 
point, Lazard had received “clear confirmation and direction from 
management,” “to use a . . . five-year set of projections,” and he had “no 
impression or understanding that there was some other set of numbers 
somewhere.”  (T pp 289:8-10, 294:7-295:16 (“Q.  But with respect to the 
five-year projections, you got clear confirmation and direction from 
management to use those five-year projections, correct? A.  Yes.”)).  RAI 
management (aware of the limits on the amount BAT could afford to pay) 
never informed Lazard that it had ten-year projections created in the 
ordinary course of business.  Similarly, Lazard never informed the Board 
that it had assumed growth in years six through ten in the range of 0-1% 
rather than the 7-8% projected in the RAI plan or that the manner in 
which it “cut off” growth after year five was inconsistent with the analysis 
it had done for RAI in connection with the Lorillard transaction (where 
it imposed a low long-term growth rate only after ten years of cash flow). 
Like Lazard, JPM’s standard preference was to use ten-year 
management cash-flow forecasts to ensure its “analytical work [is] as 
accurate as possible.”  (T p 1432:16-18; see R p 209-10 ¶ 154).  It initially 
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planned (as evidenced in its shell fairness presentation) to use either “10-
year projections based on management forecast” or an “extrapolation[] if 
necessary.”  (Doc. Ex. 859).  However, like Lazard, JPM had received only 
a five-year set of cash-flow projections from RAI management.  JPM thus 
promptly requested RAI’s “long range” cash flow projections, which 
“Andrew [Gilchrist] mentioned he would send” on October 31, 2016.  (Doc. 
Ex. 620).  Instead, JPM (as well as each of the other Financial Advisors) 
received only the RAI Board materials from its most recent Strategy Day.  
(Doc. Ex. 627).  While that document contained a chart summarizing the 
expected income growth of 7-8% in years six through ten, it did not 
contain the information necessary to convert income to cash flow.13  
Recognizing that that document contained insufficient information to 
calculate a DCF (as it omitted the information necessary to calculate 
expected cash flow) JPM explicitly asked a member of Mr. Gilchrist’s 
team, Steven Holland, to send the “detailed 10-year projection[s].”  (Doc. 
Ex. 622; see also T pp 598:3-16 (Mr. Holland was a member of Mr. 
Gilchrist’s team “providing information to the financial advisors”),  
1504:5-18 (the 2016 Strategy Day presentation did not provide “sufficient 
                                                 
13 See notes 10-11 infra. 
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underlying detail to perform a DCF” as “creating an accurate discounted 
cash flow analysis from [the Adjusted Operating Income Outlook] chart 
alone [would not be] reasonable”).  Despite JPM’s request for ten-year 
projections that could be used to calculate ten years of expected cash flow, 
RAI never sent them.  (See R p 211-12 ¶ 159). 
Without management’s 10-year forecast, JPM tried to extrapolate 
ten-year cash flow projections.  In anticipation of a November 3, 2016 
meeting with RAI management, JPM developed an extrapolation that 
reasonably assumed continued growth after year six.  (T pp 1536:-1538:2, 
1538:23-1539:4; App. 191-94; Doc. Ex. 811).  The agenda for the 
November 3 meeting included a request that RAI “[p]lease provide 
guidance on 10 year financial projections.”  (Doc. Ex. 802).  According to 
JPM deal team member John Clark, a discussion on that topic did take 
place at that meeting, and, ultimately, management informed JPM that 
RAI had no “up-to-date” ten-year projections because the projections 
associated with the “the ten-year strategic plan . . . w[ere] stale or 
outdated.”  (T p 1603:8-15; App. 199).14  After further discussion with 
                                                 
14 See also T pp 1541:14-19, 1518:12-21, 1496:19-1497:4 (“Q.  So according to your 
testimony here today, you’re saying that you asked Andrew Gilchrist and Ron Price 
if they had ten-year projections and they said they didn’t have them or that they have 
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management, JPM became “comfortable” with management’s direction 
that they use five-year projections, in part, because they were told 
(falsely) that they “were the only advisor that was requesting ten years 
of projections.”  (T pp 1570:23-1571:4; App. 196-97). 
The Financial Advisors’ use of five-year projections coupled with a 
near-zero perpetuity growth rate (“PGR”) in years six through ten had 
the effect of “cutting off” five years of robust cash flow that were forecast 
by management.  (R p 205 ¶ 144 (RAI’s projections “reflected 7% to 8% 
compound annual growth over the next ten years”).  It reduced the DCF 
valuation by about $20 per share and generated a “fair value” at or near 
deal price and at or near the maximum amount BAT could afford to pay.  
However, the drop from 7-8% growth in year five to the near-zero growth 
in year six created a cash flow “cliff” that was so pronounced that it was 
                                                 
them but they were out of date.  A.  We asked if they had up-to-date ten-year 
projections. . . . And we understood that they did not.  There was the ten-year strategic 
plan that we had referenced in a prior document, but those were six or seven months 
dated at that point.”).  An argument that the ten-year projections were somehow 
“stale” is belied by the record.  The June 2016 Strategy Day projections were the most 
recent ten-year projections.  When the ten-year projections in the Lorillard 
Transaction became “stale,” Lazard merely reduced the projection period to nine 
years.  (T pp 309:18-311:18, 312:24-313:7).  That staleness argument is further 
inconsistent with the fact that the Financial Advisors based their opinions on October 
projections—three months “stale” by January 2017 and nine months “stale” by the 
Transaction Date.  (R p 205-07). 
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questioned by both JPM’s internal tobacco expert, Emre Eler, and JPM’s 
fairness committee.  (Doc. Ex. 623-26, 830-32).  Mr. Eler informed JPM 
that dropping growth to zero after year 5 “is not fair” because “years 5-
10 should be more in lin[e] with the previous years than the perpetuity 
[growth].” (Doc. Ex. 623-24).  Eler explained that while cigarette sales are 
in slow decline (by volume), very low “perpetuity” growth rates should 
not be imposed until after ten years. (“The reason people tend to use 
negative perp[etuity] growth is that there is always the argument that 
cigarettes may not be there in x years time.  But . . . that “x” is further 
out th[a]n 10 yrs.”)  (Doc. Ex. 623-24).  Given the realities of the tobacco 
industry, Mr. Eler believed that JPM “needed to have the management 
numbers for those yrs.”  (Doc. Ex. 624 (emphasis added)).  JPM’s fairness 
committee—which ensures the reasonableness of valuations supporting 
a fairness opinion—likewise expressed concern about the “cliff effect 
between the fifth year of projections and [the sixth] terminal year” and 
questioned whether JPM “attempt[ed] to get sign off on an 
extrapolation.”  (Doc. Ex. 830 (emphasis added)).  In response, Kedar 
Muley (a JPM deal team member) stated that, while the team “push[ed] 
for an extrapolated period early on . . . management guided [the team] 
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instead to a range of TVG’s [Terminal Value Growth Rates].”  (Id. 
(emphasis added)).  In other words, like Lazard, they were guided to use 
5-year projections followed by a low growth rate. 15   
None of the Financial Advisors were ever provided with RAI’s 
detailed ordinary-course ten-year projections.  Accordingly, unbeknownst 
to the Financial Advisors, this meant that their evaluations of the 
fairness of the $59.64 January deal price were based on inputs that 
contradicted management’s financial projections for growth in years six 
through ten.  Thus, the Financial Advisors, the Transaction Committee, 
and the RAI Board all relied on DCF valuations that omitted critical 
value-relevant information—namely expected growth of between 7-8% in 
years six through ten.  Appellants’ expert Dr. Zmijewski quantified that 
impact: the difference in output under the DCF model (all else being 
equal) of applying a 0% growth rate after only five years of projections 
rather than ten was $20 per share.  (T p 1267:16-18; App. 170).   
                                                 
15 A “negative” perpetuity growth rate is any rate below the long-term rate of 
inflation.  The long-term rate of inflation is at least 2%, so a growth rate between 0-
1% is a negative growth rate and means the Company is shrinking. 
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Thus, had the Financial Advisors been given the ten-year 
projections they repeatedly sought, their DCF valuations would have 
yielded results in the $80 per share range.  (T p 1277:1-9; App. 171).  
Instead, the valuations were closer to $60 per share—the proposed deal 
price and price RAI management knew was near the top of what BAT 
could afford to pay. 
B. The Value of RAI Increases Between January and 
July 2017 
There is no doubt that the value of RAI increased between the date 
the Board approved the deal (January 2017) and the date the transaction 
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closed (July 2017).  Between the October 20 offer and the 25 July 2017 
Transaction Date, Donald Trump had been elected President of the 
United States, and the Republican Party held a majority in both the 
Senate and the House of Representatives.  (R. p 236 ¶ 209).  Market 
participants believed there was an increased likelihood of corporate tax 
reform and a more benign regulatory climate for the US tobacco industry.  
(R pp 227, ¶ 188, 236 ¶ 209 (emphasis added).16  Evidence at trial made 
clear that “from BAT’s October 20 Offer until the Transaction Date in 
July 2017, the S&P 500 . . . rose 17.15%,” “Altria, the only other major 
U.S. tobacco company, rose 20.44%.”  (R p 227 ¶ 188 (emphasis added)).  
However, since RAI stock was subject to a merger agreement with BAT, 
the price of the stock hovered around the merger price and did not 
increase with the rise in the market.  (R p 236 ¶ 209 (“events took place 
that may have affected RAI’s standalone value and been reflected in 
RAI’s stock price had BAT not made its October 20 Offer”)).  
                                                 
16 The Financial Advisors recognized this fact, too.  See Doc. Ex. 7095 (listing as 
potential upside “U.S. Corporate tax reform”), 7356 (noting that U.S. election 
increased attractiveness of RAI-BAT deal for BAT), 7366 (discussing macro changes 
with effect on value, including corporate tax reform and less burdensome US 
regulatory environment).   
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While no formal tax plan was proposed or implemented prior to the 
Transaction Date, the likelihood that the Republican-led Congress would 
pass a tax bill that lowered the corporate rate and be less burdensome on 
the US tobacco industry unquestionably increased in the days and 
months leading up to the Transaction Date.  (R. p. 236 ¶ 209; see T pp 
1279:11-1281:17; App. 172-74).17  Indeed, although excluded from their 
January analyses, the Financial Advisors calculated the value of the 
impact of corporate tax reform at between 11% and 30% per share (in 
dollar terms, an impact of anywhere from $5.54 to $19.06 per share).  (T 
pp 1279:11-1281:17; App. 172-74).   
                                                 
17 In fact, by May 2017, the market projected a 65% likelihood of corporate tax reform 
before the end of the calendar year.  Piper Jaffray, “Initiating at Overweight; RAI 
Deal Helps Drive Expected Cash Build” (May 24, 2017), p. 3 (estimating 65% 
probability of tax reform passing); App. 224. 
 
- 53 - 
 
 
Although the cash portion of the offer was fixed, the offer also 
included a percentage of a share of BAT stock.  Any increase in the value 
of RAI would—after the merger agreement—be reflected in the value of 
BAT.18  In light of the increase in the value of RAI, the value of BAT stock 
increased and accordingly on the Transaction Date, the actual Merger 
Consideration paid to RAI shareholders was $65.87 per share.  (R p 227 
¶ 191). 
                                                 
18 An illustration demonstrates this point.  If corporation A has a contract to buy an 
asset for $100 and the value of that asset increases to $150 after the contract is signed 
but before the closing, the stock of Corporation A will increase to reflect the $50 gain 
in asset value. 
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IV. THE APPRAISAL ACTION 
A. Relevant Pre-Trial Events 
It was clear that the price BAT agreed to pay—and that the 
Transaction Committee agreed to accept—was driven by how much BAT 
could afford to pay.  It was equally clear that valuations of RAI used only 
five-year cash projections followed by negative growth.  Accordingly, 
during the course of discovery, Appellants sought to determine what 
value BAT placed on RAI and whether it had used ten-year cash flow 
projections.  Appellants requested documents from BAT as both the 
acquirer of RAI and a 42% interest holder of RAI at the time of the 
Merger.  In an effort to exhaust all options, Appellants both issued 
subpoenas to US-based affiliates of BAT and approached RAI’s counsel 
(who also represented BAT in the Corwin matter) about accepting a 
subpoena on behalf of BAT or otherwise producing relevant information 
voluntarily.  RAI’s counsel refused to accept a subpoena on behalf of BAT.  
(R pp 395-98).  As such, Appellants were forced to go through the Hague 
Convention to seek discovery from BAT, ultimately receiving a voluntary 
production of approximately 79 documents and leaving Appellants 
- 55 - 
 
without the benefit of BAT’s own internal valuation of Reynolds at the 
time of the Merger.  BAT never produced its valuations of RAI. 
RAI was aware that the value of U.S. equity and tobacco stocks rose 
between the deal date and the closing date.  However, it argued that if 
one started with the “unaffected” public trading price of RAI stock (prior 
to the announcement of BAT’s offer)—and assumed that it would rise 
with the market—it would have been very near the deal price.  Of course, 
there were two glaring deficiencies with this argument.  First, it assumed 
that BAT could purchase control of RAI without paying a “control 
premium” in violation of the N.C. appraisal statute.19  Second, it assumed 
that the unaffected market price of RAI stock represented its “fair value.”  
In support of this proposition, RAI would have to demonstrate that the 
stock traded efficiently and that there was no material non-public 
information about RAI.  To assist in proving that dubious proposition, 
Plaintiff initially retained Dr. Anil Shivdasani (and paid him $900 per 
hour) to conduct “event studies” to provide empirical support for the 
                                                 
19 See Section II. F., infra. 
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proposition that RAI traded in a semi-strong efficient market.20  Dr. 
Shivdasani authored both an opening and rebuttal expert report and 
provided testimony at a deposition.  On 4 June 2019, after including Dr. 
Shivdasani on its initial list of witnesses to be called at trial, RAI 
disclosed to Appellants—for the first time and approximately two hours 
prior to the deadline for submission of the parties’ pretrial briefs, 
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and Proposed Joint 
Pretrial Order—that RAI no longer intended to call Dr. Shivdasani as 
part of RAI’s case-in-chief.  (See R p 681; App. 253).  Appellants’ request 
for leave to file a motion in limine in light of this change was denied.  (R 
p 117).  As a result, Plaintiff’s trial argument with respect to the 
efficiency of the market—an assumption on which its reliance on 
unaffected stock price as a reflection of “true value” was predicated—was 
based on a weak smattering of lay opinion testimony and legal argument, 
which, as discussed in greater detail below, was insufficient. 
 
                                                 
20 RAI’s remaining expert, Dr. Paul Gompers, did not render an opinion on the 
efficiency of the market for RAI stock, and instead relied entirely on Dr. Shivdasani’s 
conclusions.  Professor Gompers admitted that his opinions related to the market 
price of RAI’s stock are based on Dr. Shivdasani’s work.  See Section II.E., infra. 
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B. The Opinion Below 
After a nine day trial, post-trial briefing and post-trial oral 
argument, on 27 April 2020, the trial issued Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, concluding that the fair value of RAI’s shares as of 
the Transaction  was no more than $59.64 per share.  (R p 313 ¶ 382; see 
also id. p 142-330).  The Court did not conduct any independent valuation 
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ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 “When a trial court sits without a jury, findings of fact are 
conclusive on appeal if supported by any substantial evidence, while 
conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.”  Farm Bureau v. Cully's 
Motorcross Park, 366 N.C. 505, 512 (2013) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  The principal issue in this appeal is the Business 
Court’s interpretation and application of N.C.G.S. § 55-13 et seq—a 
broad, remedial statute created by the North Carolina General Assembly 
to provide shareholders in transactions involving insiders the 
opportunity for an independent judicial determination of the “fair value” 
of their shares.  As a remedial statute it should be broadly construed to 
effectuate its remedial purposes and the Business Court’s interpretation 
is subject to de novo review. See O&M Indus. v. Smith Engineering Co., 
360 N.C. 263, 268 (2006); Appeal of N. Carolina Sav. & Loan League, 302 
N.C. 458, 464 (1981) (“Any error made in interpreting a statute is an 
error of law . . . .”).  “Under a de novo review, the court considers the 
matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower 
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tribunal.”  Craig ex rel. Craig v. New Hanover Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 
334, 337 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
II. THE BUSINESS COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO MAKE AN 
INDEPENDENT DETERMINATION OF THE FAIR VALUE 
OF RAI AS OF THE TRANSACTION DATE, AS REQUIRED 
BY THE NORTH CAROLINA APPRAISAL STATUTE 
 
 The Business Court determined “the fair value of RAI’s shares as of 
the Transaction Date to be no more than $59.64 per share”—the value of 
the consideration RAI’s Transaction Committee agreed to accept from 
BAT on 16 January 2017—approximately six months prior to the 25 July 
2017 Transaction Date.  (R p  313 ¶ 382).  For the reasons that follow, the 
Business Court’s fair value “determination” was not made in accordance 
with the North Carolina appraisal statute and its decision should 
therefore be reversed. 
A. The North Carolina Appraisal Statute 
 A stockholder who is not convinced that a deal struck between a 
company and an insider is at a fair price, must nevertheless surrender 
its shares and its only remedy is a judicial appraisal.  Osher v. Ridinger, 
162 N.C. App. 155, 157 (2004) (“[a]ppraisal is the exclusive remedy for a 
shareholder who wishes to exercise a dissenter’s rights” in connection 
with a merger.); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 
- 60 - 
 
1186 (Del. 1988) (“An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy 
intended to provide shareholders dissenting from a merger on grounds of 
inadequacy of the offering price with a judicial determination of the 
intrinsic worth (fair value) of their shareholdings.”).   
Although North Carolina courts often look to Delaware courts for 
guidance on questions of corporate law, the two states have very different 
appraisal statutes.  Appraisal rights under North Carolina law are set 
forth in Article 13 of the North Carolina Business Corporation Act, which 
itself is divided into four distinct Parts:   
Part 1.   Right to Appraisal and Payment for 
Shares (N.C.G.S. §§ 55-13-01 – 19); 
 
Part 2.  Procedure for Exercise of Appraisal 
Rights (N.C.G.S. §§ 55-13-20 – 29); 
  
Part 3.  Judicial Appraisal of Shares (N.C.G.S. 
§§ 55-13-30 – 39); and 
 
Part 4.  Other Remedies Limited (N.C.G.S. §§ 
55-13-40). 
 
Under Part 1, the North Carolina appraisal statute creates a right 
substantially different than the right provided under the Delaware 
statute.  The Delaware statute provides an appraisal remedy for virtually 
all mergers, including mergers with independent third-party purchasers 
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who have no preexisting relationship with the company.  See 8 Del. C. § 
262.  In contrast, the North Carolina statute does not create a general 
right to appraisal for stockholders in a corporation like RAI but narrowly 
limits such rights only to “the holders of any class or series of shares 
where the corporate action [at issue] is an interested transaction.”  
N.C.G.S. § 55-13-02(b)(4) (emphasis added).   
An “interested transaction” under the statute is “[a] corporate 
action . . .  involving an interested person”—defined to include a “[a] 
person . . . [who is] the beneficial owner of twenty percent (20%) or more 
of the voting power of the corporation, or [who] “[h]ad the power, 
contractually or otherwise . . . to cause the appointment or election of 
twenty-five percent (25%) or more of the directors to the board of directors 
of the corporation.”  Id. § 55-13-01(7)(a) (emphasis added).   In other 
words, the North Carolina statue is limited to mergers between a 
company and one of its insiders—whether by share ownership or board 
membership.  Here, the Merger unquestionably qualifies on two separate 
grounds: (i) BAT’s 42% shareholder stake and (ii) its right under the 
Governance Agreement to appoint five out of fourteen directors to the 
RAI Board.   
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Once appraisal rights are exercised, Part 2 of the North Carolina 
appraisal statute sets forth the intricate “Procedure for Exercise of 
Appraisal Rights,” which affords dissenting shareholders with the 
opportunity to obtain “fair value” from the company and avoid the time 
and expense of a judicial proceeding.  N.C.G.S. § 55-13-20 – 29; see also 
(Model Bus. Corp. Act § 13.01 cmt. 1 (1969) (noting that the appraisal 
statute seeks “to motivat[e] the parties to settle their differences in 
private negotiations without resort to judicial appraisal proceedings”).  
Where, as here, the parties’ dispute over fair value remains “unsettled” 
after exercise of those procedures, the corporation is required to 
“commence a proceeding . . . to determine the fair value of the shares 
and accrued interest” and “[e]ach shareholder made a party to th[at] 
proceeding is entitled to judgment . . . for the amount, if any, by which 
the court finds the fair value of the shareholder's shares, plus interest, 
exceeds the amount paid by the corporation to the shareholder for the 
shareholder's shares . . . .”  N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30 (emphasis added).  The 
court’s determination of fair value under § 55-13-30, and its 
determination of costs and expenses under § 55-13-31, are the only issues 
for the court to decide under Part 3 of the statute. 
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Part 3 of the North Carolina appraisal statute provides the 
permissible methods the Business Court may employ to make an 
independent determination of  fair value.  Specifically, there are three 
criteria for the determination of “fair value.”  First, the Business Court 
must determine the “fair value” of the corporation at the closing date 
“immediately before” effectuation of the merger.  Second, the Business 
Court must use “customary and current valuation concepts and 
techniques generally employed” to value the corporation.  Finally, the 
Business Court must value the shares “without discounting” for the 
minority status of the stockholder. Specifically, the statute provides for 
valuation:  
(i) immediately before the effectuation of the 
corporate action as to which the shareholder 
asserts appraisal rights, excluding any 
appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the 
corporate action unless exclusion would be 
inequitable, (ii) using customary and current 
valuation concepts and techniques generally 
employed for similar business in the context of the 
transaction requiring appraisal, and (iii) without 
discounting for lack of marketability or minority 
status . . . . 
 
N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5).  Thus, here, the court was required to (i) 
determine fair value as of the 25 July 2017 Transaction Date—not when 
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the merger agreement was signed in January 2017, (ii) using  “customary 
and current valuation concepts and techniques generally employed for 
[corporations]”—not simply defer to the price negotiated by the Company 
and its insider shareholder and (iii) determine fair value without a 
discount for “minority status”—all of which it failed to do.  Its decision 
thus violated the clear mandates of the statute in at least three 
independent ways that warrant reversal of its decision as a matter of law. 
B. The Business Court Erred in Failing to Value RAI as 
of the Transaction Date 
 The appraisal statute requires that RAI be valued as of the 
Transaction Date.  Instead, the Business Court determined fair value of 
RAI to be no more than the amount of the merger consideration 
determined six months earlier when the deal was struck on the 
underlying transaction.  (R p 313 ¶ 382).  The Business Court’s failure to 
value RAI as of the Transaction Date is an error of law warranting 
reversal of the decision below. 
The Business Court relied on the deal price to determine “fair 
value.”  (R pp 280-98 ¶¶ 316-48).  Leaving aside the issue of whether deal 
price, in these circumstances, was an appropriate measure of fair value 
(it was not), the Business Court committed legal error by failing to value 
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Appellants’ shares based on the deal price as of the Transaction Date, as 
required by the appraisal statute.  The merger consideration consisted of 
0.5260 of a BAT share and $29.44 in cash.  There is no dispute that, as of 
the Transaction Date, the value of that consideration was $65.87 per 
share.  The increase in value relative to the $59.64-per-share value of the 
consideration as of the January 2017 Deal Date is attributable to an 
increase in the value of BAT stock.  As explained in detail below, that 
increase in value is largely, if not wholly, attributable to the increase in 
RAI’s value over that same time period.  Regardless of the source of the 
increase, given that the Business Court elected to value RAI based on the 
value of the deal price, Appellants were due that value as of the 
Transaction Date (the same amount paid to every other shareholder).  
This is no different than if, for example, the consideration consisted of 
cash and a debt instrument bearing a fixed rate of return.  If interest 
rates declined between the Deal Date and the Transaction Date, making 
the market value of the fixed rate instrument increase, investors should 
be entitled to that increased value.  The Business Court’s failure to even 
award the value of the merger consideration on the Transaction Date was 
a violation of the statutory mandate and therefore legal error. 
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An appraisal proceeding can be likened to a condemnation 
proceeding for stockholders:  shares are taken against the shareholder’s 
will pursuant to an action (with which that stockholder disagrees) and, 
in exchange, the stockholder receives an independent judicial 
determination of fair value.  Like in a condemnation proceeding, the 
operative question in determining fair value in an appraisal proceeding 
is what the shares are worth in their “existing condition” (i.e., without 
the Merger) “on the date of the taking”  (i.e., the Transaction Date) 
because that is the date on which, and condition in which, the individual 
is deprived of his or her property (without any ability to benefit from the 
value of the asset going forward).  See State v. Johnson, 282 N.C. 1, 15 
(1972).   
Embedded in the requirement that fair value be judicially 
determined as of the Transaction Date is an understanding that 
operative moment for the determination of value is not when the 
company agrees to the merger—which may be months or years before a 
transaction is closed—but on the date when the property is taken.  In this 
respect, the focus is not on whether the board or its directors acted 
properly (a question of fiduciary duty), but the value of the shares taken.  
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The Business Court continuously confused questions of fiduciary duty 
and statutory appraisal by attempting to determine whether the board 
acted reasonably.  However, that inquiry is at odds with the basic 
structure of the appraisal statute, which is focused solely on a 
determination of value at closing.  Obviously, a board can never 
determine what value its company may have months or years after a deal 
is struck (without a crystal ball) and neither microeconomic nor 
macroeconomic affects remain in stasis for extended periods.  That is why 
the statute requires that the value of the shares be independently 
determined at the closing date. 
The Business Court’s failure to value RAI as of the Transaction 
Date is significant:  the Merger was agreed to in January 2017 but did 
not close until 25 July 2017—a six-month period in which equity markets 
in the US rose at a blistering pace and the value of other major domestic 
tobacco companies in the US did as well.  Indeed, the Business Court 
found, as a factual matter, that “[t]he merger consideration on [the 
Transaction Date] had a cash value of $65.87,” as compared to the Deal 
Date merger consideration value of $59.64.  (R. 227 ¶ 191).   The reason 
for that increase in value was obvious:   BAT had an agreement to 
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purchase RAI at a fixed price.  As the value of U.S. equities rose—and 
the value of RAI increased—that value was reflected in an increased 
price of BAT stock.  Indeed the Court below recognized that the $6 
increase was at least in part attributable “to the increase in the BAT 
share price” but failed to appreciate that the increase in BAT’s price was 
attributable to the increase in value of RAI.  (R pp 227-28 ¶ 191).  The 
Court also attributed part of the increase to “favorable changes to the 
British pound/U.S. dollar exchange rate.” However, there was no 
evidence in the record about the exchange rates, how they might impact 
the value of RAI and BAT—and particularly how or why they would 
impact cash flows projected over five or ten years.  Moreover, even if the 
relative value of future cash flows changed over that period, the Court 
provided no discussion or analysis for why dissenting shareholders were 
not entitled to any portion of that increase in value.  To the extent the 
Business Court implicitly concluded that there was no increase in the 
value of RAI between the January 2017 and the Transaction Date, that 
finding was not based on any evidence in the record and was clearly 
erroneous in light of the admitted rise in the S&P 500 Index, Altria’s 
stock price, and the merger consideration itself over that period.  
- 69 - 
 
Evidence at trial—advanced by both parties and accepted by the 
Business Court—proved that “from BAT’s October 20 Offer until the 
Transaction Date in July 2017, the S&P 500 . . . rose 17.15%,” “Altria, the 
only other major U.S. tobacco company, rose 20.44%,” and “events took 
place that may have affected RAI’s standalone value and been 
reflected in RAI’s stock price had BAT not made its October 20 Offer.” (R 
pp 227, ¶ 188, 236 ¶ 209 (emphasis added)).  In particular, the increased 
likelihood of corporate tax reform and an accommodative regulatory 
climate for the US tobacco industry fueled price increases.  (R pp 227 ¶ 
188, 236 ¶ 209).  While no formal tax plan was proposed or implemented 
prior to the Transaction Date, the likelihood that the Republican-led 
Congress would pass a tax bill that lowered the corporate rate—an action 
that would substantially increase future cash flows for RAI21—and be 
less burdensome on the US tobacco industry unquestionably increased in 
the days and months leading up to the Transaction Date.  (R. p. 236 ¶ 
209; see T pp 1279:11-1281:17).  Indeed, the market projected a 65% 
                                                 
21 The DCF calculates the present value of future cash flow and cash flow is 
determined by subtracting taxes from income.  Accordingly, a reduction in taxes 
increases future cash flow and the fair value as determined by DCF. 
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likelihood of corporate tax reform before the end of the calendar year, and 
the Financial Advisors calculated the value of the impact of corporate tax 
reform at between 11% and 30% per share (though they admittedly 
completely excluded that value from their January analyses).  (T pp 
1279:11-1281:17; App. 172-74).   
It thus follows that, if the value of RAI cash flows increased prior 
to the Transaction Date as a result of the above-described events, and the 
value of RAI correspondingly increased, the value of BAT common 
stock—which traded with the expectant value of RAI after the Merger 
was approved in January 2017—and thus the value of the merger 
consideration, increased.  Indeed, once BAT agreed to acquire Reynolds 
at a fixed price in January 2017, the stock price of Reynolds was tied 
solely to that fixed price, discounting only to take into account the low 
probability that the deal might not close.  (See R pp 235-36 ¶ 208).  The 
merger consideration as of the Deal Date effectively put a cap on the 
market price such that any increase in the value of Reynolds as a 
standalone company would necessarily manifest itself only in an increase 
in the value of BAT, its acquirer.  Logically, BAT would not have 
separately benefited from changes to US tax laws as it had no sales in or 
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income from the US markets.  The increase in the value of BAT stock was 
a direct result of the increased value of Reynolds—and every single 
shareholder of RAI got the benefit of that increased value as the total 
value of the merger consideration increased from $59.64 to $65.87.  By 
awarding Appellants the $59.64 value of the merger consideration in 
January, it singled them out as the only shareholders not to receive the 
value as of the closing date in violation of the express requirements of the 
statute.   
Importantly, the record presented at trial contained no evidence—
and there could be no evidence—that the increase in the value of the 
merger consideration was solely the result of an increase in the value of 
BAT on a standalone basis that did not include the value of RAI.  As noted 
above, once BAT had a contractual right to purchase RAI at a fixed price, 
increases in the value of RAI would manifest as increases in the value of 
BAT.  The Business Court’s apparent contrary conclusion was attributed 
to two pieces of evidence in the record, each of which supported only that 
the final value of the compensation the shareholders received as of the 
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Transaction Date was $65.87, nothing more.  (R pp 227-28 ¶ 191).22  With 
that record, the Business Court was obligated to determine the fair value 
of RAI as of the Transaction Date, taking into account this increase in 
value; it did not do so. 
C. The Business Court Erred by Failing to Make an 
Independent Determination of Fair Value using 
“Customary and Current Valuation Concepts and 
Techniques Generally Employed” to Value 
Corporations 
 
 The North Carolina appraisal statute requires a judicial 
determination, “using customary and current valuation concepts and 
techniques generally employed for a similar business in the context of a 
transaction requiring appraisal.”  N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5).  However, the 
Business Court did not value RAI at all, and instead relied solely on the 
value of the merger consideration agreed upon by RAI and its insider, 
BAT, six months prior to the Transaction Date.  The Court’s failure to 
                                                 
22 Specifically, the Business Court cited to (1) RAI’s 25 July 2017 8-K stating that 
“[b]ased on the per share closing price of BAT ADS . . . on July 24, 2017 . . . the implied 
per share value of the Merger Consideration was approximately $65.87,” (Doc. Ex. 
4044-45), and (2) the testimony of Appellants’ expert, Dr. Zmijewski, that $65.87 was 
“the value of the compensation the shareholders received as of the transaction date, 
July 25, 2017,” (T pp 1241:24-1242:10; App. 168-69).   
- 73 - 
 
conduct an independent valuation using generally accepted valuation 
techniques is an error of law warranting reversal.   
 The importance of an independent judicial determination is made 
abundantly clear by the factual record of this case.  The Transaction 
Committee and the Financial Advisors who conducted the valuations 
supporting the merger consideration on the Deal Date (the sole 
participants in the negotiation process with BAT) were not in possession 
of material, value-relevant information:  RAI’s detailed ten-year cash 
projections.  The absence of those projections in the Financial Advisors’ 
DCF Valuations had a $20-per-share impact.  (T p 1277:1-9; App. 171; R 
p 250 ¶ 240).  That is because RAI’s projections showed growth rates of 
7-8% in years six through ten and the Financial Advisors assumed near-
zero growth for those years.  With the benefit of those management 
projections—which the Transaction Committee and its Financial 
Advisors did not have—the Business Court could have, and should have, 
conducted its own, independent valuation of RAI that accurately 
reflected the financial performance RAI management expected. 
 Separately, complete deferral to the transaction price negotiated 
between a company and its insider does violence to the intent of the 
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appraisal process under North Carolina law.  The state requires an 
independent judicial appraisal only when the merger price is negotiated 
in an “interested transaction,” N.C.G.S. § 55-13-02(b)(4).  The limitation 
of the appraisal remedy to interested transactions demonstrates that the 
price negotiated by the insider must be back-checked using generally 
accepted valuation techniques and cannot itself be a substitute for a 
judicial determination of fair value.  The narrow class of “interested 
transactions” subject to appraisal in North Carolina contains, by 
definition, situations in which the deal price is inherently untrustworthy, 
and, as such, requires a separate, independent valuation using 
“customary and current valuation concepts and techniques generally 
employed [to value corporations].”    
 Because the Business Court failed to conduct an independent 
valuation, as it was statutorily required to do, its decision should be 
reversed. 
D. The Business Court Erred in its Interpretation of 
Delaware Law to Rely on Deal Price Absent a Market 
Check 
 In concluding that the fair value of RAI as of the Transaction Date 
was the value of the merger consideration on the Deal Date, the Business 
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Court also incorrectly applied Delaware law to the North Carolina 
appraisal statute.  The Delaware statute is much broader than the North 
Carolina statute in two respects that are inter-related.  First, the 
Delaware statute applies to all merger transactions, including arms-
length transactions with completely independent unrelated third 
parties.23   As a result of the statute’s broad reach, the court has a 
similarly broad license to take into account “all relevant factors.”  8 Del. 
C. § 262(h).  As explained in greater detail below, that broad and 
permissive statutory language (not present in the North Carolina 
statute) and has been interpreted by Delaware courts to defer to deal 
price only in circumstances involving a robust market check by 
independent third-party purchasers.24   
  
                                                 
23 The Delaware statute does not apply only to a small group of transactions, not 
applicable here, such as stock-for-stock transactions of publicly-traded companies. 
24 The Delaware courts have specifically relied on the breadth of Delaware’s appraisal 
statute and the distinction between customary or “traditional valuation 
methodologies” and “market indicators” like deal price and trading price. In re 
Appraisal of Jarden Corp., 2019 WL 3244085, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2019); see also 
Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Cos., Inc., 2018 WL 3602940, at *2 
(Del. Ch. July 27, 2018) (adopting “a ‘traditional valuation methodology,’ a [DCF] 
analysis” after rejecting deal price as a relevant factor indicative of fair value). 
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1. Under Controlling Delaware Law, there is No 
Deference to Deal Price Without A Robust 
Market Check  
Under Delaware appraisal law, “there is no presumption in favor of 
the deal price.”  DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 
A.3d 346, 349 (Del. 2017); accord Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. 
Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 135 & n.41  (Del. 2019).  To be 
considered, deal price must result from an “unhindered, informed, and 
competitive market.”  In re AOL Inc., 2018 WL 1037450, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Feb. 23, 2018) (emphasis added); see also Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, 
Inc., 2015 WL 2069417, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015) (“The 
dependability of a transaction price is only as strong as the process by 
which it was negotiated.”).   
 As such, the controlling Delaware law (which the Business Court 
should have applied to the extent it deemed Delaware law persuasive) is 
that where a large inside stockholder makes an offer and refuses to allow 
a market check of the price, deal price cannot be relied upon as evidence 
of fair value.  Golden Telecom II, 11 A.3d at 218.  While the Business 
Court made passing reference to Golden Telecom in its decision, it failed 
to acknowledge it as the only Delaware Supreme Court case that is 
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factually analogous to the RAI-BAT transaction.  Glob. GT LP v. Golden 
Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497 (Del. Ch.) (“Golden Telecom I”), aff’d, 11 A.3d 
214 (Del. 2010).  In Golden Telecom, two stockholders collectively owning 
44% of the appraised corporation’s stock prevented the corporation from 
seeking other bidders.  Id. at 503.  Despite that, the corporation argued 
that “deference should be given to the merger price . . . because the 
Special Committee, assisted by outside advisors, was able to determine 
for itself the fair price of Golden, and because no other interested bidders 
came forward.”  Id. at 507.  The Delaware Court of Chancery (the trial 
court that decides appraisal proceedings in Delaware) unequivocally 
rejected that argument.  Id. at 508.  The similarities are striking: 
Golden Telecom RAI 
 “[T]he Special Committee 
did not engage in any sales 
efforts at all and instead 
concentrated solely on 
getting as good a deal as it 
could from [the acquiring 
company].”  Id. at 508. 
 
 Transaction Committee did 
not authorize the Financial 
Advisors to shop the 
Company. 
 
 With only one buyer, the 
Transaction Committee 
could do nothing more than 
“get the price [they] could 
out of BAT or not do the 
deal.”  
 
 Golden’s two largest  BAT, the acquirer, held a 
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shareholders—who 
collectively held a 44% 
ownership stake—were also 
the largest stockholders in 
the acquiring company.  Id. 
at 503, 508. 
 
42% ownership stake in 
RAI.   
 Golden’s two largest 
stockholders “not only had 
board representatives on the 
[acquiring company’s] board, 
but also had appointed 
members of the Golden 
Board.”  Id. at 503. 
 
 BAT had five appointees on 
the RAI Board.   
 Altimo, which owned 26% of 
Golden’s outstanding 
common stock, made a 
public announcement that it 
would not sell its 26% stake 
in another transaction.  Id. 
at 505, 508. 
 
 Telenor, which owned 18% 
of Golden’s outstanding 
common stock, “was more 
coy, but gave no affirmative 
indication that it would sell 
to another bidder, and its 
representative on the 
Golden Board had voted for 
the merger.”  Id. at 505. 
 
 BAT publicly announced 
that it “ha[d] no interest in 
selling any of the Reynolds 
shares it owns, nor would 
BAT support any 
alternative sale, merger or 
similar transaction 
involving Reynolds.”  
 
 The merger agreement 
provided for an $80 million 
termination fee and did not 
contain an active go-shop 
provision.  Id. at 505, 508. 
 The Merger Agreement 
provided for a $1 billion 
termination fee and 
contained a no-shop 
provision.   
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Against this backdrop, then-Vice Chancellor Strine stated the 
obvious: 
The reality is that any bidder peering in from the 
outside was confronted by a merger agreement 
that did not contain an active go-shop provision, 
and by a public statement by Golden’s largest 
stockholder, Altimo, that it would not sell its 26% 
stake in another transaction. . . . The idea that a 
rational third-party bidder would make a blind 
expression of interest in a situation where the 
economic interests of Golden’s largest stockholders 
was more heavily weighted toward doing what was 
best for [the acquiring company] . . . is not one that 
I accept.  
Id. at 508 (emphasis added). 
Any potential third-party bidder faced precisely this scenario in the 
RAI-BAT transaction.  The Business Court’s focus on the fact that “no 
third-party bidders expressed interest or submitted a bid during the 
Merger negotiations or in the six-month post-agreement signing period 
despite widespread public awareness of BAT’s October 20 Offer soon after 
it was made” (R p 292 ¶ 338) ignores the obvious.  First, the fact that 
bidders did not come forward—no matter what the reason—means there 
was no market check.  Second, the fact that no bidders came forward was 
a direct result of BAT’s intentional strategy to suppress market bids.  
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BAT made clear in its 20 October offer that it would not support an 
alternative transaction.  As Goldman explained to the Board, if BAT was 
not supportive of an alternative transaction, one would be nearly 
impossible to achieve.  (Doc Ex. 7617-18, 7379).   Nearly 90% of non-BAT 
shareholders would have to show up to a shareholder meeting and vote 
in favor of a competing transaction and on average only 30% of 
shareholders vote.  (Doc. Ex. 7379).  “In a situation such as this, . . .  if 
[the Transaction Committee] was relying on a market check . . . , [it] 
should have affirmatively sought guarantees from [BAT] that [it] 
would support a higher bid and used those guarantees to attract 
bidders.”  Golden Telecom I, 993 A.2d at 508 (emphasis added).   
The Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed Golden Telecom in its 
decisions in DFC25 and Dell,26 and, as such, it remains controlling law.27  
Dell, in particular, provides a stark contrast with the record in this 
                                                 
25 DFC, 172 A.3d at 366. 
26 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd, 177 A.3d 1, at 21-22 
(Del. 2017).   
27 One recent Court of Chancery opinion, now on appeal, contains dicta speculating 
about how the Delaware Supreme Court might decide an exclusive-dealing situation 
with a single third-party bidder, however, even in that case there was a robust pre-
negotiation market check and the ultimate bidder was an independent third party. 
See In re Stillwater Mining Co., 2019 WL 3943851 (Del. Ch. Aug. 21, 2019).  No recent 
opinions have changed the operative law.   
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action.  In Dell, the large inside stockholder seeking to acquire the 
company (Michael Dell) pre-committed to support any better, alternative 
bid and the corporation pursued a detailed market canvass to search for 
alternative bidders.  See 177 A.3d at 35 (holding that, “when the evidence 
of market efficiency, fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach to all logical 
buyers, and the chance for any topping bidder to have the support of Mr. 
Dell’s own votes is so compelling,” deal price should have significant 
weight).  Of course, each of these factors points in the opposite direction 
here: (i) RAI’s own expert on market efficiency conducted studies showing 
that the market for RAI stock was not efficient (so RAI declined to call 
him at trial); (ii) BAT’s offer was opportunistic and based on material, 
non-public, value-relevant information; (iii) there are incredibly high 
barriers to entry in the tobacco industry; (iv) RAI conducted no outreach 
to any logical buyers; and (v) BAT announced that it would oppose any 
competing bid.  Simply put, even assuming that Delaware criteria for 
relying on deal price as a determinant of “fair value” apply in North 
Carolina, those criteria when applied to the facts of this case dictate that 
deal price should be given no weight.  In Delaware parlance, the BAT-
RAI transaction process was not “Dell compliant,” and accordingly the 
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deal price should be given no weight in an appraisal valuation.  See, e.g., 
In re AOL, Inc., 2018 WL 1037450, at *1-2, *8-9.   
Even a cursory review of Delaware case law, including recent 
decisions in the Court of Chancery, reveals that no Delaware court has 
deferred to deal price without a market check, and certainly none have 
done so where there is a large insider shareholder who has expressed that 
it will not support an alternative transaction.  See, e.g., In re Appraisal 
of Columbia Pipeline Grp., Inc., 2019 WL 3778370, at *25 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
12, 2019).  (“[D]uring the first pre-signing phase, [the company] contacted 
other potential buyers . . . .”); Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. 
Aruba Networks, Inc. (“Aruba I”), 2018 WL 922139, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 
15, 2018) (“[T]he Aruba Board authorized [its financial advisor] to contact 
other potential buyers to gauge their interest.”), rev’d on other grounds 
and remanded, 210 A.3d 128 (Del. 2019); In re Appraisal of Solera 
Holdings, Inc., 2018 WL 3625644, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018) (“The 
merger was the product of a two-month outreach to large private equity 
firms followed by a six-week auction . . . .”); In re PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 
2303599, at *28 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (“By the time the gavel fell, JPM 
had contacted 27 potential bidders . . . .”); Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender 
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Processing Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 7324170, at *18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) 
(“[A]fter the Board receive[d] five unsolicited indications of interests, . . . 
[it] decided to solicit bids . . . .”); Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, 
Inc., 2015 WL 6164771, at *14 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015) (“[T]he Company 
conducted a robust, arms-length sales process, during which the 
Company conducted two auctions . . . .”); LongPath Capital, LLC v. 
Ramtron Int’l Corp., 2015 WL 4540443, at *23 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) 
(The Company “authorized . . . its financial advisor, to market the 
Company to other potential acquirers and . . . contacted twenty-four third 
parties . . . .”); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 399726, at 
*3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (“Given the board’s go-ahead, the auction 
process commenced . . . [and the financial advisor] reached out to a group 
of potential strategic buyers and financial sponsors . . . .”); Huff Fund Inv. 
P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 WL 5878807, at *13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013) (“The 
Board and its advisors successfully instigated a bidding war for CKx and 
also canvassed the market for other potentially interested 
bidders.”), aff’d,  2015 WL 631586 (Del. Feb. 12, 2015); Union Illinois 
1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 350 (Del. Ch. 
2004) (“The evidence supports . . . an active auction . . . to an array of 
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logical bidders.”).   
The bottom line:  absent a robust market check (which was not 
present here), even Delaware law would not allow reliance on the deal 
price as evidence of fair value, and the Business Court’s decision to do so 
should be reversed. 
2. The Business Court Improperly Confused the 
Statutory Appraisal Remedy with Common Law 
Claims for Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
The Business Court further erred by confusing the statutory 
appraisal remedy with common law remedies for breach of fiduciary duty.  
The statutory appraisal requires an insider who has purchased (and now 
owns) the corporation to pay dissenting shareholders a price 
independently determined by generally accepted valuation techniques.28 
A breach of fiduciary duty occurs when a director has engaged in conduct 
so egregious that he or she will have personal liability to shareholders.  
In a transaction the size of BAT’s acquisition of RAI, it could mean 
billion-dollar personal judgments against individual directors.  Because 
of the potentially ruinous personal liability, directors are given wide 
                                                 
28 Although the statute imposes the payment obligation on the Company that has 
been purchased, that price is paid indirectly by the insider who now owns the 
Company in question. 
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latitude in their conduct, which is protected by the “business judgment” 
rule. That a transaction may be a reasonable exercise of business 
judgment that does not give rise to liability to stockholders for breach of 
fiduciary duty does not mean the transaction is exempt from a statutory 
“fair value” determination.   
The Business Court confused these fundamental legal principles.  
Relying on Delaware law, the Business Court concluded that “even 
without more aggressive outreach and a competitive auction, the 
resulting deal price is reliable evidence of RAI’s fair value.”  (R pp 297-98 
¶ 347).  In doing so, the Business Court summarized Delaware law by 
distinguishing an appraisal decision and relying on a breach-of-fiduciary 
duty opinion,  
[a]lthough some Delaware decisions [such as 
Golden Telecom] have suggested that, in certain 
circumstances, unless there is a robust auction 
involving well-informed and unconstrained 
bidders, the transaction price is not a reliable 
indicator of fair value, the Delaware Supreme 
Court has not retreated from its long-held view 
that when ‘the directors possess a body of reliable 
evidence with which to evaluate the fairness of a 
transaction, they may approve that transaction 
without conducting an active survey of the 
market.’ 
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(R pp 287-88 ¶ 329 (citing, inter alia, Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 
A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989)).  That is not an accurate statement of 
Delaware law as it applies to appraisal.  The only Delaware Supreme 
Court decision cited by the Business Court to support that proposition 
was Barkan—a fiduciary duty case involving alleged breaches of the duty 
of loyalty and duty of care.  Fiduciary duty cases do not, and cannot, 
control appraisal matters because while it is entirely possible that a 
board of directors can discharge its fiduciary duties without conducting a 
market check, a negotiation without a market check cannot provide 
sufficient evidence of fair value to justify dispensing with an independent 
valuation.29  That is, fiduciary duty cases are concerned with directorial 
wrongdoing, while in appraisal cases the sole question is one of valuation.  
See, e.g., Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 455-56 (Del. 
Ch. 2011) (“A stockholder need not plead or prove any wrongdoing to 
                                                 
29 See Merion Capital L.P., 2016 WL 7324170, at *15 (“Because the two inquiries are 
different, a sale process might pass muster for purposes of a breach of fiduciary claim 
and yet still constitute a sub-optimal process of an appraisal.”) (emphasis added); In 
re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, 2015 WL 399726, at *16 (whether corporate directors 
satisfied fiduciary duties “is not dispositive of . . . whether that sale generated fair 
value” for appraisal); In re Orchard Enter., 88 A.3d 1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“A price 
may fall within the range of fairness for purposes of the entire fairness test even 
though the point calculation demanded by the appraisal statute yields an award in 
excess of the merger price.”). 
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obtain the fair value determination.”). In rendering its decision, then, the 
Business Court impermissibly confused conduct that withstands “breach 
of fiduciary duty” with conduct sufficient to dispense with an 
independent appraisal valuation. 
Indeed, in holding that a transaction that does not constitute a 
breach of fiduciary duty need not be independently appraised, the 
Business Court effectively rendered the North Carolina appraisal statute 
superfluous.  The Business Court’s decision relies entirely on the process 
by which the $59.64 deal price was reached and not the substance of 
valuation.  The Court defers to deal price—not because it is consistent 
with prices derived by independent valuation techniques, but because, 
inter alia, it “was negotiated at arm’s length by independent, fully 
informed, and deeply knowledgeable directors with the assistance of 
independent and experienced advisors.”  (R p 297 ¶ 347).  While such a 
process may be sufficient to protect against claims of fiduciary duty, it 
says nothing about whether the price was fair and whether the insider 
was privy to material information not available to other stockholders.  If 
all that was required was process, then the North Carolina appraisal 
statute would have required that process and allowed appraisal only 
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when such a process was ignored.  Instead, the statute requires appraisal 
whenever a transaction qualifies as an “interested transaction,” and 
provides a statutory remedy that is not already available under common 
law.     
The distinction between fiduciary duty law and appraisal rights law 
is particularly important here, where the Court has already opined on 
the impact of BAT’s 42% ownership of Reynolds in the fiduciary duty 
context in Corwin, 371 N.C. 605 (2019).  There, this Court concluded that 
although BAT’s 42% stake gave it leverage and advantages not shared by 
other shareholders, those benefits were property rights that BAT owned 
and created no fiduciary duty to shareholders.  Id. at 622.  After Corwin, 
BAT was given the “green light” to use the leverage inherent in its large 
position and presence on the board without any fear of fiduciary duty to 
other shareholders. It did not shrink from the opportunity to flex its 
substantial muscle and announced—the day it made its offer—that it 
would not support any competing offers, even at higher prices.  Having 
suppressed competitive bidding, BAT negotiated exclusively with the 
Board and ensured that the price was not higher than BAT was willing 
or able to pay.  After Corwin, those advantages belonged to BAT and it 
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was entitled to their financial benefits.  However, Corwin did not purport 
to eviscerate the protection provided by the appraisal statute, which 
provided the only legal remedy to shareholders to get a fair price for their 
stock when BAT exercised its leverage to buy RAI and stifle any 
competitive bids.  By simply deferring to the price BAT agreed to pay, the 
Business Court below effectively removed the only remaining protection 
realistically available to shareholders after Corwin and contravened the 
expressed will of the legislature. 
E. The Business Court Erred By Relying On Gompers’ 
“Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price” Analysis  
At trial, RAI presented the testimony of Dr. Paul Gompers in 
support of its valuation contentions.  Gompers was the sole expert called 
by RAI, and he performed multiple analyses for RAI on which the 
Business Court relied.  Among them, Gompers purported to “adjust” 
RAI’s public trading price from the date BAT’s acquisition proposal was 
announced through the Transaction Date and used that so-called 
“adjusted unaffected stock price” as a check on the valuation implied by 
the deal price.  This testimony was fundamentally flawed at the outset 
for at least three reasons.   
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First, it assumed that the “unaffected” market price of RAI stock 
was an appropriate measure of fair value.  As noted above, the unaffected 
market price of RAI stock could never have been a fair measure of 
inherent value because it failed to incorporate material non-public 
information that BAT had and the investing public did not.  Specifically, 
BAT knew that RAI management—after the successful integration of 
Lorillard—was projecting strong 7-8% growth in years six through ten of 
its ten-year projections.  Moreover, BAT knew that RAI management had 
been authorized to purchase up to $2 billion of RAI stock on the public 
markets at prices up to $65 per share.   
Second, the timing of BAT’s offer appeared timed to take advantage 
of a 12% sell-off in the price of RAI stock that occurred immediately prior 
to the offer.  As RAI’s own Financial Advisors observed, the timing of the 
offer was “opportunistic.”  (Doc. Ex. 6976, 7200) 
Third, the unaffected market price did not reflect a control 
premium.  The purchase of more than 50% of a corporation’s stock confers 
the valuable rights of control that inhere in a corporation including, for 
example the right to remove cash from the company through dividends 
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and the right to sell the company.  For all of these reasons, the unaffected 
stock price of RAI stock was not a reliable measure of fair value. 
However, even if one assumed that the unaffected market price of 
RAI stock could be used to determine fair value—and it should not—there 
remained substantial reasons to disregard it.  In the first instance, even 
the unaffected market price reveals nothing about value unless and until 
one can demonstrate that it efficiently incorporates all available public 
information. Economists refer to such stocks as “semi-strong efficient”.  
However, Gompers himself did not opine on the efficiency of the market 
for RAI stock.  That task was supposed to be handled by Dr. Shivdasani, 
a different expert retained by RAI.  At the last minute, RAI elected not 
to call Shivdasani at trial, stripping Gompers’ conclusions regarding 
market price of any proper foundation.   
In its Evidentiary Rulings, the Business Court held that Gompers’ 
testimony on this point was admissible because (i) expert testimony is 
not necessary to establish market efficiency and (ii) Gompers did not in 
fact rely on Shivdasani’s testimony.  These conclusions are erroneous.   
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Taking the second point first, Gompers admitted in his deposition 
that he performed no independent analysis of RAI’s market efficiency and 
in fact relied on Shivdasani: 
Q.  And you did not conduct your own analysis of 
the efficiency of the market for RAI’s stock; is that 
correct? 
A.  That’s correct. 
Q.  Okay.  And you’re relying entirely on Professor 
Shivdasani’s opinions concerning the efficiency of 
that market, correct? 
A.  That’s correct. 
(R pp 690-91; App. 220-21).  Gompers confirmed this fact at trial: 
Q:  Do you have an opinion, Professor, as to 
whether or not the market for RAI stock was 
efficient at the time of BAT’s first offer? 
A.  No. 
(T p 784:24-785:2; App. 140-41).   
Accordingly, the Business Court was simply wrong in holding that 
“Gompers did not present any testimony regarding market efficiency that 
relied on another expert.”  (R p 323 ¶ 12).  Gompers’ “adjusted unaffected 
stock price” analysis is relevant if and only if the efficiency of the market 
for RAI stock has been established.  Otherwise, the trading price of RAI 
stock (adjusted or otherwise) has no connection to the fundamental value 
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of RAI.  Given Gompers’ own admissions regarding the predicate for his 
testimony, coupled with RAI’s failure to introduce any testimony from 
Shivdasani, it was error for the Business Court to accept and rely on 
Gompers’ “adjusted unaffected stock price” analysis.  See, e.g., J.B. Hunt 
Transport, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 243 F.3d 441, 444-45 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(affirming exclusion of testimony by expert whose testimony was 
“inextricably linked” to testimony from a different expert whose 
testimony had been excluded by the trial court); Beck’s Office Furniture 
& Supplies, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 1996 WL 466673, at *7 (10th Cir. Aug. 
16, 1996) (holding that experts “may not merely parrot the opinions of 
other experts whose conclusions are not themselves in the record”); 
Fosmire v. Progressive Max Ins. Co., 277 F.R.D. 625, 630 (W.D. Wash. 
2011) (“[The] rules do not permit an expert to rely upon opinions 
developed by another expert for purposes of litigation without 
independent verification of the underlying expert’s work.”); GWTP Invs., 
L.P. v. SES Americom Inc., 2007 WL 7630459, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 
2007) (“An expert may rely upon figures calculated by another expert so 
long as he conducts an independent investigation of those figures.”); JRL 
Enters., Inc. v. Procorp Assocs., Inc., 2003 WL 21284020, at *5 (E.D. La. 
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June 3, 2003) (excluding testimony where expert testified that “he 
conducted no independent investigation of the[ ] numbers” provided to 
him). 
The Business Court also erred when it concluded that expert 
testimony was unnecessary to demonstrate market efficiency.  The 
Business Court cited Delaware case law indicating that there are various 
criteria that other state courts have considered in analyzing market 
efficiency.  (R pp 322-23 ¶ 11).  But the Business Court omitted the fact 
that Delaware courts have held that expert testimony is required to 
establish market efficiency.  See, e.g., Stillwater, 2019 WL 3943851, at 
*50 (“Assessing the reliability of the trading price for [the company’s] 
common stock . . . is one such place where law-trained judges should not 
go without the guidance of experts trained in these disciplines.”) (internal 
citation and quotations omitted).  In each of the appraisal decisions cited 
by the Business Court, expert testimony was used to establish market 
efficiency.  See Jarden, 2019 WL 3244085, at *27 (discussing testimony 
of Dr. Glenn Hubbard); Solera, 2018 WL 3625644, at *24 n.319  
(discussing expert report of Dr. Glenn Hubbard).  The Business Court’s 
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conclusion that market efficiency in an appraisal case can be established 
without resort to expert testimony appears to be unprecedented. 
Equally problematic are the factors on which the Business Court 
relied in accepting RAI’s contention that the Company traded in an 
efficient market (and, in consequence, overruling Appellants’ objections 
to Gompers’ market-based testimony).  RAI pointed to the so-called 
“Cammer Factors” as supporting market efficiency, and the Business 
Court applied the Cammer Factors.  But the Cammer Factors are ill-
suited to determine whether a corporation’s trading price accurately 
reflects its intrinsic value, which is the focus of appraisal litigation.  The 
Cammer Factors were developed in connection with the “fraud on the 
market” theory (“FOTM”) in federal securities fraud litigation, which 
assumes that “the market price of shares traded on well-developed 
markets reflects all publicly available information” such that “whenever 
the investor buys or sells stock at the market price, his reliance on any 
public material misrepresentations may be presumed.”  Halliburton Co. 
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 267-68 (2014) (“Halliburton 
II”).  If successfully employed, FOTM triggers a rebuttable presumption 
of reliance at the class certification stage.  Id.  FOTM was adopted as a 
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policy matter to encourage private securities fraud suits; without it, class 
certification would be virtually impossible and without the possibility of 
class treatment, fraudulent activity would go unaddressed.  Halliburton 
II, 573 U.S. at 267-68; see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, 
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 321 n.4 (2007) (“[P]rivate securities litigation [is] an 
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their 
losses—a matter crucial to the integrity of domestic capital markets”) 
(internal citation and quotations omitted). 
Unlike in an appraisal, courts addressing securities fraud claims 
are not concerned with whether stock prices reflect fundamental 
value.  Instead, they are focused on whether the market is reacting in 
some form or fashion to new information that enters the market to correct 
a previously false or misleading statement.  That inquiry sheds no light 
whatsoever on what the “true value” or “fair value” of the stock is. 
Accordingly, the Cammer Factors are not designed or intended to identify 
markets in which trading price is a reliable proxy for fundamental 
value.  Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at 272 (“the precise degree to which stock 
prices accurately reflect public information” is irrelevant to 
FOTM).  FOTM requires only that information affects market prices—
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not that market prices are accurate or react “correctly” to new 
information.  See Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at 271-72 (FOTM does not 
“adopt any particular theory of how quickly and completely publicly 
available information is reflected in market price”) (citation omitted); 
Brief of Securities Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Halliburton II, 2014 
WL 507165, at *15-18 (discussing academic debate over market efficiency 
and concluding: “That prices may be inaccurate does not detract from the 
fact that false information affects those prices, which is all that [FOTM] 
requires.”).  In short, the Cammer Factors are not a reliable tool for 
identifying the type of market efficiency that matters in appraisal 
litigation, and the Business Court’s use of the Cammer Factors to justify 
reliance on Gompers’ market-based testimony and conclusions was 
erroneous.  The limitations of the Cammer Factors are why they are not 
used in the damages phase of securities fraud litigation (i.e., when the 
plaintiff must prove that defendants’ misrepresentations in fact affected 
the market price).  Instead, expert testimony sufficient to establish actual 
class-wide harm is necessary to prove damages in securities fraud 
litigation.  See, e.g., In re Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. 
Supp. 2d 1005, 1014-15 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (“Because of the need ‘to 
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distinguish between the fraud-related and non-fraud related influences 
of the stock's price behavior,’ a number of courts have rejected or refused 
to admit into evidence damages reports or testimony by damages experts 
in securities cases which fail to include event studies or something 
similar.” (citations omitted)), aff'd sub nom. Mortensen v. Snavely, 145 F. 
App’x 218 (9th Cir. 2005). 
Notably, even when used at the appropriate stage of securities 
fraud cases to establish FOTM, the Cammer Factors must be predicated 
on expert testimony—most typically, an event study showing that the 
trading price of a particular security immediately (and with the correct 
magnitude) incorporated any new news released into the public sphere.  
See, e.g., In re Federal Home Loan Mortg. Corp. Sec. Litig., 281 F.R.D. 
174, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); (T pp 1878:21-1881:17 (uncontroverted trial 
testimony of Appellants’ expert explaining the use of event studies to 
examine market efficiency and key elements of price movements in the 
“correct” direction and immediate incorporation of new information); 
App. 162-65).  Shivdasani performed an event study, but as noted above, 
RAI strategically declined to present him at trial.  All RAI offered to 
establish market efficiency was Mr. Wajnert’s testimony that he 
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“observe[d] over time the Reynolds stock price reacting to decisions that 
the board had taken in a positive way or negatively” and Mr. de 
Gennaro’s unremarkable testimony that there was “[n]o indication that 
the market wasn’t absorbing news on a regular basis.”  (T pp 59:10-17, 
215:15-23; App. 13, 41).  This testimony failed even to establish that 
RAI’s stock price moved in the correct direction in response to new 
information or that the information was incorporated quickly.  Tellingly, 
Gompers admitted that such observations are insufficient to establish 
market efficiency—an undisputed fact that the Business Court simply 
ignored.  (T pp 833:23-834:22; App. 145-46).   
For all of these reasons, Gompers’ “adjusted unaffected stock price” 
analysis was castle built on air—a conclusion without the necessary 
predicate evidence—that never should have been admitted, let alone 
relied on by the Business Court in determining the fair value of RAI as 
of the Transaction Date. 
F. Even if the Business Court Could Have Relied on 
Gompers’ “Adjusted Unaffected Stock Price” Analysis, 
the Business Court Erred by Failing to Include a 
Control Premium in its Valuation of RAI 
As noted above, RAI’s unaffected stock price did not reflect a control 
premium.  The Business Court’s failure to account for that premium is 
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particularly inappropriate here, where the North Carolina appraisal 
statute mandates that fair value be determined without “discounting for 
lack of marketability or minority status.”  N.C.G.S. § 55-13-01(5).  Public 
stocks trade with an inherent minority discount because shares 
purchased in the market cannot confer the substantial benefits of 
corporate control.  Such benefits include the power to extract cash from 
the corporation (through dividends), the power to hire management, the 
power to sell assets and even the power to sell the corporation itself.  
Accordingly, any market-based appraisal valuation must correct for the 
implicit minority discount by adding back a control premium to arrive at 
going concern value.  See, e.g., M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 
A.2d 513, 523 (Del. 1999) (rejecting market-based valuation approach in 
Delaware appraisal action that failed to account for inherent minority 
discount); Prescott Grp. Small Cap, L.P. v. Coleman Co., Inc., 2004 WL 
2059515, at *23 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2004) (holding that implicit minority 
discount must be accounted for in appraisal valuations by adding back a 
control premium and noting that the Delaware courts typically employ a 
premium around 30%).  Indeed, RAI’s own expert conceded at trial that 
- 101 - 
 
the “minority discount” is the “flip of the control premium.”  (T p 786:15-
18; App. 139).   
The Business Court, however, ignored Gompers’ concession and the 
prior judicial decisions from North Carolina’s sister states that address 
the issue, concluding (with citation to an irrelevant snippet of Gompers’ 
testimony and a law review article) that the implicit minority discount 
does not exist in publicly-traded corporations.  (R pp 300-01 ¶ 354).  This 
was erroneous. 
The portion of Gompers’ testimony cited by the Business Court 
discussed whether a discounted cash flow valuation must be adjusted to 
take account of an implicit minority discount.  (T p 787:1-9; App. 140).  A 
DCF valuation is not a metric based upon the price of publicly-traded 
stock, and so it does not need to take account of the inherent minority 
discount that exists in the prices of publicly-traded shares.  The Delaware 
decisions addressing the implicit minority discount have long recognized 
this distinction.  Compare, e.g., Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., 
Inc., 2004 WL 1752847, at *23 & n.160 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004) (holding 
that valuation based on “streams of income,” such as a DCF valuation, 
need not be adjusted to eliminate a minority discount) with id. at *35 
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(holding that a comparable companies valuation, which is based on the 
prices of publicly-traded stock “suffers from an inherent minority 
discount” and must be adjusted to add back a control premium).  In short, 
the Business Court’s conclusion is based on an apples-and-oranges 
comparison of cash-flow or income-based valuations (which do not need 
to be adjusted to remove a minority discount) and publicly-traded-stock-
price-based valuations (which do).  The market-based valuation metrics 
adopted by the Business Court (trading price and adjusted trading price) 
reflect a minority discount that, under the express terms of N.C.G.S. § 
55-13-01(5), must be accounted for. 
The Business Court’s reliance on Professors Hamermesh and 
Wachter’s article chronicling the history of Delaware’s treatment of the 
implicit minority discount is equally mistaken.  In Delaware, the 
appraisal statute provides only that stockholders seeking appraisal are 
entitled to “fair value.”  The specifics of what “fair value” means have 
been developed over the years through judicial precedent, not filled in by 
the Delaware General Assembly.  See, e.g., Lawrence A. Hamermesh & 
Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of the “Implicit Minority 
Discount” in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 13-15 (2007).  
- 103 - 
 
The Delaware courts have held that appraisal “fair value” means a 
stockholders’ pro rata share of the “going concern” value of a corporation.  
See id. at 25-30.  To the extent certain Delaware decisions have backed 
away from including a control premium in market-based appraisal 
valuations, they have done so on the theory that “going concern” value 
should reflect whatever minority discount inheres in the market price of 
a corporation’s stock.  See id. at 53.  Accordingly, whatever one may think 
of the merits of the evolution of Delaware appraisal jurisprudence, the 
North Carolina appraisal statute prohibits Delaware’s embrace of a 
concept of appraisal “going concern” value that permits a minority 
discount to be included in the valuation. 
The Business Court also failed to take account of the import of this 
Court’s prior decision in Corwin v. British Am. Tobacco plc, 371 N.C. 605.  
There, this Court upheld the dismissal of claims that, inter alia, alleged 
that BAT had taken control of RAI without payment of a control 
premium.  See id. at 624.  This Court concluded that BAT was not 
actually RAI’s controller as of 2018, and was unconcerned about the non-
payment of a control premium in connection with BAT’s maintenance of 
its 42% stake in RAI after the Lorillard Transaction (and other alleged 
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fiduciary violations) as a result.  See id.  By refusing to add back a control 
premium to its market-based valuation of RAI below, the Business Court 
deprived RAI’s stockholders of ever obtaining the control premium to 
which they would have been entitled in a true arm’s length transaction 
in a sale to take RAI private.  That is, the Business Court’s approach to 
valuing RAI in the appraisal action is exactly what the Corwin dissenters 
were concerned with—and what the Corwin majority predicted would not 
occur—that BAT was able to “get the milk without buying the cow.”  See 
id. at 754.   
The Court below found that BAT did not have to pay a control 
premium under the statute because “control” constituted “appreciation 
or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate action,” which must be 
excluded from the valuation.  That is nonsense.  Control is inherent in 
the corporation and does not come into existence as a result of the 
transaction at issue.  For example, control includes the ability to declare 
dividends and withdraw cash from the corporation, the power to replace 
management or to sell assets.  Corporations have the power to do each of 
these valuable acts without the necessity of an impending takeover.  The 
corporation always has these powers but an individual shareholder 
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cannot exercise them because it is ordinarily represents only a small 
minority of outstanding shares.  In order to illustrate the point, assume 
a shareholder owned 48 shares of a 100-share corporation.  To purchase 
the 49th share, the shareholder would not pay a premium, because he or 
she would have no greater power to control the corporation.  However, 
the 50th share would be much more valuable and the buyer would be 
willing to pay a premium to purchase it.  “Control” of the corporation is 
always present, but is simply widely diffused among a populous 
shareholder base. 
The idea that a corporation should be valued without consideration 
of the appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the corporate 
action,” is meant simply to value the company without regard to any 
increase or decrease in the value of the company that arises by virtue of 
the transaction.  A typical example of such a value is the value of 
synergies.  In RAI’s acquisition of Lorillard, it expected (and obtained) 
over $800 million of decreased costs as the two companies combined and 
eliminated duplicative manufacturing plants, sales forces and 
administrative expenses.  Obviously, in valuing RAI one would not take 
into account the synergies that would be saved in the expected 
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transaction.  However, corporate control does not arise by virtue of an 
expected transaction—it is always present.  To suggest that the appraisal 
statute directs the Court to exclude a control premium makes no sense 
at all.  It would mean that every shareholder of a publicly-traded 
company would get a control premium in the context of a merger, but 
dissenting shareholders would forfeit such a right.  If that were the law, 
it would be difficult to understand why any shareholder would exercise 
his or her appraisal right.    
III. THE BUSINESS COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
DEFENDANTS’ DCF TO BE UNRELIABLE EVIDENCE OF 
FAIR VALUE 
Both parties’ valuation experts agreed that a DCF is the most 
widely accepted corporate valuation technique and is the generally 
accepted method used to value a corporation.  (R p 301 ¶ 357).  It is used 
by 100% of stock analysts and financial advisors rendering fairness 
opinions to public companies.  Despite the uniform agreement that it is 
the most widely accepted valuation technique, only Appellant’s expert 
actually conducted a DCF.  Moreover, while each of the Financial 
Advisors performed a DCF, they used only five-years of cash flow and 
valued the Company only as of the deal date and not the Transaction 
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Date.  Appellants put forth a valuation expert who conducted a DCF 
valuation to value RAI, as statutorily required, as of the Transaction 
Date.  At trial, “[t]he parties d[id] not dispute that a DCF is a reliable 
methodology, and no evidence was introduced . . . that a DCF is not a 
‘customary and current valuation technique.’’  (R p 250 ¶ 240 (citing 
N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(c)(5)).  The Business Court nevertheless found 
Appellants’ expert’s DCF valuation unreliable based on an assessment 
that finds no basis in the evidence in the record. 30 
A. RAI Management’s Cash Flow Projections Were 
Sufficiently Reliable for a Valuation Analysis 
The DCF is an extraordinarily simple and straightforward 
valuation.  It starts with the assumption that any corporation is worth 
the present value of its expected future cash flows.  Accordingly, a DCF 
analysis calculates the future cash flows and discounts them to present 
value.  It then divides the present value by the number of shares 
outstanding to arrive at a per share value. 
                                                 
30 Before the Business Court, there was no dispute as to the inputs for the standard 
DCF valuation model:  (1) the magnitude and timing of the expected free cash flows 
for a finite period; (2) the weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”); and (3) the 
anticipated long-term growth rate of the free cash flows after the finite period.  (R p 
250 ¶ 240).  Further, the WACC was not materially disputed.  (R pp 268-69 ¶ 285). 
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The first step in every DCF is thus to calculate expected future cash 
flows for a finite period.  The best evidence of such cash flows is 
projections prepared by management and relied on in the ordinary course 
of business.  Since such projections are used to make actual business 
judgments, management has an incentive to project financial 
performance and cash flow as accurately as possible.  Moreover, when 
such projections are not made in the context of a litigation, they are more 
reliable.  For this reason, when performing DCF valuations, Delaware 
courts uniformly evince a strong preference for “contemporaneously 
prepared management projections,” because management “ordinarily 
has the best first-hand knowledge of a company’s operations.”  Doft & Co. 
v. Travelocity.com, 2004 WL 5366732, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2004); see 
also, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *7 (Del 
Ch. Dec. 31, 2003) (“When management projections are made in the 
ordinary course of business, they are generally deemed reliable.”).  
Delaware courts have consistently rejected projections created for 
litigation.  See, e.g., LongPath, 2015 WL 4540443, at *18 (management 
projections unreliable where they were prepared in “anticipation of 
future disputes”); Owen v. Cannon, 
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2015 WL 3819204, at *21-22 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2015) (rejecting “after-
the-fact projections” that were “tainted by hindsight bias,” including due 
to post-litigation interviews of corporate management by the testifying 
expert) (collecting cases);  Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 WL 1569818, 
at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012) (projections not credible where made 
“outside of the ordinary course of business” “when the possibility of 
litigation, such as an appraisal proceeding, was likely”).  Ordinary-course 
management projections are consistently used over those created for use 
in appraisal proceedings.  See, e.g.,  Cede & Co. v. JRC Acquisition Corp., 
2004 WL 5366085, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (“[T]his Court prefers 
valuations based on management projections available as of the date of 
the merger and holds a healthy skepticism for post-merger adjustments 
to management  projections  or  the  creation  of  new  projections  
entirely.”); Gray v. Cytokine Pharmasciences, Inc., 2002 WL 853549, at 
*8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002) (“In sum, I cannot accept that [the expert] . . . 
was better equipped to make future financial projections than [the 
company’s] management.  Consequently, I find [the expert’s] litigation-
driven projections to be unreliable and, thus, disregard his DCF 
analysis.)  Any other result would “condone allowing a company’s 
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management or board of directors to disavow their own data in order to 
justify a lower valuation in an appraisal proceeding.” Id. 
The record showed that RAI invested an enormous amount of time 
and energy creating its projections and regularly updating them to 
ensure they were the very best view it had in connection with the future 
financial performance of the Company and expected cash flow. (See R pp 
195 ¶ 123, 198-205).  On an annual basis, it prepared detailed projections 
supporting its five-year Operating Plan and its ten-year Strategic Plan.  
RAI created each of those forecasts in a rigorous, bottoms-up process 
that involved the input of hundreds of RAI employees.  (Doc. Ex. 7573-
74).  And, RAI management actually used and relied upon its projections 
in the conduct of its business, including when it decided to pay up to $65 
per share in its $2 billion share buy-back approved just months before 
BAT launched its offer.  (R pp 212-14; T pp 149:8-150:3; App. 34; Doc. Ex. 
2072). 
The Financial Advisors performed DCF valuations that the 
Business Court concluded were “reliable and . . . persuasive evidence” of 
the fair value of RAI, (R p 305 ¶ 363 )—even though (i) they were based 
on only five years of projected cash flow and assumed growth rates for 
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years six through ten that were far lower than the cash flows projected 
by RAI for those years and (ii) they calculated “present value” at the deal 
date, not the closing date.31  After RAI entered into the merger 
agreement, it continued to update its financial projections in the ordinary 
course of business.  Accordingly, the Company created an LE (latest 
estimate) in July 2017—the same month as the closing.  Although 
Appellants’ expert calculated RAI’s free cash flows for the period 2017-
2022 using management’s most recently updated financial 
projections at the time of the closing, RAI’s July 2017 LE, the Court 
concluded—without analysis or explanation—that his DCF was based on 
“projections unsuited for valuation analysis.”  (R p 305 ¶ 364).   
In doing so, the Business Court found that RAI’s projections were 
not probability-weighted to account for certain downside risks that 
“would have a dramatic, negative effect on the Company’s growth and 
profitability” if they materialized.  (R pp 251 ¶244, 256 ¶ 254).   Those 
“downside risks”—including the potential for adverse regulation on 
                                                 
31  Management gave the Advisors five-year projections (the October 2016 LE created 
in the ordinary course) and updated them with certain “Top-Side Adjustments” or 
“Management Overlays.” RAI management represented to the Financial Advisors 
and to the public that those projections were the best estimates of its future 
performance over the next five years (see R pp 206 ¶ 146, 254 ¶ 249). 
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menthol cigarettes, increased taxes, or other competitive effects— 
however, were both unknown and unquantifiable.  (See T pp 730:21-
731:3).  By definition, no projections could be “probability-weighted” to 
account for these possibilities, but that does not undermine a valuation 
that uses them as an input.  See Matthew v. Laudamiel, 2015 WL 
5723985, at *18 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2015) (“[T]he Court does not factor in 
events or facts unknowable as of the relevant date for valuation 
purposes[.]”)   All businesses face “headwinds,” including legal and 
regulatory uncertainty and competitive pressures. And all forecasts are 
uncertain, because they project future cash flows.  That is true of every 
forecast used in every DCF; their “uncertainty” does not render them 
unreliable or biased.  
Moreover, the threat of enhanced regulation (including of menthol 
and nicotine) has been present in the industry for at least ten years.  
Despite those headwinds, RAI continued to experience robust growth 
because the actual impact of regulation has been to erect barriers to 
entry, protecting the U.S. market from competition and allowing the 
formation of oligopoly pricing.  The tobacco industry has historically 
demonstrated the ability to increase profits despite increased regulation.  
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A key part of that resilience is that cigarettes are addictive, making 
demand very inelastic.  Indeed, despite the convenient refrain that its 
projections were not reliable—and were instead optimistically and 
unrealistically assuming that it would be “business as usual”—four years 
have passed since BAT made its offer and there has been no increased 
regulation of menthol or disruption of the tobacco industry.  In other 
words, it has been “business as usual.” 
Finally, the unknowable and unquantifiable risks and sensitivities 
not included in RAI’s ordinary course projections included both downside 
risks and upside opportunities.  (See, e.g., Doc. Ex. 5328).  Among the 
“upside” opportunities was the likelihood of corporate tax reform, which 
was not reflected in the projections.  Unlike the unquantifiable prospect 
of, for example, increased menthol regulation, the probability of 
corporate tax reform as of the Transaction Date was an estimated 65% (a 
probability-weighted value of $14 per share).  (T p 1279:11-1281:17; App. 
172-74).  The upside of corporate tax reform, then, supplied a significant 
counterweight to any increased possibility of regulation and undermines 
the Business Court’s conclusion that Dr. Zmijewski’s DCF—which relied 
on management’s most recent projections—was not suitable for 
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valuation.  
B. Appellants’ Expert Used the Most Appropriate Long-
Term Growth Rate Because it was Based on the Ten-
Year Projections 
The Business Court further erred in its conclusion that PGR used 
in Dr Zmijewski’s DCF was “unsupported by credible and persuasive 
evidence.”  (R p 305 ¶ 364).   
Dr. Zmijewski’s DCF used the a growth rate of 2.2% (inflation) that 
after a projected five-years of cash flow.  The blended long-term growth 
was calculated by tobacco industry expert Dr. Fredrick Flyer.  Dr. Flyer’s 
blended PGR, in turn, was based on a calculation that began with 
management’s own ten-year projections, which forecasted high, single-
digit growth of 7-8% in years six through ten.  As discussed above, those 
ten-year projections were generated via a rigorous, bottoms-up process 
and represented management’s best estimate of future growth in those 
years.  After management’s ten-year projection period, Dr. Flyer 
calculated and applied a conservative PGR of 1%, in line with those rates 
used by the Financial Advisors.  Flyer testified that although the tobacco 
industry is in secular decline, RAI has declined at a slower rate than the 
overall industry because of its brands such that, to offset volume declines 
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as high as 3% (which is higher than RAI’s expected decline of 2.4%), RAI 
would only have to raise prices about 3.5%—approximately 1.5% above 
the rate of long-term inflation—in order to grow at 1% per year into 
perpetuity.    (R p 265 ¶ 275).   Dr. Flyer’s cogent, company-specific 
calculation of RAI’s long-term growth rate was the only such evidence 
presented at trial.   
Dr. Flyer’s calculation (and Dr. Zmijewski’s application of a PGR of 
2.2%) are consistent with mainstream finance theory, which holds that a 
long-term perpetuity growth rate should be between the rate of long-term 
inflation and long-term gross domestic product—or between 2-5%.  See 
Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 WL 3793896, at *21 (Del. 
Ch. July 8, 2013) (citing Bradford Cornell, Corporate Valuation: Tools for 
Effective Appraisal and Decision Making 146-47 (1993)).  
Delaware courts have acknowledged this generally-accepted 
valuation precept holding that “[a] viable company should grow at least 
at the rate of inflation,” which is “the floor for a terminal value estimate 
for a solidly profitable company that does not have an identifiable risk of 
insolvency.”  Golden Telecom, 993 A.2d at 511.  And Delaware courts 
repeatedly have endorsed the use of terminal or perpetuity growth rates 
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based on a premium to long-term inflation in DCF analyses,32 even where 
the relevant industry was in so-called “secular decline.”  Towerview LLC 
v. Cox Radio, Inc., 2013 WL 3316186, at *16, *27 (Del. Ch. June 28, 2013); 
see also JRC, 2004 WL 286963, at *6 (adopting perpetuity growth rate 
1.0% above inflation for tobacco company).  
None of the Financial Advisors—whose DCFs the Business Court 
accepted—were industry experts or conducted any analysis of RAI’s 
expected growth rates.  Moreover, none of the Financial Advisors had 
possession of the ten-year projections that formed the basis of Dr. Flyer’s 
calculation.  In fact, Lazard began its analysis with the same growth rate 
assumptions it used in connection with the Lorillard Transaction, despite 
its acknowledgement that the growth rate for RAI in July of 2016 was 
50% higher than at the time of the Lorillard Transaction, and despite 
that, in connection with the Lorillard Transaction, Lazard applied that 
growth rate after nine years of projections.  (T pp 297:4-15, 309:18-
                                                 
32 See, e.g., In re AOL Inc., 2018 WL 1037450, at *19 (adopting 3.5% perpetuity growth 
rate where the long-term inflation rate was 2.3% and the long-term GDP growth 
estimate was 4.6%); In re Appraisal of SWS Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 2334852, at *16 (Del. 
Ch. May 30, 2017) (adopting 3.35% “as the proper terminal growth rate” where it was 
“derived from the midpoint of the long term-expected inflation rate of 2.3% and the 
long-term expected economic growth rate of the economy at large of 4.4%”). 
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311:18, 312:24-313:7, see DX0394 at .0003).  Mr. DeGennaro testified that 
application of the same growth rate (-0.5 to 0.5) was reasonable in 
connection with the Merger because “[Lazard’s] view of the long-term 
prospects of the industry” had not changed since the Lorillard 
Transaction—a rationale that ignores his own admission that the 
perpetuity growth rate must be company-specific, not industry-specific.  
Dr. Flyer’s growth rate calculation incorporated the RAI’s actual 
forecasted growth in years’ six through ten, and was consistent with the 
directive of mainstream finance theory and appraisal jurisprudence (as 
well as JPM’s observations) that growth should drop gradually to the 
long-term, steady-state growth rate.  Absent some expected calamity, it 
is inappropriate to assume that overnight a mature, solvent company 
experiencing year-over-year growth will experience a “cliff-like” drop in 
growth just five years into the future.  Absent some clear and palpable 
threat to financial solvency (which is not present here), a growth rate 
between inflation and long-term GDP is appropriate.  As such, the 
Business Court’s conclusion to the contrary was in error.   
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IV. THE BUSINESS COURT ERRED BY RELYING ON 
GOMPERS’ TESTIMONY IN VALUING RAI  
As explained above, the Business Court should have disregarded 
Gompers’ market-price-related testimony.  It also should have drawn an 
adverse inference against RAI based on the Company’s decision to hide 
its own expert’s testimony from the Business Court.  Instead, the 
Business Court accepted and relied on Gompers’ “adjusted unaffected 
price” analysis, which was erroneous. 
Moreover, Gompers served as a mouthpiece for RAI’s and BAT’s 
investment bankers, who had performed valuations of RAI in connection 
with the Merger.  Specifically, Gompers testified that part of his 
assignment was to evaluate the DCF analyses performed by Lazard, 
JPM, and Goldman Sachs.  (T p at 723:20-25; App. 98).  Gompers then 
proceeded to offer extensive testimony about the reliability of the 
financial advisors’ analysis and his agreement with the testimony of RAI 
management.  (See, e.g., T pp 724:4-735:23; 745:21-746:6; 751:3-25; 
754:24-756:18, 759:23-760:22, 767:5-20; App. 99-110, 120-36).  None of 
this was proper expert testimony because experts cannot merely vouch 
for the opinions of others.  Yet, the Business Court erroneously overruled 
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Appellants’ objections on this point and accepted Gompers’ effort to prop 
up the bankers’ valuation analyses. 
Finally, Gompers attempted to summarize the factual record, 
characterized the testimony of various lay witnesses, and smuggled in 
hearsay in the form of analyst reports.  (See, e.g., T pp 731:6-733:7, 735:8-
24, 760:14-22; 801:21-803:8; App. 106-08, 110, 135, 142-44).  For reasons 
similar to those that should have barred Gompers’ improper vouching for 
the investment bankers’ analyses, RAI’s use of Gompers to provide an 
expert imprimatur to fact witness testimony and to bring hearsay 
evidence in through the back door was improper, and Appellants’ 
objections on these points should have been sustained below. 
A. The Business Court Erred By Failing To Apply The 
“Missing Witness Rule” Against RAI  
After the close of fact discovery, RAI disclosed to Appellants that it 
had retained Shivdasani as a testifying expert.  Shivdasani’s expert 
report, served on 22 February 2019, opined that the economic evidence 
was consistent with RAI stock trading in a semi-strong efficient market.  
Underlying this opinion was an event study analyzing seven events.  
Shivdasani was deposed on 19 April 2019.  At no point during the expert 
discovery process did RAI indicate in any way that it no longer intended 
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to call Shivdasani at trial.  Instead, approximately two hours prior to the 
deadline for submission of the parties’ pretrial briefs, proposed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law, and proposed joint pretrial order RAI 
disclosed to the Appellants for the first time that RAI no longer intended 
to call Shivdasani at trial.  This eleventh-hour decision was tactical.  RAI 
realized that Shivdasani’s testimony would harm its case because:  (i) his 
event study demonstrated that RAI’s market was inefficient; and (ii) 
Shivdasani suffers from significant credibility problems. 
Because of RAI’s belated attempt to abandon Shivdasani as a 
testifying expert, Appellants asked the Business Court to apply the so-
called “missing witness rule” and to draw an inference that Shivdasani’s 
testimony would have been adverse to RAI.  MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 
264 (7th ed. 2016) (“When it would be natural under the circumstances 
for a party to call a particular witness . . . and the party fails to do so, 
tradition has allowed the adversary to use this failure as the basis for 
invoking an adverse inference.”).  The missing witness rule is recognized 
in North Carolina and has been characterized as “similar” to “the well-
established principle of ‘spoliation of evidence.’”  McLain v. Taco Bell 
Corp., 527 S.E.2d 712, 715–16 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Yarborough 
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v. Hughes, 51 S.E. 904 (N.C. 1905)); see also Cuthrell v. Greene, 50 S.E.2d 
525, 529 (N.C. 1948) (collecting decisions).  The Business Court declined 
to apply the missing witness rule, reasoning that (i) the rule should not 
apply to expert witnesses and (ii) the rule does not apply because 
Appellants could have introduced Shivdasani’s deposition testimony.  
These conclusions were erroneous. 
The Business Court stated that “North Carolina courts have never 
suggested that the missing witness rule should apply to expert 
witnesses.”  (R p 327 ¶ 19).  While true, that statement also is 
incomplete—until the Business Court’s ruling below, no North Carolina 
court had been asked to apply the missing witness rule to an expert.  The 
fact that the question is one of first impression in North Carolina does 
not support the Business Court’s refusal to draw an adverse inference in 
this case.  Moreover, while there are two decisions (both cited by the 
Business Court; see R p 327 ¶ 19) in which the missing witness rule was 
held inapplicable to experts, the weight of authority—and the better-
reasoned set of decisions—is to the contrary.  The Business Court’s 
Evidentiary Rulings fail to mention—let alone address—the litany of 
instances in which North Carolina’s sister states have applied the 
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missing witness rule to experts.  See, e.g., Taylor v. Kohli, 642 N.E.2d 
467, 469–70 (Ill. 1994) (holding that missing witness rule applies to 
experts unless notice of abandonment of the expert is “given in 
reasonable time prior to trial”); DeVito v. Feliciano, 1 N.E.3d 791, 795-96 
(N.Y. 2013) (reversing based on failure to give missing witness 
instruction); Cler v. Providence Health Sys., 245 P.3d 642, 647 (Ore. 2010) 
(holding that missing witness rule was applicable to nurse expert); State 
v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1338 (Conn. 1994) (holding that missing witness 
instruction permitting adverse inference against defendant in criminal 
case who failed to call psychiatric experts was proper notwithstanding 
psychiatrist-patient privilege); Kovach v. Solomon, 732 A.2d 1, 8–12 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1999) (applying missing witness rule to physician expert); 
Dickey v. McCord, 63 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (“We note, 
however, that the Business Court premised its decision on an erroneous 
belief that the missing witness rule does not apply to experts, when, in 
fact, it does indeed apply to expert witnesses.”).33 
                                                 
33 Although the missing witness rule frequently is applied in jury trials, it also is 
applicable in bench trials.  See In re Adam K, 110 A.D.3d 168, 177-78 (NY App. Div. 
2013) (“[T]he missing witness rule may be applied in a nonjury civil trial.”) 
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If anything, applying the missing witness rule to experts makes 
even more sense—and is more equitable—than applying the rule to a 
missing fact witness.  As noted by Professor McCormick, the logic behind 
the missing witness rule is that a party who fails to call “a witness 
reasonably assumed to be favorably disposed to [that] party” is hiding 
damaging evidence. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 264 (citations omitted).  
The inference that a paid, testifying expert ought to be “favorably 
disposed to” the party that hired that expert—and that a failure to call 
the expert is an effort to bury damaging admissions—a fortiori is stronger 
than the same inference for a fact witness.  Before an expert is disclosed 
as a testifying expert, parties vet multiple candidates and gain an 
understanding of the scope of the opinions the expert expects to be able 
to provide.  No party in civil litigation ever discloses a testifying expert 
unless and until the party believes the expert is “favorably disposed to” 
its view of the case.  Stated differently, parties cannot choose their fact 
witnesses; the identities of the relevant, percipient witnesses are set 
before litigation ever begins.  But a party not only can choose its expert, 
but also must pay that expert for the privilege of his or her testimony.  
The decision to withdraw a testifying expert essentially on the eve of 
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trial, without explanation, cries out for application of the missing witness 
rule.34 
The Business Court also justified its decision not to apply the 
missing witness rule by suggesting that Appellants could have 
introduced Shivdasani’s deposition testimony at trial.  (R p 327 ¶ 18).  
This rationale was a misapplication of certain decisions holding that the 
missing witness rule applies only if the witness is not equally available 
to both sides.  (See id. ¶ 17 (citing Dansbury v. State, 1 A.3d 507, 521 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 2010) and State v. Montgomery, 183 P.3d 267, 278 (Wash. 
2008))).  No decision of which Appellants are aware has held that a 
witness is “equally available” to both sides based on the existence of 
deposition testimony.  Each such decision—including the two cited by the 
Business Court—focused on whether the “missing” witness was available 
to be called live at trial.  Indeed, both Dansbury and Montgomery were 
criminal cases; there were no discovery depositions involved.   
                                                 
34 There should be no concern in this case that application of the missing witness rule 
somehow would be unfair.  Shivdasani’s event study showed that RAI’s market was 
inefficient—a point RAI did not contest below and that the Business Court failed to 
account for in its decision.   
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More to the point, a witness who is under the control of one party 
or believed to be biased in favor of that party is not “equally available” to 
the other side, regardless of physical availability.  See, e.g., Simmons v. 
Univ. of Chicago Hosp. & Clinics, 642 N.E.2d 107, 111 (Ill. 1994) (“A 
witness is not equally available to a party if there is a likelihood that the 
witness would be biased against him”) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); People v. Gonzalez, 502 N.E.2d 583, 587 (N.Y. 1986) 
(“Thus the fact that a witness is ‘equally available’ to both sides, standing 
alone, is insufficient to defeat a timely request” to apply the missing 
witness rule).  As stated by Professor McCormick: 
It is often said that if a witness is “equally 
available” to both parties, no inference springs 
from the failure of either to call the witness.  This 
can hardly be accurate, as the inference may be 
allowed when the witness could easily be called or 
subpoenaed by either party.  What is in fact meant 
is that when so far as appears the witness would 
be as likely to be favorable to one party as the 
other, there will be no inference. 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 264.  Shivdasani, as RAI’s paid expert, 
was not “equally available” to Appellants as a matter of law, 
notwithstanding the existence of Shivdasani’s deposition testimony or 
Appellants’ theoretical ability to subpoena him. 
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B. The Trial Court Erred In Permitting Gompers To 
Vouch For The Work Of Others And To Insert Hearsay 
Into The Record  
“One of the worst abuses in civil litigation is the attempted spoon-
feeding of client-prepared and lawyer-orchestrated ‘facts’ to a hired 
expert who then ‘relies’ on the information to express an 
opinion.”  Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 2008 WL 2323856, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2008).  “There is no ‘particular field’ in which 
experts go along with this charade other than litigation.  The field of 
testifying for a living is not what Rule 703 had in mind.”  Id.  The sole 
expert that RAI called at trial, Professor Paul Gompers (“Gompers”), 
offered multiple categories of testimony that fit this description and that 
should have been excluded.   
Gompers testified that part of his assignment was to evaluate the 
DCF analyses performed by Lazard, JPM, and Goldman Sachs.  (T p 
723:20-25).  Gompers then proceeded to offer extensive testimony about 
the reliability of the financial advisors’ analysis and his agreement with 
the testimony of RAI management.  (See, e.g., id. at 724:4-735:23; 745:21–
746:6; 751:3-25; 754:24-756:18, 759:23-760:22, 767:5-20; App. 99-110, 
120-36).  Appellants objected to this testimony and sought its exclusion 
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because experts cannot merely vouch for the opinions of others.  See, e.g., 
State v. Bullock, 2010 WL 4290134, at *3 (N.C. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2010) 
(“[E]xpert testimony is not admissible to vouch for a witness’s 
credibility.”); FrontFour Capital Grp. LLC, v. Taube, 2019 WL 1313408, 
at *26 (Del. Ch. Mar. 11, 2019) (“Zenner did not opine on the value of 
Medley Capital, a fair price to acquire Medley Capital, or the value of the 
combined company if the Proposed Transactions were to occur.  He 
opined that the process used by various investment banks was 
reasonable, but an expert cannot simply vouch for the work of someone 
else.”) (citing Va. Power Energy Mktg., Inc. v. EQT Energy, LLC, 2012 
WL 13034278, at *1 (E.D. Va. May 9, 2012)); Dura Auto. Sys. of Ind., Inc. 
v. CTS Corp., 285 F.3d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (holding that 
expert cannot “just parrot[ ]” the opinion of another expert or become 
another expert’s “spokesman”) (citations omitted), accord HealthOne of 
Denver, Ind. v. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 2012 WL 94678, at *6 (D. Colo. 
Jan. 12, 2012) (holding that “testimony . . . that attempts to bolster the 
legitimacy” of another expert’s analysis “would be improper”); Ash Grove 
Cement Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 246 F.R.D. 656, 661 (D. Kan. 
2007) (holding that an expert “may not simply parrot or recite the 
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opinions and knowledge of other expert and fact witnesses”); In re 
Wagner, 2007 WL 966010, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2007) (“The Federal 
Rules of Evidence do not permit experts to simply ‘parrot’ the ideas of 
other experts or individuals.”) (citing Loeffel Steel Prods. v. Delta Brands, 
387 F.Supp.2d 794, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2005)).  RAI did not designate its 
financial advisors as experts, it was inappropriate for RAI to attempt to 
use them as back-door experts, and it was doubly inappropriate for RAI 
to use Gompers to provide an imprimatur of expert legitimacy to the 
investment bankers’ work.   
The Business Court overruled Appellants’ objection on this point, 
concluding that “Gompers performed his own detailed, independent 
analyses using customary valuation techniques and relying on his 
training and expertise as a financial economist, to test the validity and 
reasonableness of the Financial Advisors’ inputs, analyses, and 
valuations.”  (R pp 320-21 ¶ 9 (emphasis added)).  But that is precisely 
the point—Gompers’ vouching may have been carefully considered, but it 
was nonetheless vouching.  The ‘punch line’ to the portion of Gompers’ 
trial testimony related to the bankers’ work was teed up through the 
following question: “So overall, now that we’ve marched through the 
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different inputs to the bankers’ analyses, what conclusion did you draw 
about the reasonableness of the work that they did?”  (T p 767:5-8).  In 
short, Gompers was asked to bless the analyses conducted by RAI’s 
investment bankers.  That is not a proper function of expert testimony.   
This case is analytically indistinguishable from FrontFour, 2019 
WL 1313408, at *26, in which the Delaware Court of Chancery held that 
improper vouching occurred when an expert “opined that the process 
used by various investment banks was reasonable.”  The Business Court 
cited and purported to follow the holding of FrontFour as one example of 
improper expert vouching (see R p 320 ¶ 8), but never attempted to 
distinguish the testimony in FrontFour from the testimony offered by 
Gompers.  There is no distinction to be drawn.  In both cases, the expert 
purported to carefully analyze the work of investment bankers who were 
not called as experts, which is the very definition of vouching.  That 
Gompers applied his “training and expertise” to his evaluation of the 
bankers’ work (R pp320-21 ¶ 9) is irrelevant.  If anything, doing so only 
makes the vouching more insidious because it provides an additional 
patina of legitimacy to the work of RAI’s investment bankers—who were 
not called as expert witnesses in their own right.   
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Gompers also attempted to summarize the factual record, 
characterized the testimony of various lay witnesses, and was used as a 
conduit for hearsay analyst reports.  (See, e.g., T pp 731:6-733:7, 735:8-
24, 760:14-22; 801:21-803:8).  For reasons similar to those that preclude 
Gompers from vouching for the analysis conducted by the financial 
advisors, Gompers’ purported summation of the factual record, 
characterization of the testimony of others, and recitation of hearsay 
should have been excluded.  See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 409 S.E.2d 288, 
302 (N.C. 1991) (holding that hearsay testimony introduced through 
expert witness was inadmissible where expert did not render an opinion 
and the hearsay thus was offered for the truth of the matter); Factory 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alon USA L.P., 705 F.3d 518, 524 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Rule 
703 was not intended to abolish the hearsay rule and to allow a witness, 
under the guise of giving expert testimony, to in effect become the 
mouthpiece of the witnesses on whose statements or opinions the expert 
purports to base his opinion.”) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Bankatlantic Bancorp, Inc., 2013 WL 
12009694, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2013) (“James’ purported fourth 
opinion consists of nothing more than a summary of the analysts’ 
- 131 - 
 
reports. . . .  Because James did not actually render an opinion, the 
probative/prejudicial prong of Rule 703 does not come into play and 
Defendants’ attempt to gain admissibility of the hearsay analysts’ reports 
through Rule 703 to rebut the SEC’s securities fraud claims fails.”); 
Gannett Co., Inc. v. Kanaga, 750 A.2d 1174, 1187-88 (Del. 2000) 
(discussing danger of expert testimony used as “back door” exception to 
hearsay rule). 
The Business Court overruled Appellants’ objections on these 
issues.  As to the analyst reports, the Business Court acknowledged that 
they are hearsay but concluded that, because “analyst reports are 
frequently relied upon by valuation experts in appraisal actions,” 
Gompers was entitled to “explain how the reports supported his 
conclusions.”  (R pp 324-25 ¶¶ 14-15).  Respectfully, the Business Court’s 
stated rationale puts the rabbit in the hat.  Gompers did not offer an 
independent valuation of RAI, so the observation that analyst reports are 
relied upon by valuation experts is a non sequitur.  The statement that 
Gompers explained how the analyst reports supported his conclusions 
both misconstrues the record and misstates the applicable legal rule.  In 
appropriate circumstances, experts may rely on hearsay in conducting 
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their own analyses.  But the very portions of the trial transcript cited by 
the Business Court prove that is not what occurred here.  
In support of the proposition that Gompers “examined each 
individual analyst report and explained how the reports supported his 
conclusions,” the Business Court cited the trial transcript at pages 
729:24-730:9, 745:21-747:2, and 785:24-786:8.  (R p 324 ¶ 14).  At the 
cited portions of pages 729 and 730 of the trial transcript, Gompers is 
discussing the cash flow projections used in RAI’s investment bankers’ 
valuations.  Gompers did not rely on analyst reports to perform his own 
discounted cash flow analysis.  Gompers did not perform a discounted 
cash flow analysis at all.  Testifying that analyst reports buttress the 
investment bankers’ work just compounds the impropriety of Gompers’ 
testimony by combining vouching with back-door hearsay.   
At the cited portions of pages 745 through 747 of the trial 
transcript, Gompers again is discussing the investment bankers’ work, 
not his own.  In this excerpt, the topic is the bankers’ choices of a 
perpetuity growth rate in their discounted cash flow analyses.  One 
particular exchange is telling: 
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A. . . . But it is the same set of work that I did that 
I would have done had I come up with my own 
estimate. 
Q.  And is the work that you just described the 
work that financial economists do in the ordinary 
course of their field? 
A.  Oh, any time I’ve done my own valuation, I’ve 
done -- I do that exact same set of things where you 
look at industry reports, analyst reports and the 
like, to come up with an assessment of what you 
think an appropriate perpetuity growth rate would 
be. 
(T p 745:13-20; App. 120).  In other words, Gompers admitted that he did 
not use analyst reports in connection with his own perpetuity growth rate 
analysis because he did not perform any such analysis.   
 At the cited portions of pages 785 and 786 of the trial transcript, 
Gompers is discussing market efficiency.  The sum total of his reference 
to analyst reports is that he saw nothing in the analyst reports to suggest 
inefficiency.  But of course, the burden was on RAI to prove efficiency, 
and once again, RAI’s sole expert had no opinion to offer.  As Gompers 
admitted, he did not form any view as to whether the market for RAI 
stock was efficient at the relevant time.  (T pp 784:23-785:2, 785:20-23; 
App. 137-38).   
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RAI’s deployment of Gompers to bolster the testimony of the 
Company’s own fact witnesses was even more egregious than its use of 
Gompers to get hearsay into the record.  Appellants objected below to 
Gompers improperly providing a summary of the factual record.  The 
Business Court acknowledged that “[a]n expert is not permitted to 
‘rehash[ ] otherwise admissible evidence’ or testify ‘solely for the purpose 
of constructing a factual narrative based upon record evidence.’”  (R pp 
321-22 ¶ 10).  However, the Business Court overruled Appellants’ 
objection, reasoning (without specific citation to the record) that Gompers 
did not do so.  (See id.).  However, a review of the trial transcript 
demonstrates otherwise. 
By way of example, Gompers was asked a series of questions 
purporting to seek his recollection of the testimony of Debra Crew, RAI’s 
former CEO.  (T pp 731:18-732:16; App. 106-07).  After the Business 
Court sustained an objection to the final question in the series, RAI’s 
counsel asked Gompers whether he agreed with the testimony Crew 
delivered during the trial.  (T pp 732:24-733:7; App. 107-08).  Essentially, 
Gompers was asked to re-hash the record and then vouch for the views of 
- 135 - 
 
Crew regarding the reliability of RAI’s projections.  Again, offering such 
views is not a proper function of expert testimony. 
V. THE BUSINESS COURT ERRED IN ITS DETERMINATION 
OF THE INTEREST DUE THE APPELLANTS  
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(e)(i), “[e]ach shareholder made 
party to the [judicial appraisal action] is entitled to judgment . . . for the 
amount, if any, by which the court finds the fair value of the shareholder’s 
shares, plus interest, exceeds the amount paid by the corporation to the 
shareholder for the shareholder’s shares.”  Under North Carolina law, 
the courts “must implement the statute according to the plain meaning 
of its terms so long as it is reasonable to do so.” Midrex Techs., Inc., v. 
N.C. Dep’t of Rev., 369 N.C. 250, 258 (2016) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted); see also, e.g., Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 628 S.E.2d 
1, 3 (N.C. 2006) (“When the language of the statute is clear and without 
ambiguity, it is the duty of [courts] to effect the plain meaning of the 
statute”).35 
                                                 
35 Statutory text should be interpreted in accordance with the rules of grammar, 
including the last antecedent rule (through which relative and qualifying words and 
phrases ordinarily apply to the word or phrase immediately preceding). HCA 
Crossroads Residential Centers, Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., Div. of Facility 
Svcs., 398 S.E.2d 466, 470 (N.C. 1990) (collecting decisions); see generally United 
States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241–42 (1989) (discussing 
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Under the plain language of Section 55-13-30(e), the Business 
Court was obligated to calculate the fair value of Defendants’ shares plus 
interest at the statutory rate from the Transaction Date to the date of 
payment, and then subtract from that amount (i.e., fair value plus 
interest) the amount already paid by RAI.  This result follows the plain 
language of the statute (requiring the addition of interest before the 
subtraction of amounts already paid).  Indeed, this formulation ((fair 
value plus interest) minus (amount paid)) appears repeatedly throughout 
the North Carolina appraisal statute.  N.C.G.S. § 55-13-25, for example, 
provides that, “[a] shareholder paid pursuant to [N.C.G.S. §] 55-13-25, 
who is dissatisfied with the amount of the payment must notify the 
corporation in writing of that shareholder’s estimate of the fair value of 
the shares and demand payment of that estimate plus interest (less any 
payment under 55-13-25).”  (emphasis added).  N.C.G.S. § 55-13-30(a), 
too, provides that the corporation shall file a complaint “to determine the 
fair value of the shares and accrued interest.”   
                                                 
grammatically-appropriate reading of statutory provision regarding interest award). 
Here, the phrase “plus interest” in Section 55-13-30(e) modifies the full fair value 
award prior to taking any deduction for amounts previously paid. 
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These statutory provisions plainly contemplate that interest be 
calculated on the total fair value amount, not on any difference between 
that amount and the amount already paid.  In Torrington Research Co. 
v. Marvin, 2010 WL 1667580, at *7 & Addendum (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 
6, 2010), the Court, applying an identical statutory provision, calculated 
the judgment required by the statute in just that way.  To avoid this 
result, states that follow the MBCA, but that (as a policy matter) have 
chosen to award dissenters interest only on the difference between fair 
value and any amount previously paid, have revised their appraisal 
statute accordingly. See, e.g., 15 Pa. C.S. § 1579(d) (“Each dissenter who 
is made a party shall be entitled to recover the amount by which the fair 
value of his shares is found to exceed the amount, if any, previously 
remitted, plus interest.”).  North Carolina has not adopted a formulation 
that calls for interest to be paid only on the difference between fair value 
and amounts previously paid to dissenting stockholders by the 
corporation. 
Nonetheless, the Business Court concluded that Appellants’ 
reading of § 55-13-30(e)(i) would lead to an absurd result, inconsistent 
with the statutory text, simply because the math is such that calculating 
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interest even on the unreasonably low valuation adopted by the Business 
Court would lead to a significant award.  (R p 312 ¶ 379).  The Business 
Court’s textual point is ipse dixit.  Respectfully, there is no way to read 
the text of § 55-13-30(e)(i) as calling for anything other than the addition 
of interest before the deduction of amounts paid, and the contrast 
between the North Carolina and Pennsylvania statutes makes this point 
clear.  As to the Business Court’s conclusion that the sheer amount of the 
interest award here would be “absurd,” this outcome-based reasoning 
cannot be correct; it suggests that if the interest due Appellants were only 
$1, then the plain language of the appraisal statute could be followed.  
CONCLUSION 
 The Court should reverse the Judgement of the Business Court 
and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s 
decision.   
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Part 1. Right to Appraisal and Payment for Shares. 
§ 55-13-01.  Definitions.
In this Article, the following definitions apply:
(1) Affiliate. – A person that directly, or indirectly, through one or more
intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with
another person or is a senior executive thereof. For purposes of
G.S. 55-13-01(7), a person is deemed to be an affiliate of its senior executives.
(2) Beneficial shareholder. – A person who is the beneficial owner of shares held
in a voting trust or by a nominee on the beneficial owner's behalf.
(3) Corporation. – The issuer of the shares held by a shareholder demanding
appraisal and, for matters covered in G.S. 55-13-22 through G.S. 55-13-31, the
term includes the surviving entity in a merger.
(4) Expenses. – Reasonable expenses of every kind that are incurred in connection
with a matter, including counsel fees.
(5) Fair value. – The value of the corporation's shares (i) immediately before the
effectuation of the corporate action as to which the shareholder asserts appraisal
rights, excluding any appreciation or depreciation in anticipation of the
corporate action unless exclusion would be inequitable, (ii) using customary
and current valuation concepts and techniques generally employed for similar
business in the context of the transaction requiring appraisal, and (iii) without
discounting for lack of marketability or minority status except, if appropriate,
for amendments to the articles pursuant to G.S. 55-13-02(a)(5).
(6) Interest. – Interest from the effective date of the corporate action until the date
of payment, at the rate of interest on judgments in this State on the effective
date of the corporate action.
(7) Interested transaction. – A corporate action described in G.S. 55-13-02(a), other
than a merger pursuant to G.S. 55-11-04 or G.S. 55-11-12, involving an
interested person and in which any of the shares or assets of the corporation are
being acquired or converted. As used in this definition, the following definitions
apply:
a. Interested person. – A person, or an affiliate of a person, who at any
time during the one-year period immediately preceding approval by the
board of directors of the corporate action met any of the following
conditions:
1. Was the beneficial owner of twenty percent (20%) or more of
the voting power of the corporation, other than as owner of
excluded shares.
2. Had the power, contractually or otherwise, other than as owner
of excluded shares, to cause the appointment or election of
twenty-five percent (25%) or more of the directors to the board
of directors of the corporation.
3. Was a senior executive or director of the corporation or a senior
executive of any affiliate thereof, and that senior executive or
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director will receive, as a result of the corporate action, a 
financial benefit not generally available to other shareholders as 
such, other than any of the following: 
I. Employment, consulting, retirement, or similar benefits
established separately and not as part of or in
contemplation of the corporate action.
II. Employment, consulting, retirement, or similar benefits
established in contemplation of, or as part of, the
corporate action that are not more favorable than those
existing before the corporate action or, if more favorable,
that have been approved on behalf of the corporation in
the same manner as is provided in G.S. 55-8-31(a)(1)
and (c).
III. In the case of a director of the corporation who will, in
the corporate action, become a director of the acquiring
entity, or one of its affiliates, rights and benefits as a
director that are provided on the same basis as those
afforded by the acquiring entity generally to other
directors of the acquiring entity or such affiliate of the
acquiring entity.
b. Beneficial owner. – Any person who, directly or indirectly, through any
contract, arrangement, or understanding, other than a revocable proxy,
has or shares the power to vote, or to direct the voting of, shares. If a
member of a national securities exchange is precluded by the rules of
the exchange from voting without instruction on contested matters or
matters that may affect substantially the rights or privileges of the
holders of the securities to be voted, then that member of a national
securities exchange shall not be deemed a "beneficial owner" of any
securities held directly or indirectly by the member on behalf of another
person solely because the member is the record holder of the securities.
When two or more persons agree to act together for the purpose of
voting their shares of the corporation, each member of the group formed
thereby is deemed to have acquired beneficial ownership, as of the date
of the agreement, of all voting shares of the corporation beneficially
owned by any member of the group.
c. Excluded shares. – Shares acquired pursuant to an offer for all shares
having voting power if the offer was made within one year prior to the
corporate action for consideration of the same kind and of a value equal
to or less than that paid in connection with the corporate action.
(8) Preferred shares. – A class or series of shares the holders of which have
preference over any other class or series with respect to distributions.
(9) Record shareholder. – The person in whose name shares are registered in the
records of the corporation or the beneficial owner of shares to the extent of the
rights granted by a nominee certificate on file with the corporation.
(10) Senior executive. – The chief executive officer, chief operating officer, chief
financial officer, or anyone in charge of a principal business unit or function.
- App. 2 -
(11) Shareholder. – Both a record shareholder and a beneficial shareholder.  (1925,
c. 77, s. 1; 1943, c. 270; G.S., s. 55-167; 1955, c. 1371, s. 1; 1969, c. 751, s. 39;
1973, c. 469, ss. 36, 37; 1989, c. 265, s. 1; 2011-347, s. 1; 2018-45, s. 24.)
§ 55-13-02.  Right to appraisal.
(a) In addition to any rights granted under Article 9 of this Chapter, a shareholder is entitled
to appraisal rights and to obtain payment of the fair value of that shareholder's shares, in the event 
of any of the following corporate actions: 
(1) Consummation of a merger to which the corporation is a party if either (i)
shareholder approval is required for the merger by G.S. 55-11-03 or would be
required but for the provisions of G.S. 55-11-03(j), except that appraisal rights
shall not be available to any shareholder of the corporation with respect to
shares of any class or series that remain outstanding after consummation of the
merger or (ii) the corporation is a subsidiary and the merger is governed by
G.S. 55-11-04 or G.S. 55-11-12.
(2) Consummation of a share exchange to which the corporation is a party as the
corporation whose shares will be acquired, except that appraisal rights shall not
be available to any shareholder of the corporation with respect to any class or
series of shares of the corporation that is not exchanged.
(3) Consummation of a disposition of assets pursuant to G.S. 55-12-02.
(4) An amendment of the articles of incorporation (i) with respect to a class or
series of shares that reduces the number of shares of a class or series owned by
the shareholder to a fraction of a share if the corporation has an obligation or
right to repurchase the fractional share so created or (ii) changes the corporation
into a nonprofit corporation or cooperative organization.
(5) Any other amendment to the articles of incorporation, merger, share exchange,
or disposition of assets to the extent provided by the articles of incorporation,
bylaws, or a resolution of the board of directors.
(6) Consummation of a conversion to a foreign corporation pursuant to Part 2 of
Article 11A of this Chapter if the shareholder does not receive shares in the
foreign corporation resulting from the conversion that (i) have terms as
favorable to the shareholder in all material respects and (ii) represent at least
the same percentage interest of the total voting rights of the outstanding shares
of the corporation as the shares held by the shareholder before the conversion.
(7) Consummation of a conversion of the corporation to nonprofit status pursuant
to Part 2 of Article 11A of this Chapter.
(8) Consummation of a conversion of the corporation to an unincorporated entity
pursuant to Part 2 of Article 11A of this Chapter.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the availability of appraisal rights under
subdivisions (1), (2), (3), (4), (6), and (8) of subsection (a) of this section shall be limited in 
accordance with the following provisions: 
(1) Appraisal rights shall not be available for the holders of shares of any class or
series of shares that are any of the following:
a. A covered security under section 18(b)(1)(A) or (B) of the Securities
Act of 1933, as amended.
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b. Traded in an organized market and has at least 2,000 shareholders and 
a market value of at least twenty million dollars ($20,000,000) 
(exclusive of the value of shares held by the corporation's subsidiaries, 
senior executives, directors, and beneficial shareholders owning more 
than ten percent (10%) of such shares). 
c. Issued by an open-end management investment company registered 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, as amended, and may be redeemed at the option 
of the holder at net asset value. 
(2) The applicability of subdivision (1) of this subsection shall be determined as of 
(i) the record date fixed to determine the shareholders entitled to receive notice 
of, and to vote at, the meeting of shareholders to act upon the corporate action 
requiring appraisal rights or, in the case of an offer made pursuant to 
G.S. 55-11-03(j), the date of the offer, or (ii) the day before the effective date 
of the corporate action if there is no meeting of shareholders and no offer made 
pursuant to G.S. 55-11-03(j). 
(3) Subdivision (1) of this subsection shall not be applicable and appraisal rights 
shall be available pursuant to subsection (a) of this section for the holders of 
any class or series of shares who are required by the terms of the corporate 
action requiring appraisal rights to accept for such shares anything other than 
cash or shares of any class or any series of shares of any corporation, or any 
other proprietary interest of any other entity, that satisfies the standards set forth 
in subdivision (1) of this subsection at the time the corporate action becomes 
effective. 
(4) Subdivision (1) of this subsection shall not be applicable and appraisal rights 
shall be available pursuant to subsection (a) of this section for the holders of 
any class or series of shares where the corporate action is an interested 
transaction. 
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the articles of incorporation as 
originally filed or any amendment to the articles may limit or eliminate appraisal rights for any 
class or series of preferred shares with respect to any corporate action, except that (i) no limitation 
or elimination shall be effective if the class or series does not have the right to vote separately as 
a voting group, alone or as part of a group, on the corporate action or if the corporate action is an 
amendment to the articles of incorporation that changes the corporation into a nonprofit 
corporation or a cooperative organization, and (ii) any limitation or elimination contained in an 
amendment to the articles of incorporation that limits or eliminates appraisal rights for any shares 
that are outstanding immediately prior to the effective date of the amendment, or that the 
corporation is or may be required to issue or sell thereafter pursuant to any conversion, exchange, 
or other right existing immediately before the effective date of the amendment, shall not apply to 
any corporate action that becomes effective within one year of that date if the corporate action 
would otherwise afford appraisal rights. 
(d) Repealed by Session Laws 2018-45, s. 25, effective October 1, 2018.  (1925, c. 77, s. 
1; c. 235; 1929, c. 269; 1939, c. 279; 1943, c. 270; G.S., ss. 55-26, 55-167; 1955, c. 1371, s. 1; 
1959, c. 1316, ss. 30, 31; 1969, c. 751, ss. 36, 39; 1973, c. 469, ss. 36, 37; c. 476, s. 193; 1989, c. 
265, s. 1; 1989 (Reg. Sess., 1990), c. 1024, s. 12.18; 1991, c. 645, s. 12; 1997-202, s. 1; 1999-141, 
s. 1; 2001-387, s. 26; 2003-157, s. 1; 2011-347, ss. 1, 22(c); 2018-45, s. 25.) 
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§ 55-13-03.  Assertion of rights by nominees and beneficial owners. 
(a) A record shareholder may assert appraisal rights as to fewer than all the shares 
registered in the record shareholder's name but owned by a beneficial shareholder only if the record 
shareholder (i) objects with respect to all shares of the class or series owned by the beneficial 
shareholder and (ii) notifies the corporation in writing of the name and address of each beneficial 
shareholder on whose behalf appraisal rights are being asserted. The rights of a record shareholder 
who asserts appraisal rights for only part of the shares held of record in the record shareholder's 
name under this subsection shall be determined as if the shares as to which the record shareholder 
objects and the record shareholder's other shares were registered in the names of different record 
shareholders. 
(b) A beneficial shareholder may assert  appraisal rights as to shares of any class or series 
held on behalf of the shareholder only if the shareholder does both of the following: 
(1) Submits to the corporation the record shareholder's written consent to the 
assertion of rights no later than the date referred to in G.S. 55-13-22(b)(2)b. 
(2) Submits written consent under subdivision (1) of this subsection with respect to 
all shares of  the class or series that are beneficially owned by the beneficial 
shareholder.  (1925, c. 77, s. 1; 1943, c. 270; G.S., s. 55-167; 1955, c. 1371, s. 
1; 1969, c. 751, s. 39; 1973, c. 469, ss. 36, 37; 1989, c. 265, s. 1; 2011-347, s. 
1.) 
 
§§ 55-13-04 through 55-13-19.  Reserved for future codification purposes. 
 
Part 2. Procedure for Exercise of Appraisal Rights. 
§ 55-13-20.  Notice of appraisal rights. 
(a) If any corporate action specified in G.S. 55-13-02(a) is to be submitted to a vote at a 
shareholders' meeting, or where no approval of the action is required pursuant to G.S. 55-11-03(j), 
the meeting notice or, if applicable, the offer made pursuant to G.S. 55-11-03(j), shall state that 
the corporation has concluded that shareholders are, are not, or may be entitled to assert appraisal 
rights under this Article. If the corporation concludes that appraisal rights are or may be available, 
a copy of this Article shall accompany the meeting notice or offer sent to those record shareholders 
entitled to exercise appraisal rights. 
(b) In a merger pursuant to G.S. 55-11-04 or G.S. 55-11-12, the parent corporation shall 
notify in writing all record shareholders of the subsidiary who are entitled to assert appraisal rights 
that the corporate action became effective. Notice required under this subsection shall be sent 
within 10 days after the corporate action became effective and include the materials described in 
G.S. 55-13-22. 
(c) If any corporate action specified in G.S. 55-13-02(a) is to be approved by written 
consent of the shareholders pursuant to G.S. 55-7-04, then the following must occur: 
(1) Written notice that appraisal rights are, are not, or may be available must be 
given to each record shareholder from whom a consent is solicited at the time 
consent of each shareholder is first solicited and, if the corporation has 
concluded that appraisal rights are or may be available, must be accompanied 
by a copy of this Article. 
(2) Written notice that appraisal rights are, are not, or may be available must be 
delivered together with the notice to the applicable shareholders required by 
- App. 5 -
subsections (d) and (e) of G.S. 55-7-04, may include the materials described in 
G.S. 55-13-22, and, if the corporation has concluded that appraisal rights are or 
may be available, must be accompanied by a copy of this Article. 
(d) If any corporate action described in G.S. 55-13-02(a) is proposed, or a merger pursuant 
to G.S. 55-11-04 or G.S. 55-11-12 is effected, then the notice or offer referred to in subsection (a) 
or (c) of this section, if the corporation concludes that appraisal rights are or may be available, and 
the notice referred to in subsection (b) of this section, shall be accompanied by both of the 
following: 
(1) The annual financial statements specified in G.S. 55-16-20(a) of the corporation 
that issued the shares to be appraised. The date of the financial statements shall 
not be more than 16 months before the date of the notice and shall comply with 
G.S. 55-16-20(b). If annual financial statements that meet the requirements of 
this subdivision are not reasonably available, then the corporation shall provide 
reasonably equivalent financial information. 
(2) The latest available quarterly financial statements of the corporation, if any. 
The right to receive the information described in this subsection may be waived in writing by a 
shareholder before or after the corporate action. 
(e) The right to receive the information described in subsection (d) of this section may be 
waived in writing by a shareholder before or after the corporate action.  (1925, c. 77, s. 1; c. 235; 
1929, c. 269; 1939, c. 5; c. 279; 1943, c. 270; G.S., ss. 55-26, 55-165, 55-167; 1955, c. 1371, s. 1; 
1969, c. 751, s. 39; 1973, c. 469, ss. 36, 37; 1989, c. 265, s. 1; 2002-58, s. 2; 2011-347, s. 1; 
2018-45, s. 26.) 
 
§ 55-13-21.  Notice of intent to demand payment and consequences of voting or consenting. 
(a) If a corporate action specified in G.S. 55-13-02(a) is submitted to a vote at a 
shareholders' meeting, a shareholder who wishes to assert appraisal rights with respect to any class 
or series of shares must do the following: 
(1) Deliver to the corporation, before the vote is taken, written notice of the 
shareholder's intent to demand payment if the proposed action is effectuated. 
(2) Not vote, or cause or permit to be voted, any shares of any class or series in 
favor of the proposed action. 
(b) If a corporate action specified in G.S. 55-13-02(a) is to be approved by less than 
unanimous written consent, a shareholder who wishes to assert appraisal rights with respect to any 
class or series of shares must satisfy both of the following requirements: 
(1) The shareholder must deliver to the corporation, before the proposed action 
becomes effective, written notice of the shareholder's intent to demand payment 
if the proposed action is effectuated, except that the written notice is not 
required if the notice required by G.S. 55-13-20(c) is given less than 25 days 
prior to the date the proposed action is effectuated. 
(2) The shareholder must not execute a consent in favor of the proposed action with 
respect to that class or series of shares. 
(b1) If a corporate action specified in G.S. 55-13-02(a) does not require shareholder 
approval pursuant to G.S. 55-11-03(j), a shareholder who wishes to assert appraisal rights with 
respect to any class or series of shares must satisfy both of the following requirements: 
(1) The shareholder must deliver to the corporation, before the shares are purchased 
pursuant to the offer made consistent with subdivision (2) of subsection (j) of 
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G.S. 55-11-03, written notice of the shareholder's intent to demand payment if 
the proposed action is effectuated. 
(2) The shareholder must not tender, or cause or permit to be tendered, any shares 
of the class or series in response to the offer. 
(c) A shareholder who fails to satisfy the requirements of subsection (a), (b), or (b1) of this 
section is not entitled to payment under this Article.  (1925, c. 77, s. 1; 1943, c. 270; G.S., s. 
55-167; 1955, c. 1371, s. 1; 1969, c. 751, s. 39; 1973, c. 469, ss. 36, 37; 1989, c. 265, s. 1; 2011-347, 
s. 1; 2018-45, s. 27.) 
 
§ 55-13-22.  Appraisal notice and form. 
(a) If a corporate action requiring appraisal rights under G.S. 55-13-02(a) becomes 
effective, the corporation must deliver a written appraisal notice and form required by subdivision 
(b)(1) of this section to all shareholders who satisfied the requirements of G.S. 55-13-21. In the 
case of a merger under G.S. 55-11-04 or G.S. 55-11-12, the parent corporation must deliver a 
written appraisal notice and form to all record shareholders of the subsidiary who may be entitled 
to assert appraisal rights. 
(b) The appraisal notice must be sent no earlier than the date the corporate action specified 
in G.S. 55-13-02(a) became effective and no later than 10 days after that date. The appraisal notice 
must include the following: 
(1) A form that specifies the first date of any announcement to shareholders, made 
prior to the date the corporate action became effective, of the principal terms of 
the proposed corporate action. If such an announcement was made, the form 
shall require a shareholder asserting appraisal rights to certify whether 
beneficial ownership of those shares for which appraisal rights are asserted was 
acquired before that date. The form shall require a shareholder asserting 
appraisal rights to certify that the shareholder did not vote for or consent to the 
transaction. 
(2) Disclosure of the following: 
a. Where the form must be sent and where certificates for certificated 
shares must be deposited, as well as the date by which those certificates 
must be deposited. The certificate deposit date must not be earlier than 
the date for receiving the required form under sub-subdivision b. of this 
subdivision. 
b. A date by which the corporation must receive the payment demand, 
which date may not be fewer than 40 nor more than 60 days after the 
date the appraisal notice required under subsection (a) of this section 
and form are sent. The form shall also state that the shareholder shall 
have waived the right to demand appraisal with respect to the shares 
unless the form is received by the corporation by the specified date. 
c. The corporation's estimate of the fair value of the shares. 
d. That, if requested in writing, the corporation will provide, to the 
shareholder so requesting, within 10 days after the date specified in 
sub-subdivision b. of this subdivision, the number of shareholders who 
return the forms by the specified date and the total number of shares 
owned by them. 
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e. The date by which the notice to withdraw under G.S. 55-13-23 must be 
received, which date must be within 20 days after the date specified in 
sub-subdivision b. of this subdivision. 
(3) Be accompanied by a copy of this Article.  (1925, c. 77, s. 1; 1943, c. 270; G.S., 
s. 55-167; 1955, c. 1371, s. 1; 1969, c. 751, s. 39; 1973, c. 469, ss. 36, 37; 1989, 
c. 265, s. 1; 1997-485, s. 4; 2001-387, s. 27; 2002-58, s. 3; 2011-347, s. 1; 
2018-45, s. 28.) 
 
§ 55-13-23.  Perfection of rights; right to withdraw. 
(a) A shareholder who receives notice pursuant to G.S. 55-13-22 and who wishes to 
exercise appraisal rights must sign and return the form sent by the corporation and, in the case of 
certificated shares, deposit the shareholder's certificates in accordance with the terms of the notice 
by the date referred to in the notice pursuant to G.S. 55-13-22(b)(2). In addition, if applicable, the 
shareholder must certify on the form whether the beneficial owner of such shares acquired 
beneficial ownership of the shares before the date required to be set forth in the notice pursuant to 
G.S. 55-13-22(b)(1). If a shareholder fails to make this certification, the corporation may elect to 
treat the shareholder's shares as after-acquired shares under G.S. 55-13-27. Once a shareholder 
deposits that shareholder's certificates or, in the case of uncertificated shares, returns the signed 
forms, that shareholder loses all rights as a shareholder, unless the shareholder withdraws pursuant 
to subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) A shareholder who has complied with subsection (a) of this section may nevertheless 
decline to exercise appraisal rights and withdraw from the appraisal process by so notifying the 
corporation in writing by the date set forth in the appraisal notice pursuant to G.S. 55-13-22(b)(2)e. 
A shareholder who fails to so withdraw from the appraisal process may not thereafter withdraw 
without the corporation's written consent. 
(c) A shareholder who does not  sign and return the form and, in the case of certificated 
shares, deposit that shareholder's share certificates where required, each by the date set forth in the 
notice described in G.S. 55-13-22(b) shall not be entitled to payment under this Article.  (1925, c. 
77, s. 1; 1943, c. 270; G.S., s. 55-167; 1955, c. 1371, s. 1; 1969, c. 751, s. 39; 1973, c. 469, ss. 36, 
37; 1989, c. 265, s. 1; 2011-347, s. 1.) 
 
§ 55-13-24:  Repealed by Session Laws 2011-347, s. 1, effective October 1, 2011. 
 
§ 55-13-25.  Payment. 
(a) Except as provided in G.S. 55-13-27, within 30 days after the form required by G.S. 
55-13-22(b) is due, the corporation shall pay in cash to the shareholders who complied with G.S. 
55-13-23(a) the amount the corporation estimates to be the fair value of their shares, plus interest. 
(b) The payment to each shareholder pursuant to subsection (a) of this section must be 
accompanied by the following: 
(1) The following financial information: 
a. The annual financial statements specified in G.S. 55-16-20(a) of the 
corporation that issued the shares to be appraised. The date of the 
financial statements shall not be more than 16 months before the date of 
payment and shall comply with G.S. 55-16-20(b). If annual financial 
statements that meet the requirements of this sub-subdivision are not 
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reasonably available, the corporation shall provide reasonably 
equivalent financial information. 
b. The latest available quarterly financial statements, if any. 
(2) A statement of the corporation's estimate of the fair value of the shares. The 
estimate must equal or exceed the corporation's estimate given pursuant to G.S. 
55-13-22(b)(2)c. 
(3) A statement that the shareholders described in subsection (a) of this section 
have the right to demand further payment under G.S. 55-13-28 and that if a 
shareholder does not do so within the time period specified therein, then the 
shareholder shall be deemed to have accepted such payment in full satisfaction 
of the corporation's obligations under this Article.  (1925, c. 77, s. 1; 1943, c. 
270; G.S., s. 55-167; 1955, c. 1371, s. 1; 1969, c. 751, s. 39; 1973, c. 469, ss. 
36, 37; 1989, c. 265, s. 1; c. 770, s. 69; 1997-202, s. 2; 2011-347, s. 1.) 
 
§ 55-13-26:  Repealed by Session Laws 2011-347, s. 1, effective October 1, 2011. 
 
§ 55-13-27.  After-acquired shares. 
(a) A corporation may elect to withhold payment required by G.S. 55-13-25 from any 
shareholder who was required to but did not certify that beneficial ownership of all of the 
shareholder's shares for which appraisal rights are asserted was acquired before the date set forth 
in the appraisal notice sent pursuant to G.S. 55-13-22(b)(1). 
(b) If the corporation elected to withhold payment under subsection (a) of this section, it 
must, within 30 days after the form required by G.S. 55-13-22(b) is due, notify all shareholders 
who are described in subsection (a) of this section of the following: 
(1) The information required by G.S. 55-13-25(b)(1). 
(2) The corporation's estimate of fair value pursuant to G.S. 55-13-25(b)(2). 
(3) That they may accept the corporation's estimate of fair value, plus interest, in 
full satisfaction of their demands or demand appraisal under G.S. 55-13-28. 
(4) That those shareholders who wish to accept such offer must so notify the 
corporation of their acceptance of the corporation's offer within 30 days after 
receiving the offer. 
(5) That those shareholders who do not satisfy the requirements for demanding 
appraisal under G.S. 55-13-28 shall be deemed to have accepted the 
corporation's offer. 
(c) Within 10 days after receiving the shareholder's acceptance pursuant to subsection (b) 
of this section, the corporation must pay in cash the amount it offered under subdivision (b)(2) of 
this section to each shareholder who agreed to accept the corporation's offer in full satisfaction of 
the shareholder's demand. 
(d) Within 40 days after sending the notice described in subsection (b) of this section, the 
corporation must pay in cash the amount it offered to pay under subdivision (b)(2) of this section 
to each shareholder described in subdivision (b)(5) of this section.  (2011-347, s. 1.) 
 
§ 55-13-28.  Procedure if shareholder dissatisfied with payment or offer. 
(a) A shareholder paid pursuant to G.S. 55-13-25 who is dissatisfied with the amount of 
the payment must notify the corporation in writing of that shareholder's estimate of the fair value 
of the shares and demand payment of that estimate plus interest (less any payment under G.S. 
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55-13-25). A shareholder offered payment under G.S. 55-13-27 who is dissatisfied with that offer 
must reject the offer and demand payment of the shareholder's stated estimate of the fair value of 
the shares, plus interest. 
(b) A shareholder who fails to notify the corporation in writing of that shareholder's 
demand to be paid the shareholder's stated estimate of the fair value, plus interest, under subsection 
(a) of this section within 30 days after receiving the corporation's payment or offer of payment 
under G.S. 55-13-25 or G.S. 55-13-27, respectively, waives the right to demand payment under 
this section and shall be entitled only to the payment made or offered pursuant to those respective 
sections.  (1925, c. 77, s. 1; 1943, c. 270; G.S., s. 55-167; 1955, c. 1371, s. 1; 1969, c. 751, s. 39; 
1973, c. 469, ss. 36, 37; 1989, c. 265, s. 1; 1997-202, s. 3; 2011-347, s. 1.) 
 
§ 55-13-29.  Reserved for future codification purposes. 
 
Part 3. Judicial Appraisal of Shares. 
§ 55-13-30.  Court Action. 
(a) If a shareholder makes a demand for payment under G.S. 55-13-28 which remains 
unsettled, the  corporation shall commence a proceeding within 60 days after receiving the 
payment demand by filing a complaint with the Superior Court Division of the General Court of 
Justice to determine the fair value of the shares and accrued interest. If the corporation does not 
commence the proceeding within the 60-day  period, the corporation shall pay in cash to each 
shareholder the amount the shareholder demanded pursuant to G.S. 55-13-28, plus interest. 
(a1) Repealed by Session Laws 1997-202, s. 4. 
(b) The corporation shall commence the proceeding in the appropriate court of the county 
where the corporation's principal office (or, if none, its registered office) in this State is located. If 
the corporation is a foreign corporation without a registered office in this State, it shall commence 
the proceeding in the county in this State where the principal office or registered office of the 
domestic corporation merged with the foreign corporation was located at the time of the 
transaction. 
(c) The corporation shall make all shareholders (whether or not residents of this State) 
whose demands remain unsettled parties to the proceeding as in an action against their shares and 
all parties must be served with a copy of the complaint. Nonresidents may be served by registered 
or certified mail or by publication as provided by law. 
(d) The jurisdiction of the superior court in which the proceeding is commenced under 
subsection (b) of this section is plenary and exclusive. The court may appoint one or more persons 
as appraisers to receive evidence and recommend a decision on the question of fair value. The 
appraisers shall have the powers described in the order appointing them, or in any amendment to 
it. The shareholders demanding appraisal rights are entitled to the same discovery rights as parties 
in other civil proceedings. There shall be no right to a trial by jury. 
(e) Each shareholder made a party to the proceeding is entitled to judgment either (i) for 
the amount, if any, by which the court finds the fair value of the shareholder's shares, plus interest, 
exceeds the amount paid by the corporation to the shareholder for the shareholder's shares or (ii) 
for the fair value, plus interest, of the shareholder's shares for which the corporation elected to 
withhold payment under G.S. 55-13-27.  (1925, c. 77, s. 1; 1943, c. 270; G.S., s. 55-167; 1955, c. 
1371, s. 1; 1969, c. 751, s. 39; 1973, c. 469, ss. 36, 37; 1989, c. 265, s. 1; 1997-202, s. 4; 1997-485, 
ss. 5, 5.1; 2011-347, s. 1.) 
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§ 55-13-31.  Court costs and expenses. 
(a) The court in an appraisal proceeding commenced under G.S. 55-13-30 shall determine 
all court costs of the proceeding, including the reasonable compensation and expenses of 
appraisers appointed by the court. The court shall assess the costs against the corporation, except 
that the court may assess costs against all or some of the shareholders demanding appraisal, in 
amounts the court finds equitable, to the extent the court finds such shareholders acted arbitrarily, 
vexatiously, or not in good faith with respect to the rights provided by this Article. 
(b) The court in an appraisal proceeding may also assess the expenses for the respective 
parties, in amounts the court finds equitable: 
(1) Against the corporation and in favor of any or all shareholders demanding 
appraisal if the court finds the corporation did not substantially comply with the 
requirements of G.S. 55-13-20, 55-13-22, 55-13-25, or 55-13-27. 
(2) Against either the corporation or a shareholder demanding appraisal, in favor 
of any other party, if the court finds that the party against whom expenses are 
assessed acted arbitrarily, vexatiously, or not in good faith with respect to the 
rights provided by this Article. 
(c) If the court in an appraisal proceeding finds that the expenses incurred by any 
shareholder were of substantial benefit to other shareholders similarly situated and that these 
expenses should not be assessed against the corporation, the court may direct that the expenses be 
paid out of the amounts awarded the shareholders who were benefited. 
(d) To the extent the corporation fails to make a required payment pursuant to G.S. 
55-13-25, 55-13-27, or 55-13-28, the shareholder may sue directly for the amount owed and, to 
the extent successful, shall be entitled to recover from the corporation all expenses of the suit.  
(1925, c. 77, s. 1; 1943, c. 270; G.S., s. 55-167; 1955, c. 1371, s. 1; 1969, c. 751, s. 39; 1973, c. 
469, ss. 36, 37; 1989, c. 265, s. 1; 2011-347, s. 1.) 
 
§ 55-13-32:  Reserved for future codification purposes. 
 
§ 55-13-33:  Reserved for future codification purposes. 
 
§ 55-13-34:  Reserved for future codification purposes. 
 
§ 55-13-35:  Reserved for future codification purposes. 
 
§ 55-13-36:  Reserved for future codification purposes. 
 
§ 55-13-37:  Reserved for future codification purposes. 
 
§ 55-13-38:  Reserved for future codification purposes. 
 
§ 55-13-39:  Reserved for future codification purposes. 
 
Part 4. Other Remedies. 
§ 55-13-40.  Other remedies limited. 
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(a) The legality of a proposed or completed corporate action described in G.S. 55-13-02(a) 
may not be contested, nor may the corporate action be enjoined, set aside, or rescinded, in a legal 
or equitable proceeding by a shareholder after the shareholders have approved the corporate action. 
(b) Subsection (a) of this section does not apply to a corporate action that: 
(1) Was not authorized and approved in accordance with the applicable provisions 
of any of the following: 
a. Article 9, 9A, 10, 11, 11A, or 12 of this Chapter. 
b. The articles of incorporation or bylaws. 
c. The resolution of the board of directors authorizing the corporate action. 
(2) Was procured as a result of fraud, a material misrepresentation, or an omission 
of a material fact necessary to make statements made, in light of the 
circumstances in which they were made, not misleading. 
(3) Constitutes an interested transaction, unless it has been authorized, approved, 
or ratified by either (i) the board of directors or a committee of the board or (ii) 
the shareholders, in the same manner as is provided in G.S. 55-8-31(a)(1) and 
(c) or in G.S. 55-8-31(a)(2) and (d), as if the interested transaction were a 
director's conflict of interest transaction. 
(4) Was approved by less than unanimous consent of the voting shareholders 
pursuant to G.S. 55-7-04, provided that both of the following are true: 
a. The challenge to the corporate action is brought by a shareholder who 
did not consent and as to whom notice of the approval of the corporate 
action was not effective at least 10 days before the corporate action was 
effected. 
b. The proceeding challenging the corporate action is commenced within 
10 days after notice of the approval of the corporate action is effective 
as to the shareholder bringing the proceeding.  (2011-347, s. 1.) 
 
- App. 12 -
the impact that the decisions that you took could have on the 
stock price?
A. We would have the conversations in terms of what --
if there would be a short-term impact, in terms of a 
decision, and what the longer term benefit would be.  Of 
course we would have that conversation but it was always 
about increasing shareholder value over time.  But you had to 
recognize whether it had an immediate impact one way or the 
other.  
Q. And did you observe over time the Reynolds stock
price reacting to decisions that the board had taken in a 
positive way or negatively? 
MS. SADIGHI:   Objection. 
THE COURT:   Overruled.  
A. Yes, we did.  So, for example, the stock price
would have reacted to a stock repurchase agreement, something 
of that nature.  Yes.
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. And did you observe the stock price of Reynolds
moving positively or negatively in response to external 
events?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Can you give an example of that?
A. Well, in the case of litigation.
So if a court in Mississippi happened to find in
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favor of a plaintiff and it was one of those cases that 
generated hundreds and hundreds of millions of dollars of 
potential liability, it would have made the news and you 
would have seen an impact immediately on the share price. 
Q. So let me roll back the clock to 2004.  Were there 
any significant transactions that happened that year between 
RJR and another company?
A. In that year, there was a merger between RJ 
Reynolds and Robin Williamson Tobacco.
Q. And were you involved in that transaction?
A. I was involved, yes.  I was chairman I think of the 
Governance Committee at that particular time.
Q. And just at a general level, what was the 
relationship between BAT and RAI at the conclusion of that 
transaction?  
A. Well, at the conclusion of the transaction, BAT 
became a 42 percent shareholder in the new Reynolds American.  
And we created at the time of the merger a governance 
agreement which basically outlined the details of the 
relationship between BAT and the minority shareowners in the 
company.  
Q. Are you okay still on water?  
A. Yes.
Q. Was there a discussion during this transaction as 
to who would control the company after the transaction was 
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competitive issue or the like.  
They demonstrated for a very long period of time 
that they honored the governance agreement in every way. 
Q. Are there circumstances that you can think of where 
the RAI board took action that BAT disagreed with?
A. Two come to mind.  
The first was when we were moving to acquire 
Conwood which was a major acquisition for Reynolds American 
and BAT lobbied strongly against that.  Over time, we 
convinced them that we should make the move and they were 
very happy with it.  
On the other occasion, which was the sale of 
Natural American Spirit's international business, we actually 
ran a process and had several bidders for the international 
rights.  And BAT did not prevail in that process and we sold 
the company to Japan Tobacco which they didn't like at all.  
They would have preferred us not to sell the business rather 
than sell it to someone else.  They were unhappy.
THE COURT:  Mr. Bornstein, let's take a ten-minute 
break.  Actually, a 15-minute break.  Come back at 11:45.  
We'll be in recess for 15 minutes.  
(Off the record; recess 11:30 - 11:45 a.m.)
THE COURT:  All right.  Mr. Bornstein, you may 
resume.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Thank you, Your Honor.
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina


























- App. 15 -
THE COURT:  Actually, before you do, let me 
apologize to Deputy Milton and to the courtroom.  Let 
me indicate that I misread terribly Deputy Milton's name when 
I introduced her at the beginning.  So this is Deputy Milton.  
We appreciate her service during this trial.  
All right.  Now you, Mr. Bornstein.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Thank you again, Your Honor.  
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. Let me just touch very briefly, sir, on something 
that we were covering just before the break which was the 
sale of the Natural American Spirit international rights.  
A. Yes.  
Q. Was BAT a bidder for those assets as well?
A. Yes, they were.
Q. Did RAI sell those assets to BAT?
A. No, we did not. 
Q. So let me turn to this transaction when RAI was 
acquired.  How did you first learn that BAT was going to be 
making an offer to buy the company?
A. I received a voice mail message while at dinner on 
the night of October 20th from the chairman of BAT who said 
they would be making an offer for the company.  
Q. Did you have any forewarning that this was coming?
A. Not at all.
Q. Were you surprised?
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A. They didn't come forward.  And there were many 
issues related to Japan Tobacco too in terms of whether they 
would be interested or not, so.
Q. Well, you knew that Japan Tobacco had been in 
acquisition mode for a number of years; correct?
A. They acquired National American Spirit's 
international rights.  We knew them very well.
Q. And, in fact, they had done approximately six other 
transactions in the tobacco industry in the past five years; 
correct?
A. Probably so.  Yes.  
Q. Probably so.  
And you mentioned the Japan Tobacco actually was 
the prevailing bidder for the global rights to Natural 
American Spirit cigarettes; correct? 
A. That's what I just said.  Yes.
Q. And that was something that I believe you said that 
BAT -- that was an instance where BAT was very unhappy with 
Reynolds; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And they were unhappy because they wanted the 
global rights to Natural American Spirit; right?
A. Of course.
Q. And RAI conducted an actual auction process; right?
A. Right.
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Q. And BAT lost; right?
A. Right.
Q. And that was in the early part of 2016; correct?
A. Right.  
Q. And so BAT learned its lesson; right?
A. That's your conclusion.  I don't know.
Q. Well, they were in a bidding war.  They lost the 
bidding war to Japan Tobacco.  You testified that they were 
very unhappy about losing that bidding war.  
A. Yes.
Q. And then the same year, they come out with an offer 
to buy and they say, along with it, don't anybody even try 
this time.  Right?
A. All right.  
Q. Okay.  And did the transaction -- was the 
Transaction Committee advised by Goldman Sachs that Japan 
Tobacco told them that they would have been a player, if it 
weren't for BAT, to buy RAI?
A. No.
Q. Goldman never told you that they had that 
conversation with Japan Tobacco?
A. No.
Q. Would it surprise you to learn that Japan Tobacco, 
in fact, told Goldman Sachs that they would have been a 
player to acquire RAI if BAT hadn't been in the way?
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Q. And you didn't ask Goldman Sachs to reach out to 
Japan Tobacco to see if they would be a bidder for RAI?
A. We did not.  
Q. Despite the fact that it had been the prevailing 
bidder for Natural American?
A. Correct.
Q. And you testified, Mr. Wajnert, that because there 
were no other buyers in this process, all that you could do 
was negotiate with BAT for the best price that it could pay; 
right?
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Basis?  Mischaracterized the evidence?  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Yes, sir.
THE COURT:  Ms. Sadighi?
BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. You testified that because there were no other 
buyers, in your opinion, that all you could do was get the 
best price you could out of BAT or not do the deal; right?
A. Or not do the deal.  Correct.  
Q. And you were aware that BAT's maximum price was 
limited by its own financial considerations; correct?
A. Every buyer's financial considerations places a 
limit on them.  Sure.
Q. And BAT, in fact, sent the message through its 
financial advisor that it was constrained in what it could or 
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would pay; correct?
A. I'm sure they represented it in all kinds of ways.  
Yes.  
Q. And you're aware that BAT had advised Reynolds 
that -- withdraw.  Strike that.  
You're aware of the company's financial advisors 
advising the committees about BAT's likely debt capacity in 
connection with what it could afford to pay in a cash 
component for a deal? 
A. I'm sure we had those conversations.  Yes.  
Q. Now, when you're negotiating with only one possible 
suiter -- you were relying on the advice of your financial 
advisor to consider the BAT offer; correct?
A. We were relying on our own experience and judgment 
and the advice of our financial advisor.
Q. But you, yourself had no idea of the fair value of 
Reynolds; correct?
A. Of course I had a sense of what I thought the fair 
value was.  We can all sit around this room and everybody 
have a view of the fair value.  
Q. Then why did you need to hire a financial advisor?
A. Prudent and required.  
Q. Mr. Wajnert, do you recall giving a deposition in 
this matter?
A. Yes.
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talking about a long-term financial forecast versus a plan.  
And we reviewed many forecasts, many sets of numbers in terms 
of trying to understand what the future might look like under 
a different set of scenarios.  
The most difficult part of the tobacco business 
was, of course, all of the risks that were being faced.  And 
so those were never included specifically in the longer term 
plans in terms of what would happen if menthol was banned.  
We knew that was a risk but it was never in financial 
forecasts as such.  
Q. Well, and that -- when you talk about presentations 
to the board, would you agree with me that the board received 
higher level overviews that were roll-ups of the detailed 
financial forecasts?
A. I'm sure we received the highest level.
Q. Okay.  And is it your understanding, though, that 
when Mr. Peters, as the CFO of RJRT, presented to the board 
an overview of the -- the financial overview of the ten-year 
strategic plan, that that overview was based on a roll-up of 
all of the underlying actual forecasting that was done by 
RAI's --
A. I don't know that.  
Q. You don't know?
A. No.
Q. You don't know one way or the other?  
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THE COURT:  No.  I mean, which document are we 
looking at?
MS. SADIGHI:  We are still in JX4, Your Honor, 
which is the --
THE COURT:  Oh, I see.  You're on page 27.  I'm 
sorry.
MS. SADIGHI:  The ten-year strat plan.  Financial 
overview.
THE COURT:  Thank you.  
BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. And this is DX -- sorry -- this is JX4.0027.  
And the bottom row on this chart indicates that 
management was projecting that RAI's -- RAI was going to 
continue to have operating income growth between 2016 and 
2025 of 7 to 8 percent; correct? 
A. That's -- yes, that's what the chart says.
Q. And so there was no assumption in here that price 
would not be able to make up for volume declines beginning in 
2021; correct?
A. I assume that's correct.  
Q. And, in fact, Reynolds used these projections and 
the board relied on these projections in making judgments 
about the funding of capital expenditures; correct?
A. What you're looking at would be the basis of 
capital expenditures that were made in a shorter period of 
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time.  So the justification was based on one-year plans, 
two-year plans, and the like.  
Q. But the projections -- to be able to project ten 
years of income growth was important to the ability of the 
company to plan cash requirements long term.  Is that 
correct?
A. No.  I don't really believe that the ten-year 
forecast was used for cash planning purposes.  
Q. So still in JX4, and let's look at page 31.  
So in this same financial overview presentation of 
the ten-year strat plan, this is indicating that cash flows 
from operations were projected as sufficient to fund 
corporate initiatives and debt ratios for the years 2016 to 
2025.  Correct? 
A. Yes.  
Q. And projecting a capital spend to be a hundred to 
$200 million per year from 2016 to 2025; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And that was the purpose of projecting cash out for 
ten years; correct?
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Object to form. 
A. The purpose of the strategy session, which was 
three days, was a conversation about the overall impact on 
Reynolds American from various factors, and the conversation 
with management about their opinions about what would happen 
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over time. I think you're making this more formal than it 
was.  Mr. Peters' presentation, I think if we replayed it, 
probably took about a half an hour at the end of a three-day 
presentation.  So I just wanted to give the context.  
BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. But it was important enough for Mr. Peters to be 
able to assure the board that Reynolds was projecting 
sufficient cash over the next ten years to fund its 
strategically-planned corporate initiatives and debt 
management; correct?
A. Under a certain set of assumptions, yes.
Q. And those assumptions were the assumptions that all 
of the employees involved in the Reynolds forecasting process 
made in their best judgment to build up the ten-year 
projections; correct?
A. I don't know that.  
Q. You don't know one way or the other?
A. I don't know how many people were involved in it.
Q. You didn't have an understanding about the 
processes that Reynolds used to construct its financial 
forecasts?  
A. No.  
Q. And did anyone at the Strategy Day meeting in July 
of 2016 tell the Court -- tell the board that they expected 
there to be a growth cliff five years out?
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disastrous for the company.
Now, there's arguments that it could have taken two 
or three years to happen, it could do this, go that way, go 
that way.  So there were too many uncertainties to be able to 
model such an event.  
Q. Well, you've talked about menthol a couple of times 
and I think you've described menthol as a potential major 
threat to Reynolds; correct?
A. Right.  
Q. And you were involved in Reynolds' 2015 acquisition 
of Lorillard; correct?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. And at the time that Reynolds was considering 
acquiring Lorillard, fair to say that Lorillard's main 
product was Newport cigarettes?
A. Yes.
Q. And Newport is a menthol cigarette; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So the majority of the business that Reynolds was 
considering acquiring was a menthol cigarette business; 
right?  
A. Correct.  
Q. And I'm assuming that in 2015, under the Obama 
administration, the same risks of a potential menthol ban 
existed; right?
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A. It probably would have included that as well as 
many other matters.  Yes.  
Q. And part of the reason that the board would want to 
engage a financial advisor to value Lorillard was because the 
Reynolds board was looking at spending a lot of money to buy 
the company; right?
A. Correct.  
Q. And that ended up being about a 30-billion-dollar 
transaction.  Is that correct?
A. Correct.  
Q. And it would be important for the board in 
discharging its fiduciary duties to Reynolds' shareholders to 
make sure that it wasn't overpaying for an asset; correct?
A. You never want to overpay for an asset.  Okay.  
Q. And so it's important to have a -- the best idea 
you can about the value of that asset; correct?
A. It's important to have all the best information you 
can have.  Yes.
Q. And you talked about having no idea about when a 
menthol ban could possibly come down; right?
A. Correct.  
Q. But the Reynolds board was sufficiently comfortable 
that it wasn't happening in the near term, enough that it was 
comfortable approving a 30-billion-dollar acquisition of that 
company; right?
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A. In 2015, that was the judgment that was made, yes, 
based on the information that we had.  
Q. And are you aware at the time that Reynolds was 
talking about acquiring Lorillard of Reynolds' shareholders 
asking Reynolds, Hey, what about the risk of a menthol ban, 
why are we buying a company that's a menthol cigarette 
company?  
A. I don't recall that.  I believe the shareowners 
supported the transaction very well.  
Q. But you don't have any personal knowledge of 
Reynolds responding specifically to shareholder inquiries 
about the risk of a menthol ban?
A. I have no personal knowledge of that.  
Q. Do you think that the risk of the menthol ban was 
different in 2015 from what it was in 2017 from what it is 
today?
A. It was early in the process in 2015.  There was 
more information out as we go along in terms of the FDA and 
its regulatory approaches and how it approaches things.  So 
we have changes at the FDA in terms of its leadership.  So 
it's still unknowable.  
In 2015, it was an emerging risk but it was a risk 
we chose to take.  It still exists today.  I don't know how 
management quantifies it today, BAT and the like. 
Q. So the point is it's unknowable at all of those 
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times; correct?  Until it happens, unless you're heading up 
the FDA, it's unknowable; right?
A. It's unknowable, but the judgment we made in 2015 
was that it was worth the risk of something occurring.  We 
would have been dreadfully embarrassed and we would have been 
kicked out if the ban had occurred six months after we 
acquired Lorillard.  Yes.  We felt that wasn't going to 
happen in the near term and it was worth the risk, but we 
didn't know and that was the debate internally at the board.  
Q. And the Lorillard deal was done in 2015; correct?
A. I believe that's right.  
Q. And you were sufficiently confident at that time 
that it wasn't likely to -- a menthol ban wasn't likely to 
happen in the near term; right?
A. We felt it was worth the risk.  We didn't know.  It 
could have happened in the short term.  
Q. But you were still able to make the decision to buy 
the company for $30 billion.  
A. Yes.
Q. And is there anything that you can point to that 
would change the board's view of the risk of a menthol ban 
between the time it acquired Lorillard in 2015 and the time 
it was talking to -- received BAT's initial bid in 2016?
A. I really don't recall what was going on between 
2015 and 2016.  It's not likely.  
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MS. SADIGHI:  Okay.  I'd like to move JX4 into 
evidence.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Admitted.  
(JX4 was marked and admitted into evidence.)  
BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. When the Reynolds board was working on the 
Lorillard acquisition, it retained Lazard as its financial 
advisor; correct?
A. Correct.  
Q. And Lazard is also RAI's -- one of RAI's financial 
advisors in connection with the BAT transaction; correct?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. And as part of its mandate as RAI's financial 
advisor in connection with the Lorillard transaction, Lazard 
also did a valuation of Reynolds; right?
A. I suppose so.  I'm not sure.  
MS. SADIGHI:  I'm going to mark DX393. 
BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. Is it that you don't recall one way or the other 
whether Lazard was retained --
A. It could have.  I don't recall.  
Q. Okay.  We're going to take a look at -- this is   
the -- if we look at the front page of DX393, this is the 
Schedule 14A, Definitive Proxy Statement for Lorillard, Inc.  
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that they are going to derive over time.  
Q. And so is it fair to say that in order for 
shareholders of RAI to make an informed decision about 
whether or not the Lorillard merger was a good idea, they 
needed an as-accurate-as-possible comparison of the 
pre-Lorillard value of the company with the projected 
post-Lorillard transaction value?
A. Yes.  
Q. And you understand that the opinion given by Lazard 
in this role was intended for Reynolds' shareholders to be 
able to rely on in making that decision; right?
A. Sure.  
Q. If we take a look at page 393.0147, and I'm looking 
at the bottom portion that has discounted cash flow, has gets 
analyses.  Do you see that?
A. Now I do.  
Q. Okay.  And this is a description of how Lorillard 
performed its discounted cash flow valuations of RAI on a has 
and on a get basis.  Correct?
A. This is how Lazard did it.
Q. This is how Lazard did it.  And Lazard was retained 
as RAI's financial advisor?
A. Correct.
Q. And this is when RAI is the acquirer?
A. Correct.  
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A. I don't recall and I don't know.  
Q. Now, in 2016, the board approved a request from 
Reynolds management to institute a 2-billion-dollar stock 
repurchase program; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And you've talked about and looked at the 
governance agreement.  BAT had directors in the room that had 
been appointed since 2004; correct?  Not the same ones -- 
A. Right.  
Q. BAT --
(Simultaneous speakers.)
A. BAT had five investor directors.  Two of which were 
executives, three of which were -- met the independent 
standards.  
Q. Okay.  And BAT appointed directors were involved in 
the board review and approval of the share repurchase 
program; correct?
A. I don't recall if they recused themselves or not.  
If it would have had an impact on BAT, they would have 
recused themselves.  
Q. So I want to look at -- do you recall that as part 
of the governance agreement that we talked about that BAT, in 
fact, had -- had to give its approval for Reynolds to 
institute a share repurchase program?
A. They had approved all along share repurchase 
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programs, and I assume that was in the governance agreement.  
I'd have to review the agreement to be sure of that.  They 
participated.  Let's put it that way.
Q. They participated --
A. In a share repurchase.  Yeah.  
Q. And they participated in the board meetings talking 
about the share repurchase program; correct?
A. I don't recall.  
MS. SADIGHI:  Could we mark DX284, please?  Should 
be in the binder.  
BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. Okay.  Mr. Wajnert, DX284, do you recognize this 
document as minutes of the meeting of the board of directors 
of Reynolds American, Inc. on July 25th, 2016?
A. Yes.
MS. SADIGHI:  And we would move 284 into evidence. 
MR. BORNSTEIN:  No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Admitted.  
(DX284 was marked and admitted into evidence.) 
BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. And if we look at the minutes of this meeting, it 
indicates that you, sir, were present; correct?
A. Correct.  
Q. And do you know which of the directors that are 
indicated as being present at the meeting were directors who 
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were appointed by BAT?
A. Yes.  Mr. Abelman, Mr. Oberlander were the two 
executive directors.  Mr. Feinstein, Mr. Rolfe were the 
independent directors.  
Q. Thank you.  And if we look at the bottom paragraph 
of that first page, you set the stage for the board by 
indicating that the purpose of the meeting was to consider a 
number of items, one of which was to consider approval of a 
share repurchase program; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And if we go to the page that's DX284.003.  And if 
we look at the big paragraph under the second Further 
Resolved.  This indicates that Mr. Gilchrist -- Mr. Gilchrist 
was RAI's CFO.  Is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And Mr. Gilchrist was recommending to the board 
that the board authorize the purchase by RAI of up to $2 
billion of shares of its common stock; correct?
A. Correct. 
Q. And BAT was in the room for that discussion by 
Mr. Gilchrist; correct?
A. Apparently, yes.  According to the minutes.  
The minutes would have said that they recused 
themselves otherwise.  
Q. You're right, sir.  If we want to look at page 5, 
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I'll represent to you that it does indicate that 
Mrrs. Abelman and Oberlander abstained with respect to some 
decisions relating to the purchase agreement.  
But BAT-appointed directors were at the board 
meeting, and while they abstained from voting, they weren't 
recused for the discussion; correct? 
A. Yes.
Q. And during that discussion, if we go back to DX284, 
page three, and we look at the very bottom paragraph which 
goes over to the next page as well.  Mr. Gilchrist advised 
the board that, based on conservative assumptions, the 
discounted cash flow modeling currently supports a maximum 
share price of $65 for the proposed share repurchase program; 
right?
A. Right.  
Q. Now, when a company allocates cash to purchase its 
own shares on the open market, that's because the company 
thinks that the stock is cheap; right?
A. It's one of the reasons.  Sure.  
Q. Because the board isn't going to pay a shareholder 
more than what the company believes the stock is worth; 
correct?
A. Correct.  
Q. Because if you knowingly overpaid for the stock of 
Reynolds, that could be considered a waste of corporate 
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assets; right?  
A. You're buying back the stock because it's at less 
than what you believe fair value.  Yes.
Q. Correct.  And if you knowingly overpaid, that could 
be a breach of fiduciary duties; right?
A. You overpaid.  Right.
Q. So in July of 2016 when Reynolds decided that it 
was a good time to be a buyer of its own stock, the stock was 
trading at -- I'll represent to you that the stock had hit a 
high trading price of 54.48.
Does that sound like it rings a bell with your 
knowledge of what you testified you were always aware of 
Reynolds' stock price? 
A. Sounds okay.  
Q. And --
A. Sounds reasonable.
Q. Okay.  And that was three months before BAT made 
its offer to Reynolds; correct?
A. Yeah.  I'm sorry.  I don't recall the date of this.  
Q. Sure.  This is -- this is July 25th, 2016.  
A. Right.  Correct.  
Q. So three months before BAT made its unsolicited 
bid.  
A. Yes.
Q. And the board, in fact, did vote and adopt 
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A. It was not publicly disclosed.
Q. And the fact that Reynolds board approved 
purchasing its own shares for up to $65 a share was not 
publicly disclosed; correct?
A. The buyback was disclosed.  Probably not the price 
levels.
Q. And the stock then traded down from its high July 
price to the point at which BAT made its offer; correct?
A. I believe so.  
Q. Okay.  And so it didn't surprise you that the 
timing of BAT's offer, that it -- it heard this projected 8 
percent ten-year growth and it heard that Reynolds thought 
its shares were a buy at 65 without even a control premium, 
and now the stock from a market that doesn't know that 
information trades down, it doesn't surprise you that that's 
an opportune time to make a bid?
A. I told you I was surprised.
Q. Now, before you resigned from the Transaction 
Committee, you presented a counteroffer on behalf of the 
company, on behalf of Reynolds to BAT; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And that counteroffer was for $59.69 per share; 
right?
A. I believe that's right.  
Q. And that counteroffer was delivered temporally 
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after a Presidential election that had campaigned on a 
promise of corporate tax reform; right?  
A. Yes.
Q. And so Reynolds was willing to sell the company at 
$59 -- to recommend a sale at $59.69 per share, even though, 
six months earlier, you were willing to pay $65 a share for 
Reynolds' stock without even a control premium.  Is that 
right?
A. We offered to sell the company -- or recommend to 
the shareholders a sale at $59 and 60 some cents.  Yes.
Q. And that sale would have to include the control 
premium; right?
A. Yes.
MS. SADIGHI:  I have no further questions.  Thank 
you, Mr. Wajnert.
THE COURT:  Redirect?  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Thank you, Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. Can I ask you to turn to something in the binder?  
Or we could put it up on the screen.  Whichever is easier.  
I'm a binder guy.  
A. That's fine.  I have so many binders here.
Q. It's the very big one on the corner.  And I'm going 
to ask you to turn -- and if we could put it up on the screen 
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if we could -- to DX393.  Are you there?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And this was the proxy that we looked at in 
connection with the transaction between Reynolds and 
Lorillard.  And I'm going to bring us back to a page that 
Ms. Sadighi asked you about which ends at .1 -- .0148.  
A. All right.  
Q. And up on the left side of the page, Ms. Sadighi 
asked you a few questions about these valuation ranges that 
Lazard who was advising Reynolds reached in performing a 
discounted cash flow.  Do you remember those questions?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And do you remember she pointed you to these 
high-end ranges of 87 and $93?
A. Yes.
Q. And you asked her a question.  
A. I did.
Q. You asked:  How many shares were outstanding at the 
time?
A. Correct.  
Q. Can you tell me why you asked that question?
A. Because there was a stock split around this 
particular period of time.
Q. And why is the stock split of relevance here?
A. Depending on the calculation of the stock split, if 
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina


























- App. 38 -
brand and the reason that it strategically was a very 
attractive company was because of Newport.  That's a -- the 
leading menthol brand in the -- in the market.  Had been 
doing very well.  That's why Reynolds was very interested in 
Lorillard at the core.  That's a menthol brand.  
Competitively, some of the other brands would have 
been Kool and Salem, which were Winston brands.  They would 
have been natural candidates to include in the perimeter.  
One for regulatory reasons, but also if you had Newport, 
those were the -- that's the menthol brand you would focus 
on.  So it would probably be a better owner for Kool and 
Salem for the long term.  So. . .
Q. Did -- was there also a cash investment required 
from BAT?
A. Yes, there was.  They invested roughly five -- 
$5 billion to retain -- to maintain their 42 percent 
ownership in the pro forma, the resulting combined 
Reynolds/Lorillard company.
Q. Now, towards the end of the deal, were you asked or 
was Lazard asked to prepare to provide or -- if it could, a 
fairness opinion?
A. Yes.  We did.  We were asked to render an opinion, 
and we did.
Q. And what's the sort of nature of the fairness 
opinion in that kind of context, in an M&A context?
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shareholders?
A. So we looked at it several ways.  We did -- we 
looked at Lorillard independently.  So we did a valuation -- 
we performed a valuation analysis on Lorillard.  And then 
given the nature of the transaction, in that Reynolds was 
issuing shares to Lorillard shareholders and also paying 
cash, we also looked at another methodology that we call 
has -- has gets, which it actually -- it's what the name 
implies.  
We compare what a Reynolds shareholder has, in this 
case, a share of Reynolds, and the gets is a share in the new 
company.  And the new company was going to be meaningfully 
impacted by the transaction.  So we looked at that pro forma 
entity as well and performed a valuation on that to compare 
it to a standalone Reynolds valuation.  So we did it -- we 
did it both ways. 
Q. Okay.  And did you do any other analysis?
A. Yeah.  We looked at other -- so when I say both 
ways, we did discounted cash flow analysis for -- in both 
cases.  We looked at precedent transactions in -- in the 
tobacco space.  We looked at trading multiples of tobacco 
companies.  Again, in both cases.  
And then we also looked at a few -- a few other 
methodologies, which in -- in our parlance, Lazard parlance, 
are below the line.  So they don't form a basis for our -- 
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there was.
Q. And Speaker Boehner was one of the other directors?
A. That's right.  He was unaffiliated.  
Q. When you said that some of the directors had 
financial experience, were any, to your knowledge, familiar 
with M&A transactions?
A. I think a -- for sure they were familiar.  If only 
because of the transaction that we had just done a couple of 
years before Lorillard, which was actually a really complex 
transaction with, of course the Lorillard transaction, but 
also the disposal of the brands to Imperial.  So that was an 
education for everybody involved.  
And, yeah, there were definitely directors who had 
done M&A in their other capacities for sure.  
Q. Now, when you were looking at the RAI stock price, 
did you form a view as to whether the stock price reacted to 
the recent news about the company into the market?
A. Yes.  It was -- like I said, it was widely -- 
previously I said, it was widely covered by the analyst 
community.  It was a lot of -- it was a very large company, 
very liquid.  Certainly -- yeah.  No indication that the 
market wasn't absorbing news on a regular basis.  So widely 
covered.  Widely held stock.  
Q. So at the end of the day, did Lazard end up 
representing the Transaction Committee?
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BY MR. ROLNICK: 
Q. Good morning, Mr. De Gennaro.  My name is Lawrence 
Rolnick.  I represent a group of the dissenting shareholders 
in this action.  
A. Morning.
Q. So I think you were testifying on direct that prior 
to the work you did for RAI in connection with the BAT 
transaction you had previously worked on the Lorillard 
transaction.  Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And, in fact, your work for the -- your work on 
Lazard began in 2012 when there was possible speculation 
about the combination between Lorillard and RAI; correct?
A. Yeah.  I mean, it was periodic speculation around 
Reynolds/Lorillard.  I don't believe that our work was a 
direct result of that speculation.  But it wasn't a new 
concept.  So I don't disagree with it.  It just wasn't 
directly linked.
Q. Okay.  And in general, that combination had 
antitrust concerns which resulted in RAI divesting some of 
its brands to a third company where the combination could 
occur with Lorillard; correct?
A. Yes.  That's right.
Q. And in connection with that work, Lazard was paid 
approximately $29.5 million; correct?
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A. At consummation.  We also -- we also received an 
announcement fee.  So in aggregate, we -- our fee was 37 and 
a half.  
Q. Okay.  And you began to advise Reynolds on the 
possibility of an acquisition by BAT given its 42 percent 
stake in the company after the standstill with BAT expired; 
correct?
A. Well, we did some -- we did some work, some 
analysis looking at that potential transaction and also 
looked at the BAT/Imperial transaction, which was also one 
that was speculative in the analyst community.  So we did 
work earlier in 2016 around that.  
Q. And, in fact, prior to the time that BAT made its 
offer, you had already been meeting -- you had meetings with 
Reynolds' CFO to talk specifically about what a BAT offer 
might look like; correct?
A. Yeah.  Like I said, we did some work contemplating 
that.  And again, it's a 42 percent shareholder.  One of the 
things that you can imagine looking at is the potential for 
an offer to acquire the remaining part.  So it was -- it 
wasn't a new topic.  Some of the analysts talked about it 
periodically.  So that was the nature of it.  It was very 
exploratory and speculative.  
Q. Okay.  But you were actually trying to figure out 
with the CFO how much BAT would likely be able to afford to 
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina


























- App. 43 -
pay and how they would finance that; correct?
A. Yeah.  That was the gist of the analysis was to get 
a sense from -- potential sense from their perspective.
Q. And you were looking at, for example, what the tax 
ramifications might be to BAT and how that could impact what 
they would pay for the company; right?
A. That's right.  If they structured it a certain way, 
yeah.  
Q. And all of this was with an eye toward trying to 
figure out how much BAT could pay and how they would afford 
to pay it; correct?
A. Potentially.  I don't know that it was an eye to 
that.  It was to actually look at the scenario whereby BAT 
wanted to make an acquisition, what might they then be able 
to pay?  That was the nature of the exercise.  
Q. And specifically, those discussions occurred with 
the CFO, Mr. Gilchrist; correct?
A. Yeah.  We had a meeting with Andrew and his team.  
And then we even had a meeting involving Susan because it was 
just a running -- a running topic of the sort that you would 
have if you have a shareholder structure like this.  
Q. And that Susan you're referring to is Susan 
Cameron?
A. Yeah.  Susan.  Susan Cameron.  Yes.
Q. The CEO?
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any obligation to sell.  
And the other thing is just the scale of the 
business and the -- given the sector, it's a fairly narrow 
set of parties that can even entertain a transaction of this 
sort.  And adding to that, the fact that BAT wasn't 
interested in selling its stake, that is something that's 
noteworthy.  And even at the very early stage, knowing 
nothing more than what we knew, it's something that we would 
flag for the benefit of the directors and for the discussion 
because you have to take that into account.  
Q. And, in fact, you canvassed some market reactions 
and already the market -- I'm sorry.  
If you go to page 23, you lay out, "What Options 
Could RAI and BAT Pursue?"  
Do you see that? 
A. Yes.
Q. And if you look down on the third bullet, one of 
the options is, "Approach other potential counterparties."  
Right?
A. Right.
Q. And you have stated under there, "BAT's 42 percent 
ownership stake and the Governance Agreement are significant 
limiting factors."  
Do you see that? 
A. Yes.
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Q. So is that consistent with the testimony I think 
you previously gave, which was, while it might be nice to 
consider approaching other counterparties, the fact that BAT 
said it wouldn't support another transaction or another sale 
and was the 42 percent owner, was, in fact, a limiting 
factor?
A. Yes.  That's consistent with what I said.  Yes.  
Q. And commercial reality is that a 42 percent owner 
who's not going to support the potential sale to a third 
party is going to potentially limit how much you can get for 
the company; correct?
A. Yeah.  In effect, it's just a -- it's an important 
consideration.
Q. Because it could limit what you could get; right?
A. Well, right.  If somebody's not interested in 
selling, that -- that has to be factored in.  
Q. And the market reaction was that BAT's position as 
a 42 percent owner and having indicated that it wouldn't sell 
or support a transaction selling the company to somebody 
else, the market thought that that was going to limit any 
potential upside further improvements in an offer; correct?
A. Well, I -- I don't have a specific recollection of 
that.  But it just -- it makes sense that if you look at it 
at that time, given the scale of the business, the size of 
the business, the industry it's in and the fact that a 42 
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A. Yeah.  I just don't know.  I don't have a specific 
recollection.  I remember words, but I couldn't tell you now 
what a lead brand is versus a drive brand.
Q. Have you heard of an expression "tail brands"?
A. Yeah.  Yeah.  I can imagine what those are.
Q. Tail brands are brands that are losing market 
share; right?
A. Yeah.  Some of the smaller brands.  Yeah.
Q. So Reynolds had strong brands, which were Camel and 
Pall Mall, and it had weak brands, which were Winston, Salem 
and Kool; correct?
A. Yeah.  Weaker.  I wouldn't say weak, but weaker.
Q. Well, one's growing and one's shrinking; right?
A. Yeah.  
Q. And Lorillard had Newport, which was a strong 
brand; right?
A. Right.  
Q. A growing brand; correct?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Okay.  So through this transaction and given the 
antitrust issues in the divestiture, what wound up happening 
was RAI consolidated three strong -- three strong drive 
brands and divested three weak tail brands; correct?
A. Yeah.  Weaker brands.  
They also had Maverick in there which was a decent 
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brand from the Lorillard portfolio. 
Q. So is it fair to say that the new RAI that emerged 
from the Lorillard transaction was a much different company 
than the old RAI prior to that transaction?
A. Well, it depends on -- what do you mean by much?  
It was obviously a different company.  And the whole point of 
that transaction was to make it a more attractive portfolio 
with better long-term prospects.  And that's what drove that 
deal ultimately, the strategic value of it.  And then it wore 
out.
Q. And you and Lazard were largely responsible for 
structuring that transaction; correct?
A. Well, we advised throughout and we supported the 
company and the board in putting that together.  
Q. So that the new RAI that emerged from that 
transaction was stronger and had a stronger growth profile 
than the old RAI that went into that transaction; true?
A. Yes.  I would hope so.  There was a lot of work to 
get to that point.  It was a good deal.  
Q. So when you were doing the work on the Lorillard 
transaction, management gave you ten-year projections.  I 
think you mentioned that when you were being examined by 
Mr. Rafferty; correct?
A. That's right.  
Q. And I'd like you to look at the document marked 
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A. That's right.
Q. Okay.  So for Reynolds, your first bullet says, 
"Based on Robin management plan:  6.9 percent 2013" -- and 
"E" is estimated; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. 2013 estimated through 2023 estimated operating 
income.  And then there's an acronym, CAGR, which means 
compound annual growth rate; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So is this indicating that Reynolds had given you a 
ten-year plan, ten-year operating income projections and that 
those projections showed 6.9 percent compound annual growth 
operating income?
A. Yeah.  For this set of numbers, yes.  That's what 
it would say.  
Q. And it was your understanding, based on your 
interactions with RAI's management, that these projections 
were reasonable; right?
A. Yes.  A lot of work went into them.  This was the 
spring of 2014 so by now we had been working on this for well 
over a year and a half.  So, yeah, there had been a lot of 
effort on the part of management.  
Q. And management indicated to you, and you actually 
reflected in your fairness opinion, that these projections 
were reasonably prepared, were reliable and were based on the 
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best estimates of Reynolds' benefit; correct?
A. Yes.  The ultimate set of projections, which may 
have been different from these.  A lot happened during the 
spring of 2014.  But, yes, your point, your overall point 
stands.  
Q. And nobody said to you at that time that it was 
impossible for Reynolds to project ten years; right?
A. Well, no.  We used it.  Like I said, this was a 
process that played out over an extended period of time.  And 
we used numbers that were constantly refined, including the 
spring of 2014.  
Just as context, we had entertained a potential 
merger of equals with Lorillard which would have entailed a 
lot more stock.  And that ultimately fell apart.  So we had 
to go back to the drawing board and make it more like an 
acquisition, which resulted in.  It just meant that the 
company had to go back to the drawing board and really push 
on synergies and assumptions on Newport in order to get a set 
of financials that could justify -- now, they have to be 
prepared on a reasonable basis, but you really have to dig 
deep.  
And so all that happened over the course of months 
and months and months.  So in this case, we used a ten-year 
set of numbers. 
Q. And they had to be done well because billions and 
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Q. So this set of projections isn't an extrapolation.  
It's actually built off of the ten-year plan that was 
contained in the strategy document that you got five days 
earlier; right?
A. Yeah.  Presumably.  That's where it would have come 
from.  
Q. Okay.  And we don't need to go back to the strategy 
plan and compare it to this document to convince you that, in 
fact, this is an implementation of the ten-year plan 
containing the strategy plan?
A. Yeah.  I mean, I trust the source.  But also, 
again, the purpose of this is early on building out a model.  
This is not output that I would have ever looked at at that 
time or seen or used in any way.  So it's irrelevant to my 
view at this time.  
Q. Okay.  Now, if you could take a look at the next 
document, D 157, this is a document in which you -- I'm 
sorry.  
MR. ROLNICK:  My colleague has reminded me that I 
should move the prior DX153, DX169, DX156 and DX157 into 
evidence.
THE COURT:  Any objection? 
MR. RAFFERTY:  No objection, Your Honor.
MR. ROLNICK:  Thank you.
THE COURT:  All right.  Then DX169, DX156 and DX157 
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should be based on a 5-year set of projections.  Please 
remember to adjust it."  
Do you see that? 
A. Yes.
Q. And is that because at the meeting with the client, 
you brought the ten-year projections and the client directed 
you to use five-year projections?
A. At some point, we definitely concluded -- got 
direction from the company to use a V five-year set of 
projections that we ended up using.  And based on these 
emails, this is probably the time frame when we actually got 
confirmation that we would be using five-year -- a five-year 
set of forecast, which was fine.  
MR. ROLNICK:  Okay.  Now, I'd like to mark as DX -- 
I'm sorry.  Could I move that into evidence Your Honor?  D159 
and 158.
THE COURT:  Any objection?  
MR. RAFFERTY:  No objection, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  DX158 and DX159 will be admitted.  
(DX158, DX159 were marked and admitted into 
evidence.) 
BY MR. ROLNICK: 
Q. I'd like to show you a document, DX140.  Now, I 
have this document in two forms.  For the Court's 
convenience, I had it printed out, but it's sometimes harder 
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we were going to use what we got, and we wanted to be in a 
position to use what we got.  There's no issue with a 
five-year set of numbers.  There just wasn't this pressing 
question, other than from a procedural standpoint.  We needed 
to know what numbers we were going to get in order to be able 
to do analysis if and when the time came.  
Q. Is it fair to say that when you were rendering your 
fairness opinion in connection with the BAT transaction that 
you didn't know that management had detailed ten-year 
projections?
A. What do you mean, we didn't know?  We -- all we 
knew is what we had and -- 
Q. Well, that would mean you didn't know.  
A. Yeah.  I had no -- no impression or understanding 
that there was some other set of numbers somewhere.  And 
again, for use in this particular circumstance, which is to 
evaluate a takeover proposal.    
Q. But with respect to the five-year projections, you 
got clear confirmation and direction from management to use 
those five-year projections; correct?
A. Yes.  Once they've had a chance to go through the 
internal process that they needed to go through.  Because I'm 
very understanding of a company putting together a set of 
numbers for the purposes that we as financial advisors use 
them.  It's not ordinary course for companies to just have a 
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set of forecast to use for any number of circumstances.  
In a transactional context, we need detail and 
granularity to the extent that it genuinely requires some 
attention from management to put that together.  Even if 
there's existing work, they need to go back to it and make 
sure that it meets, not only what we need in terms of the 
granularity, but also that it represents their best view at 
that time for whatever period they're looking at.  
A lot of companies typically put a lot of focus on 
the budget year, which is the year term, but that's -- that's 
the bulk of their attention.  They'll have some years that 
follow that but not necessarily to the same level of detail 
or comfort.  And so it's not atypical for us to get sets of 
numbers that are specifically put together for a specific 
transaction because they're just not just sitting around at 
the company.  
Q. Okay.
A. And that takes -- that takes time.
Q. Okay.  And with respect to the five-year 
projections that they told you to rely on, did anybody ever 
suggest to you in any way, shape or form that those 
projections were unreliable?
A. That they were unreliable?  No.  
Q. To the contrary; right?  They assured you --
A. Right.  Absolutely.  Yes.  To the contrary indeed.
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growth rate that you were talking about earlier and the 
discounted cash flow analysis.  
A. Okay.
Q. And I think that the first thing you talked about 
was the fact that you were going to do a discounted cash flow 
analysis so you sort of dusted off the work that you had done 
in Lorillard and you made that your starting position for 
doing a discounted cash flow in connection with BAT; correct?
A. I wouldn't characterize it as dusting off.  But we 
had the benefit of our experience with the company so that 
was the starting point.  
Q. I didn't mean to disparage it in any way by saying 
dust it off.  I'm just saying you went back to that old work 
and used that as your starting work for the new assignment?
A. For aspects of it, yes.
Q. And you mentioned the fact that one of the things 
you have to look at was the discount rate; right?
A. Right.  
Q. Which is the weighted average cost of capital.  
A. That's right.
Q. And you said that had to be updated from the work 
that had been done on Lorillard; right?
A. That's right.  
Q. And that's because the weighted average cost of 
capital as an input to the DCF analysis has to be 
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THE COURT:  Admitted.  
(DX154 was marked and admitted into evidence.)
THE COURT:  Next one?  
MR. ROLNICK:  DX155.
THE COURT:  Any objection?  
MR. RAFFERTY:  No objection, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  That one's admitted.  
(DX155 was marked and admitted into evidence.)
MR. ROLNICK:  DX162.  
MR. RAFFERTY:  No objection, Your Honor.  
THE COURT:  DX162 is admitted.  
(DX162 was marked and admitted into evidence.)
MR. ROLNICK:  And DX148.  
MR. RAFFERTY:  No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  DX148 is admitted.  
(DX148 was marked and admitted into evidence.)
BY MR. ROLNICK:  
Q. So look at Exhibit 148.  These were discussion 
materials you produced on Project Green.  
Do you see that? 
A. I see that.
Q. So this is an overview of financial projections for 
RAI standalone; correct?
A. Yeah.  I see them.
Q. And these are ten-year projections; correct?
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A. Right.  
Q. Oh, I'm sorry.  We're at DX148.10.  My apologies.  
Do you see that?  
And so this is projecting, if you look on the 
right-hand side, "ex-Vapor."  Because vapor was not yet 
profitable.  5.4 percent.  
Do you see that? 
A. Yes.  I see that.  
Q. And that was the compound annual growth rate for 
that ten-year period; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you look at the projections that were 
contained in the strategy plan -- which I'm going to find in 
just one moment, what number that was.  JX004.  
MR. RAFFERTY:  Is that in this book?  
MR. ROLNICK:  There's a version of it.  I don't 
know if it's in that book.  I have it in this book.  
MR. RAFFERTY:  Well --
MR. ROLNICK:  Give me a moment.  It is DX169 in 
this book.  And if you look at page 20, which is 169.0040.
THE COURT:  I'm sorry.  Did I -- you said that JX4 
is the same thing as DX169?  
MR. ROLNICK:  It's just the projections are the 
same.  They're not the same document.
THE COURT:  Okay.  
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MR. ROLNICK:  Sorry, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  I'm with you now.  
Go ahead.  
BY MR. ROLNICK:
Q. So we're on DX169.040.  Do you see this is the 
ten-year projection for Reynolds in 2016, July, 2016?  
Do you see that?
A. Yeah.  It's a projection.  Yes.  A set of projected 
numbers.  
Q. And that's showing compound annual growth of 7.7  
percent.  Do you see that in the box in the upper left?  
A. Yes.  
Q. So now we've looked at two sets of ten-year 
projections.  One at the time of the Lorillard transaction 
and one in July of 2016.  And Reynolds' growth rate is now 
projected to be 50 percent higher over a ten-year period; 
correct?
A. Well, based on these, on these figures.  
Q. Yet despite the fact that Reynolds' growth rate was 
50 percent higher in July of 2016 than it was back when you 
did the Lorillard transaction, you decided to use the same 
perpetuity growth rate because, in your judgment, nothing had 
really changed?  
MR. RAFFERTY:  Your Honor, I object.  I think the 
question mischaracterizes the testimony.  We're comparing 
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apples and oranges here.
THE COURT:  Well, I'll overrule the objection.  The 
witness can answer the question.  
A. Yeah.  Look, I'm coming back to the long-term 
prospects of the industry and the company irrespective of 
what this set of numbers which we didn't use.  How it 
compares to the numbers two years' forth, if there's some 
percentage difference, that doesn't fundamentally change the 
profile of the business, which is sustained volume declines 
over time.  
And if you don't find ways to overcome that, you're 
not going to be able to just grow into perpetuity.  That's 
what grounded our -- our assessment.  And like I said, when 
you look at a DCF, have you to look at all the pieces and how 
they fit into each other.  
And so the combination of the low discount rate and 
the perpetual growth rate range that we looked at would yield 
a set of values that actually made sense because the implied 
exit multiple made sense and also the value in the terminal, 
the terminal value comprised a vast majority of the DCF 
value.  So there was nothing -- nothing suggesting that it 
was an unreasonable set of assumptions.  
BY MR. ROLNICK:  
Q. Well, the other thing that happened, which is 
really critically important, isn't it, is that whereas you 
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applied the zero percent perpetuity growth rate in Lorillard, 
after nine years, originally ten years, but one year had 
slipped by, you applied it after ten years.  
Here, because you were given only five-year 
projection and advised to use them, you applied the 
perpetuity rate after five years; right?
A. That's right.
Q. And that has the effect of completely knocking out 
the projected growth in years six through ten that were in 
the ten-year projections; right?
A. Knocking out -- we had five years to work with so 
I'm not sure -- 
Q. So when -- I'm sorry.  Go ahead.  
A. Yeah.  We used the five years and then we launch 
into the terminal value using the perpetual growth rate 
range.  
Q. Okay.  And just so we can -- so those of us who 
aren't --
A. Right.
Q. -- financial, as much versed in finance, in year 
six, because you applied the perpetuity growth rate starting 
in year six, you're assuming at that point that the growth 
rate is zero, correct, starting in year six?  
A. Right.  Well, you have to make an assumption after 
the forecast period.  And so we have a five-year set of 
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But we use our judgment.  You don't have the luxury 
of being too limiting when it comes to comparables.  So if 
there's companies that are publicly traded that compete in 
the tobacco space, whether it's combustible, ideally like the 
big companies like Altria, or in other forms of tobacco, we 
reference them.  Especially if they're part of the peer 
group.  
Q. Okay.  So does it matter whether they sell 
cigarettes in the United States or not?
A. I think it's a factor, but it -- we don't want to 
be too limiting when we're looking at peer sets like this 
because the more data points we have, the more useful.  And 
we -- we won't put undue weight on any one of these 
companies.  We look at medians and then we also look at some 
of the ones that are more direct and comparable.  
There's some art to picking -- picking the peer set 
and then evaluating the information to arrive at a range for 
valuation purposes.  And that's why we look at a range.  We 
don't have a point value because it's -- there's a judgment 
element to it. 
Q. So Philip Morris, how much do they have in 
cigarette sales in the United States?  
A. Which one?  
Q. Philip Morris.  How many cigarettes do they sell in 
the United States?
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different parts of the world.  
But in the U.S., why wouldn't you look at, you 
know, the -- the UST transaction, the Altria/UST transaction?  
It's -- it's relevant.  
Q. And would you agree with me that the Lorillard 
transaction, which I think you described many times on your 
own today as a very complex transaction involving the 
purchase of a company and the divestiture of major assets to 
a third company, is a very different transaction than BAT's 
take over of RAI?
A. I mean, structurally.  But it's a relevant 
transaction.  It's a big -- 
Q. Structurally and financially; right?
A. Right.  But it was acquiring a U.S. tobacco 
combustible to tobacco company.  So it's obviously relevant 
in the context of this BAT/Reynolds deal, even though the 
structured transaction is different because of the nature of 
the divestiture's line, but at the core is a highly relevant 
transaction.  
And I'll just say its context.  This set of 
precedents in the tobacco space, in contrast to some other 
categories, is actually quite well-defined.  We -- we have to 
very regularly apply judgment when it comes to precedent 
transactions and peers because there are no twins.  And the 
benefit of having a category like tobacco is that, like I 
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A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And in the first one, the base case, the 
compound annual growth rate is 4.3 percent; right?
A. Yes.  
Q. And in the second one, the alternative case, it's 
5.9 percent; right?
A. Yes.
Q. So Reynolds before the transaction and Lorillard 
before the transaction, both had substantially lower growth 
rates than Reynolds had when BAT was buying it in 2016; 
correct?
A. Yeah.  I mean, this excludes the synergies from the 
transaction.  But, sure.  Based on these numbers over that 
ten-year period, you had a lower CAGR.  
Q. And that's because, as we explained -- or you 
explained at one point today, the combination of the two 
companies created a much stronger Reynolds because it 
consolidated major drive brands that had major growth and it 
divested weak tail brands that had low growth and were 
declining; right?
A. Yeah.  It created a -- it was an attractive 
transaction.  That's why everybody did what they did to put 
the two companies together.  
Q. Right.  And so that new and improved Reynolds, the 
much better Reynolds is the one that was sold to BAT; 
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correct?
A. Right.  And the one we analyzed in the context of 
the Lorillard transaction.  That's the very company we 
evaluated in the context of the Lorillard transaction.
Q. Right.  And so when you made a decision to use the 
same perpetuity growth rate for the new and improved Reynolds 
that you had used for old Reynolds and old Lorillard, you 
were assuming that the company hadn't changed and that its 
growth profile hadn't changed when, in fact, it had 
dramatically changed.  
A. I would -- I would not necessarily characterize it 
as dramatically changed.  I think it was an attractive 
portfolio.  But again, I come back to the long-term prospects 
for an industry that is in sustained steady decline.  If -- 
absent some other information, you have to have a reason to 
have growth into perpetuity if the business is whittling away 
consistently and in a sustained manner.  And that's all I'm 
saying.  
It's that fundamental set of factors had not 
changed and actually still hasn't changed.  This is a 
declining industry at the core and there's only so much you 
can price to offset that volume because the volume decreases 
and the margins at the exit in the case of BAT deal, you had 
a company that was -- had EBITDA margins well into the 50s 
and if you're going to sustain continued growth, you're 
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A. Earnings per share.  
Q. And one more level of generality, what are earnings 
per share?  What does that represent?
A. That's the earnings per share of stock that is 
outstanding.  
Q. And is there a reason that the company tracked EPS 
as its primary metric?
A. That was what the shareholders were primarily 
focused on.  That's what our board had structured, you know, 
a lot of our goals and objectives around.  So that was our 
primary focus and that's where our goals and objectives had 
been -- you know, had been focused from the board 
perspective.  
Q. And what were the tools that you used to track your 
EPS performance?
A. We had what we -- we had a financial planning 
process.  So we would have -- every month we would have both 
the forecast and the actuals package that would come out.  So 
you would look at, you know, performance, historical 
performance and where we are, and then would you have a 
forecast on where are we versus our goals and objectives and 
our plan essentially.
Q. And you referred to the forecasting process.  How 
frequently were these forecasts created?
A. We generally did them every month.  So we ran 
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through the process every month.  
Q. And how far out into the future did the forecasts 
run?
A. Generally it was current year plus two.  A couple 
of times a year for our planning process, the forecasts would 
be extended to support either the strategic planning process, 
which was done sort of June, July in support of Strategy Day 
with the board in July.  And then we would have an operating 
plan process that went to essentially five years to support 
the operating plan which is where budgets, goals and 
objectives were all essentially reviewed and ultimately were 
approved by the board.
Q. Was there a regular calendar during the year when 
you would perform projections to a certain length?  For 
example, you referenced the July projections for Strategy 
Day.  
A. Yes.  Yeah.  That was pretty standard.  So we would 
have generally the June numbers would be in support of 
Strategy Day.  Those would be essentially a projection of ten 
years.  Five years would start in September, October.  We 
present those to the board in November at the board meeting.  
There may be some feedback on those operating plan 
numbers.  So there may be revisions.  And ultimately it would 
be approved in February at the board meeting. 
Q. And was that cadence consistent year after year in 
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Q. Now, how were these monthly projections created?
A. Well, we basically had a bottoms-up process.  So we 
had a financial planning department that ultimately reported 
up through me or about six people.  Six or seven people who 
were responsible for consolidating a lot of the assumptions, 
a lot of the numbers.  They would take information from all 
parts of the company based on the assumptions or based on the 
information that was available.  
And they would roll it together.  They'd put it in 
packages, you know, to review on a regular basis.  A lot of 
that was Excel-based packages that could be reviewed and 
discussed, you know, every month.  
Q. And when you were the CFO, what was your personal 
role in the preparation of the projections?
A. I was part of the reviewing team.  
Q. And reviewing for what purpose?
A. We would review it once a month basically to look 
and see if there was any information that perhaps was missed 
or wasn't included.  You know, we would review the 
assumptions to see whether the assumptions were reasonable 
and if there was any new information that needed to be 
included.  
Q. Okay.  And were the projections intended to be your 
best estimate of the future performance of the company over 
whatever period you were forecasting?
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A. They were intended to be the best estimate up to 
the future performance based on the assumptions that we had.  
So again, it was an assumption-based forecast so we would 
always lay out all of the different assumptions that would be 
included in the forecast.  
Q. And what do you mean when you call it an 
assumption-based forecast?
A. Well, it would be assumptions based on competitive 
activity, based on market dynamics.  It would be assumptions 
based on litigation, regulation, taxation.  You know, a lot 
of those things are unknown so we would obviously have to 
make assumptions.  And the way we did that and the way we 
were -- we structured that was basically to outline what 
those assumptions were so there was complete transparency on 
the assumptions.  Obviously, you know, everybody was aware of 
what those assumptions would be and the -- as those 
assumptions changed, you would expect to see changes flow 
through the LE.  
Q. So one of the assumptions that you mentioned was 
regulation; correct?
A. Right.  That's right.  
Q. How would you model into the numbers themselves 
that appeared in the LE if adverse regulatory developments 
that might occur?
A. Well, we would have things like taxation in there.  
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the board, were any of those items actually modeled into the 
operating plan?
A. No.
Q. And were any of those items modeled into the 
five-year forecasts that your department and group put 
together to support the operating plan?
A. Specifically these risks and sensitivities?  
Q. Yes.  
A. No, they were not included.  
Q. All right.  Did Reynolds have something called 
Strategy Day?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you tell us what that was?
A. Strategy Day was a session with the board in July 
that we looked at essentially our commercial strategies and 
our business strategies to make sure that they were viable 
and, you know, on point.  
Q. And what was your role personally as CFO in 
connection with Strategy Day?
A. I certainly would sit in Strategy Day and provide, 
you know, commentary.  But we also provided some backup 
material in the financial forecast.  And generally that was 
done through a ten-year outlook.  
Q. Okay.
THE COURT:  Is now a good time to stop for the day 
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That's -- that's it.
Q. And why do ten years instead of five years for the 
Strategy Day compared to the operating plan?
A. Well, again, looking at things like the lines 
crossing, the lines didn't necessarily cross in five years; 
right?  So the Strategy Day was to -- intended to provide 
some insight into whether the strategy was working and how 
long that would take.  You know, that was -- and was it 
financially viable during that time frame?  If the lines 
crossed in year eight or nine, you know, what happened -- we 
had a good sense, but what happened during that time frame 
generally with volume and pricing?  
You know, as we move forward, you know, and market 
share picked up, it was also a matter of if we were going to 
grow a market share, what was the pricing dynamic versus 
Altria during that time frame as well?  If we started growing 
market share, Altria was losing market share.  How did that 
pricing dynamic play out in the out years?  It was a lot of 
education, discussion debate.  
Q. And why not do 15 or 20 years, then?
A. You certainly could have.  But I mean, it's 
assumption based on assumption; right?  
Q. Well, was there any special or particular 
information that you had about years six through ten as 
compared to years 11 through 15 or beyond?  
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Q. So that would be like one of the slides that we saw 
yesterday, outside the numbers?
A. That's right.  
Q. During your time as CFO, did the company consider 
executing a share repurchase plan?
A. Yes.
Q. And I don't think we've talked about this yet.  
So can you just explain generally what a share 
repurchase plan is? 
A. Yes.  It's where the company goes on the open 
market and repurchases its shares to reduce its overall share 
count.  
Q. And when it purchases those shares, what price does 
the company pay to acquire them?
A. It pays the market price.
Q. Now, what was the reason why Reynolds was 
contemplating a share repurchase plan during your time as 
CFO?
A. The strategy behind the share repurchase plan -- or 
the idea behind the share repurchase plan was we had 
de-levered through divestment of one of our companies and we 
had capital to deploy.  And part of the capital that we had, 
given our capital structure, we intended to do a share 
repurchase program to essentially help boost EPS and overcome 
the NPM cliff at that point in time.  
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So just going back, the NPM cliff, in 2017, we had 
a 200-million-dollar increase in cost of goods as the credits 
from the MSA, the settlement that we had in 2012, those 
credits rolled off.  We had a 200-million-dollar increase in 
cost of goods as those credits rolled off.  
In order to continue to grow earnings per share, 
which was our focus of our financial objective given to us by 
the board and really from our shareholders, one way to do 
that or to mitigate the impact of that 200-million-dollar 
impact from the NPM cliff was to reduce the share count to 
help boost EPS.  
So it was a cliff -- what we call a cliff 
mitigation element to help overcome the impact of the loss of 
those credits.  
Q. And at the risk of asking a very basic question, 
how does repurchasing shares boost earnings per share at the 
company?
A. Well, your earnings are what they are but your -- 
obviously your denominator becomes lower.  So it's -- it 
boosts your EPS.  Fewer shares.  Same earnings.  Fewer 
shares.  So earnings per share is higher.  
Q. Now, did you need board approval for the share 
repurchase program?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. And what issues did you need the board to approve?
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A. Yes.   
Q. So if we start at the bottom level of the pyramid, 
those are the inputs that are being made by all those people 
in the business areas of the operating company; right?
A. Most of it was in -- was in input from finance.  
So, you know, we had six or seven financial 
planning people and they would reach out to the different 
areas of finance.  So if you had marketing finance, the 
marketing finance people would provide inputs.  If they had 
operations finance inputs, the operations guys would provide 
that in.  But it was generally put in by finance people. 
Q. Okay.  And those finance people were -- is that 
part of the result of the more transparency in 
communications?  I mean, the finance people who are making 
the assumptions, for example, for volume or marketing, 
they're not just making those numbers up; right?  That's not 
just located from -- it's actually happening?
A. Yeah.  The volume would be done by a totally 
separate group; right?  So that came from the marketing 
information, as it always had, as a forecast volume.  
But the marketing expenditures would be done by the 
marketing finance group in -- understanding what the 
strategies and the plans were from the marketing department.  
Q. So the people that were putting in the inputs at 
that sort of bottom level of the forecasting period are 
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getting that information from other people who are using 
their best estimates and best judgments about what's going to 
happen in the future; right?
A. That's correct.  Based on the assumptions that were 
out there.  
Q. And when this new more rigorous financial 
forecasting process was put into place and there was more 
discussion among the units, this did give you a more cohesive 
view of what was happening at the company; correct?
A. It certainly gave us a regular view on what was 
happening at the business and a better handle on, you know, 
all of the different dynamics.  
Q. And it meant that everybody involved was going to 
be working off of one forecast for the whole company rather 
than a lot of different disjointed forecasts; right?
A. That's what we put in place in 2000 -- yeah, 2006.
Q. Okay.  And so -- and that was a change from how it 
had been in the past; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And that new process resulted in a single 
forecast that you even had a motto for; right?
A. We had a model for?  
Q. A motto.  M-o-t-t-o.  
A. I'm sorry. 
Q. Do you recall that?  That it was called the one 
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version of the truth?
A. Well, certainly that's what we were attempting to 
get to because there was three different forecasts 
previously.  So we would have had a production forecast, a 
volume forecast and a financial forecast.  And what we wanted 
to do was make sure that everybody -- we didn't have people 
saying your forecast is wrong, our forecast is right.  We had 
one forecast, and everybody was working off the same 
forecast.  
But that is an Oliver Wight term that -- that we 
used in the education process.  Yes.  
Q. And all of the forecasts -- when you talk about the 
monthly LEs and the five-year forecast and the ten-year 
forecast, those forecasts all followed the same rigorous 
forecasting process; right?
A. They did go through the process but obviously the 
focus and attention and the availability of information got 
less as you went out in time.  That's true for, you know, 
years two, three, four, five, all the way to years ten.  
Q. And that's true in any business; right?
A. That's correct.  
Q. Anybody that tries to do any long-term financial 
forecasting, the further out in time you get, the less 
certain you can be about your assumptions; right?
A. That's right.
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A. No.  
Q. And -- and we talked about in connection with the 
Lorillard transaction, that wasn't just buying Lorillard; 
right?  That also had a divestiture component to the deal; 
right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And so we were taking the drive brands at Reynolds 
and putting it with the leading brand at Lorillard to make a 
new Reynolds; right?
A. That's right.  
Q. And getting rid of the -- you understand the term 
"tail brand"?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And it was -- it was Reynolds' tail brands 
that then went into a package and those went to Imperial 
Tobacco; right?
A. Not just tail brands, but Winston and Kool, which 
would have been investment brands, but not to the level of 
drive brands.
Q. They were not drive brands; right?
A. They were not drive brands.
Q. Okay.  And so the portfolio that was coming 
together in the combination after the Lorillard merger, 
everybody was projecting that was going to be a new Reynolds; 
right?
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A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And so up until that point, BAT never, as 
you said, went to the board and said, we're interested in 
buying old Reynolds; right?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Okay.  So now we're in June of -- sorry.  
So now we're in 2015.  The standstill releases the 
restriction on BAT to be able to go to the market to pick up 
the rest of Reynolds; right? 
A. That ended in '14.
Q. In '14.  Okay.  And it's not required to go to the 
market and try to buy the rest of Reynolds at that point; 
right?
A. That's right.
Q. And they know that there is a transformative deal 
that is at its inception; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And so they have the ability to sit back and wait 
and see if, in fact, the hoped-for transformation takes place 
before they decide they might want to buy the rest of 
Reynolds; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And so when we go to, as you were saying in the 
2016 LEs that had the ten-year financial forecast, I think 
you said that's the first time that the board was getting the 
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actual view of whether or not this concept of how a new 
Reynolds would look post-Lorillard, whether that was actually 
happening; right?
A. Yeah.  It was certainly the first time, to my 
knowledge.  Whether there was discussions around the 
Lorillard transaction with the board that I was not involved 
with, I can't speak to that.
Q. Okay.  And so the first view that you're aware of 
that the Reynolds board -- and the Reynolds board included 
board members that were BAT designees; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And so to your knowledge, the first time 
that the board, including the BAT reps, is getting the full 
view of how this Lorillard transaction impacts the ten-year 
strategic plan is at this July meeting; correct?
A. Well, again, outside of the Lorillard discussions, 
that was the first strategic plan that we had.  So that would 
be -- in that process, that's correct.  
Q. So as a matter of fact, because -- because you do 
the strategic plan with the ten-year forecasts in June; 
right?
A. Correct.  
Q. It just happened to be that this was the first time 
since the Lorillard transaction that you had done a full 
baked ten-year financial forecast; right?
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A. That's correct.  
Q. And at the time that you did that, you had almost a 
year of run rate post-acquisition to see whether or not what 
was the anticipated or hoped for to happen was actually 
happening; right?
A. Yes.  But the majority of the synergies took place 
day one.  So that was -- that was in place in 2015.  
Q. Great.  
And so you had a view of the majority of synergies 
being captured and now you're giving a ten-year projection 
that includes, not only the capture of those synergies, but 
some -- almost a year of seeing how this company is now 
operating as the new improved Reynolds portfolio; right? 
A. Yes.
Q. And so if we go back to JX4.27, and we look at the 
first headline from that ten-year plan, the headline on this 
box says, "RJRT performance a step change from pre 
acquisition performance."  Right?
A. Yes.
Q. And so that is reflecting that the theory of the 
Lorillard merger, which was to be transformative to RAI, was 
actually very improved; right?
A. Yes.
Q. So -- and a step change indicates to you that the 
hoped-for transformative transaction was, in fact, 
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transformative; right?
A. That is what we were expecting.  
Q. Okay.  And so -- okay.  And so if we look at the 
bottom row of the headline, of the summary of your now 
ten-year projections with the benefit of seeing how the 
Lorillard acquisition is playing out, the roll-up from the 
detailed ten-year forecast is that you are projecting 
ten-year growth now of 7 to 8 percent; correct?
A. Based on the assumptions that we laid out, that's 
what we had in here.  
Q. And those are the assumptions that were laid out in 
the ten-year financial forecast, correct, from the June 2016 
LE, yes?
A. That's correct.
Q. And we talked about before that even though 
different forecasts have different time horizons, those all 
follow the same process that you described to me before; 
right?
A. That -- that is basically right.  We had the 
ten-year, which we talked about earlier, which is a 
broad-brush forecast which was essentially an extrapolation 
of current trends in the out years.  
So the detail level of the out years, particularly 
in the ten-year forecast, was at a different level than the, 
you know, current year plus two forecast that we did every 
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A. I'm sure I did.  
Q. Okay.  And that would have been the most recent 
financial information about Reynolds as of June 28th, 2017; 
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And to your knowledge, is this the most recent 
financial information -- or financial forecast for Reynolds 
before the BAT transaction closed?
A. This was the -- I believe this was the last review 
prior to the transaction closing.
Q. Okay.  And like the other forecasts, this would 
represent the company's best estimates based on what they 
knew at the time for the inputs that went into this financial 
forecast; correct?
A. Based on the assumptions and as a standalone 
company, yes.
Q. Okay.  Thank you.  
MS. SADIGHI:  We would move DX141 into evidence.
MR. BORNSTEIN:  No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Admitted.  
(DX141 was marked and admitted into evidence.)
BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. Okay.  Mr. Gilchrist, you talked a little bit today 
about the share repurchase that was approved by the board in 
July of 2016; correct?
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A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And so just going back to our timeline, we 
have the three-day strategic board meetings, July 14th -- 
around the middle of July of 2016; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And if we could please look at JX3.  And I 
want to look at JX3.105.  And if you take my representation, 
you can see the front page.  This is part of JX3.  Is the 
board package for the July 14 board meeting.  
Do you see that? 
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  Great.  
And if we go to 3.105, so in the information that 
was presented to the board, on July 14th --
A. I'm sorry.  I'm trying to find. . .
One zero five?  
Q. This one's kind of a tough document because I think 
it's a printout of a board deck and so the numbers are a 
little bit tough.  It's about halfway -- 
A. I don't see a 105.  Well, I see it up here now.  
That's it.  Okay.
Q. And so the board at the mid-July meetings about the 
ten-year strategic plan forecast knew at that point that you 
had done a discounted cash flow valuation of the company and 
would be recommending a share repurchase; correct?
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A. Yes.  My team had performed that.  Yes.  
Q. Okay.  You presented this; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. Okay.  So whether or not you performed it, you 
approved --
A. That's correct.
Q. -- what was being delivered to the board?  Okay.  
And this indicates that the -- your discounted cash 
flow valuation that was done in time to present to the board 
in July supported a maximum share price of $65 for the share 
buyback program; right? 
A. For the purposes of what we were looking to do, 
that's -- that's where we recommended the ceiling be.
Q. I understand you had a purpose in mind, but I want 
to focus on what you did.  
For whatever purpose, you did a discounted cash 
flow valuation of the company at this point in time; 
correct? 
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And when you did that discounted cash flow 
valuation of RAI, you used what was termed as conservative 
assumptions of a 7.5 percent WACC and a 3 percent terminal 
growth rate; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And you also did that using five-year projections 
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as your finite forecast; correct?
A. I'm not sure about that, to be honest with you.  
Q. You're not sure about that.  Okay.  We can. . .
A. Sorry.  I know it's been three years.
Q. That's fine.  
I think if we look at DX138.  Do you have DX138 in 
your binder? 
A. I have 124, 140.
Q. Check in the front pocket of your binder.  This may 
have been a late addition.  
A. Yes, I do.  
Q. Okay.  Terrific.  
And I actually don't, but I'll go off the screen.  
And if we look at the upper right-hand corner, that says, 
Reynolds American DCF model value, right, for June 2016?  
A. Yes.
Q. And this indicates that the underlying data 
utilized in the DCF model is based on the 2016 strat plan as 
of June 2016 for a five-year period; correct?
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Objection, Your Honor.  We have no 
foundation the witness has seen this document before.
THE COURT:  Let me see the question.
MS. SADIGHI:  I'm just trying to see if this 
refreshes his recollection as to what was used as the basis 
of the plan.
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THE COURT:  You didn't recall the duration of the 
projection.  Is that right?  
THE WITNESS:  That's correct.
THE COURT:  All right.  I'll overrule the 
objection.  
BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. And this indicates in the upper left-hand corner 
that the underlying data utilized in the DCF model is based 
on the 2016 strat plan as of June 2016 for a five-year 
period.  
Do you see that? 
A. Yes.
Q. And does that refresh your recollection that in 
doing the discounted cash flow valuation of Reynolds that was 
presented to the board in July of 2016, that the finite 
period of projected cash flows, five years was used; correct?
A. Yes.  Appears that's correct.  
Q. Okay.  And five years, even though at that point 
the 2016 strat plan had ten years of projection; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. Okay.  And so you chose a five-year projection for 
the forecast period, the finite forecast period; correct?  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Objection, Your Honor.  He's 
already testified he didn't do this.  That it was somebody on 
his team.
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BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. You approved --
THE COURT:  Well, let me rule.  
Sustained.  
BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. You approved this valuation; correct?
A. I approved the outcome of this valuation and the 
recommendation to the board.  Yes.  
Q. Okay.  And by approving the outcome of the 
valuation, is it fair to say that you approved the inputs to 
the valuation?
A. I think that's -- that's fair with the output.  
Q. Okay.  And so you approved an output that was based 
on five years of forecasted cash flows for the finite period 
of the discounted cash flow valuation; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And then a 7.5 percent discount rate was attached 
to that; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. And you approved the addition of a perpetuity 
growth rate of 3 percent to be used for the terminal period; 
right?
A. At 7 and a half percent discount rate.  Yes.  
Q. Okay.  And when you have a -- five years of finite 
projections, that means that you're applying that perpetuity 
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growth rate starting in year six; right?
A. That's correct.  
Q. Okay.  And so you approved something that began 
using a 3 percent growth rate starting in year six even 
though at that time, you had projected growth over a ten-year 
period of 8 percent for a ten-year period; right?
A. Yes.  For the purposes of what we were doing.
Q. I understand.  I'm just asking you about the 
inputs.
THE COURT:  Were you finished with your answer? 
A. For the purposes of what we were doing, I was very 
comfortable with a 7 and a half percent WACC and a 3 percent 
growth.  Growth rate in perpetuity.  
BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. And the purpose of what you were doing was coming 
to a share price -- a price per share that Reynolds could 
comfortably pay where the board would feel comfortable that 
it wasn't overpaying for its shares; right?
A. It was a ceiling of the share repurchase on a 
limited share repurchase plan in order for us to achieve our 
objective of overcoming the NPM cliff.  
So, yes, given all of that, that is what we 
recommended and approved.  
Q. Is it your testimony that you would have 
recommended to the board spending an amount per share that 
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was more than what you thought the company was actually worth 
just to drive EPS to overcome an NPM cliff for purposes of 
managing the share price?
A. No.  
Q. Okay.  So is it your testimony that the purpose 
meant that you could overvalue Reynolds and recommend that 
the board pay more than Reynolds was actually worth?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. This was setting a ceiling for share repurchase.  
So to the extent the market took the price of Reynolds 
higher, that this set a ceiling for us to stop our share 
repurchase.  And certainly during that time frame, we 
expected to have regular ongoing reviews.  
Q. So are you saying that the discounted cash flow 
valuation that you did of the company, or that your team did 
that you approved, of the company, based on the most recent 
numbers, coming out of your robust forecast; right?  Is it 
your testimony that that $65 DCF valuation output would only 
represent the value of the company if the share price got 
there?
A. That was -- keep in mind, this was a ceiling for a 
two and a half year -- two and a half year program.  So we 
were attempting to set a ceiling there that we felt 
comfortable given the risks and the profile of the company.  
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina


























- App. 88 -
A. That's correct.  
Q. Okay.  And you just said, if you got -- well, two 
things.  
So you said if BAT had approached RAI before the 
expiration of the standstill; right? 
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Objection.  Incomplete question.  
BY MS. SADIGHI:  
Q. I thought I just heard you say that you had 
meetings with bankers in part because you considered whether 
BAT was going to approach RAI before the end of the 
standstill.  
A. There was discussions with the banks at the board 
level going back to when the standstill was basically 
expiring to really understand, is there or isn't there a 
likely approach and what does it look like?  And that just 
essentially carried on with discussions.  Some were meetings 
that we asked for and some were meetings that, you know, 
quite honestly, banks showed up and said they wanted to meet 
with us and they brought that with them.  
Q. Okay.  I just wanted to be clear because I thought 
I heard you say prior to the expiration of the standstill.  
And I just wanted to make sure that we're on the same page 
that BAT could not try to buy RAI prior to the expiration of 
the standstill; right?
A. No.  It was preparation for after the standstill.  
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happen?
A. I don't recall.  
Q. And if we look at DX67, who's Steve Holland, sir?
A. Steve Holland was in our treasury group.  Let me 
find DX67.  Yes.
Q. So you were saying Steve Holland was in your -- 
A. Treasury group.
Q. And was Steve Holland a member of your team that 
was working on providing information to the financial 
advisors?
A. Yes, he was.
Q. And so was Steve Holland part of that team that if 
the financial advisors asked for information, he was supposed 
to give them whatever they needed?
A. He certainly was working with them to provide 
information and perspective.  Yes.
Q. Okay.  And if we look at this email from Tom Lee at 
JPMorgan to Steve Holland on October 31st, 2016, you see the 
subject line is, "10-year projections"?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And he says, "Hi Steve, I'm just taking 
another look through the materials that were sent over and 
don't see a detailed 10-year projection.  Do you have time to 
chat quickly?"  
You see that? 
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A. No.  
Q. In discussions that you had with the banks over the 
years, you had said there were some times where there were -- 
there was conversation about BAT's ability to pay for the 
transaction with RAI; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Why was that something that was interesting to talk 
about?
A. Ability to utilize cash, is that specifically -- 
maybe just clarify that question.  Ability to utilize cash?  
Q. Yes.  
A. Well, it was basically their leverage -- they had 
taken a very significant leverage position.  So it's looking 
at what could their leverage be under their current credit 
rating where they could stay investment grade.  Because it 
was certainly a view that BAT did not want to go below 
investment grade.
Q. Would that be useful to RAI in its negotiations 
with BAT?
A. Yes.
Q. There was a long part of the cross-examination this 
morning where there was an Excel spreadsheet up on the 
screen.  Do you recall that?  
A. Yes.
Q. And there was some effort, I think, to suggest that 
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Q. And one of your jobs when you came to Reynolds was 
going to be -- assuming the Lorillard transaction went 
through, one of your jobs was going to be integrating 
Lorillard with Reynolds and creating a new and improved 
Reynolds; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay.  And at that time, I think you mentioned that 
when the transaction closed, there were about $800 million of 
synergies; correct?
A. Right.  
Q. And what we mean by synergies is that by combining 
the two companies, there were costs and other factors that 
could be eliminated and that would make the company more 
profitable.  
A. Correct.
Q. Okay.  And I think you mentioned that of the $800 
million of synergies, approximately 500 million of those were 
achieved right off -- right on the first day of the 
transaction; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And that's because the factories and the employees 
associated with a lot of the brands that were being divested 
to Imperial, those costs were immediately removed from the 
system; right?
A. Correct.
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Q. Okay.  But there was still $300 million of 
additional synergies to be achieved through the integration; 
right?
A. Correct.
Q. And is it fair to say that as the president of the 
company that was the driving force, you were the person who 
had day-to-day management responsibility for attempting to 
successfully integrate the companies?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay.  And the underlying rationale for this 
transaction with Lorillard and the creation of this new 
company was that you were acquiring a very strong drive 
brand, the Newport brand from Lorillard; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And you were divesting weaker brands, namely 
Winston, Salem and Kool to Imperial brands; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And so that would leave the new RAI with Camel, 
Pall Mall, Newport, and Natural American Spirit as drive 
brands; right?
A. Correct.
Q. And basically those weaker tail brands were now 
being divested to Imperial brands; correct?
A. Yeah.  We had -- we had other tail brands as well 
that we of course held on to.
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change from the pre acquisition RAI; correct?
A. Yeah.  Before Lorillard, these numbers would have 
been, you know, close to zero.  
Q. Okay.  So it really was a transformational change; 
correct?
A. Correct. 
Q. And if somebody said that nothing much had changed 
since the Lorillard transaction with respect to Reynolds, you 
would completely disagree with that; correct?  
A. Correct.  
Q. Okay.  And you're the person who would know more 
about that probably than anybody on the planet since you were 
the person who was the president of Reynolds' biggest 
subsidiary and the one in charge of effectuating that 
acquisition; right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay.  Now, despite the fact that you were the 
person who was giving the presentation to the board at strat 
day, the fact is that after the BAT offer, certain financial 
advisors were hired by the company to assess the offer and to 
help the Transaction Committee understand price and what was 
a good price; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And it's the case, is it not, that none of the 
financial advisors asked you what you thought was an 
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A. The CFO?  I'm sorry.  Say again.
Q. Yeah.  Were you not the CFO or just the COO?  
A. I was the COO.  I was never the CFO.
Q. Never the CFO.  Okay.  But you were in fact 
involved with the planning process; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And you had quarterly numbers, yearly 
numbers, five-year numbers and ten-year numbers --
A. Correct.  You're running the business.  You're 
regularly reporting out to shareholders, et cetera.  You're 
running the business.
Q. Okay.  And you would review all of those numbers on 
a monthly basis; correct?
A. Yes, at least.  
Q. And at that time, you would take a deep dive into 
the numbers; right?
A. Yes.  
Q. Okay.  And you would try to make sure that those 
numbers at all times reflected the best estimates and the 
best judgments of the actual people in the business for 
putting them together; right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  Now, that's also the same thing that PepsiCo 
did; right?
A. It's the same thing every company does.
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Q. Okay.  Every company.  That's correct.  Every 
company tries to put together the best projections they can; 
right?
A. Yes.
Q. And they do that in the ordinary course of business 
because they rely on those numbers to run their business; 
right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And, for example, you rely on those numbers 
to -- once you became CEO, to give Wall Street guidance on 
the next quarter and the next year; right?
A. Yes.  
Q. Okay.  And --
A. Of course it's more than the numbers, but, yes.
Q. Okay.  And, for example, the yearly projections are 
used to try to create a budget; right?
A. Yes.
Q. And two-to five-year projections are used for 
things like HAVACCs (as heard); right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And for terms -- in terms of capacity 
issues, you might use the ten-year projections; right?
A. Sure.
Q. Okay.  So all of these tools are in the toolbox to 
be used in the ordinary course of business to help you run 
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in the deposition, you can look at any one number and try to 
tear apart any one piece of the model what you try to look 
at as you try to take this in total.  And remember, we had 
multiple outside advisors doing this.  We had -- we paid 
three banks to do this.  
Q. Okay.  So you wouldn't say -- you wouldn't have any
reason to suggest that the five-year numbers that you were in 
charge of in terms of Reynolds' own projections, you wouldn't 
say that they were unreliable, would you?
A. With the context of there's always things that are
in and out of the model, I would say, you know, they were as 
reliable as, you know, we felt we could -- you know, 
foreseeable sort of forecast.  Remembering there was a lot 
that was lining the model.  We knew that.
Q. Right.  But you would never give the financial
advisors projections that were -- that you thought were 
unreliable or released to the public in a proxy statement --
A. Well, no.  We're going to be very transparent with
everything we can.  We disclose all of this. 
Q. Okay.  And so the only thing as far as you're aware
that the projections -- the projections were prepared as best 
estimates and in good faith; right?
A. Yes.
Q. As your best forward view on the business; right?
A. Yes.
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don't always do my own affirmative valuation.
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Your Honor, we would tender 
pursuant to the stipulation, Professor Gompers as an expert 
in financial economics and valuation.
THE COURT:  And you have a standing objection?  
MR. ROLNICK:  Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  The witness may testify 
subject to my earlier statements. 
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Although to be clear, I think the 
standing objection is as to the content of the testimony 
rather than the qualifications of the professor; is that 
correct?  
MR. ROLNICK:  Our view is that his qualifications 
are limited to the ability to provide a valuation of the 
company, which we contend he's not done in this case.
THE COURT:  All right.  I'll allow him to testify 
and I'll be dealing with the objections at a later time.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Understood. 
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. So, Professor, why don't you tell us what your
assignment was in this case. 
A. So I was asked to assess the evidence on fair value
for RAI.  In particular, I was asked to evaluate the 
discounted cash flow analysis of Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan and 
Lazard, the three financial advisors.  Second, I was asked to 
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evaluate market evidence of value for RAI.  And then third, I 
was asked to evaluate the valuations presented by the 
Dissenters in this case.  
Q. Well, let's start with the work that the financial 
advisors to RAI did.  
Which of their analyses in particular did you spend 
your time looking at? 
A. So my analysis of their work focused exclusively on 
the -- their discounted cash flow analysis.
Q. And there's been a lot of discussion about 
discounted cash flow in this case as you know.  Can you just 
explain at a high level so we all have a grounding on this 
what exactly a discounted cash flow analysis is?
A. So one of the fundamental sort of premise of 
finance which was really developed in the 1950s is this 
notion that you can value a security based on the expected 
cash flows that you're going to earn by owning that security.  
We don't buy shares of stock because it's a piece 
of art that we can hang on the wall.  We buy it because we 
think we're going to make money in the future.  And the 
discounted cash flow formulas make this very explicit and 
they're sort of -- sort of three components to just keep 
generally in mind.  The first is pretty easy, more cash is 
more valuable than less cash.  Pretty easy.  
The second is that cash sooner is more valuable 
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina


























- App. 99 -
than cash later.  If I get my money today, it's more valuable 
to me than I get -- if I got that same amount of money in a 
year.  
The third is that less risky cash is more valuable 
than more risky cash.  But the component -- the sort of 
concept of risk is sort of very specific.  The way we think 
about risk in finance is really dependent upon how risky is 
it to my overall portfolio?  And I'm sure we'll have a chance 
to talk about it.  But risk in a discounted cash flow sense 
from that discount rate is all about what we call systematic 
risk.  
Q. And I -- we will get to that in due course.  
Now, let me break down just the different pieces of 
a discounted cash flow analysis.  What are the components of 
the analysis? 
A. So when you implement a discounted cash flow, there 
are three particular inputs that you need.  I mean, there's 
nothing complicated about a DCF.  It's really just math.  And 
the inputs that you put into that DCF are critical.  And 
there are three critical inputs.  The first of which are a 
set of projections.  Those projections are over some finite 
period of time.  And from those projections, you derive the 
cash flows from the business.  
The second input you need in a discounted cash flow 
is what we call the perpetuity growth rate.  And because our 
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projections are for a finite period of time -- we don't 
project out forever into the future.  We don't project out, 
you know, an infinite number of years.  We need a way to 
capture the value after our projections.  Something called 
the terminal value.  And to do that, we need some estimate of 
how we think this company is going to grow.  And it's not 
just how it's going to grow over the next two or three years.  
It's really sort of off into the future.  Way off sort of 
forever into the future.  
The third element that we need is as I mentioned in 
terms of the summary, which is we need a discount rate.  We 
need a weighted average cost of capital which captures how 
risky this sort of stream of cash flows is in the context of 
an overall portfolio.  So we call -- we call that a weighted 
average cost of capital. 
Q. And so I think it will be helpful to go through the 
different pieces of the discounted cash flow analysis.  Take 
them one at a time and spend a little time putting them in 
the context of this litigation.  
So first, on the projections of cash flow for some 
finite period, what type of cash flow information would a 
financial economist need to do a discounted cash flow 
analysis? 
A. So the theory and the practice are very clear.  
What you need in a discounted cash flow to arrive at what we 
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would think of as the intrinsic or the fundamental value is 
the expected cash flow.  So it would be that cash flow which 
was somehow probability weighted among sort of good outcomes 
and bad outcomes and it's that central tendency.  If you 
don't have the expected cash flows, you're not going to get 
to that intrinsic or fundamental value.
Q. So how do you deal with the situation in which a 
business faces a variety of critical risks in trying to 
identify the right cash flows to use?
A. So sometimes it's possible in certain circumstances 
to have a set of projections which are somehow the midpoint.  
You know, they sort of -- sort of lie in the middle of what 
might happen on the upside or what might happen on the 
downside.  Other times, what you actually need to do is do 
explicit modeling of those scenarios.  
And so if there are some upside scenario where good 
events happen, you'd assess the probability of those things 
happening.  And if there are potential negative events, you 
have a scenario which looked at the financial implications of 
those negative events happened and weighted by the 
probability of those two. 
Q. So maybe it would be useful to illustrate this.  We 
have a demonstrative we can put up on the screen.  It's Slide 
No. 2 in the deck.  
So can you tell us, Professor, what it is we're 
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looking at here on Slide 2? 
A. So this is just a hypothetical example.  And 
probably the easiest way to think about it is perhaps -- 
let's think about a pharmaceutical company.  And that 
pharmaceutical company is developing a new drug.  And if we 
assume for a second that there's a 40 percent likelihood that 
that drug gets FDA approval, and if it does get FDA approval, 
then those incremental cash flows from the new drug are going 
to follow that blue line.  
And so over time, the cash flows from that company 
are going to grow from 200 million if the drug is approved in 
the first year, all the way up to a billion dollars in year 
five.  But, again, we know that drug approval is not certain 
and so if we assume that there's a 60 percent chance that the 
drug's not approved, then the cash flows from this 
pharmaceutical company might increase like that red line.  
And so starting at 200 million and at year five end up at 
only 400 million because they don't have that new drug. 
Q. So is the blue line kind of the good case and red 
line is the bad case?
A. Exactly.  Optimistic, pessimistic, upside, 
downside.  You could characterize it a lot of ways.
Q. And if you were doing a discounted cash flow of 
this company, which of these two lines would you use as 
the -- as the expected cash flows?
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A. You'd use neither one.  You'd use something which 
was in between.  You'd probability weight those two cash flow 
series.  And you'd get something which would be in between.
Q. So let's turn to the next slide.  And so what are 
we looking at here with this green line?
A. Yes.  In this hypothetical example, the green line 
would represent the expected cash flow.  And it's just a -- 
it's just taking 60 percent -- 60 percent of the downside 
scenario and 40 percent of the upside scenario.  
So the only cash flow series that would give you 
the intrinsic or fundamental value of this company would be 
that middle green line.  To use the blue line or the red line 
would be wholly inappropriate.  
Q. So if you had a student who was valuing this 
company, you would tell that student to use which line?
A. It would be the green line.
Q. Okay.  And what if the student used the blue line 
to do the valuation, what would you tell her she had done 
wrong?
A. I would tell her that she missed one of the 
fundamental premises of finance which is that value when you 
do a DCF is wholly dependent, entirely dependent on using the 
expected cash flows, not the best case or upside scenarios.  
Q. Did you form a view as to whether the projections 
that were used by the bankers in this matter complied with 
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the principles that you just articulated?
A. I did.  
Q. And what was that view?
A. So my view after, you know, reviewing industry 
information and analyst reports and the like is that the cash 
flows, those five years of projections that the financial 
advisors used are more like the blue line, more like an 
upside case, as opposed to the green line, the expected value 
case.  
Q. So did those projections that you looked at take 
account of all potential outcomes that the company was 
facing?
A. No.  It was clear in both the way that the cash 
flows were described by the company and disclosed in the 
proxy that it was assuming business as usual.  And when you 
look through in terms of looking at what the sort of industry 
experts are saying about the issues in the tobacco industry, 
there are some things which are potential upside scenarios in 
terms of market share and the like, but there's a description 
of a tremendous number of game changing downside risks.
So, you know, I've sat through the Court for a 
number of days and if you look through, reading through 
industry reports from experts and the analysts, you know, 
things like nicotine reformulation by the FDA, the menthol 
ban, changes to the age of purchase of cigarettes, the 
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increases in state and federal excise taxes, or 
cannibalization from new products, all of those things could 
be major game changers.  And were one of them to occur in the 
next three years, five years or ten years, it would have 
major negative implications for cash flow.  
Q. Now, is it your understanding that management at 
RAI just ignored the risks entirely when they put the 
projections together?
A. No.  I think the description is that, because they 
couldn't be certain when those risks might occur and could 
not assess exactly the probability, they didn't factor them 
into the projections.  The projections were business as 
usual, but they were very clear at saying that these risks 
were out there and were real probabilities occurring.  And 
the further you went in time, the increased in probability 
that at least one or multiple of those risks would occur in 
that time frame.  
Q. Now, you mentioned it and I should have asked you, 
but have you had the opportunity to be here for any portion 
of the trial?
A. I've been here since Tuesday morning.  Yes.
Q. And did you hear Ms. Crew testify this morning?
A. I did.
Q. And she was asked a number of questions on 
cross-examination about whether as a business matter, it 
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would have been appropriate for her and her team to model in 
what were characterized as speculative events.  Do you 
remember hearing those questions?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you remember Ms. Crew answering that she did
not think it was appropriate to do that as a business matter 
so that she could in fact continue to run the business?
A. Yes.
Q. And then she was asked a question about whether it
would be appropriate to factor in those kinds of risks in a 
situation in which the company was being sold.  Do you recall 
that?
A. Yes.
Q. And do you remember her testimony was that it would
be appropriate in that case because you needed to value the 
company rather than just run it on a day-to-day business?
MR. ROLNICK:  Objection, Your Honor.  Leading and 
mischaracterizes the testimony.
THE COURT:  I'll sustain the -- I'll sustain the 
objection.  The last four questions have been more of a 
memory test than they have been to actually get to the point 
so why don't you get to the point.
BY MR. BORNSTEIN: 
Q. The point I was going to get to was to ask:  Do you
agree with Ms. Crew's testimony on this subject?
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A. I do.  I mean, to ignore real probable events that 
could occur over some reasonable finite sort of time period 
that could dramatically change the cash flows of the business 
would violate all the principles of value.  And so you need 
to take them into consideration in some way.  
To ignore them and to use projections which do not 
embed them would be 100 percent wrong.  
Q. And do you agree with Ms. Crew that there are 
different considerations in doing projections to run the 
business on a day-to-day basis and doing projections for 
valuation purposes?
MR. ROLNICK:  Objection again, Your Honor.  He's 
asking a question that asks whether he agrees with testimony 
that was given and characterizing it.  It's inappropriate.  
We would ask --
THE COURT:  I'll sustain it.  Just ask him the 
question as opposed to the agreement.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Sure.  Absolutely.
BY MR. BORNSTEIN: 
Q. Is it the case that projections that someone does 
in the purpose of managing the business on a day-to-day 
business can be different in this respect from projections 
that someone does for the purpose of valuing the entity as a 
going concern?
A. A hundred percent.  And maybe sort of an example.  
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I've been on the board of some start-up companies.  I've 
advised lots of my students who have started companies.  And 
what I tell them is that you need -- you need different sets 
of projections.  You need projections to run the business.  
And those projections may not be the same thing as the 
expected outcome that you'd use to value the business because 
you need to build the business as if things continue to go.  
If there's -- if it -- for example, if you're a 
biotech company, you can't be certain that the drug's going 
to be approved, but you have to continue to operate the 
business as if you believe it will be approved.  So managing 
the business on that scenario of approval, even if from a 
valuation sense, it's only 40 percent likely that it would be 
approved.  And so absolutely, it's not only what I teach, 
it's what I've advised when I've been on the board that you 
can have projections for business purposes, but the 
evaluation for valuation purposes could be substantially 
different. 
Q. And if we have a situation where there is a company 
where there are differences between the management focused 
projections and the valuation focused projections, what would 
be the effect on the reliability of the discounted cash flow 
for using the management focused projections rather than the 
valuation focused projections?
A. So typically management projections for operating a 
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina


























- App. 109 -
business tend to be more optimistic.  They tend to be sort of 
upside.  Things are going to go well and I want to build a 
business to be able to execute if those things go well.
If you were to use management projections for 
operating the business and you don't adjust for some of these 
negative probabilities, you're going to overvalue the 
company.  It's going to be an optimistic valuation. 
Q. So in light of that, was it a mistake for the 
financial advisors to use the projections that they used to 
support their fairness opinion?
A. No, I don't think so.  
Q. And why is that?
A. Well, what the financial advisors were tasked with 
doing was to assess whether or not the deal offered by BAT 
treated the non-BAT shareholders fairly.  Were they getting 
sort of fair compensation, fair return for their shares?  So 
to the extent that the projections that they were using were 
optimistic, were upside, not factoring in some of these 
downside risks, it would -- it would be -- it would be an 
optimistic valuation.  
So if the deal price was at or above that, they 
could reasonably conclude that the RAI shareholders, the 
non-BAT RAI shareholders were getting sort of, you know, 
compensated above the intrinsic value. 
Q. So if the output of the DCF analysis the bankers 
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did were still lower than were in the range of the deal 
price, you're saying, even if they're optimistic, what flows 
from that?
A. Well, that the true intrinsic value based, or the 
fundamental value based on expected cash flows would be 
lower.  And therefore, they could reasonably conclude that -- 
that -- that the non-BAT RAI shareholders were receiving fair 
compensation.  They were receiving their value.  
Q. So if the price that's being paid is higher than an 
optimistic value, that price is by definition fair?
A. From a financial -- I can't opine as a matter of 
law.  
Q. Of course.
A. That's for the judge.  But from a financial 
economics perspective, that would be true.
Q. Okay.  And one question just to touch quickly on 
something you said, which was that management tends to have 
optimistic projections, is there a basis for that opinion in 
the field of financial economics?
A. Yes.  So there are a number of academic studies 
which have looked at realized financial performance relative 
to internal projections.  And generally speaking, internal 
projections tend to be -- management internal projections 
generally tend to be optimistic.
Q. Now, in doing a discounted cash flow analysis, are 
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there any rules about the number of years of projections that 
you need to have to do it right?
A. No.  There's no hard and fast rules.  Generally, 
you want to project out toward some steady state.  But 
there's, again, no hard and fast rule, whether it's five, 
three, ten.  
Q. Well, we heard a lot of testimony -- and since you 
were here, you heard a lot of testimony -- about whether 
five-year projections were appropriate or ten-year 
projections were appropriate.  
Can you do a reliable DCF analysis with five years 
of cash flow projections? 
A. Absolutely.  I've done them.  I've seen, you know, 
reasonable valuations done.  So absolutely.  
Q. And there was a spreadsheet that was up on the 
screen for some time yesterday morning.  Do you remember 
that?
A. Yes.  I was here for that.  Yes.  
Q. And I want to ask just a few questions related to 
that spreadsheet and the questioning around it --
THE COURT:  Why don't we -- before you do that, why 
don't we take the midmorning break and then come back and let 
you move into that subject.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Of course.  Thank you.
THE COURT:  All right.  We'll be adjourned for 15 
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minutes.  
(Off the record; recess 10:43 - 10:59 a.m.) 
THE COURT:  All right.  Mr. Bornstein, you may 
resume your examination.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Thank you, Your Honor.  
BY MR. BORNSTEIN: 
Q. So we were starting to talk about that spreadsheet 
that was up on the screen for some time yesterday morning.  
And the question I have for you is:  When you're doing a 
discounted cash flow analysis for the projections that are 
the input into that analysis, what specific cash flow 
information do you actually need to do the work?
MR. ROLNICK:  Your Honor, I'm going to just object 
to this question because there have been a number of 
projections and I'm not sure which document Mr. Bornstein is 
referring to and I don't know that the witness knows either.  
Be helpful to have an identification of what document he's 
asking about.  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Your Honor, my question is not with 
any reference to a document.  I'm asking the professor for an 
explanation as a matter of financial economics as to what 
type of cash flow information a -- an economist would use in 
putting together an analysis.
THE COURT:  So this is preliminary to ask him about 
a specific spreadsheet?  
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina


























- App. 113 -
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Correct.
THE COURT:  All right.  Overruled.  
MR. ROLNICK:  Thank you, Your Honor.  
A. So what you want is sort of the summary income 
statement and balance sheet information to get the cash flow.  
You don't need the underlying minute detail that you might 
need for a management set of forecasts for operating the 
business.  What you need for valuation at the end of the day 
are the bottom line free cash flow numbers.  
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. And to be clear, what do you mean the bottom line 
free cash flow numbers?
A. So it's the annual sort of unlevered free cash 
flows.  That's what you need.  That you'll calculate each 
year what the overall unlevered free cash flows of the 
business are going to be.  And that's the summary number for 
the whole company.  
Q. So if you had a spreadsheet -- again, just 
hypothetically -- a spreadsheet in front of you that had cash 
flow information for the company, to do the discounted cash 
flow, would you just be taking one particular line item to 
plug into your model?
A. If the spreadsheet which you're given -- or the 
exhibit you're given has those free cash number -- free cash 
flow numbers, yeah, that's the only number you would pick.  
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Q. So now let me go to the spreadsheet that was up on 
the screen yesterday morning for some time that Ms. Sadighi 
was asking Mr. Gilchrist some questions about.  Do you 
remember that document yesterday?
A. I do.
Q. Would someone who was performing a discounted cash 
flow analysis need the detailed information appearing on the 
60 some tabs of that spreadsheet in order to do the work?
A. No.
Q. Can you explain why not?
A. Because, I mean, I sort of mentioned.  I mean, 
those kind of management projections are useful for operating 
the business, for thinking about what you want to do in the 
future.  But from a valuation perspective, all you need is 
that summary annual cash flow number.  
Q. Let's actually look at a particular document.  And 
I'm just going to put this one on the screen.  We can get 
counsel a copy if you need it, but it's one we talked about 
yesterday.  DX69.  And I want to. . .
MR. BORNSTEIN:  And this is in evidence already, 
Your Honor.  
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. And it is an email that attaches a copy of the -- 
some Strategy Day materials that were sent to JPMorgan.  And 
let's turn to page .21 of the document, please.  
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Were you here yesterday when there was some 
testimony given about the bar chart appearing on this page? 
A. I was.
Q. And do have you an understanding of what the 
information appearing on this page represents in the bar 
chart?
A. It's sort of labeled here, adjusted operating 
income.  So it's my understanding that these are sort of the 
ten-year forecasts from the strategic plan.  
Q. And would someone who was knowledgeable about 
finance, who was interested in doing a discounted cash flow 
analysis using ten years of projections be able to use this 
information to perform that analysis?
A. So it would be a starting point.  You'd certainly 
need to project out things like taxes and the balance sheet 
adjustments to get to cash flow.  But that's the kind of 
thing that they could do.  And certainly if you had five 
years of balance sheet information, you could project that 
out into the future.  But certainly this is, you know, a very 
important component of that.  
And, you know, most -- you know, most professionals 
who do valuation could then go on and do the other 
adjustments to get free cash flow.  
Q. So if you had this information and you had five 
years of detailed cash flow projections and a balance sheet, 
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in that circumstance, could a knowledgeable finance 
professional do a discounted cash flow analysis using ten 
years of projections, if they wanted to?
A. Yes, they could.
Q. And at the risk of a slight repetition of one thing 
we hit before the break, would a finance professional doing a 
discounted cash flow analysis actually need to have ten years 
of projections to do the work properly?
A. No.  
Q. And why is that?
A. Because five -- using five years of projections in 
most circumstances could be enough.  And you then have to 
sort of think about the other inputs to it and what you would 
choose for example in terms of the perpetuity growth rate 
would be an important component once you have those five 
years of projections.  
Q. And, well, let's turn to the perpetuity growth rate 
piece of the discounted cash flow.  So, again, just to level 
set, what is the perpetuity growth rate and what is its 
purpose in a discounted cash flow?
A. So because we only forecast a finite period of 
time, we need to capture the fact that there's going to be 
value to the company after the set of projections.  And the 
way we do that is to calculate or assume some rate of growth 
going off into the future.  And it's not just one year, two 
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina


























- App. 117 -
years or five years into the future.  It's, like, 
theoretically or practically forever into the future.  When 
you assume a perpetuity growth rate, you're assuming that 
that company will grow at that rate forever into the future.  
Q. And how does a financial economist go about 
selecting what perpetuity growth rate to use in the DCF?
A. You analyze the industry, you analyze the company.  
You look at the trends that are happening.  You look at 
potential risks and the like.  And from an analysis of that 
information, you then sort of come up with your estimate of 
what you believe an appropriate perpetuity growth rate is.  
Q. And are there, you know, typical boundaries that 
are recognized in economics that people think about in 
selecting a growth rate?
A. Yes.  For a typical business, it's usually the case 
that most valuation professionals, most -- myself included -- 
would use a perpetuity growth rate somewhere between 
inflation and nominal GDP growth.  And the way to think about 
that is, if you have a company which is going to stay -- stay 
its steady state and it's going to stay the same size in sort 
of real economic terms, that sort of says its performance, 
its cash flows are going to grow at the rate of inflation.  
And what that is sort of saying is this firm is going to stay 
the same size forever.  
A second possibility is that the company will grow 
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at the overall rate of the economy.  So generally, the 
economy grows faster than inflation on average.  And so if 
this company is sort of going to grow roughly proportional to 
the overall economy, then you would assume that the 
perpetuity growth rate would be the rate of nominal GDP 
growth into the future. 
Q. Are there circumstances in which it is appropriate 
to use a growth rate that is below the rate of inflation?
A. Absolutely.  
Q. In what circumstances?
A. So I've been involved in circumstances where I've 
done valuations where there's no terminal value.  So the -- 
say it's a patent and you're trying to value a patent.  Once 
it expires, there's no sort of positive free cash flow.  So 
there's no terminal value.  There are other circumstances in 
which there are companies or industries that are in real 
decline, meaning that they're disappearing for a variety of 
reasons.  
It could be new technology obviates the need for 
that particular business and that business is going to 
generally go away over time.  It could be a business like 
cigarettes in which for health and regulatory reasons, that 
that business is going away over time. 
Q. Now, did you come up with your own perpetuity 
growth rate number here?
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A. No.
Q. So what work did you do in looking at the 
perpetuity growth rates that were selected by the financial 
advisors?
A. I did the same work that I would do if I were to 
have chosen my own perpetuity growth rate.  Looked at 
industry reports.  Looked at industry data.  Read through the 
volumes of analyst reports in the case.  And came up with an 
assessment and a set of information by which I could evaluate 
the choices which were made by the financial advisors.  But 
it was the same set of work that I did that I would have done 
had I come up with my own estimate.
Q. And is the work that you just described the work 
that financial economists do in the ordinary course of their 
field?
A. Oh, any time I've done my own valuation, I've 
done -- I do that exact same set of things where you look at 
industry reports, analyst reports and the like, to come up 
with an assessment of what you think an appropriate 
perpetuity growth rate would be.
Q. And what did the bankers here conclude was the 
appropriate growth rate to use, or range of rates?
A. So Goldman Sachs and Lazard used the same range.  
Their range was minus .5 percent to plus .5 percent.  
JPMorgan used a slightly higher range which was 
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from zero to 1 percent.  
Q. And what did you conclude about the ranges that 
they selected?
A. My conclusion is that, you know, range centered 
around zero sort of makes sense.  Those are reasonable 
terminal growth rates.
Q. What's the basis of that opinion?
A. So when you look, most of the investment analysts 
actually who were following RAI were projecting negative long 
run growth.  
Second, it was clear from my analysis of the 
industry reports and from the analysts that there were, you 
know, major changes in the industry.  Volumes had been 
declining for quite some time and it was clear from the 
industry experts that the ability to continue to offset those 
volume declines with price increases was potentially going to 
be limited in the future.  
And then the third thing was the discussion of what 
were these very large game changing risks which faced the 
industry?  I think I've mentioned a couple of them earlier.  
So things like FDA regulation of nicotine, the menthol ban, 
restrictions on age purchases of product, state and federal 
excise taxes, new products like vapor and its 
cannibalization.  
All of those things could have dramatic step order 
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function changes in a negative way to the industry and those 
were very real possibilities.  
Q. In addition to looking at this publicly available 
information like analyst reports and so forth, did you also 
look at any of the internal documentation from RAI or 
testimony of the like?
A. Certainly.  So I reviewed the various internal 
documents, the public disclosures and say the proxy, the -- 
and sort of the testimony, and it was clear from that that 
management itself understood that these very large risks were 
out there and were very real probabilities over a reasonable 
horizon, and that those things would dramatically change the 
business in sort of a very negative way.  
Q. There have been a number of questions over the 
course of the trial focused on what's been characterized as a 
cliff.  Do you remember that coming up?
A. I do.  
Q. Can you tell us whether a -- the use of a zero 
percent perpetuity growth rate means that a company is 
falling off a cliff?
A. Yes.  I mean, that's actually a mischaracterization 
of what a zero percent growth rate means.  
So if you think about it -- so practically speaking 
first of all, what a zero percent growth rate means is that 
if you have nine billion of cash flow or five billion of cash 
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flow in year five, you'd have that exact same amount in year 
six and year seven and year eight so your cash flow would 
stay the same.  So it's five billion in six, five billion in 
seven, five billion in eight.  But the thing that we need to 
sort of understand about this perpetuity growth rate is that 
it really is meant to capture two sort of factors.  The first 
of which is as I mentioned earlier, there's a time series of 
growth rates.  
So that perpetuity growth rate is meant to capture 
not just what happens in the next two, three, four, five 
years, but what happens over the life of the business.  
So it's time averaging over, like, infinity in some 
sense.  So if you look over the next 20 years, maybe it grows 
somewhat quickly over the next three to five years, but 
eventually it's going to decline by 5, 10, 15, 25 or 30 
percent.  And so that zero percent can capture some growth -- 
some positive growth now but then averaging with this big 
negative growth into the future.  
The second thing it captures is just the fact that 
projections are just estimates and they're never perfect.  
And I think the way we should think about it is that zero 
percent captures the fact that it's possible that RAI would 
continue to grow at 7 or 8 percent through year ten, but as 
the -- you know, as the industry analysts and experts sort of 
acknowledge and the company itself, there are real 
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina


























- App. 123 -
probabilities that one or more of these big negative events 
are going to hit.  It could hit in year four, year six, or 
year ten.  And if they hit, these are going to have game 
changing effects.  
So you could have 25, 30, 50 percent changes.  I 
mean, if it was a menthol ban, that's sort of -- you know, 
the largest area of what's going on in RAI.  Their best 
performing subset of cigarettes.  And so the way to think 
about it is that that zero percent averages across some 
scenarios in which, yes, maybe it grows at 7 or 8 percent, 
but maybe in year eight, there's a regulatory event that has 
minus 25 percent.  
And so the way -- the way you should think about 
that growth rate is it averages over the time with maybe some 
positive and then negative in the future and averages across 
scenarios some of which may be very large negative events 
that happen. 
Q. Is there a concept of present value weighting in 
connection with perpetuity growth rate selection?
A. Yes.  So the way to think about the first element 
is that that zero percent would be sort of a present value 
weighted calculation of the growth rates in year six, seven, 
eight, ten, 15, 20, 30.  
Q. And can you tell us what you mean by present value 
weighted calculation?
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A. Well, I think I explained to the Court a little 
earlier that there's the time value of money.  That money 
today is worth more than money later and so the growth rate 
ten years from now is less important to the perpetuity growth 
rate than growth say in year six.  
And so you would have to adjust for, say, a big 
negative growth rate in year ten or 15 by that time value of 
money, by the weighted average cost of capital.  
Q. And does the perpetuity growth rate which is just a 
single number -- zero or .5 or whatever it is -- does that 
number capture that rise and fall over time?
A. That's one element of how you would get to a zero 
percent growth rate.  Yes.  
Q. And so if you have a company that is growing at, 
say, 7 percent over the course of five years and then you 
assign a zero percent perpetuity growth rate in year six, 
does that mean that you are saying that growth necessarily 
stops immediately in year six?
A. No, not at all.  
Q. And that's for what reason?
A. For the two reasons I mentioned, one of which is 
that the perpetuity growth rate averages across all the 
years.  The present value across all the years, as well as 
averaging across different scenarios that might happen.  So 
there's nothing embedded in a zero percent growth rate which 
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would say that this company would fall off a cliff after year 
five.  
Q. So is it -- is it correct that the growth of RAI 
over the past several years has been higher than the rate of 
inflation?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that undermine in any way the reasonableness 
of the bankers' selection of a zero percent rate for 
perpetuity?
A. No, not at all.
Q. Can you explain why not?
A. Because part of their ability to grow quickly was 
driven by price -- their ability to increase prices.  And it 
was clear that their ability to increase prices at least from 
the perspective of analysts in the industry and including 
internally, perhaps was going to be limited in the future.  
The ability to continue to increase at 6 or 7 or 8 percent 
per year would be hard.  
The second thing is that, while we didn't get one 
of these regulatory events perhaps in the last, you know, 
three to five years, that says nothing about the real 
probability that one of those events may happen in the next 
three, five or sort of ten years.  And so the fact that 
they've grown quickly over the last several years in no way 
negates a zero percent growth rate being reasonable. 
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Q. Are there customary ways to look and check the 
reasonableness of the perpetuity growth rate that you select 
when do you a DCF?
A. For sure.  
I mean, so one of the things that we teach in first 
year finance and one of the things that you see -- one of the 
things that I've always done when I do valuation, as well as 
the thing you see that all three financial advisors doing is 
to gauge their perpetuity growth rate by looking at what's 
called the terminal year exit multiple. 
Q. And what is that?
A. So we know -- and one of the things I did here in 
terms of a market check was to do a comparable company's 
multiple analysis.  What a terminal year exit multiple 
analysis is, is just to say a particular perpetuity growth 
rate implies some multiple in that terminal year.  So because 
we're calculating a terminal value, we can say, what multiple 
would be active or valid in order to create that terminal 
value?  And so you calculate the EBITDA multiple, the ratio 
of enterprise value to EBITDA, in that final year of 
projection based on your choice of perpetuity growth rate.
Q. All right.  So let me break down a couple of pieces 
of that answer.  
First of all, you used the word multiple a lot.  
Let's make sure we're all in agreement on what you mean by 
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that.  
A. So one common -- one common check to a DCF is 
typically to do what we call a comparable companies or 
precedent transaction.  Which a lot of people would just call 
a multiples analysis.  And what that is, is it's taking the 
ratio of your value to some financial metric.  And then -- 
Q. So for example.  
A. For example.  I was going there.  
So one example -- and probably the most common is 
EBITDA, earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization.  
And so a very common -- things that market 
participants do -- and you should certainly use as a check is 
to say what does -- you know, what does the choice of your 
perpetuity growth rate imply for the multiple that will 
exist, that ratio of enterprise value to EBITDA.  
Q. And did you look at that in this matter?
A. I did, yes.  
Q. So let's see if we can put on the screen please 
Demonstrative No. 7.  And does this slide reflect the work 
that you did on this?
A. It does.
Q. All right.  So can you tell us first of all what 
that very first green bar with the 12.4X is?
A. That represents the ratio of enterprise value to 
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EBITDA for RAI as of October 20th, before the offer from BAT.  
And so at that time, if you took the enterprise value and 
divided it by the 12 months EBITDA, you would get 12.4  
times.
Q. And the enterprise value is something that you 
calculate how?
A. Well, you take the number of shares times the share 
price to get equity value.  You add the value of the debt and 
subtract out the excess cash.
Q. So is that a measure of the value of the firm as -- 
as set by the market?
A. Correct.  Yes.  
Q. And so this first multiple is calculated as a 
market value of the firm divided by some measure of earnings?
A. That's correct.  
Q. Okay.  So then what are the next three green bars?
A. So the next three green bars just do that 
calculation for the terminal value of the financial advisors.  
So you take the total value of their -- their total terminal 
value and you divide it by the last year of EBITDA.  And so 
that essentially is saying, what's the EBITDA multiple that 
is implied by this perpetuity growth rate that will exist in 
sort of year six?  
Q. So let's just take a concrete example here of let's 
say the Goldman analysis that gets you to the 10.5X.  What 
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are the different inputs into the calculation that arise at a 
10.5 times multiple?
A. It's -- so within their spreadsheets analysis, 
the -- they have a component of value which is called 
terminal value, which is the value which after the projection 
period, from year six forward, is the value that they 
calculate based on their perpetuity growth rate.  So you take 
that terminal value and you divide it by EBITDA in year five.  
So that's sort of what we call a trailing 12-month 
EBITDA multiple.  But that gives you this 10.5 number.  So 
the ratio of terminal value to year five EBITDA is 10.5.  
Q. So the numerator is the portion of the Goldman 
Sachs valuation that starts in year six?
A. Correct.  
Q. And the denominator is what?
A. Year five EBITDA.
Q. Okay.  And then they used a range of perpetuity 
growth rates in the analysis -- 
A. Correct.
Q. -- from negative .5 to positive .5.  
Do you recall which spot in the range was used to 
calculate the numbers on your chart here? 
A. So it's the midpoint for all of these.  So it's 
zero for Lazard and Goldman Sachs and .5 for JPMorgan.  
Q. Okay.  And now, can you tell anything or do you 
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draw any conclusions as an economist from the fact that the 
bankers' multiples are somewhat lower than the pre-merger 
trading multiple in the first bar?
A. That's sort of what you expect.  So their implied 
terminal exit multiples give you comfort that the choice of 
perpetuity growth rate is reasonable.
Q. And why does it give you comfort that those numbers 
are a little bit lower?
A. So the -- the multiple is really just dependent 
upon the risk of the cash flows and the growth rate.  And 
generally we think of growth rates declining over time.  So 
if the growth rates standing in year five looking off into 
the future is lower than the growth rates standing here 
today, then on average, multiples decline over time.  
And so the fact that the multiples are a little bit 
lower in year five would be reasonable because, looking 
forward, you would expect the growth rate off into the future 
five years from now will be lower than the growth rate today.  
Q. So tell us what the two bars over on the right are 
and how you calculated those.  
A. So I did the exact same thing for the two experts 
for the Dissenter, Mr. Taylor and Professor Zmijewski.  And 
if you do the exact same calculation that I did for the 
financial advisors, you arrive at implied terminal exit 
multiples of 17 and a half and 17.7.  
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Q. And can you draw any conclusions about the 
reasonableness of their valuations based on what we see here 
on the chart?
A. So as I said, this is really a test of the 
perpetuity growth rate.  And if I were looking at this -- 
because again, this is an important check -- this would cause 
me to have serious concerns about the perpetuity growth rate 
that I chose.  
Q. And why is that?
A. Because essentially you're assuming that mult- -- 
the multiple's going to go up over time.  And it would 
generally imply that from the perspective of expectations, 
growth in this company is going to be accelerating.  So 
growth in five years is going to be higher than growth today.
Q. And would it be reasonable to expect that growth in 
RAI would be higher five years from now than it is today?
A. No.  
Q. And why is that?
A. Generally speaking, this is an industry in decline.  
It's been growing relatively rapidly and is expected over the 
next several years to grow, you know, more rapid than zero 
and therefore standing five years from now, we would expect 
it to be growing slower.  
Q. Let's take a look at Slide No. 4, please.  On the 
subject of terminal value, can you tell us what it is we're 
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looking at here?
A. So what I did here is just to break apart the total 
per share enterprise value that Professor Zmijewski and Mr. 
Taylor calculate.  And I divided into the component which is 
based on their projection period cash flows.  It's five years 
for Professor Zmijewski and eight years for Mr. Taylor.
Q. And that's the green portion?
A. That's correct.  And I look at that as a fraction 
of the overall value and then also what fraction of the 
overall value is due to their terminal value.  
Q. And what, if any, conclusions or implications are 
there for you from what you've done here on the chart?
A. So what this says is that the vast, vast, vast 
majority of the value they come up with is in their terminal 
value.  
And because that is totally dependent upon their 
perpetuity growth rate, what this says is that you need to 
take an extreme amount of care in choosing that perpetuity 
growth rate because it is the most critical factor in terms 
of determining the value of RAI.  
Q. So are there some steps that you would then take 
upon seeing that your calculation led to these results?
A. Certainly.  You'd want to do checks.  
And one of the checks we just talked about which 
was a check of the implied exit multiple.  But you also -- 
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you know, again, this is sort of Finance 101.  That you don't 
just do your DCF because as I mentioned to the Court a little 
earlier, DCF is just math.  It's literally just formulas.  
And what matters are your inputs.  And you want to check 
those inputs with other measures of value.  And so you'd want 
to do reasonable checks of that value in other ways.  
Q. Have you seen any documents internally at RAI that 
reflected some kind of DCF calculation?
A. I have, yes.  
Q. And do you recall what the inputs were in -- in 
that document?
A. I do, yes.
Q. What were they?
A. So they were projections and then the discount 
rates and perpetuity growth rates.
Q. And do you recall what perpetuity growth rate was 
used by the company in connection with trying to come up with 
a ceiling for authorization to go purchase shares in the 
market if it chose to do so?
A. They used 3 percent in those projections.
Q. Okay.  And -- and in that calculation?
A. In that calculation, yes.
Q. Now, does that cause you to question in any way 
your opinion about the reasonableness of the growth rates 
that the bankers used?
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A. No.
Q. Please explain why not.
A. Well, the first reason is that they -- they tied
that growth rate to what I would almost call a step factor 
calculation of their discount rate.  So they had this set of 
factors which would increase or decrease their base discount 
rate based on things like protected market, new product, and 
the like.  And those things generally are related to the sort 
of -- the sort of probability that those things are going to 
be successful or not. 
And so there's a direct tie between the way they 
calculate the discount rate and the perpetuity growth rate. 
Those two things are inextricably sort of linked.  
The second thing is that this wasn't done for what 
I would call a fundamental or intrinsic value purposes in 
terms of really being this probability weighted expected 
growth rate into the future.  And that be sort of, you 
know -- I often talk about projections and calculations being 
done for different purposes.  This wasn't done to estimate 
intrinsic or fair value.  It was done to estimate the maximum 
price that they would be willing to pay for their shares in 
this repurchase program.  
Q. So let me go back to the first of the two things
you mentioned relating to the way they calculated the 
weighted average cost of capital.  
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types of -- I'm going to try it -- idiosyncratic risks?
A. It does not.  I mean, you have to factor them into
expected cash flows.  They are not captured by beta and 
they're not captured by cost of capital.
Q. So overall, now that we've marched through the
different inputs to the bankers' analyses, what conclusion 
did you draw about the reasonableness of the work that they 
did?
A. So for the purposes that they were -- they were
hired to opine on whether the deal price treated non-BAT 
shareholders fairly, it was -- they did reasonable work.  At 
the end of the day, I think their valuations are optimistic 
because of the projections they used.  But that was 
reasonable in this context, given that it still lined up with 
the deal price.
Q. And to be clear, why do you think they were
optimistic?
A. Because those five-year projections don't take into
account the possibility that even over the next five years, 
one of those negative events or more may occur.  
Q. Now, did do you your own ground up DCF analysis for
this matter?
A. I did not.
Q. Why not?
A. I wasn't asked to do an affirmative discounted cash
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Q. Can you tell us why as an economist that was
something that you considered relevant to look at?
A. So if the market is efficient and there's no
material, nonpublic information, then the market price will 
be the best estimate of a firm's, you know, intrinsic or 
fundamental value.
Q. And --
MR. ROLNICK:  Your Honor, I object to that answer
and I move to strike it.  This is -- the premise of that 
answer was, if the market is efficient, and they had an 
expert who was going to opine on that issue, and they made 
the decision not to call that expert.  I think it's 
inappropriate for Professor Gompers to offer any opinions 
about whether RAI's stock was efficient.
THE COURT:  I'll allow him to testify, but it will 
be subject to your objection.  
MR. ROLNICK:  Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. BORNSTEIN:  And to be clear, Your Honor, I have 
not asked him to offer the opinion as to whether it was 
efficient.  And we'll deal with the objection in due course 
in the papers.  
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. So let me just actually put that out there so it's
very clear.  Do you have an opinion, Professor, as to whether 
or not the market for RAI stock was efficient at the time of 
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BAT's first offer?
A. No.
Q. Okay.  Do you have an opinion as a financial 
economist more generally as to whether large stocks like RAI 
that trade on a large exchange, are or not generally 
efficient at various points in time?
A. I think to be precise, that most of the time, large 
firms traded on national exchanges are trading efficiently.
Q. Have you seen any evidence in this case that has 
caused you to say that the stock of RAI is inefficient?
A. No.  I see no evidence of inefficiency.  
MR. SHINDEL:  Objection, Your Honor.  
MR. ROLNICK:  Your Honor, I'm going to object again 
to this line of questioning.  He just said he was not going 
to put this witness on to opine that the stock was efficient.  
THE COURT:  I'll allow him to testify but subject 
to your objection.
MR. ROLNICK:  Thank you, Your Honor.  
BY MR. BORNSTEIN: 
Q. And, again, to be clear, have you formed a view as 
to whether it is -- the market was efficient for RAI stock at 
the time?
A. No.  
Q. So when you just testified that you didn't see 
evidence indicating inefficiency, can you explain how that is 
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina


























- App. 138 -
consistent with the fact that you haven't formed an 
affirmative opinion as to efficiency?
A. Yeah.  So there's nothing I've seen either in the
review of the analyst reports or any evidence produced in 
this manner which would cause me to be concerned that the 
market was inefficient.  There's no evidence which has been 
put forward that would demonstrate that RAI was trading 
inefficiently.  
Q. There's been some testimony that I believe you've
heard over the course of the past few days in which people 
have used the phrase minority discount.  
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember that?
A. Yes.
Q. So just as a matter of economics, what is a
minority discount?
A. So we think of a minority discount -- and the way
to think about it is, it's the flip of the control premium.  
So the way we think about a control premium is how much -- 
how much extra would you be willing to control these assets?  
And so this -- in this case, BAT paid a 26 percent premium to 
the prevailing stock price and so that's the controlled 
premium.  The minority discount is just the opposite of that. 
It relates to where the stock trades under the existing 
management.  
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Q. So if you do a DCF valuation of the company, just
in the abstract, not RAI specifically.  If do you a DCF 
valuation of the company, does the output of the DCF if done 
properly, include a minority discount or a control premium?
A. So no.  The way to think about it is that there's a
set of projections under the existing management and the DCF 
value of that will equal the stock price.  So you don't need 
to take a minority discount off of the stock price relative 
to the projections for that current management.  
Now, a controlled premium, the reason BAT may be 
willing to pay more is because they think they can derive 
more value.  So they think they can generate more cash flows. 
Perhaps they can get some synergy value and the like.  And so 
the assets are worth more.  So they pay a control premium.  
And the value they hope is that their DCF value under their 
control equals what they would be willing to pay for it.  
But it is certainly the case that if you have 
projections for a company under the existing management, that 
DCF value should equal the share price with no discount.  
Q. So assume a hypothetical company trading on an
efficient market that is trading at $10 a share.  Would that 
$10 share price on the efficient market represent the DCF 
value of the company or would there be some kind of discount 
reflected in that $10 trading price?
A. It would --
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BAT's first offer?
A. No.
Q. Okay.  Do you have an opinion as a financial 
economist more generally as to whether large stocks like RAI 
that trade on a large exchange, are or not generally 
efficient at various points in time?
A. I think to be precise, that most of the time, large 
firms traded on national exchanges are trading efficiently.
Q. Have you seen any evidence in this case that has 
caused you to say that the stock of RAI is inefficient?
A. No.  I see no evidence of inefficiency.  
MR. SHINDEL:  Objection, Your Honor.  
MR. ROLNICK:  Your Honor, I'm going to object again 
to this line of questioning.  He just said he was not going 
to put this witness on to opine that the stock was efficient.  
THE COURT:  I'll allow him to testify but subject 
to your objection.
MR. ROLNICK:  Thank you, Your Honor.  
BY MR. BORNSTEIN: 
Q. And, again, to be clear, have you formed a view as 
to whether it is -- the market was efficient for RAI stock at 
the time?
A. No.  
Q. So when you just testified that you didn't see 
evidence indicating inefficiency, can you explain how that is 
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experts.  So if there was truly some mountain of gold that 
was hidden, something inside RAI that was hidden, eventually 
that would have come out and I would have expected -- again, 
back to the analysis we talked about just before break -- 
that somehow BAT would have appreciated quite substantially 
because they got such a deal on purchasing of RAI.
Q. Are you saying that BAT stock would have gone up at
some point when the value became known?
A. So essentially both Professor Zmijewski and
Mr. Taylor are -- they're opining that, you know, $50 billion 
of value was transferred from the RAI shareholders to BAT 
because they've underpaid by $50 billion.  So if that were 
the case, one would expect that over time -- again, the proof 
is in the pudding -- that those results would have come out 
and BAT would have gone up because people would have seen 
that they got such a great deal.
Q. And did you see any evidence that that has happened
over time?
A. Well, no.  Again, the stock price of BAT has fallen
by about 60 percent since they purchased RAI.
Q. Was there anything in the analysts' coverage of the
deal that was relevant to your assessment of the Dissenters' 
valuations of the company?
MR. ROLNICK:  Your Honor, I'm going to object to 
that question.  Whether or not analysts who are not before 
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the Court offered opinions or not is rank hearsay.  They're 
not here to be cross-examined.  He hasn't conducted a 
valuation.  This is just another way of summarizing argument 
and presenting it to the Court.
THE COURT:  Well, experts can rely on inadmissible 
evidence and I'm going to -- I'll -- subject to your 
objection, I'm going to allow the testimony.  But it's 
subject to your objection and that will be something that you 
can raise in your post-trial briefing.  
MR. ROLNICK:  Thank you, Your Honor.  
BY MR. BORNSTEIN:
Q. And perhaps to grease the wheels on this a little 
bit, is the review of analyst coverage of a stock something 
that financial economists do in the ordinary course of 
assessing the value of a company?
A. Absolutely.  Whenever I do a valuation, I look at 
industry analysts, I look at company analysts to try and 
assess what the view in terms of the state of the company, 
the state of the industry, certainly the financial advisors 
here did the same thing.  And so while again, you have to 
filter it and sort of interpret it from, you know, just these 
are individuals' perspectives, it does provide you insight in 
terms of contemporaneously what they were thinking about in 
this case the deal price that was agreed to.  
Q. And what did you find when you did that analysis 
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here?
A. So I read every single analyst report around the 
deal, around the merger, for both RAI and for BAT.  And, you 
know, typically the vast, vast, vast majority -- virtually 
all except for one, thought the deal price was rich.  It was 
at a historic high.  And that potentially BAT was overpaying.  
So saw nothing -- not a single analyst who said 
that BAT was getting a steal.  
Q. Let's take a look at Slide 27, please.  And can you 
tell us, Professor, what Slide 27 shows?
A. So Slide 27 is just all of the evidence that I 
bring to bear on assessing sort of fair value here.  And it 
starts with my unaffected stock price analysis on the top.  I 
graph the range of discounted cash flow values from the 
financial analysts.  My own comparable company and precedent 
transaction analysis, as well as the comparable company and 
precedent transaction analysis of the financial advisors.  
And what you can sort of see is that generally they all line 
up -- they all line up a lot.  
The one outlier here is actually on the comparable 
companies, there's one outlier and that's ITC, this sort of 
Indian conglomerate.  That's where you get this 82 and the 
79.  But other than that one comparable company, all the 
others line up basically right where the deal price is or 
actually lower.  
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fair value of the firm; right?
A. Your question is not being very precise.  If I may
help you a second.  Those three different forms of market 
efficiency talk about the types of information which would be 
embedded in the stock price.
Q. Okay.  So let's just focus -- now, you haven't done
any study here to determine whether or not RAI stock was 
either efficient, semi-strong efficient, or strong efficient; 
right?
A. That's correct.
Q. But let's just focus for a moment on semi-strong
efficiency.  Okay?  Semi-strong efficiency says that the 
price will respond to information -- publicly disclosed 
information to the marketplace; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.  And in order to determine whether or not
that in fact occurs, you have to do a scientific analysis; 
right?
A. There are affirmative tests that you can do for
market efficiency, yes.
Q. Such as an event study for example?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay.  But just because a company is widely traded
on a national exchange, doesn't mean that it's semi-strong 
efficient at any given point; correct?
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A. That's correct.  
Q. Even widely -- even widely traded shares cannot -- 
may not be semi-strong efficient; correct?
A. That's correct.  While it's true most of the time, 
for most large companies on large exchanges, it's possible 
that they're not trading efficiently.
Q. But you wouldn't know unless you did an actual 
study; correct?
A. You wouldn't be able to provide evidence unless you 
did a study.  That's correct.
Q. And you've done no such study?
A. That's correct.  
Q. For Reynolds; correct?
A. Yeah.  We should caveat that.  Yes.  I have not 
done an efficiency analysis of RAI.
Q. Have you done it for other companies?
A. I have.
Q. So you're perfectly capable of doing it?
A. I am.
Q. Okay.  And are you capable of analyzing process to 
see whether process yields a fair price?
A. Yes.
Q. But you didn't do that here?
A. I wasn't asked.  
Q. Okay.  So that's no, you didn't; right?
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those DCF's are likely optimistic.
Q. And yet there is a long line of court decisions and 
financial literature that tells us that the best projections 
for use in an appraisal proceeding are those prepared by 
management in the ordinary course of its business; isn't that 
true?
A. That's correct.  But it depends upon the 
assumptions embedded in those projections about whether or 
not they reflect expected performance.  
Q. And, in fact, there's an equally large body of 
court decisions and financial literature that tells us that 
adjusted projections prepared for purposes of litigation 
should not be used in an appraisal proceeding; right?
MR. BORNSTEIN:  I object to the extent he's asking 
for a legal opinion.  I don't object to the extent he's 
asking about financial literature.  
MR. ROLNICK:  I'll lay a foundation, Your Honor.  
BY MR. ROLNICK:
Q. You're very familiar with the legal decisions in 
appraisal matters; right?
A. Again, I generally don't take it upon myself to 
read decisions.  I offer opinions based on my expertise which 
is financial economics.  And what I can tell you based on 
financial economics, if it's clear that the company's 
projections prepared in the course of ordinary business -- if 
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that both the discount rate and the growth rate factor into 
your terminal value.  
Q. Okay.  And if you did the same analysis for the 
fairness opinions, DCFs, for example, the DCF prepared by 
JPMorgan, do you know what that would look like?
A. 78 percent.
Q. 78 percent compared to 79.3?
A. That's correct.  
Q. Okay.  So even JPMorgan's discount rate -- 
discounted cash flow produces the same sort of graphic 
result; right?
A. That's true.
Q. Okay.  But you didn't mention that in your direct 
testimony; right?
A. I did not.  
Q. Okay.  Let's go to your comparable companies 
analysis.  Page PDX5.8.  This is your list of comparable 
companies; right?
A. That's correct.  
Q. Okay.  And this list is not for valuation purposes 
but just as a check; right?
A. That's correct.
Q. You could have done valuation using comparable 
companies but you didn't; right?
A. It's -- this is meant to provide market-based 
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A. That is correct.  
Q. And subsequent to that, you became the 
vice-president of business development at RAI?
A. That is correct.
Q. And you were the VP of business development at the 
time BAT made its offer to acquire RAI; right?
A. That is correct.  
Q. All right.  Before we talk about that, I want to 
talk a little bit about the financial planning process at 
RAI.  In particular, the financial forecasts prepared by RAI.  
You oversaw that process in your role as VP of financial 
planning; right?
A. I was in charge of the group that performed that 
process, yes.  
Q. And the financial planning process at RAI involved 
updating the company's financial forecasts each month; right?
A. That is correct.  
Q. And those monthly updates internally were called 
latest estimates or LEs?
A. That is correct.
Q. The ordinary course forecasting process involved 
over a hundred individuals throughout the organization; 
correct?
A. That is correct.  
Q. The ordinary course forecasting process involved a 
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the ten-year CAGR is based off starting year of 2015.  2015, 
not all of the Newport shipments were included in the base.  
So that's also why there's a nine-year CAGR that's presented 
there.  We didn't have a full year until 2016 of Newport 
volumes.  So it's incorrect to be looking on something that 
you only have a partial year of volumes to start it with.  
The good base would be 22nd -- 2016 when we have a full year 
of Newport volumes.  
Q. All right.  Well, you know, I want to be complete 
so if we look at the nine-year CAGR for Reynolds, that's a 
2.8 percent decline; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. And for the whole industry it's a 4.0 percent 
decline; right?
A. That is correct.
Q. So when you look at ten years or nine years, 
according to these projections, Reynolds is projected to do 
better than the industry at large; correct?
A. That is correct.  
Q. And that's what management believed at the time 
that these projections were put together; right?
A. That's their best estimate, assuming that the 
industry remains where -- you know, that the environment 
remains where it is.  That there was no outside influences.  
There's a lot of downside to the tobacco industry that are 
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depicted above; right?
A. That is correct.  
Q. All right.  And if we look, starting in 2022, 
there's a 2.9 percent year-over-year decline, then it jumps 
to a 7.7 percent year-over-year decline, then back down to 
3.1 percent, year-over-year in 2024, down to 2.7 percent in 
2025; right?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.  And so the volume projections in the 
ten-year plan are not simply straight line extrapolations; 
correct?
A. Volume is not a straight line extrapolation.  That 
is correct.  
Q. And if you look at 2023, the reason that there's a 
7.7 percent decline that's out of line with the other 
declines is that in this model, RAI assumed that there would 
be a federal excise tax increase in 2022; correct?
A. I do not know the answer to that question without 
looking at other information in here.  
Q. All right.  Well, we'll see if we can tie that one 
together later.  
A. Okay.  I mean, there's obviously something that 
went on at that point in time.  
THE COURT:  Your reference is to 2022, but your box 
highlighted is in 2023.  Did you misspeak or. . .
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Altria; right?
A. That is correct.  
Q. And if Altria has a need for robust cigarette 
pricing, that means that RAI in turn will be able to take 
price as needed to offset the volume declines; right?
A. They will be able to share in the pricing.  Yes.  
Whether it offset volume declines, that's another question.
Q. All right.  Turn to page 8 of DX234.  I want to 
focus on the second bullet point.  
A. I'm sorry.  Where are we?  Oh, I got it.  Yes.  
Okay.
Q. Talking about some obstacles that RAI might need to 
overcome.  And just to tie back what we were looking at in 
the spreadsheet, if you look at the bottom sub-bullet, it's 
written there.  
In the long-term outlook, there's a potential 
Federal Excise Tax, FET, slated to occur in 2022.  Do you see 
that? 
A. Yes, I do.
Q. All right.  And does that suggest that the jump in 
volume declines that we saw in the spreadsheet in 2023 is 
based on an assumption that that FET will be put in place?  
A. Yes, that would have that -- that would have that 
impact.
Q. And that was baked into the 2016 ten-year 
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projections; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. All right.  Now, I want to look at the next 
sentence in the narrative about Strategy Day in JX234 (as 
said) on page 8.  
At this time, there are no tangible indicators that 
this tax will come to fruition; however, we will continue to 
monitor this closely and implement appropriate mitigation 
steps as necessary.  
Is that what it says? 
A. Yes, that is what it says.
Q. All right.  So despite the fact that there were no 
tangible indicators that the tax would actually occur, it was 
baked into the 2016 ten-year plan; right?
A. Yes, it was.  Given the state of our governments 
and their need for financing, this is something that was 
debated for long periods of time, whether to include federal 
excise tax increases or large -- excise tax increases in the 
out years of the plan.  
There was positive and negatives to both.  One, it 
creates a cliff.  Two, you don't know when it's exactly going 
to happen because like we said, there's no tangible 
indicator.  But as the governments become more and more in 
need of money, tobacco is a very easy target for them to 
increase taxes, whether it be at the state level or the 
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federal level.  So there is one in there that has the impact 
of decreasing volumes at that period in time.  That excise 
tax could come earlier, it could come later.  It could be 
more, it could be less.  You have to go with some 
assumptions.  
Q. All right.  We can minimize that and turn to page 9 
of DX234.  I want to focus on the bullet point at the top.  
At the very top of the page about also critical to meeting 
the plan objectives.  
And what this part of the narrative states is that, 
critical to meeting plan objectives is successful navigation 
of the regulatory environment, especially now that all 
tobacco products are under the FDA; right? 
A. That is correct.
Q. And it goes on to say:  Incremental investments and 
resources have been added to the Strategic Plan to better 
position the RAI OpCos for success in the regulatory 
environment; correct?
A. That's what it says.
Q. So there was additional cash spending to address 
potential FDA issues built into the ten-year plan?
A. They're -- dealing with the FDA requires a number 
of people.  You can't change anything on any product today.  
You have to be able to prove that nothing has changed in that 
product.  At the time -- it's so onerous that at the time 
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A. Yes, it is.
Q. And prior to the Lorillard transaction even being 
negotiated, the FDA in 2013 had issued an advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking related to potential menthol regulations; 
right?
A. That is correct.  
Q. And after the Lorillard merger agreement had been 
signed, RAI publicly disclosed to stockholders that it was 
RAI's belief that menthol regulations would have to be based 
on scientific evidence and that there was no scientific 
evidence of health risks from menthol; correct?
A. You're asking something that occurred after the 
merger.  And I wasn't -- 
Q. Before the merger closed, while it was pending, RAI 
disclosed to stockholders that it was RAI's belief that any 
menthol regulation would have to be based on science and that 
there was no science to support a notion of health risk from 
menthol cigarettes; correct?
A. I do not recall that in specifics, but it sounds 
reasonable.  
Q. All right.  Well, let me see if I can refresh your 
recollection with a document.  
MR. SHINDEL:  May I approach, Your Honor?  
THE COURT:  I'm sorry.  You may.  
MR. SHINDEL:  (Tenders.) 
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It's not the first time.
BY MR. MILLER:
Q. Based on your experience in the cigarette industry, 
is there any particular demographic that tends to smoke 
menthol with higher percentages?
A. Well, I don't know the exact demographic breakdown 
on menthol cigarettes.  I know Newport has a lot of 
African-American smokers, has a lot of young smokers.  So 
there's -- they skew to certain demographics.  But, you know, 
over all menthol cigarettes sold, I don't know as I sit here 
the distribution between different demographic groups.
Q. And based on your past experience in the cigarette 
industry, do you have any sense of what kind of political 
resistance a potential ban of menthol might face?
A. Well, I don't know how to answer that directly, but 
I assume it would face, you know, opposition from more than 
just the cigarette industry.  When I participated in the FDA 
hearings, there were various groups.  Convenience stores 
didn't like the ban.  Members of African-American community 
came in and complained about the ban.  There were -- there 
was not just the cigarette companies who did not want the 
ban.  Presumably consumer groups.  You know, people who like 
menthol would oppose the ban.  But exactly politically, I 
don't know.  
Q. And likewise, based on your knowledge of the 
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cigarette industry, if hypothetically the FDA had announced 
before the merger closed that it intended to pursue a menthol 
ban, do you have any sense of how long it could take such a 
ban to go in place assuming it ever occurred?
A. Well, to start with that, I don't think -- the 
point where they announce it, whether it was before the 
merger or after the merger really influences that question.  
But, you know, I don't know exactly how long it would take.  
My best guess is that it would take multiple years because 
the FDA has the Tobacco Product Scientific Advisory 
Committee.  TPSAC it's called.  And they're essentially, as I 
understand, an advisory group.  And so there would be 
hearings.  There would be debates.  There would be, you 
know -- and then if they decided to go forward after that, 
presumably there would be litigation.  But, you know, how 
long -- how many years that would take, I don't know.  
Q. Let's move ahead and talk about the relevant 
geographic market for RAI.  
A. Okay.  
Q. We're on Slide 6.  
MS. SHAH:  Again, Your Honor, I think he needs to 
establish an independent recollection before he prompts the 
witness to his testimony through a PowerPoint.
THE COURT:  As I said before, I think if you -- you 
should establish with him that would assist him in providing 
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didn't -- they weren't related to such a level, didn't reach 
a threshold that they had any significant impact on pricing 
or other strategic decisions for combustible cigarettes.  
Q. So what effect does the FDA have on determining the 
relevant geographic market for RAI's business?
A. Well, that would be the second source of evidence 
that there's unique regulation in the United States.  And 
that regulation, the FDA regulation, specifically the 
restrictions on new products means that it would be very 
difficult or expensive and time-consuming, if possible, to 
bring new products from other countries into the United 
States.  So that's part of the geographic boundary because 
the FDA essentially said they had -- you know, they had 
some -- when they started to look at cigarettes or control 
cigarettes, they allowed products to come onto market that 
were marketed -- I think it was prior to 2007.  But there is 
a date.  
And they essentially said, if you were in the 
market selling those products, don't have to go through 
this -- what's called -- PTMA which is pre-tobacco market 
application.  Which is essentially the FDA restricts new 
products.  In fact, up until April 30th -- it was a few weeks 
after my deposition -- they didn't -- they only had allowed 
eight products onto the market throughout -- you know, since 
the Tobacco Control Act of 2009.  Only eight products were 
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approved by the FDA and they were noncombustible cigarettes.  
They were -- I think they were Snus.  I think products by 
Swedish Match.  But I don't -- but in April 30th they 
approved some more products.  Again, I don't know if any of 
them are cigarettes.  But there's been some more.  But 
there's not many new product approvals, so. . .  
Q. And how do you --
A. But there's -- and then there's also unique 
taxation and distribution in the United States.  So -- and 
finally, without the ability to market and advertise, really 
strong restrictions on advertising marketing promotions in 
the U.S., it would be very difficult for a new brand to come 
into the market and gain share.  How would they get 
consumer -- you know, how would they get into consumer 
consciousness?  
Q. So with restrictions on tobacco marketing, how did 
new tobacco users figure out what brands they want to use?
A. Well, they don't do it through watching TV ads or 
going to sporting events and seeing those promotions.  They 
may see other people smoke particular brands.  There's been 
some work in the literature that says that, you know, 
existing brands have -- especially the large ones have 
advantages because seeing a lot of people smoke a brand gives 
you more exposure to the brand.  But it's difficult.  It's a 
good question.  I don't know exactly.  
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Q. So hypothetically, if you had a cigarette company 
that operated in a country that unlike the U.S. didn't have 
an FDA that limited their advertising ability or their 
ability to launch new products and also unlike the U.S. 
didn't have significant excise taxes, in your opinion, how 
would competition in that hypothetical country compare to the 
U.S. cigarette market at the time of the BAT merger?
A. If you allowed new product entry and more marketing 
and advertisement, it would lead to in my opinion a higher 
level of competition because you'd always have the threat of 
new competitors.  Not only new competitors, but if you think 
about the restrictions on new products today, Reynolds nor 
Altria can introduce -- nor Imperial could introduce any new 
products without going through this PMTA process and that 
limits new products by existing players and it also limits 
entry.  And in a market where you have barriers to entry, 
barriers to new products, barriers to promotion, that makes 
the marketplace less competitive.  
Q. Who were the key players in the U.S. cigarette 
market at the time of the BAT merger?
A. Well, at the time of the merger, there were 
basically two larger players and that's the largest one 
Altria, and Reynolds.  And the two of them accounted for, you 
know, maybe a 35 -- I'm sorry -- 85 percent share.  Not 35.  
85 percent.  I misspoke.
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more competitive and robust.
Q. So just expanding on that a little bit, why do you 
think it would be less likely that a Marlboro Friday type 
event would happen -- would have happened around the time of 
the merger?
A. Why it was less likely?  Because I think the 
overall industry was less competitive.  I think 
regulation restricts competition.  And that restriction on 
competition was significant.  So it was -- so you ask 
yourself this question, what would be gained if I have a 
stable set of competitors who are always going to sell the 
same products, no new competitors are ever going to be able 
to come on the market, why would I want to go to a price war 
against these new competitors?  
The Marlboro Friday that you referenced, a lot of 
the incentives as I understood them was because they were 
value brands gaining share in the marketplace.  And that kind 
of dynamic of new brands coming in and taking share away from 
Altria is less likely to occur today.  
Q. At the time of the merger, what were the trends in 
cigarette volumes in the United States?
A. They were declining.  
Q. And were declines in volumes a recent phenomenon?
A. No.  They had been going on since 1982.  
Q. So historically, since volume started declining 
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BY MR. MILLER:
Q. Dr. Flyer, would this slide help to illustrate your 
testimony about the history of volume declines?
A. Sure.  That's the FTC.  This is based on the FTC 
data.  
So if you take the data available at their website 
and you plot it, you'll see -- and there's no numbers.  There 
should be numbers but -- the number is over 600 billion 
sticks in 1982.  And by -- I think 2016 is the last year 
here.  It would be 240 billion sticks.  2017 data have come 
out.  They came out a couple of months ago.  The FTC released 
the 2017 data and it went -- it's gone down to 230 billion 
sticks.  So roughly it was maybe 630 billion sticks in '82 
and today it's 200 -- or last year -- or '17 it was 230 
billion sticks.  And we're in '19 so it's actually more than 
last year. 
Q. So during this period of consistent volume 
declines, was the profitability of the U.S. cigarette 
industry following a similar decline?
A. No.  Profitability wasn't following a similar 
decline because pricing was increasing.  
Q. Do you know what's meant by the term price 
elasticity?
A. Yes.
Q. What is price elasticity?
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period, is it fair to say that prices -- wholesale prices of 
cigarettes have increased at a much faster rate than the CPI 
has?
A. Yes.  So the way I would generalize this chart is 
to say that the wholesale price of cigarettes has increased 
at a far higher rate over the last 20 years than the overall 
prices in the economy.  
Q. And what has allowed U.S. cigarette companies to 
raise wholesale prices at rates that are so much higher than 
the CPI?
A. Well, I mean, one is that smokers have inelastic 
demand.  So if -- if everybody in the industry raises prices, 
you're likely not to lose that many smokers.  Maybe a more 
concentrated industry that it's easier to get price 
increases.  I mean, exactly why, it's not something I 
analyze, but it's -- I mean, those are potential reasons but 
I -- you know, there's maybe more.
Q. Do you know if there's a relationship between the 
consumer price index and the rate of inflation?
A. Well, that's usually what people refer to to 
measure the rate of inflation, but there are other measures.  
It's one measure.  I think it's probably the most popular 
measure.  
Q. So is it accordingly fair to say that the wholesale 
price of cigarettes during this period has increased much 
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you have less switching.  So presumably, it gives them an 
ability to more effectively pass on pricing.  
Q. What year did the Lorillard transaction with RAI 
take place?
A. Well, it closed as I understand in 2015.  
Q. And what was going on in the Lorillard transaction 
brand -- cigarette brands wise?
A. As I said, it was a swap essentially.  They bought 
Lorillard, but because of antitrust concerns, the 
government -- they had to have a divestiture in order to get 
approval so they divested other brands in return.  
Specifically Winston, Salem, Kool.  Let me see.  There was a 
value brand -- Maverick I think.  Those are the four brands 
they divested.  Plus there was other products as well, 
noncombustible products.
Q. So the Newport brand that Reynolds obtained in the 
Lorillard transaction in 2015, was that primarily a menthol 
brand?
A. Newport?  
Q. Yes.  
A. Absolutely.  
Q. What does the fact that RAI was willing to pay $30 
billion to obtain a menthol cigarette brand in 2015 tell you 
about RAI's assessment about the likelihood of a menthol ban 
at that time?
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MS. SHAH:  Objection, Your Honor.  Asking for 
speculation about RAI's frame of mind.
THE COURT:  Rephrase the question.  
BY MR. MILLER:
Q. Hypothetically, in 2015, if you were going to 
purchase Lorillard for $30 billion, what would that indicate 
about your assessment of the likelihood of a menthol brand?
A. Menthol brand?  
Q. Menthol ban or menthol regulation.  
A. Well, presumably, it says that they thought they 
can overcome it and the value they derive from the ban 
exceeds 30 million.  Exactly how they're going to derive 
value from the brand, I don't know.  But they wouldn't make 
the transaction if they didn't think they were getting more 
value in return.
Q. How did the growth prospects of RAI's cigarette 
brands before the Lorillard transaction compare to growth 
prospects of RAI's brands after the Lorillard transaction?
A. I think the swapping out of Newport which sells a 
lot of cigarettes to younger smokers, younger adult smokers, 
but also teenagers, it's a very popular brand among young 
people, meant that there is going to be growth in share over 
time because as the older smokers cease to smoke or pass 
away, they leave the marketplace and then the younger smokers 
move in and become the marketplace.  
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know when they were valuing the Reynolds business back at the 
time of the Lorillard deal, what brands they were including.  
So the first issue, if you have a new mix of brands, then the 
answer would be no, because after the purchase was considered 
transformational, you would expect the growth to increase.  
Taking a Newport brand that's doing much better in terms of 
share gain than your older brands, Kool, Winston, and Salem, 
should bring you better growth going forward.  
So that -- that -- but I wasn't sure exactly what 
they used so I can't -- but what I did understand is that 
instead of using, you know, five years of projections as they 
did in this matter, they used nine years of projections in 
that previous matter.  And if those nine years exhibited 
robust growth predictions, like the ones that are associated 
with the BAT deal, then you're -- as I said before, what 
happens right away matters.  You're assuming you're going to 
had zero growth in year five.  Well, before they were 
assuming it in year nine which is going to mean a much lower, 
you know, calculation than you would if you assumed growth 
from nine years versus, you know, five.  
Q. Let's shift gears from the financial advisors to 
Professor Gompers.  What is your understanding of Professor 
Gompers' bases for saying that the financial advisors 
perpetuity growth rate estimates are reasonable?
A. He said that there was threats to the business that 
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A. Absolutely.  
Q. Do you know how many mergers and acquisitions 
Reynolds -- or RJRT went through between 1997 and 2016?
A. I know the larger ones that I just mentioned.  You 
know, Native American Spirits they acquired, Brown & 
Williamson, American Snuff, and obviously Lorillard.  But I 
don't know if that's an exhaustive list.  
Q. In 2006 there was also the acquisition of Conwood; 
correct?
A. Correct.  Actually, our firm worked on it, now that 
you reminded me.  Yes.  
Q. And in 2009, RAI acquired Niconovum; correct?
A. Correct.  
Q. And now, I think you testified that the industry is 
consolidated so that there are three major players in the 
cigarette market; is that correct?
A. That's correct.  But that's been true for a while.  
I mean, before the Lorillard transaction, there were -- if 
you took Lorillard, Reynolds and Altria, they were still, you 
know, dominant in the industry.  
Q. And because of antitrust concerns, it's unlikely 
that there could be any further consolidation among those 
three companies; isn't it correct?
A. That would be my best guess, yes.  
Q. And so there's no historical basis to say that RAI 
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A. They are.  
Q. Okay.  Now, to begin, I'd like to ask you to give 
us a summary of the opinions that you rendered in this case 
and then we can take them one by one.  And if we can have 
slide two, we can follow along.  
A. So this slide's -- this slide summarizes my 
opinions.  First opinion is that the discounted cash flow 
valuation methodology is the appropriate valuation 
methodology to use for RAI in this case as of the closing 
date.  The DCF valuation methodology resulted in a per share 
price as of the closing date of the transaction date of 
$92.17.  That's the first set of opinions.  
The next set of opinions addressed market multiple 
valuation methodologies, specifically comparable companies 
and precedent transactions.  And I concluded that neither the 
comparable companies analysis or the precedent transaction 
analysis would be valid ways to -- or reliable ways to value 
RAI's fair value.  
And then I was asked also to look at other 
potential indicators of value, specifically the transaction 
price.  And to also discuss or to review RAI's unaffected 
stock price.  And I concluded that those were not reliable 
indicators of value.  
Q. Now, Professor, when you talk about transaction 
price, we've heard about the deal price that was agreed upon 
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in January 2017, but are you able to tell us what the 
transaction price actually was as of the July 25, 2017, 
valuation date?
A. I'd have to look it up.  I didn't memorize it.  $65 
and I don't remember how many cents.  $65.87.  
Q. I'm sorry.  What does the 65.87 represent?
A. That's the value of the compensation the 
shareholders received as of the transaction date, July 25, 
2017.  Was that your -- that was your question; right?  
Q. It was my question, yes.
MR. RAFFERTY:  Your Honor, I'd like to speed the 
process along.  The professor has to leave.  But if they're 
going to have him you look up through the slides and give an 
answer based on what he's reading, we should at least have 
the record reflect what side they're looking at, because I 
have no idea.  I have to read through this now.
THE COURT:  All right.  Well, proceed.  
BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. Professor, did you look at Slide 46 to refresh your 
recollection as to the deal price of the transaction close 
date?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Okay.  Turning to the valuation methodology that 
you used in this case, could you please explain to the Court 
why you chose to rely on the discounted cash flow 
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growth rate.
THE COURT:  I'll allow the testimony subject to the 
objection.  
MR. RAFFERTY:  Thank you, Your Honor.  
A. Where was I?  Oh.  So the gentleman from Lazard was 
testifying and he explained how, for a ten-year forecast for 
the Lorillard transaction, they used a growth rate of minus 
.5 or half a percent negative to half a percent positive and 
that they thought things are generally the same five-year -- 
from 2014 or 2015 to the current transaction, the Reynolds 
transaction with BAT.  And they used the same range of growth 
rates.  
But the Lorillard transaction was based on ten 
years, by the time they did the transaction I guess nine 
years.  And that's not what they were using here, five years.  
And there's a difference -- big difference.  Like, a third of 
the value you'd get if you use a ten-year forecast versus a 
five-year forecast.  So what I saw with the investment 
bankers, I didn't understand how they actually got their 
growth rates so what Dr. Flyer presented to me made perfect 
sense.
BY MS. SADIGHI:
Q. Now, moving on from the second input to the third 
input of your DCF, can you please describe for the Court the 
discount rate that you used?
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Q. And so, with all other Lazard assumptions being 
equal, based on what you're depicting here, are you able to 
calculate what the choice of applying zero after five years 
instead of zero after ten years translates into on a per 
share basis?
A. It's about a little over $20.  So had Lazard used 
these June forecasts, for ten years, assumed a zero growth 
rate, their valuation instead of being $59.59, would have 
been a little over $80 just by that difference.  
Q. And can you do the same analysis with respect to 
the other financial advisors' DCFs and see the difference 
between using the -- their application of a growth rate of 
five years versus ten years?
A. Of course.  So you see on this slide I have 
Goldman's number.  Goldman calculated a value of $55.74.  And 
the Goldman -- the green line represents Goldman's cash 
flows.  There's so much overlap in the red line it's hard to 
distinguish the two.  They're very similar.  So of course the 
difference in valuation is about $20 a share.  Maybe more 
like $19 a share.  
Q. And what about for JPMorgan?
A. I have JPMorgan's calculation on the previous 
slide.  
Q. So if we look at Slide 19, this illustrates the 
same view with respect to JPMorgan?
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left out of the calculation by setting the terminal growth 
rate after five years, are you able to approximate the 
difference that is on a per share basis?
A. It's about -- again about $20.  
Q. So do you know what the Goldman valuation output 
would have been had it used management's projections for 
those years between 2021 and 2026 as opposed to applying 
it's 1 percent growth rate after five years?
A. Looking again at Slide 58 where that number is 
stated, it's $88.26.  
Q. Now, going back to your DCF valuation, Professor, 
did you include the expected value of corporate tax reform?
A. I did not.  
Q. To your knowledge, was the expected value of 




A. They considered it.  They calculated some 
valuations from it, based on it.
Q. Okay.  And if we look at Slide 22 of your slide 
deck.  Is this what you're referring to when you talk about 
the financial advisors considering the potential impact of 
any anticipated reduction in the corporate income tax rate?
A. Yes.  So this is just a slide that I prepared, and 
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it summarizes the Goldman, JPMorgan and Lazard's calculation 
of the potential effect on Reynolds' share price if the tax 
reform is passed.  And you can see, just going across all 
three financial advisors, the range is from roughly 11 
percent to 30 percent.  And what's causing that difference in 
value is an assumption of what the tax rate would end up 
being.  
Q. Now, is this difference and this expectation 
something that you can relate back to our -- your prior 
discussion of potential upsides and downside sensitivities?
A. Well, going all the way back to 2016, it was known 
that -- I believe the Republican party already proposed a tax 
decrease in 2016.  The Trump campaign, prior to the election, 
proposed a decrease in taxes.  And then that's back in 2016, 
so we're going all the way to July.  The Trump administration 
was already in office and, you know, everyone was aware that 
the Republican party was trying to get through a tax decrease 
for corporations.  
It wasn't probability one, of course, so to 
incorporate this, you would need to know when that tax rate 
would be changed, how much it would be changed, and the 
probability of it.  But we see that the financial advisors 
were estimating, if it did occur, an increase in value 
somewhere between 11 percent and 30 percent.  
Q. Do you know whether any of the data that's 
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reflected here was used by Reynolds to calculate an 
adjustment to its anticipated cash flows in the projections 
that were used by the financial advisors in the opinions that 
they rendered in January of 2017?
A. The testimony is clear that the cash flow forecast 
did not include any effect of potential tax reform.  So they 
were without -- they did not include this effect.  So it's a 
potential upside that is not in the management forecast.  
And the testimony, I believe, is clear that the 
financial advisors, although they looked at this issue and 
calculated these numbers, that wasn't part of their 
valuation. 
Q. And I believe you said this when I started asking 
you questions about the corporate tax reform, but these -- 
were these numbers incorporated at all into your $92.17 
valuation of Reynolds as of July 25, 2017?
A. No.
Q. Now, I want to shift a little bit and talk about 
some -- I think it's fair to call them criticisms that 
Professor Gompers made of your discounted cash flow 
valuation.  And I want to start by asking you if you recall 
whether Professor Gompers talked about what percentage of 
your calculated value for Reynolds sat in the terminal 
period.  So the period after the forecast.  Do you recall 
that?
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A. That is a ten-year forecast for adjusted operating 
income.
Q. So management provided you with a five-year set of 
projections.  Was that a typical time period for projections 
that you used at the time in doing valuation work?
A. It is, yeah.  Management in the context of a 
financial forecast, three to five years is very typical to be 
provided.  
Q. Did JPMorgan ask management for any longer periods 
of projections?
A. We did inquire as to whether or not the company had 
the ability to provide an additional five years to the 
financial forecast.  
Q. And why did you ask for a longer period of 
projections?
A. As a general matter, our preference would be to use 
longer term forecasts in an effort to make our analytical 
work as accurate as possible.  
Q. Did -- management provided you with the ten-year 
forecast from the July 2016 strategic plan.  Did management 
provide you any other ten-year forecasts?
A. Not to my knowledge.  
Q. Did you need a ten-year forecast to do your work?
A. It was not necessary.  In fact, we oftentimes do 
our work on five years of projections.  But as a preference, 
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A. Correct.  
Q. And I think that you previously testified that of 
the $40 million in transaction fees, approximately 30 million 
was contingent on the deal going through.  Am I right?
A. I don't recall the specific number, but it would 
have been a larger portion of it.  
Q. Now, I think you mentioned in your direct exam that 
you had provided some information to Reynolds prior to the 
BAT offer, about a potential BAT offer being made; correct?
A. Correct.  
Q. And I'd like to show you Exhibit DX63.  And this is 
an email chain that attaches a set of follow-up materials 
that JPMorgan provided to Andrew Gilchrist at Reynolds; 
correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. And you were involved in the preparation of these 
materials.  Am I right?
A. That's correct.
MR. ROLNICK:  I'd like to move DX63 into evidence. 
MS. SHAH:  It's already in, Your Honor. 
MR. ROLNICK:  Sorry.  It's already in.  That's 
good.  
BY MR. ROLNICK:
Q. So turning to the top email.  If we start at the 
bottom email, which is on -- which is August 24th, 2016, 
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there's an email from James Grant to Andrew Gilchrist; 
correct?
A. The first email is from Andrew Gilchrist to Jamie 
Grant.
Q. I'm sorry.  With that correction.  
A. Yes.  
Q. And Jamie Grant was the Global Chairman of 
Investment Banking at JPMorgan; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And you and he were responsible for coverage of 
Reynolds; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. And copied on this email is Mr. Eler; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Am I pronouncing his name correctly?
A. It's Emre Eler.  
Q. Eler, okay.  And Mr. Eler was the Managing Director 
of U.K. Investment Banking; right?
A. To clarify, he is a managing director in the 
consumer and retail investment banking coverage group.  
Q. So he would be -- he would be someone who would 
have coverage of BAT; correct?
A. He was involved in the coverage of BAT and other 
tobacco sector clients.
Q. And he was very knowledgeable about the tobacco 
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sector; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. Okay.  And the first paragraph of the email from 
Mr. Gilchrist to your colleague states:  Thank you for your 
time today.  It was great Susan was able to join us and 
provide some additional context on the transaction outlook.  
It's always an interesting discussion and the potential 
timing appears to -- and I think the word be is omitted -- 
coming more into focus.  More to come as they say.
Do you see that? 
A. I do.  
Q. Is the reference to Susan there, Susan Cameron?
A. I believe it is.  
Q. And is it the case that you had a meeting with 
Mr. Gilchrist and Ms. Cameron, in which you got from them 
some additional context on the outlook for a transaction with 
BAT?
A. I do not recall if I was involved in the meeting in 
August.  I believe I was.  I do not recall any specific 
context as it relates to the transaction personally.  
Q. Well, you were working with Mr. Grant who was 
partnering with you on this at the time; right?
A. Yes.  It was that summer of 2016, when I first 
started working with him on Reynolds American.  
Q. Okay.  And the possibility of a transaction with 
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BAT, I think you previously testified, was something that you 
were thinking about at the time; right?
A. Yes, on an ongoing basis in the ordinary course 
coverage of the client.
Q. So if your partner, Mr. Grant, had a meeting with 
the CFO of Reynolds and the CEO of Reynolds and at that 
meeting it became clear that potential timing was coming into 
focus and had provided additional context on the transaction 
outlook, isn't that something that he would share with you?
A. Not --
MS. SHAH:  Objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Overruled.  
A. Not necessarily.  As I had mentioned, this was at 
the relative outset of my joint coverage of the client with 
Jamie, and Jamie was primarily responsible for the 
relationship at that point in time.  So I cannot say if he 
had shared that additional context as Andrew had referred to 
it, and I wouldn't be surprised if he had not shared that 
with me.  
BY MR. ROLNICK:
Q. Even though the possibility of a transaction was a 
relatively important item with respect to the work you were 
doing for this client; right?
A. Correct.  
Q. Okay.  And if you look at the responding email from 
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Mr. grant to Mr. Gilchrist, the date of that is September 30, 
2016; correct?
A. It is.
Q. And he states:  Hi Andrew.  Following our meeting 
at the end of August, we did some more work looking in detail 
at four major questions that came out of that meeting, the  
results of which we have outlined in the attached deck.  As 
there is fair amounts of background thinking and analysis to 
the conclusions presented, could I suggest we set up a call 
with you to walk through it at your convenience?  
Do you see that? 
A. I do.  
Q. And does this refresh your recollection that after 
the meeting that your colleague had with Mr. Gilchrist and 
Ms. Cameron about a potential transaction, that Mr. Gilchrist 
had asked questions to be answered and that JPMorgan was 
following up on that?
A. I do have a recollection of the four questions that 
he had requested that we follow up as a team on, as I was a 
part of preparing responses to those questions.  
Q. Okay.  And if we look at document No. 63.005.  It's 
the number that begins with -- it's actually No. 1 of the 
deck.  
A. Yes.
Q. Do you see that?
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A. I do.  
Q. And that's one of the follow-up questions that 
Mr. Gilchrist was asking you to answer; correct?
A. Correct.  
Q. And the question is:  What has been the difference 
in premiums paid in precedent transactions where the acquirer 
owned a significant portion of the target versus other 
transactions?
Is that what it asks? 
A. Yes.  
Q. And if you turn to page four, there's an analysis 
provided there.  Do you see it?
A. Page two?  
Q. Page -- well, it's page four of the deck.       
It's .008.  
A. Yes.  
Q. And you state there that, "BAT would need to source 
16 billion in incremental debt financing and 34.6 billion in 
equity issuance to finance the 58 percent of Reynolds it does 
not own".  
Do you see that? 
A. I do.  It's 17.6, just to clarify the number.  
Q. I'm sorry.  
A. You said 16.
Q. I'm sorry.  You're right.  
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And then under the overview, you state:  At a 30 
percent premium, $64.55 per share, the total equity price to 
acquire 58 percent of Reynolds that BAT does not already own 
is 53.6 billion.
Do you see that? 
A. I do.  
Q. And if you look at the footnote, you're indicating 
that you're calculating that, based on the closing price on 
August 10th, of 2016.  You see that?
A. I do.  
Q. And let me represent to you that when you do the 
math, that indicates that the trading price on August 10th, 
was $49.60.  Okay?
A. Okay.  
Q. So what you're doing here on behalf of 
Mr. Gilchrist, is you're trying to figure out how much BAT 
would have to pay to take over Reynolds; correct?
A. We were in an illustrative manner looking at how 
much it would require from a debt and equity financing 
perspective to finance the purchase of Reynolds at a lesser 
premium.  
Q. And you calculated this by first trying to 
determine how much of a premium they would have to pay; 
correct?
A. No.  I would not describe it as that.  We used 
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an -- they were separate and distinct pieces of analysis; one 
was looking at an illustrative acquisition, based on a 30 
percent premium, just at a very high level assumption 
perspective.  And the second was, whether or not there was 
any differentiation between the premiums that had 
historically been paid in all transactions relative to 
transactions where the acquirer owns a significant portion of 
the potential target.  
Q. Okay.  And all of this is in aid of a question from 
Mr. Gilchrist where he was essentially trying to figure out 
how much they'd have to pay if they took over the company; 
right?
A. I don't know if I would describe it that way.  His 
questions were outlined on the first page of this document.
Q. Well, wasn't he trying to find out -- isn't the 
purpose of this question to find out how much they would have 
to pay?
A. I think the purpose is twofold.  The first question 
was to look at precedent premiums in prior transactions to 
determine if there's any difference between, you know, the 
broader set of transactions and transactions where the 
acquirer owns a significant stake in the potential target.  
And the second was in an illustrative example, how they  
would -- how BAT would be able to finance the transaction 
from a debt -- a debt and equity financing standpoint.
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Q. Okay.  But as a preliminary matter, before you go 
to try to figure out how they can pay for it, first you want 
to figure out how big the transaction might be; right?  
A. That's correct.  
Q. Okay.  So the exercise here, is to try to figure 
out how much they would likely have to pay; right?
A. That's fair.
Q. Okay.  And then if you look at -- if you go back to 
the list of questions, the next question is:  In a 
transaction with Reynolds, how would BAT look to optimize the 
debt financing portion of the consideration?
Correct? 
A. Correct.
Q. And so the next thing you did, and what really a 
lot of this debt goes on to demonstrate is to try to figure 
out how BAT would likely finance its purchase; correct?
A. Correct.  
Q. How much debt it could borrow; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. How expensive that debt would likely be; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And how it would finance the equity portion.  In 
other words, if it were issuing stock; correct?
A. Yes.  Correct.  
Q. And so these -- this deck and this information was 
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to try to inform Mr. Gilchrist how much BAT would likely have 
to pay, and if so, how they would go about borrowing money -- 
how much they could borrow and how much equity they would be 
able to utilize; correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And so you, JPMorgan, and Mr. Gilchrist, already 
had -- were already forming views on those questions as early 
as September 30, 2016.  Fair?
A. Fair.  
Q. And in fact, once the transaction began, the 
information -- the work that you had done on this provided 
useful because you continued to analyze how much BAT would be 
able to borrow and how much it would cost as the transaction 
progressed; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. And that's because understanding how much BAT could 
pay was important to the negotiations; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. Now, during this meeting in September, 
Mr. Gilchrist never asked you any questions about how much 
any other purchaser might be able to pay for Reynolds; 
correct?
A. I don't recall specifically.
Q. Well, if he asked about it, you would have 
responded in this deck; correct?
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A. If he had asked -- these were questions as   
follow-up to the meeting that had been referenced in August.  
If he had asked us one of those follow-up questions, we would 
have addressed that in the context of this deck.
Q. And there's nothing in this deck that talks about 
how much any other potential purchaser might pay for 
Reynolds; correct?
A. Correct.  
Q. So doesn't that suggest to you that you didn't ask 
about it?
A. I'm simply saying, I can't recall every question 
that was asked in the actual meeting, but it was not 
addressed in this set of materials.  Correct.  
Q. Okay.  Now, I want to look at the pitch that you 
made to the Transaction Committee.  I have it in the book as 
DX88.  I'm sorry.  This isn't the pitch book yet.  This is 
the hiring.  If you could go to DX88.  
This is an internal email at JPM, JPMorgan, 
indicating that you were going to be hired in connection with 
the bid.  Is that correct? 
A. Sorry.  This is in reference to the email from -- 
at the top from Eric Oken to Jamie Grant?  Am I looking at 
the right email?  
Q. So if you go to DX88.002, it starts with an email 
from Constance Coleman.  Are you looking at the right 
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years six through ten.  Correct.  
Q. And you wanted to know if they could provide such 
projections; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. And they never told that you they could not provide 
such projections; right?
A. Well, I think it was a little more unique than 
that.  We asked if they had up-to-date projections for years 
six through ten.  We understood that they did not.  That they 
only had the operating plan for the first five years of the 
financial forecast.  And then subsequent to that, we had 
internal discussions as to whether or not we can do our work 
with just those five years and came to the conclusion that we 
took.  
Q. So we're going to explore that a little bit 
further, but when you say "they", that's Ron Price and Andrew 
Gilchrist; right?
A. Yes.  
Q. So according to your testimony here today, you're 
saying that you asked Andrew Gilchrist and Ron Price if they 
had ten-year projections and they said they didn't have them 
or that they have them but they were out of date.  
A. We asked if they had up-to-date ten-year 
projections.  So projections that were prepared in the 
context of the five-year forecast that had been provided.  
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And we understood that they did not.  
There was the ten-year strategic plan that we had 
referenced in a prior document, but those were six or seven 
months dated at that point.  
Q. So I just want to understand your testimony before 
we continue the examination.  
You're saying that you asked Andrew Gilchrist and 
Ron Price if they had up-to-date ten-year projections and 
they said, "no"? 
A. That's correct.  
Q. Okay.  And you didn't ask whether they had any 
projections; right?  You just took that no and that was it?
A. No.  They provided to us the strategic plan that 
had been prepared in the spring of 2016, if I recall the date 
correctly, which had a set of projections for adjusted 
operating income for ten years.  But they informed us that 
those projections were not up to date.  
Q. So they told you not to rely on those projections?
A. That's correct.  
Q. So when you got that strategic plan, in fact, you 
followed that up and said, hey, do you have detailed ten-year 
projections; right?
A. Well, we asked if, you know -- in conjunction with 
the five years, the five-year forecast that we had provided, 
if there were an additional five years with that forecast to 
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A. Yes.
Q. That's -- you recall that that's the bar chart that 
Counsel showed you on your direct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. And so the record is clear, this kind of 
information, unlike the information that's provided in the 
five-year projection that you were provided, doesn't give you 
sufficient underlying detail to perform a DCF; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. Okay.  And if anybody came to this courtroom and 
suggested that a reputable financial advisor could create a 
DCF from ten years of adjusted operating income presented in 
this graph, that would be incorrect; right?
A. I don't believe creating an accurate discounted 
cash flow analysis from this chart alone is reasonable.
Q. So if anybody said otherwise, they would be wrong; 
right?
A. In my opinion, yes.  
Q. So going back to DX43, you get -- JPMorgan gets the 
five-year projections from Mr. Price on October 29th, 2016, 
at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. And is it fair to say that shortly after Mr. Grant 
got these projections, he shared them with you?
A. That's my assumption and would be likely.  I don't 
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Q. And I think I asked you to confirm that JPMorgan at 
this time, in fact, asked for a detailed ten-year projection 
and your answer was "yes"; correct?
A. We did ask if the company had the ability to 
provide ten years worth of projections.  Yes.
Q. A detailed ten-year projection; correct?
A. Correct.  
Q. And you not only asked for a detailed ten-year 
projection, but you asked if they could provide ten years of 
projections; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. And they told you that they couldn't provide ten 
years of projections; correct?
A. No.  I don't think that's technically accurate.  I 
think the strategic plan was provided as a response to our 
initial inquiry as to whether or not the company had 
projections that spanned ten years, but once we had sent that 
document, it was identified to us that that was a stale set 
of financial projections done for the purposes of the 
strategy document and that we would not be able to use that 
for purposes of our valuation work.
Q. And both Mr. Gilchrist and Mr. Price told you that; 
right?
A. It would have been them who told us that, yes.  I 
don't recall specifically who said what.  
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A. Yes.
MR. ROLNICK:  I'd like to move DX73 into evidence.  
MS. SHAH:  No objection.
THE COURT:  Admitted.  
(DX73 was marked and admitted into evidence.)   
BY MR. ROLNICK:
Q. So DX73 is a set of projections that you prepared 
in advance of a meeting with management on November 3rd; 
correct?
A. Is there a page that you're referring to?  
Q. I'm sorry.  Yes.  I'm looking at DX73.005 and then 
the attached projections.    
A. The first five -- as I recall, the first five years 
in the numbers shown on this page are the company's five-year 
operating plan that was provided.  And the five years 
thereafter were extrapolations that we prepared for purposes 
of the discussion.  
Q. Okay.  So if I just drop down -- I'm looking at 
DX73.005, that top line of growth is showing five years of 
projections that management gave you; correct?
A. For the first five years, yes.
Q. Right.  And then starting in year six, rather than 
drop down to a perpetuity growth rate of zero or negative, 
you are extrapolating numbers that show continued growth; 
correct?
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A. That is purely an illustrative extrapolation done 
on a linear basis down to zero by the tenth year.
Q. I understand.  But I'm -- I understand it's a -- an 
illustration.  
A. Yeah.
Q. But it's an illustration of what projections would 
look like after the five-year projections.  Rather than 
dropping to a zero or negative perpetuity growth rate, you 
extrapolated continued growth over years six through ten; 
correct?
A. Yeah.  I think that's technically correct.  Again, 
I wouldn't put any weight behind years six through ten.  It 
was purely just us filling in numbers for purposes of 
discussion.
Q. It's so that you could have a discussion with 
management; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And what this is doing is it's actually 
transitioning down to zero; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. So that the zero perpetuity growth rate would apply 
after year ten; correct?
A. Whatever perpetuity growth rate you ended up using 
would apply for year ten.  Yes.
Q. Could be 1 percent, could be zero, whatever you 
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use.  
A. Could be negative.  Yes.  
Q. Now, before you went to this meeting, you prepared 
a set of questions that you wanted to discuss with management 
at the meeting.  Isn't that correct?
A. And I believe that's accurate.  Yes.  
Q. If we look at DX70, this is an email from someone 
at JPMorgan.  Steven Steven, to you, and others; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. And it states: Carolyn, John, please find attached 
the compiled agenda questions list for the meeting tomorrow.
Is that correct? 
A. Yes.  
Q. And Steven Steven was someone at the investment 
banking group?
A. He was an associate.  He's since left the firm.  
MR. ROLNICK:  Okay.  I'd like to move DX70 into 
evidence.  
MS. SHAH:  No objection.
THE COURT:  Admitted.  
(DX70 was marked and admitted into evidence.) 
BY MR. ROLNICK:
Q. So the point of this document is to prepare for the 
meeting you were having the next day with management from 
Reynolds; correct?
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A. That's correct.  
Q. And that management included Andrew Gilchrist and 
Ronald Price?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall whether anybody else was at the 
meeting?
A. I do recall that there were other people there.  I 
don't recall specifically who.  
Q. Was anyone from Lazard at the meeting?
A. No.
Q. So if I split the page to DX70.003, this is setting 
up the basic top expert discussion at the meeting; right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And the meeting is to take place at the offices of 
Jones Day in downtown New York?
A. That's correct.  
Q. And the meeting was to last three hours from 9 
o'clock until noon Eastern Standard Time; correct?
A. That's correct.  
Q. And on the Reynolds side would be Mr. Gilchrist, 
Ron Price, and perhaps Steve Holland and you have a bracket 
because you're not sure; right?
A. I would imagine at the time we didn't know 
specifically who was going to attend, so that's the purpose 
of the brackets.  But I do recall that Andrew and Ron were 
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that view.  
MS. SHAH:  Objection.  Mischaracterizes the 
witness's testimony and the document.
THE COURT:  We've covered at length what Mr. Eler 
has said.  I think -- I don't think a loaded question will 
move the ball.  
MR. ROLNICK:  All right, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  Sustained. 
BY MR. ROLNICK: 
Q. So under the section for financial projections, 
under Royal stand alone projections, it states, please 
provide guidance on ten-year financial projections; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's the topic that you wanted to discuss 
with Mr. Gilchrist and Mr. Price at the meeting; right?
A. That's correct.  
Q. And that is the topic that you did discuss with 
Mr. Gilchrist and Price at the meeting; correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And they told that the only thing they had was this 
strategic plan and that was out of date; correct?
A. The only set of financial forecasts that they had 
on a ten-year basis was the out-of-date strategic plan; 
correct.
Q. Okay.  And you then wanted to ask, how does 
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from Royals on their own projections.  And they were only 
able to give us five years for Braves.  We did push for an 
extrapolated period early on, but management guided us 
instead to a range of TVGRs.
Do you see that? 
A. I do.  Yes.
Q. And TVGRs you understand in that email to mean, 
terminal value growth rate?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's the same thing as a perpetuity growth 
rate?
A. It is.
Q. And so when Mr. Muley tells Marco that JPMorgan was 
only able to get five years from Royals, you would agree with 
that statement; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And that's because you asked for ten-year 
projections, but you weren't able to get ten-year 
projections; correct?
A. We asked if the company had ten years worth of 
projections and were told that they only had five years of 
up-to-date projections.  Yes.
Q. And you asked the company if they were able, 
whether they could provide ten years of projections; correct?
A. Yes.  As I alluded to earlier, I think we also 
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understood that we were the only advisor that was requesting 
ten years of projections and so on a simultaneous basis, had 
internal discussions about whether we would be comfortable 
using five years.
Q. Okay.  But my question is, and I think you said 
yes, but you asked the company if they were able to provide 
ten years of projections; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And they indicated that they could not; correct?
A. They indicated that they did not have ten years 
worth of projections.  
Q. Okay.  And when you were talking to the other 
investment banks -- who informed that the other investment 
banks, likewise did not have ten years of projections?
A. Well, we knew that the other investment banks had 
been provided the same set of projections and we had inquired 
as to whether or not they would need or want ten years of 
projections for purposes of their valuation work and they 
indicated to both -- to us that they did not.  
Q. Okay.  You spoke to Lazard about that?
A. Yeah.  I don't remember the specific discussion but 
we certainly discussed it with them at some point.
Q. And Lazard indicated to you that they had received 
ten-year projections in connection with the Lorillard 
transaction?
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acquisitions for the companies.  I think our job as I think 
of it is to think of alternatives for the company in all 
aspects of its business on an ongoing basis.  
Q. Now, does providing additional information to 
management about what a potential acquirer could pay help 
management in thinking about the value of their own company?
A. Sorry.  Can I think about that for a second?  
Q. Sure.  
A. I guess maybe I'm being a little more technical on 
this but, you know, British American Tobacco's ability to pay 
should not impact the value of the company specifically; 
right?  I mean, there are independent thoughts and ideas.  I 
think -- you know -- again -- sorry.  Just be a little more 
articulate.  How much they can pay has no impact on the value 
of Reynolds.
Q. Would knowing or having some idea of how much BAT 
could pay, aid in any negotiations that the company might 
have with BAT?
A. Certainly.
Q. And why did you specifically focus on what BAT, as 
opposed to any other company, might be able to pay and how it 
could finance the transaction?
A. Yeah.  I mean, I think in the context of the scale 
and size of Reynolds, it was really the only logical acquirer 
for the company, as well as the fact that British American 
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ten years; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And I think she asked you whether or not the fact
that you never got detailed information supporting those was 
irrelevant because you were told that they were out of date; 
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. But in fact, management never told you that there
was anything that prevented them from updating projections; 
correct?
A. Management informed us that they had the ten-year
strategic plan which was stale or outdated.  And so we didn't 
inquire as to the back-up behind it because it was irrelevant 
for purposes of our analysis.  And what they provided that 
was up to date was the five years.  
Q. Okay.  But as far as you know, there was nothing
that prevented management from updating the strategic plan 
document; correct?
A. As far as I know, yeah, I think that that's
accurate.  Yes.
Q. And they never said that there was something that
prevented them from doing that; right?
A. That's correct.  I think as I attempted to
articulate earlier, I think ultimately we as an institution 
became comfortable with using five years worth of 
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that, et cetera.  
Q. And the reason Reynolds built these state excise 
tax assumptions into the plan is because it was, you know, 
reasonably expected that they would occur; correct?
A. That's correct.  We had seen them play out.  
Q. Many states use the revenue that is generated by 
these state excise taxes to fill budget gaps; correct?
A. That's my understanding, yes.  
Q. And, in fact, just to fund the budget, even if 
there isn't a gap; right?
A. That's correct.  
Q. So if -- just based on your experience -- or has 
Reynolds done any analysis to how they think state 
governments would react if the FDA tried to take nicotine out 
of cigarettes and, you know, destroy the industry?
A. I have not seen any analysis.  
We certainly, you know, talked about that it would 
be counter to what the states are trying to do in generating 
revenue from tobacco taxes, but that would put more risk on 
vapor taxes.  So what we talked about is, if there's an 
accelerated volume decline in cigarettes, then they're going 
to have to offset that revenue somewhere else.  There's only 
11 states that currently tax vapor so there's still more 
states to go.  
Q. And Reynolds hasn't performed any analysis to try 
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to determine, you know, how the states would react if the FDA 
tried to increase menthol regulation; correct?
A. No, I have not seen any analysis.
Q. Going down here to -- there's a reference to the
MSA.  We're back here in JX0009.  Am I correct in 
understanding that this wouldn't come into play unless 
inflation exceeded 3 percent?
A. That's correct.  That's my -- that's my
understanding of it. 
Q. And at the time of the merger, long-term inflation
expectations weren't 3 percent or more; correct?
A. I don't recall.  I wasn't forecasting inflation
rates. 
Q. Flipping to the next page, the upsides.  There's a
reference to future MSA settlement credits.  Is it your 
understanding that this is what we were discussing earlier 
about NPM cliffs and credits that Reynolds could get under 
the 1998 MSA?
A. That's correct.  So that -- that refers to the
outstanding amount that we were litigating at the time. 
Q. So when it says over one million remaining, was
Reynolds involved in arbitrations or litigations at the time 
where a billion dollars was at issue or what is this 
referring to?
A. That's what I would believe that is saying, that
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the objection. 
A. So essentially, the way it was explained to me was
the TPSAC committee is going to make a recommendation to the 
FDA and the FDA does not want to be the agency responsible 
for cutting off the cash flow streams that the federal and 
state governments have become reliant upon.  So they will 
take this document and put it in a shelf and they could do 
what they'd like.  They would never reopen that shelf.  
And that was pretty glib, but that was literally 
how it was explained.  The way we understood it was, they 
will take the scientific advisory committee's recommendation 
to conduct longitudinal scientific studies, which by 
definition are longitudinal and -- in my experience, just 
going back to my college psychology classes, a longitudinal 
study has to have at least ten years of science behind it.  
And the fact that they didn't have any of those conducted at 
that point in time, you were just going to start a ten-year 
science process.  This wasn't going to happen any time near. 
Furthermore, they said that if they were to 
implement a menthol ban, again, the industry would pursue 
litigation to slow, if not stop that process.  And 
simultaneously, they had contingency plans to move their 
customer base from one mentholated product to a 
non-mentholated product.  Basically they were pointing to the 
fact that all of the science that even the TPSAC was coming 
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up with was showing that, you know, while we all know tobacco 
in general is not good for you, menthol itself is mint, it's 
a flavoring, and so that flavoring is not a problem.  There's 
no scientific harm from menthol.  
So those were all the points that they were making 
to us as investors.  And so I felt comfortable with it. 
BY MS. RANDOLPH:
Q. So you referred to us as investors.  You mean --
these were public conversations; is that correct?
A. Yes.  I mean, I don't have any inside information.
Meetings that I attend are generally hosted by a sell-side 
bank or a non-deal roadshow, conference calls, that kind of 
thing.
Q. And then did you yourself develop a view as whether
there were into -- as to whether there was a realistic 
likelihood of a menthol ban?
A. Yes.  The advice that I gave to my partners was
formulated based on the meetings that I attended in Maryland, 
the ultimate recommendation that the committee members wrote, 
and the third-party consultants that we spoke to.  And my 
recommendation was that there will not be a menthol ban.  
Q. And so you did invest in Lorillard around the time
of the RAI acquisition?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. And what happened to that investment?
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by the transaction with BAT?
A. Sure.  So BAT approached Reynolds in October of 
2016.  And at that point in time, Reynolds was just about 16, 
18 months post the Lorillard transaction.  And one of the 
unique characteristics of that acquisition, unlike so many 
other mergers, is it was going to take them longer than is 
typical to actually integrate the companies, given the fact 
that they're tobacco companies, so heavily regulated, that 
they would literally need to disassemble manufacturing plants 
and machines, move them from one facility to another, 
reassemble. It was very onerous.  
And they had also -- Reynolds had taken on a great 
deal of debt to acquire Lorillard.  So one of the key 
features of a tobacco stock as an investor -- most of the 
investors are mutual funds.  And one of the key features as 
an investor is the dividend stream that tobacco companies 
typically pay.  And because Reynolds had taken on so much 
debt to acquire Lorillard, they really hadn't been growing 
their dividend stream.  They had been taking the excess cash 
to pay down their leverage.  And they were right at that 
moment in time getting to the upper range of what they had 
been telling investors was going to be their target leverage 
level.  So we figured that in the next couple of quarters, 
once they've finished delevering, they're really going to 
accelerate cash flow returns to shareholders in the form of 
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either share buyback or dividends.  And the broader 
investment community isn't really paying attention to 
this -- 
Q. And why would that be important to investors?
A. Well, for a dividend -- a yield fund, especially in 
this low interest rate environment, you know, any opportunity 
to get a little more yield is very attractive.  So if the 
actual dollar per share that you're getting back is growing, 
the yield can be fairly stable.  So you basically take the 
dividend and divide it by the stock price.  That gives you 
your yield.  
So if the cash itself is increased, then the stock 
price will commensurately increase.  And if that's all you're 
focused on is your yield fund, you don't really pay attention 
to too much else.  Whereas, you know, we were looking at all 
these other factors so -- so we thought we could buy in ahead 
of that and kind of get -- 
Q. So just to be clear, so it's not everyone else, in 
their -- is this -- on the financial aspect of things is you, 
how did RAI's leverage levels relate to its yield?
A. So for Reynolds, they had communicated that they 
would like to see their net debt over their EBITDA, which is 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization charges.  They wanted to get that level to 
something closer to two and a half times.  And once you get 
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to that point in time, provided your cash flow stream remains 
steady, you don't need to put the cash into taking your debt 
level down anymore.  In fact, it would be suboptimal at a 
certain point because you want to have some degree of 
leverage in your business to optimize your capital structure.  
And so once they got to that level, we figured that 
that excess cash flow stream is going to be deployed in 
either share repurchases, which is one way of returning 
capital to shareholders who hold onto their stock.  If 
everybody else sells, then the denominator shrinks and the 
value per share increases in dividend payouts.  And Reynolds, 
like I said, they had not been growing their dividend, but 
they said that they would look to increase their payout ratio 
once they got their target leverage back in line.  
And alternatively, you could put the capital into 
R&D and develop more -- you know, be more innovative with 
your product line and potentially grow your revenue stream 
that way. 
Q. So this is one sort of value opportunity that you 
were thinking about in connection with the investment in 
Reynolds around the time of the BAT offer.  Were there other 
sort of hidden value or value opportunities that you were 
looking at?
A. Yes.  So another consideration that we had was 
heat-not-burn and next-gen vapor technology.  Reynolds had 
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global aspirations to be the No. 1 tobacco company in the 
world.  And yet they have pretty glaring holes in their 
geographic footprint and so they should go forth and 
participate in M&A because, given the rates available to 
Japanese corporate companies, pretty much any acquisition 
funded with debt is accretive.  
And so as a consequence of our familiarity with JT, 
which I think is somewhat unique to U.S. investors, it's not 
a company that's listed in the United States, and a lot of 
their materials are in Japanese.  So if you're not paying 
attention, you wouldn't necessarily be aware of them.  But 
they are the No. 3 tobacco company in the world.  And we 
happened to know that just in October of the prior year, they 
had paid $5 billion to buy the international rights to Santa 
Fe Natural American Spirits, which was almost like found 
money for Reynolds.  It was hugely -- hugely valuable to them 
because it allowed them to accelerate their deleveraging.  
But they had virtually no sales outside of the United States 
so the price that JT was willing to pay was frankly very 
surprising, even to us.  
But so we figured if they're willing to pay that 
much for a company that's got virtually zero in terms of 
sales and profitability right now, they'll definitely want to 
buy into the U.S. because they don't have really any market 
presence here.  And so -- that was like case No. 1. 
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lack of strong-form efficiency for relying on the trading 
price of a stock as a proxy for fair value?
A. Okay.  So this now starts to get into the questions
that I'm trying to answer.  So given that strong-form 
efficiency doesn't hold, and we all agree there is no dispute 
on that, we immediately conclude that, unless the company 
doesn't have any private information about it, the price that 
we observe in the marketplace will not be equal to the fair 
value.  Just that's by definition.  
By the way, we are on the next slide, if people are 
trying to follow me.  We are one slide behind.  I wish I had 
the clicker, but.  Okay.  Here we are.  
Q. All right.  So turning to semi-strong efficiency.
In your opinion, are the trading prices in a
semi-strong efficient market a good proxy for a fair value?
A. Okay.  So it's the same idea.  By definition, the
semi-strong efficiency holds, when all public information is 
incorporated in the prices but private information is not but 
we want the private information, therefore semi-strong 
efficiency is not going to be sufficient for our purposes.  
Q. And are there methodologies that one can use to
test for whether semi-strong efficiency exists in the market 
for a particular security?
A. Unfortunately we don't have a conclusive test.  The
best state-of-the-art tests are so-called event studies. 
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Event studies are not sufficient in the following way.  
We run a test, test either going to be negative or 
positive.  When it is negative, then we say, ah, we know 
markets are not semi-strong efficient for the stock.  But 
when the test is positive, we say, we don't know, we just -- 
this test didn't tell us that it wasn't.  It could be or 
maybe it isn't.  We don't know.  So it's not a conclusive 
test.  In other words, the tests are necessary but not 
sufficient.  
So event studies are doing the following 
exercise -- 
THE WITNESS:  And, Your Honor, please stop me if 
this becomes unnecessary for our purposes but I try to kind 
of share my views because it will be important.  But if it 
gets technical and unnecessary, please stop me.  
A. (Continuing) So what we try to do is the following:  
We say, okay, we don't know whether the price was efficient 
today when we woke up; but, going forward, when there's a new 
information comes on the marketplace, will it actually move 
the price in the right direction?  
And the right direction is important, not the 
magnitude.  Okay?  So nobody knows what the magnitude is at 
this point.  
So what we do is the following:  We say, okay, the 
stock is -- has some kind of risk level that leads to some 
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kind of return due to the exposure to the risk factor.  And 
that's usually measured by beta.  So we can basically use a 
little regression and find the beta, if you already don't 
know that.  
And you say, okay, as the market moves or the index 
that you'd like to go on the right side of that regression 
moves, you're going to see how much the stock should be 
moving in a fair way.  By fair way, meaning that there is no 
company-specific information or action.  The market moves, so 
will the stock.  Okay?  
But if the stock moves beyond that, either up and 
down, we call it abnormal or excessive returns.  They mean 
the same thing.  Okay?  
So now we look at the following question.  All 
right?  On these days that we see excessive returns, was 
there information about this company?  And if the answer is 
yes, we say, okay, did the price move in the right direction?  
If the answer is yes, then say, ah, so the test is 
passed, so we cannot say the market is not inefficient.  
Okay?  We can't say it is efficient either but at least it 
has passed the test so it has a better chance of being 
efficient.  
But when you run that test, it is important to 
notice couple of things here.  One thing is that you cannot 
talk about the magnitude.  Because when there's an 
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information event, we kind of know what the direction is, but 
if you don't really know how many dollars and cents the stock 
should be moving in response to that.  We just try to match 
the direction right.  
Second, when you do this analysis, it is not 
sufficient to pass the test to say, oh, it moved on that in 
the right direction.  It should be moving in the right 
direction that day but it shouldn't be moving in future days.  
Because if the stock -- there's an information event on 
today, 24th of June, I believe -- right?  24th of June, stock 
moves up or down along the side of information and it 
continues to move for another ten days.  Then we actually say 
the market is not efficient because there was no other 
information event in the next ten business days, yet prices 
continue to move.  
So you have to check this in its entirety for the 
entire spectrum you're looking at.  
THE COURT:  Are we at a stopping place?
MR. SHINDEL:  I think so, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  We'll adjourn for the day.  
Is there anything we need to take up before we 
adjourn?  
MR. BORNSTEIN:  Nothing from us, Your Honor.
MS. SADIGHI:  Nothing from Defendants, Your Honor.
THE COURT:  All right.  Thank you.  
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everything.  All right?  And one of the things that everybody 
knows is that there is a large blockholder who has an 
influence over how the company is run and successful 
diverts -- or let me, in fact, rephrase it.  
People suspect he could in future successful divert 
some of the cash flows.  All right?  So what is the trading 
price going to be?  Is it going to be the present value of 
all cash flows of firm's future operations -- future 
operations of the company?  It wouldn't be.  It will be that 
minus the probability that there will be some diversion of 
value times the loss due to that diversion.  All right?  
Similarly, this blockholder might have interest to 
acquire the company private in future.  And if the market 
participants put a positive probability that he may be able 
to buy the firm at the future date at a discount, the price 
we see in the marketplace is going to reflect that 
expectation as well.  In that, the fair value is not going to 
be equal to the price that we observe in financial markets.  
But I should also tell you that this is not an 
everyday event.  So it has to really involve a large 
blockholder with means to do it, access to private 
information, and things like that.  You usually don't think 
an average widely-held firm suffers from these kind of agency 
problems.  
Q. And if we go to Slide 13, were you able to reach
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figure out.  So I think those are the reasons why I think 
there was significant private information and, therefore, 
trading price had no chance of incorporating those into the 
prices.  
Q. And turning to the next slide, Slide 14, were you 
able to reach any conclusions regarding whether nonpublic, 
value-relevant information existed as of the transaction date 
in July of 2017?
A. The same way.  There was a number of items I've 
identified with respect to information not being made to -- 
publicly available, especially to the shareholders who will 
get to decide on the future of the company.  
I may not be the best witness because I'm sure 
officers have testified and they've talked about these.  I'm 
saying this through their depositions, obviously.  And I was 
absent in their trial -- I don't know.  It's not called a 
deposition.
COURT REPORTER:  Testimony?
A. Thank you.  Trial testimony.  
Having said that, when I read information that was 
available to me, I realize that the firm did not even 
disclose the existence of their ten-year projections.  That 
was made very recently.  I may not remember the exact day but 
it was I think a one-month difference between five-year 
projections or ten-year projections.  
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And there is a little uncertainty to how much the 
financial advisors knew.  But from my reading, financial 
advisors thought there was something about it but they didn't 
have the entire full picture there either.  And even they, 
let alone the shareholders, were -- did not really exact 
know.  Though it really doesn't matter whether they knew or 
not, by the way.  What matters is that the public didn't know 
this.  
And Reynolds also haven't really made a big attempt 
to explain their rigorous process, because it's not the 
information but also the precision of information.  And the 
management also had some internal presentations to the board 
which are also not reflected in their public disclosures.  
There are also a few items which I was slightly less clear 
what exactly who knew what but there were even some items 
that was not even widely known within Reynolds, the company.  
So all of this makes me conclude that there was 
enough private information that was value relevant that was 
not -- didn't have any channel through which it could be 
incorporated into the prices.  And also, therefore, it cannot 
be incorporated into the decision making of the shareholders 
whether this is a good deal or a bad deal.  
Q. Are you aware that Professor Gompers attempted to
adjust Reynolds' trading price from the pre-offer time frame 
up to the transaction date and attempted to reach a 
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profession because I think some of us have to push this thing 
through because this is really misunderstood.  It's like a 
mystery.  You say, Oh, what is this winner's curse thing?  I 
would like to explain this, Your Honor, for five minutes.  It 
would kind of make me a good thing so that I communicate 
effectively, but -- 
Q. Well, let me ask you some questions and see if we 
can elicit the parts of this that are most helpful to this 
case.  
So why is it that having an insider with a large 
toehold is going to dampen competition? 
A. There are several channels.  Okay?  One channel is 
that getting into a competition is costly.  I don't start -- 
I don't initiate a corporate acquisition just for free.  I 
have to incur a lot of costs.  Due diligence costs and so on 
and so forth.  The fact that there is somebody who is sitting 
there with a 42 percent ownership that is my opponent, he is 
better positioned to buy the company than I, so my 
probability of winning that object is smaller.  
Again, I'm going to maximize my profits.  There's a 
probability of winning and there's a profit when I win.  That 
probability is much smaller if my opponent has a big toehold.  
That's No. 1.  I think that's very clear.  
The second channel happens through this 
informational advantage.  Right?  
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Let me give you an example.  My bag is back there.  
There's cash in it.  Okay?  And we're going to hold an 
auction.  Each one of you will write a piece of paper, say 
this is how much I'm bidding, and we are going to close all 
these things and are one of -- one of judge's assistants will 
open all the envelopes.  Whoever bid the highest will pay 
whatever he or she bid and will pay me that money but you 
also get the money in my bag.  Okay?  But I'll help you a 
little bit.  
I say, The amount of money that I have in my bag is 
somewhere between zero and 100, equal likely; and not only 
that, I am going to write a card for each one of you, and if 
you were to average all those numbers on those cards, that's 
going to be equal to the money in my bag.  And I give these 
cards to you.  You all look at your cards and then I will ask 
you to bid without showing the card to your neighbor.  
So, Mr. Shindel, you look at your card.  So you're 
now doing math.  Says, Okay, without looking at my card, the 
expected value of the money is 50 because it's uniformly 
distributed anywhere between zero and 100, average value is 
50.  Now, you look at your card, Mr. Shindel.  It says 50.  
I'm just giving an example.  
Given 50, what is your expected value?  You thought 
it was 50 to begin with.  You got another 50.  Say, Okay, my 
best estimate is it's 50.  So my next question to you is, 
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what happens if you actually bid 50 on that thing?  What 
happens if everybody bids truthfully their true valuation?  
Now, Mr. Shindel, this is an unfair question to you 
so I will answer it.  So if you actually bid 50, what's going 
to happen?  With some probability, you're going to win.  With 
some probability, you're going to lose.  When you lose, 
you're not going to win or lose anything.  You're just going 
to walk away.  But when you win, you're going to pay that 50 
and you're going to get the money in my bag.  
But you pay 50, what is the value of -- in my bag?  
Well, that's the average of all those cards.  The fact that 
you won, you are the most optimistic person so you have the 
highest number.  The fact that your number said 50, everybody 
else's numbers are lower, that's the reason you win because 
your expected value is the highest, but you overpaid.  The 
fact that you won this tells you that you are the highest 
card and the average of those cards was less than 50.  So you 
overpaid.  So no one is going to bid their true valuation 
when they think others have valuable information.  Okay?  So 
that's the concept.  
So if I actually ask you, what is your optimal bid, 
probably you'll be stunned.  You won't be able to answer this 
now because you need to solve the problem.  It's a fairly 
complicated mathematical problem that takes 20 minutes to 
solve but you can do it.  
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The optimal bidding would be to shave.  You're 
going to shave your bid to a lower number so that you don't 
lose money.  Okay?  
So now let's change the problem a little bit.  
Mr. Miller is no longer here so I will make him the bad guy.  
So there are about 20 of you here.  Each one of you get one 
card.  I give 80 cards to Mr. Miller.  So now he has 80 
points of information.  You guys know only one each.  Okay?  
So he's almost sure what the value is because he's holding so 
many cards.  Right?  So he's going to say, Okay, I don't need 
to shave my bid; right?  But you guys should shave your bids 
a lot more because the feed in Mr. Miller is really bad news.  
If I tell you, Oh, you bid more than Mr. Miller, 
oh, my god, he knew so much more than I, I made a major 
mistake, so you're going to shave your bid so much.  
But Mr. Miller's smart.  He's going to say, The 
fact that they know I have so much inside information about 
how much money Professor Yilmaz has in his bag, they're going 
to be scared.  They're not going to bid very aggressive.  
They're going to shave their bids a lot.  Therefore, I don't 
have to bid very aggressively.  He's going to shave his bid 
too.  
In fact, he may win the auction even when he thinks 
that the value is not a lot because you will be all so 
scared.  You'll be shaving your bids.  Optimally he actually 
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would not need to bid very aggressively.  
So this is exactly the problem you're talking 
about.  When somebody is sitting on the board, they know a 
lot more than you do.  So therefore, you are not going to be 
very aggressive.  But the person who is sitting on the board 
knows that the opponents are not going to be very aggressive 
so they don't have to be aggressive themselves.  So that's 
the concept.  That's the channel through which it happens.  
Q. Now, is there -- in addition to the theory that 
we've been discussing, is there empirical evidence that 
toeholds dampen competition in an auction?
A. Yes.  This is a fairly old literature that happened 
I think late '80 to maybe early '90s.  That when you look at 
the acquisitions, you see that there are a lot of acquirers 
who initially had 10 to 20 percent ownership.  So that's not 
uncommon.  I mean, 42 percent is very uncommon.  42 percent 
doesn't happen that often to begin with.  But 10 to 20 
percent, there's a lot of data to show that the owners 
actually have that kind of toehold.  
Q. And does the empirical literature suggest that even 
a 10 to 20 percent toehold can reduce competition in an 
auction?
A. We have actually evidence in that direction.  When 
we look at uncontested and contested bids, there's 
evidence -- I mean, this section makes good sense.  You don't 
Theresa B. Kramer, Official Court Reporter
Mecklenburg County Courthouse, North Carolina
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C O M PA N Y  N O T E
M a y  2 4 ,  2 0 1 7
British American Tobacco plc (BATS LN) Overweight 
Initiating at Overweight; RAI Deal Helps Drive Expected Cash Build
PRICE: 5,445.83p
TARGET: £59.00
        Our £59 target price applies a 18.9x
multiple to 2018E EPS of £3.12, in-line with its
current 18.9x multiple on our 2017E EPS.We
expect BAT to deliver 5-6% three-year average
sales growth and 10-11% average EPS growth.
Michael S. Lavery





FY17E Rev (mil) — £21,938.0
FY18E Rev (mil) — £28,021.0
FY17E EPS — p286.00
FY18E EPS — p311.50
52-Week High / Low 5,524.00p / 4,072.00p
Shares Out (mil) 1,865.0
Market Cap. (mil) 10,156,473p
Total Assets ($mil) 39,733
Avg Daily Vol (000) 3,198
Div (ann) 182.80p
Yield 3.36%
Fiscal Year End Dec
Price Performance - 1 Year














Jun Dec FY FY RM
6,669.0 8,082.0 14,751.0 6.9x
7,916.0 14,022.0 21,938.0 4.6x
13,469.0 14,552.0 28,021.0 3.6x
EARNINGS PER SHARE (p)
Jun Dec FY FY P/E
111.10 136.30 247.50 22.0x
132.80 153.20 286.00 19.0x
147.30 164.20 311.50 17.5x
Revenues are excluding excise taxes
CONCLUSION
We initiate coverage with an Overweight rating and £59 target price. We expect 10% 3-
year EPS growth, driven in part by its deal to acquire the remaining 58% of RAI. We include
expected 4-6% deal accretion, and there may be an additional 30-45p EPS lift (10-15%) if
US tax reform lowers rates to 20-25% and comes post-deal close (which would accrue the
full benefit to BAT without risking disrupting the deal). Its glo heat-not-burn platform also
offers an accretive, reduced risk opportunity that has had a fast early start in Japan.
• We expect about 4-6% accretion from its RAI deal. BAT agreed to buy the shares of
RAI it does not own for $29.44 in cash and 0.526 BAT shares (now worth $66.29/share),
which we estimate adds 4% EPS accretion (assuming a 4.5% weighted average rate on
new debt) to 6% (assuming a 3.5% rate). We assume the midpoint; our model reflects a
4% rate. We assume an even spread of synergies over 3 years, though pacing is likely
uneven. We use current USD/GBP exchange rates, which are subject to change. FCF/
share accretion looks even greater, with a double-digit lift from the deal.
• glo gets a pricing lift from lower taxes. BAT launched its glo heated tobacco product
in Sendai, Japan, in December, where it now has a 6.7% share. We estimate BAT's
revenue/pack is 75-100% higher than for cigarettes, as glo’s Neostiks excise taxes are
45% below those of its cigarettes (while retail prices are similar). Neostiks gross margins
in Japan could be 90%, with potential EBIT margins (at scale) of 75% vs. 60% for
cigarettes. BAT expects to be in 4-5 markets by year end; we believe a US launch is
also in the works.
• We project a significant cash build. BAT has finished the last 8 years with £1.8-2.3B
in cash (average: £2.1B), but in our model, pro-forma for the RAI deal, we project £5B
at the end of 2018 and £8.1B at the end of 2019. We believe the company's first priority
remains delevering to its 1.5-2.5x range, which we project by 2019, though we believe
buybacks could come into play afterwards. Smaller acquisitions are also possible in the
meantime, including potentially expanding its presence in the Philippines.
• We expect 9% upside to our £59 target and 12.5% total return. BAT’s shares trade at
17.3x our 2018E EPS (pro-forma for the RAI deal). Our £59 target price applies a 18.9x
multiple to 2018E EPS of £3.12, in-line with its current 18.9x multiple on our 2017E EPS.
We believe this is justified its improving brand portfolio, expected accretion from recent
RAI deal, and strength in emerging markets. We expect BAT to deliver 5-6% three-year
average sales growth and 10-11% average EPS growth. Its dividend yield is 3.4%.
RISKS TO ACHIEVEMENT OF PT & RECOMMENDATION
Unfavorable regulatory action, especially disruptive excise taxes, macroeconomic erosion,
and a stronger British pound could pose a risk to upside to the shares.
COMPANY DESCRIPTION
BAT produces and markets cigarettes and other tobacco products and is based out of
England. Key brands include Dunhill, Kent, Lucky Strike, Pall Mall, and Vype.
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We initiate coverage at Overweight as we expect BAT to continue to benefit from its 4% six year 
historical average organic revenue growth and 6-7% organic EBIT growth while also benefitting 
from increased exposure to the US profit pool through its acquisition of the 58% remaining shares 
of Reynolds American (RAI) that it does not already own. (It obtained a 42% stake in RAI when 
RAI was formed through the combination of RJ Reynolds and BAT’s former US subsidiary, Brown 
& Williamson, in 2004.) We believe the US market’s attractive, consistent pricing and earnings 
growth will improve BAT’s earnings growth profile. It is also one of only two global players that 
have launched a heated tobacco product, both of which have already quickly gained traction in 
Japan and are showing promise in other markets as well. While Philip Morris International (PMI) 
has an early lead in heated tobacco, the platforms are very accretive to both PMI and BAT and 
show promising consumer adoption rates. We believe that BAT’s projected cash flow generation 
also suggests that buybacks could be on the horizon, which would add a potential incremental lift 
to our current estimates.  
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We expect 4-6% accretion from its deal to buy the rest of RAI 
 
Using terms of BAT’s deal for RAI, with an offer of roughly half debt and half equity (BAT agreed to 
buy the shares of RAI it does not own for $29.44 in cash and 0.526 BAT shares, now worth 
$66.29/share in total), we estimate EPS accretion of about 4% (assuming debt issued at about a 
4.5% weighted average rate) to 6% (assuming a 3.5% rate). We include the 4% midpoint in our 
model. FCF/share accretion looks even greater, with a double-digit lift expected from the deal. We 
assume an even spread of synergies over 2 years, though pacing is likely uneven, and could take 
up to 3 years. We use current USD/GBP exchange rates, which are subject to change.  
 
 
We assume a 36-37% base case tax rate for RAI, consistent with its history, but if US tax rates fell 
to 20-25% as has been proposed, it could add 30-45p to BAT’s EPS, or an incremental 10-15% lift 
beyond its 4-6% deal accretion. The benefit could be even greater with a 15% rate, which has 
been discussed but which we consider less likely. We believe there is about a 65% chance of US 
tax reform passing this year, the full benefit of which could pass to BAT holders if it is enacted 
after the RAI deal has closed, as looks increasingly likely. Timing matters; if there is clarity on 
reform prior to shareholder votes, it could cause RAI holders to reconsider terms of a deal. 
 
 
Both BAT and RAI have the option to back out of the deal for a breakup fee of $1B. The most 
imaginable scenario in which this option might be considered is a potential windfall for RAI from 
tax reform. However, timing matters, and we believe tax reform would need to be finalized prior to 
deal close, which is possible but does not currently look likely, increasing the odds (in our view) 
that the deal closes as currently structured.  
 
 
BAT intends to register under the US securities laws in connection with its proposed transaction. 
Registration with the SEC likely takes about 4-5 months and is required to upgrade its ADR to a 
fully tradeable security. That timing would likely mean a vote sometime in late 2Q17 or early 3Q17. 
The vote would require approval by a majority of all holders (including BAT) and a majority of non-
BAT holders (the latter guarantees the former if BAT votes yes as expected).  
 
 
BAT indicated estimated synergy savings of $400M, which would come from better procurement 
scale, some R&D savings, and eliminating RAI’s Corporate costs ($180M last year). A deal could 
also allow BAT to continue production for Japan in the US (currently set to end in 2019, though 
related savings are modest) and could add greater flexibility for North American production, but we 
do not expect its RAI’s Tobaccoville plant to close, partly due to FDA regulation. 
 
 
If the deal for the rest of RAI closes (which we consider likely), we estimate about 60% pro-forma 
revenues would come from developed markets and 40% from emerging markets. We estimate the 
reverse for volumes, with 60% from emerging markets, down from about 70% now. 
 
 
We consider the US profit pool to be attractive, and Imperial and now BAT have made recent 
efforts to increase their US exposure. While we have learned to never say never to potential deals, 
we do not believe this merger is likely to be a catalyst for PMI and Altria to reunite. We believe 
PMI’s focus is on pursuing its iQOS launch, which it can do in the US through its agreement with 
Altria (without having to merge). BAT’s situation is also different: it had a subsidiary in the US that 
merged with RJ Reynolds, driving the change from a controlling stake to a minority interest, while 
Altria and PMI chose to separate just 9 years ago.  
US tax reform could 
add 10% to EPS; full 
lift would go to BAT 
holders post-close 
Timing of tax reform 
matters for breakup 
clause to be invoked 





modest; upside to 
its $400M estimate 
looks unlikely 
Pro-forma: About 
50% of volume from 
Emerging markets  
We don’t see this as 
a catalyst for an 
Altria-PMI deal 
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BAT’s glo platform gets a big lift from lower taxes 
 
 
Heat-not-burn (or heated tobacco) products are reduced-risk products, conceptually similar to e-
cigarettes, but using tobacco instead of vapor to deliver the nicotine. Given the tobacco leaf the 
product contains, the taste is more similar than e-cigarettes to that of combustible cigarettes, but 
still without the smoke, which studies show can therefore reduce harmful exposure in a way that is 
comparable to cessation when used for prolonged periods in place of smoking. PMI launched the 
first heat-not-burn device, iQOS, in Nagoya, Japan, in 2014. In December 2016, BAT launched 
glo, its heat-not-burn platform in Sendai, Japan, and has since achieved about 6.5-7.0% of market 
share there. It has since also launched in Switzerland and Canada. BAT plans to roll out nationally 
in Japan by the end of the year, and to launch in one or two more countries. 
 
 
In Japan, glo Neostiks enjoy lower taxes than combustible cigarettes, and also lower than PMI’s 
HeatSticks for its iQOS platform. Both are taxed according to weight and PMI’s HeatSticks (which 
have 20% lower excise taxes than cigarettes do) weigh roughly 60% more than Neostiks (0.8g vs. 
0.5g for Neostiks). We estimate taxes on Neostiks are at least 45% less than BAT’s cigarettes in 
Japan, or a roughly 75-100% price premium vs. cigarettes. Even with some estimated higher costs 
for Neostiks relative to cigarettes, gross profit per pack and EBIT per pack (at scale) could be 
more than twice that of BAT’s combustible cigarettes in Japan, as shown below. We believe taxes 
(and therefore price realization) in some other countries are even more favorable than in Japan. 
 
 
BAT launched its glo device in Sendai at a ¥8,000 price ($US70), and demand has exceeded 
BAT’s ability to supply the product. The Kent Neostiks that fill it are priced at ¥420, in-line with the 
price of Kent cigarettes and less than the price of the Marlboro HeatSticks (¥460) used by the 
iQOS device. We expect device sales to be dilutive to the Neostiks economics detailed above but 
believe the economics on the Neostiks are extremely attractive, with revenue realization and profit 






Operating profit comparison for Neostiks vs combustible cigarettes: Japan 




Note: We assume a local and national NeoStiks’ tax advantage. Source:  Piper Jaffray & Co 
Discounts on 
devices are in place 
to help boost trial 
Combustible cigarettes NeoStiks Tax discount N.S. vs. cigs
Retail price ¥420.0 ¥420.0
Consumption tax ¥31.1 ¥31.1 0%
Retailer margin ¥42.0 ¥46.2
Total consumption tax and retailer margin  ¥73.1 ¥77.3
Total price excl. consumption tax and retailer margin ¥346.9 ¥342.7
National tax ¥122.4 ¥67.3
   Tobacco tax ¥106.0 ¥58.3 45%
   Special tobacco surtax ¥16.4 ¥9.0 45%
Local tax ¥122.4 ¥67.3
   Prefectural tobacco tax ¥17.2 ¥9.5 45%
   Municipal tobacco tax ¥105.2 ¥57.9 45%
Total tobacco taxes ¥244.8 ¥134.6
Total wholesale price ¥102.1 ¥208.0
Wholesale margin ¥8.8 ¥14.3
Manufacturer price ¥93.3 ¥193.8 208%
Exchange rate ¥135.9 ¥135.9
Manufacturer price, GBP £0.69 £1.43 208%
Average COGS per pack, excluding excise taxes £0.11 £0.15 30%
Gross profit per pack £0.57 £1.28 223%
Gross margin 83.6% 89.8%
Average SG&A per pack, exluding excise taxes £0.16 £0.20 30%
Operating profit per pack £0.42 £1.08 258%
Operating margin 60.8% 75.5%
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BAT’s glo tobacco heating device heats tobacco to release a nicotine aerosol. Like PMI’s iQOS 
device, it heats tobacco sticks that the user inserts into the device. However, unlike PMI’s product, 
the device and the charger are one in the same. Some consumers may prefer the potential 
simplicity this may offer, but it also means that the device that the consumer holds while using it is 
larger than the iQOS heating device, which is more like a cylinder that wraps around the tobacco 
stick and is not much larger than most vapor devices. BAT appears to be following PMI’s lead for 
its launch strategy and go-to-market approach, including opening a flagship store. With PMI and 
BAT as the only two heated tobacco product players, we believe there is lots of headroom for 
incremental market share gains for both. 
 
 
While the simplicity of the device (i.e., all-in-one) likely holds appeal for at least some consumers, 
its bulkier size is a trade-off. Nicotine delivery and consumer satisfaction with the flavor are likely 
the primary consideration factors for consumers. PMI’s iQOS device has proven success on taste 
and nicotine delivery satisfaction given its in-market momentum. iQOS heats its tobacco from the 
center, with the tobacco stick on a ‘spike,’ while glo heats the tobacco from the outside, heating 
the paper wrapper first, which may add more of the taste of the paper into the aerosol than iQOS.  
 
 
Without divulging consumer testing specifics, BAT notes that glo scores very well on five of its 
seven key product metrics. Flavor is not listed explicitly, and neither is nicotine delivery per se, 
though we would consider nicotine delivery to be a part of overall product performance. While 
there is not yet enough extensive in-market history to know how consumers think the product 
compares to iQOS on flavor and nicotine delivery (two criteria we believe are the most important to 
consumers), we do believe glo’s battery life is longer (it has a bigger battery), even if it makes the 
device a bit more bulky. BAT has identified seven consumer criteria that it considered its key focus 
for its consumer research on glo:  
 
 Product performance 
 Smell/odor 
 Ease of use 
 Battery charge 
 Startup time 
 Cleanliness 
How does BAT’s glo 
compare to PMI’s 
iQOS? 
Exhibit 2 
PMI’s iQOS (left) and BAT’s glo (right) side-by-side 




Source:  Piper Jaffray & Co, PMI, BAT 
The mechanics of 
heating influence 
taste 
glo does well on five 
of seven key 
consumer criteria 
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BAT likely benefits from consumers who are already aware of heat-not-burn in concept, thanks to 
PMI’s launch and spending behind its iQOS platform. We believe iQOS’s current momentum in 
Japan helps pave the way for glo’s launch, and also that the glo launch is likely to further increase 
interest in heat-not-burn products generally, helping both glo and iQOS as more money is invested 
in non-combustibles. BAT has also recently launched glo in Switzerland, where PMI’s iQOS has 
about 2% share in its launch area (in about a year and a half – relative to PMI’s 0.7% share hurdle 
for what it considers a ‘successful’ new product launch), and we expect other glo launch markets 
to be places where PMI has already begun the work of educating the consumer with its efforts 
behind its iQOS platform. We believe both companies’ heat-not-burn products can gain share, and 
that they both benefit from significant gross margin accretion, as excise taxes are lower for glo and 
iQOS, but price points are in-line with that of each company’s combustible cigarette prices. 
 
 
BAT has been clear that it sees a big opportunity for reduced risk products in the US, which drove 
part of its interest in acquiring full control of RAI. RAI’s existing Vuse vapor platform is one piece of 
the equation, but we believe BAT plans to launch glo in the US, just as PMI and Altria are planning 
for iQOS. Both products would need FDA approval to launch in the US. PMI has already applied 
for pre-market tobacco approval (PMTA) in late 1Q17. While BAT has not publicly indicated that it 
has submitted a PMTA application, we believe it either has submitted one without making a public 
announcement, or that it is preparing one to submit soon. The PMTA application process is meant 
to take about a year (per FDA guidance), but could take longer. The FDA does not have a history 
of operating in a timely manner on other tobacco applications, which is why we believe BAT does 








We expect a US 
launch to be in the 
works 
Page 6 of 15British American Tobacco plc
- App. 227 -
We project a significant cash build 
 
 
BAT has finished the last 8 years with £1.8-2.3B in cash (average: £2.1B), but in our model, pro-
forma for the RAI deal, we project £5B at the end of 2018 and £8.1B at the end of 2019. We 
believe the company's first priority remains delevering to its 1.5-2.5x range, which we project by 
2019, though we believe buybacks could come into play afterwards. Smaller acquisitions are also 
possible in the meantime, including potentially expanding its presence in the Philippines. 
 
 
Mighty, a local, privately-held Filipino competitor, has grown share from 2% in 2012 to 27% in 
1Q17. However, it has also come under investigation from the government for potential tax 
evasion, with a $735M lawsuit filed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Mighty’s operations are 
also under pressure, as the Bureau of Customs has suspended its license to import raw materials 
on March 14th due to mis-declaration. It must now rely on its existing raw material inventory, which 
likely has a shelf life of six months at most. According to the Philippine Star, a number of retailers 
have also pulled Mighty product off the shelves in order to avoid the risk of selling product that 
might have counterfeit tax stamps.  
 
 
Mighty could be an acquisition target for a company hoping to grow its presence in the Philippines, 
such as BAT, which currently has about 1% share in the market. Whether Mighty continues as a 
going concern or is acquired by BAT or another company, we believe that competitive dynamics in 
the Philippines are likely to improve for BAT. If Mighty’s share gains have been driven by artificially 
low prices driven by tax evasion as the government alleges, we believe restoring more normal 
competitive dynamics should be positive for category pricing, and could also potentially help BAT’s 
market share outlook and its operating income trajectory. If BAT were to acquire Mighty, it could 




Mighty may be on 
the ropes 
Mighty could be a 
seller in the 
Philippines 
Page 7 of 15British American Tobacco plc
- App. 228 -
We expect 9% upside to our £59 target and 12.5% total return 
 
 
BAT’s shares currently trade at 17.3x our 2018E EPS. Our £59 target price applies an 18.9x 
multiple to 2018E EPS of £3.12, in-line with its current 18.9x multiple on our 2017E EPS. We 
believe this is justified given its improving brand portfolio, expected accretion from recent RAI deal, 
and strength in emerging markets. We expect BAT to deliver 5-6% three-year average organic 
sales growth and 10-11% average EPS growth. Its dividend yield is currently 3.4%. 
 
 
Our EPS estimates are pro-form for BAT’s acquisition of the remaining 58% of RAI it does not 
already own, which we expect to close in 3Q17. We include the addition of full consolidation of 
RAI’s US business, with the related decrease in equity income, increase in interest expense and 
share count, along with $400-425M of synergies (about £330M) realized over two years. Including 
pro-forma components of the RAI deal is accretive to our base case earnings by about 4-6%. 
 
 
BAT’s shares have traded within a PE range of 9.9-19.0x over the last 10 years, including the 
recent rise in the shares and the doom-and-gloom of late 2008/early 2009. Its average multiple 
was 14.2x. The shares are currently trading near the top of its historical range at 17.3x our 2018 
EPS estimate of £3.12, which we consider sustainable given its increased exposure to the US 
profit pool from the RAI deal and expected 6-8% organic EBIT growth over the next three years. 
 
 
Our estimates are 
pro-forma for the 
RAI deal 
Exhibit 3 
PE Multiple comparisons 




Source:  FactSet, Piper Jaffray & Co. Reflects pricing as of 5/19/17. 
PE of 17.3x is now at 
the high end of its 
historical range 
Exhibit 4 




Note: Reflects pricing as of 5/19/17. Source:  Factset, Piper Jaffray & Co 
Historical Current Target
BAT's multiple range 9.9-19.0x 17.3x 18.9x
BAT vs global tobacco peers 0% premium 6% premium 16% premium
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BAT has tended to trade in-line with other global tobacco companies, including Imperial, PMI and 
JT, in recent years. At current valuation levels, the stock is trading at a 6% premium to its global 
tobacco peers; historically it trades in-line with its peers. 
 
 
Our discounted-cash flow (DCF) model renders a mid-point valuation of £59, in-line with our £59 
price target. We assume a terminal-growth rate of 2.0% and a weighted-average cost of capital of 
8.3%. Our estimate includes a compound annual free cash flow growth rate of 13% (helped by the 
expected lift from its acquisition of RAI), with decelerating top-line growth and operating margins 
reaching 45% by 2026E. 
 
 
BAT at a modest 
premium to global 
tobacco peers, in-
line with recent 
history Exhibit 5 
BATS-LON PE versus global tobacco peers 




Note: Global tobacco average includes PMI, BAT, JT and Imperial. Reflects pricing as of 5/19/17. Source:  Factset, Piper Jaffray & Co 















































































































































































































































































Equity risk premium (%) 5.0
10-year Treasury Bond risk-free rate (%) 5.0
Target equity / total capital (%) 83.8
Target debt / total capital (%) 16.2
Cost of equity (%) 9.3
Cost of debt (%) 3.8
After-tax cost of debt (%) 2.8
Weighted average cost of capital (%) 8.3
Terminal growth (%) 2.0
Public to private discount (%) 0.0
Shares outstanding (m) 2,303
Equity value (£)  59.00
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The DCF value is sensitive to the terminal-growth rate assumed, where a 1.0% terminal-growth 
rate indicates a value closer to £53 and a 3.0% terminal-growth rate points to a value around £68. 
It is also sensitive to our WACC assumptions; if either assumed rate is adjusted by 1ppt up or 

























DCF sensitivity analysis 
      
 
 
Source: Piper Jaffray & Co 
Exhibit 8 
DCF model 




Source:  Piper Jaffray & Co 
WACC
£ 7.3% 7.8% 8.3% 8.8% 9.3%
1.0% £60.96 £54.68 £52.64 £44.59 £40.48
1.5% £65.31 £58.24 £55.58 £47.05 £42.56
2.0% £70.49 £62.42 £59.00 £49.88 £44.92
2.5% £76.76 £67.38 £63.00 £53.15 £47.63
3.0% £84.49 £73.39 £67.77 £56.99 £50.77
Terminal-growth assumption
£ 2016 2017E 2018E 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E 2023E 2024E 2025E 2026E
EBIT 5,480 8,918 11,990 12,671 13,382 14,131 14,873 15,639 16,428 17,256 18,125
   - Taxes at 25.3% 1,245 2,566 3,429 3,674 3,379 3,569 3,756 3,949 4,149 4,358 4,577
EBIT less taxes 4,235 6,352 8,561 8,997 10,002 10,562 11,117 11,689 12,279 12,898 13,548
  % growth 14 50 35 5 11 6 5 5 5 5 5
    + Depreciation and amortization 393 393 393 393 442 496 552 613 677 746 819
    - Capital expenditures 586 696 749 749 754 758 759 759 793 828 865
    + Change in net working capital, Other -18 257 309 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149
Free Cash Flow to Firm 4,024 6,307 8,514 8,790 9,839 10,449 11,059 11,692 12,312 12,965 13,651
  % growth -5 57 35 3 12 6 6 6 5 5 5
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Company overview  
 
 
British American Tobacco p.l.c. is engaged in the manufacture and sale of cigarettes and other 
tobacco-related products in more than 200 markets worldwide. It has a portfolio of premium, mid-
priced and value brands, both international and local. Its five top brands by volume are Dunhill, 
Kent, Lucky Strike, Pall Mall and Rothmans. Key brands for other tobacco-related products include 
Vype and glo. British American Tobacco is headquartered in London, England. 
 
 
British American Tobacco competes with other international tobacco companies such as Philip 
Morris, Imperial Tobacco and Japan Tobacco. It also competes with numerous local competitors 
including Korea Tobacco & Ginseng (KT&G), ITC and Gudang Garam. The company accounts for 
roughly 20% of the global tobacco market. Its revenue splits by segment are as follows: Asia 
Pacific is ~30%, the Americas are ~20%, Western Europe is ~25%, and E.E.M.A. is ~25%. 
Emerging markets generate 60-65% of revenues currently, but we project this to fall to about 40% 
of revenues following the close of the RAI deal. 
 
 
For additional color on the broader industry, please also see our industry report, “Tobacco Industry 
Initiation: Pricing Story Intact; Accretive Disruption, Too” published May 24, 2017, in conjunction 
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Risks to our investment thesis 
 
 
Large, disruptive government excise taxes could provide a headwind to volumes and earnings 
growth, limiting upside in the shares. Macroeconomic erosion and a corresponding weak 
employment outlook (especially in Europe) could weaken demand for BAT’s premium brands. A 
stronger British pound could hurt earnings growth of BAT’s operations, most of which is located 
outside the UK, which could limit upside to the share price. Counterfeit products present a risk to 
sales and earnings growth. The UK, New Zealand, France and Hungary are in the midst of 
implementing a requirement that cigarettes be sold in plain packaging without branded logos, 
following Ireland (which passed a law in March 2015, but has yet to implement the law) and 
Australia (which began plain packaging in December 2012). While Australia’s experience suggests 
consumption has not been affected, as volumes rose slightly after years of declines, there could 
be long-term erosion of premium pricing power. If tobacco litigation were to be significantly more 
unfavorable than we estimate, there could be risk to cash flow and upside in the share price. If 
tobacco consumption declines at rates faster than we expect, there could be risk to cash flow and 
earnings, which could impact upside to the shares. 
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Net income attrib. to noncontrol. int.





2016 Jun-17 Dec-17 2017E Jun-18 Dec-18 2018E 2019E
1HE 2HE 1HE 2HE
14,751 7,916 14,022 21,938 13,469 14,552 28,021 29,354
12.6% 18.7% 73.5% 48.7% 70.1% 3.8% 27.7% 4.8%
3,733 1,884 3,015 4,899 2,603 3,056 5,659 5,904
11,018 6,032 11,007 17,039 10,866 11,496 22,362 23,450
74.7% 76.2% 78.5% 77.7% 80.7% 79.0% 79.8% 79.9%
5,538 3,056 5,064 8,120 5,160 5,212 10,372 10,778
37.5% 38.6% 36.1% 37.0% 38.3% 35.8% 37.0% 36.7%
-122 bps -30 bps -30 bps -53 bps -30 bps -30 bps 0 bps -30 bps
5,480 2,975 5,943 8,918 5,706 6,284 11,990 12,671
9.8% 21.3% 96.3% 62.7% 91.8% 5.7% 34.4% 5.7%
4.6% 6.4% 10.0% 7.8% 9.8% 5.7% 7.4% 5.7%
37.2% 37.6% 42.4% 40.7% 42.4% 43.2% 42.8% 43.2%
-95 bps 350 bps 214 bps 38 bps
1,327 776 219 995 236 252 488 521
40.7% 28.3% -69.6% -25.0% -69.6% 14.9% -51.0% 6.8%
(529) (289) (863) (1,153) (831) (853) (1,683) (1,626)
6,278 3,462 5,299 8,761 5,111 5,684 10,795 11,566
1,473 883 1,683 2,566 1,623 1,805 3,429 3,674
23.5% 25.5% 31.8% 29.3% 31.8% 31.8% 31.8% 31.8%
4,805 2,579 3,616 6,195 3,487 3,878 7,366 7,892
190 99 101 200 94 111 205 213
4,615 2,480 3,515 5,995 3,394 3,767 7,161 7,679
247.5 132.8 152.6 285.5 147.4 163.6 311.0 333.5
18.8% 19.6% 12.0% 15.4% 10.9% 7.2% 8.9% 7.2%
1,865 1,867 2,303 2,100 2,303 2,303 2,303 2,303
155.9 118.1 54.4 172.5 125.2 57.6 182.8 193.8
Michael S. Lavery
212-284-9511
michael.s.lavery@pjc.com Model last revised 5/24/2017. Current disclosure information for this company can be found at: www.piperjaffray.com/researchdisclosures  
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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
FORSYTH COUNTY 
IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION 
17 CVS 7086 
REYNOLDS AMERICAN INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
THIRD MOTION EQUITIES MASTER FUND 
LTD., MAGNETAR CAPITAL MASTER 
FUND, LTD., SPECTRUM OPPORTUNITIES 
MASTER FUND LTD., MAGNETAR 
FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIES MASTER 
FUNDS LTD., MAGNETAR MSW MASTER 
FUND LTD., MASON CAPITAL MASTER 
FUND, L.P., ANTON S. KAWALSKY, trustee 
for the benefit of Anton S. Kawalsky Trust UA 
9/17/2015, CANYON BLUE CREDIT 
INVESTMENT FUND L.P., THE CANYON 
VALUE REALIZATION MASTER FUND, 
L.P., CANYON VALUE REALIZATION
FUND, L.P., BLUE MOUNTAIN CREDIT
ALTERNATIVES MASTER FUND L.P.,
BLUEMOUNTAIN FOINAVEN MASTER
FUND L.P., BLUEMOUNTAIN GUADALUPE
PEAK FUND L.P., BLUEMOUNTAIN
SUMMIT TRADING L.P., BLUEMOUNTAIN
MONTENVERS MASTER FUND SCA
SICAV-SIF, AMUNDI ABSOLUTE RETURN
CANYON FUND P.L.C., CANYON-SL
VALUE FUND, L.P., PERMAL CANYON IO
LTD., CANYON VALUE REALIZATION






































FOR ISSUANCE OF 
LETTERS OF REQUEST 
PURSUANT TO THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION OF 18 
MARCH 1970 ON THE 
TAKING OF EVIDENCE 
ABROAD 
Pursuant to Rule 45 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (N.C. Gen. Stat. §1A-
1, Rule 45 (2009)) and the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence 
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (the “Hague Convention”), defendants 
Mason Capital Master Fund, L.P., The Canyon Value Realization Master Fund, L.P., Canyon 
Case No.2017CVS7086 ECF No. 87 Filed 08/31/2018 15:55:38 N.C. Business Court
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Value Realization Fund, L.P., Canyon Blue Credit Investment Fund L.P., Canyon-SL Value 
Fund, L.P., Permal Canyon IO Ltd., Canyon Value Realization MAC 18 Ltd., Amundi Absolute 
Return Canyon Fund P.L.C., Anton Kawalsky, as trustee for the benefit of the Anton S. 
Kawalsky Trust UA 9/17/2015, Blue Mountain Credit Alternatives Master Fund L.P., 
BlueMountain Summit Trading L.P., BlueMountain Montenvers Master Fund SCA SICAV-SIF, 
BlueMountain Foinaven Master Fund L.P., BlueMountain Guadalupe Peak Fund L.P.,  and 
defendants Magnetar Capital Master Fund, Ltd, Magnetar Fundamental Strategies Master Fund 
Ltd, Magnetar MSW Master Fund Ltd, Third Motion Equities Master Fund Ltd, and  Spectrum 
Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., and defendant Barry W. Blank Trust (collectively, 
“Defendants”) respectfully request that this Court issue Letters of Request in the form attached 
hereto to the Senior Master of the Royal Courts of Justice in the United Kingdom, requesting the 
production of documents from each of British American Tobacco PLC (“BAT”), Centerview 
Partners U.K. LLP (“Centerview”), Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch (“Deutsche Bank”), and 
UBS Limited (“UBS,” and collectively, the “Discovery Parties”), which are all located in the 
United Kingdom.   
In support of this Motion, Defendants show the Court as follows: 
1. As set forth in more detail in Defendants’ Opening Brief in Support of Motion for 
Issuance of Letters of Request Pursuant to the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the 
Taking of Evidence Abroad filed contemporaneously herewith, each of the Discovery Parties has 
evidence that is highly relevant to the claims and defenses of the case and may not be obtained 
by other means. 
2. Because the Discovery Parties are located in a foreign state, it is beyond the 
jurisdiction of the Court to issue subpoenas to compel the evidence sought. 
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3. The United States and the United Kingdom are contracting states under the Hague 
Convention.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1781; Cavlam Business Ltd. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
London, No. 08 Civ. 2225, 2009 WL 667272, at *7 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2009).  More 
specifically, the Hague Convention allows judicial authorities in one signatory country to obtain 
evidence located in another signatory country for use in judicial proceedings. See Hague 
Convention, Art. 1. The Hague Convention provides for the taking of evidence “by a Letter of 
Request from a U.S. judicial authority to the competent authority in the foreign state.”  Tulip 
Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472 (D. Del. 2003). 
4. Accordingly, Defendants request that the Court execute the Letters of Request 
attached hereto, to permit the taking of discovery from the Discovery Parties. 
5. Counsel for Plaintiffs has been consulted.  Plaintiff has advised that it opposes the 
issuance of the proposed Letters of Request because Plaintiff believes certain statements 
contained therein are inaccurate or unwarranted and therefore should not be issued in the name 
of the Court. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that the Court execute the Letters of 
Request attached hereto, to permit the taking of discovery from the Discovery Parties. 
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This the 31st day of August, 2018. 
 
_Jessica Thaller-Moran   
Jennifer K. Van Zant 
N.C. State Bar No. 21280 
Jessica Thaller-Moran 
N.C. State Bar No. 46444 
BROOKS PIERCE MCLENDON, HUMPHREY & 
LEONARD, LLP 
2000 Renaissance Plaza 
230 North Elm Street 
Greensboro, NC 27401 
Telephone: (336) 373-8850 
Facsimile: (336) 378-1001 
jthaller-moran@brookspierce.com   
jvanzant@brookspierce.com 
 
Counsel for Defendants Mason Capital Master 
Fund, L.P., Anton S. Kawalsky, Canyon Blue Credit 
Investment Fund L.P., Canyon Value Realization 
Master Fund, L.P., Canyon Value Realization Fund, 
L.P., Blue Mountain Credit Alternatives Master 
Fund L.P., BlueMountain Foinaven Master Fund 
L.P., BlueMountain Guadalupe Peak Fund L.P., 
BlueMountain Summit Trading L.P., BlueMountain 
Montenvers Master Fund SCA SICAV-SIF, Amundi 
Absolute Return Canyon Fund P.L.C., Canyon-SL 
Value Fund, L.P., Permal Canyon IO Ltd., and 
Canyon Value Realization MAC 18 Ltd. 
 
OF COUNSEL: 
Lawrence M. Rolnick, Esq. 
Sheila A. Sadighi, Esq. 
Maya Ginsburg, Esq. 
LOWENSTEIN SANDLER LLP 
1251 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10020 
(973) 597-2500 
  
- App. 240 -
__Gregg E. McDougal, with permission 
Gregg E. McDougal 
N.C. State Bar No. 27290 
Brandon S. Neuman 
N.C. State Bar No. 33590 
H. Denton Worrell 
N.C. State Bar No. 49750 
SHANAHAN MCDOUGAL, PLLC 
128 E. Hargett Street, Third Floor  
Raleigh, North Carolina 27601  
Telephone: (919) 856-9494 





Counsel for Defendant Barry W. Blank Trust 
      
 
 
___George F. Sanderson, III, with permission___  
George F. Sanderson, III 
N.C. Bar No. 33054 
Troy D. Shelton 
N.C. Bar No. 48070 
Ellis & Winters LLP 
4131 Parklake Avenue, Suite 400 
Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 
Telephone: (919) 865-7000 




Counsel for Defendants Magnetar Capital Master 
Fund, Ltd, Magnetar Fundamental Strategies 
Master Fund Ltd, Magnetar MSW Master Fund Ltd, 
Third Motion Equities Master Fund Ltd, and 
Spectrum Opportunities Master Fund Ltd 
 
OF COUNSEL: 
Kevin G. Abrams, Esq. 
Sarah E. Delia, Esq. 
ABRAMS & BAYLISS LLP 
20 Montchanin Road, Suite 200 
Wilmington, Delaware 19807 
(302) 778-1000 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on August 31st, 2018, the foregoing document was electronically 
filed with the North Carolina Business Court using the CM/ECF system, which sends 
notification of such filing to all counsel of record so registered for this case.   
This the 31st day of August, 2018. 
 /s/ Jessica Thaller-Moran 
Jessica Thaller-Moran 
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Pursuant to Rule 45 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (N.C. Gen. Stat. §1A-
1, Rule 45 (2009)) and the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence 
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (the “Hague Convention”), defendants 
Mason Capital Master Fund, L.P., The Canyon Value Realization Master Fund, L.P., Canyon 
Value Realization Fund, L.P., Canyon Blue Credit Investment Fund L.P., Canyon-SL Value 
Fund, L.P., Permal Canyon IO Ltd., Canyon Value Realization MAC 18 Ltd., Amundi Absolute 
Return Canyon Fund P.L.C., Anton Kawalsky, as trustee for the benefit of the Anton S. 
Kawalsky Trust UA 9/17/2015, Blue Mountain Credit Alternatives Master Fund L.P., 
BlueMountain Summit Trading L.P., BlueMountain Montenvers Master Fund SCA SICAV-SIF, 
BlueMountain Foinaven Master Fund L.P., BlueMountain Guadalupe Peak Fund L.P.,  and 
defendants Magnetar Capital Master Fund, Ltd, Magnetar Fundamental Strategies Master Fund 
Ltd, Magnetar MSW Master Fund Ltd, Third Motion Equities Master Fund Ltd, and  Spectrum 
Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., and defendant Barry W. Blank Trust (collectively, 
“Defendants”) hereby submit this Opening Brief in Support of their Motion for Issuance of 
Letters of Request Pursuant to the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of 
Evidence Abroad (the “Motion”).   Defendants respectfully request that this Court issue Letters 
of Request to the Senior Master of the Royal Courts of Justice in the United Kingdom, 
requesting the production of documents from each of British American Tobacco PLC (“BAT”), 
Centerview Partners U.K. LLP (“Centerview”), Deutsche Bank AG, London Branch (“Deutsche 
Bank”), and UBS Limited (“UBS,” and collectively, the “Discovery Parties”), which are all 
located in the United Kingdom. 
Because the Discovery Parties are located in a foreign state and outside this Court’s 
territorial jurisdiction, the Court lacks power to issue subpoenas to compel the evidence sought.  
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Therefore, the proper procedure is for the Court to order the issuance of Letters of Request, 
directed toward the appropriate authority having jurisdiction of civil causes in the United 
Kingdom.  Defendants request that the Court affix its signature to each Letter of Request 
attached to the Motion as Exhibits 1 through 4 (the “Letters of Request”), and that the Clerk of 
the Court affix the seal of the Court to each of the Letters of Request. 
 As described in more detail below, each of the Discovery Parties has evidence which is 
highly relevant to the claims and defenses asserted in the case and which may not be obtained by 
other means.  
BACKGROUND 
 
This is a judicial appraisal action under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-13-30 to determine the fair 
value of Defendants’ shares in Plaintiff Reynolds American Inc. (“RAI”).  On July 25, 2017, 
RAI, a North Carolina corporation, merged into an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of BAT 
(the “Merger”).  Defendants are former RAI shareholders who did not vote in favor of the 
Merger, and who have invoked their statutory appraisal rights to receive the fair value of their 
shares.   
Defendants contend that the per-share Merger price did not reflect RAI’s fair value, 
because, inter alia: (i) BAT’s 42% ownership position in RAI (which also depressed RAI’s pre-
Merger announcement share price) and the terms of the Merger agreement precluded any 
meaningful sale process; (ii) the opinions provided by RAI’s and BAT’s bankers, whose fees 
were principally contingent upon consummation of the Merger, improperly assumed perpetual 
growth rates below the rate of inflation in their discounted cash flow analysis, indicative of a 
company expected to go out of business; (iii) the fairness opinions overstated RAI’s long-term 
pension obligations and Weighted Average Cost of Capital, (iv) the Merger Price failed to 
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properly reflect the anticipated U.S. corporate tax rate reduction, and (v) the Merger agreement 
provided for special payouts of more than $154 million to RAI’s key executive officers and 
directors, which RAI conceded “may cause [them]… to view the proposals relating to the merger 
… more favorably than RAI shareholders ….”1     
The Discovery Parties consist of BAT, the acquirer and a 42% interest holder of RAI at 
the time of the Merger, and Centerview, UBS and Deutsche Bank who each served as financial 
advisors to BAT in connection with the Merger.  The Discovery Parties have documents that are 
highly relevant to the litigation to the extent these documents include analysis, projections and 
other reports that depict the calculations performed and factors considered in assessing the fair 
value of RAI’s shares.  
Defendants now seek discovery from the Discovery Parties concerning the following: 
their participation in the Merger process; their knowledge, analyses and calculations of the value 
of RAI; their interest (or lack thereof) in the Merger; their respective roles in advising on or 
financing the Merger; and the fees and compensation each entity received as a result of the 
Merger.  All of these documents are necessary and relevant to this appraisal action.  
ARGUMENT 
 
 The United States and the United Kingdom are contracting states under the Hague 
Convention.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1781; Cavlam Business Ltd. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 
London, No. 08 Civ. 2225, 2009 WL 667272, at *7 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2009).  The Hague 
Convention allows judicial authorities in one signatory country to obtain evidence located in 
another signatory country for use in judicial proceedings. See Hague Convention, Art. 1. 
1 The foregoing factors are not exhaustive and remain subject to modification as 
discovery progresses. 
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Resorting to the Hague Convention is appropriate where the subpoenaed party is not a party to 
the lawsuit, is a citizen of a contracting state, and is not otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of 
the Court.  See Tulip Computers Int’l B.V. v. Dell Computer Corp., 254 F. Supp. 2d 469, 474 (D. 
Del. 2003); see also Metso Minerals Inc. v. Powerscreen Int’l Distrib. Ltd., No. cv-06-1446, 
2007 WL 1875560, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 25, 2007). 
The Hague Convention provides for the taking of evidence “by a Letter of Request from 
a U.S. judicial authority to the competent authority in the foreign state.”  Tulip Computers, 254 
F. Supp. 2d. at 472. A party seeking evidence through the Hague Convention must 
“demonstrat[e] that proceeding in that manner is ‘necessary and appropriate.’”  Metso Minerals, 
2007 WL 1875560, at *2 (collecting authorities).  “That burden is not great, however, since the 
[Hague] ‘Convention procedures are available whenever they will facilitate the gathering of 
evidence by the means authorized in the Convention.’”  Tulip Computers, 254 F. Supp. 2d. at 
474 (quoting Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 
482 U.S. 522, 541 (1987)). 
In accordance with the United Kingdom’s reservation to Hague Convention Art. 23, a 
Letter of Request may only seek specific testimony and particular documents for use at trial.  See 
Metso Minerals, 2007 WL 1875560, at *2 (citing Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 564 (Article 23 
exceptions apply only to “requests that lack sufficient specificity or that have not been reviewed 
for relevancy by the requesting court”)).  “[I]n practice,” however “a reservation is not the 
significant obstacle to discovery under the Convention that the broad wording of Article 23 
would suggest.”  Tulip Computers, 254 F. Supp. 2d. at 475 (quoting Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 
564).  Rather, “[w]hether the Letter of Request will ultimately be executed in light of the United 
Kingdom’s reservation under Article 23 . . . is best left to the judicial authorities in the United 
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Kingdom.” Metso Minerals, 2007 WL 1875560, at *3 (collecting authorities).  In this instance, 
the Court should issue the Letters of Request because the Discovery Parties (1) are not parties to 
this action; (2) have not voluntarily submitted to discovery; (3) are located in the United 
Kingdom, a contracting state under the Hague Convention; and (4) are not otherwise subject to 
the jurisdiction of this Court.  As indicated in RAI’s definitive proxy filed with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, each of the Discovery Parties played a substantial role in 
the Merger: 
 BAT acquired RAI in the Merger;  
 Centerview served as a financial advisor to BAT in connection with the Merger; 
 Deutsche Bank served as a financial advisor to BAT in connection with the 
Merger; and 
 
 UBS served as a financial advisor to BAT in connection with the Merger. 
Accordingly, each entity is in possession of documents and information that are highly 
relevant to this appraisal litigation and trial.  As the acquiring entity and its financial advisors, 
BAT, along with UBS, Centerview and Deutsche Bank, performed analyses and projections that 
are directly related to the fair valuation of RAI’s shares and such documents may only be 
obtained from the Discovery Parties.  Defendants’ Letters of Request are narrowly tailored to 
comply with the United Kingdom’s reservation to Hague Convention Art. 23.  Specifically, each 
Letter of Request is limited in that it seeks only to obtain information in the form of documents 
that are highly relevant to each entity’s activities in connection with the Merger.  Such 
information is necessary to use as evidence at trial and cannot be obtained by parties to this 
litigation.  The Letters of Request are therefore necessary and appropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant the 
Motion and execute the Letters of Request attached to the Motion as Exhibits 1 through 4.  
Defendants further request that, after the Court has signed the Letters of Request, the Register 
authenticate the Court’s signature under the seal of this Court, and return the original signed and 
sealed executed Letters, and two certified copies of the signed and sealed executed letters, to 
Tatiana Menshenina, Esq., Withers LLP, 16 Old Bailey, London EC4M 7EG, United Kingdom 
for delivery to the proper authority in the United Kingdom. 
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing document does not contain in excess of 7,500 words, 
exclusive of the case caption, any index, table of contents, table of authorities, signature blocks 
or required certificates.  
This the 31st day of August, 2018. 
 /s/ Jessica Thaller-Moran 
Jessica Thaller-Moran 
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June 6, 2019 
VIA EMAIL 
The Honorable Louis A. Bledsoe, III 
Chief Business Court Judge 
832 E. Fourth St #9600 
Charlotte, NC 28202 
Re:  Reynolds American, Inc. v. Third Motion Equities Master Fund Ltd., 
Civil No. 17-CVS-7086 
Dear Chief Judge Bledsoe: 
We write on behalf of the dissenting stockholders in the above-referenced 
action (“Dissenters”) to request permission to file a motion in limine seeking (i) an 
adverse inference as a result of Reynolds American, Inc.’s (“RAI’s”) belated 
abandonment of Dr. Anil Shivdasani as an affirmative expert and (ii) to preclude 
RAI’s other expert, Professor Paul Gompers, from offering testimony or opinions at 
trial that are predicated on Dr. Shivdasani’s analysis, or to have these matters heard 
and adjudicated as otherwise directed by the Court.   
On June 4, 2019, RAI disclosed to the Dissenters—for the first time and 
approximately two hours prior to the deadline for submission of the parties’ pretrial 
briefs, proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and Proposed Joint Pretrial 
Order—that RAI no longer intends to call Dr. Shivdasani as part of RAI’s case-in-
chief.  RAI’s pretrial brief makes much of so-called informational (also known as 
“semi-strong”) market efficiency—the notion that the trading price of a company’s 
stock incorporates all public, value-relevant information.  Based on its brief, RAI’s 
argument in this action boils down to the assertion that the market simply cannot 
have underpriced RAI to the extent implied by the Dissenters’ valuations.  
RAI hired Dr. Shivdasani and paid him $900 per hour to analyze market 
efficiency by conducting “event studies” intended to demonstrate that the market for 
RAI common stock was informationally efficient.  RAI withdrew Dr. Shivdasani at 
the last minute because his event studies suggest that RAI’s market was not 
J. PETER SHINDEL, JR.
DIRECT DIAL NUMBER 
302-778-1165 
SHINDEL@ABRAMSBAYLISS.COM 
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efficient.1  Given that fact, and because RAI has made the tactical decision not to 
call him, Dissenters are entitled to an adverse inference that Dr. Shivdasani’s event 
studies suggest that RAI’s stock did not trade in an efficient market.  MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 264 (7th ed. 2016) (“When it would be natural under the circumstances 
for a party to call a particular witness . . . and the party fails to do so, tradition has 
allowed the adversary to use this failure as the basis for invoking an adverse 
inference.”); see also id. (“[A]n adverse inference may be drawn against a party for 
failure to produce a witness reasonably assumed to be favorably disposed to the 
party.”) (citations omitted).  This absent witness rule is recognized in North Carolina 
and has been characterized as “similar” to “the well-established principle of spoliation 
of evidence.”  McLain v. Taco Bell Corp., 527 S.E.2d 712, 715–16 (N.C. App. 2000) 
(quoting Yarborough v. Hughes, 51 S.E. 904 (N.C. 1905)); see also Cuthrell v. Greene, 
50 S.E.2d 525, 529 (N.C. 1948) (collecting decisions). 
There are consequences to RAI’s decision to walk away from its market 
efficiency expert.  One such consequence is Dissenters’ entitlement to an adverse 
inference.   Another is that RAI’s second expert, Professor Gompers, should not be 
permitted to offer testimony grounded in notions of market efficiency. 
One of RAI’s primary arguments—as evident from its pretrial brief—is that 
the so-called “unaffected stock market price” of RAI stock prior to BAT’s offer should 
be considered by the Court as evidence of Fair Value.  Professor Gompers was unable 
or unwilling to render that opinion, and instead relied entirely on Dr. Shivdasani’s 
conclusions.  Professor Gompers admitted that his opinions related to the market 
price of RAI’s stock are based on Dr. Shivdasani’s work: 
Q. And you did not conduct your own analysis of the
efficiency of the market for RAI’s stock; is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Okay.  And you’re relying entirely on Professor
Shivdasani’s opinions concerning the efficiency of that
market, correct?
1 Moreover, Dr. Shivdasani’s testimony regarding market efficiency was 
effectively debunked by Dissenters’ rebuttal expert, Dr. Bilge Yilmaz, who explained 
(among other things) that (i) a company’s stock price does not reflect Fair Value 
because the stock market does not have access to non-public, value-relevant 
information and (ii) Dr. Shivdasani’s event studies failed to support the premise that 
RAI traded in an efficient market. 
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*1  This statutory appraisal action arises out of a May 12,
2015, merger whereby Fortune Brands Home & Security, Inc.
(“Fortune”) acquired Norcraft Companies, Inc. (“Norcraft” or
the “Company”) (the “Merger”) for $25.50 cash per share (the
“Merger Price”). Petitioners, Blueblade Capital Opportunities
LLC and Blueblade Capital Opportunities CI LLC (together,
“Blueblade”), were Norcraft stockholders on the Merger's
effective date and seek a judicial determination of the fair
value of their Norcraft shares as of that date.
In an appraisal action under the Delaware General
Corporation Law, the trial court's “fair value” determination
must “take into account all relevant factors.”1 The relevance
(or not) of certain factors “can vary from case to case
depending on the nature of the [acquired] company,” the
nature of the process leading to the company's sale and,
perhaps most importantly, the evidence adduced by the parties
at trial in support of their respective valuation positions.2 “In
some cases, it may be that a single valuation metric is the
most reliable evidence of fair value and that giving weight to
another factor will do nothing but distort that best estimate.
In other cases, “it may be necessary to consider two or more
factors.”3 In all cases, however, the trial court's determination
respecting the “relevant factors” must be grounded in the
evidentiary record and “accepted financial principles.”4
I am cognizant of the Delaware Supreme Court's embrace
of “deal price” as a strong indicator of fair value in Dell
and DFC. Those decisions teach that deal price often will
be a relevant factor in the trial court's fair value calculus
—particularly where the respondent company was publicly
traded and sold following a meaningful market check.5 In
both cases, however, despite having been urged to do so, the
Supreme Court declined to adopt a rule that the deal price is
presumptively reflective of fair value.6 Mindful of DFC and
Dell, I have considered carefully whether the Merger Price
(less synergies) reflects the fair value of Norcraft as of the
Merger date. For the reasons explained below, I am satisfied
it does not.
*2  In this case, the evidence reveals significant flaws in the
process leading to the Merger that undermine the reliability of
the Merger Price as an indicator of Norcraft's fair value. There
was no pre-signing market check; Norcraft and its advisors
fixated on Fortune and never broadened their view to other
potential merger partners. As the parties worked to negotiate
the Merger agreement, Norcraft's lead negotiator was at least
as focused on securing benefits for himself as he was on
securing the best price available for Norcraft. And, while
the Merger agreement provided for a thirty-five-day post-
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signing go-shop, that process was rendered ineffective as a
price discovery tool by a clutch of deal-protection measures.
Dell reminded us that Delaware courts have “long endorsed”
the “efficient market hypothesis” and emphasized “that the
price produced by an efficient market is generally a more
reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single
analyst, especially an expert witness who caters her valuation
to the litigation imperatives of a well-heeled client.”7 I have
heeded that guidance as well. Unfortunately, this case was
tried before the Supreme Court decided Dell, and the record
evidence regarding the efficiency of the market for Norcraft
stock prior to the Merger is, in a word, thin. With that
said, the evidence that can be drawn from the record reveals
that, at the time of the Merger, Norcraft was fresh off an
initial public offering of its stock, was relatively thinly traded
given the niche market in which it operated and was also
thinly covered by analysts. Under these circumstances, I
can discern no evidence-based rationale that would justify
looking to the unaffected trading price of Norcraft's stock
either as a standalone indicator of fair value or as a data point
underwriting the use of a deal-price-less-synergies metric.
Having concluded that flaws in the sales process leading to
the Merger undermine the reliability of the Merger Price as
an indicator of fair value, and that the evidence sub judice
does not allow for principled reliance upon the efficient
capital markets hypothesis, I have turned to a “traditional
valuation methodology,” a discounted cash flow (“DCF”)
analysis, to calculate the fair value of Norcraft as of the
Merger date.8 In my view, given the evidence in this record,
a DCF-based valuation provides the most reliable means by
which to discharge the Court's statutorily mandated function
to appraise Norcraft.
Not surprisingly, both parties proffered expert testimony
regarding Norcraft's fair value on a DCF basis. And, as
we have come to expect in appraisal litigation, the experts'
DCF analyses yielded valuations that are miles apart. Neither
expert walked the high road from start to finish during their
respective DCF journeys. That is to say, both experts, at
times, made choices in their analyses that were not supported
by the evidence or not supported by “accepted financial
principles” in order to support a desired outcome. I have,
therefore, borrowed the most credible components of each
expert's analysis to conduct my own DCF valuation, in my
best effort to obey our appraisal statute's “command that the
Court of Chancery undertake an ‘independent’ assessment of
fair value” when performing its mandated appraisal function.9
As explained below, my DCF analysis reveals a valuation of
$26.16 per share.
*3  Insofar as Dell and DFC require that the trial court
carefully consider deal price before disregarding it altogether,
I have returned to the Merger Price as a “reality check” before
locking in my DCF valuation as the last word on fair value.
Having done so, I am satisfied that the $0.66 per share delta
between the Merger Price and my DCF valuation of Norcraft
is a product of the identified flaws in Norcraft's deal process.
Accordingly, I conclude that the fair value of Norcraft as of
the Merger date was $26.16 per share.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I recite the facts as I find them based on the evidence presented
during a four-day trial. That evidence comprises testimony
from thirteen fact witnesses (some presented live and some by
deposition) and three live expert witnesses, along with over
500 exhibits. I accord the evidence the weight and credibility
I find it deserves. As noted, both parties carried a burden to
prove their respective valuation positions by a preponderance
of the evidence. Thus, Petitioners were obliged to prove that
their proffered valuation of Norcraft, a DCF-based valuation
of $34.78 per share, represented Norcraft's fair value as
of the Merger; Respondent's burden was to prove that its
proffered valuation of $21.90 per share, the Merger Price less
synergies, was Norcraft's fair value as of the Merger. With
these competing burdens in mind, I find that the following
facts were proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
A. Parties and Relevant Non-Parties
Respondent, Norcraft, is a Delaware corporation in the
cabinetry manufacturing business.10 Prior to the Merger,
Norcraft's stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange.11
On May 12, 2015, Fortune acquired Norcraft for $25.50 cash
per share in the Merger.12 In connection with that transaction,
Norcraft merged with an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary
of Fortune, Tahiti Acquisition Corp. (“Tahiti”), with Norcraft
surviving as a wholly-owned Fortune subsidiary.13
Petitioners were Norcraft stockholders as of the Merger date
and collectively held 557,631 shares of Norcraft common
stock.14 It is undisputed that they properly perfected their
statutory appraisal right.
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Non-party, Fortune, is a home and security products company
with four business segments: cabinets, plumbing, doors and
security.15 Fortune sells its products through several sales
channels, “including kitchen and bath dealers, wholesalers
oriented to builders or professional remodelers, industrial
and locksmith distributors [and] ‘do-it-yourself’ remodeling-
oriented home centers .... ”16
Non-parties, Mark Buller, Christopher Reilly, Michael
Maselli, Harvey Wagner, Ira Zecher and Edward Kennedy
served on Norcraft's board of directors (the “Board”)
at all relevant times.17 Buller also served as the Chief
Executive Officer of Norcraft (and its predecessors) from
2003 to the Merger's consummation in May 2015.18 Non-
party, Leigh Ginter, was the Chief Financial Officer of
Norcraft (and its predecessors) from 2003 through the
Merger's consummation.19 And non-party, Eric Tanquist, was
Norcraft's Vice President of Finance Administration from
approximately 2007 through the Merger's consummation.20
*4  Non-party, Christopher Klein, is Fortune's CEO and
served in that capacity at all times relevant to this action.21
Non-party, Robert Biggart, is Fortune's general counsel and
served in that capacity at all relevant times.22 And non-party,
Jason Baab, served as Fortune's Vice President of Corporate
Development and M & A at the time of the Merger.23
B. Pre-Merger Norcraft
As of the Merger date, “Norcraft was a leading manufacturer
of kitchen and bathroom cabinetry in the United States and
Canada.”24 The Company sold its products primarily to
kitchen and bathroom cabinet dealers in the home repair,
remodeling and new home construction markets through
four business divisions: Mid Continent Cabinetry, StarMark
Cabinetry, UltraCraft Cabinetry and Urban Effects (a.k.a.
Norcraft Canada).25 Prior to the Merger, Norcraft regarded
Fortune, American Woodmark Corporation (“American
Woodmark”) and Masco as its principal competitors.26 It
also faced competition from “a large number of smaller
manufacturers.”27
1. Buller and Two Private Equity Firms Acquire
Norcraft's Operating Subsidiary in 2003
In October 2003, Buller, certain Buller family members
and funds affiliated with the private equity firms Saunders,
Karp & Megrue (“SKM”) and Trimaran Capital Partners
(“Trimaran”) acquired Norcraft Companies, L.L.C. for
approximately $315 million (the “2003 Acquisition”).28 At
the same time, Norcraft Companies, L.L.C. converted to
a Delaware limited partnership, Norcraft Companies, L.P.
(“Norcraft LP”), and Buller became the CEO of that entity.29
For the next ten years, Norcraft LP operated as a privately-
held company.
2. Norcraft and the Cyclical Cabinetry Industry
*5  The undisputed evidence reveals that Norcraft operated
in a cyclical industry.30 As one naturally might expect,
the cabinetry industry is directly affected by the home
improvement industry, which, in turn, is affected by
macro-economic conditions, including employment levels,
demographic trends, availability of financing, interest rates
and consumer confidence.31 The cabinetry industry is also
directly affected by housing starts, as a significant percentage
of sales are connected to new home construction.32 When
housing starts decrease, as they often do for various reasons,33
cabinet sales decrease as well.34
Norcraft was no exception to this cyclicality. Norcraft
LP enjoyed steady growth of its earnings before interest,
taxes, depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA”) from 2003
through 2006—$47 million (2003) to $80 million (2006).35
This growth was fueled, in large part, by a significant
acquisition in March 2002 and a boom in the United States
housing market.36 Growth stalled, however, beginning in
2007, when Norcraft LP experienced the first of three
consecutive years of declining sales and adjusted EBITDA.37
As is typical in classically cyclical businesses, Norcraft LP
saw improved sales beginning in 2010, although its adjusted
EBITDA continued to decline until 2012 (with 2010 being the
only exception). The attached chart illustrates the trends38:
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As reflected in the chart, Norcraft LP's adjusted EBITDA
trended up in 2013, suggesting that its six-year period of
decline had come to an end, at least for the time being.39
3. Norcraft's IPO and Reorganization
On November 13, 2013, Norcraft completed an initial public
offering (“IPO”)40 whereby the Norcraft enterprise was
reorganized into the following holding company structure41:
The newly-formed parent company, Norcraft—a publicly-
traded company—was a holding company; Norcraft
Companies LLC (“Norcraft LLC”)42 and its subsidiaries
were the operating entities.43 Following the reorganization,
Norcraft was Norcraft LLC's sole managing member and
owned (directly and indirectly) approximately 87.7% of
Norcraft LLC, with Buller, his family members and certain
members of Norcraft management holding the remainder.44
*6  As part of the IPO, Norcraft sold 7,356,634 shares
of Norcraft common stock, or 39.1% of Norcraft's equity,
to the public at $16.00 per share.45 SKM and Trimaran
together retained a 60.9% equity interest in Norcraft, while
Buller, his family members and certain members of Norcraft
management, through their convertible Norcraft LLC units,
collectively held a prospective 12.3% equity interest.46
In conjunction with the IPO, Norcraft entered into Tax
Receivable Agreements (“TRAs”) with SKM, Trimaran
and the Norcraft LLC unitholders (collectively, the “TRA
Beneficiaries”).47 Under the TRAs, Norcraft was required to
pay the TRA Beneficiaries 85% of the applicable annual tax
savings, if any, that Norcraft realized as a result of certain
tax benefits contributed to Norcraft by the TRA Beneficiaries,
including net operating losses and asset basis step-ups.48 The
TRAs also provided that Norcraft's payment obligations to
the TRA Beneficiaries would be accelerated in the event of
a “Change of Control.”49 The TRAs later came to feature
prominently in the Norcraft-Fortune negotiations leading up
to the Merger.
C. Fortune Approaches Norcraft
On October 20, 2014, representatives of Fortune's financial
advisor, RBC Capital Markets, LLC (“RBC”), contacted
Buller to inform him of Fortune's interest in a potential
acquisition of Norcraft.50 Three days later, Buller met with
Fortune's CEO, Christopher Klein, at Fortune's headquarters
in Deerfield, Illinois to discuss a potential Norcraft-Fortune
transaction.51 During that meeting, Buller informed Klein
that Norcraft was not for sale, but also indicated that he
(Buller) would convey any acquisition proposal to Norcraft's
Board.52 Perhaps sensing that his Board might be inclined
to pursue a deal with Fortune, Buller advised Klein that
he would like to have a role in the post-Merger company
in the event the parties reached an agreement.53 Klein was
noncommittal but, internally, Fortune was disinclined to bring
Buller on board post-Merger.54 At the meeting's close, Klein
provided Buller with a written, non-binding proposal under
which Fortune would (1) acquire “100% of [Norcraft's] equity
ownership interests” for $22.00 cash per share via a tender
offer (followed by a merger); and (2) satisfy Norcraft's
obligations under the TRAs.55
*7  Buller promptly informed Norcraft's Board of Fortune's
proposal, and the Board convened on November 4, 2014
to discuss it.56 Following that meeting, Norcraft engaged
legal and financial advisors to assist the Board in its
consideration of Fortune's proposal.57 The Company retained
Ropes & Gray LLP (“Ropes & Gray”) as its legal advisor
and Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (“Citi”) as its financial
advisor.58 The Board promptly tasked Citi with “review[ing]
strategic alternatives of the [C]ompany, including a potential
sale to Fortune.”59 Norcraft also engaged Pricewaterhouse
Coopers (“PwC”) to provide an assessment of the Company's
contractual obligations under the TRAs.60
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D. Norcraft's Management Prepares Long-Term
Projections
Norcraft's Board met again on November 8, 2014.61 During
this meeting, “[t]he [B]oard ... discussed next steps in
formulating a potential response to [Fortune], and after
discussion, agreed that [Buller, Ginter and Reilly] would
map out a proposed strategy and response with Citi [ ] and
report their recommendations back to the [B]oard.”62 The
Board also instructed Buller and Ginter to prepare five-year
financial projections to facilitate the Board's evaluation of
strategic alternatives (including a potential Norcraft-Fortune
transaction).63
Buller and Ginter both had experience preparing long-term
projections, having previously prepared five-year projections
in connection with Norcraft's IPO and four debt financing
transactions between 2003 and 2010.64 Norcraft, however,
did not prepare long-term projections in the ordinary course of
its business; it only did so in connection with “extraordinary
event[s]” such as financing transactions and ultimately the
Merger.65 Ordinarily, Norcraft management prepared an
annual one-year budget, which forecasted Norcraft's quarterly
(and monthly) performance for the upcoming year.66 The
Company's annual budgeting process began each fall and
involved several steps67:
• First, the corporate controller for each of Norcraft's four
business divisions would prepare a detailed “bottoms-
up” budget for his or her division.68 As part of that
process, the division controllers “would work with [their
respective] division presidents to come up with what
they expected for sales growth in the [upcoming] year
and... would build that into the budget[,] [along with] ...
other assumptions like labor efficiencies [and] material
cost.”69 In this way, the division controllers “would get
a picture of what [profit and loss] would look like for
[their respective divisions for] the [upcoming] year.”70
• Next, each division controller would present his or her
division-level budget to Buller and Ginter “for review
and approval.”71
• Finally, “[a]fter several rounds of... back-and-forth,”
Ginter would compile the division-level budgets “into
a consolidated format,” which was then presented to
the Board for review and approval in January of the
budgeted year.72 After review, the Board typically
would approve the consolidated annual budget that same
month.73
*8  Following the Board's November 8, 2014 meeting,
Buller and Ginter created two sets of five-year projections:
a base-case projection (the “Base Case”) and an upside-
case projection (the “Upside Case”), both of which are
summarized below.74






































































































EBITDA $51 $61 $75 $89 $105 $120
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In preparing the Base Case and Upside Case projections,
Buller and Ginter took a “top-down” approach—
independently projecting Norcraft's net sales, operating
expenses and capital expenditures (for all business divisions)
in the first instance, and then consulting with division-
level management as and where needed—rather than the
“bottoms-up” approach they used to prepare Norcraft's annual
budgets.77 They created the Upside Case first.78 After
preparing the Upside Case, Buller and Ginter presented it to
Reilly for his review.79 “Upon review, [Reilly opined] that
the [Upside Case] ... was too aggressive ... and asked [Buller
and Ginter] to go back and... do a more conservative model,
which became known as the [B]ase [C]ase.”80 Buller and
Ginter both believed that Norcraft could achieve the results
forecasted in the Base Case and Upside Case projections,
although “the [U]pside [C]ase was more of a stretch and
everything would have had to go right.”81
Buller and Ginter presented the Base Case and Upside Case
projections to Norcraft's Board at a meeting on November
25, 2014.82 After discussion, the Board approved both
sets of projections for use in connection with the Board's
consideration of Fortune's proposal.83
E. Norcraft Pushes Fortune to Increase its Offer
*9  Norcraft's Board next met on December 3, 2014.84
During this meeting, Citi presented the Board with an analysis
of Norcraft's standalone prospects and possible strategic
alternatives.85 Citi's presentation included an overview of
preliminary valuation perspectives and selected strategic
alternatives,86 “including maintaining the status quo, a
possible sale of the Company to [Fortune] or another buyer, as
well as some other potential acquisition targets.”87 Following
Citi's presentation, the Board determined that (1) “[Fortune's]
proposed price of $22.00 per share was inadequate”; and
(2) “[Fortune's] offer would need to be significantly and
substantially higher in order for the Board to consider a
potential sale of the Company at this time.”88 The Board,
however, did not task Citi with pursuing alternative buyers or
canvassing the market.
Two days later, Buller called Klein and conveyed to him
the Board's determination.89 Buller also explained that “if
[Fortune] were interested in significantly increasing [its
proposed price] ..., [Norcraft] would be prepared to share
certain [non-public] information [with Fortune], under a
confidentiality agreement with an appropriate standstill,
in order to assist [Fortune] in understanding [Norcraft's]
prospects, upside potential and intrinsic value.”90 Soon
thereafter, on December 11, 2014, Norcraft and Fortune
entered into a confidentiality agreement with a standstill.91
On January 7, 2015, Buller, Ginter and Citi representatives
met with Fortune's management at Buller's home in
Winnipeg, Canada to discuss the proposed Norcraft-Fortune
transaction.92 The discussion focused on the structure and
timing of the proposed transaction, Norcraft's business and
financial projections and the integration of Norcraft into
Fortune.93 Norcraft provided Fortune with the Base Case
and Upside Case projections as well as certain preliminary
information regarding the TRAs.94 During this meeting,
Buller reiterated his interest in post-closing employment with
Fortune and discussed the possibility with Klein.95 Again,
Klein “ke[pt] the door open” but stopped short of making a
commitment.96
The following week, on January 14, Norcraft's tax advisor,
PwC, presented its analysis regarding the TRAs to Fortune's
management and RBC.97 PwC explained that termination of
the TRAs in connection with Fortune's acquisition of Norcraft
would require significant payments to the TRA Beneficiaries
(including Buller).98 PwC also identified certain tax benefits
that Fortune could realize from the acquisition, including a
stepped-up basis in Norcraft's assets.99 The next day, Klein
advised Buller that Fortune's tax advisor was performing
its own analysis of Norcraft's obligations under the TRAs
following the proposed transaction.100 Klein also noted that
Fortune would require more information about the TRAs
to calculate Fortune's full payment obligations to the TRA
Beneficiaries.101
*10  On January 27, 2015, Klein delivered to Buller a revised
written indication of interest with a proposed price of $25.00
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per share.102 Buller promptly informed Norcraft's Board of
Fortune's revised proposal, and the Board met on February
2 to discuss it.103 During this meeting, Citi provided the
Board with its revised valuation analysis, which incorporated
Norcraft's net sales and EBITDA results for Q4 FY2014
(both of which were higher than expected) and Fortune's
latest proposal of $25.00 per share.104 Reilly then reviewed
with the Board the tax benefits that Fortune would realize
in connection with its proposed acquisition of Norcraft,
including a stepped-up basis in Norcraft's assets.105 After
receiving Reilly's report, “the Board concluded that [Fortune]
would benefit from th[at] step-up in basis going forward and
should therefore value th[at] benefit in its offer price.”106
With Citi's and Reilly's input in hand, the Board determined
that Fortune's proposed purchase price of $25.00 per share
was inadequate, in part because it did not value the tax
benefits that Fortune would realize in connection with the
proposed transaction.107 The Board also believed, however,
“that a transaction with [Fortune] could potentially create
more value for [Norcraft] stockholders if at an appropriate
valuation than if [Norcraft] continued independently to
execute on its strategic plan. Accordingly, the Board
authorized [Buller and Reilly] to continue to engage in
discussions with [Fortune] to confirm if [Fortune] was
willing to further increase its propos[ed] [price].”108 Even
at this stage, however, the Board did not reach out to other
potentially interested parties in hopes of securing a better
offer or, at least, a source of leverage in its discussions with
Fortune.
The next day, Buller called Klein to convey Norcraft's
position regarding Fortune's revised proposal.109 During that
call, Buller advised Klein that Fortune's proposed price
remained inadequate and encouraged Fortune to increase
its bid.110 Unable to invoke the threat of an alternative
transaction, Buller highlighted Norcraft's better than expected
preliminary FY2014 results and FY2015 outlook as support
for his pitch that Fortune pay a higher price.111 Apparently
not feeling the heat, Klein advised Buller that Fortune would
consider increasing its bid but that it was unlikely that
Fortune's proposed price would move significantly higher
than $25.00 per share.112
Following Buller and Klein's February 3 call, Fortune
increased its offer to $25.50 per share, indicating that this
was its “best and final offer.”113 The Norcraft team was less
than thrilled with Fortune's $25.50 per share proposal; indeed,
Reilly and Ginter both believed that Fortune's proposal
significantly undervalued Norcraft.114 Nevertheless, the
Board remained focused exclusively on Fortune. In a last-
ditch effort to get Fortune to increase its “best and final
offer,” the Board responded with a counterproposal of $27.50
per share.115 When Fortune rejected that counterproposal,
the Board bid against itself with a second counterproposal
of $26.25 per share.116 Once again, Fortune held firm
and reiterated that $25.50 per share was its best and final
offer117—well aware that it was getting the Company for
a “good price.”118 With no alternative transaction on the
horizon, Norcraft's Board capitulated on February 21 at
$25.50 per share, hoping to extract further value during a post-
sign go-shop.119
F. The Parties Negotiate the Merger Agreement
*11  In late February 2015, Citi informed Fortune that
Norcraft was prepared to move forward with Fortune's
$25.50 per share proposal, subject to the negotiation of a
merger agreement that included a forty-five-day post-signing
go-shop right for Norcraft.120 Fortune responded with a
counterproposal that provided for a twenty-five-day post-
signing go-shop “that would be limited to certain identified
potential purchasers.”121 The counterproposal also called
for a $15 million termination fee if Norcraft accepted a
superior proposal received during the go-shop period and
a $25 million termination fee otherwise.122 By proposing
this structure, Fortune sought to give Norcraft's Board “the
minimum amount [of time it] needed to satisfy [its] fiduciary
responsibility... and no more,”123 while also “discourag[ing]
potential bidders.”124
On February 27, following negotiations, the parties
eventually settled on a thirty-five day post-signing go-shop
period (the “Go-Shop Period”) with no restrictions on the
parties Norcraft or its advisors could contact, a $10 million
termination fee if Norcraft accepted a superior proposal
during the Go-Shop Period and a $20 million termination
fee otherwise.125 Importantly, however, Fortune also secured
information rights with respect to competing proposals
and unlimited matching rights with respect to superior
proposals.126 In a final stroke of masterful bargaining,
Fortune also secured the right to launch Tahiti's tender offer
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for all of Norcraft's outstanding common stock (at $25.50 per
share) fifteen days after the start of the Go-Shop Period.127
In early March 2015, Fortune was given access to Norcraft's
electronic data room, and on March 4, Fortune and Norcraft
entered into a thirty-day exclusivity agreement.128 Thereafter,
on March 13, Buller, Ginter and Tanquist met with Fortune
management to provide additional non-public information
about Norcraft, and, on March 18, Fortune met with the senior
management of each Norcraft business division.129
*12  With the Merger Price set, and negotiations between
Norcraft and Fortune proceeding apace, Buller again
approached Klein about post-Merger employment with
Fortune. At a Fortune-initiated meeting with Norcraft
management on March 6, Buller advised Klein that he
wanted to head Norcraft and Fortune's combined cabinetry
business post-acquisition.130 With the price locked in, and
the inevitably uncomfortable confrontation now unavoidable,
Klein finally informed Buller that Fortune would have no
place for him after the Merger.131 This came as a shock to
Buller, who thereafter became increasingly “disruptive.”132
Unable to abandon the enterprise completely, Buller soon
returned to Fortune with a new proposal: if he would
not be a part of the combined company, then, upon
Fortune's acquisition of Norcraft, Buller would acquire Urban
Effects (Norcraft Canada) from Fortune.133 After Buller
announced his interest in acquiring Norcraft Canada, the
Board determined, for the first time, that Buller was conflicted
and, therefore, should be excluded from Board deliberations
regarding the potential Norcraft-Fortune transaction.134
*13  Buller, for his part, was determined to acquire Urban
Effects and continued to press Fortune for a commitment
to sell him the business, while also continuing to lead
Norcraft's negotiations with Fortune.135 Fortune, however,
was unwilling to give such a commitment while negotiations
with Norcraft were ongoing—much to Buller's frustration.136
Yet it soon became clear to Fortune that Buller's ire now risked
derailing the deal.137 To keep the peace, on March 25, Reilly
emailed Buller to advise him that “[Klein] is going to offer
to provide you some meaningful comfort on [C]anada....”138
Klein's overture to Buller accomplished its intended purpose;
Buller felt he had “[g]ot[ten] good comfort on UE.”139 This
“comfort” included:
• Fortune's waiver of a two-year, Canada-specific non-
compete covenant otherwise applicable to Buller140; and
• Fortune's agreement to modify Buller's employment
agreement with Norcraft's operating subsidiary to
provide that Buller would receive a severance payment
if his employment was terminated without cause
(including by Buller himself) within twelve months of
Fortune's acquisition of Norcraft.141
Thereafter, it appears that Buller was content to “live with a
trust me I will sell Canada to you” status quo, and ostensibly
was willing to support the Norcraft-Fortune transaction again
—to Fortune's great relief.142
With the Norcraft Canada fire contained, Fortune was soon
on to the next Buller-related fire. In late March 2015,
having finalized most of the merger agreement's material
terms, Norcraft and Fortune found themselves unable to
reach agreement on the termination payments that would be
due to the TRA Beneficiaries holding Norcraft LLC units
(including Buller and his family members).143 Norcraft's and
Fortune's tax advisors disagreed as to the value of certain tax
attributes associated with the Norcraft LLC units, resulting in
a $3 million difference in their respective calculations of the
termination payments.144
*14  On March 26, Fortune tried to “cut a deal with
Buller” on the TRA termination payments by offering to pay
$2 million of the $3 million difference.145 Buller insisted,
however, that Fortune pay the entire $3 million, much to
Fortune's exasperation.146 At this point, Fortune seemingly
had reached its limit with Buller and advised Citi that “if
there [was] no signed [merger] agreement by [the morning
of March 30, Fortune was] done.”147 Negotiations followed.
Ultimately, to appease Buller and keep the deal on track,
SKM and Trimaran offered to transfer $1 million of the TRA
termination payments they stood to receive to the Norcraft
LLC unitholders, such that the unitholders would receive the
full $3 million demanded by Buller.148 With that, the TRA
fire was extinguished and Fortune had no more Buller-related
fires to fight.
G. Norcraft's Board Approves the Merger and Norcraft
Executes the Merger Agreement
On March 29, 2015, Norcraft's Board received Citi's
fairness opinion and approved the Merger Agreement.149
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The following day, Norcraft and Fortune executed the
Merger Agreement and issued a press release announcing
the Merger.150 Immediately following the execution of the
Merger Agreement, Norcraft entered into TRA termination
agreements with the TRA Beneficiaries—SKM, Trimaran
and the Norcraft LLC unitholders—providing that the TRAs
would be terminated (if the Merger was consummated) in
exchange for $43.5 million in total payments to the TRA
Beneficiaries.151
SKM, Trimaran and the Norcraft LLC unitholders also
entered into Tender and Support Agreements (“TSAs”) with
Fortune and Tahiti,152 whereby SKM, Trimaran and the
Norcraft LLC unitholders agreed that:
• they would “promptly” tender their Norcraft shares into
Tahiti's tender offer and, in any event, would do so
at least two days before the offer's initial expiration
date153; and
• the shares so tendered could not be withdrawn unless
and until the tender offer expired or was “terminated in
accordance with the terms of Merger Agreement.”154
H. The Go-Shop
*15  The Go-Shop Period commenced with the Merger's
announcement on March 30, 2015.155 Given that Norcraft
and Citi had focused exclusively on Fortune during the pre-
sign “process,” it was especially important that the Company
run an effective go-shop to provide a meaningful market
check. Yet Citi's lead banker, Eldridge, had never run a sell-
side go-shop.156 Because Norcraft's Board was unsure of the
go-shop's core components, it relied completely on Citi to
oversee the process.157 Fortune, on the other hand, knew
full well what was at stake. Its Vice President of M & A,
Robert Baab, pushed hard for an unlimited match right and for
Fortune's right to launch Tahiti's tender offer during the Go-
Shop Period, understanding that both measures would make
it less likely that a topping bidder would emerge.158
During the Go-Shop Period, Citi contacted fifty-four potential
bidders: twelve potential “strategic” bidders and forty-two
private equity firms.159 Of the fifty-four parties contacted,
seven entered into nondisclosure agreements—six private
equity firms and American Woodmark, one of Norcraft's
industry peers.160 Only one of those seven parties, Carlyle,
went on to meet with Norcraft management.161 Carlyle
ultimately did not submit a bid.162
Most of the parties Citi contacted indicated either that they
were “not interested in competing with Fortune”163 or that
“[t]he price [was] too high.”164 At least two non-bidding
parties, however, advised Citi that they could not “move fast
enough [to submit a bid] in 35 days.”165
In an effort to ensure that Fortune would reap the benefits
of its hard-fought bargain, RBC and Klein devised a strategy
to dissuade potentially interested parties from engaging with
Norcraft. In that connection, early in the go-shop process,
RBC emailed Klein advising that RBC had “a call scheduled
for [April 9, 2015] with Masco”—one of the go-shop
participants—“to discuss the [Merger].”166 In this email,
RBC explained that it would “emphasize [to Masco] that
[Norcraft] is an asset that [Fortune has] been monitoring/
targeting for a long time ... and [that Fortune] view[ed] the
[Merger] as highly strategic.”167 RBC also indicated that it
hoped to “get some sense from Masco as to whether or not
[Masco was] likely to engage [with Norcraft].”168 Eager to
close the deal, Klein advised RBC that “[t]he trick [with
Masco] ... is not to make Norcraft sound very interesting for
them.”169 Klein also emphasized that he was “more interested
in [RBC] shutting the door on [Masco] and [its] willingness
to look at [acquiring Norcraft], versus learning a lot from
[Masco] .... ”170
*16  When Fortune's general counsel, Biggart, learned of
this correspondence, he nearly had “a heart attack in [his]
office.”171 He immediately “went over to see [Klein]”—
before RBC's call with Masco—and “explained to him that
[Fortune and its deal team] can't be doing this.”172 Biggart
then warned RBC that Klein's proposed approach was “the
wrong way to deal with a go-shop” and that “[RBC] can't
be interfering like this.”173 Klein apparently heeded Biggart's
admonition, as did RBC.174
As permitted by the Merger Agreement, Fortune launched
Tahiti's tender offer for Norcraft's stock fifteen days into the
Go-Shop Period, on April 14, 2015, securing the support of
a majority of Norcraft's outstanding common stock (per the
TSAs).175 The Go-Shop Period expired as scheduled on May
4, with Norcraft having received no competing acquisition
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proposals.176 Tahiti successfully completed its tender offer on
May 11, and the Merger closed the following day.177
I. The Parties' Experts
Both parties presented valuation experts at trial to opine on
Norcraft's fair value as of the Merger date.178 Petitioners'
valuation expert was David A. Clarke; Respondent presented
Yvette R. Austin Smith.179 Petitioners also presented a deal
process expert, Guhan Subramanian (“Subramanian”), to
opine on the soundness (or not) of Norcraft's deal process.180
I summarize each expert's opinion below.
1. Clarke's Opinion Regarding Norcraft's Fair Value
*17  Clarke opined that the Merger Price of $25.50 per
share “does not reflect Norcraft's fair value [as of the Merger
date] ... [b]ecause there was no competitive process to acquire
Norcraft prior to the signing of the Merger Agreement and
the post-signing go-shop process was not an effective tool for
price discovery .... ”181 According to Clarke, a DCF analysis
premised on the Base Case projections provides the most
reliable evidence of Norcraft's fair value as of the Merger
date.182 Based on his DCF analysis, Clarke concluded that
Norcraft's fair value as of the Merger was $34.78 per share.183
For his DCF analysis, Clarke chose to extend the Base Case
projections for an additional five years (through 2024), before
applying a perpetuity growth rate (“PGR”) of 3.5% at the end
of the projection period.184 He also adjusted the Base Case
projections to deduct for income tax expense in each projected
year, which the Base Case projections presented in Norcraft's
Schedule 14D-9 failed to do.185
After determining Norcraft's projected unlevered free cash
flows through Norcraft's FY2024, Clarke then discounted
each year's projected free cash flow amount to present value
using a 9.6% discount rate based on an estimate of Norcraft's
weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”).186 With these
inputs, Clarke concluded that the present value of Norcraft's
projected unlevered free cash flows through FY2024 was
$297.3 million.187
Clarke then calculated Norcraft's terminal value by (1)
dividing Norcraft's terminal year unlevered free cash flow by
a capitalization rate of 6.1% and (2) discounting the quotient
of that calculation to present value using Norcraft's estimated
9.6% WACC.188 This yielded a terminal value of $509.5
million.189 Clarke then added Norcraft's terminal value to
the present value of Norcraft's projected unlevered free cash
flows through FY2024 to obtain an $806.8 million operating
value.190
*18  Clarke next made the following adjustments to
Norcraft's operating value to derive Norcraft's total equity
value: (1) adding Norcraft's excess cash, estimated at $44.3
million; (2) adding the value (to Norcraft) of TRA-related
tax benefits, estimated at $4.4 million; (3) adding cash
received by Norcraft from the (presumed) exercise of all
outstanding options on Norcraft stock, estimated at $18.3
million; and (4) deducting the book value of Norcraft's
long-term debt—$147.5 million, per Norcraft's Form 10-Q
for Q1 FY2015.191 After making these adjustments, Clarke
concluded that Norcraft's total equity value was $726.3
million.192 Finally, Clarke divided this aggregate value by
Norcraft's “fully diluted” shares outstanding (20,880,123) to
obtain an aliquot value of $34.78 per share.193
Clarke also performed a comparable company analysis to
confirm the results of his DCF analysis.194 For this analysis,
he selected four companies for his peer group: (1) American
Woodmark, (2) Masonite International Corp. (“Masonite”),
(3) PGT Innovations, Inc. (“PGT”) and (4) Ply Gem Holdings,
Inc. (“Ply Gem”).195 The analysis yielded a $33.92 per share
valuation.196 Clarke “determined not to weight this analysis
in determining a specific per share value [for Norcraft],
however, due to the difficulties in finding any companies that
were fully comparable to Norcraft.”197
2. Austin Smith's Opinion Regarding Norcraft's Fair
Value
Austin Smith determined that the most reliable indicator
of Norcraft's fair value as of the Merger date was
the Merger Price, “less ... contemporaneously estimated
synergies [of $3.60 per share]”198—a metric that yields a
valuation of $21.60 per share. Austin Smith also conducted
an independent valuation using three different valuation
methodologies: DCF, comparable company and precedent
transaction analyses.199 Based on those approaches, Austin
Smith determined that Norcraft's fair value as of the Merger
date “ranged from $17.48 to no more than $23.74.”200
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Austin Smith's primary DCF analysis, like Clarke's, relied
on the Base Case projections (adjusted to deduct for income
tax expense in each of the projected years) and applied a
3.5% PGR at the end of the projection period.201 Unlike
Clarke, however, Austin Smith did not extend the Base Case
projections.202
*19  After determining Norcraft's projected unlevered
free cash flows through Norcraft's FY2019, Austin Smith
discounted each year's projected free cash flow amount to
present value using a 11.2% discount rate based on her
estimate of Norcraft's WACC.203 From this, Austin Smith
concluded that the present value of Norcraft's projected
unlevered free cash flows through FY2019 was $151
million.204
Austin Smith then calculated Norcraft's terminal value by (1)
dividing Norcraft's terminal year unlevered free cash flow
by a capitalization rate of 7.69% and (2) discounting the
quotient of that calculation to present value using Norcraft's
estimated 11.2% WACC.205 Austin Smith concluded that
Norcraft's terminal value was $435 million.206 She then
added Norcraft's terminal value to the present value of
Norcraft's projected unlevered free cash flows through
FY2019 to obtain a $586 million operating value.207
Austin Smith made two adjustments to Norcraft's operating
value to determine Norcraft's total equity value: (1) adding
Norcraft's excess cash, estimated at $52.7 million208; and
(2) deducting the book value of Norcraft's long-term debt—
$147.5 million, per Norcraft's Form 10-Q for Q1 FY2015.209
Having made these adjustments, Austin Smith concluded that
Norcraft's total equity value was $491 million.210 She then
divided this total equity value by Norcraft's “fully diluted”
shares outstanding (20,880,123) to obtain an aliquot value
of $23.54 per share.211 Finally, upon “summing th[is]...
component[ ] of [Norcraft's] value” with the value of the
TRA-related tax benefits that Norcraft would realize in each
projected year (estimated at $0.20 per share), Austin Smith
determined that “the per share value of Norcraft was $23.74”
as of the Merger date.212
*20  As noted, Austin Smith also undertook to value Norcraft
using two “market-based” valuation methodologies. Her
comparable company analysis yielded a valuation of $23.46
per share and her precedent transaction analysis yielded a
valuation of $17.48 per share.213
According to Austin Smith, “[t]he high level of consistency
between [her] three separately determined estimates of fair
value and the [Merger Price] (less synergies) provides strong
analytical support that $21.90 accurately represents the per
share fair value of Norcraft.”214 In addition, Austin Smith
submits, “the fact that the [Merger Price] derived from a
robust deal process” lends “additional support” to her fair
value determination.215
3. Subramanian's Opinion Regarding Norcraft's Deal
Process
Professor Subramanian served as Petitioner's deal process
expert.216 According to Subramanian, Norcraft's deal process
was flawed in several respects that rendered the process
“unlikely to have yielded fair value for the Norcraft
shareholders.”217 The principal flaws Subramanian identifies
are (1) the lack of any “competitive process to acquire
Norcraft prior to the signing of the Merger Agreement”218;
(2) information asymmetries between Fortune and potential
third-party bidders219; and (3) the presence of certain deal
protection mechanisms that curbed the efficacy of the go-shop
and effectively truncated the Go-Shop Period by at least five
days.220
a. Absence of Pre-Signing Competition
Subramanian posits that Norcraft's “decision to negotiate
exclusively with Fortune” prior to signing the Merger
Agreement “eliminated a standard source of bargaining
leverage for Norcraft”—namely, “invok[ing] the threat of an
alternative deal” to extract a higher price.221 Consequently,
Norcraft was unable to move Fortune above its proposed
purchase price of $25.50.222 Moreover, Subramanian
submits, it does not appear “that Norcraft extracted something
else [from Fortune] in exchange for exclusivity.”223
As a practical matter, the absence of pre-signing competition
“meant that the Norcraft Board was relying on [the] go-
shop process to ensure that Norcraft shareholders received
fair value.”224 According to Subramanian, this reliance was
misplaced because Norcraft's go-shop process was so poorly
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structured that it was rendered entirely ineffective as a price
discovery tool.225
b. Information Asymmetries
Subramanian next posits that certain information
asymmetries between Fortune and prospective acquirors
vitiated the effectiveness of Norcraft's go-shop process.226
As noted, Fortune first approached Norcraft regarding a
potential acquisition on October 20, 2014, and the parties
signed a confidentiality agreement on December 11, 2014.227
Exclusivity soon followed.228 This dynamic gave Fortune
a substantial head start relative to other potential suitors
in evaluating the benefits and challenges of a Norcraft
transaction, including the complex issues relating to the
TRAs.229 And, per Subramanian, “[t]his discrepancy ...
created a severe information asymmetry problem, because
it would be virtually impossible for prospective third-party
bidders to [learn] as much about Norcraft as Fortune [already
knew]” in the thirty-five days allotted for Norcraft's go-shop
process.230
*21  Moreover, Subramanian submits, regardless of whether
Fortune's “first mover” status provided it with an actual
benefit, potential competing bidders would have perceived
Fortune to enjoy an informational advantage.231 That
perceived advantage, in turn, discouraged others from bidding
for Norcraft to avoid the “winner's curse”—a phenomenon
that occurs in common value auction settings where the
winning bidder has “buyer's remorse” because it has overpaid
for the asset in question.232 That remorse is a product, in
part, of the winner's perception that it lacked an adequate
understanding of the asset before it made its bid.233 Here,
Subramanian submits, because potential competing bidders
for Norcraft perceived that Fortune knew more about the
Company than they could hope to learn in thirty-five days,
they may well have feared that they would end up overpaying
to acquire Norcraft if they outbid Fortune.234
c. Deal Structure Minimizes Efficacy of the Go-Shop
According to Subramanian, the interaction between certain
deal protection provisions in the Merger Agreement and the
TSAs effectively truncated the Go-Shop Period “from 35
days to 30 days or even shorter.”235 As noted, the Merger
Agreement entitled Fortune to launch Tahiti's tender offer
for Norcraft's stock fifteen days into the Go-Shop Period.236
In addition, under the TSAs, Buller, SKM and Trimaran
were obligated to tender 53.6% of Norcraft's outstanding
voting stock into Tahiti's tender offer “promptly following”
the initiation of the offer and, in any event, no later than
two days before the offer's initial expiration date.237 And that
tender could not be rescinded absent a “full-blown superior
proposal.”238
Thus, if Fortune launched Tahiti's tender offer halfway
through Norcraft's go-shop process (as it did),239 53.6% of
Norcraft's voting shares would “promptly” be tendered to
Tahiti—and that tender would be irrevocable absent a superior
proposal. Moreover, even if Norcraft received a superior
proposal during the Go-Shop Period, Fortune would still have
at least four days to match that proposal.240
According to Subramanian, the confluence of the deal
protections, the limited duration of the Go-Shop Period,
Fortune's unlimited match right, the definition of “superior
proposal” and Fortune's ability to launch Tahiti's tender offer
during the go-shop, resulted in a systematic “tightening
and shortening” of the go-shop process. The “tightening”
occurred because “a third party would have to make a full-
blown superior proposal, not just get to excluded party status,
by the end of the 35 days.”241 The full-blown superior
proposal was required for Norcraft to terminate the Merger
Agreement and prevent Tahiti from accepting the shares
tendered pursuant to the TSAs (a majority of the shares
outstanding). Subramanian explained:
Ordinarily, if this was a normal go-shop, you'd have
excluded party status by the end of the go-shop period.
But... [here] you've got to get to a superior proposal. Got
to get the whole shebang done, as Chancellor Strine said
it in Lear, by the end of the go-shop period. And in my
observation and in my experience looking at these go-
shops, that is a big deal. Having to get to an entire superior
proposal by the end of the go-shop period is a very different
task than getting to simply excluded party status.242
*22  The “shortening” occurred because any potential bidder
contemplating whether to participate in the go-shop could
wait no longer than April 30—what Subramanian terms the
“last clear chance” date—to make its superior proposal if
it wanted to ensure that (i) the Norcraft Board had the two
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business days it was allowed under the Merger Agreement
to assess the proposal and declare it superior; (ii) Fortune's
four-business-day period to match expired; and (iii) Norcraft
terminated the Merger Agreement before Fortune (via Tahiti)
could close on the tendered Covered Shares. The following
graphic from Subramanian's report illustrates the “tightening
and shortening” phenomenon:
Subramanian also observes that, even without the “tightening
and shortening” of the go-shop, Fortune's unlimited match
right stands alone as a disabling feature of this go-
shop.243 According to Subramanian, from the perspective
of a potential bidder, unlimited match rights are typically
perceived as limiting any “pathway to success.”244 Indeed,
Subramanian submits, “[e]verybody agrees that match rights
deter bids. It [is] not even a debated question.”245
Here again, Fortune was acutely aware of the advantage it
secured, while Norcraft's Board apparently did not understand
what an unlimited match right was much less how that
deal protection might work to hinder the go-shop.246 In
describing the disparity in the sophistication of the two parties
negotiating this Merger, Subramanian observed: “it seems
like... the Fortune side was playing chess and the Norcraft side
was playing checkers.”247
J. Procedural Posture
Petitioners filed a petition with this Court on June 22, 2015,
seeking appraisal of their 557,631 shares of Norcraft common
stock.248 The Court held a four-day trial in June 2017, and the
parties thereafter submitted post-trial briefing. On December
20, 2017, the Court requested supplemental submissions
from the parties to address certain questions following the
Delaware Supreme Court's December 14, 2017, decision in
Dell.249 The Court heard post-trial argument on April 25,
2018.
II. ANALYSIS
Our appraisal statute, 8 Del. C. § 262, provides, “[t]hrough
[the appraisal] proceeding, the Court shall determine the fair
value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon
the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining
such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant
factors.”250 “Easy enough,” one might say on a first read, but
the judicial appraisal process, through the years, has proven
to be anything but “easy.”251
*23  “Section 262(h) unambiguously calls upon the Court
of Chancery to perform an independent evaluation of ‘fair
value’ at the time of a transaction ... [and] vests the Chancellor
and Vice Chancellors with significant discretion to consider
‘all relevant factors’ and determine the going concern value
of the underlying company.”252 “By instructing the court
to ‘take into account all relevant factors’ in determining
fair value, the statute requires the Court of Chancery to
give fair consideration to ‘proof of value by any techniques
or methods which are generally considered acceptable in
the financial community and otherwise admissible in court.’
Given that ‘[e]very company is different; [and] every merger
is different,’ the appraisal endeavor is ‘by design, a flexible
process.’ ”253
Taking to heart the mandate of Section 262(h), as reiterated by
our Supreme Court, I have carefully considered all relevant
factors. And I have assigned those factors the weight (or not)
I determined they deserve based on my evaluation of the
credible evidence, and my application of “accepted financial
principles” as derived from that evidence.254
A. The Merger Price is Not a Reliable Indicator of
Norcraft's Fair Value
As our Supreme Court has recognized, “corporate finance
theory reflects a belief that if an asset—such as the value of
a company as reflected in the trading value of its stock—can
be subject to close examination and bidding by many humans
with an incentive to estimate its future cash flows['] value,
the resulting collective judgment as to value is likely to be
- 13 -
Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Companies, Inc., Not Reported in Atl....
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 14
highly informative[.]”255 So long as “all estimators hav[e]
equal access to information, the likelihood of outguessing the
market over time and building a portfolio of stocks beating
it is slight.”256 Thus, the Supreme Court has emphasized
that our courts must appreciate “the economic reality that the
sale value resulting from a robust market check will often
be the most reliable evidence of fair value, and that second-
guessing the value arrived upon by the collective views of
many sophisticated parties with a real stake in the matter is
hazardous.”257
Nevertheless, our Supreme Court has declined on several
occasions to pronounce a presumption in favor of deal price
in determining fair value.258 Instead, it has reiterated the
“flexible” nature of the trial court's fair value calculus, while
also noting its lack of “confidence in [its] ability to craft,
on a general basis, the precise pre-conditions that would
be necessary to invoke a presumption” in favor of the deal
price.259
Here, Norcraft's deal process did not include a meaningful
market check and, consequently, the Merger Price was not
“arrived upon by the collective views of many sophisticated
parties with a real stake in the matter.”260 Prior to the
execution of the Merger Agreement, the Company chose to
negotiate with Fortune and Fortune alone.261 That decision,
if made as a strategic choice, does not alone render Norcraft's
deal process unsound.262 Nor does it preclude a finding
that Norcraft's deal process resulted in a reliable indication
of fair value (reflected by the Merger Price). Indeed, even
Petitioners' expert has acknowledged that negotiating with a
single potential buyer pre-signing can, in certain instances,
lead to significant value.263
*24  But the single bidder focus here, while perhaps not
amounting to a breach of fiduciary duty,264 did not provide a
meaningful market check as would yield a reliable indication
of fair value. First, there is no evidence that the Board or Citi
employed a single bidder approach for the sake of achieving
a strategic advantage or maximizing value. Second, and more
troubling, the Board's focus on only one bidder was tainted by
the fact that Buller (who was conflicted) served as Norcraft's
lead negotiator from start to finish.
The shambolic pre-signing process left Norcraft's post-
signing go-shop as the only meaningful opportunity to check
the market.265 Unfortunately, Fortune extracted concessions
from Norcraft that rendered the go-shop process equally
ineffective as a price discovery tool.
1. The Board's Singular Focus on Fortune, Failure to
Manage Buller's Conflicts and Misplaced Reliance on
the Go-Shop
There is no dispute that neither Norcraft nor Citi contacted
other bidders before Norcraft signed the Merger Agreement.
This resulted in lost opportunities. Not only did Norcraft
miss the opportunity to test the market before committing to
Fortune, it also missed the opportunity to leverage the interest
of another suitor to extract a higher price from Fortune.
Given these missed opportunities, it is not surprising that, by
the time the parties settled on the Merger Price, Norcraft's
management still believed that the merger consideration was
too low.266 The plan, therefore, was to put all eggs in the
go-shop basket as a means to achieve fair value for Norcraft
stockholders.267
Of course, on the other side of the table, Fortune perceived
the Merger Price as very favorable (to Fortune).268 It was
protective of that price and sought to avoid or limit the go-
shop to preclude a topping bid.269 And that is precisely what
it did.
*25  Norcraft's Board left the negotiations principally to
Buller. Yet Buller was just as (if not more) fixated on
extracting commitments from Fortune regarding the TRAs
and his future role with the combined company as he was
on securing the best price possible for Norcraft. Fortune,
for its part, was “stringing Buller along” as it negotiated
with him over the Merger Price, leading him to believe he
might continue his employment with Fortune post-close.270
When Fortune finally informed Buller (after settling on the
Merger Price) that he would have no place at Fortune post-
close, Fortune secured Buller's continued commitment to the
Merger by stringing him along again, this time by dangling
the possibility that Fortune would be willing to sell Norcraft
Canada to Buller after the closing.271
The Board either did not appreciate Buller's conflict, or
chose not to manage it, until Buller announced that he would
pursue the acquisition of Norcraft Canada after closing.272
By then, Buller had been spurring with Fortune in an
attempt to extract every dollar he demanded for the TRAs
(diverting consideration from the stockholders) and had
pushed hard for post-closing employment with Fortune. Yet
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all along, the Board did nothing to manage the conflict
—it did not form a special committee of its members to
negotiate with Fortune or take any other steps to neutralize
Buller's influence. Even its half-hearted effort to recuse
Buller from further Board deliberations regarding the Merger
following his demonstrated interest in Norcraft Canada
proved ineffective.273
Given that the single-bidder pre-signing process led
by a conflicted negotiator yielded what at least some
within Norcraft deemed unsatisfactory consideration, it was
imperative that the Norcraft Board run an effective post-
signing go-shop. It did not.
2. The Post-Sign Go-Shop Provides No Basis to Rely on
the Deal Price
Although it is hardly clear that Norcraft's Board appreciated
this fact, the ineffective pre-signing process should have made
clear that the post-signing go-shop would offer the only real
opportunity for a meaningful market check.274 Unfortunately,
that process fell far short on many levels, as the following
evidence illustrates:
• Prior to the Go-Shop Period, it was not widely known
that Norcraft was “up for sale”275; thus, potentially
interested parties did not know that Norcraft was “in
play” before the Merger was announced, putting them
several steps behind Fortune in pursuing an acquisition
of Norcraft276;
• Norcraft's Board appeared to lack even a basic
understanding of the terms and function of the go-
shop277;
• Any potential bidder had to value the TRAs—and provide
for the satisfaction of Norcraft's payment obligations
thereunder—within the Go-Shop Period, a task that
Fortune had several months to complete (and struggled
to navigate successfully, even with the assistance of
expert tax advisors)278;
• Fortune had an unlimited match right under the Merger
Agreement, which gave Fortune four business days to
match a superior proposal by a third-party bidder and
two business days to match any subsequent proposal by
the same bidder279;
*26  • In order to proceed with an alternate transaction,
Norcraft had to receive a “Superior Proposal” by the
end of the Go-Shop Period, “essentially require[ing]
the bidder to get the whole shebang done within the
[Go-Shop Period].”280 This requirement was made more
onerous by the TRAs' interaction with the Merger
Agreement's go-shop provisions, allowing “Fortune [to]
close its tender offer for the 54 percent [of Norcraft
common stock] before Norcraft [could] terminate the
merger agreement, because Norcraft [couldn't] terminate
on the possibility of a superior proposal. [Rather,
Norcraft could] only terminate after [it had] given
Fortune four days to match. And the four days [could]
go beyond the tender offer expiration.”281
• On April 14, 2015, about two weeks into the thirty-
five-day Go-Shop Period, Fortune launched Tahiti's
tender offer,282 triggering the TSAs and causing 53.6%
of Norcraft's outstanding shares to be committed to
supporting the Norcraft-Fortune transaction absent a
superior proposal283; and
• In a fit of bad judgment, RBC attempted to contact and
dissuade possible bidders from topping Fortune's bid
during the go-shop.284
*27  Presented with this factual record, I am not persuaded
that Norcraft's go-shop process provided a meaningful market
check that resulted in a transaction price derived from the
“collective views of many sophisticated parties with a real
stake in the matter.”285 Accordingly, I do not accord any
weight to the deal price in my fair value calculus.286
3. Insufficient Evidence to Consider the Efficient
Market Hypothesis
Following our Supreme Court's renewed endorsement of the
efficient capital market hypothesis in Dell, I requested that
the parties submit supplemental post-trial briefing addressing
whether Norcraff's unaffected trading price was probative
of Norcraft's fair value on the Merger date.287 Because this
case was tried before the Supreme Court's decision in Dell,
the parties presented limited evidence at trial respecting
Norcraft's trading history and the market for its stock.
Consequently, the parties had a rather limited record to
draw upon when addressing this issue in their supplemental
submissions.288
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To the extent the trial evidence is informative at all
on this issue, it does not support assigning any weight
to Norcraft's unaffected trading price for purposes of
determining Norcraft's fair value on the Merger date. Norcraft
had a limited public trading history given that it had just
completed an IPO eighteen months before the Merger.289
What trading did occur following the IPO was relatively
limited, an unsurprising phenomenon given the niche market
in which Norcraft operated.290 The analyst coverage of
Norcraft's stock was relatively sparse.291 Based on this
record, I am unable to conclude that the market for Norcraft's
common stock was efficient or semi-strong efficient.292
Absent that finding, I do not assign any weight to Norcraft's
unaffected trading price as an indicator of Norcraft's fair value
on the Merger date.293
B. Norcraft's Fair Value under “Traditional Methods”
of Valuation
*28  Having determined that neither the Merger Price
nor Norcraft's unaffected stock price provide a reliable
indicator of the Company's fair value, I must now consider
the remaining valuation analyses presented by the parties'
experts. In this regard, our law is clear that:
In discharging its statutory mandate, the Court of Chancery
has the discretion to select one of the parties' valuation
models as its general framework or to fashion its own. The
Court of Chancery's role as an independent appraiser does
not necessitate a judicial determination that is completely
separate and apart from the valuations performed by
the parties' expert witnesses who testify at trial. It
must, however, carefully consider whether the evidence
supports the valuation conclusions advanced by the parties'
respective experts.294
I have followed this guidance as I have worked through the
experts' competing analyses here.
1. Comparable Companies and Precedent Transaction
Analyses Are Not Reliable
As previously mentioned, both experts performed a
comparable company analysis. Austin Smith also performed
a precedent transaction analysis. “The utility of a comparable
company [or precedent transaction] approach is dependent
on the similarity between the company the court is valuing
and the companies [or precedent transactions] used for
comparison.”295 When there are no sufficiently comparable
companies or precedent transactions, such analyses are
unavailing in the search for fair value.296
After carefully reviewing the evidence, I see no factual basis
to rely on a precedent transaction or comparable company
analysis as an indicator of Norcraft's fair value as of the
Merger date. The parties agree that there had not been an
acquisition of any publicly-traded, “dealer channel” cabinet
manufacturer—or a satisfactorily comparable business297—
in any temporal proximity to the Merger.298 Nor were the
parties (or their experts) able to identify any truly comparable
companies that could support a reliable comparable company
analysis.299 It is, therefore, unsurprising that neither expert
relied on market-based approaches (comparable company
or precedent transaction analyses) as the principal metric
by which to value Norcraft.300 Instead, they offered
these valuations to corroborate the results they reached
utilizing their preferred valuation methodologies.301 Because
I disagree that market-based valuation metrics provide any
guidance here, I do not consider those metrics further.
2. The DCF Analysis
*29  “[A] DCF analysis can provide the court with a helpful
data point about the price a sale process would have produced
had there been a robust sale process involving willing buyers
with thorough information and the time to make a bid.”302
The basic premise underlying the DCF methodology is
that the value of a company is equal to the value of
its projected future cash flows, discounted to the present
value at the opportunity cost of capital. Calculating a DCF
involves three steps: (1) one estimates the values of future
cash flows for a discrete period, where possible, based on
contemporaneous management projections; (2) the value
of the entity attributable to cash flows expected after the
end of the discrete period must be estimated to produce
a so-called terminal value, preferably using a perpetual
growth model; and (3) the value of the cash flows for the
discrete period and the terminal value must be discounted
back using the capital asset pricing model or “CAPM.”
In simpler terms, the DCF method involves three basic
components: (1) cash flow projections; (2) a discount rate;
and (3) a terminal value.303
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a. The Disputed Inputs
As is typically the case, the substantial delta between
the experts' DCF valuations can be traced to their
disagreements regarding the DCF inputs. Their most
significant disagreements are: (1) whether to extend the Base
Case projections by an additional five years; and (2) how
to calculate Norcraft's beta in connection with estimating
Norcraft's WACC. On the latter point, the experts disagree
regarding (i) the selection of appropriate guideline public
companies (“GPCs”) for a proxy beta calculation and whether
net debt or gross debt should be used to unlever the GPC
betas and relever the resulting proxy beta304; and (ii) whether
Norcraft's observed capital structure or a target capital
structure should be used to relever the concluded beta when
calculating Norcraft's cost of equity.305 The experts generally
agree on the remaining DCF inputs.
i. Management Projections
“The most important input necessary for performing a proper
DCF is a projection of the subject company's cash flows.
Without a reliable estimate of cash flows, a DCF analysis
is simply a guess.”306 While Norcraft's management (Buller
and Ginter) prepared several sets of projections, the experts
agree that the most reliable projections are the Base Case
projections—and both experts relied on those projections in
their primary DCF analyses.307
*30  The record reflects that Norcraft management did
not prepare long-term projections in the ordinary course of
Norcraft's business.308 Nevertheless, Buller and Ginter knew
how to prepare long-term projections and they approached
the Base Case projections with a view to providing the
Board with a reliable estimate of Norcraft's future financial
performance.309 When all was said and done, Buller and
Ginter were confident they had prepared a set of realistic,
reasonable projections upon which Citi and the Board could
rely in assessing Norcraft's value during the course of
negotiations.310 While not perfect, I am satisfied that the Base
Case projections provide a reliable foundation for a valid
DCF.311
The experts' dispute regarding the Base Case projections does
not turn on their reliability (or lack thereof), but rather on
whether the projections should be extended by an additional
five years. Clarke opined that the extension was necessary,
while Austin Smith opined that a PGR should be applied at
the end of the five-year Base Case projection period.
According to Clarke, extending the Base Case projections is
necessary to capture Norcraft's future cash flows because “the
Base Case [p]rojections had not reached [a] steady state at
the end of the [five-year] projection period” and, therefore,
“it would be inappropriate to apply a standard [PGR] at
th[e] last year [of that period].”312 To account for Norcraft's
growth potential as of 2019, Clarke extended the Base Case
projections by an additional five years—through 2024—“to
gradually reduce growth rates over time until reaching [a
3.5%] PGR.”313
*31  Austin Smith, on the other hand, maintains that
extending the Base Case projections is inappropriate because
doing so forecasts growth that Norcraft almost certainly could
not achieve. In this regard, she points out that the cabinetry
industry is cyclical, as demonstrated by trends in (1) the
industry's historical performance (growth and decline); and
(2) the historical growth (and decline) of the residential
construction market.314 Extending the Base Case projections
by an additional five years implies a ten-year period of
consistent growth following two years of already achieved
growth. According to Austin Smith, projecting twelve years
of steady growth for a business in the cabinetry industry is
patently unreasonable.315
On this point, I find Austin Smith most credible. The
evidence adduced at trial supports her view that the cabinetry
industry is cyclical and follows the cycle of the residential
construction market.316 The evidentiary record also reflects
that the residential construction market is projected to reach
a “steady state” at or slightly before the last year of the
Base Case projection period (2019).317 Moreover, insofar
as Norcraft's own management was not inclined to project
Norcraft's financial results beyond FY2019, I see no basis to
do so post hoc for the sake of reaching a litigation result.
ii. Norcraft's Estimated WACC
*32  The parties also dispute how to calculate the applicable
discount rate based on Norcraft's estimated WACC. More
specifically, they dispute how to calculate Norcraft's beta in
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connection with estimating Norcraft's cost of equity capital (a
key component of WACC).
The application of a discount rate to financial projections
attempts to “convert the [subject company's] expected
economic income stream to present value.”318 Where the
discount rate is based on the subject company's WACC, the
projected future cash flows and terminal value are discounted
by the WACC to bring them back to present value.319 A
company's WACC represents the cost (to the company) of
financing its business operations; it comprises the weighted
average of the company's cost of debt and equity320:
Here, both experts calculated Norcraft's cost of equity capital
pursuant to CAPM.321 Following CAPM, a company's cost
of equity is calculated as follows322:
The experts generally agree on many of the relevant inputs to
calculate Norcraft's WACC; both experts used the same risk-
free rate of return (2.75%), equity risk premium (6.21%) and
size premium (2.69%).323 The experts differed, however, in
their respective estimates of Norcraft's pre-tax cost of debt.
Clarke estimated Norcraft's pre-tax cost of debt as 6.95%—
based on “the average of the 15-year yield-to-maturity of B
and BB rated bonds” as of the Merger date.324 Austin Smith,
by contrast, estimated Norcraft's pre-tax cost of debt as 5.85%
—based on the “[a]verage of (a) BofA Merrill Lynch US High
Yield B Effective Yield as of 5/12/15 [the Merger date] and
(b) total return on Norcraft['s] [then-outstanding] term loan
(including [the] effect of issuance discount).”325
The experts' respective estimates of Norcraft's pre-tax cost of
debt are both reasonable. As of the Merger date, Norcraft's
long-term debt was rated “B2” by Moody's Global Credit
Research and “B+” by Standard & Poor's, and the yield
to maturity on high-yield U.S. corporate bonds with 10+
year maturity on that date was approximately 6.34%.326
Accordingly, I use the average of the experts' respective
estimates of Norcraft's pre-tax cost of debt (6.40%) for my
DCF analysis.327
*33  As to the estimation of Norcraft's cost of equity, the
experts' principal point of disagreement concerns Norcraft's
beta coefficient. “Beta is a measure of the systematic risk
of a stock; the tendency of a stock's price to correlate with
changes in the market.... [B]etas for equity capital are used
as a modifier to the equity risk premium [ ] in the context of
[calculating a company's cost of equity].”328
A company's beta is measured by tracking relative change
in the trading price of its stock over a discrete time period
(the “lookback period”), with a set frequency (e.g., daily,
weekly, monthly).329 When there is insufficient data on
the trading history of a company's stock, the company's
“beta must be an estimate based on the [observed] betas
of comparable, publicly traded companies” (i.e., a “proxy
beta”).330 Observed betas are levered betas; they reflect a
company's operating risk and its financial risk.331 Thus, when
calculating a proxy beta, one must “unlever” each GPC's
observed (levered) beta to remove the debt-related risk(s) of
that particular GPC.332 Once the GPC betas are unlevered,
and the mean or median of those betas is calculated, the
unlevered summary measure beta (i.e., the unlevered proxy
beta) must be relevered to add back financial risk.333 The
relevant financial risk, however, is the subject company's not
the GPCs'.334
The experts generally agree that there is insufficient
information regarding Norcraft's own beta to allow a reliable
beta calculation based solely on that information—a function
of Norcraft's limited trading history.335 Accordingly, they
agree that the use of a proxy beta is appropriate. They
disagree, however, as to (1) which GPCs should be used to
derive the proxy beta; (2) whether gross debt or net debt
should be used to unlever the GPC betas and relever the
resulting unlevered proxy beta; and (3) whether Norcraft's
observed capital structure or a target capital structure should
be used to relever the proxy beta.
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I begin with the first point of disagreement—appropriate
GPCs. Clarke used four GPCs for his proxy beta calculation
—American Woodmark, Masonite, PGT and Ply Gem336—
which he selected by applying a set of comparability-related
screening criteria.337 After selecting these four GPCs, Clarke
then calculated each GPC's beta over a two-year lookback
period (measured weekly) and a one-year lookback period
(measured daily)—both periods relative to the Merger date—
and unlevered each observed GPC beta using the gross debt
of the corresponding GPC.338 This led Clarke to derive an
(unlevered) proxy beta for Norcraft of 0.80 based on the mean
and median of the unlevered GPC betas.339
*34  Austin Smith, by contrast, identified sixteen GPCs for
her proxy beta calculation; the four companies selected by
Clarke and twelve additional companies, including Fortune
and Masco.340 Having selected these sixteen GPCs, Austin
Smith derived a proxy beta for Norcraft based on the median
of the unlevered GPC betas, measured weekly over a two-year
lookback period—relative to the Merger date—and unlevered
using each GPC's net debt.341 This resulted in an unlevered
proxy beta for Norcraft of 1.02.342
Each expert disputes the suitability of the other's selected
GPCs. According to Clarke, Austin Smith's selected GPCs
“were either not comparable [to Norcraft] and/or were
going through significant restructuring events that impacted
their historical betas.”343 Austin Smith, for her part,
maintains that Clarke's methodology for selecting GPCs is
“fundamental[ly]” flawed, principally because: (i) it “results
in the exclusion of two of the three publicly-traded cabinet
manufacturers: Fortune ... and Masco”; and (ii) it yields
a relatively small set of companies, all but one of which
manufacture products other than cabinets—meaning they are
less comparable to Norcraft than Fortune and Masco.344
Both experts present valid arguments. After considering the
evidentiary record, I have determined to derive a proxy
beta for Norcraft based on the weekly observed betas of
Fortune, Masco, American Woodmark, Masonite, PGT and
Ply Gem, measured over a two-year lookback period (relative
to the Merger date). I acknowledge the size difference
between Norcraft, on one hand, and Fortune and Masco,
on the other, but there are few publicly-traded, “dealer
channel” cabinet manufacturing businesses operating in the
United States from which to draw.345 To account for this
dynamic, I have selected a set of GPCs that includes
publicly-traded companies directly competing with Norcraft
(Fortune, Masco and American Woodmark), and also public
companies operating in the same general industry that are
more comparable in size to Norcraft (Masonite, PGT and
Ply Gem).346 Since neither party has provided me with a
principled way to assign different weights to the betas of
individual GPCs, I have determined to derive the proxy beta
by taking the median of the unlevered GPC betas.347
*35  As to the question whether to use gross or net debt for
unlevering and relevering purposes, I have determined that
Clarke's approach (gross debt) is most appropriate. I consulted
the finance literature cited by both experts with regard to this
issue and have come to the conclusion that using gross debt
is the more generally accepted approach when applying the
Hamada unlevering and relevering formulas (as both experts
did),348 which utilize “total debt” as an input.349 I also find
that considering net debt, while it might eliminate some of
the drawbacks of the Hamada approach if done properly,350
complicates the analysis and adds a significant risk of error to
an already abstract process.
In her deposition, Austin Smith explained that using net debt
requires “a judgment call” because “public companies don't
report excess cash.”351 In essence, to derive net debt, one
“look[s] at how the cash balances for th[e chosen] companies
changed over time, and [then] look[s] at the relationship
between cash and debt, and come[s] to an assessment.”352
If insufficient data about excess cash is available, “total
cash is assumed to equal excess cash.”353 Considering the
many variables already at play in a DCF analysis (especially
when deriving a proxy beta), I find that figures based on a
“judgment call” are unreliable in the absence of a principled
way to evaluate the soundness of the underlying “judgment.”
For all these reasons, I have utilized gross debt rather than net
debt for unlevering and relevering purposes.
That takes me to the final beta-related dispute: the appropriate
capital structure to relever the unlevered proxy beta. Austin
Smith submits that a target capital structure based on the
capital structure of comparable companies provides the most
reliable input, while Clarke advocates the use of Norcraft's
actual (observed) capital structure as of the Merger date.
Austin Smith explains her choice by noting that Norcraft only
went public in 2013 and its management had not indicated
as of the Merger that it intended to maintain the Company's
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then-existing capital structure.354 According to Austin Smith,
it is likely that, over time, Norcraft's capital structure would
come to resemble that of its peers.355 Clarke counters that
Norcraft's observed capital structure as of the Merger date
was the “operative reality” of the Company at that time and,
as such, is the appropriate capital structure to apply when
relevering the unlevered proxy beta.356
Clarke has the better of this debate. While there are instances
where using a target capital structure for relevering purposes
would be appropriate,357 especially where the target's capital
structure is in flux, that is not the case here. It is true that,
as of the Merger, Norcraft had operated for only eighteen
months after its IPO. There is no evidence, however, that
management intended to change Norcraft's capital structure,
and any suggestion that it would do so is nothing more
than sheer speculation.358 Accordingly, I refer to Norcraft's
observed capital structure as of the Merger (75% equity, 25%
debt) to relever Norcraft's concluded unlevered beta.359
b. The Court's DCF Valuation of Norcraft
*36  Like Clarke and Austin Smith, I begin my DCF analysis
with the Base Case projections, adjusted to deduct for income
tax expense in each of the projected years (based on a 38%
tax rate). This adjustment yields the following figures for





















I next adjust the NOPAT figures to obtain unlevered free
cash flow figures for each projected year by (1) adding
back non-cash charges—depreciation, amortization and stock
compensation expense; (2) deducting Norcraft's capital
expenditures; and (3) deducting year-over-year change in
Norcraft's net working capital (“NWC”). My adjustments
with respect to each item track those made by both experts.361
The foregoing adjustments yield the following figures for





















*37  To calculate the present value of these unlevered
cash flows, like Clarke and Austin Smith, I have applied
a discount rate based on Norcraft's estimated WACC. My
WACC calculation also uses CAPM to estimate Norcraft's
cost of equity—based on the parties' common risk-free rate
of return (2.75%), equity risk premium (6.21%) and size
premium (2.69%)—and uses a 6.40% pre-tax cost of debt,
which yields a post-tax cost of debt for Norcraft of 3.97%
(again based on a 38% tax rate).
To derive a beta for my cost of equity calculation, I have
unlevered the observed weekly betas of my selected GPCs
over a two-year lookback period relative to the Merger
date, using the Hamada unlevering formula and gross debt
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The median of the unlevered GPC betas, 0.98, constitutes
Norcraft's concluded unlevered beta. I then relevered that beta
using Norcraft's observed capital structure of 75% equity and
25% debt (per Clarke's estimation), resulting in a levered beta
for Norcraft of 1.187. Incorporating this levered beta into
my WACC calculation, along with the other inputs already
mentioned—again using Norcraft's observed capital structure
—I derived a WACC for Norcraft of 10.60%. Applying
Norcraft's concluded WACC to discount its projected future
cash flows to present value, I have calculated the present value
of those cash flows to be $149.7 million.
To calcul ate Norcraft's terminal value, I have used the
Perpetuity Growth method (as did both experts),362 which
posits that terminal value equals the quotient of (1) the
subject company's terminal year free cash flow (here, $51.41
million); and (2) the applicable capitalization rate (here,
7.10%)363—discounted to present value using the applicable
discount rate (here, Norcraft's WACC of 10.60%).364 This
yields a terminal value of $477.2 million.
*38  Summing together the present value of Norcraft's
projected unlevered cash flows ($149.7 million) and its
terminal value ($477.2 million) results in an operating value
for Norcraft of $626.9 million. To calculate Norcraft's total
equity value, I then made the following adjustments to
Norcraft's concluded operating value:
• adding Norcraft's excess cash as of the Merger date,
calculated as $62.6 million365;
• adding the value of the TRA-related tax benefits realized
by Norcraft in each of the projected years, calculated as
$4.3 million366; and
• deducting Norcraft's long-term debt as of the Merger date,
calculated as $147.5 million.367
These adjustments to Norcraft's operating value yield a
total equity value for Norcraft of $546.3 million. Dividing
Norcraft's total equity value by Norcraft's fully diluted shares
outstanding as of the Merger date (20,880,123),368 I conclude
that Norcraft's equity value per share on that date was $26.16.
3. The Merger Price as a “Reality Check”
*39  As explained above, I have determined that the Merger
Price is not a reliable indicator of Norcraft's fair value as of the
Merger date. That does not mean, however, that the Merger
Price is irrelevant for purposes of the Court's fair value
determination. To the contrary, it is appropriate to consider
the Merger Price as a “reality check” on the Court's DCF
valuation of Norcraft.369 Insofar as I am obliged to articulate a
principled, evidence-based explanation for the delta between
the Merger Price and the Court's DCF valuation (here, $0.66
per share), I am satisfied that the process infirmities I have
identified resulted in the Board leaving $0.66 per share on the
bargaining table.370 With that said, I am also satisfied that the
delta between the Merger Price and the DCF value is not so
great as to cause me to question whether the DCF value is
grounded in reality.371
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I have found the fair value of
Norcraft shares as of the Merger date (May 12, 2015) was
$26.16 per share. The statutory rate of interest, compounded
quarterly, shall accrue from the date of closing to the
date of payment. The parties should confer and submit an
implementing final judgment within ten (10) days.
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Mr. Buller was insisting on some understanding pre-signing with respect to the sale to him of the Canada business? A.
That's my understanding. I believe [Buller] continued this up right until we signed the [Merger Agreement].”); TT 125:3-21
(Biggart) (explaining that Buller was upset because Fortune would not commit to sell him Norcraft Canada).
136 See JX 168 (e-mail chain between Klein and Fortune deal team, Mar. 14, 2015) (Klein: “I told [Buller that his proposed
acquisition of Urban Effects] would likely be a subsequent transaction - a week later or something like that, post close.”);
JX 195 (e-mail chain between Klein and Fortune deal team, Mar. 25, 2015) (Klein: “[Eldridge] said I need to call [Buller]
and calm him down and make him feel good”); TT 114-15 (Biggart) (explaining that Fortune did not feel comfortable
negotiating a Norcraft Canada transaction with Buller pre-closing).
137 JX 195 (e-mail chain between Klein and Fortune deal team, Mar. 25, 2015) (Klein: “[Eldridge] said I need to call [Buller]
and calm him down and make him feel good.”).
138 JX 197 (e-mail chain between Buller and Reilly, Mar. 26, 2015).
139 JX 202 (e-mail from Buller to PwC, Mar. 27, 2015).
140 JX 198 (e-mail chain between Norcraft and Fortune deal teams, Mar. 26, 2015) at NCFT0168392; TT 126:6-16 (Biggart)
(“I got Chris Klein to agree ... that [Fortune] would waive [Buller's] noncompete in Canada, as a showing of good faith
to ... Buller that we were serious when we say we're going to ... have a negotiation after the closing.... ”).
141 JX 219 (Amendment to Buller's Employment Agreement).
142 JX 204 (e-mail from Reilly to Maselli, Mar. 27, 2015).
143 TT 123-26 (Biggart) (explaining the TRA-related difficulties); id. at 126:2-5 (Biggart) (“I called [Ropes & Gray] and said ...
[w]e better do something quick or this whole deal is going to fall apart.”).
144 TT 123-24 (Biggart).
145 JX 13 (Biggart Dep.) at 168:2-3; JX 198 (e-mail chain between Norcraft and Fortune deal teams, Mar. 26, 2015); JX
207 (e-mail from Klein to Fortune deal team, Mar. 27, 2015); TT 126:8 (Biggart) (“[Fortune was] willing to pay 2 out of
the $3 million.”).
146 JX 207 (e-mail from Klein to Fortune deal team, Mar. 27, 2015) (Klein: “We[ ] heard through [Buller's] personal lawyer
that he rejects our offer of 2 of 3 million [of the] disputed TRA amount, needs all 3.... I've been very reasonable here in all
of this, but really cannot go any farther. I do not wish to call [Buller] and go through all of this again with him - it could do
more harm than good.”) (formatting altered); TT 128:12-23 (Biggart) (“Q. What was [Buller's] response to that proposal?
A. He said no. And he said, I want... everything that my accountant says I'm entitled to. He said, [my accountant] has
calculated my TRA payment at 19.7 [million], I want 19.7.”).
147 JX 207 (e-mail from Klein to Fortune deal team, Mar. 27, 2015).
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148 JX 212 (Mar. 27, 2015 e-mail from Buller to Maselli, Reilly et al., thanking Maselli and Reilly for agreeing that Trimaran
and SKM, respectively, would transfer the $1 million sum to the Norcraft LLC unitholders); TT 129:6-24 (Biggart).
149 JX 238 (Norcraft Schedule 14D-9) at 16-17.
150 PTO ¶ 2y; JX 238 (Norcraft Schedule 14D-9) at 17.
151 PTO ¶ 2z. Under the TRA termination agreements, the Norcraft LLC unitholders would receive approximately $ 19.7
million, SKM would receive approximately $15.9 million and Trimaran would receive approximately $7.9 million. Id.
152 PTO ¶ 2bb.
153 JX 229 (Buller Tender and Support Agreement [“Buller TSA”] ) § 3; JX 230 (SKM Tender and Support Agreement [“SKM
TSA”] ) § 3; JX 231 (Trimaran Tender and Support Agreement [“Trimaran TSA”] ) § 3. Fortune initiated Tahiti's tender
offer on April 14, 2015, PTO ¶ 2ee, and the offer's initial expiration date was May 11, 2015. JX 239 (Norcraft Schedule
TO, filed Apr. 14, 2015, attaching Tahiti's tender offer) at 9.
154 JX 229 (Buller TSA) § 3(b); JX 230 (SKM TSA) § 3(b); JX 231 (Trimaran TSA) § 3(b).
155 PTO ¶ 2cc.
156 TT 45:14-46:8 (Eldridge); JX 8 (Eldridge Dep.) at 49:8-12, 89:17-90:22.
157 JX 3 (Buller Dep.) at 199-200; JX 9 (Maselli Dep.) at 76:5-16; JX 11 (Reilly Dep.) at 122-29.
158 JX 12 (Baab Dep.) at 100-02; see also JX 149 (Feb. 27, 2015 email from Klein to Fortune deal team outlining Fortune's
conditions for the go-shop, explaining their intended effect of avoiding an auction); JX 232 (e-mail chain between RBC,
Klein and other members of Fortune's deal team, Apr. 7, 2015, explaining RBC should emphasize to other potential
buyers that Fortune has matching rights).
159 TT 26:22-27:1 (Eldridge). Citi's contact list was developed with input from Buller and Reilly, who “suggested [certain]
companies to put on the list, including companies that had reached out to [Norcraft] historically.” TT 27:7-12 (Eldridge).
160 TT 27 (Eldridge); JX 243 (“Buyers Log” dated May 4, 2015, prepared by Citi [“Citi Go-Shop Log”] ). The six private equity
firms were The Carlyle Group (“Carlyle”), TPG Capital, Wind Point Partners, Olympus Partners, American Industrial
Partners and another unidentified private equity firm. TT 27 (Eldridge); JX 243 (Citi Go-Shop Log).
161 JX 240 (“Go-Shop Process Update” dated Apr. 20, 2015, prepared by Citi); TT 157 (Biggart).
162 PTO ¶ 2cc.
163 JX 243 (Citi Go-Shop Log) at 5 (“no interest in going head-to-head with Fortune on this”), 7 (“Fortune is a logical buyer
here, so hard for us to compete”), 8 (“[n]ot that interested in competing against Fortune”), 10 (“[c]an't compete with
Fortune”), 11 (“[c]an't compete with Fortune”).
164 Id. at 6, 14 (“[v]alue too high”).
165 Id. at 15; seeid. at 2 (“investment is too big [ ] to consider in a short period”); TT 46:9-19 (Eldridge) (“Q. And, sir, you
testified at your deposition that there were go-shop participants in this process who indicated that they would like to have
more time. Correct? A. Yes. Q. And what parties were those? A. I don't recall specifically. I recall it being a general
comment from a couple of people that we spoke with. They may not have been people that signed NDAs. It was just a
general comment from various people that we contacted.”).





171 TT 144:3-4 (Biggart).
172 TT 144:5-6 (Biggart).
173 TT 144:16-18 (Biggart).
174 JX 5 (Klein Dep.) at 275:6-276:14.
175 JX 221 (Merger Agreement), pmbl. & § 1.1; PTO ¶¶ 2cc, 2ee.
176 PTO ¶ 2cc.
177 JX 250 (May 12, 2015 Fortune press release); PTO ¶ 2ff.
178 TT 455-56 (Clarke); TT 698 (Austin Smith).
179 YT 455-56 (Clarke); TT 698 (Austin Smith). By any measure, both experts are well qualified. See JX 18 (Report of David G.
Clarke, ASA [“Clarke Report”] ) at 8 (describing qualifications); JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 3 (describing qualifications).
And both did what they were engaged to do here - advocate their side's position on fair value - quite effectively. It is
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accepted in Delaware appraisal litigation that paid valuation experts have assumed more of an advocacy role, and less of
a traditional expert witness role (as illustrated by the wide deltas we regularly see in their valuation conclusions). SeeDell,
177 A.3d at 24 (“the price produced by an efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the
view of a single analyst, especially an expert witness who caters her valuation to the litigation imperatives of a well-heeled
client”); Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, 993 A.2d 497, 498-99 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Both these men of valuation science
purported to apply the same primary method of valuation—the discounted cash flow (‘DCF’) method—but the expert for
the petitioners came up with a value of $139 per share and the expert for Golden came up with a value of only $88 per
share—a modest $51 per share value gap.” (emphasis supplied) ). Despite the repeated expressions of frustration by our
courts, the practice continues. When a rushing river flows against a resisting rock, eventually the river wins out. Perhaps
that is the hope among appraisal advocates and the valuation experts they engage to sponsor their positions.
180 TT 243–14 (Subramanian). Subramanian is “the H. Douglas Weaver Professor of Business Law at the Harvard Business
School (HBS) and the Joseph Flom Professor of Law and Business at the Harvard Law School (HLS).” JX 19 (Expert
Report of Guhan Subramanian [“Subramanian Report”] ) at 2; see id. (describing qualifications).
181 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 17 (quoting JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 25) (internal quotation marks omitted). Clarke did
not offer any independent analysis as to why the Merger Price is not a reliable indicator of Norcraft's fair value as of the
Merger date; instead, he adopted in full Subramanian's conclusion on that point. See JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 6, 17.
182 Seeid. at 2.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 2-3. The extension of the projections, according to Clarke, was required to reduce Norcraft's growth rates gradually
to a “steady state.” In this regard, Clarke notes that “if [he] had to use 2019 as the final year of [his] projections, [he]
would then need to use a higher [PGR of 4.4%] to account for the tapering of [Norcraft's] growth to a steady state.” JX
21 (Rebuttal Report of David G. Clarke, ASA [“Clarke Rebuttal Report”] ) at 27 n.62.
185 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 24; JX 1 (Ginter Dep.) at 44—45.
186 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 3, 42. To derive Norcraft's WACC, Clarke first “calculated [1] Norcraft's cost of equity based
on the capital asset pricing model (‘CAPM’) and [2] Norcraft's long-term[,] [after-tax] cost of debt.” Id. at 3, 33. Clarke
next multiplied (1) Norcraft's estimated cost of equity (11.4%) by the proportion of equity in Norcraft's capital structure
(approximately 75%), as measured by Norcraft's (undiluted) market capitalization immediately before the Merger's
announcement ($396 million); and (2) Norcraft's estimated after-tax cost of debt (4.31%) by the proportion of debt in
Norcraft's capital structure (approximately 25%), as measured by the book value of Norcraft's long-term debt on March
29, 2015 ($147.5 million). Id. at 33, 42 & sched. 5-B. Finally, Clarke summed the product of each calculation to obtain
a WACC of 9.6%. Id. at 33.
187 Id., sched. 2-A (DCF analysis).
188 Id., sched. 2-A (DCF analysis). Terminal year free cash flow is the future value implied by (1) the subject company's
projected revenue and expense items in the final year of the discrete projection period; and (2) the subject company's
estimated PGR. See id. Clarke calculated Norcraft's capitalization rate as the positive difference of Norcraft's estimated
WACC (9.6%) and estimated PGR (3.5%). Id. at 43.
189 Id., sched. 2-A (DCF analysis).
190 Id.
191 Id. Operating value, as stated here, represents the present value of Norcraft's future unlevered free cash flows. Id. A
DCF analysis, however, attempts to derive the value of the subject company's equity. Id. at 45. Thus, adjustments to the
operating value are generally necessary to add in equity in the form of excess cash (or cash equivalents) and to remove
debt. Id. at 45-47. Clarke based his excess cash and “cash from option exercise” estimates on the information disclosed
in the Base Case projections and Norcraft's Form 10-Q for Q1 FY2015. Id. at 45. He based his estimation of the TRA-
related tax benefits on the “[I.R.C. § ] 743(b) and [net operating loss] utilization” projections included in Citi's March 28,
2015 presentation to the Norcraft Board. Id. at 46.
192 Id. at 48.
193 Id. Clarke calculated Norcraft's “fully diluted shares outstanding” as the sum of (1) the total number of Norcraft shares and
stock options outstanding as of the Merger date; and (2) the total number of convertible Norcraft LLC units (convertible
into Norcraft stock) outstanding on that date. Id.
194 Id. at 2–4.
195 Id. at 51.
196 Id. at 4.
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197 Id. at 2.
198 JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 29 (emphasis in original). Austin Smith based her $3.60 per share “synergies” figure on
“the presentations of Citi and the work done by RBC.” TT 704:24-705:1 (Austin Smith).
199 JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 1.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 20-21, 23 & Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis). Austin Smith performed two additional DCF analyses, one relying on the Ginter
2014 Projections, which valued Norcraft at $15.59 per share, and another relying on a Capitalization of Cash Flow
methodology, which valued Norcraft at $12.65 per share. Id. at 23-24.
202 Id. at 23 & Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis).
203 Id. at 20.
204 Id., Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis). To derive Norcraft's WACC, Austin Smith first calculated (1) Norcraft's cost of equity based
on CAPM and (2) Norcraft's after-tax cost of debt (using a 37.69% tax rate). Id., Ex. 5 (Calculation of WACC). She next
multiplied (1) Norcraft's estimated cost of equity (12.4%) by a target proportion of equity in Norcraft's capital structure
(86%), based on the capital structure of selected comparable companies; and (2) Norcraft's estimated after-tax cost of
debt (3.6%) by a target proportion of debt in Norcraft's capital structure (14%), again based on a “comparable capital
structure” approach. Id., Exs. 4 (Calculation of Beta) and 5 (Calculation of WACC). Finally, Austin Smith summed the
product of each calculation to obtain a WACC of 11.2%. Id., Ex. 5 (Calculation of WACC).
205 See id., Ex. 5 (Calculation of WACC). This is the same approach Clarke followed to determine terminal value (with
different inputs). JX 18 (Clarke Report), sched. 2-A (DCF analysis).
206 JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis).
207 Id.
208 JX 537 (native Excel version of Austin Smith's DCF model). Austin Smith calculated Norcraft's excess cash on the Merger
date based on the “Cash from Norcraft” figure in the “Funds Flow Memorandum” prepared in connection with the Merger
($54,396,335.01), JX 249 at 2, less a $20 million cash balance (cash for operations, per the Base Case projections) plus
the product of (1) Norcraft's total options outstanding as of the Merger date (1,142,383) and (2) the weighted average
exercise price of those options ($16.01). JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis) (drawing option-related
information from Norcraft's Q1 FY 2015 10-Q, JX 248 at 14).
209 JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis).
210 Id.
211 Id. Austin Smith calculated Norcraft's fully diluted shares outstanding as 20,869,976. JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at
13 & n.25. It is unclear how Austin Smith derived this figure, and the figure conflicts with the information set forth in
Norcraft's Form 10-a for Q1 FY2015 and the “Funds Flow Memorandum” prepared in connection with the Merger. See
JX 248 (Norcraft's Q1 FY2015 Form 10-Q) at 4, 11 (17,311,573 shares of Norcraft common stock outstanding, 2,426,167
convertible Norcraft LLC units outstanding and 1,142,383 options on Norcraft stock outstanding as of March 31, 2015); JX
249 (Funds Flow Memorandum) at 3, 11 (18,947,886 shares of Norcraft common stock outstanding, 789,854 convertible
Norcraft LLC units outstanding and 1,142,383 options on Norcraft stock outstanding as of May 11, 2015). Both documents
indicate a figure of 20,880,123 fully diluted shares outstanding as of the Merger date.
212 JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 23.
213 Id. at 25-28.
214 Id. at 29.
215 Id. In her reports and trial testimony, Austin Smith provided only a cursory—and mostly conclusory—discussion of
Norcraft's deal process. Seeid. at 19-20; TT 701-703 (Austin Smith). She also acknowledged that she had never before
been called upon to offer expert testimony on the efficacy of a sales process. TT 791:20—24 (Austin Smith).
216 JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 24-25.
217 Id. at 26.
218 Id.
219 7d. at 25, 33-36.
220 Id. at 25, 45-52.
221 Id. at 30 (internal quotation and footnote omitted).
222 Id. at 31; see TT 100:4-17 (Biggart); JX 238 (Norcraft Schedule 14D-9) at 13.
223 JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 31.
224 Id. at 32.
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225 Id. at 32-33.
226 Id. at 25, 33-36.
227 PTO ¶¶ 2k, 2p.
228 PTO ¶¶ 2w.
229 JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 29-30, 34 (“Fortune ... signed a confidentiality agreement on December 11th, 2014, and
then had 110 days of exclusive access to confidential information and management time at Norcraft before the deal was
announced on March 30th, 2015.”). During the course of those 110 days, both Norcraft and Fortune had to deal not
only with valuation issues relating to the Norcraft business, but also complex tax and valuation issues (with the help of
separate independent experts) relating to the TRAs. JX 5 (Klein Dep.) at 137-38.
230 JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 34.
231 Seeid. at 35.
232 Id. at 35-36 (citing Guhan Subramanian, Deal Making: The New Strategy of Negotiauctions 87-88 (2011) ).
233 Id. at 40-41.
234 Id. Per Subramanian, Fortune's unlimited match right compounded the “winner's curse” problem, and so operated as a “
‘powerful disincentive’ to prospective third-party bidders.” Id. at 43 (footnote and citation omitted).
235 Id. at 52.
236 JX 221 (Merger Agreement), pmbl. & § 1.1.
237 JX 229 (Buller TSA) § 3; JX 230 (SKM TSA) § 3; JX 231 (Trimaran TSA) § 3.
238 TT 254:21-255:7 (Subramanian); JX 221 (Merger Agreement) § 1.1.
239 PTO ¶ 2ee.
240 JX 221 (Merger Agreement) § 5.4(g).
241 TT 255:4-7 (Subramanian).
242 TT 299:18-300:4 (Subramanian).
243 JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 41-44; JX 221 (Merger Agreement) at § 5.4(g).
244 JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 50.
245 TT 254:4-7 (Subramanian).
246 Compare JX 232 (e-mail chain between RBC, Klein and other members of Fortune's deal team, Apr. 7, 2015) with JX 11
(Reilly Dep.) at 125:3-22 and JX 3 (Buller Dep.) at 206:16-207:24.
247 TT 269:8-11 (Subramanian).
248 JX 260 (Petition for Appraisal).
249 1 77 A.3d 1; D.I. 91.
250 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
251 See, e.g.,In re Orchard Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *18 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (“As a law-trained judge who
has to come up with a valuation deploying the learning of the field of corporate finance, I choose to deploy one accepted
method as well as I am able, given the record before me and my own abilities.”); Global GT LP, 993 A.2d at 517 n.126
(explaining that “academics and professionals throw around ... ranges of value [that] are used by a law-trained judge
to come to a single point estimate of value” and that “[t]he law-trained judges who must perform such analyses are
more conscious than anyone of the inherent risk of error in such an endeavor, and indeed of the reality that no one can
really tell if an error was made”), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214; Finkelstein, 2005 WL 1074364, at *12 (“The judges of this court
are unremittingly mindful of the fact that a judicially selected determination of fair value is just that, a law-trained judge's
estimate that bears little resemblance to a scientific measurement of a physical reality.”). Indeed, “the judges of this Court”
have lamented the challenges posed by the appraisal statute for many years. While perhaps repetitive, these expressions
serve a valuable function; they serve as a longhand way of saying to the parties and the community of interest: “I've
done the best I can here.”
252 DFC, 172 A.3d at 364 (quoting 8 Del. C. § 262(h) ).
253 Dell, 177 A.3d at 21 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983); Golden Telecom, 11 A.3d at 218; and
In re PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, at *26 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) ) (alteration in original).
254 Dell, 177 A.3d at 22.
255 DFC, 172 A.3d at 370.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 366.
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258 See, e.g., id.;Golden Telecom, 11 A.3d at 217-18.
259 DFC, 172 A.3d at 366.
260 Id.
261 TT 13-15 (Eldridge).
262 SeeIn re Fort Howard Corp. S'holders Litig., 1988 WL 83147, at *13-14 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988) (finding board-chosen
single-bidder process satisfied Revlon duties); In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 691, 706 (Del. Ch. 2001) (“[T]he
mere fact that the Pennaco board decided to focus on negotiating a favorable price with Marathon and not to seek out
other bidders is not one that alone supports a breach of fiduciary duty claim.”); In re MONY Gp. Inc. S'holder Litig., 852
A.2d 9, 21 (Del. Ch. 2004) (same) (quoting Pennaco, 787 A.2d at 706).
263 JX 31 (Guhan Subramanian, Go-Shops vs. No-Shops in Private Equity Deals: Evidence and Implications, 63 Bus. Law.
729 (2008) ) at 755 (“[A] pure go-shop can be a valuable tool for extracting the highest possible price in the sale of [a]
company.”).
264 M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 797 (Del. 1999) (“A fair merger price in the context of a breach of fiduciary
duty claim will not always be a fair value in the context of determining going concern value.”); In re Trados Inc. S'holder
Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 78 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“A court could conclude that a price fell within the range of fairness and would
not support fiduciary liability, yet still find that the point calculation demanded by the appraisal statute yields an award in
excess of the merger price.”); Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 466 (Del. Ch. 2011) (same).
265 Petitioners urge the Court to conclude that “a go-shop only process” is, per se, inadequate to generate fair value. Pet'rs'
Post Trial Opening Br. 3 (citing IQ Hldgs. v. Am. Commercial Lines, 2013 WL 4056207 (Del. Ch. Mar. 18, 2013) and Huff
Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 WL 5878807, at *13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013) ). Having reviewed the cited authority, I
do not see where IQ Holdings addressed the issue at all. As for CKx, Inc., while the court acknowledges that a scenario
where the only market check is an unsuccessful go-shop might undermine the reliability of the deal price as an indicator
of fair value, the court says nothing of adopting a rule that a go-shop alone will never produce fair value for the target.
Id. at * 13. I see no basis in law or fact to adopt such a rule.
266 JX 140 (e-mail from Reilly to Buller, Maselli and Citi representatives, Feb. 20, 2015) (Reilly: “I do believe we are leaving
$ on the table”); TT 29:19-22 (Eldridge) (Buller “eager to try and find a buyer at a higher valuation”); JX 138 (e-mail from
Ginter to Buller, Feb. 19, 2015) (“Current offer will be 10.9x or less by the time we close in April at $25.50. so we weren't
happy with the deal in [O]ct[ober] but now we are?”).
267 See JX 3 (Buller Dep.) at 85-86.
268 JX 185 (e-mail chain between Fortune director David Mackay and Klein, Mar. 20, 2015) (Mackay: “Looks very positive[.]
A good strategic fit at a reasonable price ... I fully support the deal and hope no one comes along and offers more.”);
id. (Klein: “You are spot on - its [sic] a good price, and there is a risk someone comes along and tries to top the offer.”);
JX 300 (Mar. 31, 2015 e-mail from Fortune director Mackay to Fortune's other directors and deal team members) (“Let's
hope no one bids!”).
269 TT 146:18-147:9 (Biggart) (explaining a Fortune presentation analyzing potential go-shop competitors “[b]ecause at this
point in time, we're about to agree to a go-shop, and our CEO is very upset about the idea of doing this”); see also JX
5 (Klein Dep.) at 164:11—22 (“Q. And Norcraft insisted on some type of go-shop process, right? A. Yes. Q. And in the
context of negotiating that, your goal was to minimize the chances that the go-shop process would result in a higher
bidder, — A. I wanted to — Q. — correct? A. — give them what they needed - the minimum amount they needed to
satisfy their fiduciary responsibility which I know they had.”). Of course, it is not unusual—or inherently problematic—for
a prospective acquiror to want to avoid being outbid after having expended considerable time, effort and funds. Fortune's
attitude, however, suggests that it appreciated the pre-sign process did not yield fair value for Norcraft stockholders
and that it wanted to protect that advantage throughout the go-shop process. Again, this is precisely what the Board
reasonably should have expected from the party sitting on the other side of the table.
270 JX 166 (e-mail from Klein to Fortune deal team, Mar. 12, 2015); TT 205 (Biggart) (On March 6, 2015, Fortune “definitively
told [Buller] he didn't have the job.”).
271 See JX 189 (e-mail chain between Dave Randich, head of Fortune's cabinet division, Klein and members of Fortune's
deal team, Mar. 23, 2015); JX 199 (Mar. 26, 2015 e-mail from RBC to Klein and other members of Fortune's deal team);
JX 202 (Mar. 27, 2015 email from Buller to PwC); JX 194 (e-mail chain between members of Norcraft and Fortune deal
teams, Mar. 25, 2015).
272 JX 11 (Reilly Dep.) at 158-160.
273 JX 13 (Biggart Dep.) at 107-109, 111:6-112:3; JX 194 (e-mail chain between members of Norcraft and Fortune deal
teams, Mar. 25, 2015).
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274 In re AOL, Inc., 2018 WL 1037450, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018) (observing “if front-end information sharing is truncated
or limited, the post-agreement period should be correspondingly robust, so to ensure that information is sufficiently
disseminated that an informed sale can take place and bids can be received without disabling impediments”).
275 The Merger Agreement was publicly announced on March 30, 2015. See JX 227 (Norcraft Mar. 30, 2015 Proxy Statement)
at 3. That same day, the Go-Shop Period began. PTO ¶ 2cc.
276 JX 19 (Subramanian Report) at 34; JX 243 (Citi Buyers Log) at 2 (“investment is too big [ ] to consider in a short period”);
id. at 12 (“can't move fast enough in 35 days”); id. at 2, 5, 7-9 (prospective bidders explaining they had no interest in
competing against Fortune).
277 See, e.g., JX 3 (Buller Dep.) at 207:5-24 (“Q. Do you know what Norcraft's rights were if another proposal came in during
the go-shop period? A. Don't recall. Q. Do you have any knowledge of what Norcraft could have done if one of the go-shop
parties was interested and made a bid? A. We could have pursued the offer. Q. Were there any restrictions on Norcraft's
ability to pursue an offer? A. Some, but I don't recall what they were.... Q. Do you recall anything about Fortune's rights if
another offer came in? A. I don't recall.”); JX 8 (Eldridge Dep.) at 85:17-19 (“Q. What kind of matching rights did Fortune
have in this transaction? A. I don't recall.”); JX 9 (Maselli Dep.) at 75:5-78:5 (“Q. Under the terms of the merger agreement,
what needed to occur for a go-shop participant to continue to negotiate with Norcraft regarding a possible sale after the
go-shop period ended? ... A. I don't know what the threshold was, but ... if it was a sufficiently robust offer, they would have
an opportunity to complete the transaction.”); JX 11 (Reilly Dep.) at 121:3-130:20 (“Q. Did you personally ever consider
what effect the tender and support agreements would have on the go-shop process? A. I can't recall.... To be honest
with you, I'm not an expert in going private transactions, though I've been around for a while; and, in my estimation, the
retention of both Ropes and Citibank and to rely on their advice and counsel with respect to the process was, you know,
doing my duty. So that's kind of what we really looked to the experts to help us.... Q. What are matching rights? A. I have
no idea.... Q. Okay. Well, do you know what type of matching rights Fortune had in Norcraft's go-shop process? ... A. I
don't recall.... Q. Do you recall any discussions among Norcraft's directors or officers with respect to Fortune's matching
rights in this go-shop process? A. I do not. Q. Under the merger agreement that Norcraft signed with Fortune Brands,
what needed to happen for a go-shop participant to continue to negotiate with Norcraft regarding a possible sale after
the go-shop period ended? A. I don't recall.”); cf. JX 1 (Ginter [CFO] Dep.) at 140:9-14 (“A. My knowledge of a go-shop
is limited in that regard. I know the banks ran it for us and prepared a list of potential investors that may be interested in
looking at Norcraft. But my knowledge of a go-shop is limited to that and what I learned during the process.”).
278 JX 5 (Klein Dep.) at 137-139; JX 11 (Reilly Dep.) at 164-165; JX 130 (Feb. 9, 2015 RBC presentation regarding TRA
value); JX 162 (Mar. 10, 2015 RBC email attaching questions regarding TRAs).
279 JX 221 (Merger Agreement) § 5.4(g); seeLender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *25 (“In this case, the most persuasive
explanation is that the existence of an incumbent trade bidder holding an unlimited match right was a sufficient deterrent
to prevent other parties from perceiving a realistic path to success.... Without a realistic path to success, it made no sense
to get involved.”). Fortune's Vice President of M & A confirmed that “the team at Fortune understood that unlimit[ed]
matching rights would discourage potential bidders in a go-shop process.” JX 12 (Baab Dep.) 99-100. And, Fortune's
CEO touted Fortune's match right when instructing RBC how to dissuade potential go-shop participants from bidding. JX
232 (e-mail chain between RBC, Klein and other members of Fortune's deal team, Apr. 7, 2015).
280 In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 119-20 (Del. Ch. 2007).
281 TT 289:1-7 (Subramanian).
282 PTO ¶ 2ee. As noted, the Go-Shop Period began on March 30, 2015. PTO ¶ 2cc.
283 JX 229 (Buller TSA); JX 230 (SKM TSA); JX 231 (Trimaran TSA).
284 JX 232 (e-mail chain between RBC, Klein and other members of Fortune's deal team, Apr. 7, 2015) (RBC describing its
planned efforts to dissuade potential buyers); id. (Klein expressing his interest in RBC “shutting the door on [potential
buyers] and their willingness to look at [Norcraft]”).
285 DFC, 172 A.3d at 366. Respondent advanced deal price less synergies as reflecting Norcraft's fair value. Accordingly,
it was Respondent's burden to prove the reliability of Norcraft's deal process. Respondent, however, failed to meet
that burden—its witnesses struggled to recall basic aspects of the deal process and its valuation expert presented
only a cursory, mostly conclusory, analysis of that process. Petitioners, on the other hand, presented credible evidence
demonstrating that deal price less synergies is not a reliable indicator of Norcraft's fair value.
286 This, of course, means that I give no weight to Austin Smith's deal price less synergies valuation.
287 D.I. 91.
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288 SeeAOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *10, n.118 (declining to engage in an extensive analysis of the efficient market hypothesis
when the parties did not present either an argument to that effect or sufficient evidence to allow the court to undertake
the analysis on its own).
289 JX 216 (e-mail from RBC to Biggart, Mar. 29, 2015, attaching RBC presentation on Norcraft) at FB0047792, FB0047795.
290 See JX 68 (Sept. 18, 2014 Fortune Presentation) at FB0089499; JX 215 (Citi Board Discussion Materials) at FB0049833.
291 See JX 215 (Citi Board Discussion Materials) at FB0049845.
292 SeeDell, 177 A.3d at 25 (“A market [for a company's stock] is more likely efficient, or semi-strong efficient, if [the company]
has many stockholders; no controlling stockholder; ‘highly active trading’; and if information about the company is widely
available and easily disseminated to the market.” (quoting DFC, 172 A.3d at 373-74) ).
293 SeeVerition P'rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 2018 WL 922139, at *24 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (“DFC and
Dell teach that if a company's shares trade in a market having attributes consistent with the assumptions underlying a
traditional version of the semi-strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, then the unaffected trading price
provides evidence of the fair value of a proportionate interest in the company as a going concern.” (footnote omitted) ).
294 MG. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 525-26 (Del. 1999).
295 IQ Hldgs., Inc., 2013 WL 4056207, at *1 (quoting Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL 1152338, at *8 (Del.
Ch. May 20, 2004) ) (internal quotation omitted); see alsoMerion Capital, 2013 WL 3793896, at *5; James R. Hitchner,
Financial Valuation: Applications and Models 291-93, 297 (4th ed. 2017) (cited in JX 21 (Clarke Rebuttal Report) ).
296 In re Orchard Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (“Reliance on a comparable companies or
comparable transactions approach is improper where the purported ‘comparables’ involve significantly different products
or services than the company whose appraisal is at issue, or vastly different multiples.”); see also Hitchner, supra, at
292-93.
297 See JX 13 (Biggart Dep.) at 75:1-76:23, 152:22-153:1 (explaining he could not recall any precedent transaction in
the dealer channel since 2010). Many of the precedent transactions identified by Austin Smith preceded the Norcraft-
Fortune Merger by three or more years during a time in which the housing market was still recovering from the Great
Recession. See JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 14 (Precedent Transaction Method) (showing that 11 out of the 16
transactions predated 2012). The remaining transactions involved very small, non-public companies, making them unfit
for comparison. See id. Under these circumstances, I see no reason to dwell on a precedent transaction analysis in
determining Norcraft's fair value on the Merger date. SeeMerion Capital, 2013 WL 3793896, at *5 (“The utility of a market-
based method depends on actually having companies that are sufficiently comparable that their trading multiples provide
a relevant insight into the subject company's own growth prospects.”); see also Hitchner, supra, at 304-06.
298 See JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 14 (Precedent Transaction Method) (showing that 11 out of the 16 transactions
predated 2012); JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 4 n.8; JX 21 (Clarke Rebuttal Report) at 6.
299 Cf. JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 25-28 (explaining, “of the guideline public companies, [Norcraft] is most similar to
(though smaller than) American Woodmark, the only other pure-play cabinet manufacturer,” “Norcraft is significantly
smaller than most of the guideline public companies based on revenue, EBITDA, or assets”); TT 510:10-13 (Clarke) (“I
view Norcraft being somewhat unique in that regard. So these are not — you know, these are not perfect comps.”).
300 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 32, 55; TT 636:17-637:6 (Clarke); JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 29.
301 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 32, 55; TT 636:17-637:6 (Clarke); JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 29.
302 Dell, 177 A.3d at 35.
303 Merion Capital, 2013 WL 3793896, at *10 (internal citation omitted).
304 See Shannon P. Pratt & Roger J. Grabowski, Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples 223 (5th ed. 2014) (cited in JX
18 (Clarke Report) ) (“Using betas of guideline public companies for estimating a proxy beta has been found to provide
reasonably accurate estimates of the subject company”); Duff & Phelps, 2015 Valuation Handbook, Guide to Cost of
Capital 5-3 (2015) (cited in JX 18 (Clarke Report) ); Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 WL 2045640, at *15 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 19, 2005). “A company's debt capital can be measured by [gross] debt or net debt, where net debt is equal to
total debt less excess cash.” JX 23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report) at 23 (emphasis in original).
305 The capital structure used to relever the subject company's unlevered beta should also be used when calculating its
WACC (for weighting purposes). TT 854:17-857:10 (Austin Smith).
306 AOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *11 (quoting Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 332 (Del.
Ch. 2006) ). See also Shannon P. Pratt, Robert F. Reilly & Robert P. Schweihs, Valuing a Business: The Analysis
and Appraisal of Closely Held Companies 156 (4th ed. 2000) (cited in JX 18 (Clarke Report) ) (hereinafter “Valuing a
Business”).
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307 As noted, Austin Smith performed two additional DCF analyses, one relying on the Ginter 2014 Projections and another
relying on a Capitalization of Cash Flow methodology. See JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 23-24. Neither analysis,
however, formed the basis for her final conclusion regarding fair value. Seeid. at 1.
308 JX 1 (Ginter Dep.) at 27:2-28:14, 34:5-10; JX 3 (Buller Dep.) at 101:20-24.
309 JX 3 (Buller Dep.) at 115:8-18 (explaining that the Base Case projections were “something [management] felt very, very
comfortable in doing”); id. at 114:11-22; JX 1 (Ginter Dep.) at 93:23-25 (stating the Board approved the Base Case
projections); JX 11 (Reilly Dep.) at 55:9-19.
310 JX 3 (Buller Dep.) at 115:8-18. Cf. Petsmart, 2017 WL 230359, at * 12 (noting that the respondent company's management
characterized their projections as “bordering on being too aggressive”—even “approaching ‘insan[ity]’ ”) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks, footnote and record citation omitted).
311 TT 473-75 (Clarke) (explaining why the Base Case projections are reasonable). Austin Smith found several “significant
limitations” to the Base Case projections: (1) they were not created in the ordinary course; (2) they were not created
using the same procedure as Norcraft's annual budgets (i.e., bottoms-up); (3) they projected an additional five years of
growth after two years of already achieved growth in a cyclical industry; and (4) Ginter and Buller, who prepared the
Base Case projections, allegedly knew they were going to lose their jobs if the transaction was completed—introducing
the possibility of bias. TT 734:10-736:14 (Austin Smith). Despite all of her concerns, however, Austin Smith relied on the
Base Case projections for her primary DCF analysis. TT 737:13-23 (Austin Smith). See In re Appraisal ofAncestry.com,
Inc., 2005 WL 399726, at *18 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (noting that “in a number of cases Delaware Courts have relied
on projections that were prepared by management outside of the ordinary course of business and with the possibility
of litigation”) (collecting cases).
312 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 2.
313 Id. 2-3. Clarke “gradually reduce[d] growth rates over time until reaching the PGR,” id., by applying a “straight line reduction
in growth” from the end of the Base Case projections to the end of his additional five-year projection period. TT 606-607.
According to Clarke, “if [he] had to use 2019 as the final year of [his] projections, [he] would need to use a higher [PGR
of 4.4%] to account for the tapering of [Norcraft's] growth to a steady state.” JX 21 (Clarke Rebuttal Report) at 27 n.62.
314 JX 23 (Rebuttal Report of Yvette R. Austin Smith [“Austin Smith Rebuttal Report”] ) at 5-6.
315 Seeid. at 4-6.
316 See JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 21-22 & Ex. 3 (Indexed Growth of Norcraft Adjusted EBITDA versus Key Economic
Indicators 2013-2015); TT 21:8-9 (Eldridge) (“[B]uilding products companies are cyclical .... ”); JX 23 (Austin Smith
Rebuttal Report), Fig. 1 (Comparison of Normalized Growth Patterns); id. at Fig. 2 (Historical and Forecasted EBITDA
Margins); TT 607:23-608:1 (Clarke) (“Q: Mr. Clarke, the cabinet business is cyclical, isn't it? A. Yes.”); see also JX
23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report), Fig. 1 (Comparison of Normalized Growth Patterns); id. at Fig. 2 (Historical and
Forecasted EBITDA Margins); JX 5 (Klein Dep.) at 312:4-10. In light of this determination, I decline to apply Petitioners'
suggested 4.4% PGR since that PGR is based on an unrealistic assessment of Norcraft's future financial performance.
See JX 21 (Clarke Rebuttal Report) at 27 n.62.
317 See JX 112 (Gabelli Report) (stating, as of January 2015, “[w]e see a gradual recovery in housing that will materialize over
the next several years”); JX 535 (Fortune Investor Presentation, “Maximum Long-Term Value,” May 1, 2015) (“Expectation
is for the housing market to return to steady state (1.5 million [new construction] starts and 5-6% [average] annual [repair
and remodeling] growth) by 2017 or 2018.”). According to “accepted financial principles,” Dell, 177 A.3d at 22, “terminal
value must reflect an appropriate estimate of sustainable growth.” Pratt, supra, at 49. “[F]or cyclical businesses [ ] the
discrete [projection] period commonly corresponds to the number of years or periods until the point is reached where the
net cash flow represents an average base net cash flow expected over an entire business cycle,” i.e., until the midpoint
of the cycle. Id. at 47 (emphasis supplied); see also Robert W. Holthavsen & Mark E. Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation:
Theory, Evidence & Practice 216 (2014) (“[T]he steady state for a company in a cyclical industry should be at the midpoint
of the cycle.”). Clarke's extension of the Base Case projections posits a ten-year growth trend but does not account for
cyclicality in the cabinetry industry and the impact of such cyclicality on Norcraft's free cash flows. See JX 14 (Clarke
Dep.) at 60-61 (explaining his extension does not reflect cyclicality prior to 2025); JX 23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report),
Fig. 1 (Comparison of Normalized Growth Patterns); JX 18 (Austin Smith Report), Fig. 1 (Norcraft Net Sales and EBITDA
(Historical 2003-2014) (citing JX 99 (Norcraft Jan. 2015 Management Presentation) ) ). See alsoAOL, 2018 WL 1037450,
at *19 (“In a fast-paced industry with significant fluctuations, where management is hesitant to project beyond four years,
using a three-stage DCF model or a ten year projection period seems particularly brazen.”).
318 Pratt, supra, at 8; see also Duff & Phelps, supra, at 10-15.
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319 Pratt, supra, at 546 (“WACC generally works as a substitute for the enterprise-cash-flow discount rate.”). See also Valuing
a Business, supra, at 184.
320 Valuing a Business, supra, at 184; Duff & Phelps, supra, at 10-16.
321 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 33; JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 5 (WACC Calculation).
322 Duff & Phelps, supra, at 2-13.
323 JX 21 (Clarke Rebuttal Report) at 27.
324 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 41.
325 JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 5 (WACC Calculation). The BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield B Effective Yield
“represents the effective yield of the ICE BofA[ ] [Merrill Lynch] US Corporate B Index, a subset of the ICE BofA[ ] [Merrill
Lynch] US High Yield Master II Index tracking the performance of US dollar denominated below investment grade rated
corporate debt publically issued in the US domestic market. This subset includes all securities with a given investment
grade rating B.” ICE BofAML US High Yield B Effective Yield, retrieved from FRED, Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis;
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A2HYBEY (last visited July 24, 2018). By way of reference, Citi used a pre-tax
cost of debt of 5.3% in its calculation of Norcraft's WACC and RBC used 4.5%. See JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 41 n.91.
326 JX 267 (Norcraft FY2014 10-K) at 21; ICE BofAML US High Yield B Effective Yield, retrieved from FRED, Fed. Reserve
Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BAMLH0A2HYBEY (last visited July 24, 2018); S & P U.S. High
Yield Corporate Bond 10+ Year Index, available online at https://us.spindices.com/indices/fixed-income/sp-us-high-yield-
corporate-bond-10-year-index (last visted on July 24, 2018). The experts do not challenge each other's estimates of
Norcraft's pre-tax cost of debt. See JX 21 (Clarke Rebuttal Report) at 31 (“Austin Smith's conclusion [regarding Norcraft's
pre-tax cost of debt] is in the range of reasonableness given Norcraft's improving performance and generally positive
industry outlook as well being consistent with the financial advisors' cost of debt estimate.”).
327 This average figure tracks the ICE BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield B Effective Yield as of the Merger date (6.39%)
and the S & P U.S. High Yield Corporate Bond 10+ Year Yield to Maturity as of that date (6.34%). ICE BofAML US
High Yield B Effective Yield, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/
BAMLH0A2HYBEY (last visited July 24, 2018); S & P Dow Jones Indices LLC, S & P U.S. High Yield Corporate Bond 10+
Year Index, available online at https://us.spindices.com/indices/fixed-income/sp-us-high-yield-corporate-bond-10-year-
index (last visited on July 24, 2018).
328 Duff & Phelps, supra, at 5-1.
329 Id. at 5-3.
330 Id.; Pratt, supra, at 223. When calculating a company's beta, change in the trading price of the company's stock is
measured relative to change in the returns of the overall market (or a proxy therefor) over the relevant observation period.
JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 34.
331 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 34-35.
332 See Duff & Phelps, supra, at 5-25 and 10-17.
333 See JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 34-35.
334 See Duff & Phelps, supra, at 10-21; Pratt, supra, at 244.
335 See JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 37-39; JX 23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report) at 18-20. While Clarke found Norcraft's
observed beta “statistically relevant,” he did not rely upon that beta beyond using it to define the lower end of a range of
betas. He ultimately selected the higher end for his DCF. See JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 37-39.
336 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 51. Clarke notes in his report that RBC used all four of his chosen companies and Citi used
three of the four in their respective analyses of Norcraft. Id.
337 Id. at 48-49. Clarke's screening criteria were: (1) public company; (2) industry classification of “Building Products”; (3)
2014 Calendar Year Revenue between $40 million and $4 billion; (4) primary geographic location in the U.S. or Canada;
and (5) no recent major divestures or pending significant acquisitions. Id. Clarke's application of these criteria yielded a set
of sixty-five companies, which Clarke then screened “for companies with a minimum expected EBITDA margin of 7.5% for
fiscal year 2016 (approximately half of Norcraft's EBITDA margins) and a maximum expected EBITDA margin of 22.5%
for fiscal year 2016 (approximately 50% above Norcraft's margins). In addition, [he] screened for companies that had
forecasted 2016 revenue growth between 5% (approximately half of Norcraft's expected growth) and 15% (approximately
50% above Norcraft's expected growth). Based on those two criteria, the 65 companies were reduced to 28.” Id. at 50.
Clarke then determined that four of those companies—his four chosen GPCs—“had a primary business in manufacturing
products for the [repair and remodeling] and/or new construction residential home construction [markets].” Id.
338 Id. at 38 & sched. 5-C; JX 517 (native Excel version of Clarke's DCF model).
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339 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 39 (“An unlevered beta of 0.80 is slightly above the median and average of the one-year daily
betas of the [GPCs] (0.75 to 0.79) while slightly below the median and average two-year weekly betas of the [GPCs]
(0.81 to 0.87).”). Clarke relevered his concluded unlevered beta for Norcraft based on Norcraft's actual (observed) capital
structure as of the Merger date (75% equity, 25% debt, per Clarke). Id., sched. 5-B. This resulted in a relevered beta
for Norcraft of 0.97. Id.
340 JX 20 (Austin Smith Report) at 26 & Ex. 4 (Beta Calculation). The other ten GPCs were: Armstrong World Industries, Inc.,
Beacon Roofing Supply, Inc., Builders FirstSource, Inc., Caesarstone Ltd., Continental Building Products, Inc., Mohawk
Industries, Inc., Patrick Industries, Inc., Quanex Building Products Corporation, Trex Company, Inc. and Universal Forest
Products, Inc. Id., Ex. 4 (Beta Calculation). Austin Smith divided her sixteen GPCs into two groups: Group I (comprising
American Woodmark, Masco and Fortune), “which consists of companies operating specifically (though not exclusively)
in the cabinet market, and Group II [comprising the rest of the GPCs], which consists of companies operating in the
general residential building products sector.” Id. at 26.
341 Id., Exs. 4 (Beta Calculation) and 5 (WACC Calculation).
342 Id., Exs. 4 (Beta Calculation) and 5 (WACC Calculation). Austin Smith relevered her concluded unlevered beta for Norcraft
based on a target capital structure comprising 86% equity and 14% debt. Id., Ex. 5 (Calculation of WACC). This yielded
a relevered beta for Norcraft of 1.12. Id.
343 JX 21 (Clarke Rebuttal Report) at 28.
344 JX 23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report) at 17.
345 See JX 112 (Gabelli Report) at CITI-00053582.
346 See Pratt, supra, at 223 (“The more guideline companies used in the sample size, the better the accuracy.”); id. (“The
accuracy is also enhanced if the guideline public companies are reasonably close in size to the subject company. When
the guideline public companies are larger than the subject company, the beta estimate for the subject company is likely
biased low because of the propensity of betas of larger companies to be smaller than the betas of smaller companies.”).
My selection of GPCs is further supported by RBC and Citi's choices of GPCs. RBC included all six of the selected
companies, JX 216 (Mar. 29, 2015 e-mail from RBC to Biggart, attaching RBC presentation) at FB0047799, and Citi
included five out of the six (it did not include Masonite). JX 505 (Citi Discussion Materials for the Fairness Opinion
Committee) at CITI-00075076.
347 See Pratt, supra, at 204 (explaining that to derive a proxy beta, one will take the median or an average of the unlevered
betas). This approach also avoids additional risk for error that might flow from assigning different weights. See JX 530
(Bradford Cornell, Corporate Valuation, Tools for Effective Appraisal and Decision Making (1993) ) at 68. As previously
explained, Austin Smith derived a proxy beta for Norcraft based on the median of the unlevered betas of her selected
GPCs. JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Exs. 4 (Beta Calculation) and 5 (WACC Calculation). Clarke's proxy beta calculation,
by contrast, took into account both the median and the mean of the unlevered betas of his selected GPCs. JX 18 (Clarke
Report) at 39. My proxy beta calculation utilizes the median rather than the mean of the unlevered GPC betas. I took
that approach to account for Masonite. Austin Smith and Clarke included Masonite in their respective analyses but both
acknowledged that its business was less comparable to Norcraft than some of the other companies considered. Indeed,
Masonite exhibited a significantly lower unlevered beta that risked distorting the Court's measurement of Norcraft's relative
operating risk (if the Court were to use the mean for summary measure purposes).
348 JX 18 (Clarke Report), sched. 5-B (Cost of Equity Calculation per CAPM); JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Exs. 4 (Calculation
of Beta) and 5 (Calculation of WACC).
349 Pratt, supra, at 243. The Hamada unlevering formula is as follows:
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350 Seeid. at 262-63.
351 JX 16 (Austin Smith Dep.) at 192:5-12.
352 Id. at 192:13-16.
353 Id. at 192:18-21.
354 See JX 23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report) at 22; TT 764:1-19 (Austin Smith).
355 See TT 764:1-19; JX 23 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report) at 22.
356 TT 506:11-17 (Clarke).
357 See Duff & Phelps, supra, at 1-15, 1-16.
358 TT 859:4-16 (Austin Smith) (“Q. And you testified earlier that you found no evidence in the record which would guide
you in selecting what that target capital structure would be for Norcraft. Correct? A. That's right. Q. And so you had to
use the data from comparable companies. Correct? A. Right. Q. And just to be explicit, there's no evidence in the record
that Norcraft had any expectation of changing its capital structure after the transaction. Correct? A. That's correct.”).
Austin Smith herself recognizes that use of a target capital structure is only appropriate when “the company's existing
capital structure is not equal to the company's target capital structure.” JX 23 (Austin Smith Report) at 21-22. According
to Austin Smith, Clarke's estimation of Norcraft's actual capital structure as of the Merger date is erroneous because it
fails to account for Buller et al.'s ownership of Norcraft LLC units convertible into a 12.3% equity ownership interest in
Norcraft (in the form of shares of Norcraft common stock). Id. at 21. Austin Smith's criticism in this regard is based on
her (apparent) assumption that the conversion of the Norcraft LLC units into Norcraft common stock would not affect
the per share trading price of that stock. See id. (calculating Norcraft's fully diluted market capitalization on the Merger
date without adjusting for the potential dilutive effect of a Norcraft-LLC-unit-to-Norcraft-common-stock conversion on
the per share trading value of Norcraft common stock). Upon reviewing the record, it is unclear how such a conversion
would affect Norcraft's market capitalization—and, by extension, the equity component of Norcraft's capital structure. In
addition, Austin Smith's calculation of Norcraft's fully diluted market capitalization on the Merger date does not account
for the exercise of all outstanding options on Norcraft stock on that date. See id. (“The total equity in Norcraft['s] capital
structure was $452 million ... not the $396 [million] calculated by Mr. Clarke. The operating cash flows of Norcraft were
supported not just by the equity of Norcraft Inc. but also by [Buller et al.'s] ownership interest [in Norcraft] LLC.”); but
cf.id. at 13 & n.25 (“[Norcraft's] implied fully diluted market capitalization was $532 million based on the transaction price
of $25.50 [multiplied by] 20,869,976 fully diluted shares [outstanding].”) (emphasis supplied). Moreover, as previously
noted, Austin Smith's calculation of Norcraft's fully diluted shares outstanding as of the Merger date is inconsistent with
the information set forth in Norcraft's Form 10-Q for Q1 FY2015 and the Funds Flow Memorandum prepared in connection
with the Merger. The inclusion of all options on Norcraft stock outstanding as of the Merger date in the equity component
of Norcraft's fully diluted capital structure (together with all Norcraft common stock and convertible Norcraft LLC units
outstanding on that date) implies a capital structure of approximately 76% equity and 24% debt. I am satisfied, therefore,
that Clarke's estimation of Norcraft's actual capital structure on the Merger date captures Norcraft's “operative reality” on
that date. Accordingly, I have adopted that estimation.
359 For these same reasons, I refer to that same capital structure to calculate Norcraft's WACC (for weighting purposes).
360 The calculation of Norcraft's NOPAT (and unlevered free cash flow) for FY2015 is based on the Base Case projections for
the May-December 2015 period. Hence the “Stub” notation. Austin Smith took this same approach in her DCF analysis.
JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis). I have adopted Austin Smith's approach in this regard, given that the
operative valuation date here is May 12, 2015 (the Merger date).
361 See JX 18 (Clarke Report), sched. 2-A (DCF Analyis); JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis). In calculating
the period-over-period change in Norcraft's NWC, both experts excluded Norcraft's current TRA liability in each of the
projected years. JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis) (“Working capital excludes tax-related items.”); see JX
517 (native Excel version of Clarke's DCF model). The rationale for this exclusion appears to be that Norcraft's payment
obligations under the TRAs are non-ordinary-course, non-operating liabilities. See JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 29, 46. It is,
therefore, more accurate to describe the experts' respective NWC-related computations as calculating period-over-period
change in Norcraft's net operating working capital (“NOWC”). The Court's calculation of period-over-period change in
Norcraft's NWC—or rather, its NOWC—likewise excludes Norcraft's current TRA liability in each of the projected years.
I also note that both experts departed from the Base Case projections' forecast of Norcraft's “current portion of long-
term debt” in FYs 2018 and 2019. See JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis); JX 517 (native Excel version
of Clarke's DCF model); JX 509 (native Excel version of Base Case projections). Both experts projected a $1.5 million
figure for each year, whereas the Base Case projects zero for both years. Compare JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6
- 37 -
Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Companies, Inc., Not Reported in Atl....
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 38
(DCF Analysis) and JX 517 (native Excel version of Clarke's DCF model), with JX 509 (native Excel version of Base Case
projections). The record is unclear as to why, exactly, the experts chose to depart from the Base Case in this particular
respect. Nevertheless, because both experts made the same adjustment to the Base Case projections with regard to
Norcraft's “current portion of long-term debt” in FYs 2018 and 2019, i have followed suit.
362 JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 43 (“I calculated [Norcraft's] terminal value using the Perpetuity Growth Method[.]”); JX 20 (Austin
Smith Report) at 20 (“To calculate [Norcraft's] terminal value I relied upon the Gordon Growth (or Perpetuity Growth)
model.”).
363 In the Perpetuity Growth model, the capitalization rate is calculated as the positive difference between the applicable
discount rate and the subject company's PGR. JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 43. I have used Norcraft's WACC (10.60%) as
the applicable discount rate and a 3.5% PGR for Norcraft, which together imply a capitalization rate of 7.10%.
364 Id. Mindful of Clarke's justified criticism of Austin Smith's calculation of Norcraft's terminal year free cash flow, my
calculation of that value adjusts for the fact that Norcraft's projected depreciation and amortization expense in the
final year of the Base Case projections (FY2019) exceeds Norcraft's projected capital expenditures in that year by
approximately $100,000. The adjustment entails implying a 3:4 relationship between Norcraft's depreciation/amortization
expense and capital expenditures in perpetuity and thereby avoids “underinvesting in net PP & E.” JX 21 (Clarke
Rebuttal Report) at 25; see Hitchner, supra, at 138 (“[I]n a growing business, long-term annual estimated capital
expenditures exceed annual depreciation, primarily due to inflation.”); see also Gilbert E. Matthews & Arthur H.
Rosenbloom, Delaware's Unwarranted Assumption that Capex Should Equal Depreciation in a DCF Model, (May 15,
2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/05/15/delawares-unwarranted-assumption-in-dcfpricing/ (“The assumption
that depreciation equals capital expenditures is only appropriate if it is also assumed that there is no growth and no
inflation. However,... the normalized capital expenditures of a [perpetually] growing company must materially exceed
depreciation over time.”).
365 Both experts added Norcraft's estimated excess cash to its operating value in order to calculate the Company's total
equity value. JX 18 (Clarke Report), sched. 2-A (DCF Analysis); JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis). The
experts differed, however, in how they calculated Norcraft's excess cash and thus reached different estimates of that
figure. As noted, Austin Smith calculated Norcraft's excess cash on the Merger date based on the “Cash from Norcraft”
figure in the “Funds Flow Memorandum” for the Merger ($54,396,335.01), JX 249 at 2, less a $20 million cash balance
(cash for operations, per the Base Case projections), plus the product of (1) Norcraft's total options outstanding as of
the Merger date (1,142,383) and (2) the weighted average exercise price of those options ($16.01). JX 20 (Austin Smith
Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis). Clarke, by contrast, calculated Norcraft's excess cash on the Merger date as the sum of
(1) the cash balance indicated in Norcraft's Q1 FY2015 Form 10-Q ($63,135,000), JX 248 at 4, and (2) the Merger-related
fees indicated in that same filing ($1.2 million), less $20 million cash for operations (per the Base Case projections). JX
18 (Clarke Report) at 45. I have adopted Clarke's approach, but have added to his excess cash figure Norcraft's cash
receipts from the exercise of all options outstanding on the Merger date (1,142,383) at the weighted average exercise
price ($16.01). JX 248 (Norcraft's Q1 FY2015 Form 10-Q) at 14. I find that this holistic approach best approximates
Norcraft's “operative reality” as of the Merger date.
366 Clarke valued the TRA-related tax benefits realized by Norcraft in each of the projected years at $4.4 million, JX 18 (Clarke
Report) at 46, while Austin Smith valued them at $4.2 million. JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 7 (Tax Characteristics
Analysis). Having considered each expert's (quite complicated) approach to valuing those tax benefits, I find that both
approaches—and both resulting valuations—are reasonable (they differ by approximately $200,000). Accordingly, I have
adopted the average of the experts' respective value estimates.
367 Like Clarke and Austin Smith, I have drawn this figure directly from Norcraft's Q1 FY2015 Form 10-Q. JX 248 (Norcraft's
Q1 FY2015 Form 10-Q) at 4; JX 18 (Clarke Report) at 47; JX 20 (Austin Smith Report), Ex. 6 (DCF Analysis).
368 JX 248 (Norcraft's Q1 FY2015 Form 10-Q) at 11.
369 SeeAOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *2 (“I take the parties' suggestion to ascribe full weight to a [DCF] analysis ... [and thus]
relegate transaction price to a role as a check on that DCF valuation: any such valuation significantly departing from even
the problematic deal price here should cause me to closely revisit my assumptions.”).
370 I am mindful that “[t]he issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest possible bid. Rather,
the key inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value and were not exploited.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33. Here, in light of the
identified flaws in Norcraft's deal process (pre- and post-sign), I find it more likely than not that the Board “left a portion
of [Norcraft's] fundamental value on the table.” Verition P'rs Master Fund, 2018 WL 922139, at *44.
371 SeeAOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *2.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
CHANDLER, J.
*1  This action, brought under 8 Del. C. § 262, seeks
an appraisal of 652,400 shares of 800–JR Cigar, Inc.
(“Respondent,” “JR Cigar” or the “Company”) held of record
by Cede & Co. (“Petitioner” or “Cede”) for the benefit of
various investment funds. This Opinion determines the fair
value of those shares, together with an appropriate rate of
interest. For the reasons set forth in greater detail below, I
conclude that the fair value of JR Cigar stock as of the merger
date is $13.58 per share. The Company must pay Petitioner
$8,859,592. In addition, I award Petitioner 4.73% interest on
the principal, compounded monthly, from October 4, 2000 to
the date of payment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Stipulated Facts
On August 29, 2000, pursuant to a merger agreement dated
the day before, the Rothman family commenced an offer to
purchase all shares of common stock of JR Cigar that they did
not already own. The Rothmans, before the offer, owned 78%
of the outstanding common shares of JR Cigar. After the offer
closed on September 26, 2000, the Rothmans, through an
acquisition corporation owned by them, beneficially owned
over 90% of the outstanding shares of JR Cigar. Because the
Rothmans owned more than 90% of the outstanding shares
following the offer, the merger was accomplished pursuant to
8 Del. C. § 253.1 The merger became effective on October 4,
2000.
Under the merger agreement, each share of common stock
outstanding immediately before the merger was converted
into the right to receive $13.00 per share in cash. From before
the offer commenced, through the effective date of the merger,
Cede & Co. was the record owner, on behalf of the Royce
family of funds, of 652,400 shares of JR Cigar. Petitioner
complied with the provisions of 8 Del. C. § 262 and is entitled
to a determination of the fair value of, and payment for, the JR
Cigar shares it held as of the date the merger became effective.
The only issue in this case is the fair value of Petitioner's
shares, together with the appropriate rate of interest. The
matter was tried on October 15, 2003. There were only two
live witnesses: Petitioner's expert and Respondent's expert.
Testimony of Lewis Rothman, JR Cigar's President and CEO,
was introduced by deposition designation.
B. The Experts
Cede's expert, Charles DeVinney, has his MBA in Finance, is
Vice President of Curtis Financial Group, Inc., an Accredited
Senior Appraiser, and a Chartered Financial Analyst.
DeVinney is in the business of appraising companies. He used
two methods to value JR Cigar. First, he looked at transactions
comparable to the acquisition of JR Cigar. Based on these
purportedly comparable transactions, DeVinney found that
JR Cigar was worth $16.80 per share as of October 4, 2000,
the date the merger became effective. Second, DeVinney
performed a discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis. His DCF
analysis resulted in an estimated fair value of $19.80 per
share. Placing equal weight on the two valuation methods,
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DeVinney opined that JR Cigar was worth between $16.80
and $19.80 per share.
*2  JR Cigar's expert, Dr. Gregg Jarrell, is a Professor
of Economics and Finance at the University of Rochester's
William E. Simon Graduate School of Business. Jarrell holds
a Ph.D. in Business Economics and was formerly the Chief
Economist for the SEC. He teaches graduate courses in
finance, is well-published, and has served as an expert witness
in several valuation cases. In rendering his opinion, Jarrell
relied principally on a DCF analysis, but he also conducted
two market-based analyses to verify his DCF analysis. First,
he performed what he referred to as a “market check,” which
consisted of a determination of whether other reasonably
bona fide offers were made for JR Cigar. Second, Jarrell
conducted an analysis of the control premium in this case as
compared to control premiums obtained in over 2,000 other
deals during a five-year period. He concluded that the fair
value of JR Cigar was $12.67 per share.
As noted, both experts testified at trial. Additionally, both
experts prepared a report shortly before trial summarizing
their valuation work. Those reports, along with numerous
other documents, were introduced as exhibits at trial.2
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Under 8 Del. C. § 262, dissenting stockholders are entitled
to their pro rata share of the “fair value” of the corporation
in which they held stock before the merger. “Accordingly,
the Court of Chancery's task in an appraisal proceeding
is to value what has been taken from the shareholder,
i.e., the proportionate interest in the going concern.”3 “The
application of a discount to a shareholder is contrary to
the requirement that the company be viewed as a ‘going
concern’.”4 But the valuation is “exclusive of any element
of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of
the merger,”5 although it may “encompass known elements
of value” not the product of speculation.6
The corporation may be valued “by any techniques or
methods which are generally considered acceptable in the
financial community and otherwise admissible in court.”7
In recent years, the DCF valuation methodology has
featured prominently in this Court because it “is the
approach that merits the greatest confidence” within the
financial community.8 In appropriate cases, this Court has
relied exclusively on DCF models.9 Regardless of the
methodology, however, this Court prefers valuations based
on management projections available as of the date of
the merger and holds a healthy skepticism for post-merger
adjustments to management projections or the creation of
new projections entirely. Expert valuations that disregard
contemporaneous management projections are sometimes
completely discounted.10
In this proceeding, “both sides have the burden of proving
their respective valuation positions by a preponderance of the
evidence.”11 If neither party satisfies its burden, however, the
Court must use its own independent judgment to determine
fair value.12 The Court can reject the views of both experts.13
III. ANALYSIS
*3  In this section, I evaluate the respective valuations of
the parties' experts. I begin with DeVinney's comparable
transactions analysis, turn to the dueling DCF models,
assess Jarrell's “market checks,” and then reach the Court's
determination as to the fair value of JR Cigar as of October
4, 2000.
A. DeVinney's Comparable Transactions Analysis
DeVinney used the comparable transactions found in Merrill
Lynch's “Presentation to the Special Committee of the Board
of Directors of Leaf.”14 A special committee of JR Cigar's
Board of Directors retained Merrill Lynch to advise them in
connection with the then-proposed merger, and it rendered
a fairness opinion dated August 28, 2000.15 “Merrill Lynch
noted that nearly all of the Comparable Transactions represent
the acquisition of control of the target company which may
not be directly comparable to the acquisition of a minority
stake of a target company, as in the Offer and the Merger.”16
Nonetheless, “Merrill Lynch determined a reference multiple
range LTM [latest twelve months] EBITDA [earnings before
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amoritization] for the
Company of 6.0x to 7.5x, resulting in a reference range for an
implied value per Share of $12.00 to $15.50.”17 Merrill Lynch
found that “the most comparable transaction,” one involving
Swisher International, “represents 6.2x LTM EBITDA or
$12.00 per share.”18 The Swisher International transaction
was the most comparable because, like the JR Cigar deal, it
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did not involve a change of control. But even that transaction,
as well as all the other “comparable” transactions, involved
companies that manufacture cigars and related products.19 JR
Cigar is not a manufacturer; it only sells cigars, cigarettes, and
related products .20
DeVinney looked at the same set of transactions as Merrill
Lynch, but altered their calculations in one significant respect.
One of the transactions reviewed by Merrill Lynch was
Swedish Match's acquisition of General Cigar. Merrill Lynch
calculated the LTM EBITDA multiple in that transaction at
10.4x. DeVinney calculated the multiple at 12.8x because he
included EBITDA of General Cigar for a 13–week period
ending after the transaction was announced. During this
period, General Cigar's EBITDA declined, which has the
effect of inflating the transaction multiple. I cannot discern
any principled basis for this alteration of General Cigar's
EBITDA. As DeVinney admitted on cross-examination,
Swedish Match did not use the post-transaction EBITDA data
in arriving at its offer price.21 Moreover, Merrill Lynch did
not use the post-transaction EBITDA data, even though it
advised Swedish Match on the transaction and had “expertise
in evaluating similar transactions.”22
Moreover, contrary to DeVinney's expert report,23 the
Swedish Match transaction is not comparable to the
transaction in this case. Swedish Match's acquisition of
General Cigar was, unlike the going private merger here,
a strategic acquisition.24 The synergistic nature of the deal
accounts for some of the premium, which DeVinney conceded
on cross-examination.25 Additionally, Swedish Match was
acquiring 64% of the equity of General Cigar. Again,
DeVinney testified on cross-examination that this “may
explain some of the premium.”26 Merrill Lynch, also Swedish
Match's advisor, determined that the transaction in that case
was not the most comparable to the JR Cigar merger. Merrill
Lynch's opinion was that the Swisher International transaction
was the most comparable.27 The Swisher transaction multiple
was 6.2x, less than half of the “adjusted” multiple DeVinney
derived for the Swedish Match transaction.28
*4  The problems identified above render DeVinney's
comparable transactions analysis unreliable. Most of these
errors were exposed on cross-examination, as he was unable
to fully defend his methodology. Witnessing DeVinney's
testimony first-hand convinces me once again that “no
substitute has ever been found for cross-examination as a
means of ... reducing exaggerated statements to their true
dimensions.”29
B. Discounted Cash Flow Analysis of DeVinney and Jarrell
The DCF method estimates the value of a business such
as JR Cigar based on projected future free cash flows
that are discounted to present value, Based on a DCF
analysis, DeVinney concluded that the fair value of JR Cigar
was $19.80 per share. Jarrell, using the same basic DCF
methodology, concluded that the range of fair value of JR
Cigar was from $11.76 to $13.58 per share. By way of
comparison, Merrill Lynch performed a DCF analysis in
connection with its fairness opinion that produced a reference
range for an implied value per share of $9.49 to $12.63.30
The parties agree that most of the difference between the
experts' DCF calculations is the result of four variables: (1) JR
Cigar's estimated growth rate in perpetuity; (2) the Company's
debt-to-equity ratio; (3) the Ibbotson equity size premium
applied in the capital asset pricing model (CAPM); and (4)
JR Cigar's tax rate.31 The latter three factors collectively
contribute to JR Cigar's weighted average cost of capital
(WACC), which is used to discount future cash flows. I will
discuss each variable in turn.
1. Growth Rate in Perpetuity
In a DCF valuation, the cash flow is projected for each year
into the future for a period of years, typically five. After that
point, one uses a single value representing all subsequent
cash flows to calculate a company's terminal value. The
terminal value may be determined by using multiples from
comparable transactions, referred to as an exit multiple, or
may be ascertained by assuming a constant growth rate
after the initial five year forecast period, i.e., the growth
rate in perpetuity. The terminal value calculation is critical
here because it represents well over half of JR Cigar's total
estimated present value.32
Jarrell used the perpetuity growth approach and computed
a range of values based on growth rates of 2.5% to
3.5%, rates equal to or exceeding the long-term rate of
inflation.33 DeVinney used both the comparable transactions
approach and the perpetuity growth approach to calculate
JR Cigar's terminal value. DeVinney used the multiple of
8.5x (ascertained in his comparable transaction analysis) and
applied that multiple to JR Cigar's estimated 2004 EBITDA.
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DeVinney also used a perpetuity growth rate of 5%.34
DeVinney opined that each method of calculating terminal
value is equally appropriate and averaged the two indications
of value.
Regardless of whether ascertaining a company's terminal
value by applying a transaction multiple is appropriate as a
matter of finance theory, I have already determined that the
8.5x multiple derived by DeVinney is unreliable and should
not be used in any DCF analysis. As such, in determining the
terminal value of JR Cigar, the analysis is necessarily limited
to the appropriate perpetual growth rate. DeVinney on cross-
examination agreed that this was the appropriate route if the
Court concluded that his comparable transaction analysis was
not valid.35
*5  Although DeVinney's report is silent as to the rationale
for using a 5% growth rate into perpetuity, at trial he indicated
reliance on a document prepared by Fleet Bank, N.A.36
DeVinney testified on direct examination that “it appears
that there were management projections provided to Fleet
that utilized a five percent growth rate through 2009.”37 The
document at issue does in fact show 5% growth from 2000
through 2009 and includes small type in the lower left that
reads “Management Case.” Jarrell testified, however, that
upon conversation with JR Cigar's CFO Michael Colleton,
he understood that JR Cigar had not prepared projections
beyond five years.38 Moreover, he testified that it appeared
from the face of the document that Fleet merely extrapolated
upon management's five-year projections.39 This conclusion
is sustainable given that only five-year projections are
shown in another portion of the document that discusses the
“Management Case.”40
Petitioner is anxious to have the Fleet document characterized
as a “management projection” because of the Court's
preference for such projections. After reviewing the
document and after considering the testimony of both
experts, however, I cannot conclude with confidence that
the projections in the Fleet document for the years 2004
to 2009 are actually “management projections.” Petitioner
attempts to create the inference that the later year projections
were management's with several novel arguments that, to be
candid, are mostly sophistry. The bottom line is that nothing
in the document states affirmatively that JR Cigar provided
Fleet with ten-year projections and Colleton stated that this
was because JR Cigar did not give Fleet such projections.
Because I cannot safely conclude that management projected
growth of 5% after 2004 does not mean that calculating
JR Cigar's terminal value based on such a growth rate is
inaccurate. Nor does it mean, presumptively, that Jarrell's
lower perpetual growth rate of 2.5% to 3.5% is accurate. The
lack of definite, long-term management projections simply
means that the experts, and ultimately this Court, must
ascertain some independently justifiable growth rate with
which to calculate JR Cigar's terminal value.
In Jarrell's opinion, JR Cigar's likely growth rate in the long-
term was only at or slightly above the rate of inflation.41
Jarrell based this opinion initially on the fact that the
management forecasted growth rate of 5% for 2000 to 2004
was modest and that it is “quite common and normal in
discounted cash flow analysis to observe a higher growth rate
in the forecast period than in the perpetuity period.”42 Jarrell
buttressed this opinion with empirical and contemporaneous
evidence that sales of JR Cigar's two main products, cigars
and cigarettes, were on the decline.43 Merrill Lynch's
presentation to JR Cigar shows that sales of premium cigars
were on the decline.44 Rothman testified in his deposition
that sales of premium cigars were on the decline.45 And since
the early 1980s, there has been a “steep and steady” decline
in the domestic consumption of cigarettes.46 Based on the
foregoing, Jarrell testified that it was “conservative on behalf
of the petitioners, to assume that over the long haul after 2004
that this company's sales, dollar sales, will keep up with the
inflation rate.”47
*6  In support of using a 5% perpetual growth rate, Petitioner
turns back to the Fleet document. In that document, prepared
as part of a credit offering, Fleet notes JR Cigar's impressive
pre–2000 results and that “the U.S. cigar market [was]
expected to grow by 2.0% to 5 .0% in the medium to long
term.”48 Additionally, in his deposition, Rothman noted that,
although cigar prices were declining, JR Cigar's revenues
grew by 10.6% in 1999 and that the Company increased its
market share.49 Perhaps realizing that JR Cigar's performance
before 2000 was no indication of growth beyond the year
2004, especially given the declining state of the domestic
market, Petitioner offered a couple of other rationales for
a 5% perpetual growth rate. First, DeVinney testified that
JR Cigar could eliminate competitors in a declining market
due to its advantageous distribution systems.50 Second,
Petitioner hypothesized that JR Cigar could have seized upon
international sales, sales over the internet, and sales in non-
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tobacco related products to grow at 5% in perpetuity in spite
of a declining domestic market.51
As to international expansion, there is simply no record
support for this theory. It is the product of speculation. As to
the sale of non-tobacco related products, again, there is no
record support that JR Cigar had any plans to enhance revenue
in this fashion. In fact, JR Cigar's already minimal sales of
fragrances and other merchandise declined in 2000 from the
previous year.52
The most compelling rationale offered by Petitioner for
JR Cigar's ability to maintain growth at 5% is through
the elimination of competitors. This rationale has some
historical support. Rothman testified that JR Cigar increased
revenues and market share in the late 1990s even though the
tobacco market was beginning to contract.53 Notwithstanding
Rothman's testimony, there is no persuasive evidence that
JR Cigar's ability to sustain growth in the face of an initial
market decline would have translated into long-term growth
prospects. Increased market share could explain the 5%
growth forecasted by management in years 2000 to 2004, but
it does not follow that JR Cigar would grow by 5% per year
into perpetuity. Additionally, increasing market share when
the market is declining overall is not a recipe for growth: half
of two is one, but all of one is still one.
The problem with ascertaining a growth rate in perpetuity is
that it is an inherently speculative enterprise, Jarrell, under
questioning by the Court, was refreshingly candid when
he stated: “Who knows what the growth rate in perpetuity
is going to be. It's a judgment call.”54 The experts, and
ultimately the Court, are asked to surmise what rate a
company will grow at five years into the future. This is
hardly an exact science. In this type of circumstance it is
difficult (if not impossible) for litigants to “prov[e] their
respective valuation positions by a preponderance of the
evidence.”55 Nevertheless, the Court must assess whether one
expert's judgment is more defensible than the other. And, on
this record, it appears that Jarrell's judgment that JR Cigar's
growth rate in perpetuity is at or slightly above the rate
of inflation is more credible. Jarrell used a range of 2.5%
(roughly equal to the long-term rate of inflation in 2000) to
3.5% in his DCF analysis.56 In my opinion, the upper end
of that range is appropriate and fair. Using a rate of 3.5%
accounts for the possibility, however marginal, that JR Cigar
may be able to expand in an otherwise declining domestic
market for cigars and cigarettes.
2. Debt–to–Equity Ratio
*7  Under a DCF analysis, JR Cigar's future cash flows must
be discounted to present value. DeVinney and Jarrell based
their discount rates on the weighted average cost of capital
(“WACC”) methodology. DeVinney explained WACC quite
concisely at trial: “It's the cost of equity times the percentage
of equity in the capital structure plus the cost of debt times that
percentage of debt.”57 The parties dispute the “percentage
of debt” part of this equation, primarily because the more
weight one gives to debt, the lower the discount rate and the
higher the valuation.58 Petitioner argues that the appropriate
percentage of debt to ascribe to JR Cigar is 25%. Respondent
urges a debt percentage of 10% or less.
Respondent's position that 10% debt is appropriate is based on
three factors. First, before the merger, JR Cigar had no debt.59
Second, Jarrell testified that at the time of the transaction JR
Cigar did not anticipate any large capital expenditures and that
management believed that the Company optimally was run
with minimal debt.60 Third, Jarrell noted that the only other
publicly-traded retail cigar company operated with no debt.61
Petitioner's support for 25% debt-allocation is based on
four factors. First, Petitioner points to JR Cigar's pre-IPO
capital structure, which was approximately 17% debt.62
Second, DeVinney opined that 25% debt was similar to that
of comparable companies.63 Third, Petitioner argues that
JR Cigar had expansion opportunities that would require
additional capital. And, fourth, Petitioner notes that JR Cigar
borrowed $55 million for the merger.64
Reviewing the record and submissions by the parties, I
am convinced that the appropriate percentage of debt for
the WACC calculation is 10%. The pre-IPO structure is
not indicative of JR Cigar's going-forward capital structure
precisely because it was “pre-IPO.” The IPO was in 1997,
three years before the valuation date, and the IPO was
used to reduce JR Cigar's debt.65 Moreover, the comparable
companies relied upon by Petitioner are not comparable.
The companies used as reference points by DeVinney are
manufacturing companies, not retailers. DeVinney conceded
on cross-examination that the capital structure of those
companies “would be different most likely.”66 As noted
above, the only other publicly-traded retail cigar company
had no debt. Finally, although I agree that JR Cigar may
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have pursued expansion opportunities, no evidence exists to
suggest that those opportunities would have required such
debt as to justify a 25% capital allocation, especially since
management did not plan on incurring significant debt and
since the Company already had over $13 million in cash and
equivalents as of June 30, 2000.67
Petitioner's final justification for a 25% debt allocation is that
JR Cigar incurred $55 million of debt to finance the merger.
Petitioner's argument is that “[t]he merger did not enhance
JR Cigar's ability to borrow; therefore valuing it based on its
optimal capital structure instead of its actual capital structure
does not contravene, but instead comports with, 8 Del C.
262(h).”68 Although Petitioner cites to ONTI, Inc. v. Integra
Bank,69 that case does not support Petitioner's argument.
In ONTI, this Court decided that certain transactions that
affected the valuation were “not the product of speculation”
and were in place at the time of the merger, “as Cede
requires.”70 Nothing in ONTI supports the position the merger
itself, in this case the debt incurred because of the merger, can
be included as an element of value. Petitioner's consideration
of such debt contravenes the valuation statute's command to
appraise shares “exclusive of any element of value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger.”71
Additionally, the fact that the merger did not enhance JR
Cigar's ability to borrow does not condone ignoring its actual
capital structure in favor of some “optimal capital structure.”
In In re Radiology Assocs., Inc.,72 the petitioner argued that
the respondent's debt to equity ratio should mimic the overall
industry's debt-to-equity ratio because it was more efficacious
than the respondent's actual debt-to-equity ratio. The Court
dismissed this effort because an appraisal proceeding does
“not attempt [ ] to determine the potential maximum value of
the company.”73 I must value JR Cigar, “not some theoretical
company.”74
*8  JR Cigar had no debt before the merger. Petitioner has
introduced no evidence of non-speculative plans to incur
significant debt that is not due to the accomplishment of
the merger. Therefore, a capital structure of 25% debt is not
appropriate. A debt ratio of 10% is, however, reasonable and
accounts for the probability that JR Cigar may seek to incur
limited debt to pursue expansion opportunities.
3. Ibbotson Equity Size Premium
The parties also disagree about another component of the
WACC formula–the cost of equity. A standard method of
ascertaining the cost of equity is CAPM. CAPM is based
on the premise that the expected return of a security equals
the rate on a risk-free security plus a risk premium. Under
CAPM the cost of equity is equal to the risk-free rate (the
yield on 20 year Treasury bonds) plus a large company equity
risk premium multiplied by the specific company adjusted
beta for JR Cigar. Added to this figure is an equity size
premium. An equity size premium is added because smaller
companies have higher returns on average than larger ones,75
i.e., small companies have a higher cost of equity. The equity
size premium for all sized companies is published by Ibbotson
Associates.
Both experts used CAPM to derive JR Cigar's cost of equity,
but applied different equity size premiums. Both used a chart
published in Ibbotson to find the premium.76 The Ibbotson
chart indicates that the size premium for companies with
capitalization between $192 and $840 million is 1.1%, the
“low-cap” category. The premium is 2.6% for companies with
capitalization below $192 million, the “micro-cap” category.
DeVinney added an equity size premium of 1.1%, while
Jarrell added 2.6%. Jarrell placed JR Cigar in the micro-cap
category because its market capitalization, based on the traded
price of the stock before the announcement of the merger (or
based on the merger price), was well below $192 million.77
On the other hand, DeVinney placed JR Cigar in the low-cap
category because he “determined that the value, the market
capitalization, should be more at the fair value implied market
capitalization.”78 DeVinney made this determination because
the stock price was, in his opinion, depressed.79
Respondent argues that basing the equity size premium on JR
Cigar's implied fair value contravenes finance theory. When
asked on cross-examination if the Ibbotson text suggested
that his methodology was sound, DeVinney answered in
the negative.80 Jarrell testified that implying the fair value,
rather than using a market measurement, is somewhat circular
because the whole purpose of the DCF analysis is to
ascertain JR Cigar's fair value.81 Additionally, Jarrell testified
that the Ibbotson data already incorporates illiquidity and
depressed values since it is derived exclusively from traded
stock prices.82 Although one valuation textbook suggests
that simply estimating the market value of the equity is
appropriate for some WACC calculations,83 it does not state
whether it is appropriate to imply a fair value to determine the
equity size premium, a number derived from actual market
prices.
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*9  Regardless of whether or not adjusting the equity size
premium based on implied fair value is appropriate in some
circumstances, I ultimately determine that the record in this
case does not support DeVinney's methodology. According to
Petitioner, JR Cigar's stock was depressed because Rothman
held an abnormally large majority position and because the
minority portion of the stock was very illiquid. In order
for Petitioner's argument to stand, JR Cigar's stock would
have needed to be depressed by over five dollars per share–
over half its value.84 Petitioner cites to two First Union
presentations as support for this position.85 These documents
reveal that First Union believed JR Cigar's shares were
discounted in the public markets because of Respondent's
“[s]mall public float,”86 i.e., the number of shares available
for trading, “[s]ignificant inside ownership,”87 and “[l]ack
of research coverage.”88 But the same documents indicate
that the stock was also depressed because of JR Cigar's small
market capitalization89 and “[n]egative public, legal and
governmental sentiment toward tobacco”90 These documents
offer mixed support for the position that JR Cigar's stock
was significantly depressed because they do not quantify the
extent to which the stock was depressed by illiquidity as
opposed to generalized industry factors. The sour state of the
tobacco market would undoubtedly depress JR Cigar's stock
price, but would also depress JR Cigar's fair value.
The failure to isolate the specific impact of JR Cigar's
illiquidity on its stock price undermines Petitioner's analysis.
The illiquidity of a particular security is usually measured
by the size of the bid/ask spread.91 In general, the lower
the liquidity, the higher the bid/ask spread. And when the
spread is higher, the “discount” to a firm's fundamental value
increases. Petitioner introduced no evidence regarding JR
Cigar's bid/ask spread. The only evidence introduced related
to JR Cigar's trading volume. That evidence shows that 7.9
million shares of JR Cigar were traded during the 12 months
preceding the announcement of the merger–more than double
the number of shares not controlled by Rothman.92 During
this period, JR Cigar's stock price never rose above $12.75
per share–well within the Ibbotson micro-cap category.93
Even assuming that JR Cigar's stock price was depressed
because of its illiquidity, Petitioner cannot justify categorizing
JR Cigar as a low-cap, rather than micro-cap, company (for
the purposes of CAPM) based on this fact. CAPM identifies
the expected return on a particular security, an expected return
that is inputted into the WACC and used to discount JR Cigar's
future cash flows to present value. The Ibbotson size premium
number reflects the empirical evidence that smaller firms
have higher returns than larger firms. Petitioner's position
that JR Cigar is a low-cap company (rather than a micro-
cap company) decreases the expected rate of return on JR
Cigar's stock by lowering the “size premium” applied. The
problem with using liquidity as a basis for justifying a lower
expected return, however, is that low liquidity is associated
with higher expected returns. Investors seek compensation
for the high transaction costs of illiquid securities, e.g.,
the bid/ask spread. In other words, even if JR Cigar had
a higher market capitalization than the market price of its
stock suggested because of its illiquidity, investors would still
expect higher returns because of its illiquidity.
*10  Petitioner also seeks to justify the categorization of JR
Cigar as a low-cap company based on its beta. A company's
beta is the measure of its volatility in relation to the overall
market, in this case the S & P 500. Petitioner's argument is
that JR Cigar's adjusted beta, calculated by DeVinney at .62,
is much lower than the betas of the other companies in its
Ibbotson micro-cap group.94 This argument is unavailing for
several reasons. First, there is no evidence that DeVinney
categorized JR Cigar as a low-cap company based on its low
beta. DeVinney only testified that he thought that JR Cigar's
stock was “depressed.”95 Second, Petitioner did not introduce
evidence that JR Cigar's beta is outside the ranges of betas
for the micro-cap category. Lastly, the size premium is not
dependent on the beta of the firm. In fact, it is because the
beta does not capture all the systemic risk that a size premium
is included. “[E]ven after adjusting for the systematic (beta)
risk of small stocks, they outperform large stocks.”96
4. Tax Rate
Petitioner argues that JR Cigar's tax rate is 36%. DeVinney
arrived at this figure after reviewing JR Cigar's income
statement contained in Merrill Lynch's August 28, 2000
presentation to the JR Cigar Board.97 The income statement
does not actually list JR Cigar's tax rate, but the rate used by
Merrill Lynch can be deduced by calculating the difference
between the yearly EBIT and net income figures over the
historical and forecast period. Merrill Lynch's figures imply
a tax rate near the 36% rate used by DeVinney.98 The
August 28, 2000 presentation, as well as other documents,99
indicate that Merrill Lynch's income statement was based
on management forecasts and estimates. It is unclear from
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the face of these documents, however, what exactly JR
Cigar management provided to Merrill Lynch. Merrill Lynch's
due diligence request list does not show that Merrill Lynch
ever asked for JR Cigar's effective tax rate.100 No evidence
indicates that Merrill Lynch ever received such information.
Even if management did provide Merrill Lynch with
information regarding its effective tax rate, the presentation
upon which Petitioner relies does not imply that management
gave Merrill Lynch the 36% figure that DeVinney used
for his calculations. A colloquy between DeVinney and
Respondent's counsel on cross-examination demonstrated
that the Merrill Lynch presentation may have included other
items in JR Cigar's net income, resulting in an implied tax rate
lower than the actual tax rate.101 DeVinney could have made
some inquiry, but did not speak to anybody at Merrill Lynch
or JR Cigar to identify the actual effective tax rate.102
Fortunately, the Court does not need to engage in guesswork
to determine JR Cigar's tax rate. Note 6 to JR Cigar's financial
statements in its 1999 Annual Report explicitly states that
the tax rate was 40.9% in 1997, 40.1% in 1998, and 40.2%
in 1999.103 This information came from management.104
Nothing indicates that management understood that the 40%
tax rate would decline.105 JR Cigar's CFO indicated that the
tax rate was 40% and, generally, 40% is a common tax rate to
use.106 At the end, JR Cigar's historical tax rate published in
its annual report is more reliable than speculation regarding
Merrill Lynch's analysis.
5. Reconciling the Differences in the DCF Analyses
*11  The parties anticipated that the validity of the DCF
calculations would hinge on the four differing assumptions
examined above. Respondent introduced a demonstrative
exhibit at trial that purported to recast DeVinney's DCF
analysis by integrating Jarrell's assumptions.107 Respondent,
for example, introduced a demonstrative exhibit that showed
the impact that changing the tax rate had on DeVinney's
DCF calculations.108 According to Respondent, changing the
four variables discussed at length in this section has the
effect of reducing DeVinney's imputed fair value by $9.95
per share.109 In its opening brief, Petitioner took issue with
these calculations and stated that the composite effect of
the four variables is to decrease DeVinney's DCF value per
share by $8.03.110 In other words, the parties put Jarrell's
assumptions into DeVinney's model and came up with two
different values.111
Failing to adhere to elementary principles and to “show your
work,” the Court was unable to ascertain the nature of the
$1.92 (the difference between $9.95 and $8.03) discrepancy.
Nonetheless curious as to why the DCF estimates were
off by almost two dollars per share, I sought the parties
input on this issue.112 The parties' responses were less
than satisfactory as they largely regurgitated exhibits already
submitted at trial. Although Respondent was able to ascertain
some of the discrepancy, it was ultimately unable to reconcile
$0.69 per share difference.113 Despite having the benefit of
Respondent's submission, Petitioner was unable to explain the
reason for any of the discrepancy.114 As such, insufficient
evidence has been presented to enable the Court to integrate
Jarrell's assumptions (those largely accepted by the Court)
into DeVinney's DCF model.115 Consequently, the Court
must rely on Jarrell's DCF model exclusively.
C. Jarrell's Market–Based Analysis
1. Measurement of Control Premiums
Jarrell, in addition to his DCF analysis, looked at how the
premium paid in the JR Cigar merger compared with control
premiums paid in 2,077 deals between January 1995 and
August 2000.116 For that sample, the median one-day control
premium was 25% and the mean one-day control premium
was 30.4%. Isolating the 31 mergers out of 2,077 where the
buyer already owned 75% or more of the stock (as is the case
here), Jarrell found that the median one-day control premium
for those 31 transactions was 17%, as compared with the 21%
premium paid by the Rothmans. Petitioner argues, among
other things, that this analysis “violate[s] any concept of
comparability, including the ‘law of one price.” ’117 I agree.
The only thing that the transactions in Jarrell's sample have
in common are that they are all transactions. The data is not
segmented by industry or date. The one-day premiums vary
considerable; the standard deviation is 32%.118 Additionally,
it is not clear that any analysis of premiums over all
transactions has any bearing on “fair value” in an appraisal
action, even if it may bear on how efficiencies arising from
a merger could equitably be apportioned between the buyer
and the sellers.
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2. “Market Check”
*12  Jarrell considered the fact that First Union was unable to
find any interested potential acquirers and that none emerged
once the deal was publicly announced at $13 per share.119 He
testified that “in my judgment, the evidence clearly indicated
that there were no such offers and that there were no such
folks out there willing to pay that, because if there were, they
would have shown up .”120
Although Jarrell's testimony has a certain intuitive appeal,
there is insufficient record support from which a reliable
conclusion can be drawn about this “market check.” First
Union, JR Cigar's financial advisor at the time, was only
authorized to conduct a “limited market check.”121 As such,
First Union only contacted two possible buyers.122 Little
can be drawn from the fact that these two buyers declined
to make an offer. Additionally, simply because no rival
bidders appeared after the announcement of the going private
proposal does not help the Court ascertain the fair value of
JR Cigar.
D. The Court's Determination
The comparable transactions looked at by DeVinney are
not reliable indicators of the fair value of JR Cigar. The
only transaction worth noting is the Swisher International
transaction that was, in the opinion of Merrill Lynch, the most
comparable to the JR Cigar transaction.123 That transaction
implies a fair value of $12.00 per share.124 Jarrell's market
based analysis, the measurement of control premiums and
his “market check,” are not reliable indicators of JR Cigar's
fair value. In my opinion, the more “reliable” indicator of JR
Cigar's fair value is a DCF analysis.
The four key DCF variables identified by the parties are JR
Cigar's growth rate in perpetuity, its debt to equity ratio, the
equity size premium, and JR Cigar's tax rate. As discussed
earlier in the Court's analysis, the appropriate growth rate
in perpetuity is 3.5%, the WACC calculation should reflect
a 10% debt ratio, the equity size premium included in the
CAPM calculation should be 2.6, and JR Cigar's effective
tax rate is 40%. Jarrell's DCF calculations include an equity
size premium of 2.6 and a tax rate of 40%. Jarrell uses a
range of growth rates (2.5% to 3.5%) and a range of discount
rates (13% to 15%). The range of discount rates reflect a
debt weighting of 0% to 10% (13% discount rate reflecting
10% debt). Looking at the upper end of Jarrell's ranges, i.e.,
10% debt and 3.5% growth, his DCF model produces a value
of $13.58 per share.125 Given that the parties are incapable
of reconciling divergent results when Jarrell's variables are
placed in DeVinney's model, I will not engage in my own
quixotic attempt to do so. The fair value of JR Cigar as of
October 4, 2000 is $13.58 per share.
E. Interest
1. Legal Framework
This Court's decision in Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow
Publishers, Inc.126 is an accepted method for determining the
rate of interest in appraisal actions. Gonsalves rests on the
principle that the interest award should serve two purposes.
First, it should disgorge the respondent of any benefit it
received from the use of the petitioner's funds. Second, the
interest award should compensate the petitioner for the loss
of the use of its money. The second purpose, however, is
countenanced with the understanding that the election to
“reject the merger amount and to pursue appraisal does
not shift to the corporation all responsibility for losses [the
petitioner] may incur as a result of [its] inability to use the
funds retained by the corporation” and that the petitioner
can mitigate its losses and obtain perfect “compensation
for the loss of the use of their funds by borrowing the
fair value of their shares.”127 Gonsalves, and several other
decisions,128 have found that these twin purposes are served
by awarding interest by weighing equally the respondent's
actual costs of borrowing and, based on an objective prudent
investor standard, the petitioner's opportunity cost. The
prudent investor portfolio in Gonsalves consisted of 20% in
broadly diversified common stocks, 40% in United States
Treasury and corporate bonds, and 40% in money market-
type instruments or their equivalent, i.e., bank certificates of
deposit.129 The S & P 500 was used as a proxy for broadly
diversified stocks.130
2. Rate of Interest
*13  DeVinney's expert report stated that the appropriate rate
of interest was 8%, compounded annually.131 Cede's position
as to the appropriate rate of interest has changed twice since
that report. DeVinney testified at trial that the appropriate rate
was 5.5%132 and that he had “abandoned” the proposed rate
of 8%.133 DeVinney changed his opinion about the fair rate of
interest upon review of this Court's opinion in Gonsalves.134
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In arriving at an interest rate of 5.5% at trial, DeVinney used
the Gonsalves approach with two exceptions.
First, DeVinney averaged several commonly used stock
indices to serve as a proxy for broadly diversified stocks,
instead of using the S & P 500 exclusively.135 Second,
DeVinney, instead of simply averaging JR Cigar's cost of
borrowing and the returns of a prudent investor portfolio,
weighted JR Cigar's borrowing costs at 75%. He testified
that this weighting was based on Petitioner's subjective
opportunity cost.136 Specifically, DeVinney increased the
emphasis on Respondent's borrowing costs because the Royce
family of funds that held JR Cigar stock over the period had
returns that were higher than an objective prudent investor
portfolio.137
Respondent does not advocate using DeVinney's opinion at
trial as to the fair rate of interest, but instead argues for an
interest rate of 8%, i.e., the rate that DeVinney originally
espoused and later abandoned. In its post-trial brief, Petitioner
proposes using a version of the Gonsalves approach to arrive
at the fair rate of interest, albeit in a manipulated fashion.
Petitioner advocates using the prime rate at the time of the
merger, 9.5%, as JR Cigar's cost of borrowing.138 Petitioner
does not adjust that rate, however, to reflect the changes in
the prime rate from the time of the merger to the date of
judgment. Petitioner then weighs JR Cigar's unadjusted cost
of borrowing thrice and DeVinney's prudent investor portfolio
rate of return once to arrive at an interest rate of 8%.139
Petitioner's use of 9.5% as JR Cigar's cost of borrowing is
incorrect. The parties agree that Petitioner's cost of borrowing
from the time of the merger to the present has been the prime
rate. And it is undisputed that the prime rate was 9.5% at the
time of the merger. The prime rate, however, has declined
significantly since the date of the merger. Jarrell accounted
for this fact, as did this Court's opinion in Gonsalves.140
The prime rate at the time of the merger may have been JR
Cigar's borrowing costs three years ago, but it is not JR Cigar's
actual borrowing costs during the relevant period, which is
from the time of the merger to the date of judgment. In order
to determine the cost of borrowing for the relevant period,
one must ascertain Respondent's borrowing costs from the
date of the merger and at regular intervals, i.e., monthly,
until an appropriate ending point near the judgment date.
Respondent's borrowing costs should also be compounded
during that period. Based on monthly compounding of the
historical values for the prime rate, Jarrell calculated JR
Cigar's cost of borrowing to be 5.96%.141 Accordingly, I
find that 5.96% is JR Cigar's borrowing costs, not 9.5% as
suggested by Cede.
*14  Petitioner's weighting of JR Cigar's borrowing costs
more than its own opportunity cost, as reflected by a prudent
investor portfolio, is also incorrect. At trial, DeVinney
testified that the excess weight given to Respondent's
borrowing costs was due to Cede's subjective opportunity
costs.142 DeVinney stated that because Cede's own funds
achieved a rate of return around 9%, it was his judgment
that JR Cigar's cost of borrowing should be given more
weight.143 In its post-trial brief, Royce makes the same
assertion.144 I reject Petitioner's position for two reasons.
First, it does not make any sense for this Court to adjust
for the higher, subjective opportunity cost of Petitioner by
increasing the emphasis on Respondent's borrowing costs.
Second, this Court rejected approaches geared towards a
petitioner's subjective opportunity cost in Gonsalves.145
The language of Gonsalves was clear: “Although the
Court may look at the actual cost of borrowing by the
respondent company, the Court determines the petitioner's
opportunity cost based on an objective standard.”146 Several
other decisions have similarly rejected consideration of
a petitioner's subjective opportunity cost in awarding
interest.147 Petitioner voluntarily relinquished funds it could
have otherwise invested as it pleased and cannot now argue
that in hindsight it would have used those funds to achieve
higher returns than the objectively prudent investor.148
Respondent's cost of borrowing and Petitioner's opportunity
cost shall have equal weight.
Although I have found that the prudent investor portfolio
should have equal weight as Respondent's borrowing costs,
that portion of the portfolio that represents broadly diversified
common stocks does not have to use the S & P 500 as its
exclusive proxy. Gonsalves does not suggest that the S & P
500 is the only representative index of the types of stocks that
the prudent investor would hold. Even JR Cigar's expert noted
at trial that “you have some choices”149 and that he selected
the S & P 500 simply because it is the most well known.150
DeVinney averages a variety of indices to arrive at the rate
of return of broadly diversified common stocks. There is no
error with this approach, especially where, as here, the S &
P 500 had the worst returns of all the major stock indices. JR
Cigar's only objection to this approach is that it will result in
the double counting of some stocks. This objection is without
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merit. In fact, this simply reflects the reality that some stocks,
i.e., those included in the S & P 500, are more widely held than
others. As such, I find that the rate of return on the prudent
investor portfolio is 3.5%, as calculated by DeVinney.
JR Cigar's cost of borrowing is 5.96%. Petitioner's
opportunity cost, as measured by the objective prudent
investor, is 3.5%. Giving equal weight to each element, the
appropriate rate of interest in this appraisal action is 4.73%.
3. Form of Interest
*15  The last matter for consideration is the form of
interest. “The compounding interval should ... reflect the
interval available to the petitioners had they the use of their
funds as well as, if possible, the interval actually received
by the corporation.”151 Petitioner requests that interest be
compounded daily. Although I have commented that daily
compounding may be appropriate in some cases,152 Petitioner
has not introduced evidence that daily compounding is
appropriate in this case. In fact, DeVinney compounded
interest annually in his report.153 JR Cigar's post-trial brief
is silent regarding the compound interval, as is Jarrell's
report. Jarrell does, however, compound the prime rate on
a monthly basis in order to determine JR Cigar's annual
borrowing costs.154 Ultimately, given that neither side has
provided evidence as to the appropriate interval, “I find that
the dual purposes of compensation and restitution may only
be served by a compounding interval at least as frequent as
one month.”155
IV. CONCLUSION
The fair value of Petitioner's 652,400 shares of JR Cigar
stock as of the merger date is $13.58 per share. Respondent
must pay Petitioner $8,859,592.00, plus interest of 4.73%,
compounded monthly, from October 4, 2000 to the date of
payment.
Counsel shall confer and agree upon a form of Order to
implement this decision.
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periods after 2004. It could easily refer to management's five-year projections.
49 Rothman Dep. at 80:18–24; 221:20–222:5.
50 Tr. at 17–18.
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51 See Ex. 67 at 26–29 (international market); OB at 10–11 (citing exhibits related to internet sales); Tr. at 17–18 (internet
sales); Tr. 170–71 (non-tobacco products).
52 Ex. 3 at JRC 0295.
53 Rothman Dep. at 80:18–24, 222:20–222:5.
54 Tr. 260:12–13.
55 M.G. Bancorporation, 737 A.2d at 520.
56 Ex. 65 at 20.
57 Tr. 64:24–65:4.
58 Tr. at 164 (DeVinney Cross).
59 Ex. 65 at 18.
60 Tr. 200–01. As noted earlier, I am unmoved by concerns regarding Jarrell's discussions with JR Cigar's CFO, especially
where, as here, DeVinney conceded on cross-examination that Colleton would have a better understanding of JR Cigar's
optimal capital structure than he did. Tr. at 163–64.
61 Tr. at 215.
62 Ex. 71 (800–JR Cigar, Inc. Common Stock—Prospectus date June 6, 1997) at 20.
63 Tr. 66:12–23.
64 Ex. 1 at 38.
65 Ex. 71 at 5 (discussion regarding “Use of Proceeds”).
66 Tr. at 163:6.
67 Tr. at 200–01; Ex 65 at 18.
68 Petitioner's Reply Brief (“RB”) at 8.
69 751 A.2d 904, 910–11 (Del.Ch.1999).
70 Id. at 910.
71 8 Del. C. 262(h). Simply because the merger did not enhance JR Cigar's ability to borrow does not mean that the debt is
not an “element of value” under the statute. The fact that the debt was incurred is itself the “element of value.”
72 611 A.2d 485 (Del.Ch.1991).
73 Id. at 493.
74 Id.
75 Ibbotson Associates, Ibbotson, stocks, bonds, bills and inflation: Valuation edition 2001 Yearbook 107 (2001) (“Ibbotson”).
76 Id. at 244.
77 Tr. at 210–11.
78 Tr. at 91:8–10. In other words, DeVinney thought the Company was worth more than the market thought it was worth.
79 Tr. at 91–92.
80 Tr. at 151–52.
81 Tr. at 207–208.
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 28, at 224–25 (suggesting iterative process for estimating equity weight).
84 The low-cap grouping where DeVinney placed JR Cigar is reserved for companies with a market capitalization of $192
million, “implying” a “fair value” of over $15.50 per share.
85 Ex. 41 (First Union Securities, Inc. Materials for Discussion dated Jan. 1, 2000); Ex. 70 (First Union—Materials for
Discussion dated Jan. 11, 1999).
86 Ex. 70 at 33.
87 Ex. 41 at 10.
88 Ex. 70 at 33.
89 Ex. 41 at 10.
90 Id. See also Ex. 3 at 4 (stock prices in tobacco industry depressed).
91 Ibbotson, supra note 77, at 134.
92 Ex. 10 (Stock prices and volume for 800–JR Cigar, Inc., Stand and Poor's 500 Index and the Standard and Poor's 600
Small Cap. Index from June 25, 1997 through October 5, 2000).
93 Id.
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94 DeVinney calculated a beta of .62 based on a period beginning six months after JR Cigar's IPO. Tr. at 84–85. Jarrell
calculated a beta of .67 based on a period beginning a week after the IPO. Id. Neither period is presumptively valid.
A longer period of time, such as the period used by Jarrell, is generally preferred. A five-year period, longer than the
period used by either expert, is the most common. Shannon P. Pratt, Cost of Capital: Estimations and Applications 82
(2d ed.2002). Petitioner's argument that the stock should be given time to “season” after an IPO is understandable, but
I am unsure why this takes six months.
95 Tr. at 91–92.
96 Ibbotson, supra note 77, at 44. Separately, Petitioner suggests that JR Cigar's raw beta is more appropriate than the
adjusted beta. Petitioner's own expert did not use the raw beta, probably because doing so is inaccurate. Betas based
on observed historical data are more representative of future expectations when they are adjusted. Pratt, supra note
96, at 89.
97 Ex. 3 at JRC 0306.
98 The average tax rate for all eight years shown on the income statement is over 37%. Id.
99 Ex. 1 at 11.
100 Ex. 37 (Project Leaf Due Diligence Request List dated July 12, 2000).
101 Tr. at 158:11–24.
102 Tr. at 131–32.
103 Ex. 45 at 17–18.
104 Tr. at 154–56 (DeVinney Cross).
105 Tr. at 159.
106 Tr. at 211–12.
107 Ex. 77.
108 Id., Chart A.
109 Id., Chart E.
110 OB at 25. These estimates do not assume the use of an exit multiple in the DCF calculation, as I have determined that
the exit multiple used by DeVinney is unreliable.
111 This discrepancy is in addition to the fact that Jarrell's model generates a fair value per share that is different from using
his assumptions in DeVinney's model.
112 Letter from Chandler, C. to Counsel of 1/2/04.
113 Letter from Walsh to Chandler, C. of 1/12/04, at 2. It is notable that some $0.83 of the discrepancy was attributed to
possible calculation errors by DeVinney. Id.
114 Petitioner's submission was a day late and (almost literally) a dollar short. Letter from Mondros to Chandler, C. of 1/13/04.
Importantly, Petitioner did not deny that DeVinney made calculation errors.
115 This problem was compounded by Petitioner's decision to not comply with my request to “provide the Court with electronic
versions (Microsoft Excel compatible) of the DCF worksheets,” e.g ., “Exhibit 4 of Prof. Jarrell's report.” Letter from
Chandler, C. to Counsel of 1/2/04, at 2. Only Respondent complied with this request.
116 See Ex. 65 at 21–26.
117 OB at 29.
118 Ex. 11 (Data on mergers between January 1995 and August 200 from Thomson Financial SDC database).
119 See Ex. 65 at 27–29.
120 Tr. at 225.
121 Ex. 69 (Special Meeting Minutes of the Board of Directors) at JRC 0033; Ex. 38 (Presentation to Board of Directors by
First Union Securities, Inc.) at JRC 94.
122 Ex. 50 (First Union Situation Overview: Proposed Offer from Lew and Lavonda Rothman) at ML 186.
123 Ex. 3 at JRC 0325.
124 Id.
125 Ex. 65 at Ex. 4. Jarrell calculated a discount rate of 13.12% based on a debt ratio of 10% and a beta of .67. Ex. 65 at 19.
He rounded this number down to 13%. Keeping everything else the same, but substituting DeVinney's “seasoned” beta
of .62, results in a discount rate of 12.77%. I find that a discount rate of 13% is reasonable.
126 2002 WL 31057465 (Del.Ch. Sept.10, 2002).
127 Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 1997 WL 538676, at *10 (Del.Ch. Aug.28, 1997).
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128 See Hintmann v. Fred Weber, Inc., 1998 WL 83052, at *12 (Del.Ch. Feb.17, 1998) (Steele, V.C.); Ryan v. Tad's
Enterprises, Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 705 (Del.Ch.1996) (Jacobs, V.C.); Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., 1995 WL
376911, at *10 (Del.Ch. June 15, 1995).
129 Gonsalves, 2002 WL 31057465, at *13 n. 59.
130 Id. at *11.
131 Ex. 66 at 28. DeVinney arrived at 8% after consideration of the rate of return of certain corporate bonds and various
investment funds managed by Royce (the investment fund that Cede held Respondent's shares on behalf of). DeVinney
initially gave no consideration to JR Cigar's cost of borrowing.
132 Tr. at 115–16.
133 Tr. at 174.
134 Tr. at 115.
135 Tr. at 118. DeVinney, using this broadened prudent investor portfolio, calculated a return of 3.5%. Id.
136 Tr. at 119–20.
137 Id.
138 The parties agree that Respondent's cost of borrowing is the prime rate. OB at 32; AB at 34.
139 OB at 32. Those calculations actually result in a figure of 8 .3%, but Respondent only argues for 8% interest.
140 In Gonsalves the Respondent's cost of borrowing was “compounded monthly [from] the date of the merger.” Id. at *13.
141 Ex. 65 at 39.
142 Tr. at 119–20.
143 Id.
144 OB at 32.
145 2002 WL 31057465, at *12.
146 Id.
147 See Grimes, 1997 WL 538676, at *10; Chang's Holdings S.A. v. Universal Chems. & Coalings, 1994 WL 681091, at *4
(Del.Ch. Nov.22, 1994); Lebman v. National Union Electric Corp., 414 A.2d 824, 829 (Del.Ch.1980).
148 Petitioner also cannot argue that it is forwarding an objective standard because it only changes the weight given to
the objective prudent investor portfolio. Ultimately, Petitioner advocates de-emphasizing the objective opportunity cost
portion of the interest award in order to account for its returns on the Royce family of funds, a subjective consideration.
149 Tr. at 232.
150 Id.
151 Grimes, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, at *55, 1997 WL 538676.
152 See ONTI, 751 A.2d at 927 & n. 93.
153 Ex. 66 at 28.
154 Ex. 65 at 39.
155 Grimes, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 124, at *55, 1997 WL 538676.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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*1  This case involves the appraisal of 201,200 shares of
respondent Technicolor, Inc. owned by petitioner Cinerama,
Inc. The litigation began in 1983. There have been five
remands by the Supreme Court and two appraisal trials
before two different trial judges. The second appraisal trial
was completed in May 2003. This is the Court's decision,
following the May 2003 trial and post-trial briefing.
For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the per share going
concern value of Technicolor at the time of the merger, taking
into account the implementation of the so-called Perelman
plan, is $21.98 per share. Petitioner is entitled to $21.98 per
share, or $4,422,376. In addition, petitioner is entitled to pre-
judgment interest of 10.32% from January 24, 1983 to August
2, 1991. Finally, I award post-judgment interest of simple
interest (on the principal amount only) at the statutory legal
rate of 7.0 percent, from August 3, 1991 until the date the
judgment is paid.
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Only a brief review of the facts will be given since the history
of this action is thoroughly recorded in the annals of Chancery
litigation. In the early 1980s, MacAndrews and Forbes Group,
Inc. (“MAF”), through a wholly-owned subsidiary, sought to
purchase Technicolor. On December 31, 1982, MAF closed
a public cash tender offer at $23.00 per share for up to all
of the Technicolor common stock. All but 17.81% of the
outstanding stock was tendered. Next, on January 24, 1983,
a cash-out merger occurred, converting all common stock
not owned by MAF into the right to receive $23.00 in cash.
Petitioner Cinerama, Inc., a beneficial shareholder that owned
201,200 Technicolor shares through its nominee, Cede & Co.,
dissented from the merger and sought judicial appraisal of its
stock under 8 Del. C. § 262.
The first appraisal trial was held in 1989 and included a
related fiduciary duty case.1 After the entire fairness action
was resolved in Technicolor's favor and affirmed by the
Supreme Court, petitioner appealed the Court's first appraisal
decision rendered by my predecessor, Chancellor William
Allen, and the case was remanded to me (as the successor
judge) for a new appraisal.2 Following this remand, I entered
an order making several decisions concerning the nature
and scope of the new appraisal proceeding on remand (the
fourth remand from the Supreme Court). Petitioner took
an interlocutory appeal from this order and the case was
remanded yet again, the Supreme Court directing that I
conduct a completely “new trial” on the valuation of the
Technicolor shares.3 The current (fifth) remand requires the
Court to value Technicolor as a going concern as of January
24, 1983, taking into account that the Perelman plan4 was
the operating plan for Technicolor at that time. Before the
second trial, the Court decided the issue of pre-judgment
interest, concluding that former Chancellor Allen's ruling
regarding prejudgment interest (at the rate of 10.32% per
year compounded annually) was the law of the case. All that
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remains to be decided, therefore, is the value of Technicolor
and the applicable post-judgment interest rate. To that end, a
nine-day trial was held from May 12th to the 22nd of 2003.
*2  Although 8 Del. C. § 262 requires this Court to determine
“the fair value” of a share of Technicolor on January 24,
1983, it is one of the conceits of our law that we purport to
declare something as elusive as the fair value of an entity on
a given date, especially a date more than two decades ago.
Experience in the adversarial, battle of the experts' appraisal
process under Delaware law teaches one lesson very clearly:
valuation decisions are impossible to make with anything
approaching complete confidence. Valuing an entity is a
difficult intellectual exercise, especially when business and
financial experts are able to organize data in support of wildly
divergent valuations for the same entity. For a judge who is
not an expert in corporate finance, one can do little more
than try to detect gross distortions in the experts' opinions.
This effort should, therefore, not be understood, as a matter
of intellectual honesty, as resulting in the fair value of a
corporation on a given date. The value of a corporation is not
a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values, and the
judge's task is to assign one particular value within this range
as the most reasonable value in light of all of the relevant
evidence and based on considerations of fairness.5
II. VALUATION OF TECHNICOLOR
A. The Valuation Experts
Both petitioner and respondent retained valuation experts
who testified at trial. Petitioner's expert was John B.
Torkelsen, a Chartered Financial Analyst who also testified
for Cinerama in the first trial. Torkelsen is the Managing
Director of Equity Value Advisors, LLC, which provides
security analysis consulting services, including business
valuation and financial expert witness services. He received a
Masters in Business Administration from Harvard University
and a Bachelor of Science in Chemical Engineering from
Princeton University.
In general, I found Torkelsen's testimony and his report
on value unreliable. Without considering the fundamental
credibility issues that were argued vigorously by respondent,6
I have concluded, independently, that the Torkelsen
methodology, and in particular his repeated discarding
or modification of contemporaneous (i.e., 1981-1983)
management forecasts, cast serious doubt upon the integrity
and reliability of his expert report. Not only does Torkelsen
value Technicolor at an amount nearly triple the deal price
that the Supreme Court has affirmed as the highest price
reasonably available and entirely fair ($23 per share), but he
arrives at a nearly identical price for Technicolor as his first
report, after inexplicably making significant revisions to his
1989 report. Specifically, Torkelsen increased his valuation
of Technicolor under the Perelman plan by $1.02 per share7
by: (1) increasing his discount rate from 12.5% to 14.6%; (2)
increasing his growth in perpetuity rate from 5% to 7.35%
(nearly a 50% increase); and (3) considerably altering his
depreciation forecast for each of the years in his 1983-1987
forecast period. If Torkelsen had changed his discount rate
alone, his valuation figure would have dropped $12.12 per
share.8 Torkelsen partially offset that reduction, however, by
increasing the growth in perpetuity rate, which added $9.73
to the per share result, bringing it up to $60.36.
*3  When asked about these changes, Torkelsen dismissed
them as minor variations and offered no plausible justification
for making them. Respondent offers one-that Torkelsen
changed his report because this Court heavily criticized
his 1989 weighted average cost of capital (WACC) in its
1990 appraisal opinion.9 Respondent further points out that
Torkelsen offers no new evidence to support the upward
revision of the terminal value growth rate that restored
much of the value lost after his revision of the discount
rate. Respondent observes that Torkelsen also altered his
depreciation assumptions to fully restore the value to his
previously forecasted levels, as well as to address criticism
leveled against his old 5% growth in perpetuity rate.10
This allowed him, respondent argues, to grow his forecasted
revenue at a faster rate and to increase his terminal value base
year cash flow-resulting in a higher terminal value.11
Although I agree that these unexplained modifications
produce skepticism, Torkelsen's casual discarding of
contemporaneous management forecasts raises (to my
mind) even more red flags. As a general matter, I find
Torkelsen's rejection of management projections erroneous
and unreasonable. After considering all of the evidence,
I am convinced that Technicolor management was in the
best position to project the short-term prospects of the
company, as they created projections ex ante, based upon
information gleaned from their particular customers. I find
it unreasonable to reject these forecasts (as Torkelsen did)
in favor of information that is not in any way specific to
Technicolor, but instead to create (as Torkelsen did) hindsight
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forecasts based primarily upon the industry as a whole. The
specifics of Torkelsen's rejection of management forecasts
will be discussed in more detail in the respective unit
valuations. As a general matter, however, his overall rationale
for rejecting them was not that Technicolor's management
had some sort of bias or improper motive when creating
them, but that management was incompetent. This rationale
is wholly unpersuasive and demonstrably inaccurate. As
will be shown below, management forecasts for Technicolor
were historically accurate and, therefore, the best evidence
regarding the short-term prospects of Technicolor. Although
some aspects of Torkelsen's report and testimony were
helpful, I have found that much of it is discredited by
contemporaneous pre-merger evidence.
Respondent hired as its expert Professor Peter Easton,12
the John J. Gerlach Chair in Accounting at Fisher College
of Business at Ohio State University. Easton's relevant
educational experience includes a Bachelors degree in
Economics from the University of Adelaide in Adelaide,
Australia, a Diploma in Financial Management at the
University of New England in Armidale, Australia, and a
Ph.D in Business Administration from the University of
California at Berkeley. He also serves on the faculties of
the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business and
the University of Melbourne's School of Economics. As a
professor and consultant, he focuses on financial statement
information and valuation. As a scholar, he has published
numerous scholarly articles in leading academic journals
regarding the role of accounting information in security
valuation. He also serves as the Associate Editor for four
of the five leading academic journals in the United States,
and for leading journals both in Australia and in the United
Kingdom.
*4  In general, I found Easton's testimony and his report
on valuation to be more reliable and persuasive. First,
he begins his valuation by adopting contemporaneous
management forecasts-a much more credible exercise at
the start. Second, his projections are significantly more
straightforward, directly projecting the necessary variables
as contrasted with Torkelsen's contortionist projections-upon-
projections to come up with a relevant proxy for a necessary
input. Not only are Easton's projections easier to follow, they
make more logical sense and leave less room for error. Third,
Easton's projections are supported by several independent
indicia of value, while Torkelsen does not even attempt to
perform reasonableness checks upon his valuation. These
reasonableness checks will be discussed below in Section
VIII. Because I found Easton's analysis more reliable overall,
I have begun with his projections and modified them only as
necessary throughout most of the business units.
B. The Experts' Methodology
Both experts used the discounted cash flow (“DCF”) method
to determine Technicolor's value. Discounted cash flow
has been accepted as an appropriate valuation method in
Delaware.13 Easton also used the residual operating income
method. I choose not to use this alternate form of valuation
without actually deciding whether it is a viable valuation
method.
A DCF analysis projects operating cash flows for an extended
period, determining a terminal value upon sale at the end of
the period, and then discounting those values at a set rate
to determine the net present value of the common stock.14
Discounted cash flow is based upon three inputs: (1) the
free cash flow projections for a certain number of years; (2)
the terminal value estimate; and (3) the discount rate. The
free cash flow and terminal value projections are evaluated
for each business within Technicolor. A uniform discount
rate adjusted for Technicolor's risk is used throughout. In
addition, and finally, the post-judgment rate of interest must
be determined.
I begin my analysis by defining the Perelman plan. Then I
evaluate the free cash flow projections and terminal value
of each business within Technicolor. Next, I examine the
discount rate, including the amount of Technicolor debt in
that calculation. Finally, I establish the rate and form of post-
judgment interest. Once all the inputs are established, the final
valuation of Technicolor can be calculated.
III. VALUATION UNDER THE PERELMAN PLAN
Former-Chancellor Allen's decision to value Technicolor
under the Kamerman plan and not the Perelman plan
constitutes the overriding basis behind the Supreme Court's
reversal and remand, and consequently the fundamental cause
of the great expenditure of time and energy occasioned by
holding a second appraisal trial.15 According to the remand
instructions, I first must determine what the Perelman plan
means. Then, I must establish an approach for valuing
Technicolor under that plan. Only non-speculative elements
of value may be considered.16
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*5  The parties basically agree as to the nature of the
Perelman plan.17 This plan sought to capitalize on the steady
cash flow of Technicolor by retaining certain core businesses
and selling off four non-profitable businesses. The plan itself
did not change the value of the retained businesses, but
focused solely on trimming the company's losses by selling
off the four non-profitable businesses: Gold Key, Audio
Visual, One Hour Photo, and Consumer Photo Processing.
As with the retained businesses, I need to individually
determine the value of each of these divisions. Certain
assumptions will be made, specifically that the discount rate
used for the retained businesses is the same for the businesses
being sold, and that the businesses were to be sold within six
months of the merger.18 I directly address the value of the four
divisions being sold in Section V of this decision.
It is important to note at this time that the major issue in
this dispute, according to the remand opinion, was the value
added to Technicolor by the Perelman plan. The Perelman
plan did not seek to change the retained businesses in
any way. It is undisputed that MAF was merely a holding
company and MAF did not seek to change the operation
of the retained businesses, but merely to harness the cash
flow of those operations. MAF's other holdings at the time
were a chocolate company and a licorice extract supplier
business, thus creating no synergies through the merger with
Technicolor.
The only value added by the Perelman plan, therefore, was
the cash flow generated by selling off the four non-profitable
divisions within six months of the merger. The difference
between the parties' valuations of that cash flow is less than $3
million. Petitioner expected $46,043,000 (or an undiscounted
$50.2 million), and respondent expected $43,070,000 (or
an undiscounted $47 million).19 Taking the difference of
$2,973,000 and dividing it by the 4,567,491 outstanding
Technicolor shares yields a difference in valuation of the
Perelman plan by the parties of sixty-five cents per share.20
After seven years of additional litigation since the first
remand,21 with extensive costs both to the parties and to
the judicial system, and an entirely new trial to resolve the
main issue (include the value of the Perelman plan)-all over
a difference in value per share of only sixty-five cents, or a
total of $130,780 for Cinerama's 201,200 shares.
Of course, the ultimate difference between petitioner and
respondent is much greater. Petitioner's expert opines that
Technicolor's value per share on January 24, 1983 was $63.77,
while respondent's expert opines that value was $22.62 per
share, for a spread of $41.15. My point is simply that the
Perelman plan ultimately does not assume a large role in the
final analysis, despite the emphasis it has received throughout
these protracted proceedings.
Nevertheless, as directed on remand, I have conducted a
completely new appraisal of the entire company under the
Perelman plan, which is described below. To determine the
final valuation of Technicolor per share, I must first determine
the value of the retained businesses. Then, I determine the
cash flow generated through selling off the four divisions
under the Perelman plan. Finally, I sum the value of the
retained businesses and the sold businesses, discounting each
according to a reasonable discount rate, subtract the value of
Technicolor's outstanding debt,22 and divide by the number
of outstanding shares.
*6  One important point bears emphasizing at the outset.
The Supreme Court reversed the first appraisal decision,
and remanded for an entirely new trial. I understood this
mandate for what it is-an instruction to hear and consider the
evidence regarding valuation completely afresh in order to
reach a new, independent determination of Technicolor's fair
value on January 24, 1983. Based on the complete reversal
in this case (Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 302), the 1991
valuation of $21.60 per share has been rendered a nullity.
Thus, the $21.60 value found in the original decision exists
no more. For this reason, one cannot view the $21.60 as a
“floor” or as a “ceiling” on the valuation to be determined
on retrial. In addition, one cannot simply add the independent
value of the “Perelman plan” to former Chancellor Allen's
Kamerman plan valuation of Technicolor, and arrive at the fair
value of Technicolor. The Supreme Court specifically noted
that the $21.60 valuation had been impermissibly tainted by
former Chancellor Allen's majority acquirer principle. It thus
becomes impossible to rely upon the $21.60 number at all,
and I have ignored it for purposes of the retrial. My valuation
of Technicolor at $21.98 per share is an independent and
objective judicial determination based solely on the evidence
adduced during the May 2003 retrial.
IV. VALUATION OF THE RETAINED BUSINESSES
A. North Hollywood
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It is undisputed that Technicolor's most important line
of business was professional film processing, and that
North Hollywood was the largest of Technicolor's film
processing operations.23 Easton's analysis provides that North
Hollywood comprises $15.88 of his ultimate $22.62 per share
value for the company, or roughly 70% of Technicolor.24
Torkelsen did not provide a separate value for North
Hollywood alone.25 Petitioner contends that Easton's method
of valuing Technicolor as a sum of its parts is novel
and improper. It argues that Easton's approach “ignores all
synergistic benefits of an integrated enterprise” and that “if
each division were treated as a stand-alone business for
valuation purposes, a specific divisional discount rate would
be required for each.” To the contrary, I have found Easton's
analysis far more complete and reasonable than Torkelsen's.
This is, in part, precisely because Easton has broken down
Technicolor into its various divisions, making his calculations
and conclusions of value more explicit and understandable.
Although applying a separate discount rate to each division
would theoretically yield a more accurate result, it appears,
as partially evidenced by the dispute regarding Technicolor's
beta and discount rate as a whole, that the data necessary
to determine divisional discount rates with any reasonable
degree of certainty and validity do not exist. Easton used
Technicolor's overall discount rate as a reasonable proxy,
especially given that the discount rate for the entire company
is, in reality, a form of weighted-average discount rate based
on the appropriate discount rates of the various divisions.
1. Management Forecasts
*7  One of the key areas of contention between Easton
and Torkelsen relates to the applicability of management
forecasts. Easton derives his analysis from management
projections, especially those contained in the calendar year
1983 Profit Plan (“CY 1983 Plan”).26 He also relies on
Technicolor's historical results. Torkelsen, on the other hand,
considers short-term management forecasts to be inadequate,
and uses less than three years of historic data in deriving
the statistical regressions from which he values North
Hollywood.27 As of the time of the merger, Technicolor did
not have long-term (post 1983) projections.28
a. Management forecasts are beneficial in an appraisal
context
Management forecasts are an appropriate starting point from
which to derive data in performing an appraisal analysis.29
Contemporary pre-merger management projections are
particularly useful in the appraisal context because
management projections, by definition, are not tainted by
post-merger hindsight and are usually created by an impartial
body. In stark contrast, post hoc, litigation-driven forecasts
have an “untenably high” probability of containing “hindsight
bias and other cognitive distortions.”30 Additionally, then-
Vice Chancellor Steele noted in Gilbert v. MPM Enterprises,
Inc. that “management was in the best position to forecast
[the company]'s future before the merger....”31 If management
forecasts are prepared a significant period of time before
the merger, it may be necessary to make minor changes
to them reflecting actual results as of the merger date.32
Such alterations are not necessary in this instance, however,
because the CY 1983 Plan was being prepared beginning in
December 1982 and was finished by March 1983.33 Although
March 1983 is post-merger, the CY 1983 Plan contains
information that only validates what was known or knowable
and susceptible of proof on or about January 24, 1983. I
therefore find that for purposes of determining the fair value
of Technicolor as of the merger date, use of the CY 1983 Plan
as a contemporary management forecast is most suitable.34
When management projections are made in the ordinary
course of business, they are generally deemed reliable.35
Experts who then vary from management forecasts
should proffer legitimate reasons for such variance.36
Torkelsen significantly alters management forecasts in his
valuation of North Hollywood. Petitioner has attempted to
discredit Technicolor's internal projections and assert the
reasonableness of Torkelsen's alterations to management's
forecasts, but do so unpersuasively for several reasons, as
discussed below.
b. Technicolor management's projections were consistently
accurate
First and foremost, both experts have testified to and
demonstrated the uncanny accuracy of Technicolor's
management in preparing financial forecasts.37 It has been
shown that, once normalized for abnormal silver reclamation
profits, the average operating margin variance (the difference
between actual and projected profit margins) for North
Hollywood during fiscal years 1979-82 was a mere 0.1%.38
The average sales variance (as a percentage of the Plan) was
2.1%-an extremely accurate projection.39
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*8  Second, Technicolor management did not produce
calendar year forecasts prior to MAF's assuming control of
Technicolor in late 1982. Petitioner has attempted to show
that actual calendar year 1981 and 1982 results varied greatly
from the fictional calendar year forecasts by reconstructing
calendar year plans for 1981 and 1982. This is an activity in
which Technicolor management never engaged. For example,
when switching from a fiscal year to a calendar year in
December of 1982, Technicolor management did not borrow
the last six months of the fiscal year 1982 projection when
creating the CY 1983 Plan. Instead, it created new projections
in order to make the CY 1983 Plan as accurate as possible.40
Third, petitioner attacks the reasonableness of the CY
1983 forecasts by comparing them to actual post-merger
1983 results. It does so in contravention of my previous
evidentiary rulings in this case.41 In a March 27, 2003
hearing, I stated that “[p]ost-merger evidence may be used
to validate or invalidate what was known or knowable
at the time of the merger, but only in the limited sense
of crediting or discrediting pre-merger projections.”42 I
qualified this, however, by stating that “the evidentiary weight
of such post-merger evidence” will “necessarily be of less
weight than pre-merger or contemporaneous evidence of
post-merger value, and of no weight whatsoever without
such contemporaneous evidence. Basically it is useful only
to supplement contemporaneous evidence supporting or
refuting an allegation that the pre-merger projections were
intended for strategic purposes rather than for accuracy.”43
Despite this caution, petitioner's briefs repeatedly attempt
to use post-merger information to denigrate the accuracy
of management forecasts as opposed to using post-merger
information properly to demonstrate strategic motives. For
example, in its post-trial brief, petitioner points out that for
the first quarter of 1983, revenues exceeded the CY 1983 Plan
by 22.4%. This information does not suggest that the pre-
merger projections were for strategic purposes rather than for
accuracy. Additionally, were petitioner to continue its use of
post-merger information, it would have to state that for the
second quarter of 1983, there was less than a 5% variance
between actual and Plan revenues.44 Therefore, this use of
post-merger information was unhelpful and improper and has
been ignored in my valuation process.
c. Trends in the industry
In the course of preparing their forecasts, there is no evidence
that Technicolor management had reason to skew the figures
in any way.45 Despite this knowledge, Cinerama argues
that the CY 1983 Plan was inconsistent with current trends
in the motion picture industry.46 Cinerama has failed to
demonstrate, however, that Technicolor's management was
unaware of these trends. Cinerama has further failed to
demonstrate that Technicolor's performance had a correlation
to “trends” in the motion picture industry. For example,
though only about two-thirds of film processing revenues
were derived from the motion picture industry (the remaining
third coming mostly from the television industry), the
evidence presented at trial by petitioner focused almost
entirely, if not exclusively, on the trends in, and state of, the
motion picture industry. Torkelsen first rejects management's
projections, though he later admitted that the “management
at Technicolor understood the economics of the company
very well.”47 He then testified that Technicolor management's
projections were untenable based upon the very same
data available to Technicolor years after Technicolor's
management came to their conclusions.48 Even assuming,
for the sake of argument, that Cinerama's portrayal of the
motion picture industry in early 1983 is accurate, it is hard
to believe that Technicolor management would have been
ignorant of the trends affecting its industry. It is much more
plausible, and in accord with the long-standing respect for
management financial projections, that Technicolor made a
conscientious effort to produce accurate forecasts, and that
any variations in Technicolor's projections from industry
trends were consciously and reasonably made based upon
management's experience and information gleaned from
Technicolor customers.49
*9  For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that management
forecasts, and the CY 1983 Plan in particular, were the
appropriate starting point for an appraisal analysis of North
Hollywood.
2. Torkelsen's Regression Analysis
Finally, as will be shown below, Torkelsen's replacement
of management forecasts with litigation-driven regression
analyses leads to wholly unreasonable and unsustainable
valuation inputs. Of great concern to the Court are Torkelsen's
regression analyses. Although it is generally agreed that
the developments announced in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.
regarding appropriate valuation methods for appraisal were
positive, the multiplicity of accepted valuation methods
and analyses often leads to an “apples and oranges”
comparison of the competing experts' opinions.50 While both
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experts in this matter used a DCF framework, Easton and
Torkelsen took very different approaches in reaching their
ultimate valuations. Despite the utility of and preference for
contemporary management forecasts, if it can be shown that
the regression analyses are more reasonable and accurate, it
may still be appropriate to use them for determining the inputs
to the DCF framework.51
a. When regression analysis is appropriate
In order for regression analysis to be an appropriate tool
for forecasting economic relationships, the analysis must
be based on a mature business with stable economic
relationships.52 Further, there should be a significant
relationship between the dependent (factor) and independent
(response) variables throughout the historical period from
which the regression is derived.53 It should also be reasonable
and expected that this relationship will continue throughout
the forecast period.54
b. Regression analysis is not appropriate for valuing North
Hollywood
Torkelsen only used thirty months-two-and-a-half years-of
historical data in developing his regressions. Admittedly,
from a purely statistical perspective, a statistically valid
regression model can be constructed with twenty data
points.55 This was done notwithstanding the fact, as has
been touched on above, that data from only thirty months
may include month-to-month variations that can easily skew
the regression's forecasts from true long-term historical
relationships developed over an appropriate business cycle.56
As Easton pointed out, “[m]onthly data is highly variable
and is not indicative of margins going forward.”57 From
the outset, the Court is therefore suspicious of Torkelsen's
regression analysis for North Hollywood as being based on
very little historical data when additional data had been
available.
Based on the above criteria and for the additional
reasons discussed below, I have reservations about the
appropriateness of a regression analysis in determining the
value of North Hollywood. First, the North Hollywood
operation, although it had been functioning for many years,
had recently undergone a significant retooling and upgrade
designed to modernize the facility.58 This modernization
program is apparently largely why Torkelsen only used data
from 1980-82 in his analysis. Torkelsen then assumes that the
advantages in efficiency obtained by the modernization effort
will continue into perpetuity. This assumption is erroneous.
Although this limitation may create a better fit for the data,
it begs the question of whether the rewards reaped from
the modernization program would continue through 1987
(the end of the explicit forecast period) and beyond. It is
more plausible that competition from other processing firms
as well as advancements and changes in the technology of
film processing, distributing, and projection would cause the
modernization program (as largely completed in 1980) to
diminish in value as time progressed.
*10  Second, the film processing business, although it was
a mature operation, was facing some potential “bumps in
the road” as of the merger. United Artists, previously one
of Technicolor's largest contract customers, indicated that it
would not renew its contract when it expired in May 1983.59
This information was known to Technicolor management
before the merger.60 Torkelsen makes no attempt to correct
for this known certainty, but simply dismisses it by asserting
that Technicolor would “make up” the difference in growth
from other customers.61 Respondent rightly points out that
it is highly unlikely that Technicolor could instantly “make
up” the loss of 11% of its customer base in 1983 and
into perpetuity by Torkelsen's estimated annual growth of
2.31%.62 Torkelsen's assumption also ignores the fact that
Technicolor had been losing market share, was having a
difficult time retaining its contract customers, and was facing
the potential of non-film based motion picture delivery and
projection systems in only a few years.63 These major issues-
the unknown future effects of the modernization program,
potential technology threats, and the loss of the business
from a substantial customer coupled with a demonstrated
inability to retain key clients-lead to my conclusion that
North Hollywood was not necessarily the type of business
with stable economic relationships sufficient to support a
forecast based on regressions, especially given a hesitance
among authors of scholarly texts on regression to use it for
forecasting purposes.
c. Even if appropriate, Torkelsen's use of regression
analysis leads to unreasonable results
Even if regression analysis is the appropriate method with
which to forecast North Hollywood's performance and
determine its fair value, the manner in which Torkelsen
performed the regressions leads to incredulous results that are
so far outside the realm of reasonableness that they must be
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rejected. Easton calculated that the value Torkelsen attributed
to North Hollywood was $42.54 per share,64 or almost twice
the $23 per share merger consideration paid for the entire
company, even though the $23 price per share consideration
was found by the Delaware Supreme Court to be entirely fair
and the “highest reasonably available.”65 Regression analysis
is most useful when a given independent (or response)
variable is difficult to predict, and that variable is well
correlated over the applicable time periods with another
dependent (or factor) variable that is significantly easier to
predict.66 Such is not the case in the analyses performed by
Torkelsen. Furthermore, as demonstrated below, his inputs
to a regression model, already on shaky ground, are fatally
flawed.
i. Footage
Preliminarily, and to reinforce a point made above, all the
data from which Torkelsen derives his regressions are tainted
by his inclusion of United Artists' business, which would not
be retained from the latter half of 1983 onward. This is just
one of many unsubstantiated deviations from management's
untainted, contemporary forecasts. Torkelsen justifies his
variations with respect to the number of prints and footage
forecast largely by surmising that Technicolor management
was out of touch with respect to purported industry trends
toward more major releases and wider release patterns.
*11  I find it very interesting to note at this point that
Torkelsen actually visited the North Hollywood facility
in 1986.67 He specifically points out in his report that
his degree in chemical engineering enabled him to “ask
questions concerning the technology and the economics of
the facility both as to the past, the present and the future.”68
Unfortunately for Cinerama, in 1986, both the present and the
future (as well as several years of the past) of the technology
and economies of the facility constituted improper post-
merger information.69 Once Torkelsen rejects contemporary
management forecasts and decides to replace them with his
own post hoc idea of what would have been more reasonable
as of the merger date, there is a substantial risk of errors
entering into the analysis, even with the best of intentions.
To help determine the footage figure to apply to his regression
analysis, Torkelsen uses 35mm theatrical release prints as
a surrogate for all film processed by North Hollywood.70
Torkelsen mentions that Technicolor management prepared
its forecasts in much the same way as he does, but provides no
legitimate reasons for arriving at vastly different conclusions
with respect to CY 1983 footage.71 He continues by stating
that by January 24, 1983, the number of films Technicolor
would process during CY 1983 would be known.72 If that
were the case, there is no obvious need to revise the number
of prints projected in the CY 1983 Plan.
Instead of using the number of prints forecast by the persons
who worked in the motion picture industry at Technicolor day
in and day out at the time of the merger, Torkelsen chooses to
forecast for 1983 the same level of release prints per studio
as in 1982.73 Mr. Jay Cipes was the Technicolor employee
responsible for these projections.74 In the CY 1983 Plan,
Cipes forecast 37,800 release prints, down from 44,700 in
the FY 1983 Plan.75 Nevertheless, Torkelsen decides that
Cipes' projections-projections made contemporaneously with
the merger and representing a downward correction from
the FY 1983 Plan-were inconsistent with industry trends.76
Torkelsen instead forecasts 45,358 release prints for CY
1983.77 I find this arbitrary (and quite substantial) increase
in projected release prints unreasonable and unpersuasive.
Cipes' forecast was based on the specific films anticipated in
1983 and his personal contact with Technicolor's customers.78
Additionally, other members of Technicolor management
carefully scrutinized, and when necessary, revised, Cipes'
projections.79 That 1983 projections vary from 1982
projections is not surprising: the films projected for 1983
were different from those released in 1982 and would have a
different release strategy and audience.
The length of each print is also an essential element in
determining footage. Cipes' forecast was based on an average
of 10,000 feet per release print.80 Torkelsen derives a figure
of 11,087 feet processed per release print because he divides
total footage for fiscal 1982 by the number of release prints
made in that same year.81 He attempts to justify this by
saying that the 11,087 feet includes the dailies, answer prints,
trailers, etc. that are part of making a movie.82 This exercise
results in double-counting those types of non-release print
work. Since the Technicolor forecasts were exploded from the
release print forecasts,83 adding footage from other work to
release print forecasts will result in unwarranted inflation of
the footage figures. Between his inflation of the number of
release prints and the size of each print, Torkelsen manages to
inflate projected motion picture release print footage for CY
1983 from 378 million feet to more than 502 million-a nearly
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33% increase.84 This is unwarranted and entirely outside
the realm of reasonableness based upon historic data.85 I
therefore conclude that Torkelsen's use of a regression model
based upon CY 1983 footage of 502.9 million feet yields an
unreasonable and untenable result and must be rejected.
ii. Revenues, costs, and margins
*12  The parties disagree as to the elasticity of demand
for film processing services and its effects on footage.
Torkelsen cites to the deposition testimony of Raymond Gaul,
the President of Technicolor once it was under Perelman's
control, saying that all the major processors' pricing “was
about the same” and that the industry was driven by
service and capacity, not price.86 James Wilson, a long-
time executive of Technicolor, and vice-president of finance
and administration for the motion picture and television
division at the time of the merger, testified at trial that the
industry was very competitive as to price.87 As objective
evidence supporting Wilson's very credible testimony, the
contracts between Technicolor and three of its largest clients
(Warner Brothers, MCA Universal, and Disney) contained
“most favored nation” clauses that required that the lowest
price offered to any customer for similar types and volumes
of work be offered also to those contract customers.88 If
price was of little import to the producers, it is illogical for
their contracts to contain these clauses. Accordingly, I find
that the most reasonable view of the motion picture film
processing industry as of January 24, 1983 was that it was
very competitive as to price.
Torkelsen performs a series of regressions apparently
designed to enhance his analysis. By adding a time variable
to his revenue per foot analysis, he is able to add a “price
increase variable” to his analysis that has the effect of
increasing Technicolor's revenues, and by logical extension
its prices, by $713 per million feet per month.89 This
means that revenues in month one of Torkelsen's analysis
are $0.102374 per foot processed and by month thirty,
revenues have increased to $0.123764 per foot processed,
an increase of more than 20.89% over only two-and-a-half
years. With active customers so keen on price, and with all
of Technicolor's major contract customers being advantaged
by “most favored nation” clauses, it seems highly unlikely
that such an enormous price increase would be even remotely
possible, as discussed below.
The constant (y-intercept) derived from Torkelsen's
regression analysis implies that North Hollywood revenues
for non-35mm film processing would be $28.128 million
in CY 198390-almost double management's forecast of only
$14.8 million in (net of contractual discounts) revenue for
8mm, 16mm and 70mm film processing for CY 1983.91 This
is yet another example of the unreasonableness of Torkelsen's
analysis.
In analyzing the costs at North Hollywood, Torkelsen
essentially performs the same analysis as he did with
revenues. His cost constant is $2.17 million, or in other words,
excluding costs associated with 35mm film processing, $2.17
million in costs would be incurred as fixed costs and in
connection with processing 8mm, 16mm, and 70mm film.92
His cost increase variable is constructed in much the same
way as his revenue increase variable discussed above. The
cost increase variable found by Torkelsen implies that every
month the cost of processing one million feet of 35mm film
will increase by $369, or roughly half of the monthly increase
in revenues per million feet of film processed.93
*13  This result leads to some interesting projections
regarding Technicolor's operating margins. Torkelsen's
bivariate revenue and cost regressions yield an operating
margin of 22.6% for 1983, increasing to 27.1% by 1987.94
Yet historically, operating margins (as a percentage of sales)
at North Hollywood ranged from 16% to 21%. There was one
exception in 1980, when the operating margin was 28.2%.95
The 28.2%, however, included a windfall in silver reclamation
income.96 In fiscal year 1980, silver reclamation income
represented 11.5% of North Hollywood sales.97 Excluding
FY 1980, from FY 1978 through FY 1982, the average
reclamation income as a percentage of sales was 4.9%.98
Easton testified that Torkelsen's regressions based on footage
and time instead of just time had the effect of almost
doubling operating profit for 1987.99 1987 was the last
year of the explicit forecast and used to determine the
terminal value.100 Terminal values are easily manipulated.101
Although Torkelsen did not provide the figures himself,
Easton prepared an estimate of what North Hollywood's
terminal value would be under Torkelsen's analysis. He
calculates Torkelsen's discounted free cash flow terminal
value for North Hollywood at $146,552,000 out of a total
North Hollywood value of $209,420,000.102 In other words,
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roughly three-quarters of the value Torkelsen attributes to
North Hollywood is due to the terminal value, as opposed to
roughly half for Easton's analysis-yet another reason for my
deep distrust of Torkelsen's conclusion.103
This back-loaded terminal value is a direct result of
Torkelsen's over-projection of North Hollywood's operating
margins. Wilson testified that as a result of the contracts
between Technicolor and the major studios, he did not think
Torkelsen's projected increase in margins were reasonable.104
Wilson explained that Technicolor's contract customers had a
keen interest in Technicolor's margins, to the extent that when
Technicolor wanted to raise prices it would essentially have to
obtain approval from its customers.105 Margin increases were
basically not possible based on the key contracts in place on
January 24, 1983.106 Torkelsen's projections into perpetuity
would essentially increase margins to and eventually beyond
margins achieved only at the height of the silver bubble-
a result entirely inconsistent with North Hollywood's past
performance.107 I find Wilson's testimony credible and,
therefore, that Torkelsen's projections regarding operating
margins are unreasonable, are based upon suspect methods,
and must be rejected.
One final observation before I turn to growth rates. Torkelsen
attributes his use of separate regression analyses for revenues
and costs to a need to develop an income statement.108 He
also stated that “[y]ou're going to get the same results” using
the combined or separate analyses.109 Statistically, however,
the results are quite different. The combined revenue and cost
regression performed by Torkelsen is PNX 2, and its omission
from Torkelsen's report is strange, indeed. This combined
analysis is a very poor predictor of North Hollywood
performance. The R-squared of the model (or the changes in
profits explained by the regression formula) is only 58%.110
That means that more than 40% of the changes in profits from
month-to-month are not captured by Torkelsen's regression
and are due to other factors. Furthermore, the absolute
average monthly error is greater than 21%.111 Additionally,
the T-statistic of 1.752 means that the model is not statistically
significant at the 95% confidence interval for a two-tailed
test.112 Thus, Torkelsen's combined revenue/costs regression
analysis is such a poor predictor of profit over the July 1980-
December 1982 period (the period for which the regression
was performed) that it would be worthless as a predictive tool
for forecasting future profits. This fact is cleverly disguised
by Torkelsen's summary page regarding North Hollywood
operating profit.113 At the end of his analysis, Torkelsen
returns to annual figures, presented in tabular form that
falsely represent the accuracy of Torkelsen's back cast when
compared with the high variances observed in the monthly
data.114 In sum, these errors further undermine Torkelsen's
methodology, at least to my mind.
iii. Growth rates
*14  Both parties presented a great deal of evidence relating
to the state of the motion picture industry in the early 1980s. In
particular, there has been much dispute regarding a statement
made by Mr. A.D. Murphy,115 quoted in the 1983 edition
of The Movie Business Book, that “there will probably be
another reduction in the number of screens from the current
18,000 total to a level of 8,000.”116 On cross-examination as
an expert witness in the previous trial,117 and in a statement
made to the Court for the current trial,118 Murphy attempted
to recast his past comments in a light more favorable to
petitioner. In brief, Murphy claims that his statement in The
Movie Business Book was taken out of context, not properly
updated from when it was originally made, and misrepresents
his contemporaneously expressed views on the industry. I find
Murphy's attempts to recharacterize his previous statements
unpersuasive. At best, Murphy's statements from the late
1970s and early 1980s, when analyzed in their totality and
in context, show that an observer could conclude that the
motion picture industry had rough times ahead. Although
true that Easton did not portray Murphy's statement in the
manner most favorable to Cinerama, Easton's report, in my
opinion, is highly persuasive; Easton's selective quotations
of Murphy119 are certainly not unexpected in an adversarial
process-especially in a “battle of the experts” appraisal trial.
Barry Reardon testified on behalf of Cinerama regarding
the explosive growth of the film industry at the time of the
merger. Though I find him credible as a witness overall, the
little weight I gave his testimony was tempered with the
cautiousness requisite to the realization that he is a close
personal friend of the Forman family, Cinerama's owners,
who would directly benefit from a favorable outcome for
the petitioner. Reardon admittedly agreed to testify as a
personal favor to them, which could easily (though perhaps
unintentionally) bias his opinions in favor of petitioner.120
I am also cautious with the treatment of his testimony
because he relied upon post-Merger documents to refresh
his recollection about pre-Merger events. Though seemingly
harmless, such reliance would likely exacerbate the hindsight
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bias he may have already had due to his twenty years of
post-Merger industry experience as an executive at Warner
Brothers.121 Therefore, I find that Reardon's testimony was
not helpful in this adjudication, since it was tainted with the
infirmities of personal bias, hindsight bias, and because it was
geared toward the industry as a whole, rather than providing
any information specific to Technicolor or its customers.
Torkelsen references both the Murphy and Wilkofsky Gruen
reports in support of the proposition that the motion picture
industry was booming and that rapid growth was expected in
the industry.122 Torkelsen notes that overall industry growth
was forecast at over 8%.123 He also cites statistics from
the Motion Picture Association of America (“MPAA”) that
theater admissions from 1972 to 1982 had increased at an
annual rate of 2.66% and that box office revenue growth
had grown annually over that same period at a rate of
8.50%.124 Torkelsen continues by assuming that “[i]f the
average number of days that a print is shown were held
constant, then the number of prints required to fill all theatres
would have to grow at the rate of all theatre screens.”125
Borrowing again from the MPAA statistics, Torkelsen states
that historically the number of movie screens in the United
States grew at 2.31% annually from 1972-1982. Citing this
figure as a conservative estimate, he then uses this historic
average annual growth rate as a proxy for the growth rate
of the number of prints produced by North Hollywood. This
aspect of Torkelsen's report is particularly troubling because
no evidence was presented establishing a correlation between
the past screen growth and the number of release prints
processed by North Hollywood.126 This is another example
of the unreasonableness of Torkelsen's analysis.127
*15  The terminal value is used to determine the value of the
entity being valued beyond the explicit forecast period since
it is impractical to forecast free cash flow into perpetuity.128
Torkelsen calculates his terminal value based on normalized
net cash flow for 1987, then grows that figure based upon
the Gordon Growth Model into perpetuity.129 Torkelsen
discusses the growth rates projected for North Hollywood and
Videocassette by the Wilkofsky Gruen reports but decides
not to adopt them.130 Instead, Torkelsen chooses to grow
the terminal value at the stipulated rate of inflation (5%)131
plus the rate of real long-term growth in the United States'
gross domestic product (“GDP”), which he calculates at
2.35% compounded annually.132 The only support Torkelsen
provides for this inexplicable substitution is the assumption
that “it is reasonable to expect that Technicolor's real growth
over the long-term should be in line with national real
economic growth. Technicolor's market, the entertainment
industry, should at least maintain its share of [GDP] going
forward.”133 Again, Torkelsen has failed to explain why he
substituted a figure that would be Technicolor-specific (i.e.,
the growth rate of 6.3% found by Wilkofsky Gruen) for a
generic figure (GDP) that has not been shown to have any
relation to or correlation with either Technicolor or North
Hollywood. Accordingly, Torkelsen's determination of the
terminal value is inherently flawed and unreasonable.134
Having demonstrated and discussed the unreasonableness of
Torkelsen's analysis and the plethora of errors throughout,
it is clear that his valuation of North Hollywood cannot be
sustained. He bases his regression model on an artificially
small data sample-less than three years. He makes perplexing
alterations to contemporaneous management forecasts that
have been shown to be historically very accurate and
prepared with great care. He determines footage, margins,
and other inputs to his model inconsistently and arbitrarily.
Finally, the growth rates he applies to the data are not
specific to Technicolor, but rather are proxies that have no
demonstrated statistically significant or practical relationship
to Technicolor's past performance. Torkelsen's valuation of
North Hollywood is rejected in its entirety as unreasonable.
3. Easton's Analysis
It now remains to be seen whether Easton provides
a reasonable valuation of North Hollywood. Easton's
report relies heavily upon management forecasts, especially
Technicolor's CY 1983 Plan.135
a. Revenue and sales
The CY 1983 Plan projected net sales revenues for North
Hollywood of $81.409 million.136 This was part of a
downward trend experienced by Technicolor in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.137 For CY 1983, management projected the
following footages and gross sales (all figures in thousands):
35mm, 460,209 feet and $79,065; 16mm, 91,960 feet and
$14,905; 8mm, 7,862 feet and $640; 70mm, 3,309 and
$1,943.138 These figures translate into the following revenues
per foot: 35mm, $0.172; 16mm, $0.162; 8mm, $0.081; 70mm,
$0.587.139
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i. Footage
*16  Easton accepts management's figures for 1983, but then
adjusts to correct for the loss of the United Artists business
in the future.140 I agree with Easton's use of management
figures for CY 1983 and accept them as part of my appraisal
analysis.141 I also agree with Easton's desire to correct the
CY 1983 footage in order to obtain accurate forecasts going
forward, although I disagree with his method.
With respect to the United Artists business, Easton essentially
extracts 11% of CY 1983 footage for five of twelve months
to arrive at a corrected CY 1983 footage (for purposes
of forecasting from 1984-87) of 439,116,000 feet. I find
this to be unreasonable and incorrect. It was apparent and
documented that United Artists' work under an expiring
contract was to represent 6.6% of the CY 1983 release
prints.142 I conclude that a more appropriate adjustment
would be to subtract 6.6% from the CY 1983 figures for
moving forward. This results in a footage reduction greater
than that made by Easton. Since the footage figures from the
other gauges are exploded out from the 35mm figures, it is
appropriate to similarly reduce the 16mm, 8mm, and 70mm
footage projections. Therefore, I find that the appropriate
corrected footage figures for North Hollywood CY 1983
for use in forecasting forward are (in thousands): 35mm,
429,835; 16mm, 85,891; 8mm, 7,343; 70mm, 3,091.
Easton analyzes Technicolor data from Hope Reports, Inc.143
to determine the growth or decline in footage for each
gauge.144 Specifically, he calculates the percentage change in
footage for each gauge for the years 1979-82 and then adopts
these growth rates, applying them to the corrected CY 1983
figures to forecast footage from 1984-87.145 With respect
to 35mm film, Technicolor experienced an overall annual
4% decline in footage from 1979-82.146 Easton decides that
negative growth in 35mm was not likely to continue and
substitutes the negative 4% growth for 0% growth, aggressive
when compared to recent historical data.147 This substitution
is especially aggressive when the Hope Reports showed that
Technicolor processed 507,922,000 feet of film in 1982, and
the CY 1983 plan projected only 460,209,000 feet, a decrease
of almost 10%.148 Although somewhat arbitrary, and even
optimistic, I find Easton's assumption of no growth or decline
in 35mm reasonable based on the information available as of
the merger date. Accordingly, I project 35mm footage at the






















With respect to 16mm and 8mm film, severe declines in
footage had occurred between 1979 and 1982. This was
due in large part to the introduction of videocassettes as
an alternative medium for industrial and educational use.149
Given that the use of videocassette was expected to increase
at the expense of these gauges, Easton applied the historical
declines to the corrected CY 1983 figures, with no growth or
decline projected after 1987. I agree with this analysis and
adopt it.150 Therefore, the footage figures I adopt for my
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70mm film was essentially an alternative to 35mm, with the
overwhelming majority of its use in the theatrical area.151 In
the few years before the merger, 70mm film had grown more
popular as demonstrated by an overall annual increase of 11%
between 1979 and 1982.152 Easton projects this significant
increase to continue until 1987, but then flat growth of
70mm footage from 1987 onward. Again, I find this to be a
reasonable assumption, supported by the empirical evidence
available contemporaneously with the merger, and I adopt it.


























































































































ii. Price and revenue
In his report, Easton analyzes the historical growth rates
in prices by Technicolor and one of its largest competitors,
MGM, using the data provided in the Hope Reports.153
Easton concludes that price increases between 1977 and
1982 were largely in line with inflation.154 He also finds
that relative market share was constant, such that it was
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unlikely that Technicolor would be able to raise prices and
maintain market share.155 This inability to increase prices
significantly more than inflation is also due to the contracts
by which North Hollywood obtained the vast majority of
its business.156 Easton assumes that growth in prices at the
rate of inflation (5%) over the prices derived from the CY
1983 Plan would be reasonable. I agree and adopt that same
framework for my valuation analysis. The difference between
gross and net sales is attributable to the discounts granted
to contract customers.157 Similar to Easton, I adopt the ratio
of net-to-gross sales that was projected in the CY 1983 Plan
(approximately 84.3%). At the end of the explicit forecast
period, Easton expected sales to grow at the rate of inflation.
I find that to be a reasonable determination, and accept it.
In summary:




















































































































































































*18  As discussed above, margins at North Hollywood were
traditionally in the 16% to 21% range.158 The CY 1983 Plan
projected an 18.9% margin.159 Easton uses this figure for his
analysis, having testified at trial that it was in accordance with
previously observed margins at North Hollywood, especially
when adjusted for abnormal silver reclamation income.160 I
find his analysis credible and sensible. Exhibits 3 and 7 of his
report analyzing the operating margins and silver reclamation
revenue at North Hollywood were very helpful.161
The parties presented conflicting evidence regarding whether
further abnormal silver reclamation profits would be possible
in the future.162 I find that the more sensible conclusion
is that Technicolor would be unable to reap large windfalls
from silver reclamation in the future for two reasons. First, a
portion of Technicolor's windfall in late 1979 and early 1980
was a result of the rapid increase in the price of silver. A
more gradual increase would increase the cost of film stock
more or less in line with the excess profits expected from
silver reclamation. Second, Technicolor's contract customers
had a great deal of leverage in keeping prices down and North
Hollywood's margins constant.163 It would be unreasonable
to assume that these customers would ignore the effects
of silver reclamation in their negotiations with Technicolor
management. I find, therefore, that Easton's conclusions
regarding silver reclamation are reasonable, and I adopt them
for my analysis.
Because silver reclamation profits would not continue,
margins would be unlikely to increase significantly for
reasons set forth by Easton as well, with which I agree
and find reasonable.164 First, as I have determined, footage
will decrease and revenue will increase approaching 1987.
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As footage decreases, the fixed cost per foot increases.
The increase in revenue would be largely attributable to
the increase in price per foot to account for variable
costs. Second, with the “most favored nation” clause in
Technicolor's contracts, it would seem reasonable that
retaining clients and raising margins would be mutually
exclusive. I find that use of an 18.9% margin for CY 1983 and
onward is appropriate and reasonable.
iv. Net investment in fixed capital and working capital165
The DCF model calculates enterprise value based on free
cash flow, not income, as measured by Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles or the Internal Revenue Service.166
Therefore, it is vitally important to account for working
capital requirements and fixed capital investment (net of
depreciation) in determining the free cash flow that will be
discounted back to present value.167
Due to the modernization program discussed briefly above,
capital expenditures at North. Hollywood had been high
in the past.168 It would seem unreasonable that these high
levels of capital investment would continue, and indeed,
the CY 1983 Plan reflects that assumption. For fiscal years
1979-1982, capital expenditures averaged $2.0 million, or
2.4% of the following year's net sales.169 For CY 1983,
however, management projected only $704,000 in capital
investment, a marked decrease representing only 0.9% of
my projected 1984 net sales.170 It does not, however, seem
probable that this low level of capital investment would be
sustainable into perpetuity. As a result, capital expenditures
should be higher than 0.9% of next year's sales from 1984
forward. Easton projects fixed capital investment equal to
1.8% of the following year's sales going forward. This is
equal to the depreciation rate (as a percentage of net sales)
he projects. Depreciation at North Hollywood historically had
been between 1.5% and 2.1% of net sales, with an average
of 1.8%.171 I find Easton's assumptions reasonable and in
accord with both the CY 1983 Plan and Technicolor's historic
results. Accordingly, after CY 1983, I will calculate fixed
capital investment as 1.8% of the following year's net sales,
and depreciation as 1.8% of net sales.172
*19  Between 1979 and 1982, working capital (as a
percentage of net sales) had averaged 17.8%.173 The CY
1983 Plan projected working capital at 17% of net sales.
Easton uses 17% for his analysis, and finding it reasonable
and supported by the evidence, I do so as well.
v. Conclusion
I present the summary of my findings regarding North
Hollywood's fair value in tabular form below. As can be seen,
and for the reasons discussed above, I find that the fair value
of North Hollywood as of January 24, 1983 is $53,991,172,
or $11.82 per share.
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North Hollywood Value
 
     $ 53,991.172
 
- 74 -
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Not Reported in A.2d (2003)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 21
Per Share Value (4,567,491 shares outstanding)
 




        
 
 
        
 
 
        
B. Newbury Park
*20  The videocassette recorder was introduced in the United
States in 1976.174 Technicolor opened its videocassette
duplication division in Newbury Park, California five
years later, in January 1981. This division offered
mass reproduction of pre-recorded videocassettes for film
copyright owners and distributors. Technicolor opened the
division after agreeing to perform all of Warner Brothers'
duplication for three years.175 Technicolor's Newbury Park
videocassette duplication plant had an initial capacity of
approximately two million units per year.176 At trial, I heard
testimony regarding the prospects of both the videocassette
industry as a whole and of Technicolor's videocassette
division in particular.
1. Business Prospects for the Pre-recorded Videocassette
Industry
Overall, the wildly divergent testimony at trial pointed
to one simple fact: the future of the prerecorded
videocassette industry was not certain. As anticipated,
petitioner viewed the industry's future through rose-colored
glasses, predicting quite lucrative prospects for duplicating
prerecorded videocassettes, despite the admitted uncertainty
rampant in the industry. In contrast, respondent predicted a
rocky path, despite increasing sales and VCR acceptance in
American households.
One Cinerama witness, Stephen Roberts, offered glowing
reports of the videocassette industry as of the time of the
merger. Drawing upon his expertise as a Fox executive, he
testified that as of the time of the merger, he believed that the
prerecorded videocassette industry would grow fifteen-fold
by 1986.177 Yet interestingly enough, just four months before
the merger Roberts testified before Congress and stated a
completely opposite proposition-that the unauthorized rentals
of videocassettes was acting as a “ravaging steamroller” and
would “crush” the videocassette business.178
Though Roberts brushes these former contradictory
statements aside as hyperbole, this Court is unwilling to
play a game of “believe me now that I was lying then.”
If anything, his statements before the House Subcommittee
only four months before the merger seem more reliable,
though they may be to some extent exaggerated due to the
persuasive intent of his speech. Unable to reconcile these
contrary views, I am reluctant to give any weight to Roberts'
current rosy predictions regarding the videocassette industry.
In any event, his predictions du jour evaluated the industry as
a whole and were not tailored to the prospects of Technicolor's
videocassette division.
Cinerama's industry expert, Dr. Arthur Gruen, projects
dramatic future growth for the videocassette industry in his
expert report and trial testimony as well. Besides the fact
that Torkelsen rarely relies upon Gruen's predictions in his
calculations for Newbury Park, Gruen's testimony may be
somewhat influenced with hindsight bias due to the great
deal of knowledge he has amassed about the industry as
it existed from 1986 onward. This extensive post-merger
knowledge, though impressive, may have unconsciously, yet
impermissibly, colored Gruen's analysis and opinions. In fact,
Gruen conceded as much at trial.179 Additionally, Gruen
relied upon post-merger documents to refresh his recollection
about the pre-merger state of the industry. More importantly,
the relevance of his testimony and report is limited because
of its complete failure to evaluate Technicolor specifically,
even though information was available upon which such an
analysis could have been executed. Instead, Cinerama seems
to have strategically ignored the less-pleasant reality of late-
coming Technicolor in favor of the rosier forecasts of the
industry as a whole.
*21  Further, Gruen may have erroneously based his opinions
on some significant legal inaccuracies, as adeptly pointed out
by Technicolor. For example, he maintained in every draft of
his expert report, until the final draft, that the federal courts
as of the time of the merger had held that the recording
of television programs and movies for home use did not
constitute copyright infringement. This was simply incorrect-
individuals were prohibited at the time from using their VCRs
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to copy movies and television programs. This feature was one
of the only advantages of VCRs over competing technologies.
Even his final version of the report omitted another detail that
was of profound consequence in the industry-that the Ninth
Circuit had found the mere sale of videocassette recorders
to be illegal and as constituting contributory copyright
infringement.180 It was not until well after the merger that
VCRs could be legally sold and that consumers could use their
VCRs to copy televised material and movies without fear of
infringing a copyright. Uninformed of these legal obstacles
that existed at the time of the merger, Gruen projected that
the industry would grow in leaps and bounds, despite the fact
that VCRs could not be sold and consumers could not use
their VCRs to record copyrighted materials.181 His testimony
was further undermined by a document he published in
1985 entitled “Video 1995.” In this report, Gruen stated
that by the end of 1982 (i.e., pre-merger), the prerecorded
videocassette rental market had “almost totally overwhelmed
retail sales.”182 Intuitively, and as he confirmed at trial, a
rental market requires a much smaller inventory than does
a sales market, which would not be good for prerecorded
videocassette distributors or duplicators.183 Although I find
several portions of his report interesting and somewhat
enlightening, my reliance upon his expert report took into
account its infirmities described above.
In general, after hearing all of the testimony at trial, and
reviewing the voluminous paper record, I cannot avoid the
conclusion that the growth of the videocassette industry as a
whole was uncertain at the time of the merger. Respondent
Technicolor provided ample evidence that the industry stood
on shaky grounds, as it was complicated by several factors,
such as low barriers to entry, competing technologies, legal
complications, and confused marketing strategies.
a. Low barriers to entry
Duplicating prerecorded videos was a fairly simple business
that required only an original tape and an army of VCRs with
which to copy it.184 To illustrate, when Technicolor entered
the market, it simply leased a facility and installed about 2,000
VCRs in it. This provided it an initial duplication capacity
of approximately two million tapes per year for a relatively
modest capital investment.185 Additionally, videocassette
duplicating did not require significant technical expertise.
Technicolor used virtually the same VCR machines that any
consumer could purchase.186 This was a business simple
enough that virtually anyone could enter the market at any
time as a matter of logic.
*22  At the time of the merger, there were relatively few
main competitors in the prerecorded videocassette industry:
CBS/Fox Home Video and Bell & Howell/Columbia Video
Services.187 CBS/Fox Home Video was then operating at full
capacity and was seeking to expand its capacity with a $15 to
$20 million project to build a new plant.188
b. Competing technologies
Besides the competition generated by the industry's relatively
low barriers to entry, video competed with other technologies
for consumer attention as well. At the time, a movie could
be seen on videocassette, videodisc, cable or broadcast
television.189 The VCR was a relatively new technology and
had not yet achieved widespread consumer acceptance.190
VCRs did, however, have one primary advantage over
videodisc-their ability to record television programs. This was
an activity that would reduce, not increase, consumer demand
for Newbury Park's prerecorded videocassettes.191 Therefore,
even if VCRs penetrated more households because consumers
found the recording feature desirable, it does not immediately
follow that demand for prerecorded videocassettes would
increase at the same rate, as Torkelsen assumed, especially
when it would be less costly for a consumer to purchase a
VCR and premium cable television to record films at home192
than it would be to purchase a VCR and pay the prevailing
$60-$100 price per prerecorded video.193 In fact, blank tape
sales grew rapidly during this period.194
c. Legal complications
As mentioned earlier, the prerecorded videocassette industry
as a whole was turbulent due to various legal obstacles.
At the time of the merger, home recording of television
broadcasts had been held illegal, as was the sale of VCRs.195
The first sale doctrine, which allowed a prerecorded
videocassette purchaser to rent the copyrighted materials to
the public without permission, threatened to extinguish the
profitability of the industry.196 Significant lobbying efforts
were underway and court challenges had been brought to
minimize the effects of these legal barriers, but as of the
merger date, no headway had been gained. As Roberts
testified before Congress, Fox's business was hurting because
of the first sale doctrine.197 He further stated that “[t]he future
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of the prerecorded cassette business is now bogged down
in uncertainties, marketplace distortions and artificial pricing
mechanisms.”198
d. Marketing strategies
Just before the merger, the videocassette industry had
undergone a significant restructuring. The marketing of
prerecorded videocassettes began as a direct sales model,
selling videos directly to customers. Although Technicolor's
directors heard lofty reports of Newbury Park's business in
November of 1981,199 they were hearing a very different
story by the spring of 1982. This is because in early-to-
mid 1982, its major flagship customer, Warner Brothers,
championed a “rental plan” movement that led to marketing
confusion and ripples in videocassette sales.200 Accordingly,
Technicolor directors learned in May of 1982 that its Newbury
Park division was suffering because “the videocassette
business with Warner Brothers has been less than anticipated,
as Warner Brothers has not made any firm commitment as
to how it will market its video cassettes-sale or rental.”201
Arthur Ryan, at the time a Technicolor director, partially
blamed Newbury Park's poor 1982 fiscal performance on
Warner Brothers' inconsistent orders and its “indecision
regarding the method of marketing their videocassettes (i.e.,
rental or sale).”202 He also indicated that the division was
attempting to stem costs and expenses by cutting back on
labor and overhead.203
*23  By the time of the merger, the direct sales model had
almost completely transformed into a rental model, where
videos would instead be sold to rental chains that would
then rent the videos to customers for a fee.204 As Gruen
admitted, by the end of 1982 (pre-merger), the prerecorded
videocassette rental market had “completely overwhelmed
the sales market, the rental market had completely reversed
the growth in prerecorded videocassette shipments, and
Hollywood was striking out in its efforts to deal with those
problems in Congress and the courts.”205 He also conceded
that a rental market requires a much smaller inventory than
does a sales market, which would not be good for prerecorded
videocassette distributors or duplicators.206 As expected, the
number of prerecorded videos sold per VCR began to decline
as a result, from 1.72 in 1981 to 1.18 in 1982, while the
number of blank tapes sold grew.207
2. Business Prospects for Newbury Park Specifically
Although Technicolor's Newbury Park facility suffered from
the same infirmities that affected the entire industry, its future
was further clouded by other factors, such as its late entrance
into a market with relatively low barriers to entry. Technicolor
did have a competitive advantage in the market due to its
strong pre-existing relationships with many of the major
movie distributors,208 but it was somewhat disadvantaged
because it entered the market later in the game than many
of its competitors.209 By year-end 1982, most of the major
movie distributors had already formed contractual ties or
a long-standing relationship with one of the existing video
duplicators. In fact, it was only MGM that was not bound in
such a way, which provided a limited universe of potential
clients for Technicolor to acquire. The evidence suggests that
this limited universe was unlikely to expand since Newbury
Park's competitors did not seem to anticipate leaving the
business.210
As a new business, Newbury Park did not begin to turn a
profit until the last six months of 1982.211 Its 1982 annual
report to stockholders, dated September 7, 1982, reported
that the company expected Newbury Park to “realize a
significant sales increase in the current fiscal year and to
provide an important profit contribution to the Company.”212
As expected, it recorded $1,379,000 in profit in the last
half of 1982. Almost a third of this profit, however, was
attributable to rebates on raw material stock (i.e., blank tape
rebates),213 which seemed unlikely to accrue to Technicolor
in the future.214 Both Wilson and Easton testified that the
large customers would likely demand that the rebates be
passed through to them once they were discovered. Though
Torkelsen believes that these rebates would continue to accrue
to Technicolor, Technicolor management apparently did not
believe that these rebates would continue to do so because
they did not include them in their profit forecasts for Newbury
Park. This assumption seems the more reasonable one, in
light of the fact that Technicolor's contract with Warner
Brothers provided that it would pay only the manufacturer's
invoice price less any discount.215 Even if technically the
rebates were not yet considered a “discount” under the
contract, Warner Brothers could have easily acquired the
material rebates to itself because it was also permitted to
designate its own supplier for raw videocassette stock.216
And if Technicolor did not keep its prices competitive, Warner
Brothers had the contractual right to unilaterally terminate its
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duplicating contract.217 It seems clear to me that Technicolor
had plenty of incentive to shave off the rebates to keep its
prices as low as possible. Because management likely had the
most current and thorough information regarding the future
of material rebates at the time of the merger, I accept their
projection that these rebates would not continue to accrue to
Technicolor.218
*24  Even though material rebates would be taken out of
the profit equation in the future, Newbury Park did have
some relatively important advantages in the industry. As
part of Technicolor, it benefited from the good will that
Technicolor had already established with its major film
customers. Further, it was one of the newest and largest
videocassette duplicating facilities in the United States at the
time.219
3. Valuation of Newbury Park
The experts differ quite significantly in their respective
valuations of Newbury Park.220 The magnitude of this
difference accounts for 18.5%, or $7.63 per share, of the total
difference in the parties' valuations.221 Though both experts
use the DCF method to value Newbury Park, that is almost
the end of the similarities between their reports.
Because both experts agree that the Perelman plan was not
expected to impact the value or profitability of Newbury Park,
its consideration is not necessitated in this section.222
a. Rejection of the Torkelsen Report
Consistent with the majority of his expert report, Torkelsen
inexplicably ignores contemporaneous management
projections in favor of his own post-hoc calculations, even
though management forecasts were shown to be extremely
accurate.223 As pointed out in Easton's supplemental expert
report,224 Torkelsen's projections include an inconsistency
that directly affects his calculation of Newbury Park's
working capital investment. Although he uses management's
CY 1983 Plan for his 1983 working capital forecast and
he intends to grow working capital with net revenue
going forward, Torkelsen overstates the net revenue forecast
by incorporating the pass-through revenue of blank tape
sales. This results in a similarly overstated working capital
investment. Easton notes that:
[t]his inconsistency highlights the use of incompatible
net revenue and working capital investment forecasts
for Videocassette in 1983. Management's 1983
Videocassette net revenue forecast was $5.3 million
and management specifically projected Videocassette
net working capital of $1.732 million at the end of 1983
in the same forecast. Mr. Torkelsen employs a year-end
1983 working capital balance that is virtually identical
to the assumption in the management forecast ($1.726
million versus management's $1.732 million), and thus
the implied 1983 working capital investment levels, yet
he inflates the 1983 Videocassette net revenue forecast
to $26.65 million-five times management's forecast level
of $5.3 million. Thereafter, Mr. Torkelsen grows this
already inflated 1983 Videocassette net revenue from
$26.65 million in 1983 to $60.483 million in 1987-an
annual growth rate of 17.8% from his highly inflated
base.225
Correcting for this mistake alone to comply with Torkelsen's
stated working capital investment forecast methodology
yields a significantly lower figure for 1984 through 1987,
which leads to a higher overall value for the division-an
increase of $2.49 per share.226
*25  It appears that Torkelsen's mistaken calculation of
Newbury Park's duplicating revenue ($10.7 million) was
101.8% greater than management's original CY 1983 sales
projection alone, and 87.3% greater than the $5.7 million
1983 base year projection Easton used. Even more shocking
is Torkelsen's projected margin of 50.1%, as compared to
management's projected 26.8%.227 Such extreme divergence
from a contemporaneous management forecast that has not
been discredited is simply unreasonable on its face.
Besides these very basic problems, Torkelsen's valuation is
less reliable due to its indirect methodology. Torkelsen's
forecast consists of two basic elements: (1) a unit forecast
and (2) a profit margin per unit assumption. His analysis of
both results in base year amounts that are extremely inflated
over the CY 1983 Plan. Specifically, he projects a unit level
of 171% over plan and a margin level of more than 50% over
plan. This further leads to an absolute dollar profit of 377%
over management's 1983 plan ($5.383 million versus $1.427
million).228
Additionally, both key inputs to Torkelsen's forecast
are convoluted. The unit forecast is indirectly derived,
using contortionist calculations and inappropriate proxies
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for growth. Torkelsen largely ignores management's unit
forecasts and instead creates base year values by annualizing
the units sold in July through December of 1982 (i.e., by
multiplying those results by two), not taking into account
seasonality or other factors. This simple oversight leads to a
unit projection for 1983 that is 71% higher than management
forecasts for this same period (2.4 million units instead of
1.4 million units). Torkelsen's unit projection calculation is
so grossly in excess of management's calculation that it
seems to lack all credibility-especially in light of the fact
that Technicolor management indicated that they generated
their projections by relying upon information gleaned from
the videocassette customers themselves, the studios. Further,
management was aware of the data Torkelsen annualized
when drafting their projections and drew from it strikingly
different conclusions.
Even though these flaws alone are enough to reject
Torkelsen's projections for this business unit, there are
additional errors. Not only does Torkelsen begin with
erroneous base numbers that will be carried forward through
the forecast period, he then inflates these excessive numbers
by using a convoluted measure of growth. He generates
an all-new revenue forecast in a round-about way, using
indirect (and, some would argue, extremely attenuated and
inappropriate) indicia of future revenue growth. Specifically,
he uses a logistic curve forecasting methodology to project the
aggregate number of VCRs (not prerecorded videocassettes)
owned by consumers over the 1983 to 1987 forecast period to
arrive at a growth forecast that changes from 59.6% to 26.7%.
To do this, Torkelsen uses a product life-cycle methodology
to predict growth in household VCR penetration using a
logistic S-curve analysis and an experience curve model.
According to this theory, growth of a new consumer electronic
product follows the shape of an S-curve, divided into four
stages: introduction of the new product, growth, maturity,
and decline.229 Torkelsen analogizes to the examples of
mainly unrelated products in demonstrating this sort of
growth curve: clothes dryers, AM radio stations, radios,
telephones, and color TVs.230 This S-curve analysis, while
enticingly complicated, erroneously assumes that all new
products maintain identical, successful life cycles. In reality,
we all know this to be untrue. For a relevant example,
videodisc players had been introduced during that era, but
they did not follow this successful S-curve of growth.
Throughout the ages, several new technologies have been
introduced and some have been quickly replaced by better
technologies before they have even had the chance to realize
full acceptance into American households. At that time,
VCRs were still new enough to lack the growth stability
predicted in this methodology, especially in light of the
various competitive and legal challenges the industry faced
at the time. Torkelsen relies upon examples of unrelated
technologies without demonstrating how they were similar
to the VCR experience and specifically whether these
technologies were subject to competing technologies as was
the VCR. Further, S-curve forecasts are not extremely reliable
because they are highly sensitive to their data inputs and can
be dramatically skewed by even small differences in their
factors.231
*26  Going forward with his VCR penetration calculation,
Torkelsen then substitutes the projected growth in VCR
households as a proxy for growth in the prerecorded
videocassette industry. The statistics at the time, in contrast,
showed that there was actually a declining ratio of
prerecorded videocassette sales to VCRs and an increasing
ratio of blank cassettes to VCRs.232 In fact, while VCR
penetration was growing at 60% in 1982, the growth in
prerecorded videocassette sales was stagnant or declining.233
Therefore, even the 1982 data demonstrates that VCRs are an
unreliable proxy.
Moving on, Torkelsen's second key input, as indicated above,
is his operating margin per unit for duplication. Rather
than passing through the cost of raw materials (i.e., blank
videotapes) to its customers as required by contract, and as
forecasted by management, Torkelsen includes this cost in
his Newbury Park margin calculation. In fact, Torkelsen's
profit forecast rests upon the assumption that Newbury Park
will realize a $2.22 profit per tape, which he maintains
will continue from 1983 through 1985. Yet, at the tape
duplicating volumes that he predicts, Technicolor would
be paid only $2.49 in duplicating fees, according to its
contracts in place at the time of the merger.234 Accepting
these figures would result in an operating margin of 89% for
duplication (i.e., $2.22/$2.49),235 an improbable result that
would be impossible to sustain in a competitive market.236
Wilson illustrated by chart these absurd results at trial237 and
petitioners contested them, insisting instead that Torkelsen's
margin ranged from only 49.9% to 55.6% once material costs
were extracted, not 89%.238 Even this profit margin, however,
does not comport with reality. Wilson also calculated the
actual profits for each half-inch tape239 during the last six
months of 1982-arriving at a figure of only $0.86, a figure
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that included $0.60 in material rebates, a figure much lower
than the $2.22 calculated by Torkelsen. All remaining profit
was attributable to the lower volume three-quarter inch tape,
master tape and dubbing tapes.240 Simply put, Torkelsen's
numbers do not add up.
Although Technicolor management specifically forecasted its
expected volume and the revenues to be produced by that
volume, Torkelsen rejects these contemporaneous projections
as “unrealistic.”241 Torkelsen attempts to arrive at more
“realistic” results with a hindsight valuation that completely
ignores the seasonality of the business, completely ignores
the closest insiders' projections, and results in a strikingly
high number. This is simply inexcusable. Similar to the
expert employed by Dunham's in Taylor v. American
Specialty Retailing Group, Inc.,242 Torkelsen's “valuation
lacks credibility because ... he ignored a contemporaneous
set of projections prepared by [Technicolor's] management,
choosing instead to rely on far more [optimistic] assumptions
of [Technicolor's] future prospects that he prepared on his
own.”243
*27  Though there was limited historical data to rely
upon, management had proven accurate in its predictions.
At trial, Wilson demonstrated this accuracy. For the period
of July through December 1982 (i.e., just prior to the
merger), management's actual results for Newbury Park were
within 5% of the half-inch volume forecast (748,489 versus
782,000), and net duplicating revenue per unit was exactly
as forecast ($2.85 per tape). Instead, Torkelsen substitutes
his judgment, annualizes base numbers that ignore the
seasonality of the business by cleverly using the results of the
six most profitable months of the business and multiplying
them by two. Further, his resultant revenue forecast assumes
an absolute operating profit per tape that fails to exclude blank
tape rebates that were not expected even by management to
continue.244
Finally, Torkelsen forecasts Newbury Park's videocassette
duplication unit volume as a certain portion of the industry's
sales, from which he forecasts revenue.245 This revenue
figure is a final output provided solely to generate a
working capital investment ratio.246 This complex, and
elusive, projection results in a base year projection for
Newbury Park's duplicating revenue that was more than
double Technicolor management's projection for that same
year ($10.742 million as opposed to $5.323 million).247 And
despite all of the uncertainty facing the industry at this time,
Torkelsen glowingly projects a value of Newbury Park that is
roughly nine times its net operating assets at the time of the
merger.248 Further, Torkelsen's per-share value of Newbury
Park alone is approximately equal to the pre-merger stock
price of Technicolor in its entirety.249 If Newbury Park were
so valuable at the time, it seems that another bidder would
have come forward to purchase Technicolor or its assets or
that competitors would have rushed into the business.
b. Easton Report
Easton acknowledges that creating projections for Newbury
Park was the most difficult portion of his report, due to the
manifest uncertainties in the industry and limited information
available for a new division. In contrast to Torkelsen,
however, Easton chooses to begin with management's CY
1983 forecast for the business. Because I find Easton's expert
report, which was based upon contemporaneous management
projections, more credible and reliable, I will use his report as
a starting point, diverging from it as necessary.
Technicolor management painstakingly created projections
for the Newbury Park facility very close to the time of
the merger. Management went through quite a long process
to arrive at their projections, which had proven extremely
accurate even in the face of the uncertainty in the business
and its newness in the industry.250 Thus, I believe that
Easton correctly identifies the CY 1983 Plan as the best
source for reliable data regarding the business expectations
of Newbury Park. Technicolor management was paid well
for their expertise in analyzing these business expectations
just before the merger, they took their job seriously, and had
proven reliable and accurate in their results.
*28  Regardless of this, petitioner attacks Easton's reliance
upon management's CY 1983 Plan. As part of this attack,
however, petitioner attempted to disprove the accuracy of
management forecasts by erroneously adopting Torkelsen's
method of annualizing the last six months of Newbury
Park's performance (i.e., simply multiplying by two the
profitable results of July through December of 1982).
Petitioner then attempts to establish that the CY 1983
Plan was completely unreliable because the annualized
results showed that Newbury Park was “substantially in
excess of plan.”251 I find this criticism wholly unfounded.
Annualizing data in an industry subject to seasonality is
simply inappropriate-especially when the six-month period
includes the six most profitable months of the season-
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summer through Christmas.252 Further, these were the only
profitable months in Newbury Park's history. Therefore, I
find petitioner's attack on Easton's use of the CY 1983 Plan
unpersuasive.
Easton valued the business primarily using the DCF
methodology. As explained above in Section II.B., a DCF
analysis projects operating cash flows for an extended period,
determining a terminal value upon sale at the end of the
period, and then discounting those values at a set rate to
determine the net present value of the common stock.253 Free
cash flows are equal to after-tax operating income minus
changes in net operating assets (i.e., changes in fixed and
working capital minus depreciation). Thus, two variables are
critical in the DCF analysis: after-tax operating income and
net operating assets. To predict these variables, Easton first
projects sales revenue and sales revenue growth, the operating
margin ratio, and the change in the net book value of the
operating assets.
i. Sales and sales growth
In FY 1982, Technicolor realized sales of $2.6 million254
and projected sales of $5.323 million in its CY 1983
Plan.255 In his valuation, Easton uses a slightly higher figure
($5.7 million) as his 1983 net sales assumption, but selects
this number from an earlier draft of the CY 1983 Plan.
This divergence from the CY 1983 Plan was appropriately
criticized by petitioner as “strange” and as erroneously
resulting in a revenue forecast that was “some $400,000 in
excess of the actual plan forecast.”256 This error, as petitioner
pointed out, similarly affected Easton's revenue forecast by
inflating it $110,000 (to $1.537 million rather than the $1.427
million found in management's plan).257 Because I agree with
petitioner's criticism on this point, I have corrected for these
errors by using $5.323 million as the 1983 sales assumption.
To estimate sales growth for the following years of the
forecast period, Easton offers four wide-ranging scenarios. Of
the four, two are easily disposable. One is based upon growth
at only the 5% rate of inflation during the entire forecast
period, concededly an extremely pessimistic assumption.258
The other is overly optimistic, and is based upon a one-
to-one ratio of VCR-to-prerecorded videocassette growth-an
assumption I rejected in Torkelsen's report.259
*29  The other two forecasts seem much more closely to
represent the growth of Newbury Park's business at the
time of the merger. All four of the growth forecasts use
Technicolor management's CY 1983 Plan as a starting point
for growth into the immediate future. From that point, one of
the four remaining scenarios selects a growth rate based upon
a contemporaneous industry study performed by a neutral
entity, International Resource Development, Inc. (“IRD”).
The other projection carries management's CY 1983 Plan
projection forward at a constant rate (33.1%) through 1987.
After 1987, both projections drop the growth rate to the
expected rate of inflation (5%), as projected by IRD.
Easton chooses to accept the latter scenario, carrying
forward management's projection of 33.1% growth during
the period of 1984-1987. I have difficulty accepting this
conservative projection for several reasons. First, Easton too
readily dismisses Technicolor's competitive advantage in the
industry. Although I have acknowledged that logically there
were few barriers to entry, in all practicality, Technicolor
stood a much better chance of acquiring the business of the
large studios with which it had pre-existing relationships
than would a complete stranger to the industry. Second, this
was a fairly new business that was still ramping up in its
operations. It was just starting to realize a profit on the eve of
its second birthday. A business emerging from net operating
losses to finally reap positive gains seems to be a business
in the process of positive, not steady state, growth. Even
Easton acknowledges later in his report that the Newbury
Park unit was “in a high growth stage.”260 Though I accept
management's CY 1983 Plan projected growth of 33.1% for
the first year, I believe that it would be an error to carry this
same growth rate forward for several years.
Instead, I believe that the IRD projection seems to be the
most neutral and comprehensive evidence of prerecorded
videocassette growth for this time period. The IRD report is
an impartial analysis of the industry and specifically assesses
videocassette demand, taking into account factors that added
turbulence to the industry's future at the time, such as long-
term competing technologies. Therefore, in the absence of
better information, such as management projections, I believe
that this study is the best secondary source for projecting
Newbury Park's future growth rate.
I acknowledge Gruen's expert opinion that similarly predicts
a high level of growth in prerecorded videocassette sales
over the few years following the merger. As he explained,
the VCR had achieved a critical mass of acceptance into
American households, allowing manufacturers to begin
realizing economies-of-scale from their mass-production.261
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Such mass-production would reduce prices for consumers,
making VCRs more financially accessible to households.262
At the time, for example, retail prices of VCRs had declined
to about $600263 and growth in VCR sales had been rapid,
characterized by an upward trajectory in the annual number
of units sold: 430,000 in 1978; 500,000 in 1979; 800,000 in
1980; 1,400,000 in 1981; and 1,900,000 in 1982.264 Though I
do not agree that one could foresee prerecorded videocassette
growth would grow at a one-to-one ratio with VCR sales
(or TV households for that matter), a trend of positive
growth in VCR sales would inevitably lead to some level of
positive growth (not flat sales) in the rerecorded videocassette
market. In fact, consumer spending on home video had been
growing rapidly: from $260 million in 1981 to $520 million
in 1982.265
*30  Admittedly both the IRD and Gruen reports are not
specifically tailored to Technicolor and its clients. They
are, however, at a minimum less flawed than conservatively
carrying forward for several years a management projection
designed only to project the growth of the third year of an
infant operation. Further, the IRD report seems more reliable
and less subject to manipulation than any other evidence
presented by either party as to the growth of prerecorded
videocassettes. Thus, I accept the IRD forecast for the
remaining forecast period and I accept Easton's scenario of a
growth rate that begins with management's forecast for 1983
and adopt the IRD report's forecasts for the subsequent years
in the forecast period.






























As a new business, Newbury Park incurred an operating loss
in FY 1982 of $1.2 million. It was not until the last six months
of 1982 that it began to make a profit, as discussed above.
Going forward into 1983, Technicolor management projected
operating margins of 26.8% in its CY 1983 Plan. As with the
sales and growth rate section, Easton graciously provides two
scenarios of Technicolor's operating margins going forward.
In one, he offers a projection simply carrying forward the
management CY 1983 Plan's forecast of 26.8% through the
forecast period. In his second scenario, he projects a margin
that quickly decreases to a margin resembling Technicolor's
more mature film processing business. Although Technicolor
management projected a healthy profit margin for the
immediate future, I agree with Easton that such high margins
would be unlikely to continue far into the future, which rules
out his first scenario. It seems more likely that the excess
margins would erode over time, as competition grew within
the duplication industry. With barriers to entry much lower
than that of its film processing business, competitors would
have plenty of incentive to enter a business with such high
margins, driving the prices down. Technicolor's customers
had the power to unilaterally terminate their duplication
contracts with Technicolor, forcing Technicolor to keep its
prices competitive.
Therefore, I accept Easton's conclusion that the profit margin
would erode over time, as demonstrated in his second
scenario, but I reject his conclusion that it would quickly
plummet to a mature business level. Easton's second scenario
begins with management projections of operating margins
in 1983 (26.8%) and then immediately drops down for
the remaining period to mirror the margin of Technicolor's
more mature business-its film processing business (19%).
I believe that it is likely that the margin would eventually
erode to its mature business margin level, but not the year
immediately following the merger-especially when sales
growth was rapidly increasing. As petitioners point out,
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Easton erroneously employed a “margin from a mature,
slow growth business into a new business poised to grow
very rapidly.”266 Therefore, to be reasonable, I have carried
management's 1983 margin projection forward until 1987,
the point at which the IRD predicted a leveling-off of sales
to the rate of inflation. Rather than an immediate decline to
the mature-business margin of 19%, I gradually decrease the
1987 margin by averaging management's predicted margin
(26.8%) with the mature business margin (19%), resulting in
a margin of 22.9% for 1988. Thereafter, I accept the mature
business margin of 19%.






























iii. Fixed and working capital investment, depreciation, and
change in net operating assets
As a new facility, Newbury Park incurred large capital
expenditures in its first full fiscal year of operations
(approximately $2.9 million). In April 1981, analysts
estimated that videocassette-duplicating equipment for two
million units of capacity alone would cost approximately
$1.2 million and would be depreciated over two years.267
Consistent with this projection, Wilson testified that Newbury
Park would incur approximately $500,000 of normal capital
expenditures per year, assuming that capacity remained the
same.268 Though Technicolor management projected only
$0.373 million in fixed capital expenditures for CY 1983,269
this low number was likely due to the recent investments that
grew capacity over the preexisting levels of production. As
Easton notes, capital expenditures would likely increase after
1983 to achieve the capacity required to produce the sales
projections determined above.
To make these determinations, Easton relies primarily upon
Technicolor management's testimony and contemporaneous
estimates of Newbury Park's projected investments to
determine fixed and working capital investment and
depreciation. After accepting management's projected $0.373
million in capital expenditures for 1983, he predicts increases
of fixed capital investments to $0.6 million per each
incremental 1 million units of capacity. I accept these figures,
as they seem reasonable in light of the two-year depreciation
estimates for equipment that cost approximately $1.2 million
to achieve Newbury Park's then-current capacity.
Lacking historical data, Easton projects investment in
working capital to equal 11% of incremental net sales, to
produce a ratio of working capital-to-net sales of just over
16% by 1988, within what I consider a reasonable range as
compared to other film divisions. I accept this working capital
investment projection as supported by the evidence.
In determining depreciation expenses, Easton acknowledges
Newbury Park's past depreciation figures of 24% of net sales
in FY 1982 and approximately 21% of net sales in CY 1983.
Easton projected that these figures would decline to 16.1% of
net sales by 1986 to equal projected fixed capital investments
as a percentage of next year's sales. This is a reasonable
assumption for this type of division and is supported by the
evidence and is adopted in my valuation.
As for changes in net operating assets, Easton calculates the
changes in each period by summing investments in fixed and
working capital net of depreciation and adding the balance to
the prior year's net operating assets.270 This calculation leads
to a declining ratio of net operating assets as a percentage of
sales that is consistent with a long-term growth expectation.
Again, I accept these conclusions as reasonable and supported
by the evidence.
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iv. Newbury Park valuation conclusion *32  In sum, after calculating the historical and forecasted
value drivers, I arrive at a DCF valuation of $10,398,185, or
$2.28 per share.
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*33  Although this estimate was difficult due to the
uncertainties in the industry, conflicting information
regarding Newbury Park's facility, and the uncertainty
inherent in performing a hindsight valuation, I take comfort
from the simple fact that an unbiased average of the eight
scenarios presented by Easton (using his assumptions) yields
a valuation of $12.741 million-within 23% of what I consider
to be the most reasonable result ($10.398 million). Easton
performed this unbiased average to capture the considerable
uncertainty of the business, arriving at a figure that would thus
average out the very best and worst prospects for Newbury
Park.271 I find it reassuring that when averaging eight wildly
different scenarios of a turbulent industry to capture the
uncertainties, one arrives at a result closely resembling the
figure I calculated above using reasonable forecasts based
upon the best contemporaneous information available.
C. Other Businesses
The valuation of Technicolor's East Coast facilities,
Technicolor, Ltd. (London), Technicolor, S.p.A. (Rome),
Government Services, Vidtronics, and Magna Crafts
(collectively the “Other Businesses”) is rendered both simpler
and more difficult by the fact that the parties valuations
are not wildly divergent and because very little evidence
was offered with respect to the valuation of these entities.
Vidtronics presents the greatest discrepancy-as the experts
differ by $11 million. Easton projects its value at $3.711
million and Torkelsen projects its value at $14.642 million.
The difference in valuation between the experts for the other
businesses accounts for only $0.42 per share of their total
$41.15 per share difference, a difference that is explained
mostly by their different discount rates.
Easton's report bases revenues and costs on management's
CY 1983 Plan for each division. His projections for
subsequent years take varying approaches to predicting rates
of growth for both costs and revenues. Notably for businesses
anticipating declining or flat revenues from 1982 to 1983,
Easton projects lower growth rates (sometimes negative)
going forward for a few years until at some point he
projects the businesses to grow at the anticipated inflation
rate of 5%.272 For businesses anticipating revenue growth,
Easton projects annual growth at the rate of inflation or
5% for the period 1984-89.273 Although the report offers
various justifications in each instance for the rates of growth
projected, none of the explanations seem sufficient to offset
the appearance that the report considers detailed information
when such information is beneficial to Technicolor's position
and uses more general projections when the details would
suggest that the value of the underlying business would be
higher if a more nuanced approach were adopted.
Torkelsen states that his projections for these entities are
based entirely on management's CY 1983 Plan for each entity.
His method is to accept the 1983 projections for revenues
and costs and grow both annually at the expected inflation
rate of 5% annually. This approach, while certain to less
accurately predict particular details, is likely to provide a
fairly accurate rough measure of the value of an aggregate of
the six businesses for which accurate detail is not available.
Torkelsen's argument is well taken that had the Perelman plan
anticipated declining revenues in any of these businesses, it
seems quite likely that they too would have been selected
for disposal under that plan. Since they were not, at least as
of the time of the merger, it seems reasonable to presume
that on January 24, 1983, the revenue streams of these other
businesses were expected to at least keep pace with inflation
in the foreseeable future. In addition, this method, when
applied to a group of six businesses in which roughly half
predicted flat or declining revenues for 1983 and the other half
predicted revenues increasing at or above the rate of inflation,
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unfairly favors the interests of neither party and is perhaps
more fair ex ante.
*34  I adopt the sales and operating expenses projected in
the CY 1983 Plan for each of the businesses in this group
and grow both at an annual rate of 5% through the forecast
period. This will have the effect of holding operating margins
constant at the margin forecast in the CY 1983 Plan. I note
that, although both experts purport to use CY 1983 Plan
projections as their basis for 1983 sales and profits, the actual
dollar amounts reported by each expert differ for three of the
businesses. For London and Rome, the difference is easily
explained.274 For the third, Government Services, it is not.
I have referred to Government Services CY 1983 Plan275 in
order to derive the sales and costs for its valuation of this
business.
Torkelsen's report does not provide separate valuations for
the businesses in this group. For this reason, he provides no
separate forecasts of depreciation, fixed capital investment,
or working capital investment, instead addressing the effects
of these factors as they relate to Technicolor as a whole.
Easton bases his projections for these values on historical
information for each of the businesses. Because I find that
Easton's projections represent a reasonable estimate of these
factors going forward from the date of the merger, I adopt
Easton's projections of depreciation (as a percentage of sales);
fixed cost investments (as a percentage of the following
year's sales); and working capital (as a percentage of current
year sales). As each of these value drivers are based on
percentages of net sales and my projections for annual net
sales vary from Easton's, the actual dollar values projected
for depreciation, fixed capital investment, and changes in
working capital differ from the actual dollar values projected
by Easton. Finally, the change to working capital in 1983 is
derived from Easton's report, which takes the historical 1982
working capital for each business, compares it to the projected
working capital in the CY 1983 Plan, and calculates the 1983
change to working capital.
The following tables report the values I find when applying
this method for each of the other businesses:
1. East Coast (New York)
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2. Technicolor, Ltd. (London)
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Tech., Ltd. (London) Value (70% Interest)
 










3. Technicolor, S.p.A. (Rome)


































Sales Growth (net) 0.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
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Per Share Value             $   0.39
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4. Government Services























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Discount Period  0.4274  1.4274  2.4274  3.4274  4.4274  5.4274  6.4274  6.4274
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Working Capital $ 1,168 $ 1,226 $ 1,288 $ 1,352 $ 1,420 $ 1,491 $ 1,565  -
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*35  Therefore, I find that the total value of the other
businesses are as follows:









Technicolor's corporate headquarters provided oversight and
both managerial and accounting support for the company.276
This corporate unit would be retained even after the merger,
as there was no equivalent corporate unit within MAF to
merge the Technicolor operations into.277 The only change
expected was that either Kamerman or Ryan would be
let go following the merger.278 Therefore, it is undoubted
that Technicolor's corporate headquarters would continue to
incur corporate expenses, even under the Perelman plan.
The remaining question is whether MAF is entitled to a
management fee in this valuation for the costs it incurred
to manage Technicolor, or whether these costs arose only
because of the pending merger. Respondent points out that
MAF management became involved in the management
of Technicolor-it had begun to develop and maintain new
financial relationships, and had been working to orchestrate
the restructuring contemplated under the Perelman plan.279
For example, by the time of the merger, Bruce Slovin, an MAF
executive, stated that he had already made approximately
33 trips to California on Technicolor business.280 Perelman
testified that he attempted to strengthen ties with the studios
in the industry by making loans and investments in production
companies to get their processing work.281 I have no doubt
that MAF provided various services to Technicolor following
the merger. Wilson indicated that, following the merger, MAF
offered tax service, treasury service, and accounting and
financial services, and that MAF assisted with the divestiture
of the assets.282 Easton reported that he believed that any
benefits of the Perelman plan must be offset by the costs
incurred in achieving those benefits, and that management
fees to MAF were foreseeable and reasonable as of January
24, 1983.283 At first blush, this seems like a reasonable
assumption.
Upon further study, however, assessing a management fee
to Technicolor seems erroneous because Technicolor's own
corporate headquarters would have simply performed all
of these provided services but for the merger. Wilson
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acknowledged that Technicolor had provided all of these
services in the past and could provide them to itself in the
future at no cost beyond its base corporate expenses.284
Therefore, MAF's services, though useful, were fairly
redundant.
The costs that would arise to implement the Perelman plan
would have been incurred by Technicolor management rather
than MAF had these two entities not merged. Petitioner argues
that MAF should not receive a management fee because the
costs of the Perelman plan implementation occurred pre-
merger, because it was a conceptual plan and because the
Delaware Supreme Court characterized it as the operative
reality on the date of the merger.285 Although I agree that
the concept of Perelman's plan had been established, I do not
agree that its implementation, or the costs associated with
its implementation, had taken place before the merger. As
discussed above, Perelman's plan was simply to capitalize
on the steady cash flow by retaining certain core businesses
and selling off four units that were not profitable.286 At the
time of the merger, these businesses had not been sold and
it was foreseeable that certain expenses would be incurred
for their disposal. It was not foreseeable, however, that MAF
would incur these expenses rather than Technicolor, because
Technicolor had the capability to do all of the things that MAF
took upon itself. Thus, I do not believe that MAF is entitled
to a management fee under the Perelman plan.
*36  The factors left to determine before I can calculate the
value of corporate headquarters, then, are what the cost of
corporate headquarters operations were (and how they would
have been affected by the selling off of the discontinued
operations) and its fixed and working capital investment
figures, depreciation, and the change in net operating assets.
1. Cost of Operations
Easton indicated that corporate headquarters' operating loss
was approximately 2% of total Technicolor net sales in fiscal
year 1982.287 He uses this number going forward, but adjusts
it to add a management fee, which I have already rejected. The
problem with using his projected operating loss of 2% of net
sales is that he adopts the highest, rather than the average, of
the past four historic operating margins. In fact, the operating
margins as a percentage of Technicolor net sales for the years
of 1979 through 1982 were: -1.9%, -1.8%, -0.7%, and -2.0%-
for an average of-1.6%.288 I have adopted this average of the
historic operating margin as the assumption going forward.
Petitioner suggests that Easton erred by failing to account
for the impact the Perelman plan would have on corporate
headquarters, once the discontinued businesses shrank the
fiscal revenue and once major concerns regarding One
Hour Photo were alleviated. I believe that my approach of
carrying forward the historical figures as a percentage of
sales addresses this concern because most of the historical
figures predate the 1981 implementation of One Hour Photo
and because One Hour Photo carried many of its own
administrative expenses. Further, because the calculations
are based upon percentages of the net sales of Technicolor,
shrinkage in future revenue is reflected in the calculations.
2. Fixed and Working Capital Investment: Depreciation
Corporate headquarters historically incurred small
investments in fixed capital as a percentage of the following
year's total net sales (0.15%). I continue this trend forward
throughout the forecast period.
Similarly, depreciation averaged 0.05% of sales over the
past four years (specifically, 0.03% in 1979, 0.07% in
1980, 0.05% in 1981, and 0.04% in 1982), which I carry
forward throughout the forecast period. In contrast, Easton
gradually increases the depreciation percentages over the
forecast period to equal the percentage of fixed capital
expenditures (0.15%). I believe, however, that this was
unwarranted for corporate headquarters even though I agreed
with a similar Easton assumption for the videocassette
business. This is because there was no corresponding reason
to accept such an assumption for corporate headquarters,
which was a stable, mature operation quite different from
Newbury Park. Newbury Park had little historical data to
rely upon and would presumably incur much more significant
depreciation expenses since each duplicating machine had a
useful life of only two years. Further, the historical data for
corporate headquarters did not suggest an increasing trend in
depreciation, but was relatively stable.
*37  The historic average of working capital as a percentage
of net sales was -1.3% (-1.3% in 1979, 3.4% in 1980, -5.3%
in 1981, and -2.1% in 1982).289 I carry this average forward
as well, rejecting Easton's roundabout approach of deriving
working capital by projecting working capital investment
as a percentage of incremental sales (using an unexplained
0.1%) and subtracting that number from the prior year's
working capital. Instead, I rely upon Technicolor's historic
working capital as a percentage of sales and carry this -1.3%
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figure forward through the historic period. Working capital
for the base year was -$4.548 million. Working capital for
the following year is then derived by multiplying -1.3%
by the following year's sales. Working capital investment is
determined by calculating the difference between the base and
following year's working capital.
3. Conclusion
In sum, my findings regarding the value of Corporate
Headquarters are as follows:
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V. VALUATION OF THE BUSINESSES TO BE SOLD
*38  The Perelman plan contemplated that four Technicolor
divisions would be sold “as quickly as [MAF] could” in
the course of the takeover: Consumer Photo Processing
(“CPPD”), One Hour Photo, TV Program Licensing (“Gold
Key”), and Audio Visual.290 Audio Visual also owned
real property in Costa Mesa, California, for which a
contract of sale was entered into on January 12, 1983.291
That contract was to close on March 31, 1983 with
aggregate proceeds of $6,839,200. Perelman's intentions
with respect to these divisions are demonstrated by the “T-
Company” projections provided to MAF's lenders prior to the
Technicolor acquisition.292 Both experts relied upon the T-
Company projections.
The T-Company projections anticipated $50 million in gross
proceeds from asset dispositions, less $4 million in debt to
be retired, combined with a tax benefit of $4 million due to
losses on the sale of those divisions, for a bottom-line figure
of $50 million realized from the sales.293 The $50 million
was not discounted to its present value nor adjusted for
profits or losses incurred in operation of the divisions before
disposition.294 The T-Company projections were made very
early-the chart on which both experts relied is dated June 26,
1982.295 By January 4, 1983, Bear Stearns had been retained
to assist MAF in selling these divisions.296 Bear Stearns,
consistent with Perelman's testimony, indicated that MAF's
goal was to have the divisions disposed of quickly-by the end
of June 1983.297 MAF's intention was to sell these divisions
as going concerns, which would require Technicolor to absorb
any operating profit or loss incurred before the sale.298
Neither expert's valuation of the sold businesses was terribly
persuasive. Torkelsen claims to have forecast sales based on
“book value as scheduled by MAF as part of the Perelman
Plan,” reaching an undiscounted total of $50.2299 million
(including $6.8 million from the Costa Mesa property) in cash
proceeds from the sale of these four businesses.300 Easton
projects cash proceeds of $41 million plus a tax savings of $6
million for an undiscounted net cash benefit of $47 million301
by June 30, 1983. After a detailed analysis of Audio Visual
and Gold Key, Easton returns to the rough estimates of
the T-Company document and arbitrarily discounts those
projections at a rate of 10%.302 Easton purports to accept
the T-Company projections, but fails to include the roughly
$6.8 million to be received in March 1983 from the sale of
the Costa Mesa property.303 I find that since both experts
based their analysis on the T-Company document, and that
neither expert adequately explains their variations from that
document, which I find to be the best available evidence,
I will accept the already discounted book value projections
made in the T-Company document. Therefore, I project that
in addition to the roughly $6.8 million realized from the Costa
Mesa sale, Technicolor will realize $50 million in proceeds
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from the company sales and retire $4 million in debt in 1983. I
include a tax benefit of 46% ($3.7 million) in my calculation.
*39  Two issues remain before the net present value of the
sold companies can be determined: the date the proceeds
are expected, and any operating profit or loss incurred
before disposition. The proceeds from the Costa Mesa sale
were expected by March 31, 1983.304 Easton projects that
the divisions would have been sold by June 30, 1983,
consistent with Bear Stearns' correspondence and MAF's
goal.305 Torkelsen largely agrees with this disposition date,
but arbitrarily decides that since there were some problems
associated with Gold Key, a more appropriate disposition date
would be December 31, 1983. I have found no evidence to
support this decision. I conclude, therefore, that the most
reasonable expectation would be that the proceeds from these
sales would be available on June 30, 1983.
With respect to the cash flow of the sold businesses before
sale, Torkelsen clearly lays out that from July 1982 through
December 1982, the four divisions had a pre-tax cash
outflow of $1.214 million, and a post-tax free cash flow of
$134,640.306 Easton, analyzing June 1982 through November
1982 numbers, determines that the after-tax operating loss
was $1.179 million.307 Since Torkelsen's figures clearly
represent cash flow, the proper measure of a DCF analysis,
I will accept them.308 It is reasonable to expect a similar
outflow in the operations of those divisions during the first
half of 1983. Therefore, I project a cash flow of $134,640,
discounted for simplicity's sake (and for lack of more detailed
evidence) as if the entire cash flow occurred on June 30, 1983.
I find that the net value of the sold businesses as of January
24, 1983 was $52,761,127 or $11.55 per share. Below my
conclusions are detailed in tabular form.
*40  I note that my projection for the sold businesses
is higher than both experts' projections. I project $52.8
million, Torkelsen projects $50.2 million, and Easton projects
$47 million. This discrepancy is easily explained, however.
Torkelsen selects one of the only businesses in this category
that contributed positive cash flow (Gold Key) to Technicolor
and, rather than projecting it to be sold by mid-1983,
projects that it would not be sold until December 1983. This
allows Technicolor to reap the positive cash flows Torkelsen
projected for an additional six months. More importantly,
Torkelsen's discount rate is much lower than the discount rate
I have selected. Easton inexplicably fails to include the $6.839
million in proceeds resulting from the Costa Mesa sale. This
contract was entered into before the merger date and was to
close post-merger (March 31, 1983) and should have been
incorporated into Easton's projection. Easton also discounted
the T-Company projections by 10% for no valid reason that
is readily apparent from reading his report.
VI. DISCOUNT RATE
Now that the forecasted cash flows are determined, I need to
discount those cash flows to their present value. The Weighted
Average Cost of Capital (“WACC”) is used to determine the
discount rate based on Technicolor's cost of capital. WACC is
equal to the sum of: (1) the percentage of the capital structure
financed with equity multiplied by the cost of equity capital;
and (2) the percentage of the capital structure financed with
debt multiplied by the after-tax cost of debt. Each of these
inputs will be determined to establish Technicolor's WACC.
A. Capital Structure
1. Long-Term Debt
To determine Technicolor's debt-to-equity capital structure,
I must first determine Technicolor's outstanding long-
term debt at the time of the merger. The only financial
statement available to determine Technicolor's debt is
the Macanfor consolidated statement dated December 31,
1982.309 Macanfor was created solely to merge with
Technicolor. Therefore, the debt listed on that financial
statement is limited to the debt used to purchase Technicolor
and the debt attributable to Technicolor itself. All but $21.3
million is attributable to the purchase of Technicolor.310 The
debt used to acquire the company cannot be figured into the
calculation when determining Technicolor's long-term debt.
Since all the remaining debt is Technicolor's, the resulting
long-term debt of Technicolor is $21.3 million.
Petitioner asserts that only $19.9 million should be
attributable to long-term debt because this is the figure that
appears on MAF's 1983 10-K Annual Report filed with the
SEC. This figure reflects MAF's bank loan agreement, that
called for all outstanding, pre-existing Technicolor debt to be
repaid by January 24, 1983, subject to a limitation that the
debt could not exceed $20 million.311 Appropriately, the MAF
10-K stated that the $19.9 million in Technicolor pre-existing
debt was repaid to the bank on January 24, 1983.312 The MAF
10-K, however, is not the best evidence available, as it merely
reports the payment of Technicolor debt that was capped at
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$20 million and, therefore, was not necessarily an accurate
reflection of the true outstanding Technicolor debt.
*41  Petitioner further criticizes Easton's reliance upon
Macanfor's balance sheet because Macanfor is not the same as
Technicolor-an assertion that ignores the fact that Macanfor
existed only to purchase Technicolor. Even petitioner
acknowledges that “Macanfor was an MAF subsidiary
created to accomplish the Technicolor acquisition.”313
Therefore, any long-term operational debt not related to the
purchase of Technicolor had to have been debt owed by
Technicolor. Accordingly, I find petitioner's assertion without
merit. After deducting the debt not related to the purchase of
Technicolor, I find that Technicolor's outstanding debt at the
time of the merger is $21.3 million.
2. Debt-to-Equity Capital Structure
Torkelsen determines the capital structure of Technicolor
by analogizing to the capital structure of the average
manufacturing business.314 Easton uses the actual debt-to-
equity structure of Technicolor at the time of the merger. Since
Technicolor operated in a highly competitive area with a small
customer base, I find that Technicolor is not typical of the
average manufacturing business. It seems hardly necessary to
state that the capital structure of Technicolor at the time of
the merger is the best indication of the capital structure of the
company in determining its future value.
I estimate Technicolor's capitalization by using the purchase
price at the time of the merger-$105.1 million. Using the long-
term debt of $21.3 million, the total capital is $126.4 million.
Therefore, of the total capital, 16.9% [21.3 / 126.4 = 16.9]
was debt and 83.1% [105.1 / 126.4 = 83.1] was equity.
B. Cost of Equity Capital
The cost of equity capital is the risk-free rate of return
plus Technicolor's risk under the Perelman plan. Risk is
determined by multiplying Technicolor's beta315 by the equity
risk premium. The required inputs to be determined are (1)
the risk-free rate of return; (2) Technicolor's beta; and (3) the
equity risk premium.
1. Risk-free Rate
Petitioner uses a risk-free rate of 10.37%, based on U.S.
Treasury Bonds with greater than ten years to maturity
without citing to any source.316 Respondent uses a risk-free
rate of 10.88% based on the 30-Year Total Constant Maturity
Yield as of January 24, 1983, citing the Federal Reserve's
website as its source.317 According to the Federal Reserve,
the risk-free rate never dropped below 10.39% the entire
month of January 1983, and varied between 10.39% and
10.99% for that month.318 I think it is reasonable to adopt the
risk-free rate on the closing date of the merger, which was
10.88%.
2. Technicolor's Beta
Beta measures the relative risk of a company. Torkelsen
does not calculate a beta specific to Technicolor, but instead
makes an assumption that it should be around one without
any verifiable reason other than his own opinion.319 Easton
lists the various betas for Technicolor from January 1980
through December 1982, listing separate periods with varying
betas.320 Five different sources are used for the historical
betas.321 Easton then averages Technicolor beta from January
1980 through December 1982, ending with a pre-Perelman
plan beta of 1.43.322
*42  Since I am required to evaluate Technicolor under the
Perelman plan, and not the Kamerman plan, I am concerned
that using the two-year historical beta created under the
Kamerman plan would be viewed as an error by the Supreme
Court. Thus, I will use the average beta for December
1982 (after the Perelman plan became the guiding force for
Technicolor) as the appropriate beta. That beta, which is equal
to 1.60, is appropriate because it incorporates the risks of the
Perelman plan, as is indicated by the increase in Technicolor's
post-offer, pre-Perelman beta (1.57) to the post-Perelman beta
(1.60).323 It thus takes account of the market's perception of
the changing riskiness of an investment in Technicolor after
the tender offer, and for that reason is the most appropriate
beta.
It is standard to use the derivable beta from market
information when valuing a public company.324 As stated
earlier in this opinion, Technicolor was in a highly
competitive industry with a small customer base. It had
already lost its United Artists contract, and was facing
increased competition. The videocassette business was
suspect in its potential, and there was no guarantee as to the
sale or purchase price of the divisions Perelman sought to sell.
Coupled with a new business plan, the Technicolor beta of
1.60 in December 1982, as actually reflected by the market,
is the most accurate indication for purposes of valuing the
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company. Accordingly, I use a beta equal to 1.60 for my
calculation.
3. Equity Risk Premium
Petitioner uses the average equity risk premium for long-
term market risk in 1982, which is 8.3%.325 Petitioner states
that the arithmetic mean of the differences between returns
on common stock and the risk-free rate is most commonly
used.326 Respondent lists both the geometric and arithmetic
means, but comes up with a slightly different number of 7.2%
for the arithmetic mean.327
Easton, however, uses a different equity risk premium for his
discount rate calculation. In his review of the previous trial
he found an equity risk premium equal to 4.6%.328 He did
not independently verify this number, but yet deems it reliable
for his use. Since my mandate was to hold a completely new
trial, I choose not to use an unverified equity risk premium
from the first trial. Instead, I agree with petitioner's assertion
that the arithmetic mean of the differences is the best source
for the equity risk premium. Petitioner's arithmetic mean is
based on 1982 historical averages.329 Respondent's is based
on the mean at the time of the merger.330 Recognizing the
differences between the two experts, I find that respondent's
arithmetic mean at the time of the merger is the more
appropriate value to determine Technicolor's cost of capital.
Accordingly, the equity risk premium is 7.2%.
4. Conclusion
Using the formula that Technicolor's cost of equity capital
equals the risk-free rate added to the product of beta
multiplied by the equity risk premium, I find this value to be
22.4% (i.e., 10.88% + (1.60)(7.2%) = 22.4%).
C. After-tax Cost of Debt
*43  The after-tax cost of debt is equal to the cost of debt
multiplied by the difference of one minus the tax rate (i.e.,
(cost of debt) (1-tax rate)). The cost of debt is the borrowing
cost of Technicolor at the valuation date. Petitioner does
not analyze any borrowing cost, but simply assumes that
the prime rate should be the borrowing cost. Respondent
evaluates the borrowing cost as equivalent to the rate paid
in acquiring Technicolor. Macanfor had a credit facility at
13.0% and a note payable to its parent at 15.625%.331 Easton
weighted the interest in proportion to the balance of each
debt to obtain a borrowing cost of 13.96%.332 I find this to
be a more accurate borrowing cost than the prime rate since
it accurately reflects the rate at which Technicolor would
borrow under the Perelman plan. Using the 46% tax rate
agreed upon by both experts, the resulting after-tax cost of
debt is 7.54% (i.e., (13.96%)(1-46%) =7.54%).
D. Technicolor's Cost of Capital
Using all of the above inputs, I obtain the resulting discount
rate:
WACC = (cost of equity capital) (percentage of equity capital structure) + (after-tax
 
 
cost of debt) (percentage of debt capital structure) = (22.40)(0.831) +
 
 
(7.54)(0.169) = 19.89 %.
 
VII. THE FINAL VALUATION OF TECHNICOLOR
UNDER THE PERELMAN PLAN
To determine the final valuation of Technicolor per share,
I sum the value of the retained businesses and the sold
businesses, subtract the value of the outstanding debt,333 and
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VIII. REASONABLENESS CHECKS
The above analysis sets forth the basis for the Court's
valuation of Technicolor. As a check on that analysis, I
examined the following corroborative indicia of value. Each
supports the Court's final result as to the per share value of
Technicolor.
*44  Before I begin, however, I address each expert's
reasonableness checks. Torkelsen uses the MAF T-Company
projections from PX 99, but then changes several of
the assumptions to match his position.335 I find it to
be unreasonable to begin with an outside source as a
reasonableness check and then to alter the assumptions of
that source to match one's own position. That removes the
credibility of the petitioner's check, and I disregard it entirely.
Easton uses several indicia of reasonableness.336 I adopt his
use of market price, even though I address its significance
in a different manner, but I reject his use of the T-Company
projections and alternative forecast methodologies. The T-
Company projections strike me as self-serving since they
are basically a reiteration of respondent's original position.
Accordingly, I use the Supreme Court's fairness opinion and
the market value at the time of the merger, and the conduct
of knowledgeable insiders, to check the reasonableness of my
final valuation.
A. The Supreme Court's Fairness Opinion
In petitioner's personal liability action filed against
respondent and several others alleging a breach of fiduciary
duty in approving the Technicolor merger with MAF,
the Supreme Court affirmed this Court's “holding that
the MAF transaction was entirely fair to the Technicolor
stockholders.”337 As part of that decision, the Supreme
Court held that “[s]ubstantial record evidence supports the
Court of Chancery's finding that the $23 deal price was
the highest price reasonably available. That conclusion is
the result of an orderly and logical deductive process.”338
The Supreme Court's holding that $23 was the highest price
reasonably available comports reasonably with the value I
have ultimately found for Technicolor ($21.98).
B. The Market Price
The Technicolor board agreed to Perelman's $23 tender offer
on October 29, 1982.339 On October 27, 1982, Technicolor
stock traded at $17.375 per share, with a volume of over 88
million shares. Immediately after Perelman's $23 tender offer,
Technicolor shares traded at $22.375 per share, with a volume
of over 655 million. On January 24, 1983, Technicolor
shares were trading at $22.875 per share, with a volume of
only 1.9 million. It is reasonable to assume that the market
was weighing and reacting to all the competing information
because the price immediately reflected the tender offer, yet
no one attempted to outbid the tender offer. Accordingly, a
value ranging from $17 to $23 appears to be reasonable in
relation to the market value for Technicolor shares around the
time of the merger.
C. Knowledgeable Insiders Accept $23/Share
Morton Kamerman and Guy Bjorkman, Technicolor
insiders at the time of the AMF merger, had substantial
ownership interests in Technicolor. As directors (and, in
Kamerman's case, CEO) Kamerman and Bjorkman were very
knowledgeable about Technicolor. If Torkelsen was even
close to correct in his opinion on value, the opportunity costs
involved in the sale of the company would be enormous for
insiders like Kamerman and Bjorkman.
*45  As the Supreme Court noted in an earlier opinion in this
case, “the fact that major shareholders, including Kamerman
and Bjorkman, who had the greatest insight into the value of
the company, sold their stock to MAF at the same price paid to
the remaining shareholders powerfully implies that the price
received was fair. If Technicolor was worth more than $62
per share, as Cinerama contends, Kamerman (with 128,874
shares) and Bjorkman (with 409,406 shares) would have
lost more than $5,000,000 and $16,000,000, respectively,
by tendering their shares to MAF for $23 per share.”340
Accordingly, the fact that sophisticated, knowledgeable
persons did not act in a manner consistent with the belief
that Technicolor stock had an inherent value of $63.77 as
of January 24, 1983, is a significant factor in determining
the reasonableness of the experts' competing valuations. The
actions of these knowledgeable and sophisticated insiders
strongly supports the Court's determination that $21.98 is a
reasonable assessment of the fair value of Technicolor stock
on January 24, 1983.
D. Conclusion
The above three checks were used to evaluate the
reasonableness of the Court's final Technicolor valuation.
Using the Supreme Court's holding that $23 per share
was the highest price reasonably available, the final value
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of $21.98 reasonably approximates that determination. In
addition, using the market price variation of $17 to $23 as an
external indicator, and the actions of sophisticated insiders as
a reasonable barometer of fair value, the final appraisal value
of $21.98 per share appears highly reliable. Accordingly, I
find that $21.98 is the fair value of a share of Technicolor
stock at the time of the merger.
IX. POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST
As previously determined, the pre-judgment interest
established in the first appraisal trial constitutes the law of
the case.341 Accordingly, 10.32% annual compound interest
applies from January 24, 1983 to August 2, 1991.342 The
only issues left to decide are the appropriate form of post-
judgment interest, the relevant post-judgment period, and the
appropriate rate.
After the fair value of the dissenting shareholders' shares is
ascertained, 8 Del. C. § 262(h) requires the Court to determine
“the fair rate of interest, if any” through the consideration of
“all relevant factors.”343 Section 262(i) states that the interest
applicable to an award “may be simple or compound.”344 The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that this Court's discretion
to award simple or compound interest is broad, but requires
explanation for the choice.345 In addition, the exercise of that
discretion is entitled to deference absent abuse.346
Generally, interest awards require the Court to determine
both the rate of interest and the form of interest in a
way that is fair to both the dissenting stockholder and the
surviving corporation.347 Awarding post-judgment interest
serves three purposes. First, similar to prejudgment interest,
it compensates the dissenting stockholder for the loss of use
of the fair value of shares during the appraisal process and
requires the surviving corporation to disgorge any benefit
obtained from the use of those funds found to rightfully
belong to the petitioner.348 This first purpose is “substantive”
in nature, i.e., it ensures shareholders receive the full value of
their shares without regard to the time necessary to efficiently
prosecute an appraisal action. Second, post-judgment interest
ensures that neither party is punished for one party's decision
to appeal. And third, it encourages the surviving corporation
to promptly pay, eliminating the need for judicial proceedings
to enforce the award. The second and third purposes are not
compensatory in nature, but are borne out of concerns for
the orderly administration of justice, and the avoidance of
improper manipulation of the appeals process.
*46  Prejudgment interest is distinct from post-judgment
interest in that prejudgment interest is an essential element
of fully compensating a dissenting stockholder-this is why
prejudgment interest is often awarded at rates that a “prudent
investor” could expect to receive and why prejudgment
interest is frequently compounded. Post-judgment interest
has more modest aims, however, and merely ensures that
the dissenting shareholder remains whole during any post-
judgment litigation. Post-judgment interest should not serve
to punish the surviving corporation, nor should it provide
a windfall to the dissenting stockholder in excess of the
principal award.349
The prejudgment interest award of 10.32% compound
interest from January 24, 1983 to August 2, 1991 fairly
compensated petitioner. But as noted above, the goals of post-
judgment interest are to ensure the petitioner remains whole
during post-judgment litigation and prevent improper judicial
machinations, either through frivolous appeal or willful delay
of payment. Since the statute allows the Court to consider
all relevant factors in determining the fair rate of interest,350
the procedural posture and relative change in position of the
parties is a factor in this Court's post-judgment interest award.
Before the first judgment, Technicolor was holding
Cinerama's money pending the outcome of the trial. At the end
of the trial, however, Technicolor was required to pay $21.60
per share, plus prejudgment interest, to Cinerama. Rather than
accepting its award, Cinerama chose to appeal the judgment-
forcing Technicolor to continue holding Cinerama's money.
Cinerama sought to appeal both on the fairness of the
dispute and the appraisal value. Since those appeals were
bifurcated, the appeal process took even longer. The Supreme
Court held that the appraisal case was moot while Cinerama
appealed the entire fairness action. Thus, during the entire
course of Cinerama's pursuit of its entire fairness appeal, the
appraisal action lay dormant. Once the appraisal decision was
eventually reversed and remanded, Cinerama then took an
interlocutory appeal from an earlier decision of the successor
judge, resulting in further delay.
None of these appeals constituted bad faith or misconduct
by either party. Therefore, no punitive aspect is appropriate
in determining the appropriate rate and form of interest.
Nonetheless, the post-judgment goal of putting the parties
back in the position they would have been had the judgment
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been paid requires consideration of the party initiating the
appeal. Equity is the guiding force behind this factor. Were
it not a factor, and prejudgment interest applied throughout,
unjust incentives might arise due to the varying nature
of interest rates. Petitioner could opportunistically appeal
just to increase the amount of interest paid and have an
almost guaranteed rate of return on its money. Conversely,
respondent might appeal in order to have use of the money
owed to petitioner at a low rate of interest.351 Regardless,
the proper application of the law, and not the time-value of
money, should govern a decision to appeal.
*47  The post-judgment interest award, in order to remove
any improper incentive to appeal, must consider the
identity of the appealing party.352 Accordingly, if respondent
appealed, it is more likely that the post-judgment interest
would be closer to what petitioner would have received had
the judgment been invested by a prudent investor. Since
petitioner appealed in this case, the more appropriate post-
judgment interest will reflect what the petitioner would have
received had the judgment been placed in escrow pending
the outcome. This principle removes any tactical incentive
petitioner may have had in its appeal and ensures that
neither party is punished nor rewarded for the length of the
appeals process. Since respondent did not choose to be in the
appeals process, there is no reason to require that petitioner's
opportunity cost be a factor since petitioner chose its current
position. “[P]etitioners' election to exercise their statutory
right to reject the merger amount and to pursue appraisal
does not shift to the corporation all responsibility for losses
they may incur as a result of their inability to use the funds
retained by the corporation.”353 Therefore, I now determine
the post-judgment interest, starting with the form, then the
applicable period, and, finally, the appropriate rate based on
that principle.
A. Form of Interest
Since the interest is likely to exceed the principal due to the
longevity of this action, whether it is simple or compound
is of great significance. Initially, simple interest was most
favored in Delaware.354 Over time, the Court of Chancery
recognized that compound interest more accurately reflects
the time value of money in the modern commercial world.355
Nonetheless, in Technicolor IV the Supreme Court stated that
“[a]n award of compound interest is the exception rather than
the rule,”356 a point the Supreme Court later reiterated in
M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau.357 I also take note
of the Supreme Court's concern that this Court should not
award compound interest “routine[ly]”358 or as “a matter of
course.”359
I have said on other occasions that it is hard to imagine
any corporation or sophisticated investor seeking only simple
interest on the funds they hold.360 I have also noted that an
award of simple interest may not fully disgorge a defendant
company from the benefit it received from using the plaintiff's
funds.361 But since the purpose of post-judgment interest
in an appeal by petitioner is to basically treat the funds
as if in escrow, the form of interest should be neutral
with respect to the length of the appeals process. In the
unique circumstances of this case, the only way to achieve
neutrality with respect to the length of the appeals process is
through simple interest. Any improper incentive in the appeal
becomes moot, and neither party is rewarded for the length
of the delay. Compound interest would reward petitioner for
delay caused by the appeals process, and punish respondent
for defending the original judgment. Equity should not allow
that. Accordingly, I award post-judgment simple interest on
the $21.98 per share principal award only.
B. Applicable Period
*48  Respondent argues that certain time periods,
specifically the time petitioner spent appealing the entire
fairness aspect of this action, should not be considered
in the time period for establishing interest. I reject this
argument because post-judgment interest already takes this
delay into effect in its goal of treating the principal as if
it had been placed in escrow. Moreover, the use of simple
interest further prevents any injustice associated with the
entire fairness appeal delay. The principles described earlier
preclude the need to remove certain time periods from
the interest calculation. Consideration of who appealed the
original judgment and the award of simple interest by its
nature removes any impropriety. Accordingly, the applicable
post-judgment time period commenced on August 3, 1991,
and runs until the date the judgment is finally paid.
C. Rate of Interest
As stated earlier, petitioner seeks to continue the pre-
judgment rate of interest (10.32%) through the post-judgment
period. Respondent, however, asserts that the first $21.60 of
any award should receive the risk-free rate of interest, and any
award over that amount should receive interest based on an
- 102 -
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Not Reported in A.2d (2003)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 49
equally weighted average of respondent's borrowing cost and
the prudent investor rate. I reject both of these positions.
The purpose of the post-judgment rate in this situation is
to place the parties in the same position they would have
been if the judgment had been paid on the judgment date.
Neither party's position meets this goal. Petitioner's desire to
continue the pre-judgment interest rate just rewards petitioner
for its appeal and would result in a windfall to petitioner.
After the August 2, 1991 judgment, petitioner's expectation of
receiving at least $21.60 per share was all but certain-reducing
the investment risk and also the expected return. Respondent's
proposal, however, goes too far the other way. There is some
risk inherent in an appeal,362 and the risk-free rate punishes
petitioner for exercising its legal right to appeal.
The best rate to apply to the funds held (as though) in
an escrow account is the current legal rate.363 The current
statutory legal rate equals 7.0%.
D. Conclusion
Post-judgment interest serves to remove any improper
incentives on appeal by including in its relevant factors
the appealing party. The ultimate purpose of post-judgment
interest is to place the parties in the position they held at the
time of the original judgment. Accordingly, post-judgment
interest is awarded, on the principal amount of $4,422,376
only, as simple interest at the current statutory legal rate
of 7.0% from August 3, 1991, to the date the judgment is
paid. Post-judgment interest is awarded only on the principal
amount of the judgment ($4,422,376) in order to preserve
the fundamental fairness imperative of the simple interest
determination.
X. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, I conclude that Technicolor must pay
Cinerama $21.98 per share (a total of $4,422,376), together
with prejudgment interest of 10.32% compounded annually
from January 24, 1983 to August 2, 1991, plus post-judgment
simple interest on the principal amount only at 7.0% from
August 3, 1991 until the date the judgment is paid.
*49  Counsel shall confer and submit a form of Order
consistent with this decision.
All Citations
Not Reported in A.2d, 2003 WL 23700218
Footnotes
1 Petitioners also filed a personal liability action related to the merger. This Court found that the merger met the standard
of entire fairness. Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1991 WL 111134 (Del.Ch. June 24, 1991), aff'd, 663 A.2d 1156
(Del.1995). Thus, all that remains is to determine the fair value of petitioners' shares and the appropriate post-judgment
interest.
2 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289 (Del.1996) (hereinafter “Technicolor IV” ).
3 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d 485 (Del.2000) (hereinafter “Technicolor V” ). The Supreme Court reversed
my decision to appoint an expert in corporate finance as a Special Master who could assist the Court, holding that the
appraisal statute implicitly prohibits the Chancellor and Vice Chancellors from appointing a neutral expert as a special
master in an appraisal proceeding. But see 73 Del. Laws c. 201 (amending 10 Del. C. § 372(a) to allow appointment of
a master in any cause pending in the Court of Chancery unless a statute explicitly provides to the contrary).
4 Ron Perelman was the controlling shareholder of MAF and the driving force behind the Technicolor merger. Once the first
step of the merger was completed in December 1982, Mr. Perelman's business plan was found by the Supreme Court
to have replaced that of Technicolor's Chief Executive Officer before the merger, Morton Kamerman. See Technicolor
IV, 684 A.2d at 300. Throughout this Opinion, the Perelman plan is the plan in place at the time the second step of the
merger was completed on January 24, 1983. The exact nature of the Plan was one of the issues before the Court during
the second trial.
5 See, e.g., Taylor v. American Specialty Retailing Group, Inc., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 19239, Lamb, V.C. (July 25, 2003)
(valuing company by averaging values yielded by DCF and guideline companies analysis when one analysis was about
10% higher than the other analysis); Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., et al., Del. Ch., C.A.
No. 15754, Strine, V.C. (July 8, 2003) (valuing a company using the average of four valuations, where those valuations
diverged by more than 173%). Many commentators have recognized the indeterminate nature of the search for the fair or
intrinsic value of a company. Professors Allen and Kraakman have also noted the institutional disinclination of Chancery
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judges to engage in the valuation process in certain circumstances precisely because those judges recognize it as a
“daunting task” subject to significant uncertainty. The same institutional pressures that result in this disinclination at the
Chancery Court level, of course, do not apply at the appellate level and may explain why the Supreme Court exhibits more
confidence in the ability to ascertain the fair value of an enterprise. See W.T. Allen and R. Kraakman, Commentaries and
Cases on the Law of Business Organization at 312 (2003).
6 Respondent repeatedly sought to undermine Torkelsen's credibility in this trial by highlighting his “hired gun” relationship
with the Milberg Weiss law firm, including allegations that Torkelsen performed expert witness services for Milberg,
Weiss on a contingency fee basis. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [hereinafter
Technicolor Proposed Findings or “TPF”] at 27, citing Tr. 1341-57. References to Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law throughout the opinion will be designated as “Cinerama Proposed Findings” or “CPF”.
7 From $62.75 per share at the first trial (total Technicolor value of $286.629 million) to $63.77 per share at the second
trial (total Technicolor value of $291.253 million). Compare RX 18 with PNX 15 at 212. Trial exhibits will be designated
throughout the opinion as follows: (1) Plaintiffs' exhibits from the first trial: PX [number] at [pg.]; (2) Petitioners' exhibits from
the second trial: PNX [number] at [pg.]; (3) Defendant's exhibits from the first trial: DX [number] at [pg.]; (4) Respondent's
exhibits from the second trial: RX [number] at [pg.].
8 From $62.75 per share to $50.63 per share.
9 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084, at *30 (Del.Ch. Oct.19, 1990) (mem.op.) (finding that Torkelsen's
“technique of estimating a discount rate is decidedly less reliable than Professor Rappaport's technique. It is not an
acceptable professional technique for estimating Technicolor's cost of capital to look to the cost of capital (CAPM derived)
of the acquiring company. Torkelsen's alternative of the average of all industrial concerns is far too gross a number to
use except where no finer determination is feasible, which is not the case here.”).
10 TPF at 90.
11 Id. at 90-91.
12 Respondent's expert at the first trial was Professor Alfred Rappaport, at the time a professor at the Northwestern University
Graduate School and participant in a consulting firm, Alcar. He was not available to testify at the second trial.
13 See, e.g., Erickson v. Centennial Beauregard Cellular, L.L.C., 2003 WL 1878583 (Del.Ch. Apr.1, 2003); Union Illinois
v. Korte, 2001 WL 1526303 (Del.Ch. Nov.28, 2001); Parnes v. Bally Entertainment Corp., 2001 WL 224774 (Del.Ch.
Feb.23, 2001).
14 Taylor v. American Specialty Retailing Group, Inc., 2003 WL 21753752 at *3 (Del.Ch. July 25, 2003).
15 Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 300.
16 Id. at 299.
17 PNX 15 at 9; RX 4 at 10. The plan changed somewhat during its implementation, but I only address the plan as it was
developed on the date of the merger.
18 The parties divide the time between six months and a year for the various divisions. I find that the Perelman plan intended
to sell all four within six months, if possible. Therefore, since this is the best evidence as to sales time lines, I find that
six months is the proper time for discounting the expected cash flows.
19 RX 30; see also text accompanying notes 303 and 304, infra.
20 Id.
21 The Supreme Court remanded the appraisal action on October 14, 1996. See Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 284.
22 Outstanding debt is determined in the discount rate section as long-term debt.
23 PNX 15 at 2 n. 3, 5, 60-61; RX 4 at 18, 23.
24 RX 30. Easton came to this by dividing his projected value of North Hollywood ($72,547,000) by 4,567,491 shares
outstanding as of January 24, 1983.
25 Petitioners' Reply Brief Concerning Respondents Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Laws [hereinafter
Cinerama Reply Brief or “CRB”] at 13.
26 RX 4 at 17.
27 PNX 15 at 22, 62. It is interesting to note, however, that Torkelsen only performs regression analyses for North Hollywood
and Newbury Park. For the other film processing facilities (East Coast, S.p.A., and London) and Technicolor's other
divisions, Torkelsen relies on management's CY 1983 Plan.
28 Tr. at 1983. Testimony is cited within as follows: New Trial Testimony is “Tr. at __”; Deposition Testimony is “[Name] at
__”; Old Trial Testimony is “[Volume Number] [Name] at [pg.]”.
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29 In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490-91 (Del.Ch.1991); see Harris v. Rapid-American Corp., 1990 WL
146488 at *6-*7 (Del.Ch.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 603 A.2d 796 (Del.1992) (rejecting petitioners'
valuation method because the inputs were too speculative, largely due to the fact that management did not create them
or give any input to the third party which did create them).
30 Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 892 (Del.Ch.2001).
31 709 A.2d 663, 669 (Del.Ch.1997), aff'd, 731 A.2d 790 (Del.1999).
32 Id.
33 Tr. at 1081; PX 348-55.
34 Petitioner's attempt to strike respondent's valuation of North Hollywood as being tainted by post-merger bias through the
use of the CY 1983 Plan is disingenuous and somewhat troubling considering that petitioner's own expert heavily relied
on the CY 1983 Plan for all portions of his valuation other than North Hollywood and Newbury Park. See Tr. at 1277-1278.
35 In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490-91 (Del.Ch.1991).
36 See Gray v. Cytokine Pharmasciences, Inc., 2002 WL 853549 at *8 (Del.Ch.) (rejecting valuation because it inexplicably
ignored and altered management forecasts in favor of litigation-driven projections); Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp.,
1995 WL 376911, at *5 (Del.Ch.) (remarking that variations from management projections merit “close inspection” and
may impeach the credibility of an expert witness).
37 Tr. at 1435-45, 2182; RX 4 at 16-17; PNX 1 (demonstrating an average profit margin variance of only 1.8% for fiscal
years 1981-82).
38 RX 4, Ex. 3; Tr. at 2179-80. Even if the abnormal silver reclamation profits are not corrected for, the absolute average
operating margin variance is still only 3.0%. RX4, Ex. 3.
39 Id.; Tr. at 2182. The absolute average sales variance (as a percentage of the Plan) would be about 9%. RX 4, Ex. 3.
40 Tr. at 1602. The seasonal, sensitive, and volatile nature of scheduling in the motion picture industry testified to by
petitioners' witnesses meant that release dates for movies and demand for North Hollywood's services (and therefore,
also, its revenues) could vary greatly from month to month. See tr. at 111-31, 1427-28.
41 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 32, 1999 WL 65042 (Del. Ch.); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., C.A. No. 7129, bench ruling (Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2003) (“March 27 Hearing”).
42 March 27 Hearing, tr. at 90.
43 Id. at 91-92 (emphasis added).
44 PNX 1 at 6.
45 See In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490-91 (Del.Ch.1991) (concluding that forecasts prepared with a
“business purpose” were reliable and should be used to determine DCF inputs).
46 CPF at 59-61. RX 4 at 18.
47 Tr. at 1439-40.
48 Torkelsen agreed under cross-examination to the proposition that he claims to have analyzed the data “in a more rigorous
manner” than Technicolor management. Tr. at 1439-40.
49 There is a presumption that directors-and by inference, officers-“acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.1984).
In such instances, the court should “not substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment [for those
of management].” Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.1971). Technicolor management engaged in a
rigorous process in creating the CY 1983 Plan because such plans were very important to management. Tr. at 1601-02.
50 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del.1983); see Jack B. Jacobs, Reappraising Appraisal: Some Judicial Reflections, Speech at 15th
Annual Ray Garrett, Jr. Corporate and Securities Law Institute, Northwestern University School of Law 10 (unpublished
manuscript Apr. 27, 1995). This problem could be largely overcome by a method similar to that adopted by the British
High Court of Justice, in which competing experts discuss their reports (usually outside the presence of counsel) and file
a joint report with the Court detailing the items in their respective reports on which they agree and disagree. See Civil
Procedure Rules, Rules 35.10, 35.12 (Sweet & Maxwell 2002).
51 Petitioner cites several federal cases for the proposition that regression analysis is a well-recognized statistical technique
that has met with widespread judicial acceptance. I do not disagree with this proposition, but point out that in this instance,
a statistical technique is very different from a valuation technique. With one exception, all the cases that petitioner cites
use regression analyses merely to demonstrate a connection between the dependent and independent variables (a
statistical technique)-not to forecast costs, revenues, or profits (a valuation technique). See CPF at 64-65; Reply Brief
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in Opposition to Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law [hereinafter Technicolor Reply Brief or
“TRB”] at 18, n. 11.
52 Tr. at 1255-56. It should also be borne in mind that “[r]egression analysis is widely used and, unfortunately, frequently
misused.” Douglas C. Montgomery & Elizabeth A. Peck, Introduction to Linear Regression Analysis 42 (2nd ed.1992)
(emphasis in original).
53 Tr. at 1194-95. Furthermore:
The purpose of a regression analysis is to estimate or explain a response variable (y ) for a specified value of a
factor variable (x ). This purpose implies that the variable x is chosen or “fixed” by the experimenter ... and the
primary interest of a regression analysis is to make inferences about the dependent variable using information from
the independent variable.
Rudolf J. Freund & William J. Wilson, Regression Analysis: Statistical Modeling of a Response Variable 52 (Academic
Press 1998). This purpose is distinguished as being different from using regressions to determine a relationship or
correlation between two random variables, though the authors note that the two concepts are often confused. Id. at
52-53.
54 See Montgomery & Peck, supra n. 52, at 4. Regarding the dangers of using regression analysis to forecast, it has been
written by scholars of regression analysis that:
It is not advisable to use an estimated regression relationship for extrapolation. That is, the estimated model should
not be used to make inferences on values of the dependent variable beyond the range of observed x-values. Such
extrapolation is dangerous, because although the model may fit the data quite well, there is no evidence that the
model is appropriate outside the range of the existing data.
Freund & Wilson, supra n. 53, at 65 (emphasis added).
55 Tr. at 2230.
56 Id. at 2064.
57 Id.
58 PNX 15 at 63; Tr. at 1626.
59 RX 4 at 26.
60 Id. at 21.
61 Tr. at 1370, 1464-65.
62 PNX 15 at 95.
63 DX 238; Tr. at 524-25, 1624-25. For example, even though Warner Brothers' contract with Technicolor was not due to
expire until 1984, Technicolor had already been informed that Warner Brothers intended to seek competing bids. Gaul 47
(Mr. Raymond Gaul was Technicolor's president once it was under Perelman's control); Ryan 215-16 (Mr. Arthur Ryan
was a Technicolor director before the merger). Some of these technological threats included videocassette and videodisc,
cable television, and direct satellite transmission of movies to theaters. Tr. at 881-82; 963-66; 1163-64. Contracts with
Disney and Universal were scheduled to expire in 1985 and 1986, respectively. PX 372. Perelman did not see North
Hollywood as having great growth potential, in large part because there were so few major studios (a maximum of eight)
that were potential customers, and two already had their own labs. PNX 15 at 33 n. 20. See also tr. at 1839-40:
Q. You bought a company that you expected not to grow?
A. When we bought it, I didn't know how it would grow.
Q. Well, you expected it to grow and that's why you bought it. Yes?
A. How would I expect it to grow? We couldn't get any more customers. You've got to look at the base. There are six
customers, two of whom own their own laboratory.... We couldn't grow outside the industry. We were tied to that one
industry. So that our future was determined by A, could we keep the customers; and, B, at what price they would
pay us to service them.”
64 RX 30. $194,289,000/4,567,491 shares outstanding as of January 24, 1983.
65 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1177 (Del.1995) (“Technicolor III” ).
66 Tr. at 1194.
67 PNX 15 at 2 n. 3.
68 Id. (emphasis added).
69 I do not mean to say that any such visits by witnesses, especially valuation experts, in an appraisal context are entirely
prejudicial, but I do harbor serious doubts as to whether an observer in that setting can make a truly impartial determination
of only what was known, knowable, or susceptible of proof as of the merger date.
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70 PNX 15 at 86. It should be noted that 35mm theatrical release prints, as a proxy for all North Hollywood revenue is
incomplete, especially when placed in the context of Torkelsen's regression analyses. Only two-thirds of North Hollywood
revenues came from the motion picture industry, and of the motion picture work, only two-thirds were release prints.
One-third of North Hollywood 35mm motion picture volume consisted of dailies. Dailies and release prints were quite
different to Technicolor, as the margins on dailies were higher; therefore dailies accounted for more than one-third of
North Hollywood motion picture film processing revenues. In addition, at the time of the merger, there was speculation
that dailies would be eliminated entirely through the use of high-definition videotape. RX 4 at 18.
71 PNX 15 at 86. I do not agree with Torkelsen's characterization of Technicolor's forecasting as being done in the “exact
same way.” Pretending that 35mm motion picture release prints represent all of North Hollywood's business is quite
different from exploding a forecast of the other types (dailies, trailers, etc.) and gauges (8mm, 16mm, and 70 mm) of
prints based on historical ratios. See PNX 15 at 87.
72 Id.
73 Id. Much has been made of the “trend” toward wider film releases. The problem inherent in that statement is the definition
of a wide release. As argued by petitioner and defined by Murphy, a wide release is a release on more than 500 screens.
This wholly arbitrary figure yields the conclusion that the “trend” is heavily dependent on how a wide release is defined,
and as such, Torkelsen's arguments that Technicolor's forecasts varied from industry trends carry even less weight. See
PNX 14 at 24.
74 Cipes was the senior vice president of marketing for Technicolor. Tr. at 1604.
75 PNX 15 at 91.
76 Id. at 92.
77 Id. at 91. It is interesting to note that Cipes forecasts fewer prints per release in 1983 than 1982 for Disney and Universal,
but forecasts more prints per release in 1983 for United Artists and Warner Brothers. This appears to show a concerted
effort by Cipes to make the CY 1983 Plan projections conform to the ebb and flow of the individual industry participants
as of January 1983.
78 PX 388; tr. at 1603-04.
79 It is known that at least Wilson and Ryan were involved in the process. Tr. at 1603-07.
80 PX 153, reproduced in PNX 15 at 87-88.
81 PNX 15 at 88.
82 Id.
83 See supra n. 71.
84 Cipes projected 37,800 prints at 10,000 feet each. Torkelsen projects 45,358 prints at 11,087 feet each. PNX 15 at
87-88, 91. Torkelsen also arbitrarily substitutes the number of prints forecast for non-contract customers with the actual
non-contract prints made in fiscal 1982, with his only potential justification again being that Technicolor's management
must have been sorely mistaken when preparing the CY 1983 Plan. PNX 15 at 90-91. This is simply another example
of Torkelsen's unjustified post hoc decisions to substitute his own post-merger hindsight judgment for the unbiased,
contemporary forecasts of Technicolor's management.
85 There is great discrepancy and confusion as to what the actual footage results were, though I need not make a specific
finding as to this narrow issue. I believe a great part of the confusion is due to differences in fiscal/calendar years and
what footage was analyzed (release print, total theatrical, or something else). Petitioner argues that actual total 1982
footage was 479.5 million feet in an attempt to validate Torkelsen's figure of 502.9 million feet. CPF at 63-64. Presumably,
total footage would include release prints, dailies, trailers, etc. That footage of release prints alone would exceed the total
footage from the prior year seems specious. Respondent argues that actual total CY 1982 footage was 507.9 million
feet. RX 29 at 10. Regardless, Torkelsen's conclusion regarding release print footage is far too high. The 378 million feet
projected by Technicolor management for release prints seems quite reasonable when one recalls that release prints
only accounted for two-thirds of Technicolor's motion picture processing work. See supra note 70.
86 PNX 15 at 51 (quoting Gaul 31). Torkelsen's portrayal of Gaul's testimony strikes me as somewhat incomplete and almost
a blatant mischaracterization when in addition to the quoted passage, he references Gaul's statement that no single
laboratory could handle the volume of work required by Warner Brothers in support of the proposition that service was
more important than price. PNX 15 at 53 (citing Gaul 47). On the very same page of Gaul's deposition, however, he
testified, as has been noted above, that Warner Brothers would be seeking competitive bids when their contract with
Technicolor expired in 1984, and furthermore, that the reason Warner Brothers was doing so would be to solicit bids at
lower processing prices. Gaul 47.
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87 Tr. at 1623.
88 Id. at 1623-25.
89 PNX 15 at 82-84. Analyzing the scatter graph shown on page 77 of Torkelsen's report, it is interesting to note that the
four data points representing August through November of 1982 vary greatly from the fitted line. PNX 15 at 77. Without
engaging in a full, scientific analysis myself, it appears that the coefficient (or slope) of the line would be decreased
significantly if those data points were corrected for or omitted. Torkelsen's use of a small sample enhances any outlier
effect that these four points may have. See Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 199, 217
(2d ed.2000) (stating that “[e]stimated regression coefficients can be highly sensitive to particular data points,” that “the
coefficients in a multiple regression [can] change substantially if the data point[s] in question were removed from the
sample,” and that “the sensitivity of the [fitted] line to individual points sometimes can be substantial”). Furthermore, if the
profit per foot derived from Torkelsen's analysis is laid out, it is clear that his 1983 figures ($0.042) equal a profit per foot
attained only at the height of the silver bubble ($0.043) and unlikely to be repeated. From there, he manages to increase
the profits per foot to $0.058 by 1987, a 76% increase over historic levels. RX 24.
90 PNX 15 at 84.
91 RX 5 at 12.
92 PNX 15 at 108. These two constants, when combined, would imply that North Hollywood would have an operating profit
of almost $26 million if only 8mm, 16mm, and 70mm film were processed. This leads to a ludicrous operating margin
of 92.3%.
93 Id.; supra n. 89.
94 RX 23.
95 RX 4 at Ex. 7.
96 Silver prices greatly affect the cost of film stock. During processing, however, some of this silver is reclaimed. Technicolor
management would sell this reclaimed silver from time to time. During late 1979 and the first half of 1980, there was a
significant run-up in the price of silver from $6.25 per ounce in January 1979 to $38.27 in January 1980 and decreasing
to $16.06 by July 1980. PNX 15 at 63-65.
97 RX 4 at Ex. 7.
98 Id.
99 Tr. at 2072-73; RX 44.
100 PNX 15 at 208.
101 Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 81 (6th ed.2000) (teaching that “the horizon [or
terminal] value can change dramatically in response to apparently minor changes in assumptions”).
102 RX 5, Appendix B at 2.
103 Id. Easton projects $34,128,000 as the discounted free cash flow terminal value out of a total value for North Hollywood
of $72,547,000. Id. See Gray v. Cytokine Pharmasciences, Inc., 2002 WL 853549, at *9 (Del.Ch. Apr.25, 2002) (noting
that the results of a DCF valuation must be regarded with great suspicion and given little weight when the terminal value
accounts for over 75% of a DCF analysis); The Union Illinois 1995 Investment Limited Partnership, et al. v. Union Financial
Group, Ltd., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 19586, Strine, V.C. (Dec. 19, 2003) (noting unreliability of a DCF model in which 97%
of the value was derived from the terminal value).
104 Tr. at 1631.
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See RX 23.
108 Tr. at 1261.
109 Id.
110 PNX 2 at 2.
111 Id. at 1.
112 Tr. at 2074-76; Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 127, 194 (2d ed.2000) (remarking that
the level of statistical significance required in most scientific work is the 95% confidence level, that one-tailed tests at
the 95% level are the weakest standard used in technical literature, and that courts have expressed a preference for
two-tailed tests).
113 PNX 15 at 113.
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114 Compare PNX 15 at 113 with PNX 2 at 1.
115 Murphy was Cinerama's expert on the movie industry for the first trial. He did not testify at retrial due to failing health,
and passed away on June 16, 2003. Lorenza Munoz, Arthur Murphy, 70; Turned Box Office Data Into a Studio Science,
Los Angeles Times, June 18, 2003, at B12.
116 Tr. at 149; DX 258; DX 263.
117 Murphy's cross-examination from the original trial is found at Tr. Vol. II at 167-228 and Tr. Vol. III at 14-136. On cross-
examination, Murphy admitted that “lots of people,” including Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture Association of
America, and Richard Orear, then President of the National Association of Theater Owners, were predicting that screens
would decline. Tr. Vol. III at 40-47. He also stated that he revised the numbers that appeared in the 1983 The Movie
Business Book. Tr. Vol. II at 210-12.
118 PNX 13.
119 RX 4 at 19.
120 Tr. 79-81.
121 Besides the fact that he admitted that he did not attempt to wall off the events that occurred after the merger, Reardon
contemporaneously published views that seem inconsistent with his current testimony at trial. For example, at trial
Reardon testified that screen growth was on an upward trend as of the merger date. (Tr. 156-61) Though he testified that
he had never held a contrary view, respondents pointed out that he opined in a late-1981 industry publication that cable
television could negatively affect screen growth in three to five years. (RX 14 at 16)
122 PNX 15 at 95.
123 Interestingly, Torkelsen does not cite to any specific proposition in either the Murphy or Wilkofsky Gruen reports for this
assertion, but rather summarily instructs the reader to “see the Wilkofsky Gruen and Murphy reports.” Id. Furthermore, a
growth rate means absolutely nothing when taken out of the context of the time period over which the growth will occur.
Torkelsen's report does not provide the Court with any ability to give an iota of credence to his bare assertion of “over
8 percent industry growth.” Id.
124 Given that Technicolor's business was processing film, increases in admissions are not necessarily probative. That
increase could simply be a product of larger theaters. Similarly, average annual box office revenue growth of 8.50% could
be a function of larger theaters, inflation, or any number of other factors.
125 Id. at 93. Torkelsen, as is rather common throughout his report, and this section in particular, fails to justify this assumption
or provide evidence that this assumption is true.
126 Given Torkelsen's affinity for regression analyses, it is remarkably befuddling why he did not perform a regression based
on past screen growth nationwide and the number of release prints processed by North Hollywood to determine if there
is any correlation between the two. This would be an appropriate use of multiple regression analysis. “Multiple regression
analysis is a statistical tool for understanding the relationship between two or more variables.” Federal Judicial Center,
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 181 (2d ed.2000).
127 Petitioner offered PNX 10 to demonstrate a relationship between screen growth and film footage. Without a more detailed
analysis, however, petitioners have provided me no legitimate grounds for determining that there is a significant statistical
(as contrasted with a purely practical) correlation between the two. Easton testified that in the four years from 1979-1982,
Technicolor experienced an overall decrease in footage, which tends to undermine petitioners' argument. Tr. at 1988-90.
In this instance, Torkelsen and the petitioner have the burden of showing that their conclusions and assumptions were
reasonable. They have failed to do so.
128 Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 80 (6th ed.2000).
129 PNX 15 at 208.
130 Id. at 209-11.
131 Pre-Trial Order for Retrial at 12.
132 PNX 15 at 211.
133 Id. at 210-11.
134 Easton also points out a serious flaw in Torkelsen's discounting of the terminal value for Technicolor. See RX 5 at 4-5.
Torkelsen essentially discounted the terminal value by one too many years. Although his error reduced his value for
Technicolor, it is a mistake that is not expected in litigation of this caliber. When asked on direct examination during
Cinerama's rebuttal if there were errors in RX 5, Torkelsen had an opportunity to contest Easton's report, but he did not
disagree that his terminal value calculation in PNX 15 had been performed incorrectly. Tr. at 2327-30.
135 RX 4 at 17.
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136 PX 347 at 077181.
137 See RX 4 at 24; RX 4 Exs. 8C, 8D.
138 PX 348 at 114796-97.
139 RX 4 at 25.
140 RX 4 at 26; Tr. at 1986-87. The United Artists' contract was going to expire in 1983 and was not expected to be renewed.
141 See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
142 2,500/37,800. Historically, United Artists was 11% of North Hollywood's business. See supra notes 59-62 and
accompanying text. Easton was unable to explain why he performed the reduction the way he did instead of simply
subtracting 6.6%. Tr. at 2268-69; See PNX 15 at 87-88.
143 Hope Reports, Inc. compiled industry data received from the major film labs for publication in quarterly reports, to which
many of the major film labs subscribed.
144 RX 4 at 25; DX 238.
145 Id. at 25-26.
146 Id. at Ex. 4.
147 Id. at 25; Tr. at 1988-90.
148 RX 4 at 25; DX 238.
149 Tr. at 1991.
150 In support of Easton's conclusion, Wilson testified at trial that Technicolor's management was aware that 16mm “was
going down,” and that 8mm and 16mm “was a declining business.” He testified that knowledge of these declining historical
relationships affected Technicolor's budgeting process. Tr. at 1607-13.
151 PX 348 at 114796-97; Tr. at 1991-92.
152 RX 4 Ex. 4.
153 RX 4 at 26; RX 4 Exs. 5, 6.
154 RX 4 at 26. Technicolor's prices slightly outpaced inflation while MGM's real prices were falling, though this may not be
entirely accurate as to Technicolor because there were missing data. Id.
155 Id. at 26-27.
156 See supra Section IV(A)(2)(c)(i) and accompanying footnotes.
157 RX 4 at 27; PX 348 at 114773; Tr. at 1615-16.
158 See supra text accompanying notes 98 and 959.
159 PX 348 at 114780. Wilson testified at trial that margins at North Hollywood were expected to be around 21%, though he
was emphatic that the CY 1983 Plan represented the views of Technicolor management at the time it was prepared, and
that although he could not recall a specific reason for the projections twenty years later, he was sure that the variation
had been explained. Tr. at 1714-17.
160 Reference was made both to 19% and 18.9%. As will be seen below, I use exactly 18.9% in my calculations. Tr. at
2001-07.
161 RX 4 Exs. 3, 7.
162 Tr. at 2007, 2265-66.
163 See supra nn. 108 and 109 and accompanying text.
164 RX 4 at 29. I do not consider his argument regarding industry over-capacity, as it is based on a document not in the
record on remand, but do not need to do so in order to support the conclusion that it is reasonable to project margins
will remain constant.
165 Torkelsen only provided net fixed capital investment and depreciation schedules for Newbury Park. PNX 15 at 177-84.
It is clear from his analysis, however, that he forecasts significant negative net capital investment (that is, depreciation
exceeds fixed capital investment) every year from 1983-87. Id. at 177, 181. Easton clearly laid out the unreasonableness
of this determination, and I agree with his criticism of Torkelsen's approach. RX 5 at 23-27; Tr. at 2293-98.
166 Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 121-22 (6th ed.2000).
167 Id. at 77-78, 123.
168 See supra note 58.
169 RX 4 at 30.
170 Id. & 8C; Tr. at 2014.
171 RX 4 at 30.
- 110 -
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., Not Reported in A.2d (2003)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 57
172 At trial, there was very little testimony or evidence offered regarding the investment tax credit applied in Torkelsen's
analysis but omitted from Easton's analysis. Torkelsen's analysis of the investment tax credit assumes that every capital
expenditure made by Technicolor (with the exception of the videocassette recorders (“VCR”) purchased for use in
Newbury Park) qualifies for the credit. No evidence has been offered to show that this was true. Similarly with any potential
deferred tax liability, petitioners have not shown the effects of this potential liability outside of Torkelsen's already heavily
discredited report. PNX 15 at 175, 177-78.
173 RX 4 at 30.
174 PNX 14 at 34.
175 DX 53 at 114931-32.
176 PTO § II, ¶ 12.
177 Tr. at 259.
178 DX 285 at 838.
179 Tr. at 700-04.
180 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 974-76 (9th Cir.1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417, 104
S.Ct. 774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984).
181 This time-shifting feature (i.e., allowing consumers to tape record programs of their choosing to be watched at a more
convenient time or multiple times) was one of the only advantages that VCRs had over competing technologies of the day.
182 Tr. at 735-38.
183 Tr. at 736-37.
184 RX 4 at 50.
185 PTO § II, ¶ 12, Tr. at 1775. At the time of the merger, Newbury Park had net operating assets of approximately $5.59
million.
186 Tr. at 1637-38.
187 Tr. at 1181, 1784.
188 Id. at 245-48.
189 Id. 745-46.
190 RX 4 at 49-51, DX 244G at 10107554, Tr. at 278-79. Only 6% of TV households owned VCRs in 1982. PNX 14 at 37.
191 Tr. at 670; DX 244G at 1017567.
192 As Jack Valenti, President of the MPAA, told a Congressional subcommittee, “As one VCR owner wrote in his diary, ‘why
buy prerecorded movies? You can record the same thing from a premium pay channel ... much cheaper.’ ” DX 220 at 11.
193 DX 272 at 11, Tr. at 407.
194 PNX 14 at 43.
195 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d 963, 969-74 (9th Cir.1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417, 104 S.Ct.
774, 78 L.Ed.2d 574 (1984). The appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling was argued before the United States Supreme
Court just days before the merger.
196 DX 285 at 838 (House Subcommittee hearing regarding “Home Recording of Copyrighted Works” on Sept. 22, 1982).
Roberts testified that “[a]bout 18 months ago we saw a spot on the horizon, a spot that has grown into a ravaging
steamroller which is now crushing the prerecorded video cassette business and is about to flatten the video disc business
as well. I am referring to the unauthorized rental of prerecorded video products.” Id.
197 Id. at 840.
198 Id.
199 I.e., that sales had exceeded expectations and that Technicolor was doing all of Warner Brothers' videocassette
duplication work, half of Disney's and was in negotiations with Universal, Paramount and MGM. DX 10 at 000709.
200 Tr. at 288-89.
201 PX 63 at 000960-61.
202 PX 64 at 001070-71.
203 Id. at 001071.
204 Tr. at 995-96.
205 Tr. at 739.
206 Tr. at 736-37.
207 Tr. at 995, PNX 14 at 43.
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208 Respondent discounts this advantage as a fragile one because Technicolor's customers could simply enter the business
themselves. I believe, however, that these relationships would still advantage Technicolor over a new entrant that did not
have such pre-existing relationships. Even though Technicolor could not guarantee the business of its film processing
customers, it would certainly have more of an “in” than entering strangers to the industry.
209 RX5 at 52 (“Unlike in the film processing business, Technicolor was not the industry leader and was at a comparative
disadvantage due to its later entry into the market.”).
210 Id.
211 DX 248TT at 057826.
212 PX 7 at 4.
213 Id.
214 For example, Wilson testified that he did not expect rebate income to continue. Tr. at 1650-53, 1792.
215 DX 53 at 9.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 7-8.
218 Petitioner creatively attributes management's failure to project continued rebate income to the fact that the rebates were
accounted for on its profit and loss statements as a net negative material cost rather than in its sales numbers. Because
of this, petitioner contends that management excluded these profits from their CY 1983 Plan because the profit plans
included revenue only from duplication funds. Petitioner states that management deliberately ignored the positive impact
of negative material costs, again implying that management was simply incompetent. CPF at 75. It seems hard to believe
that management somehow ignored or failed to notice a source of “income” that amounted to one-third of the division's
profits in the last half of 1982 and yet still quite accurately created its projections. Further, because management did not
expect this source of income to continue, it seems reasonable to expect its exclusion from the CY 1983 Plan.
219 PX 400 at 113846.
220 Though Torkelsen did not separately value Newbury Park, or any Technicolor division for that matter, he provided his
inputs for the videocassette business as well as his assumptions for discount rate and terminal value growth rate in
perpetuity in his aggregate valuation of Technicolor. Easton then used these inputs to compute a synthetic Torkelsen
valuation for Newbury Park.
221 TPF 60. Torkelsen forecasts $46.310 million ($10.14 per share) and Easton projects $11.476 million ($2.51 per share)
for Newbury Park. RX 33; RX 4 at 61; RX 30.
222 Tr. at 1510, 1835, 1856, 1853, 1910-11.
223 Actual results for the first six months of FY 1983 show that management for this same period made predictions that were
within 4% for unit forecasts, 3% for net sales, and 28% for profit net of material rebates. Tr. at 1825-26; DX 248 TT at
057819, 057821.
224 RX 5.
225 Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
226 In his analysis of this issue, Easton also corrects for Torkelsen's terminal value over-discounting error in RX 5 at Ex. 2.
227 Id. at 13.
228 Id.
229 PNX 15 at 119.
230 Id. at 120-21.
231 Tr. at 1297-98.
232 PNX 14 at 43; RX 15 at 35; Tr. at 975-76.
233 Compare PNX 14 at 37 with RX 15 at 35.
234 The Warner contract provided a pricing structure that charged decreased prices for increased volumes. DX 53. At its
highest volumes, Technicolor agreed to charge only $2.49 per tape for its duplicating services. Not only was Warner
Brothers to account for 70% of Newbury Park's half-inch duplicating work in 1983, but it seems that Universal, which would
account for the remaining work, was subject to an identical pricing arrangement. DX 150D at GS1161. Further, Torkelsen
admitted that Technicolor's revenue per half-inch tape before material rebates was $2.47 just before the merger. Tr. at
2339.
235 PNX 15 at 132; Tr. at 1302-03.
236 As noted above, duplication had significant competition with few barriers to entry. Further, Technicolor's only contractual
customer had the unilateral right to terminate the contract if Technicolor's prices did not remain competitive.
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237 RX 26-28.
238 PNX 21, PX 48.
239 Half-inch tape accounted for approximately three-quarters of Newbury Park's revenue and is the product that was the
sole driver of both experts' growth forecasts.
240 RX 26.
241 CPF at 78.
242 2003 WL 21753752 (Del.Ch. July 25, 2003).
243 Id. at *2.
244 RX 26-27.
245 PNX 15 at 114-60.
246 Tr. at 1279.
247 RX 29 at 8. In contrast, Easton arrives at a base year revenue projection of $5.735 million for duplicating revenue. Though
his projection ends up being slightly higher than Technicolor's final CY 1983 Plan and 35% higher than calendar 1982
actual results, it seems much more directly and accurately to approximate expected revenue.
248 RX 4 at Ex. 13R, RX 33.
249 Torkelsen values Newbury Park at $10.14 per share, though the Technicolor stock price before the merger ranged from
$9 to $11. Tr. at 1860-61.
250 Tr. at 1304, 1825-26.
251 CPF at 73.
252 Further, management was aware of the data that Torkelsen relies upon at the time they made their projections and drew
very different conclusions from this information than Torkelsen does in his hindsight valuation.
253 Taylor v. American Specialty Retailing Group, Inc., 2003 WL 21753752 at *3 (Del.Ch. July 25, 2003).
254 DX 149(16) at GS0045.
255 PX 353 at 078838.
256 CPF at 72.
257 Id.
258 RX5 at 58.
259 Id. at 57.
260 RX 4 at 60.
261 PNX 14 at 37; Tr. at 656-57.
262 Id.
263 PNX 14 at 42; Tr. at 259-60, 653, 658.
264 PNX 14 at 37.
265 PNX 35.
266 CPF at 77.
267 RX 4 at 60.
268 Id. at 59.
269 This calculation was derived by Easton by calculating the difference in gross property, plant, and equipment between the
CY 1983 Plan balance sheet and his estimated CY 1982 balance sheet. RX 4 at 59.
270 Id. at 60-61.
271 RX 4 at 62.
272 East Coast (N.Y.) projected net negative sales of 7.4%. Easton projects negative sales growth through 1987. Technicolor,
Ltd. (London) projected negative sales growth of 2% for 1983. Easton projects negative growth again for 1984 and below
inflation rate growth through 1987. Technicolor, S.p.A. projected zero sales growth for 1983. Easton projects negative
sales growth in 1984 and growth below the inflation rate through 1987.
273 Magna Crafts projected 1983 sales growth of 20.2%, Vidtronics projected 9.2%, and Government Services projected
5.0%. Easton uses the 1983 projection for all these businesses and then grows revenues and costs at the rate of inflation
for 1984-89.
274 London's Profit Plan is reported in British Pounds Sterling and Rome's in Italian Lira. Each expert uses a slightly different
conversion factor. The Court uses a factor of 1.65 to convert Pounds to Dollars and 0.0008 to convert Lira to Dollars.
275 PX 351.
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276 Certain divisions, such as One Hour Photo, seem to have partially borne their own corporate expenses, but the retained
businesses generally relied upon corporate headquarters for this support. RX 4 at 70.
277 Id.
278 Id. Because this change in management seems to be a result of the merger and because it would be impossible to
quantify the value of this change if it were not, I have not separately valued the impact of substituting management on
Technicolor's value. I do not believe such an exercise would be realistically possible in any event.
279 Id.
280 XXIV (Slovin) 37.
281 XLII (Perelman) 35-36.
282 XXIV (Wilson) 263-64, 269-70.
283 RX 4 at 72.
284 Tr. at 1805.
285 CPF at 89.
286 The Perelman plan is described in Section III, supra.
287 RX 4 at 72.
288 RX 4 Ex. 16B.
289 Id.
290 Tr. at 1850.
291 RX 4 at 84; PNX 15 at 187-88.
292 See PX 99; Tr. at 1421-22. The T-Company projections were made under the direction of Perelman by Bob Carlton of
MAF, based upon Technicolor's balance sheet. Tr. at 1851-52.
293 PX 99 at 7. The pages are not numbered, but the referenced page is titled “T COMPANY Divisions to be Disposed.” The
$50 million did not include any proceeds from the Costa Mesa sale, though it was clear that the sale would take place,
and indeed, $7 million for that property was handwritten on the document.
294 Tr. at 1851.
295 PX 99 at 7. At that time, MAF had received very little information about the Technicolor divisions. Tr. 1899, 1852; PNX
15 at 223.
296 PX 225. Bear Stearns did not think they would be very helpful in selling Audio Visual, as the sale of Audio Visual was
really nothing more than inventory liquidation. Id.
297 Id.
298 Tr. at 1852.
299 The discounted value is approximately $46 million. See supra text accompanying note 19.
300 PNX 15 at 188.
301 The discounted value is approximately $43 million. See supra text accompanying note 19.
302 RX 4 at 87. The $50 million in proceeds expected in the T-Company document already represent a discount of roughly
15% from the total assets of the combined companies. RX 4, Ex. 17.
303 Id.
304 RX 4 at 84.
305 Id. at 80; PX 225.
306 PNX 15 at 166.
307 RX 4 at 80.
308 Torkelsen, however, goes on to make inexplicable changes to these figures to give these divisions positive cash flow in
the first half of 1983, and then cancels them out with transaction costs. While transaction costs are sure to be incurred,
there is no evidence that allows me to determine them sufficiently to deduct them from the sale proceeds. Any figure I
could put forth would be a complete fiction. Accordingly, I find Torkelsen's alterations arbitrary and without support. See
PNX 15 at 167-69.
Valuation of the Sold Businesses (in 000s)
Subtotals Totals
COSTA MESA
Proceeds from Costa Mesa Sale $ 6,839
Discounted@19.89% from 3/31/83 to 1/24/83 $ 6,615
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Costa Mesa Total $ 6,615
OTHER SOLD BUSINESSES
    
Estimated Realizable Asset Value $
50,000
  
Less: Estimated Liabilities $ 4,000   





Book Value of Net Assets $
54,111
  










Proceeds Net of Tax Benefit  $
49,731
 
Cash flows from Operations  $ 135  










Other Sold Businesses Total   $ 46,146
    
Total Net Value of Sold
Businesses on 1/24/83
  $ 52,761.127
Per Share Value   $ 11.55
309 PX 396 at P300217.
310 Id.
311 PX 244 at B000030-31.
312 PX 403 at M00023.
313 CPF at 99.
314 PNX 15 at 200.
315 Beta measures the relative risk of a company. Beta is “a measure of systematic risk of a security; the tendency of a
security's returns to correlate with swing in the broad market.” Shannon P. Pratt et al., Valuing a Business, Appendix
A at 912 (4th ed.2000). For example, a beta of 1 indicates that the security's price will rise and fall with the market. A
beta greater than 1 indicates that its price will be more volatile than the market. And a beta less than 1 means that it
will be less volatile than the market.
316 PNX 15 at 194.
317 RX 4 at 91.
318 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data/b/tcm30y.txt.
319 PNX 15 at 198-99.




324 See Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., C.A. No. 15754, 2003 WL 21639071 at *14-*15 (Del.Ch.
July 8, 2003) (slip op.) (noting that the beta for a public company is normally the market beta unless it can be shown that
there was an insufficient market in the public company to create an accurate beta).
325 PNX 15 at 194.
326 Id.
327 RX 4 at 92.
328 Id.
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329 PNX 15 at 194.
330 RX 4 at 91.
331 PX 396 at P300217-18.
332 RX 4 at 90. Easton rounded up to 14.0%, but the actual value of 13.96% was used to obtain the after-tax cost of debt
of 7.54%.
333 Outstanding debt is determined in the discount rate section as long-term debt.
Technicolor under the Perelman Plan Fair Value as of January 24, 1983
 Value Per Share
   
North Hollywood $ 53,991,172 $ 11.82
Newbury Park Video $ 10,398,185 $ 2.28
East Coast $ 2,978,096 $ 0.65
Technicolor Ltd. $ 6,450,561 $ 1.41
Technicolor SpA $ 1,791,761 $ 0.39
Magna Craft $ 1,774,267 $ 0.39
Vidtronics $ 2,866,241 $ 0.63
Government Services $ 2,503,479 $ 0.55
Corporate Headquarters $ (13,802,515) $ (3.02)
Retained Businesses Subtotal $ 68,951,247 $ 15.10
   
Plus: Sold Businesses $ 52,761,127 $ 11.55
   
Plus: Debt Outstanding334 $ (21,300,000) $ (4.66)
334 Outstanding debt is determined in the discount rate section as long-term debt.
335 PNX 15 at 214-30.
336 Some of his alternative forecast methodologies lack the requisite amount of support for me to rely upon them. In addition,
I do not address the comparable company analysis of Vidtronics here because this is a check on the final valuation,
rather than a check on a specific division.
337 Technicolor III, 663 A.2d 1156, 1180 (Del.1995).
338 Id. at 1177.
339 Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 293.
340 Technicolor III, 663 A.2d at 1177.
341 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 39, 1999 WL 65042 (Del. Ch.).
342 Id.
343 The inclusion of the language “if any” suggests that the Legislature contemplated circumstances where the relevant
factors counsel a court to award zero interest.
344 Before 1987, the statute only allowed for the award of simple interest.
345 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 1999 WL 87280, at ----4 (Del. Feb.25, 1999) (Gonsalves II ). See also
M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 527 (Del.1999) (Court of Chancery “has broad discretion under the
appraisal statute to award either simple or compound interest.”).
346 Gonsalves II, at ----3.
347 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105, at *37, 2002 WL 31057465 (Del. Ch.).
348 Id. at *38.
349 Id.
350 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
351 Granted, neither of these issues would arise were the statute to be changed to require the parties to place the judgment
amount in escrow until all appeals were heard. In fact, the most equitable approach to all interest issues would be to
require the surviving corporation to place the amount offered to the dissenting stockholder in escrow at the time appraisal
was sought. Should the statute ever be changed to reflect this idea, many of the concerns and arguments involving
interest rate and form would either disappear or be significantly reduced.
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352 In other circumstances the relative culpability of the parties in delaying final judgment, even absent misconduct, has
been a factor in determining interest awards. See, e.g., Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 1997 WL 538676, at
*13 (Del.Ch.) (“The extent to which one party may be relatively more responsible for a delay in the proceedings may
be addressed by balancing the two rates to relieve some of the burden imposed by the other party.”); Ryan v. Tad's
Enterprises, Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 706 (Del. Ch.1996, V.C.Jacobs) (plaintiffs' “excessive delay” warranted awarding only
two-thirds the statutory rate of simple interest); Wacht v. Continental Hosts, Ltd., et al., 1994 WL 928836, at *3 (Del. Ch.)
(discounting rate of interest because of plaintiff's failure to prosecute claim diligently).
353 Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 1997 WL 538676, at *10 (Del.Ch.).
354 Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 807 (Del.1992).
355 See, e.g., Gonsalves, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 105 at *41-*43, 2002 WL 31057465; Onti, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d
904, 926-929 (Del.Ch.1999).
356 684 A.2d 289, at 302.
357 737 A.2d 513, 527 (Del.1999).
358 Id.
359 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 1999 WL 87280, ----4 (Del. Jan.5, 1999). Although the Supreme Court
has expressed concern over the frequent award of compound interest, several cases since 1987, when the award of
compound interest became permissible, have awarded only simple interest. See, e.g., Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., 709
A.2d 682 (Del.Ch.1996), aff'd, 693 A.2d 1082 (Del.1997); TV58 Ltd. Partnership v. Weigel Broad. Co., 1993 WL 285850
(Del.Ch. July 22, 1993); Harris v. RapidAmerican Corp., 1990 WL 146488 (Del.Ch. Oct.2, 1990), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 603 A.2d 796 (Del.1992).
360 See Onti, 751 A.2d, at 926-27; Gonsalves, 2002 WL 31057465, at *10.
361 Id.
362 Although the risk of receiving less than $21.60 per share approaches zero.
363 6 Del. C. § 2301(a).
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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*1  This is an appraisal action, pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 262,
filed as a result of a merger that cashed-out the petitioners'
shares at a price of $28 per share. Both parties presented
expert testimony to determine the fair value of the shares as of
the merger date. For the reasons herein, the court concludes




Travelocity.com Inc. (“Travelocity”), a Delaware
corporation, is the surviving entity of a merger between it
and Travelocity Holdings Sub Inc. (“Holdings”), a wholly
owned subsidiary of Sabre Holdings Corporation (“Sabre”).1
Because Sabre, through Holdings, owned more than 90% of
the outstanding shares of common stock of Travelocity, the
merger was authorized by Sabre's board of directors pursuant
to 8 Del. C. § 253 and became effective on April 11, 2002
(the “Merger Date”). As a result of the merger, Travelocity is
(again) a wholly owned subsidiary of Sabre.2
The petitioners owned 265,540 shares of Travelocity before
the merger3 and were entitled to demand an appraisal of
those shares pursuant to Section 253(d) of the DGCL.4 The
parties stipulate that the petitioners have complied with the
provisions of 8 Del. C. § 262, in timely filing their petition
for appraisal and in perfecting their right to appraisal.
2. The Online Travel Industry
Travelocity is in the business of providing online travel
services. When Travelocity went public in 2000, the online
travel industry was in nascent form and the future of the online
travel industry was uncertain. By early 2001, the online travel
industry was beginning to show profitability. By that time,
Travelocity was the leading online travel agency.
The events of September 11, 2001, however, created great
uncertainty in the online travel business. Even though the
industry slowed in the period after September 11, analysts
predicted that the negative effect would be temporary.5
Travelocity, however, also faced strong competition in the
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market at this time. Expedia, Travelocity's main competitor,
surpassed Travelocity as the industry leader in early 2002 and
Orbitz, a then brand new travel services provider, had become
the third largest online travel agent in less than a year.
Expedia quickly became more successful than Travelocity
because of its early implementation of the “merchant model.”
The merchant model is a business plan in which travel
agencies purchase the airline tickets, hotel rooms or car
rentals at a negotiated rate from the suppliers and then
resell them directly to consumers at a higher price. In the
traditional agency model then used by Travelocity, the travel
agent merely serves as a liaison between the supplier and
the customer and receives a commission for the sale. The
merchant model generates higher profit margins and much
higher cash flows than the traditional agency model because
the travel agent controls the price and works directly with both
the supplier and the consumer.
In the fourth quarter of 2001, 42% of Expedia's revenues
came from merchant model business while only 3.5% of
Travelocity's revenue was from merchant model business,
specifically merchant airline ticket sales.6
*2  Moreover, Travelocity was limited in its ability to
develop the merchant model business because it was
committed to working in partnerships with other entities to
help build its merchant business. This partnership approach
negatively affected Travelocity's ability to reap the full
benefits of the merchant model business. For example,
Travelocity had an exclusive contract running until 2005
with Hotel Reservations Network (“HRN”). HRN controlled
Travelocity's relationships with hotels, the booking of hotel
rooms and the price markup. Travelocity received only a
commission on sales. Therefore, HRN and not Travelocity
enjoyed the benefits of the merchant model plan.
Travelocity was also partnered with Contour, a small, start-
up software company, to provide vacation package deals to its
customers. Pursuant to its contract with Travelocity, Contour
had control over the technology developed in setting up the
vacation packaging business and Travelocity paid Contour a
fee for changes in the software. Therefore, Travelocity was
also sharing its profits with Contour.7 In addition, Travelocity
was partnered with other entities to facilitate entry into
the international market, and was dependent on third-party
relationships with Internet portals, like AOL and Yahoo!, to
direct consumers to its website.8
Additionally, airlines began reducing the traditional
commissions paid to travel agencies for airline tickets in the
mid-1990s. The airlines specifically targeted online travel
agents in mid-2000 and began actively cutting commissions
for online travel agents.9 In June 2001, in a further effort
to reduce the commissions paid to online travel agencies,
five major airlines created Orbitz to sell discounted airfares
directly to online consumers. Orbitz had exclusive access to
the discounted web fares offered by its owners and online
travel agents were forced to renegotiate their relationships
with major airlines in order to have access to web fares.
Travelocity was hit harder than Expedia by Orbitz's formation
and the resulting competition because it was still heavily
dependent on airline ticket commissions while Expedia
enjoyed substantial revenue from merchant model sales
independent of those commissions.10
Even though Travelocity was facing tough competition from
Expedia in the fourth quarter of 2001, analysts expressed
the belief that the gap in performance was temporary and
that Travelocity would continue to be competitive.11 In
fact, Travelocity's performance in early 2002 was ahead of
the management forecast.12 Commenting on Travelocity's
forecast for 2002, one analyst noted: “Although the addition
of vacation packages comes two quarters after a similar move
by Expedia, we believe that the leisure market remains large
enough to support at least two dominant players, and we
expect Travelocity to narrow the gap between Expedia over
2002.”13
In March 2002, Travelocity purchased Site59, a small
online company with a limited working merchant model
business. Site59 is in the business of providing last minute
travel bookings at a substantial discount for customers who
are flexible in their travel schedules. Travelocity's goal in
acquiring Site59 was to build a merchant model hotel business
and continue Site59's last-minute packaging business.14
Travelocity purchased Site59 with a loan from Sabre.
3. The Merger
*3  In early 2001, Sabre began to consider buying back
the public shares of Travelocity. Sabre launched “Project
Tango” to examine the online travel business and to make
recommendations on Travelocity's business approach. By
September 2001, Project Tango was finished and resulted
in the conclusion that “it was vital for Sabre to ‘own the
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customer,’ to build strong relationships with suppliers and to
grow its online presence.”15
On February 16, 2002, William J. Hannigan, Sabre's
Chairman and CEO, contacted Terrell B. Jones, Travelocity's
President and CEO, and F. William Conner, a Travelocity
director, and advised them that a Sabre board meeting was
scheduled for February 18, 2002 to discuss a $23 per share
cash tender offer to acquire all shares of Travelocity not
already owned by Sabre. Hannigan also informed them that
it was Sabre's intention, pending Sabre's board approval,
to confirm the proposal in writing on February 18, and
then publicly disclose the offer. On February 18, with
the Sabre board's approval, Hannigan advised Travelocity's
board members of its intention to start the $23 per share
cash tender offer. That same evening, the Travelocity board
met and established a special committee comprised of
its two independent directors, Conner and Kathy Misunas
(the “Special Committee”). The Special Committee retained
Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. (“Salomon”) as its financial
advisor and Locke, Liddell & Sapp LLP as its legal counsel.
On February 19, 2002, Sabre announced that it intended
to make a tender offer for all of the outstanding publicly
held Travelocity shares. The Special Committee then sent
Sabre a letter inquiring if it would be interested in exploring
alternatives to the going private proposal, such as the sale
of some of Sabre's interest in Travelocity to a third party.
Sabre responded the following day that it was not interested
in selling any of its equity interest in Travelocity. On March 4,
2002, the Travelocity board met and the Special Committee
delivered its initial report regarding Sabre's offer of $23 per
share. At the meeting, Salomon representatives advised the
board, orally and in writing, that the $23 per share offer was
inadequate. The Special Committee then presented its report,
concurring that Sabre's initial offer was inadequate.
Nonetheless, on March 5, 2002, Sabre began a $23 per
share cash tender offer for all of Travelocity's publicly held
common shares. On March 18, 2002, Sabre amended the offer
by increasing the offering price to $28 cash per share. On
March 18, 2002, the Special Committee and the Travelocity
board voted to recommend that the Travelocity stockholders
accept Sabre's amended offer and tender their shares.16 Sabre
succeeded in acquiring approximately 95% of the outstanding
shares of common stock by the close of the offer. Then, Sabre
acted to effect the short-form merger under 8 Del. C. § 253.
The merger became effective on April 11, 2002. Pursuant
to the merger, the publicly held shares of Travelocity were
converted into the right to receive $28 per share.
In accordance with 8 Del. C. § 262, the petitioners now seek
a determination of, and payment for, the fair value of the
Travelocity shares they held on the Merger Date.
B. The Experts
*4  The petitioners' trial expert was William H. Purcell.
Purcell has a B.A. in Economics from Princeton University
and an M.B.A. from New York University. He has been
an investment banker for more than 35 years, 24 years of
which are with Dillon, Read & Co. Inc. Over the span of
his career, Purcell has worked on approximately 100 merger
and acquisition related projects. He has performed numerous
financial valuations of private and public companies in
various industries. He also served as advisor to special
committees of boards of directors in connection with
corporate transactions. Purcell has testified many times as an
expert regarding a wide range of investment banking matters,
including a number of valuation issues. He has also testified
as an expert before various regulatory agencies, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
Purcell testified that the going concern value of Travelocity
was at least $35 per share as of March 16, 2002.17 Purcell
testified that he relied primarily on the most recent set of
management projections in his valuation analysis. Purcell
also looked to analyses performed by third parties to test the
validity of his conclusions.18
Travelocity's trial expert was Professor Paul A. Gompers
of the Harvard Business School. Gompers has an A.B. in
Biology from Harvard College, a M.Sc. in Economics from
Oxford, and a Ph.D in Business Economics from Harvard
University. He was an assistant professor of Finance and
Business Policy at the Graduate School of Business at the
University of Chicago for two years before joining the
Harvard Business School faculty. He is also the Director of
Research at the Harvard Business School and his research
focuses on financial issues, valuation financing, and the
markets related to young, growing technology companies.
Although Gompers had never before testified as a trial expert,
he had been retained 15 times as an expert in the area of
finance and valuation of emerging technology companies in
other legal matters.
- 120 -
Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., Not Reported in A.2d (2004)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
Gompers reviewed various documents and materials on the
online travel industry in general, as well as internal documents
of Sabre and Travelocity. He also conducted interviews with
some Sabre and Travelocity personnel.19 Gompers reached
the conclusion that the going concern value of Travelocity as
of the Merger Date was $20 per share.20
C. The Valuation Methods Used
Both experts used essentially the same methods to value
Travelocity's stock; i.e. a discounted cash flow analysis
(“DCF”) and a comparable company analysis. In performing
their comparable company analyses, both Purcell and
Gompers used Expedia as the single comparable company.
Despite the similar approaches taken, the results arrived at by
Gompers and Purcell vary widely. Gompers opines that, on
a DCF basis, Travelocity common stock was worth between
$11.38 and $21.29 per share. Using the same methodology,
but using different inputs, Purcell opines that a share of
Travelocity common stock was worth between $33.70 and
$59.95 as of the Merger Date. The two experts' comparable
company analyses also yield significantly divergent results
because they disagree about the appropriate discount to apply
to reflect Travelocity's competitive disadvantages.
III.
*5  Pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 262, the petitioners are entitled to
their pro rata share of the fair value of Travelocity's common
stock as of the Merger Date.21 Fair value, as used in an
appraisal setting, is defined as “the value of the Company
to the stockholder as a going concern, rather than its value
to a third party as an acquisition.”22 Moreover, section
262(h) requires this court to determine fair value “exclusive
of any element of value arising from the accomplishment
or expectation of the merger.”23 “In a statutory appraisal
proceeding, both sides have the burden of proving their
respective valuation positions by a preponderance of the
evidence.”24 The court may exercise independent judgment
to assess the fair value of the shares if neither party meets its
burden.25
IV.
In determining the fair value of Travelocity's shares, the court
may consider “proof of value by any techniques or methods
which are generally considered acceptable in the financial
community and otherwise admissible in court.”26 Both parties
used a DCF approach and a comparable company approach
to value the shares. DCF involves projecting operating cash
flows for a determined period, setting a terminal value at the
end of the projected period, and then discounting those values
at a set rate to determine the net present value of a company's
shares.27 It is an exercise in appraising the present value at
a set date of the expected future cash flows earned by the
company. A DCF analysis is a useful tool for valuing shares
and is frequently relied on by this court in appraisal actions.28
Delaware law clearly prefers valuations based on
contemporaneously prepared management projections
because management ordinarily has the best first-hand
knowledge of a company's operations.31 Here, management
prepared the 5-year projections for the period 2002-2005 and
gave them to Sabre for use in its routine planning processes.
Often, projections of this sort are shown to be reasonably
reliable and are useful in later performing a DCF analysis. In
this case, however, the court is persuaded from a review of all
the evidence that the Travelocity 5-year plan does not provide
a reliable basis for forecasting future cash flows.
The utility of a DCF analysis, however, depends on the
validity and reasonableness of the data relied upon. As this
court has recognized, “methods of valuation, including a
discounted cash flow analysis, are only as good as the inputs
to the model.”29 The problem in this case is that the most
fundamental input used by the experts-the projections of
future revenues, expenses and cash flows-were not shown to
be reasonably reliable.30
To begin with, Travelocity's management held the strong view
that these projections should not be relied upon because the
industry was so new and volatile that reliable projections
were impossible.32 At trial, Punwani, Travelocity's CFO,
characterized the 5-year projections as “simulations” and
“thought studies” and said that they were never reviewed by
any of the operating departments at Travelocity.33 Punwani
further testified that because of the limited financial history
of Travelocity, together with a rapidly evolving marketplace,
it was difficult “to forecast the next quarter, let alone five
years out.”34 He also confirmed that the events of September
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11 led to more doubt about the future of the industry and
Travelocity's positioning in the market.35
Although it was aware of the 5-year forecasts, Salomon did
not conduct a DCF analysis of Travelocity as part of its work
in connection with the merger.36 The testimony of Anwar
Zakkour, Salomon's managing director, is especially relevant
on this issue:
*6  Q. Did Salomon Smith Barney prepare a discounted
cash flow analysis of Travelocity in connection with this
transaction?
A. Absolutely not.
Q. Why was no discounted cash flow analysis prepared in
connection with this transaction?
A. Because this was an industry that was in flux. And
the management team itself, which should have been
the team that was most able to put together a set of
projections, would have told you it was virtually impossible
to predict the performance of this company into any sort
of reasonable future term. And they in fact had very little
confidence with even their 2002 forecast numbers because
of that.
September 11th didn't help the pace of migration from
off-line to online. It didn't help. The airlines being very
focused on cutting their distribution costs didn't help. These
were all things that were happening real time. Travelocity
going from being the number one player to being very
unfavorably compared to Expedia and certainly losing its
number one position to them in a very short time didn't
help. These are all things that support that. And other than
maybe God himself, I suspect nobody could really predict
what this business is going to do in the next five years.
Q. Is a discounted cash flow methodology a methodology
that is commonly used by Salomon Smith Barney in
valuing companies?
A. Valuing mature companies, yes.37
Purcell's DCF relies more or less uncritically on the
Travelocity 5-year plan.38 Purcell justifies his reliance on
these projections because they were provided to Sabre for
its 5-year planning and later used by Goldman Sachs in
its presentations to Sabre. Punwani, however, explained at
trial that these numbers were given to Sabre as a routine
requirement for Sabre's internal planning process and with
express caveats as to their reliability, and that he personally
told both Sabre's CFO and controller that the numbers were
only simulations.39 Moreover, Punwani was presented on
cross-examination with several Sabre documents showing
projects for Travelocity, and testified credibly that he had
never seen the documents before nor was he familiar with
how Sabre used Travelocity's projections in its business
planning.40 Despite the normal preference for management
projections, the court concludes that the petitioners failed to
prove that Purcell's reliance on these projections was justified.
Thus, the court must disregard Purcell's DCF analysis.
Gompers takes a different approach, after concluding that
the Travelocity 5-year plan was “merely meant as a rough
plan and were considered to be optimistic targets” and not
a reliable basis for a DCF analysis.41 Instead of eschewing
a DCF analysis, however, Gompers sets about to create a
new set of projections, covering periods of 10 and 15 years
into the future, based on his expert analysis of Travelocity
and post-merger discussions with certain members of its
management. As a preliminary matter, this court is inherently
suspicious of post-merger, litigation-driven forecasts because
“[t]he possibility of hindsight bias and other cognitive
distortions seems untenably high.”42 As important, in this
case, Gompers's exercise is strikingly at odds with the views
of Travelocity management and Salomon that no one could
reliably predict Travelocity's future cash flows.
The reliability of Gompers's projections is further undermined
by the fact that he selectively picks and chooses variables
from management's 5-year forecast that conveniently fit
into his exercise in creating less “optimistic” projections.
Although Gompers's valuation is facially more credible
than Purcell's, in that he provides both the numerical
calculations and the academic theories for his assumptions,
his selective reliance on aspects of management's projections
is suspect.43 Gompers starts reasonably by using Travelocity's
2002 revenue projection, adjusted for Travelocity's actual
performance in the first three months of 2002. He then
generates 10-year and 15-year revenue projections by
assuming that the revenue growth rate will (i) decrease in
a linear fashion to 17.2%, the 2005 revenue growth rate
found in the 5-year forecast, and then (ii) will continue to
slow in a linear fashion until it reaches the “steady state
of growth” in 2011 or 2016.44 Gompers does not explain
why only the 2005 growth rate from the Travelocity 5-year
- 122 -
Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., Not Reported in A.2d (2004)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6
plan is reliable and ignores that the Travelocity 5-year plan
predicted much higher intervening growth rates.45 Gompers
then uses the operating margins found in the Travelocity 5-
year plan through 2005 and uses the 2005 operating margin
in perpetuity to derive his projections for operating income.46
*7  The respondents argue that this selective use of
management projections is acceptable because “they are
reasonable or somewhat optimistic” and that since the
petitioner's valuation wholly relies on the Travelocity 5-year
plan that it is somehow estopped from arguing that Gompers
selective use is unacceptable. Neither of these arguments is
persuasive. The only reasonable conclusion the court can
draw from the record evidence is that no one, including
Professor Gompers, is able to produce a reliable set of long-
range projections for Travelocity, as of the Merger Date.
This conclusion is substantially reinforced by the observation
that Gompers's DCF produced values ranging from $11.38 to
$21.29 relative to a squeeze-out merger in which Travelocity's
70% parent agreed to pay $28 per share to acquire the
minority interest.
For these reasons, the court reluctantly concludes that it
cannot properly rely on either party's DCF valuation. The
goal of the DCF method of valuation is to value future
cash flows. Here, the record clearly shows that, in the
absence of reasonably reliable contemporaneous projections,
the degree of speculation and uncertainty characterizing the
future prospects of Travelocity and the industry in which
it operates make a DCF analysis of marginal utility as a
valuation technique in this case. If no other method of analysis
were available, the court would, reluctantly, undertake a DCF
analysis and subject the outcome to an appropriately high
level of skepticism. The court, however, now turns to the other
method of valuation offered by the parties.
D. The Comparable Company Approach47
The comparable company approach entails the review of
publicly traded competitors in the same industry, then the
generation of relevant multiples from public pricing data of
the comparable companies and finally the application of those
multiples to the subject company to arrive at a value.48 The
true utility of a comparable company approach is dependent
on “the similarity between the company the court is valuing
and the companies used for comparison.”49 Both experts and
Salomon use Expedia as the single comparable company in
their analyses, but disagree on the appropriate discount to
be applied to the multiples derived from their analyses of
Expedia. The court agrees that Expedia is clearly comparable
to Travelocity.
*8  Gompers does not challenge Salomon's valuation, but
he dismisses Purcell's valuation because “it is applied in
an ad hoc manner with little understanding of the proper
measure of comparison and the factors that affect comparable
multiples.”50 Gompers states that the discount to Expedia
should be at least 40%51 and concludes that Travelocity's
valuation as of the merger date is $22.08.
Purcell critiques Gompers's valuation in that it is significantly
lower than any valuation done of Travelocity and, more
importantly, inexplicably less than the $28 paid by Sabre in
the merger.52 Purcell also criticizes Gompers's comparable
company analysis in that it is “wildly divergent” from his
DCF calculation when Gompers states that his comparable
company valuation serves as a check on his DCF.53 Purcell
states that a 10% discount to Expedia is appropriate and
concludes that the value should be no less than $35 a share.
Salomon applies a 20%-30% discount range to Expedia and
concludes that the appropriate value is between $24 and $32
a share.54 The independent valuation performed by Salomon
provides the court with a neutral framework from which to
analyze Purcell and Gompers's divergent values.55
1. The Appropriate Discount
The experts disagree on the appropriate discount that should
be applied to Expedia as a comparable company. Purcell
adopts Salomon's initial discount to Expedia of 10% and
Gompers uses a minimum 40% discount. Salomon derives
its discount range of 20% to 30% comparing the historical
discounts of Travelocity's multiples of firm value to EBITDA
and share price to estimated 2002 earnings per share relative
to corresponding multiples for Expedia. The court finds
Gompers's detailed analysis of Travelocity's risk and expected
future growth rates reasonable. Furthermore, when asked why
Salomon adjusted its initial discount rate, Zakkour testified
at length about discussions with Travelocity's management
as to the difficulties it faced in catching up to Expedia
and successfully implementing a merchant model business.56
Gompers, like Zakkour, discusses the difference in the
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business models of the companies and the significance of this
difference in the comparable company valuation.57
Purcell relies on the early 2002 positive analyst research
reports as proof that Travelocity should only be at a
“moderate,” if any, discount to Expedia.58 Purcell gives
great weight to James Hornthal's testimony about Travelocity
and its potential.59 Hornthal characterized the Expedia-
Travelocity competition as a “cat-and-mouse game” where
the two companies were “jockeying back and forth” in the
market.60 Hornthal relies on the Site59 acquisition as a
beacon of light for Travelocity in its ability to catch up
to Expedia after Expedia had pulled ahead in the fourth
quarter of 2001. Peluso's testimony on Site59's ability
to “transform” Travelocity's business model is persuasive:
the acquisition of Site59 while being a step in the right
direction did not equal a fully operational merchant model
business.61 Hornthal's optimistic view of Travelocity's ease
in catching up to Expedia, on which Purcell relies, is too
speculative when compared to the clear evidence in the
record that Travelocity still faced significant challenges in
the development of its merchant model business. Purcell
also places great importance on the fact that Travelocity was
going to meet or exceed its 2002 expectations, but Punwani
testified that it was only going to meet its projections through
strategic cost-cutting that could not be sustained long-term.62
Moreover, Salomon adjusted its initial 10% discount (on
which Purcell relies) to a 20% to 30% range after discussing
Travelocity's strengths and weaknesses with management.63
Therefore, the record shows that Purcell's assumptions vis-à-
vis the appropriate discount to be applied in comparing the
companies are unduly optimistic.
Gompers concludes that the discount to Expedia should be at
least 40% because Travelocity had a higher cost of capital,
a lower growth rate, and a lesser ability to generate cash.64
He states that at the time of the merger, “Travelocity had
lost momentum and was facing new competition that made
its prospects potentially tenuous.”65 The record is clear that
even though Travelocity was actively working to remedy
its outdated model, it still faced significant challenges at
the time of the merger. The court notes that there was no
evidence presented at trial or in the record to quantify the
actual cost of building a merchant model or any necessary
technological upgrades.66 With all of these factors in mind,
the court concludes that it should apply a 35% discount to the
valuation multiples derived from the analysis of Expedia, to
reflect that competitive obstacles Travelocity confronted as of
the Merger Date. This decision reflects the court's view that
Gompers is substantially correct, albeit unduly pessimistic, in
his critical comparison of Travelocity to Expedia. Instead of
relying on Gompers's assessment that a discount of at least
40% is warranted, the court adopts, instead, the mid-point
of Gompers's 40% and the high end of Salomon's 20%-30%
range.
2. Valuation Multiples
*9  Gompers and Purcell agree that firm value to EBITDA67
is the most important valuation metric. Purcell isolates firm
value/ EBITDA as “by far the most relevant and important
statistic for comparison purposes.”68 Purcell argues that
this is the most important statistic because Travelocity has
a great deal of noncash expenses, including depreciation,
amortization, and the amortization of intangibles such as
goodwill.69 Gompers agrees with Purcell that the EBITDA
multiples are the “preferred multiple to examine” because
they “are closest to cash flow and are a better proxy for the
firm's on-going concern value.”70
Zakkour testified in his deposition that even though a range
of valuation metrics were used in Salomon's report,71 the
most important valuation metric for comparing the companies
was the price to earnings multiple because Travelocity was
less profitable than Expedia.72 Zakkour further testified that
Travelocity had a lot of work to do to catch up to Expedia, not
only because Expedia was growing faster than Travelocity,
but also because Travelocity had to basically transform its
business model to remain competitive.
Based on the expert reports and Zakkour's testimony, the
court isolates the 2002 EBITDA multiple and the price-
to-earnings multiple as the most important multiples in
calculating Travelocity's firm value. Since Purcell does
not present any calculations to back up his comparable
company valuation, the court looks to Gompers's analysis in
deriving the correct multiples. Gompers provides detailed and
reasonable calculations for both Travelocity and Expedia's
financial multiples, and the court agrees that these multiples
are appropriate in comparing the companies.73
Discounting Expedia's EBITDA multiple (34.8 x) by 35%
produces an EBITDA multiple of 22.62 x. Applying this
multiple to Travelocity's expected 2002 EBITDA of $47.80
million yields a value of $1,081,236,000. Discounting
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Expedia's EPS multiple (50.77 x) by 35% produces an EPS
multiple of 33.00 x. Applying this multiple to Travelocity's
expected 2002 net earnings of $39.45 million yields a value of
$1,301,850,000. The court gives 2/3 weight to the EBITDA
calculation and 1/3 weight to the PE calculation, yielding an
enterprise value of $1,154,774,000. To determine the equity
value, Gompers adds back the cash of $114 million and
subtracts out the debt of $4.03 million. This leads to an equity
valuation of $1,264,744,000, or $25.20 per share.74
E. Application Of A Control Premium
*10  Delaware law recognizes that there is an inherent
minority trading discount in a comparable company analysis
because “the [valuation] method depends on comparisons
to market multiples derived from trading information for
minority blocks of the comparable companies.”75 The equity
valuation produced in a comparable company analysis does
not accurately reflect the intrinsic worth of a corporation on
a going concern basis. Therefore, the court, in appraising the
fair value of the equity, “must correct this minority trading
discount by adding back a premium designed to correct it.”76
The parties are silent on the proper application of a control
premium. Purcell states summarily that if the court is to accept
the theory that “some minority discount from going concern
value” is appropriate in a comparable company analysis,
then the correct valuation would be above his stated value.77
Salomon conducted a review of precedent minority squeeze-
out transactions and found that the average premium paid
for a control block when compared to the stock price was
approximately 50%.78 Travelocity, however, is not directly
comparable to the companies in Salomon's data survey. In
fact, the online travel industry, as already discussed in great
detail, is unique when compared generally to publicly traded
companies. Moreover, the recent appraisal cases that correct
the valuation for a minority discount by adding back a
premium “that spreads the value of control over all shares
equally” consistently use a 30% adjustment.79
Relying on recent precedents, the court will adjust the $25.20
per share value by adding a 30% control premium.80 This
results in a per share value of $32.76.81
F. Interest
The petitioners are entitled to interest on the fair value of their
shares pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 262(h).82 Moreover, section
262(i) states that “[t]he Court shall direct the payment of
fair value of the shares, together with interest, if any, by the
surviving or resulting corporation to the stockholders entitled
thereto. Interest may be simple or compound as the Court
may direct.”83 This court has consistently awarded compound
interest in appraisal proceedings.84
There is no precise formula the court must use in determining
the appropriate rate of interest, and “[e]ach party bears
the burden of proving the appropriate rate under the
circumstances.”85 The petitioners argue that the appropriate
rate of interest to be applied is 9.53%. Purcell reached this
conclusion by averaging the petitioners' lost opportunity costs
at a prudent investor rate (10.95%), and the respondents'
borrowing costs (8.1%).86
*11  Although it is reasonable to base the appropriate
rate of interest on the average of prudent investor rate
and a company's cost of borrowing, the court does not
accept Purcell's calculation of pre-judgment interest. First,
Purcell states that “a prudent investor would likely invest
in a combination of long- or medium-term and short-term
investment vehicles that would generate the highest return
available, such as a mix of treasury and corporate bonds.”87
He then assumes based on his “experience regarding portfolio
mix allocations” that a prudent investor would invest 50%
in three-year treasury bonds and 50% in Baa-rated corporate
bonds.88 He offers no explanation, however, why a “prudent”
investor, such as any of the plaintiffs, would not invest a
portion of available funds in the
Moreover, Purcell inexplicably relies on a 2002 KPMG
Consulting valuation of Travelocity's tangible and intangible
assets to determine Sabre's cost of borrowing.89 Purcell relies
on the cost of debt used in the KPMG report without offering
any evidence as to why the court should adopt this calculation
nor does he address Sabre's actual cost of borrowing.
Since the petitioners have failed to develop a credible record
on the issue, the court looks to the legal rate of interest.90 The
legal rate of interest, as defined by 6 Del. C. § 2301, is 5%
over the Federal Reserve discount rate. Because the court will
award the legal rate of interest, the appropriate compounding
rate is quarterly.91
The petitioners shall submit a form of final order, on notice,
within 10 days.
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All Citations
Not Reported in A.2d, 2004 WL 5366732
Footnotes
1 Both Holdings and Sabre are Delaware corporations.
2 Travelocity's common stock began to trade on the public market in the first quarter of 2000 when Sabre, which owned
100% of Travelocity's business as a division, purchased Preview Travel, a publicly traded company. The combined entity
was named Travelocity. Resp'ts Pre-Trial Br. at 5.
3 As of April 11, 2002, petitioner Cede & Co. was the record holder of the 265,540 shares of Travelocity common stock,
for the benefit of: Doft & Co. Inc. (61,500 shares); First Trust Corp., as trustee FBO Alan Doft (3,800 shares); Elisabeth
H. Doft (43,000 shares); Laurence Hoffman (300 shares); Maria Ivkovic (1,000 shares); Shirel Partners (8,000 shares);
Blanche & Romie Shapiro Charitable Remainder Unitrust dated 9/1/95 (4,000 shares); Edna R. Hoffman (600 shares);
Blanche Shapiro 1999 Trust (8,000 shares); MJR Partners (124,340 shares); and, DB Securities, Inc. as custodian FBO
Morton M. Maneker IRA dated 12/03/01 (11,000 shares).
4 8 Del. C. § 253(d).
5 See Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 95.
6 Resp'ts Pre-Trial Br. at 6. Michelle Peluso, Travelocity's COO, described in great detail the benefits of the merchant
model approach for both the stand-alone hotel business and for dynamic packaging and how “being a merchant is really
critical to Travelocity's growth and profitability.” Trial Tr. at 240.
7 Peluso testified that Travelocity should not continue outsourcing its merchant business and packaging business to
Contour. She further testified that Travelocity's management had not as of the time of the merger decided whether it
would continue to use Contour for the merchant model hotel business. Id. at 243.
8 For example, Michael Gilliland, Travelocity's president and CEO as of May 2002, testified that about 15% of Travelocity's
revenue came from its contract with Yahoo! and that Yahoo! Travel was in fact a private label for Travelocity. Id. at 188.
9 For example, Northwest Airlines announced in early 2001 that it would no longer pay commissions to online travel agents.
Id. at 162.
10 Gilliland testified to the extent that the formation of Orbitz and the general commission-cutting by airlines affected
Travelocity because Travelocity, unlike Expedia, had not made progress in diversifying its revenue. Id. at 169.
11 See id. at 44.
12 Id. Ramesh Punwani, Travelocity's executive vice president and CFO until April 2002, however, testified that Travelocity
had actively reduced operating expenses in the first quarter of 2002 in order to meet the proposed budget plan. Punwani's
testimony on whether Travelocity would meet its projections for the year was pessimistic at best. Notably, Punwani and
Brett Little, Travelocity's controller, were the top financial officers at Travelocity before the merger and were responsible
for preparing Travelocity's projections and providing this forward-looking information to Sabre. Id. at 416.
13 Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 103, quoting CIBC World Markets, Travelocity, 4Q EPS As Expected; 2002 Growth Of, Jan.
17, 2002, p. 6.
14 Trial Tr. at 197. Gilliland testified that the acquisition of Site59 did not help Travelocity in its competition with Expedia in
the merchant model hotel business. He distinguished the merchant model hotel business from the last-minute packaging
business. Id. Peluso, however, testified that Travelocity was working toward a merchant model hotel business. She
testified that the process was extensive and that the goal was to acquire contracts with 4,000 hotels in an 18-month period.
This number would put Travelocity at half the size of its competitors after 18 months. Peluso's testimony is indicative that
in the purchase of Site59 Travelocity acquired “a team of people who had the ability at any given time with our merchant
business to change the margins by hotel, by city, by chain, by region, depending what the market conditions are.” Id. at
233. Therefore, even though Travelocity was handicapped by its contract with HRN and other partnership relationships,
it was actively working toward regaining its competitive position, as evidenced by its purchase of Site59.
15 Resp'ts Pre-Trial Br. at 9-10.
16 Both Special Committee directors voted in favor, one director voted against, and six directors abstained from the vote.
17 Purcell's valuation was as of March 16, 2002, the date that Salomon presented its fairness opinion to the Travelocity board
regarding the merger. Therefore, Purcell's valuation, like Salomon's, does not factor in the Site59 acquisition. Notably,
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both experts treated the Site59 acquisition on a stand-alone basis because of its proximity to the merger date. Purcell
did not add any incremental value to Travelocity as a result of the acquisition.
18 Specifically, Purcell looked at the Goldman Sachs presentations to Sabre and the Salomon presentations to the Special
Committee. He also looked at analyses by various securities and industry analysts studying Travelocity in 2001 and 2002.
19 Gompers did not interview Peluso or Gilliland in connection with his valuation analyses. Trial Tr. at 355.
20 Gompers did include the incremental value of the Site59 acquisition in his valuation. Gompers valued the acquisition to
Travelocity stockholders at $36.2 million, approximately $0.72 per share in incremental value. Gompers Expert Report
at ¶¶ 30, 203. Purcell stated that he would add at least $0.72 per share of incremental value if he accepted Gompers's
criticism that the acquisition should be factored into the valuation. Purcell Rebuttal Report at ¶ 14(a).
21 Gray v. Cytokine Pharmasciences, Inc., 2002 WL 853549, at *6 (Del.Ch. Apr.25, 2002).
22 Id. (citation omitted).
23 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
24 Taylor v. Am. Specialty Retailing Group, Inc., 2003 WL 21753752, at *2 (Del.Ch. July 25, 2003), (quoting M.G.
Bancorporation, Inc. v. LeBeau, 737 A.2d 513, 520 (Del.1999)).
25 Taylor, 2003 WL 21753752, at *2.
26 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del.1983), aff'd, 497 A.2d 792 (Del.1985).
27 Taylor, 2003 WL 21753752, at *3.
28 See Donald J. Wolfe, Jr, & Michael A. Pittenger, Corporate and Commercial Practice in the Delaware Court of Chancery,
§ 8-10[d] (2003 ed.) (discussing how almost all appraisal actions since the Delaware Supreme Court “liberalized the
appraisal valuation process” in Weinberger involve a form of DCF analysis). But cf. Onti, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d
904, 916 (Del.Ch.1999) (acknowledging that even though this court frequently uses DCF as one method of valuation,
“no method of valuation is preferable per se in Delaware”).
31 See Gilbert v. MPM Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 663, 669 (Del.Ch.1997), aff'd, 731 A.2d 790 (Del.1999) (concluding that
management was in the best position to forecast the company's future before the merger); Gray, 2002 WL 853549, at *8
(rejecting valuation that inexplicably ignored management projections).
29 Neal v. Ala. By-Products Corp., 1990 WL 109243, at *9 (Del.Ch. Aug.1, 1990) (citing S. Pratt, Valuing a Business: The
Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held Companies, 84 (2d. ed. 1989)), aff'd, 588 A.2d 255 (Del.1991).
30 “Inputs in a discounted cash flow are predictions which are necessarily speculative in nature. The quality of these
predictions is therefore central to the reliability of the underlying methodology.” Harris v. Rapid Am. Corp., 1990 WL
146488, at *6 (Del.Ch. Oct.2, 1990), aff'd in relevant part, and rev'd on other grounds, 603 A.2d 796 (Del.1992).
32 In Gray, the court relied on management's determination that their projections were reliable even though prepared in an
industry with a high degree of speculation due to the facts that the company's product required regulatory approval and
that there was an unknown market share for drug delivery products. In Gray, management submitted their projections to
Merrill Lynch to use in its independent valuation of the company's shares in connection with a merger. Gray, 2002 WL
853549, at *8. To reflect the inherent risks involved in achieving those projections, Merrill Lynch applied a discount rate
as high as 50%. Id at * 11. Those facts are easily distinguishable from the case at hand. Here, Punwani clearly testified
that the projections that he prepared were merely speculative and too unreliable to give to Salomon in their independent
valuation of Travelocity.
33 Trial Tr. at 381.
34 Id. “We were really not in a position to be able to put any credence on the numbers, both on the revenue and on the cost
side. And the only way to get credibility in our numbers would have been to take those models and put them through
reasonability checks ... [that] were never done because, when we built these frameworks, I'll call them, in the year 2000,
we were in a period of explosive growth. We were growing at 150 percent per year .... No one really knew what the right
number was.” Id. at 381-82.
35 Id. at 383. “It was bad enough before when we did the data, and we had this new variable that got thrown into our lap,
which totally destroyed our ability to have any confidence in projections beyond one quarter out.” Id.
36 Purcell notes that “it is very unusual for an investment banking firm not to employ a DCF analysis in a valuation study,
appraisal study or in a fairness opinion.” Purcell Rebuttal Report at ¶ 5.
Goldman Sachs did do a DCF analysis of Travelocity for Sabre. The Goldman Sachs report, however, is not helpful for
this court's inquiry into the fair value of Travelocity as of the Merger Date. First, it was prepared nine months before
the merger and before September 11. Second, it was prepared for Sabre, not Travelocity. Third, there is nothing in the
record that indicates that Goldman Sachs used Travelocity's management projections in its analysis. In fact, the record
shows the opposite. Punwani testified that Sabre did not have direct access to Travelocity's financial data and that the
- 127 -
Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., Not Reported in A.2d (2004)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11
projections he did give to Sabre were highly qualified as to their reliability. Trial Tr. at 372-73. Punwani also testified that
he did not have any discussions with Sabre regarding the use of his numbers in Goldman Sach's DCF analysis. Id. at
415-16. Furthermore, Gilliland testified that these management projections “are about as good as the weight of the paper
they're written on.” Id. at 158.
37 Zakkour Dep. at 35-37
38 Purcell's DCF is flawed for other reasons that the court will not describe in detail. Generally, Purcell makes certain
assumptions and observations that are unsubstantiated in his report or in his testimony. Moreover, his report only provides
the court with only the most skeletal mathematical calculations to back up his analysis.
39 Trial Tr. at 383-84, 410.
40 Id. at 412-16.
41 Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 27.
42 Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 892 (Del.Ch.2001).
43 Trial Tr. at 342.
44 Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 155. Gompers testified that it is standard practice in both his teaching and his valuation
exercises to project out for a longer period of time when valuing start-up companies or venture capital firms with the goal
of the young industry reaching a steady state of growth: “most of the time when I ask my students to project out, or if
I do it as a board member, or do it as an advisor to people raising capital, I tell them to project out ten years or fifteen
years, to get out to the point where the industry is more mature and their prospects look as though they grow in line with
the overall economy.” Trial Tr. at 277-78.
45 See In re Emerging Communications, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2004 WL 1043794, at * 15 (Del.Ch. May 3, 2004) (dismissing
an expert's unsubstantiated adjustments to management projections because the “adjustment amounts to [the expert]
substituting his personal judgment of what [the input] should be for the non-litigation business judgment of [the company's]
management.”).
46 “None of the long-term forecasts were provided to or approved by senior management or the board o[f] directors, much
less the public. Projections beyond 2003 were merely meant as a rough plan and were considered to be optimistic targets,
i.e., they were not the expected cash flows.” Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 27.
47 A comparable company analysis is often used in connection with a DCF analysis. The court, however, may use a
comparable company valuation on a stand-alone basis in an appraisal action when it is the only reliable method of
valuation offered by the parties. In Borruso v. Communications Telesystems Int'l, the court relied on a comparable
company analysis because neither expert was comfortable using a DCF analysis to value the company's shares due to
the limited financial data of the company available as of the merger date. 753 A.2d 451, 455 n. 5 (Del.Ch.1999).
48 See Taylor, 2003 WL 21753752, at *7.
49 Gray, 2002 WL 853549, at *9 (quoting In re Radiology Assoc., Inc. Lit., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del.Ch.1991)).
50 Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 172.
51 Gompers testified that even a 60% discount could be justified. Trial Tr. at 332.
52 Gompers testified that he did not inquire as to why Sabre was willing to pay $28 per Travelocity share as a check against
his significantly lower valuation. Id. at 359.
53 Additionally, the petitioners argue that Gompers's valuation is fatally flawed because he relied on post-merger information
in his valuation. The petitioners rely on Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 1988 WL 15816, at *14 (Del.Ch. Feb.22, 1988),
where the court held that the expert's DCF analysis was flawed because it relied on actual earning and expense data
from a period after the merger. Gompers use of Expedia's first quarter 2002 results publicly announced on April 23, 2002,
twelve days after the merger, does not implicate the credibility of Gompers's valuation. The court in Cavalier held that
the post-merger data was suspect because it was not available until after the merger and it “could not have been known
or susceptible of proof” at the time of the merger. Id. (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713). Here, Expedia's first quarter
performance “could have been known or susceptible of proof” before the actual data was released after the merger date.
In Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., the court allowed the expert's reliance on a balance sheet released after the
merger date and noted that data released on a balance sheet pertains to events that happen before the balance sheet is
released. 1995 WL 376911, at *7 (Del.Ch. June 15, 1995). Expedia first quarter 2002 information was clearly knowable
or “susceptible of proof” before the actual balance sheet was released only twelve days after the merger. Moreover, trial
testimony clearly shows that Travelocity's management had general knowledge of Expedia's first quarter performance.
Trial Tr. at 401-02. Therefore, the statutory requirement that the valuation must exclude elements of value “arising from
the accomplishment or expectation of the merger” is clearly not implicated by Gompers's valuation. See 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
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54 Salomon also uses two other valuation methodologies in connection with its independent valuation of Travelocity. It looks
at precedent squeeze-out transactions and a Sabre “ability to pay” analysis. The precedent squeeze-out transaction
premiums comparison involves taking a list of 40-plus companies and looking at the premiums paid and then applying
them to Travelocity's various stock prices. This valuation supports a price range of approximately $30 to $35 per share.
The “ability to pay” analysis based on 2002 and 2003 EPS (assuming no multiple expansion) supports a price well in
excess of $35 per share. The “ability to pay” analysis factors merger synergies and is therefore not relevant to the court's
analysis. See Zakkour Dep. at 50.
55 Zakkour testified in his deposition about Salomon's approach to the valuation and discusses the metrics of the valuation
that were emphasized and why. The court adopts Salomon's valuation as a framework, and isolates the valuation metrics
that should be of greater or lesser importance in determining the appropriate value for Travelocity's shares. Notably,
Zakkour's extensive and detailed testimony in his deposition about Travelocity's “lost momentum” to Expedia evidences
Salomon's awareness of Travelocity's positioning in the market vis-à-vis Expedia. See id. at 51-54.
56 Id. at 77-81.
57 Gompers testified that he discussed the business models of the companies and the respective cash flows of each
model with Punwani who verified that this difference must be incorporated in discounting the cash flow multiples in the
comparable company valuation. Trial Tr. at 328-29.
58 “[T]he research analysts discussed Travelocity in January and February of 2002 in such positive terms as a company
with a strong business model that can make money with gross margins of 63% (i.e., Bear Steams); a company whose
sales are back on track, with a healthy outlook for 2002, and expected solid earnings growth with a possible multiple
(price earning ratio) expansion (i.e., Weisel); a company on target with revenue growth between 20% to 30% in 2002,
with expectations of narrowing the gap with Expedia (i.e., CIBC); and a company with travel-bookings now running close
to pre-September levels (i.e., Untenberg).” Purcell Expert Report at ¶ 41.
59 Hornthal was the founder and chairman of Preview Travel, a travel agency that started with a television platform in the
mid-1980s and later moved online, which went public and then merged with Travelocity in 2000. He became vice chairman
of the combined companies after the merger. See Hornthal Dep. at 10-16.
60 Id. at 91-93.
61 As already discussed, Peluso testified extensively on how Travelocity needed to develop its merchant model business
and the obstacles it faced in doing so. See supra notes 6, 7, 14 and accompanying text.
62 Trial Tr. at 397-401.
63 Salomon used a 10% discount rate in its initial presentations to the Special Committee and the Travelocity board. JX
15 (“Project Roundtrip” - Salomon's February 27, 2002 Presentation on Travelocity). Zakkour explained that this initial
number was more of a preliminary guess by Salomon before it had spent any time with Travelocity's management to
“really understand how Travelocity and Expedia compared.” Zakkour Dep. at 77.
64 Gompers Expert Report at ¶¶ 194, 195.
65 Id. at ¶ 136.
66 See Trial Tr. at 246.
67 EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.
68 Purcell Expert Report at ¶ 47.
69 Id. at ¶ 48.
70 Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 173.
71 In calculating its reference range for comparison of the two companies, Salomon sets up a table of four statistical
parameters: firm value/estimated 2002 EBITDA; firm value/estimated 2002 EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes);
share price/estimated 2002 EPS; and share price/estimated 2003 EPS. Salomon derived a reference range of $24 to
$32 per Travelocity share by applying 20% to 30% discount on the Expedia multiples. See JX 8 (Letter to shareholders
and SEC Schedule 14D-9 for Travelocity.com).
72 “In this case, which is what I'll comment on, because every situation is unique, in this case, there is no doubt that PE
multiples is by far the most important metric.” Zakkour Dep. at 69. Furthermore, Zakkour testified that Goldman Sachs in
its valuation of Travelocity also considered the PE multiples as the most important valuation metric. Id. Salomon defines
the price/earnings (PE) multiple as earnings per share before noncash expenses. See JX 14 at 36 (Salomon February
25, 2002 Project Roundtrip Presentation).
73 See Gompers Expert Report at ¶ 197 and Exhibits C25 and C26 thereto.
74 There were approximately 50.19 million shares outstanding.
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75 Agranoff, 791 A.2d at 892.
76 Id. at 893.
77 Purcell Expert Report at ¶ 52.
78 Salomon looked at both negotiated and unilateral squeeze-out transactions to determine whether Sabre's initial offer was
adequate. Salomon determined that Sabre's offer was inadequate when compared to other squeeze-out transactions by
acquirers with greater than 50% ownership and transaction values greater than $50 million on completed transactions
announced from January 1999 to February 2002. See JX 16 (Salomon Presentation to the Travelocity Board of Directors,
March 4, 2002); JX 14 (“Project Roundtrip” - Salomon's February 25, 2002 Presentation on Travelocity).
Notably, Salomon's final presentation to the board looked only at the unilateral precedent squeeze-out transactions. The
actual numbers presented by Salomon on March 4, 2002 are: a 52.4% premium over 1 day prior; a 54.3% premium over
30 days average; and a 51.1% premium over 60 days average. JX 16 (Salomon Presentation to the Travelocity Board
of Directors, March 4, 2002).
79 See Agranoff, 791 A.2d at 887; Borruso, 753 A.2d at 459; Bomarko v. Int'l Telecharge, Inc., 794 A.2d 1161, 1186 n. 11
(Del.Ch.1999), aff'd, 766 A.2d 437 (Del.2000).
80 See Borruso, 753 A.2d at 458-59 & n. 10.
81 The court will not adjust this figure to reflect any incremental value inherent in the acquisition of Site59. While that
acquisition held significant future promise to allow Travelocity to develop a merchant model for its business, there is no
reason to believe that it was immediately additive to value. Notably, Salomon did not factor the Site59 acquisition in its
valuation for several reasons. First, at the time of the fairness opinion, the deal was still in negotiations. Second, the deal
was relatively small so that the effect on Travelocity stock would be at least in the short term, value-neutral. Third, even
though it was a step in the direction of a merchant model approach, the acquisition of Site59 was only an initial step in
a long process of transforming Travelocity's business model. Fourth, Zakkour stated in his deposition that the decision
not to include the acquisition in the valuation of Travelocity was a “consensus view” by Salomon, the Special Committee,
and management. See Zakkour Dep. at 22-24.
82 “After determining the stockholders entitled to an appraisal, the Court shall appraise the shares, determining their fair
value ... together with a fair rate of interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair value.” 8 Del.
C. § 262(h) (emphasis added).
83 8 Del. C. § 262(i) (emphasis added).
84 See Onti, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 926 (Del.Ch.1999) (holding that a compound interest award in an appraisal
proceeding is consistent with “fundamental economic reality”).
85 Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 1997 WL 538676, at *9 (Del.Ch. Aug.28, 1997), aff'd, 708 A.2d 630 (Del.1998).
86 Purcell Expert Report at ¶ 78.
87 Id. at ¶ 79.
88 Id. equity market. Since Purcell does not provide the court with the necessary details to support his opinion, the court
rejects his calculation of the prudent investor rate.
89 The KPMG report assumes that Sabre's cost of borrowing is equal to “Moody's Baa Industrial Yield Average Bond Rate.”
Id. at ¶ 83.
90 Chang's Holdings, S.A. v. Universal Chems. & Coatings, Inc., 1994 WL 681091, at *3 (Del.Ch. Nov.22, 1994) (stating that
the legal rate of interest is “a useful default rate when the parties have inadequately developed the record on the issue”).
91 See Taylor, 2003 WL 21753752, at * 13 (holding that the appropriate compounding rate for the legal rate of interest
is quarterly because “the legal rate of interest most nearly resembles a return on a bond, which typically compounds
quarterly”).
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*1  This is an appraisal proceeding brought pursuant to 8
Del. C. § 262. Petitioners, former shareholders and managers
of a prison healthcare detention company, seek appraisal
of their shares following an all cash acquisition of the
company for $40 million. Collectively, Petitioners are entitled
to appraisal of 533,792 Series A preferred and 1,479,551
common shares.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court




Respondent Just Care, Inc. (“Just Care” or the “Company”) is
a privately held prison healthcare services company. Just Care
operates a private healthcare detention facility that provides
an alternative to public and private hospitals for the care of
sick, aging, and mentally ill inmates and detainees. Before
the merger, Just Care was controlled by majority shareholder
Maxor National Pharmacy Services Corp. (“Maxor”).
Petitioner Tull N. Gearreald, Jr. was the principal founder and
former CEO of Just Care. He was also a director. As a director,
Gearreald voted in favor of the merger, but he later voted
against it as a shareholder.
Petitioner Rodger A. Brunk was Just Care's CFO, a position
he held since the Company's founding. As a shareholder,
Brunk originally voted in favor of the merger before revoking
his proxy and ultimately voting against it.
Petitioners B & J LLC and Bill Habert Construction, a
division of Bill Habert International Construction, Inc., are
shareholders of Just Care. Both companies are controlled by
James Rein, a former director of Just Care who failed to
perfect his appraisal rights in his individual capacity and was
dismissed from this appraisal proceeding.
Petitioners Nely Gearreald, Raymond Schettino, M.D., and
Wayne D. Thornbrough are Just Care shareholders.
Nonparty GEO Care, Inc. (“GEO”) “provides government-
outsourced services specializing in the management of
correctional, detention, and mental health and residential
treatment facilities” in the United States and abroad.2
GEO acquired Just Care through its acquisition subsidiary,
nonparty GEO Care Acquisition, Inc.
B. Facts
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1. The business
Just Care was founded in 1996 and became operational on
June 9, 1998 with 326 beds. Since its inception, the Company
has operated a single facility, the Columbia Regional Care
Center in Columbia, South Carolina (the “Columbia Center”).
Following an expansion in 2007, the facility currently
has a capacity of 350–360 beds and receives prisoners
and detainees from four primary customers: (1) the South
Carolina Department of Mental Health; (2) the Georgia
Department of Corrections; (3) the U.S Marshals Service; and
(4) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.3
2. The transaction
GEO first contacted Jerry Hodge, a Maxor employee and
Just Care director, about a possible acquisition of Just
Care in November 2008. GEO and Maxor entered into a
confidentiality agreement relating to a potential transaction
on November 21, 2008, but discussions between the parties
cooled in December 2008 after Maxor expressed uncertainty
about wanting to go through with due diligence. At the time,
Hodge had not informed the Just Care board (the “Board”) of
GEO's advance.
*2  On April 20, 2009, GEO sent Hodge a nonbinding letter
of interest to purchase the Company for cash consideration
between $30 and $35 million. Hodge immediately rejected
GEO's offer as inadequate. Four days later, GEO increased
its offer to $35–40 million, which Hodge again rejected as
inadequate. Finally, on May 6, 2009, GEO offered to acquire
Just Care for 5.9x the Company's facility-level EBITDA,
which equated to approximately $40 million. After receiving
that offer, Hodge informed the entire Board for the first time
of GEO's interest in an acquisition.
At a meeting on May 21, 2009, the Board approved pursuing
negotiations with GEO related to a potential sale of the
Company. To resolve any potential conflicts that might arise
during the course of the negotiations, the Board formed a
special committee (the “Special Committee”) on June 12,
2009. The Special Committee retained Thompson & Knight
LLP as independent legal counsel and Harris Williams &
Co. LLC (“Harris Williams”) as their independent financial
advisors.
Although the Special Committee did not authorize Harris
Williams to conduct a formal market check, the Company
received an unsolicited competing bid from private equity
firm Brookstone Partners (“Brookstone”) on July 6, 2009.
The Brookstone offer valued the Company between
$38.25 and $40.25 million. Daniel Carbonara, a Just Care
shareholder, led the Brookstone group with assistance from
Gearreald and Rein, who were interested in participating in
the post-buyout Company if Brookstone succeeded. As a
result of the Brookstone offer, the Board expanded the Special
Committee's mandate to include considering the relative
merits of the Brookstone and GEO proposals. Brookstone was
given access to the Company's data room on July 16.
Just Care typically did not prepare management projections
beyond the current fiscal year. On July 18, 2009, however,
Harris Williams requested that management prepare updated
financial projections for the Company through 2013 (the
“Management Projections”). Although Harris Williams used
the Management Projections in its fairness opinion, the
projections were not formally approved by the Board.
Gearreald and Brunk presented the Management Projections
to Harris Williams on August 6. As discussed infra, the
Management Projections contained three different growth
scenarios for Just Care. The base scenario (the “Static Case”)
assumed that Just Care would continue operating close to full
capacity without further expansion of its facilities. The second
scenario projected that Just Care would continue operating its
current facilities under the Static Case and also would build
a new facility at the Columbia Center to house sixty sexually
violent predators (the “SVP Case”). Finally, management's
most optimistic scenario included the Static Case, the SVP
Case, and an additional expansion into a prison center in
Milledgeville, Georgia (the “Georgia Case”).
Because Brookstone never was able to obtain firm financing
for any of its offers, Harris Williams eventually opined that
the GEO offer was superior. On August 25, 2009, the Board
unanimously approved the Agreement and Plan of Merger
(the “Merger Agreement”) between Just Care and GEO. The
Merger Agreement was executed on August 28 and a proxy
statement informing shareholders that the Board considered
the transaction to be “advisable, fair to and in the best interests
of, the Company and the Company Stockholders”4 was
disseminated to shareholders on September 8.5 Just Care's
shareholders approved the merger at a meeting on September
29, 2009, and the deal closed on September 30. Although a
majority of the outstanding shares approved the merger, 65 of
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the Company's 115 shareholders, representing approximately
36% of the Company's shares on an as-converted basis, voted
against it.6
*3  Under the terms of the Merger Agreement, GEO acquired
Just Care as a wholly owned subsidiary for $40 million
in cash. Of that amount, however, $6 million was held in
escrow to pay claims against the Company arising during the
two-year period following the close of the merger, including
appraisal claims and costs.
C. Procedural History
Following the merger, Petitioners filed their Verified Petition
for Appraisal on January 27, 2010. A trial was held on July
18–20, 2011, followed by extensive post-trial briefing and
oral argument.
D. Parties' Contentions
Petitioners contend that the fair value of Just Care is $55.2
million. In support of this valuation, Petitioners rely on their
expert, Frank Torchio, who is the founder and president of
Forensic Economics, Inc. In valuing the Company, Torchio
performed a discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis, trading
multiples analysis, and a precedent transactions analysis.
Torchio relied, however, only on his DCF analysis in reaching
his valuation opinion because his trading multiples analysis
yielded a wide range of values.7
Respondent claims that Just Care's fair value is $33.6 million.
In support of its valuation contentions, Respondent relies
on the expert testimony and report of J.T. Atkins, who is
the founder and managing director of Cypress Associates
LLC.8 Atkins valued the Company using a DCF analysis,
comparable public companies analysis, and a precedent
transactions analysis. Atkins weighted the values derived
from his DCF analysis at 66.7% and his comparable
companies analysis at 33.3% in coming to a final value for
the Company.
As discussed infra, much of the difference between the
parties' valuations can be accounted for by two disputed
aspects of their respective valuation analyses: (1) whether the
cash flow projections for the Georgia and SVP Cases should
be included in calculating the value of Just Care, and (2) the
appropriate small company size premium to be applied to
the Company's cost of equity. Together, these two areas of
dispute account for most of the difference between the parties'
respective valuations.9
II. ANALYSIS
An appraisal action is a “limited legislative remedy which
is intended to provide shareholders, who dissent from a
merger asserting the inadequacy of the offering price, with
an independent judicial determination of the fair value of
their shares.”10 The Delaware General Corporation Law
(“DGCL”) entitles petitioners to their pro rata share of the
“fair value” of the companies in question as of the merger
date.11 The Court is given broad discretion to determine fair
value.12 In doing so, it should take into account all relevant
factors known or ascertainable as of the merger date that
illuminate the future prospects of the company.13 The Court,
however, must determine the fair value of “the company
to the stockholder as a going concern.”14 Determining the
value of a “going concern” requires the Court to exclude
any synergistic value, that is, “the amount of any value that
the selling company's shareholders would receive because a
buyer intends to operate the subject company, not as a stand-
alone going concern, but as a part of a larger enterprise, from
which synergistic gains can be extracted.”15
*4  In an appraisal proceeding, both sides have the burden
of proving their respective valuations by a preponderance
of the evidence.16 The Court may consider “proof of
value by any techniques or methods which are generally
considered acceptable in the financial community and
otherwise admissible in court.”17 Acceptable techniques
include the DCF approach and the comparable transactions
approach.18 If neither party satisfies its burden, however, the
Court must use its own independent judgment to determine
the fair value of the shares.19
A. Credibility Claims
Before discussing the competing valuations presented by the
parties' experts, I briefly discuss Petitioners' challenges to
Respondent's credibility and the sales process employed in
selling Just Care to GEO. Petitioners claim that “the merger
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was the result of an unfair process not designed to achieve
the highest price” and that the sales process was “a blueprint
for faithless conduct, designed solely to benefit Maxor to
the detriment of the majority.”20 Specifically, Petitioners
aver that the Board conducted an inadequate sales process,
that the Special Committee was conflicted, and that Maxor
orchestrated the merger at an inadequate price to curry
favor with GEO in order to obtain a nationwide pharmacy
contract.21 As a result, Petitioners argue that “Respondent's
valuation contentions simply are not credible in light of
the flawed sales process .... [and] the Court should reject
Respondent's valuation contentions, including its contention
that the Georgia expansion should be accorded no value.”22
In making this argument, Petitioners misunderstand the nature
of an appraisal action under § 262. The “only litigable issue
in a statutory appraisal under [§ ] 262” is “the value of the
appraisal petitioners' shares on the date of the merger....”23
Considerations of whether corporate fiduciaries “engage[d]
in self-dealing and fix[ed] the merger price by procedures
not calculated to yield a fair price” are considered only
when assessing the credibility of a party's specific valuation
contentions.24 Here, however, Petitioners do not attack the
credibility of the specific valuation contentions made by
Respondent. Instead, Petitioners attack the overall credibility
of Respondent and its officers and directors, arguing that the
Court should reject all of Respondent's valuation contentions
because some of its directors allegedly were conflicted and
exhibited bad faith during the sale of the Company.25 Having
considered these claims, I find that such a broad-based
attack on Respondent's credibility is of little consequence
to this appraisal action because Respondent does not rely
on the merger price as evidence of fair value.26 Respondent
instead has presented an expert valuation of the Company
derived from an analysis of the Company's business, financial
statements, and projections.
Indeed, it is Petitioners' heavy reliance on the Management
Projections that presents the primary credibility issue in this
appraisal. Although the Court generally relies on management
projections made in the ordinary course of business,27 the
Management Projections here were made outside of the
ordinary course of business by Petitioners in this action.
Before the creation of the Management Projections, Just
Care's management had never prepared projections beyond
the current fiscal year. Moreover, the projections were made
at a time when Petitioners Gearreald and Brunk risked losing
their positions if the GEO bid succeeded and were involved
in trying to convince the Board to pursue a different strategic
alternative in which Gearreald and Brunk were involved.
They were also made when the possibility of litigation, such
as an appraisal proceeding, was likely. Therefore, I find
that the Management Projections prepared by Gearreald and
Brunk are not entitled to the same deference usually afforded
to contemporaneously prepared management projections and
that, in the circumstances of this case, Petitioners carry the
burden of proving the credibility of those projections.28
B. The DCF Analysis
*5  Both experts rely primarily on their DCF analyses to
value the Company. Therefore, in appraising Petitioners'
shares, I focus on the competing contentions underlying
the experts' respective DCF analyses.29 In particular, the
experts relied on various conflicting inputs and assumptions
regarding the Company's projected cash flows, capital
structure, and cost of capital. I now turn to those disputed
inputs and assumptions.
1. Cash flow projections
a. The Management Projections
A central dispute between the parties is whether the projected
cash flows from the SVP and Georgia Cases should be
included in Just Care's DCF analysis.30 Torchio determined
that both scenarios should be included, whereas Atkins
rejected the Georgia Case as too speculative and performed
analyses both with and without the SVP Case. Having
considered the assumptions underlying each scenario, I agree
with Atkins that the Georgia Case is too speculative. I further
find that the SVP Case can be included with an appropriate
probability weighting.
1. The Georgia Case
For at least one year before the merger, Just Care had been
interested in expanding its operations through one of two
potential projects in Milledgeville, Georgia. In 2008, Just
Care first considered establishing a facility to house Georgia's
“not guilty by reason of insanity” (“NGRI”) patients in
the Cook and Kidd buildings of the Georgia Central State
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Hospital (the “Kidd Project”). When a request for proposal
(“RFP”) for the Kidd Project was issued in November 2008,
however, Just Care found the financial terms of the RFP
so “appalling” that the Company decided not to bid on the
project.31 As a result, GEO was the only bidder for the
project, and Georgia eventually rescinded the RFP for lack of
competition.
Following the disappointment of the Kidd Project RFP,
Just Care refocused its efforts throughout 2009 on another
project in Georgia, which involved the renovation of the
Bostick State Prison into a medical detention facility.32 In the
Management Projections for the Georgia Case, Gearreald and
Brunk projected that an RFP would be issued within two to
six months after August 2009 and that the Bostick facility
would be operational in 2010.33 The Georgia Case projections
anticipated that the Bostick facility would house up to 304
patients, with a guaranteed occupancy of 200.34 The project
was expected to generate $20–25 million in annual revenues
and profits of more than $5 million.
Here, I find that the Georgia Case was too speculative to
be included in the valuation of the Company as of the
merger date. In an appraisal proceeding, “the corporation
must be valued as a going concern based upon the ‘operative
reality’ of the company as of the time of the merger.”35
The Court should consider “all factors known or knowable
as of the Merger Date that relate to the future prospects
of the Companies,” but should avoid including speculative
costs or revenues.36 As an initial matter, I consider it
highly relevant that, in the approximately eleven years of
its existence before the merger, Just Care had operated only
one facility. Although Petitioners assert that Just Care would
have had to expand to grow,37 its business model was not
predicated on maintaining multiple facilities and it had no
prior experience with expanding its business outside of the
Columbia Center. Moreover, as Petitioners admit, the Bostick
facility would be significantly different from the Columbia
Center, operating in a different regulatory environment and
providing different services.38 In the absence of any history
of expansion outside South Carolina, projections regarding
the viability and profitability of future expansions would be
subject to greater uncertainty.39 Furthermore, even if the new
facility was successful, there was a risk that Georgia would
move its prisoners currently housed at the Columbia Center
back to Georgia, thereby reducing the value of the Columbia
Center.40
*6  I also find it significant that, as of the merger date,
Georgia had not decided to go forward with the Bostick
project. As Petitioners admit, “Georgia's ultimate course of
action (whatever that course of action may have been) was
not susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger.”41
This uncertainty is fatal to the Georgia Case because Just
Care could not undertake the expansion unilaterally without
a decision by Georgia to move forward. The fact that the
Company was focused on expanding into Georgia and had
taken actions in furtherance of that goal is insufficient
to make the Georgia Case part of Just Care's operative
reality. Similarly, Petitioners' evidence that Just Care had (1)
commissioned architects to design plans for renovating the
facility, (2) sent its construction firm to survey and estimate
the costs of the project, and (3) received a verbal commitment
for financing from Wells Fargo, may reflect a strong intent on
the part of the Company to pursue the project, but “intent does
not equate to ability.”42 Indeed, Just Care had taken the same
actions while it was pursuing the Kidd Project, but ended up
not even bidding for the RFP.43
Even assuming that Georgia decided to proceed with the
project, the process and the economics of any potential
RFP were also speculative. Although Petitioners now argue
Georgia conceivably might proceed without an RFP process
for the facility, the Management Projections assumed that
Georgia would issue an RFP.44 If it did, Just Care would
have had to compete for the project, and the existence of
such competition likely would affect both the economics of
the project and the probability that Just Care would win the
project. Furthermore, because GEO had found the economics
of the Kidd Project feasible, Just Care probably would have
faced serious competition from GEO for the Bostick facility.
For all these reasons, I find that the Georgia Case was
too speculative as of the merger date to be included in the
Company's value.45
2. The SVP Case
In 2008, Just Care expanded its lease at the Columbia Center
to include another twenty acres on which it intended to
build a new, sixty-bed building to house sexually violent
predators from the South Carolina Department of Corrections
(“SCDOC”). According to Petitioners, at the time of the
merger, Just Care was operating near capacity and recognized
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it would have to expand its facilities. Under the SVP Case,
Gearreald and Brunk projected that the Company would
expand to a new building at the Columbia Center. The
expansion would be financed through Just Care's cash flows,
house a homogeneous population of civilly-incarcerated
individuals, and maintain a run rate occupancy of 95%.
According to Petitioners, Just Care had experience housing
similar patients through its existing contract with the South
Carolina Department of Mental Health. Moreover, because an
RFP process had not been used for the establishment of Just
Care in 1997 and its original expansion in 2007, management
was confident that the SVP Case also would be undertaken
without an RFP process.
*7  For many of the same reasons stated in the discussion
of the Georgia Case, I find that the SVP Case involved
a high degree of risk. Similar to the Georgia Case, there
was substantial uncertainty about whether the SCDOC would
move forward with the project, whether it would use an
RFP process, and whether Just Care would win the RFP.
The SCDOC had issued and revoked an RFP to house the
same patient population eighteen months before the merger,
and Smith testified that “[t]here was no assurance that such
an RFP would be issued again.”46 Even if an RFP was
issued, “there was no guarantee that ... Just Care would be
selected....”47 Indeed, in its fairness opinion, Harris Williams
observed that there was “significant risk associated with the
value and timing of the projected financial results” associated
with the SVP Case.48
Despite these risks, the evidence presented provides a
sufficient basis to include the SVP Case to at least some
extent in the determination of the Company's value on the
merger date. Unlike the Georgia Case, Just Care could expand
unilaterally into a new facility at the Columbia Center. In
fact, Just Care already had extended its lease to include the
twenty acres on which it planned to build the SVP facility.
Moreover, the Company had a history of expansion at the
Columbia Center, having added a sixty-bed wing in 2007. Just
Care also had experience housing similar patients to those
expected under the SVP Case and was housing thirteen such
inmates at the time of the merger. As Respondent's own expert
report admits, the SCDOC had 100 more inmates that it could
transfer to the new facility.49
Because the SVP Case essentially represented an extension
of Just Care's existing business at the Columbia Center and
Just Care successfully had expanded its Columbia operations
in 2007, the SVP Case is significantly more credible than
the Georgia Case. The SVP Case represented a relatively
small expansion, at the same location, in the same state,
for the purpose of adding additional business for patients
similar to those already being treated by Just Care. Therefore,
although there still was significant risk as to whether the
SCDOC would go forward with the project, the SVP Case
is sufficiently reliable to be considered part of Just Care's
“operative reality” as of the merger date. Based on the
uncertainty related to the SCDOC's decision to go forward
with the project and the possibility that it might proceed by
way of an RFP process, however, I require that the values for
the SVP Case be probability weighted by 66.7%.
b. Terminal Value
In addition to their disagreement as to the credibility of the
Management Projections, the experts dispute the appropriate
terminal growth rate for the Company. Atkins applied a
terminal growth rate of approximately 5.5%, whereas Torchio
applied a more conservative terminal growth rate of 3.5%.
Because I have adopted growth projections more consistent
with Respondent's view of Just Care's prospects, I also adopt
Respondent's terminal growth rate projections. Therefore, I
apply a terminal growth rate of 5.5% for the Company.50
2. Just Care's cost of capital
*8  In order to discount the cash flow projections for the
Company, both experts computed a weighted average cost
of capital (“WACC”). Because WACC is estimated based on
the relative percentages of debt, preferred stock, and common
equity in a company's capital structure, both experts made
assumptions about what they believed to be the appropriate
capital structure for the Company. The experts then estimated
the Company's costs of debt, preferred stock, and equity. I turn
next to these contentions.
a. Just Care's capital structure
Atkins chose a capital structure under which the Company
consisted of 100% common equity, which he asserts was
the Company's actual capital structure immediately before
the merger. Torchio used a capital structure consisting of
5% debt, 35% nonconvertible preferred stock, and 60%
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common equity. Torchio asserts that this ratio best represents
what the Company's capital structure would have been as a
going concern based on Just Care's historical capital structure
and the average debt to total capital ratios of comparable
companies over the last five years.
In considering the appropriate capital structure to apply in this
context, I note that this Court is required to “determine the fair
value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger.”51
As a going concern, Just Care historically operated with a
capital structure comprised of both preferred and common
equity, as well as some debt. The Company paid off all of
its debt, however, as a condition of the Merger Agreement.52
Moreover, in connection with the merger, all of Just Care's
preferred stock was converted to common equity.
At trial, Atkins testified that he understood Delaware law
to require him to apply the actual capital structure of the
Company as of the merger date, which for Just Care was
100% common equity.53 Such an approach was inappropriate
here, however, because the capital structure applied by Atkins
arose directly out of the expectation of the merger. This
Court previously has rejected the proposition that changes
to a company's capital structure in relation to a merger
should be included in an appraisal. For example, in Cede
& Co. v. JRC Acquisition Corp.,54 this Court refused to
include debt incurred as part of the merger in the company's
capital structure because to do so would “contravene[ ] the
valuation statute's command to appraise shares ‘exclusive
of any element of value arising from the accomplishment
or expectation of the merger.’ “55 Instead, the Court found
that because the company had no debt before the merger
and because “Petitioner ha[d] introduced no evidence of non-
speculative plans to incur significant debt that is not due to
the accomplishment of the merger,” it was inappropriate to
include the actual additional debt for purposes of appraisal.56
Therefore, I find that the correct capital structure for an
appraisal of Just Care is the theoretical capital structure it
would have maintained as a going concern. Because Torchio's
estimation of a capital structure as including 5% debt, 35%
preferred stock, and 60% common equity more reasonably
reflects the capital structure the Company would have had as a
going concern, I adopt Torchio's capital structure for purposes
of this appraisal.57
*9  As to the treatment of Just Care's preferred stock,
however, I agree with Respondent that, in the circumstances
of this case, the preferred stock should be treated as common
equity for purposes of calculating Just Care's WACC. Just
Care was capitalized initially with a fairly typical venture
capital structure consisting almost entirely of convertible
preferred stock and a small sliver of common equity allocated
to the Company's management.58 Just Care has never paid a
dividend on its preferred shares and, in the event of a merger,
the Company was entitled to convert the preferred shares
into common.59 In essence, Just Care's preferred stock was
treated as a common stock equivalent, not a dividend-paying
debt instrument. Therefore, when determining the actual cost
of Just Care's preferred equity for appraisal purposes, the
preferred stock should be treated as common equity because
that was the true economic nature of the Company's preferred
stock financing. If Just Care had continued as a going concern,
it is unlikely that it would have paid a dividend on its
preferred stock and, more likely than not, the value of the
preferred stock would have been realized by converting to
common equity through some liquidity event, as occurred in
this case.60 Consequently, treating Just Care's preferred stock
as a dividend-paying instrument would distort Just Care's
actual financing costs at the time of the merger. Therefore,
I find that Just Care's cost of preferred equity is equivalent
to its cost of common equity. Accordingly, for purposes of
calculating the WACC, I treat the Company's capital structure
as if it was composed of 5% debt and 95% common equity.
b. Cost of equity
Both experts employed the capital asset pricing model
(“CAPM”) to determine the Company's cost of equity.61 They
also agreed that the appropriate risk-free rate at the time of
the merger was 4.02%.62 The experts disagreed, however, on
the appropriate beta, equity risk premium, and size premium
to be used in calculating the Company's cost of equity.
1. Beta
Atkins, assuming a capital structure of 100% common equity,
calculated an unlevered beta of 0.69 by analyzing the betas of
comparable publicly-traded companies. Torchio calculated a
levered beta of 1.3, assuming a capital structure of 5% debt,
35% preferred stock, and 60% common equity. In arriving
at his beta, Torchio utilized a sum beta model. Sum beta is
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calculated by “regressing the security return in the current
period with both the market return in the current period and
the market return in the prior period.”63 Torchio considered
it more appropriate to apply a sum beta for Just Care because
it accounts for the possibility that price changes for small,
thinly-traded stocks may lag the overall market.64
In considering which approach to use, I note that neither side
seriously contested the other's beta calculation. Indeed, most
of the difference between the two beta values stems from the
experts' divergent capital structure assumptions. According
to Atkins, unlevering Torchio's beta results in a beta of 0.79,
as compared to Atkins's unlevered beta of 0.69.65 Because
Respondent has not provided a substantive basis for rejecting
the use of sum beta and because Torchio's justification for
applying sum beta in this context appears reasonable based
on Just Care's size and the illiquidity of its stock, I accept
Torchio's methodology. Furthermore, by adjusting Torchio's
beta calculation to account for a theoretical capital structure of
5% debt and 95% common equity, I find that the Company's
relevant beta is equal to 0.82.66
2. Equity risk premium
*10  As for the company's equity risk premium, the experts
dispute whether a historical or supply side equity risk
premium should apply. Torchio supports the use of a supply
side equity risk premium of 5 .73%, whereas Atkins applied
a historical risk premium of 6.47%. In support of using a
historical equity risk premium, Atkins explained that the
historical equity risk premium has been the industry standard
and that Torchio has used the historical equity risk premium
in past cases. Atkins failed to articulate, however, any
substantive financial reason why a supply side equity risk
premium would be inappropriate in this specific case.
This Court recently observed in Global GT LP v. Golden
Telecom, Inc.67 that, although experts and this Court
traditionally have applied the historical equity risk premium,
the academic community in recent years has gravitated toward
greater support for utilizing the supply side equity risk
premium.68 As Chancellor Strine reasoned in Golden Telecom
in support of the application of a supply side equity risk
premium:
when the relevant professional community has mined
additional data and pondered the reliability of past practice
and come, by a healthy weight of reasoned opinion, to
believe that a different practice should become the norm,
this court's duty is to recognize that practice if, in the court's
lay estimate, the practice is the most reliable available for
use in an appraisal.69
Therefore, upon considering the opinions of Atkins and
Torchio and having been provided with no persuasive
substantive financial reason as to why the application of a
supply side equity risk premium would be inappropriate in
this case, I find that the supply side equity risk premium of
5.73% is the appropriate metric to be applied in valuing the
Company.
3. Size premium
In addition to the equity risk premium, an equity size premium
generally is added to the company's cost of equity in the
valuation of smaller companies to account for the higher rate
of return demanded by investors to compensate for the greater
risk associated with small company equity.70 Small company
premiums are empirically estimated and both experts utilized
Ibbotson size premiums in performing their analyses.
Both experts agree that, by size alone, Just Care falls
within Ibbotson decile 10b, which includes companies with
a market capitalization between $1.6 million and $136
million.71 Decile 10b implies an equity size premium of
9.53%, and Atkins applied that size premium in calculating
Just Care's cost of equity. Torchio, however, applied a lesser
size premium of 4.11%, which is the premium applied
to Ibbotson decile 10a companies.72 Torchio supports this
adjustment primarily on the basis that 4.11% represents
the Company's size premium after eliminating the “well-
documented liquidity effect” contained within the size
premium.73 According to Torchio, because “the illiquidity
premium reflected in the size premium data for small cap
stocks is akin to a liquidity discount” such a discount “must
be eliminated in a fair value determination—much like a
discount for lack of marketability or minority interest.”74
*11  As a matter of law, Torchio is correct that a
general liquidity discount cannot be applied in an appraisal
proceeding. Such a discount generally relates to the
marketability of the company's shares and is therefore
- 138 -
Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., Not Reported in A.3d (2012)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 9
prohibited. As Vice Chancellor Lamb stated in Borruso v.
Communications Telesystems International:75
To the extent Respondent is arguing for the application
of a “corporate level” discount to reflect the fact that all
shares of WXL shares were worth less because there was
no public market in which to sell them, I read Cavalier Oil
as prohibiting such a discount. This is simply a liquidity
discount applied at the “corporate level.” Even if taken “at
the corporate level” (in circumstances in which the effect
on the fair value of the shares is the same as a “shareholder
level” discount) such a discount is, nevertheless, based on
trading characteristics of the shares themselves, not any
factor intrinsic to the corporation or its assets. It is therefore
prohibited.76
Although a liquidity discount related to the marketability of
a company's shares is prohibited, that does not mean that
the use of any input that is correlated with a company's
illiquidity is per se invalid. As Atkins correctly points out,
a company's liquidity is highly correlated with its size, i.e.,
smaller companies tend to be less liquid. As a result, their
equity is riskier and investors will demand higher returns from
such investments, increasing the cost of capital.77 It is this
kind of liquidity effect that is captured in the Ibbotson size
premium. As this Court held in JRC Acquisition Corp.:
The Ibbotson size premium number reflects the empirical
evidence that smaller firms have higher returns than larger
firms. Petitioner's position that JR Cigar is a low-cap
company (rather than a micro-cap company) decreases the
expected rate of return on JR Cigar's stock by lowering
the “size premium” applied. The problem with using
liquidity as a basis for justifying a lower expected return,
however, is that low liquidity is associated with higher
expected returns. Investors seek compensation for the high
transaction costs of illiquid securities, e.g., the bid/ask
spread. In other words, even if JR Cigar had a higher market
capitalization than the market price of its stock suggested
because of its illiquidity, investors would still expect higher
returns because of its illiquidity.78
The liquidity effect in this case arises in relation to
transactions between Just Care and its providers of capital
and, as such, is part of the Company's value as a going
concern. Where a company's illiquidity affects its ability to
obtain financing for its operations, the company's overall
risk and return profile will be affected, i.e., the company
will be worth less as a going concern because its financing
costs are higher. The liquidity effect that is prohibited
under our appraisal law, on the other hand, relates to
transactions between a company's shareholders and other
market participants. Thus, where the effect of the company's
illiquidity relates only to the ability of an investor to exit
his investment by selling his shares in the market, such a
transaction relates more to the structure of the market than it
does to the company's ability to generate profits. As a result,
such a discount rightly is excluded in an appraisal because it
does not relate to the company's intrinsic value. Here, because
the liquidity effect at issue relates to the Company's ability to
obtain capital at a certain cost, I find that the effect is related to
the Company's intrinsic value as a going concern and should
be included when calculating its cost of capital.
*12  Furthermore, although I reject Torchio's adjustment
as a matter of law, I note that I also would exclude it
as unreliable. Small company size premiums regularly are
applied in appraisal proceedings in Delaware without the
type of adjustment performed by Torchio. Moreover, in
addition to his adjustment being unprecedented, Torchio's
methodologies for removing the liquidity effect from the
size premium are novel and have not been peer reviewed.79
Indeed, he himself could not decide on a single methodology
for performing this adjustment. Instead, Torchio applied four
different methodologies for adjusting the size premium and
arrived at four different values, ranging from 3.35% to
6.35%. These divergent values resulted in an unusually large
variation in the range of values he calculated for the Company.
As a result, I also reject Torchio's adjustment on the basis that
it was not the product of reliable principles and methods.80
Finally, Petitioners attempt to justify the application of a
smaller size premium on the alternative basis that Just Care's
individual characteristics make it comparable to a decile
10a company. This Court may adjust a company's size
premium where sufficient evidence is presented to show that
the company's individual characteristics make it less risky
than would otherwise be implied under its corresponding
Ibbotson decile based on size alone.81 Here, however, Torchio
did not opine on whether Just Care was less risky than
other companies in decile 10b and Petitioners made only
conclusory assertions that Just Care's characteristics made
it comparable to decile 10a companies. Indeed, Petitioners
devoted only one sentence in their Opening Brief to
attempting to justify the treatment of Just Care as a decile
10a company, stating that “its risk characteristics are more
akin to those companies that fall within decile 10a; indeed,
Respondent's expert testified that Just Care is ‘not a young
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company,’ and that healthcare is a ‘very mature industry.’ “82
Therefore, because Petitioners have not provided a sufficient
factual basis for treating Just Care as a decile 10a company,
I decline to reduce the Company's size premium to less than
what is implied by its actual size.83
3. Cost of debt
In calculating Just Care's cost of debt, Torchio assumed that
Just Care would be able to borrow long-term at a rate of
8.3%.84 Torchio based that assumption on: (1) the fact that
Just Care had existing medium-term debt on its balance sheet
at a rate of 7.75%; (2) Wells Fargo's estimation that Just Care
could borrow for its expansion plans at a rate of 6 to 7%; and
(3) Harris Williams's calculation that the average cost of debt
for comparable public companies was 7.31%.85 In arriving
at the 8.3% rate, Torchio specifically determined that “[t]he
intermediate-term debt rate of 6%–7% proposed by [Wells
Fargo] is consistent with a BB  and BB rating” and that the
long-term debt for BB  to BB rated debt in September 2009
was 8.3%.86
*13  Atkins argues that Torchio's cost of debt underestimates
Just Care's credit risk because it is based largely on Just
Care's ability to borrow for the Bostick project. As Atkins
points out, the debt for that expansion by Just Care would
have been secured by the Bostick facility, making it less
risky. Moreover, the Bostick project would have provided
Just Care with an additional stream of income, improving the
Company's overall creditworthiness.87
I agree with Atkins that Torchio underestimated the cost of
debt for Just Care. Torchio did not undertake a credit analysis
of the Company and his estimate assumes the success of
the Georgia Case, which I reject as too speculative. Instead,
I find more reliable the cost of debt estimates made by
Harris Williams and Brookstone at the time of the merger. In
preparing its fairness opinion, Harris Williams estimated that
Just Care's cost of debt was 12.38%.88 Brookstone estimated
it to be between 10.5 to 11%. Therefore, I find that Just Care
had a cost of debt of 11% as of September 30, 2009. Assuming
a tax-rate of 36%, that would produce an after-tax cost of debt
for Just Care of 7.04%.89
4. Just Care's fair value
To summarize, I find that Just Care's WACC should be
calculated using: (1) a capital structure consisting of 5% debt
and 95% common equity; (2) an after-tax cost of debt of
7.04%; (3) a risk-free rate of 4.02%; (4) a levered beta of 0.82;
(5) a supply side equity risk premium of 5.73%; and (6) a size
premium of 9.53%. Using these values, Just Care's WACC is
17.69%.
Applying that discount rate to Just Care's cash flow
projections including the Static Case and the probability-
weighted SVP Case, with a terminal growth rate of 5.5%, I
find that the fair value of Just Care as a going concern, based
solely on a DCF analysis, is $34,244,570.
C. The Escrow Provision
Under the Merger Agreement, $6 million of the merger
consideration was placed in escrow to cover claims brought
against the Company in the two years following the merger,
including claims for appraisal. Therefore, if an appraisal
petitioner prevails in proving a higher valuation of the
Company, i.e., a value above the merger consideration of
$40 million, the additional amount would be paid to those
petitioners from the funds held in escrow. The practical
effect of this provision, therefore, is that the risk of appraisal
(or other claims) is transferred from the acquirer, GEO, to
Just Care's consenting shareholders.90 In other words, the
consenting shareholders are guaranteed total consideration
of $34 million, with the possibility of receiving additional
consideration based on whatever value remains in escrow
after two years, up to a maximum of $6 million.
Petitioners strenuously criticize the escrow provision,
claiming that the Special Committee had no reasonable basis
to rely on the Harris Williams fairness opinion because it
failed to consider the effect of the escrow provision on the
overall fairness of the merger .91 Petitioners also assert that
“it is not mere ‘coincidence’ that Mr. Atkins' valuation ... is
virtually identical to the $40 million merger price less the $6
million escrow.”92
*14  Having considered the details of the escrow provision
and its practical effect on the merger transaction, I find that
the escrow provision is immaterial to the determination of
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fair value in this appraisal action. If nobody sought appraisal
and no other claims were asserted against Just Care in the
two years following the merger, each consenting shareholder
would receive their pro rata share of the full purchase price
of $40 million. Therefore, dissenting shareholders still must
prove that the value of the Company was greater than $40
million at the time of the merger in order to receive additional
consideration from the escrow account. In total, the escrow
fund could result in the transfer of up to $6 million from
the consenting shareholders to the dissenting shareholders.93
At any value less than $40 million, as is the case here,
however, Petitioners will receive less than the consideration
they would have received had they approved the merger and
the consenting shareholders will receive their pro rata share of
the excess amount that Petitioners forfeited as a consequence
of pursuing appraisal.94 Therefore, as a matter of valuation, I
find that the existence of the escrow provision is immaterial
and, in any case, even if the escrowed amount were excluded
entirely from the merger consideration, the transaction would
have been at a value close to what the Court has determined
to be the fair value.95
D. Options Issue
Petitioners Gearreald, Brunk, and an additional dissenter,
Alicia E. Dunne,96 claim that they also are entitled to
appraisal for the shares they acquired through properly
exercising their options immediately before the merger.
Although Respondent reserved the right to argue that
Petitioners failed to exercise their options effectively before
the merger, Respondent did not pursue that argument in its
post-trial briefing or argument. Therefore, Respondent has
waived its challenges to the Gearreald and Brunk options.97
Furthermore, and in any case, I find that the factual record
shows that Petitioners, in fact, did exercise their options
before the merger and that they are entitled to appraisal of
those additional shares.98
E. Compounded Interest
In appraisal proceedings, “the general rule is that an award
of interest is routinely made unless the petitioner brought the
action in bad faith.”99 Under 8 Del. C. § 262(h):
[u]nless the Court in its discretion determines otherwise for
good cause shown, interest from the effective date of the
merger through the date of payment of the judgment shall
be compounded quarterly and shall accrue at 5% over the
Federal Reserve discount rate (including any surcharge) as
established from time to time during the period between the
effective date of the merger and the date of payment of the
judgment.
Respondent argues that prejudgment interest should be
denied here because Petitioners Gearreald and Rein acted
in bad faith by voting for the merger in their capacities as
directors before voting against the merger as shareholders.
In considering this contention, I note that Rein is no
longer an individual Petitioner in these proceedings and
that, in any case, Gearreald and Rein are only two of
seven Petitioners. Respondent makes no claim that the
other Petitioners acted in bad faith. Furthermore, although
Gearreald's and Rein's alleged duplicity in approving the
merger and later dissenting from it is troubling, the matter
was not fully litigated in this action. Gearreald has put forth
at least a colorable justification that he voted for the merger
as a director to obtain a reduction of the termination fee for
the deal and, thereby, increased the possibility of a topping
bid. Therefore, because Respondent has not shown good
cause to deny prejudgment interest, I award Petitioners
prejudgment interest consistent with § 262(h) on the value
of their appraised shares.
III. CONCLUSION
*15  For the reasons discussed in this Opinion, I find that
the fair value of Just Care as of September 30, 2009 was
$34,244,570.100 The parties shall cooperate to determine the
amount of the interest award in accordance with the rulings
in this Opinion and Petitioners shall present, on notice, an
appropriate proposed order of final judgment specifying,
among other things, the corresponding fair value per common
share and per Series A preferred share within ten days.
All Citations
Not Reported in A.3d, 2012 WL 1569818
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Footnotes
1 Verified Pet. for Appraisal ¶¶ 1–7. As discussed infra, this number includes certain shares attained through the exercise
of options by two of the Petitioners.
2 JX 126.
3 Just Care's top four customers represented over 90% of its fiscal year-to-date June 2009 revenues. JX 198 at 9.
4 JX 152 at P000124.
5 Although Gearreald and Rein originally approved the merger and consented to the proxy statement, both later voted
against the merger in their capacities as shareholders. A related action for breach of fiduciary duty against Gearreald
and Rein currently is proceeding in Texas. JX 300.
6 JX 163.
7 Because a precedent transactions analysis generally captures anticipated synergies from the transaction, both experts
excluded it from their final appraisal computations.
8 Cypress Associates LLC is an investment banking firm that provides financial advisory services related to mergers and
acquisitions, corporate restructuring and recapitalizations, private placements of debt and equity, and litigation consulting
services and expert witness work. Tr. 613 (Atkins).
9 According to Atkins, if Torchio's analysis were changed to disregard the Georgia Case and use the full small company
size premium implied by Just Care's actual size, Torchio's own methodology would value the Company at $31 million.
Id. at 638.
10 Ala. By–Prods. Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 256 (Del.1991).
11 8 Del. C. § 262(h) (“Through such proceeding the Court shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any
element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with interest,
if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be the fair value.”).
12 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 299 (Del.1996).
13 8 Del. C § 262(h); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del.1983) (quoting Tri–Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74
A.2d 71, 72 (Del.1950)).
14 M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 795 (Del.1999); accord Technicolor, 684 A.2d at 298 (“[T]he Court of
Chancery's task in an appraisal proceeding is to value what has been taken from the shareholder, i.e., the proportionate
interest in the going concern.”).
15 Union Ill.1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Gp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. Ch.2004).
16 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. LeBeau, 737 A.2d 513, 520 (Del.1999).
17 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
18 See Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co., 2004 WL 2271592, at *8 (Oct. 4, 2004); see, e.g., Cede & Co. v. JRC Acq.
Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (utilizing the DCF approach); Gentile v. Singlepoint Fin., Inc.,
2003 WL 1240504, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 2003) (utilizing the comparable transactions approach).
19 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publ'rs, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 362 (Del.1997); Taylor v. Am. Specialty Retailing Gp., Inc., 2003
WL 21753752, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 25, 2003).
20 Pet'rs' Opening Br. (“POB”) 26. Petitioners and Respondent simultaneously filed their respective post-trial opening and
answering briefs.
21 Id. at 2 (Petitioners allege that “[d]uring the sales process, Maxor was in the delicate position of negotiating for the sale
of its Just Care stock, but not at a price so high that it soured the potential for a pharmacy contract between Maxor
and GEO. Thus, the ‘price Maxor could accept’ included a discount equal to the value Maxor implicitly placed on a
nationwide pharmacy contract with GEO”). Notably, Petitioners Gearreald and Rein have not brought any action for
breach of fiduciary duty. Indeed, as directors, they actually voted to approve the merger and authorized a proxy statement
informing shareholders that the transaction was fair and in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders, despite
having knowledge of at least some of the facts underlying their allegations against Maxor and the Board. Later, however,
Gearreald and Rein voted against the merger and perfected their appraisal rights as shareholders.
22 Id. at 28.
23 Ala. By–Prods. Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 256–57 (Del.1991).
24 Id. at 257.
25 Pet'rs' Ans. Br. (“PAB”) 7.
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26 Where a company relies on the merger price as evidence of fair value, allegations of breach of fiduciary duty or other
improper actions during the sales process are relevant to whether the merger price is credible evidence of fair value.
See Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. Ch.2007) (noting that merger price can indicate
fair value if “the transaction giving rise to the appraisal resulted from an arm's-length process between two independent
parties.”) Where evidence of fair value is supplied by expert analyses, however, allegations of improper conduct by the
company's fiduciaries are relevant only to the extent that they relate to some assumption or input to the expert's valuation,
affecting in turn the credibility of the challenged valuation. See Chang's Hldgs. v. Univ. Chems. & Coatings, Inc., 1992
WL 301327, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1992) (“ ‘Where [valuation] assumptions are values supplied by others, the conduct
of such other persons is probative of their credibility and of the information being supplied to the expert.’ Information
concerning breach of fiduciary duty is thus relevant because it may concern either the conduct of other persons (namely
the board who supplied the information to [the financial advisor] ) or the credibility of the board.” (quoting Ala. By–Prods.,
588 A.2d at 258)).
With these principles in mind, I have considered Petitioners' allegations of breaches of fiduciary duty only in
connection with the reliability of information conveyed to Respondent's expert regarding, for example, the likelihood
that Just Care would implement the Georgia expansion. Moreover, in making my own assessment as to the credibility
of the SVP and Georgia projections, I did not rely on the Respondent directors' testimony regarding the reliability
of those projections.
27 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003) (“When management projections
are made in the ordinary course of business, they are generally deemed reliable.”), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 884 A.2d
26 (Del.2005).
28 See id. at *7 (“Contemporary pre-merger management projections are particularly useful in the appraisal context because
management projections, by definition, are not tainted by post-merger hindsight and are usually created by an impartial
body. In stark contrast, post hoc, litigation-driven forecasts have an ‘untenably high’ probability of containing ‘hindsight
bias and other cognitive distortions.’ ”).
29 Because Just Care has a unique business model and is a private company, I doubt the reliability of the comparable public
companies analysis and do not give it any weight in arriving at a final value for the Company. I do consider that analysis,
however, in the sense that it lends support to the final valuation arrived at in this Opinion.
30 Although Respondent challenges even the Static Case presented by Petitioners as “aggressive” because it assumed
occupancy levels based on an allegedly temporary spike in the patient census in August 2009, Respondent nonetheless
gave Petitioners the “benefit of the doubt” and accepted the Static Case in its own valuation. Therefore, I consider here
only whether to include the SVP and Georgia Cases.
31 JX 50 at P001773.
32 See JX 48 at JCI00005645 (materials from February 5, 2009 board meeting characterizing the Bostick project as the
“Highest Probability 2009 New Facility”).
33 JX 126 at 9.
34 JX 48 at JCI00005645.
35 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. LeBeau, 131 A.2d 513, 525 (Del.1999).
36 In re U.S. Cellular Operating Co., 2005 WL 43994, at *14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2005); accord Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del.1983) (“[E]lements of future value, including the nature of the enterprise, which are known or
susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and not the product of speculation, may be considered.”).
37 POB 31.
38 Tr. 78 (Gearreald).
39 Cf. Del. Open MM Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A .2d 290, 315 (Del. Ch.2006) (“The dangers for the minority
[shareholders] arguably are most present when the controller knows that the firm is on the verge of break-through growth,
having gotten the hang of running the first few facilities, and now being well-positioned to replicate its success at additional
locations.” (emphasis added)). In Delaware Open MRI, on which Petitioners rely, then-Vice Chancellor, now Chancellor,
Strine found it appropriate to include expansion plans for new facilities in the company's value at the time of the merger
because the future facilities were part of an “obvious strategy of creating a statewide network of MRI Centers.” Id. at
319. At the time of the merger, the company, Delaware Radiology, had two fully operational facilities and had formed
and formalized leases for two more sites, leading the Court to analogize the business to a McDonald's or Starbucks.
Chancellor Strine later noted that “[p]ervading this analysis is an obvious point: [radiology centers] I through V are all
premised on the same model of operation....” Id.; see also id. at 317 (“[E]ven more importantly ... [radiology center] III
represented an extension of a business model that Delaware Radiology already had used successfully twice.”). Here,
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the nature of Just Care's business model is substantially different from the standardized business model in Delaware
Open MRI.
40 JX 59 (projecting the effect on the Columbia Campus if a new Georgia facility were built and Just Care's Georgia patients
were moved back to Georgia).
41 Pet'rs' Mot. in Limine ¶ 9.
42 Lane v. Cancer Treatment Centers of Am., Inc., 2004 WL 1752847, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004).
43 Tr. 270 (Brunk).
44 See JX 126 at 9.
45 In coming to this conclusion, I note that Harris Williams also found that the Georgia Case carried substantial uncertainty
and risk. According to Geoffrey Smith, the lead Harris Williams partner for the merger with GEO, Harris Williams “had
questions about whether or not Georgia would ever issue an RFP, the timing of such an RFP, if such an RFP were to
be issued, if Just Care ... would choose to participate, if they chose to participate, if they would ultimately win, given the
fact that there was a very high likelihood that there would be other bidders on that RFP. In particular, GEO had already
demonstrated in a previous RFP process for the State of Georgia that they had bid on that. So we expected that at least
they would bid again. And so had we put all that together, in addition to ... it being a political process and that having
a significant impact on whether it actually happened or not, as well as the potential timing, we felt like that there was
significant risk associated with the Georgia opportunity.” Tr. 456–57. The speculative nature of both the Georgia and
SVP Cases led Harris Williams to apply a company-specific risk premium of 6% when valuing Just Care. Smith further
testified that Harris Williams “believed that the financial projections, in particular associated with SVP and Georgia ... were
so speculative that [they] needed to make an adjustment to reflect the risk associated with those.” Tr. 458. Moreover,
Gearreald himself stated at the Board meeting approving the merger with GEO that it was his belief that “[i]f someone
asserted their dissenting rights to an appraisal ... an expert would look at the static projections assuming no expansion....”
JX 144 at 13.
46 Tr. 455.
47 Id.
48 JX 126 at 10.
49 JX 198 at 16. Indeed, Atkins accepted the SVP Case in one version of his DCF analysis, even though he characterized
it as “very aggressive.” Tr. 710.
50 Atkins magnanimously offered “to give the benefit of the doubt” to Petitioners on this issue. Tr. 630. Because the higher
terminal growth rate will benefit Petitioners and otherwise comports with Atkins's analysis, I consider it more appropriate
to treat Atkins's terminal growth rate as uncontested.
51 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
52 JX 147 § 7.02(j) (“Payoff of Company Indebtedness and Termination of Liens” Condition).
53 Tr. 633 (“Our understanding ... in the context of appraisal, is that the Delaware Courts [require] ... that we look at the
actual capital structure at the time of closing to develop our capital structure.”).
54 2004 WL 286963 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004).
55 Id. at *7 (quoting 8 Del. C § 262(h)).
56 Id. at *8.
57 This finding is supported by the possibility that Just Care might have sought to expand under the SVP Case had it not
merged with GEO. See id. (holding that a hypothetical “debt ratio of 10% is ... reasonable and accounts for the probability
that JR Cigar may seek to incur limited debt to pursue expansion opportunities.”). Although management projected that
the SVP Case could be financed out of the Company's cash flows, it is not unreasonable to assume that the Company
would have continued to maintain a limited amount of debt for the expansion, in line with its historical practice. See JX
201 (Atkins Rebuttal Report) (“It was conceivable that the Company might incur a modest amount of debt in the future.”).
58 Tr. 110 (Gearreald); Tr. 686 (Atkins).
59 In his rebuttal report, Torchio acknowledged that “[p]resumably, the preferred holders are sophisticated investors who
understand that the rights of the preferred stock would only give them the conversion value in a change of control event.
It follows then, that the preferred stock's appraisal value cannot exceed the preferred stock's proportion of the enterprise
value that can be obtained upon conversion of the preferred stock.” JX 200 at 9–10.
60 Atkins explained that, “[w]hen people put money into a venture capital, it always comes in as a preferred stock and the
management usually gets common. But the investors, venture capital stocks look at it as common stock from a valuation
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point of view, simply supervoting common. And they're still expecting-venture capitalists are still expecting a 25 percent-
plus return, which is the same thing as the cost of equity.” Tr. 686.
61 JRC Acq. Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *8 (“Under CAPM the cost of equity is equal to the risk-free rate (the yield on 20
year Treasury bonds) plus a large company equity risk premium multiplied by the specific company adjusted beta ....”).
62 In determining the Company's cost of equity capital, both experts used data from the Ibbotson Associates 2009 Valuation
Yearbook.
63 JX 197 at 19.
64 Id.
65 JX 201 Ex. A at 4.
66 Id.
67 993 A.2d 497 (Del. Ch.2010).
68 Id. at 517.
69 Id.; see generally id. (discussing the academic literature related to the application of supply side versus historical equity
risk premiums).
70 JRC Acq. Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *8 (“An equity size premium is added because smaller companies have higher
returns on average than larger ones, i.e., small companies have a higher cost of equity.” (footnotes omitted)).
71 Tr. 636 (Atkins); JX 201 at 9.
72 For 2009 valuation dates, decile 10a companies were those companies with a market capitalization between $136 million
and $218 million. JX 201 at 9.
73 POB 35.
74 Id.
75 753 A.2d 451 (Del. Ch.1999).
76 Id. at 460.
77 Tr. 664; see JRC Acq. Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *8.
78 JRC Acq. Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *9.
79 See Tr. 418 (Torchio) (“No one has tried to tease out this value like I have. I readily admit that.”); id. at 429 (“[T]his is
the first time that I'm aware that the specific size premium is being adjusted to account for liquidity inherent in that size
premium.”).
80 See D.R.E. 702 (“If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or
data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the case.”); Beard Research, Inc. v. Kates, 8 A.3d 573, 592 (Del. Ch.2010).
81 See Taylor v. Am. Specialty Retailing Gp., Inc., 2003 WL 21753752, *5 n.18 (Del. Ch. July 25, 2003) (“There is no
indication of whether a company with a market capitalization of less than $48,345,000 may nonetheless fall within decile
10a or even decile 9 given certain characteristics.”); see, e.g., id. at *6 (applying a size premium closer to decile 10a
even though the company being valued technically was categorized under decile 10b because the company “share[d]
more risk characteristics with companies in decile 10a than it [did] with companies in decile 10b .... because companies
falling within decile 10b include many start-up ventures that receive public funding and are inherently riskier”); Gesoff v.
IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1161 (Del. Ch.2006) (reducing the size premium applied to the company on the basis that
the company being valued formed part of the index for the stock exchange that it traded on and was part of an industry
that might have been “less subject to the size premium than other industries”).
82 POB 37 (quoting Atkins at Tr. 725).
83 Petitioners further argue that 4.11% represents an appropriate size premium based on their observation that this Court
previously has approved size premium adjustments that are roughly half of the implied decile 10b size premium in Taylor,
Gesoff, and ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 921–23 (Del. Ch.1999). In each of the cited cases, however, the
Court arrived at a final size premium through analysis of the specific facts of the case, as well as empirical data related
to the performance of small company stocks over time. The fact that the adjusted size premiums applied in each case
were approximately half of the size premium suggested by each company's corresponding Ibbotson decile appears to
be coincidental. Petitioners have not shown that any reasoned principle or methodology reflected in the cited decisions
supports use of the low size premium that their expert applied in this case.
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84 Because Atkins assumed the Company should be valued on the basis of 100% common equity, he did not address
extensively the Company's cost of debt in his report. Atkins did apply, however, a cost of debt of 12% for the Company,
based on Harris Williams's estimation.
85 JX 197 at 27.
86 Id.
87 Tr. 690–91 (Atkins).
88 JX 142 at HFS00146.
89 Both experts assumed a tax-rate of 36% for Just Care.
90 See 8 Del. C. § 262(i) (“The Court shall direct the payment of the fair value of the shares, together with interest, if any,
by the surviving or resulting corporation to the stockholders entitled thereto.”).
91 POB 22.
92 Id. at 41.
93 Because attorneys' fees and costs related to any appraisal action presumably also would come from the escrow account,
less than $6 million actually would be available following an appraisal.
94 JX 147 § 2.06(b) (“[T]o the extent that the fair value as finally determined pursuant to Section 262 is less than the Merger
Consideration ... the Exchange Agent shall pay such excess amount to the Company Stockholders in accordance with
their Pro Rata Percentage.”).
95 In this context, I need not consider Petitioners' additional argument that Harris Williams's fairness opinion was unreliable
because it did not consider the escrow provision.
96 Alicia Dunne is not a Petitioner in this action; therefore, her shares are not included in this appraisal.
97 See Emerald P'rs v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1224 (Del.1999) ( “Issues not briefed are deemed waived.”).
98 Tr. 219–20 (Brunk); JX 211; JX 214.
99 Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., 1993 WL 208763, at *11 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993).
100 This value was calculated by inputting the conclusions in this Opinion into the model provided by Atkins.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
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*1  In this appraisal action, filed pursuant to Section 262
of the Delaware General Corporation Law (“DGCL”), the
court is called upon to determine the fair value of the
shares of common stock of PharmaSciences, Inc. (“PSI”
or “Company”), a Delaware corporation, as of June 30,
1999, the date on which it merged (“Merger”) with and into
Cytokine Networks, Inc. (“CNI”). The surviving corporation
then changed its name to Cytotokine PharmaSciences, Inc.
(“CPSI”). Pursuant to the Merger, each share of PSI common
stock was converted into the right to receive approximately
59.4 shares of CPSI common stock. Petitioner made a timely
demand for appraisal in accordance with the requirements
of Section 262 of the DGCL. Petitioner contends that PSI's
fair equity value at the time of the Merger was $192.5
million, or $3,330 per share. Petitioner also seeks 8.31%
interest compounded monthly on his appraisal award, plus his
costs and expenses including reasonable expert witness and
attorney's fees.
The Respondent contends that the fair value of PSI at the time
of the Merger was $26.5 million, or $458 per share of common
stock. Respondent agrees that interest should be awarded at
the rate of 8.31% but argues that it should be compounded
quarterly not monthly. Respondent also objects to any award
of expert witness or attorney's fees.
For reasons discussed below, I find that (i) the going concern
value of PSI common stock, as of June 30, 1999, was $1,114
per share, or a total of $659,458 for the 592 shares subject
to appraisal; (ii) the Petitioner is entitled to 8.31% interest
compounded monthly; and (iii) the Petitioner is not entitled
to an award of legal fees or expenses.
II. Background
A. PSI's Creation
PSI was incorporated in Delaware on February 25, 1992.
From its inception to the date of the Merger, PSI was a closely
held corporation primarily in the business of developing drug
delivery products. Drug delivery is the method of delivering
a biological or pharmaceutical compound into the body in an
efficient manner in order to optimize the therapeutic effect
and/or minimize side effects.
PSI was founded by Petitioner, Kerry Gray, along with
Richard P. Storm and Dennis F. Willson. Gray was employed
by PSI for eighteen months during 1992-1993. At the time
of the Merger, Gray owned 592 of the 57,800 issued and
outstanding shares of PSI common stock. Immediately prior
to the Merger, Storm was President and CEO of PSI while
Willson held the positions of Vice President and Secretary.
Both Storm and Willson were involved in making financial
projections for the Company.
PSI was not fully funded until May 28, 1993, when
Acquisition and Shareholders Agreements were signed. The
parties to the shareholders agreement included Montgomery
Medical Ventures (“MMV”), a venture capital fund that
focused on the health science area, and entities owned or
controlled by Jeffrey Picower. Picower, directly or indirectly,
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controlled a majority of the outstanding shares of PSI
common stock.
B. PSI's Operations
*2  To evaluate the different products being developed and
sold by PSI at the time of the Merger, some understanding
of government regulation of pharmaceutical products is
necessary.
1. Regulatory Approval
A new drug or drug delivery system must proceed through
various stages of testing in order to obtain FDA approval. The
initial stage consists of laboratory and animal testing and is
often termed “preclinical testing.” The next stage is Phase I,
which involves testing done on a small group of volunteers.
The purpose of Phase I testing is to determine safety and
dosage. The product then moves to Phase II, which typically
involves testing on 100 to 300 patient volunteers for the
purpose of evaluating efficacy and side effects. Finally, 1,000
to 5,000 patient volunteers are used in Phase III testing to
monitor adverse reactions to long-term use and to determine
the effectiveness of the product.
Drug delivery companies such as PSI apply proprietary
techniques to create new pharmaceutical products based on
drugs developed by others. These products are generally
novel, cost-effective dosage forms that provide any of several
benefits, such as improved safety, efficacy and ease of
use. The risks and costs inherent to commercializing a
pharmaceutical product are considerably minimized when
developing an alternative delivery system for a currently
approved drug. While on average it takes 10 to 15 years
to bring a new chemical entity to market, a new delivery
formulation of an existing approved product takes on average
5 years.
2. PSI's Products
At the time of the Merger, Cervidil® was the Company's only
product on the market. Cervidil® is a vaginal insert used to
ripen the cervix when there is a need to induce labor. The
insert, which is attached to a string for ease of removal,
contains Dinoprostone (“PGE2”) in a controlled-release
hydrogel polymer. Cervidil® has a number of advantages
over competitive products. In particular, it is control released,
which eliminates dosing, and it can be easily removed in
case of an adverse reaction. Through the Company's sole
licensee in the United States, Forest Laboratories, Cervidil®
has captured over 85% of the relevant United States market.
Outside the United States, Cervidil® is marketed under the
name Propess®. Prior to the Merger, Propess® had been
launched in the U.K., Canada and Sweden. It was scheduled
to launch in France in 1999; in Germany, Norway and
Switzerland in late 1999 or 2000; in Australia and New
Zealand in late 1999 or early 2000; and in Japan beginning
in 2002.
At the time of the Merger, PSI had three products in its
development pipeline: an erectile dysfunction product (“ED
Product”), a Parkinson's disease product and a mucositis
product. Both the Parkinson's disease product and the
mucositis product were in Phase I of development. Both
products used the same hydrogel polymer that was used in
Cervidil® but these products were designed for oral delivery.
*3  The ED Product was developed by Dr. Gary Neal,
founder and CEO of AndroSolutions, Inc. Dr. Neal first
approached PSI in late 1996 to obtain a small quantity
of PGE2 for work he was doing in the area of erectile
dysfunction. In exchange for the PGE2, Dr. Neal gave PSI a
right of first refusal on any products he developed in the field.
In late 1997, Dr. Neal presented PSI with a product he had
developed and was testing under a physician's IND.1 This
product was a combination of PGE2 and a dehydrogenase
inhibitor (oleic acid) and was designed to be inserted into
the meatus (tip) of the penis where it would dissolve at body
temperature, be absorbed into the body, migrate to the base
of the penis and produce an erection sufficient for vaginal
penetration. The theory behind the use of an inhibitor was
that, although PGE2 is a potent vasodilator, it is quickly
broken down by enzymes. Thus, if this breakdown could be
prevented or delayed, the PGE2 could be used to induce an
erection even when administered in the relatively remote site,
such as the tip of the penis. Since this concept did not involve
a transdermal injection or the use of any mechanical device
for inserting the product deep into the urethra, PSI thought
it would be an attractive alternative to other non-systemic
therapies then available on the market.2
Although PGE2 was an approved drug, it had never
been approved for the treatment of ED. In addition, the
combination of PGE2 with a dehydrogenase inhibitor had
- 148 -
Gray v. Cytokine Pharmasciences, Inc., Not Reported in A.2d (2002)
28 Del. J. Corp. L. 291
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3
never been approved for any purpose. Nevertheless, the
record shows that PSI initially regarded the inhibitor to
be classified as “GRAS,” i.e., generally accepted as safe.3
Also, “because there was experience using [PGE2] in cervical
ripening ... the regulatory pathway would be easier.”4 While
the regulatory barriers confronting the ED Product were not
“insignificant,” PSI expected that process to be “much easier
than starting with a new chemical entity....”5
At its meeting held on December 10, 1997, the PSI board
of directors expressed a favorable view of management's
proposal to pursue the development of the ED Product and
instructed them to develop a clinical plan with cost estimates,
for presentation at the next meeting. Thereafter, management
developed such a plan and presented it to the PSI board
at its April 14, 1998 meeting, at which the directors were
told that the ED Product had passed a “preliminary efficacy
test.”6 The PSI directors approved a licensing agreement
with AndroSolutions and agreed to convey an initial payment
of $200,000 to AndroSolutions. The board also authorized
a budget of approximately $750,000 (including licensing
fees) to see the project through the proof-of-principle stage,
estimated to continue through the first quarter of 1999. The
licensing agreement was signed on July 9, 1998. Under its
terms, PSI would have to make a second payment of $400,000
to AndroSolutions on its first anniversary, unless it decided
to terminate the contract, in which case it could avoid the
payment.
*4  PSI conducted a double-blind, randomized, placebo-
controlled Phase I clinical trial for the ED Product in the first
quarter of 1999. The results of this testing were inconclusive.
Further work was done in March and April 1999 to understand
those results, including a meeting held at CTS's laboratories
in Scotland with Dr. Neal. The results of those meetings are
summarized in a series of reports prepared by J.A. Halliday, a
scientist employed at CTS. In summary, the reports relate that
CTS was unable to formulate a product with the same clinical
effects as those reported by Dr. Neal.
This report was discouraging to PSI management, but they
did not abandon their efforts to find a solution to the problem
because the potential financial rewards of a successful ED
Product were so great. As of the effective date of the Merger,
the board of directors had not decided whether to make the
next $400,000 payment to AndroSolutions or to pull the plug
on the project.
C. The Merger
Beginning in the spring of 1996, the management and major
stockholders of PSI began active consideration of an exit
strategy. The possibilities considered included (a) an outright
sale of the Company, (b) a merger with another company
which was either publicly traded or had the prospects of going
public; and (c) development of new products, which would
lead to an IPO or increase the value of the Company for sale
or merger.
Later in 1996, PSI's management had discussions with
representatives from Forest Laboratories concerning a
possible sale of the Company. Representatives of Forest
prepared a financial analysis, which concluded that PSI had a
net present value of $27 million. PSI's management, however,
found the analysis to be flawed because it did not consider any
value for new products. Consequently, PSI's board rejected
the offer from Forest.
PSI's management also considered a proposal by the
investment firm of Volpe Welty & Co. to sell the Company.
Volpe Welty advised the PSI board that the sale price of
the Company should range between $35 and $45 million,
although a higher price could be obtained if an active bidding
auction occurred. Picower, however, concluded that at $35
to $45 million, he would rather keep the Company than sell
it. At this time, there was general agreement among the PSI
board that the Company should be valued in the range of $60
million.
In 1997, Access Pharmaceuticals-a company run by Petitioner
Gray-offered $45 million for PSI, subject to due diligence
and financing. Access later increased its offer to $51 million.
In correspondence between Gray and PSI, Gray maintained
that investment bankers for Access considered the $51 million
offer to be a premium price based on a discounted cash flow
(“DCF”) models and payback analysis.
While the Access offer was pending, PSI's management also
explored a merger with CNI, which was also controlled
by Picower. In connection with those discussions, Lehman
Brothers was retained to value PSI in April 1997. Using
financial projections prepared by PSI's management that did
not quantify new business opportunities, Lehman Brothers
valued PSI at $64 million. One of the exercises performed by
Lehman Brothers was a DCF analysis of the projected stream
of earnings attributable to the cervical ripening product. This
DCF analysis produced a valuation range with a midpoint of
$83 million.
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*5  In mid-1998, PSI's management estimated the value of
the Company at $49.4 million without new products and
$129.6 million with new products. CPSI now contends that
the projections used to support these valuation exercises
were inaccurate because they did not take into account the
probability that some or all of the new products would fail.
In other words, CPSI argues that the projections prepared by
PSI management were not meant to reflect management's best
estimate of the future performance of the Company.
In 1999, PSI's management met with representatives of CNI
and decided to merge on a stock-for-stock basis. MMV,
which owned approximately 39% of PSI's common stock,
was opposed to the Merger because MMV was about to
liquidate and could not distribute unregistered securities to
its investors. Under the stockholders' agreement, MMV had
the right to block a merger. In return for liquidity, however,
MMV was willing to sell its interest in PSI at a discount
from fair value. PSI repurchased MMV's interest at a price of
$266 a share,7 a price that PSI Chief Executive Officer later
described as a “steal.”
After negotiating a 60:40 ratio (PSI to CNI) for the Merger,
both parties deemed it necessary to obtain a fairness opinion.
After pricing such an opinion, however, the parties decided
to save money by asking Merrill Lynch to value the stock of
both companies, without opining as to fairness. Accordingly,
Merrill Lynch was engaged to determine the fair market value
of PSI and CNI for a proposed merger of the two companies.
The Merrill Lynch valuation derived the following equity


























In its DCF analysis, Merrill Lynch applied a blended discount
rate of 40% to 50% to management's financial projections,
i.e., a lower rate was used for the product already on the
market and a higher rate for the pipeline products. At the
time of the valuation, PSI's management took issue with the
discount rate used by Merrill Lynch and contended that it
should be significantly lower.8 Merrill Lynch did not agree
and stuck to the higher discount rates.
In this appraisal action, CPSI takes the position that the
Merrill Lynch valuation is entirely irrelevant because, it
claims, Merrill Lynch supposedly did not value either PSI
or CNI as a going concern on a stand-alone basis. Rather,
Respondent claims that management sought only a relative
valuation from Merrill Lynch in order to confirm that the
proposed allocation of 60% PSI and 40% CNI was justified
for purposes of the Merger.
D. The Experts
Gray's trial expert was Jeffrey B. Davis, President of
Small Caps Online Group, LLC (“SCO”). SCO is a
boutique communications and investment banking firm that
provides financial services to small-cap health care and
information technology companies. Davis earned an M.B.A.
from the Wharton School of Business of the University of
Pennsylvania. His experience includes service as a Senior
Vice President and CFO of a publicly traded development
stage healthcare technology company, and a position as Vice
President, Corporate Finance at Deutsche Bank. Davis had
never before served as an expert in any judicial proceeding.
Gray retained Davis in this matter because of his expertise in
the emerging pharmaceutical marketplace. Gray was familiar
with Davis because of services SCO provided to Gray as
President and CEO of Access Pharmaceuticals.
*6  Davis relied entirely on a DCF analysis to value PSI,
testifying that other approaches normally used to value
companies were not useful in valuing PSI.9 Davis's DCF
analysis was based on the projections prepared by PSI's
management and given to Merrill Lynch. Davis claims that
these projected revenues, earnings and cash flows were
discounted using discount rates commensurate with other
drug delivery companies. Davis's DCF analysis ultimately
resulted in a valuation with a midpoint of $192.5 million, or
$3,330 per share.
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Respondent's expert witness was J. Mark Penny of Hempstead
& Company. Penny is an accredited senior appraiser in the
American Society of Appraisers with a specialty discipline
of business valuation. Penny has conducted approximately
one thousand business valuations, including ten in the
pharmaceutical industry and two in the drug delivery
business.
In determining the fair value of PSI common stock, Penny
used a DCF analysis and a guideline company analysis.
Based on the DCF analysis, Penny determined that the fair
equity value of the Company was $36.7 million. Based
on the guideline company analysis, Penny concluded that
the fair equity value of the Company was approximately
$35.9 million. Weighing these nearly identical results equally,
Penny found that the fair value of PSI common stock at the
time of the Merger was $36.4 million, or $383 per share.
Penny subsequently adjusted this valuation to reflect the fact
that MMV shares were not outstanding at the time of the
Merger, having been purchased for $10 million cash. After
making this adjustment, Penny concluded that the fair equity
value of the Company was $26.5 million, or $458 per share.
III. Analysis
Under Section 262 of the DGCL, Gray is entitled to his pro
rata share of the fair value of PSI's common stock at the time
of the Merger. Fair value, as used in Section 262(h), has been
defined as “the value of the Company to the stockholder as
a going concern, rather than its value to a third party as an
acquisition.”10 Furthermore, Section 262(h) directs this court
to calculate the going concern value “exclusive of any element
of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of
the merger or consolidation.”11
As is all too often the case, the parties' experts examined
PSI's operations and assets at the time of Merger, analyzed
the corporation's financial performance, both historical
and projected, and came up with enormously disparate
conclusions as to its value. Penny, for the Respondent,
concluded that PSI's going concern value was only $26.5
million and, thus, Gray was entitled to approximately
$271,136 for his shares. Davis, for the Petitioner, arrived
at a value of $192.5 million for the Company and
approximately $1,971,360 for Gray's shares. Obviously, the
underlying assumptions that drive these valuations must be
tested to ensure that all relevant facts are properly and
reasonably considered.12 Just as obviously, I must examine
the circumstances surrounding the preparation of these
valuations to determine whether or not they are credible or
reliable.
*7  Fortunately, I have the benefit of an independent
valuation performed by Merrill Lynch in connection with the
Merger.13 PSI management used the Merrill Lynch valuation
to justify a favorable exchange ratio for its shareholders in
the Merger. Moreover, the record fully justifies the conclusion
that PSI's management and board of directors accepted the
Merrill Lynch analysis and valuation as substantially accurate
for purposes of approving that transaction. In this litigation,
CPSI chose to retain Penny's firm, rather than Merrill Lynch,
to act as its expert witness. Penny arrived at a valuation
more than 50% lower than Merrill Lynch. To explain this
significant variance, CPSI tries to undermine the reliability of
Merrill Lynch's work as a measure of going concern value.
The arguments it makes are discussed and rejected below.14
I find that the Merrill Lynch valuation is both reliable and
highly probative of the going concern value of PSI and will
rely on it in appraising the shares at issue.
A. Petitioner's Valuation Expert
Davis prepared a DCF analysis, a comparable companies
analysis and a comparable Mergers & Acquisitions
transactions analysis. The reliability of Davis's entire
valuation is undermined for several reasons. First, more
than a year before the Merger, Gray retained Davis to
serve as a financial consultant and advisor to Access
Pharmaceuticals. At that time, Gray was President and CEO
of Access and regularly consulted with Davis in connection
with financial advisory issues and investor relations needs.
In exchange for his services, Davis received substantial
monthly cash payments and warrants to purchase Access
stock. Furthermore, Davis admitted that he agreed to serve
as an expert in this action, a role that he never previously
performed, due to his relationship with Gray. These facts
substantially undermine Davis's ability to act independently
of Gray.
Second, Davis's valuation report contained several errors.
In his DCF analysis, Davis included interest income in his
projection of free cash flows15 and applied an inappropriately
low discount rate to PSI's future cash flows.16 These errors
resulted in a substantial overvaluation of the Company and
further undermine the reliability of Davis's DCF analysis.
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Finally, Davis's valuation reached conclusions as to value that
are so high that they draw into question both his qualifications
and his independence. Compared to the valuations conducted
by Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers, Davis's valuation is
off the charts. As stated above, the Merrill Lynch analysis
produced a valuation with a midpoint of $87.5 million. On
par with the Merrill Lynch analysis, Lehman Brothers' April
1997 DCF analysis valued PSI at approximately $84 million.
Davis's valuation, which produced a going concern value of
$192.5 million, more than doubles the results reached by
Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers.
Davis's going concern value is also more than four times
higher than any offer PSI's board received when attempting
to sell the Company. In 1996, PSI's board rejected a $27
million offer from Forest Laboratories. At about the same
time, Volpe Welty & Co. advised PSI's board that the sale
price of the Company should range between $35 and $45
million. In 1997, Access Pharmaceuticals offered to purchase
PSI for $51 million. The extraordinary variance from these
indications of value is unexplained.
*8  In sum, when compared to other indications of value,
Davis's valuation is such an outlier that it casts doubt on
its reliability, quite apart from its exact assumptions and
methodologies. Given its “outlier” status, Gray and Davis had
an obligation to explain the extreme variation from the pack.
Because they failed to do so, and because of Davis's lack of
independence, I will not rely on Davis's valuation.
B. Respondent's Valuation
Respondent's expert, Penny, included a DCF analysis and a
comparable companies analysis in his valuation. For reasons
discussed below, I also find Penny's entire valuation to be
unreliable.
1. Discounted Cash Flow Approach
In preparing his DCF analysis, Penny completely disregarded
the cash flow projections that were prepared by PSI's
management and relied on by Merrill Lynch. Instead, Penny
made his own projections. He did so by assuming a constant
rate of growth over PSI's 1998 revenues (10% in one case
and 20% in the other). Penny also eliminated all projected
earnings from new products.
In formulating his own projections for PSI, Penny endorsed
CSPI's argument that management's prior forecasts were
merely “what if” scenarios used to assist the board
in considering various funding options. I cannot agree.
Considering the type of industry PSI is in, management
projections will inevitably contain “what if” scenarios. This is
primarily due to the inherent difficulty involved in predicting
when a pipeline product will gain FDA approval and how
much of a market share an approved product will capture.
Nevertheless, PSI's management presented these forecasts to
Merrill Lynch to determine the fair market value of PSI and
CNI for a proposed merger of the two companies. In fact,
Willson testified that his projections were based on detailed
information and were conservatively prepared. Certainly,
CPSI presented no evidence suggesting that Merrill Lynch
was told that the financial forecasts it was given were mere
“management tools” that did not accurately reflect PSI's
future cash flows.
Aside from disregarding management's revenue projections,
Penny also ignored management's projections in several
other respects. Specifically, Penny increased management's
projected General and Administrative expenses from 5% to
10%; increased management's projected Cost of Goods Sold
and Royalties from 37.6% of sales to 50% of sales; and
increased the tax rate to 40% from management's projected
35%. Penny did not provide valid reasons to warrant all of
these adjustments. In sum, I cannot accept that Penny, with
his limited experience with the Company, was better equipped
to make future financial projections than PSI's management.
Consequently, I find Penny's litigation-driven projections to
be unreliable and, thus, disregard his DCF analysis. Any other
result would condone allowing a company's management or
board of directors to disavow their own data in order to justify
a lower valuation in an appraisal proceeding.17
*9  I also find that Penny's DCF is so heavily dependent
on the determination of PSI's terminal value that the entire
exercise amounts to little more than a special case of the
comparable companies approach to value and, thus, has little
or no independent validity.18 This is easily seen from the
fact that Penny's discounted terminal value calculations equal
or exceed 75% of the total discounted cash flow value of
the enterprise in the lowest case and 85% or more in the
other three cases presented. Thus, it is hardly surprising that
there is a tight fit between the results Penny derives from the
DCF ($36.7 million) and that from the comparable companies
approach to value ($35.9 million). In the circumstances, this
is an added reason not to rely on Penny's DCF analysis in
valuing PSI.
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2. Comparable Companies Approach
Penny's comparable companies approach is also unreliable for
several, different, reasons. First, the comparable companies
used by Penny were much larger than PSI both in terms
of revenue and market capitalization.19 Second, of the ten
comparable companies utilized by Penny, only one was in the
drug delivery business. This court has found that the “utility of
the comparable company approach depends on the similarity
between the company the court is valuing and the companies
used for comparison.”20 Where there is a “lack of comparable
companies,” the analysis is not “particularly meaningful” and
should not be used.21 Since Penny's comparable companies
were not in the drug delivery business and were on average
much larger than PSI, I find that they are dissimilar from PSI.
As a result, I find Penny's comparable companies analysis to
be unreliable.
C. The Merrill Lynch Valuation
The valuation done by Merrill Lynch is a reliable depiction
of the fair value of PSI at the time of the Merger. Merrill
Lynch was a disinterested party at the time it prepared its
valuation. Unlike the litigation-driven models prepared by
each party's expert witness, the Merrill Lynch valuation was
prepared shortly before the Merger at a time when Merrill
Lynch had no incentive to artificially inflate or shrink the
value of PSI.
CPSI argues that the Merrill Lynch valuation should be set
aside because it does not represent the fair value of PSI as
a going concern on a stand-alone basis. CPSI contends that
the Merrill Lynch valuation was done only to determine the
relative values of CNI and PSI-not their absolute values-
in connection with a possible stock-for-stock merger. In
support of this contention, CPSI cites deposition testimony
elicited from Kit A. Kamholz, lead analyst in the Merrill
Lynch valuation. At his deposition, Kamholz testified that
the projections used in his DCF valuation do not take into
account the risk that the ED Product would never be approved.
Kamholz further testified that, had he valued PSI as a going
concern on a stand-alone basis, he would have adjusted
management's financial projections to reflect the increased
risk associated with the “stage of development the client was
in.” Kamholz repeatedly stated that he took management's
financial projections at face value and did not discount the
projections to reflect the possibility that the pipeline products
would never reach the market.
*10  If this were true, it would, of course, undermine the
reliability of the Merrill Lynch DCF analysis. However,
Kamholz's deposition testimony on this matter contradicts
what is actually stated in the Merrill Lynch valuation report.
When discussing the discount rate applied to management's
projected cash flows, the valuation report states:
Discount rates for development stage companies in the
biopharmaceutical/biotechnology industry typically range
from 35% to 70%. The discount rate appropriate for a
particular company depends upon factors including:
- Stage of development for the company's product pipeline
(i.e ., Preclinical, Phase I, Phase II, Phase III) and the
probability of developing these products successfully.
- Diversification of the product pipeline/portfolio.
- Level of competition within the targeted market(s).
- Existence of collaborations and/or partnerships with large
drug companies.
- Outlook for and existence of commercially launched
products by the company.
- Management depth and other qualitative factors.
Given these considerations and other factors specific to
PSI, Merrill Lynch applied discount rates of 40% to 50%
to PSI'S forecasted cash flows. (Emphasis added.)
The italicized portion of the Merrill Lynch report directly
contradicts Kamholz's testimony. It is quite clear that the
large discount rate applied by Merrill Lynch to PSI's projected
cash flows takes into consideration the possibility that the
Company's pipeline products will never reach the market.
Moreover, the thrust of CPSI's argument is undercut by other
parts of Kamholz's testimony. At his deposition, Kamholz
stated that Merrill Lynch's valuation approach would not
have changed if the Merger were a stock-for-cash merger
as opposed to a stock-for-stock merger. He clarified this
statement by agreeing that if the Merger involved Cytokine
shareholders receiving stock and PSI shareholders receiving
cash, his valuation method would have been the same.
The obvious implication of this testimony is that Kamholz
and Merrill Lynch did not merely perform a comparative
valuation but, instead, applied normal valuation techniques as
they would in any valuation assignment.
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1. Discounted Cash Flow Approach
In its DCF analysis, Merrill Lynch applied a range of
discount rates to PSI's projected cash flows. As noted above,
the discount rates took several factors into consideration,
including the stage of development of the products in the
Company's pipeline and the probability of developing those
products successfully. Ultimately the discount rates applied to
PSI projected cash flows ranged from 40% to 50%.
Merrill Lynch also placed a value on PSI beyond the forecast
period by applying a range of multiples of revenue to
projected revenues in 2008. Based upon market valuations for
publicly traded companies similar to PSI, a range of revenue
multiples from 4.0x to 6.0x was selected. The terminal value
was then discounted to the present and added to the present
value of projected cash flows from 1999 to 2008.
*11  Applying different variations of discount rates and
terminal multiples leads to drastically different results. At
the low end of the spectrum, applying a 50% discount rate
and a terminal multiple of 4.0x would lead to a valuation
of approximately $66.5 million. At the high end of the
spectrum, applying a 40% discount rate together with a
terminal multiple of 6.0x would result in an approximate
valuation of $126.5 million.
I find that PSI's projected stream of future cash flows should
be discounted at 50%. As stated above, the Merrill Lynch
valuation was completed in May of 1999. Consequently,
the discouraging results of meetings conducted at CTS on
June 9 and 10, 1999 were not considered in Merrill Lynch's
analysis. The results obtained decreased the likelihood that
the ED Product would successfully enter the market. The
results, however, did not indicate that the ED Product
would never reach the market. If this were the case, PSI
management would certainly have informed Merrill Lynch
that its financial projections were inaccurate, which would
render the previously deduced merger ratio invalid. Because
PSI's board never informed Merrill Lynch of the “new”
information obtained at the CTS meeting, I will account for
that discouraging information by applying the high end (50%)
of the range of discount rates applied by Merrill Lynch.
I also find that a revenue multiple of 4.0x should be applied to
PSI's projected revenues in 2008 to determine most accurately
the Company's terminal value. At the time of the Merger,
PSI was in a strong financial position and it had no long-
term debt on its balance sheet. Furthermore, it had a very
successful product that had captured over 85% of the United
States market and was scheduled to launch in markets all
over the globe. Nevertheless, a substantial part of PSI's future
revenues hinged on the success of the ED Product. Taking into
consideration the discouraging results of the CTS meeting, I
find that applying a low revenue multiple of 4.0x will best
reflect PSI's terminal value.
Applying a 50% discount rate to PSI's projected cash
flows together with a terminal multiple of 4.0x results in
an enterprise value of approximately $66.5 million. The
enterprise value must be adjusted because Merrill Lynch's
DCF valuation did not include interest income on any cash or
cash equivalents or interest expense on any debt. As a result,
the Company's cash or cash equivalents should be added to the
Company's enterprise value. Conversely, any interest-bearing
debt should be deducted from the Company's enterprise value.
As of June 30, 1999, the Company had cash and investments
of $8.7 million and no interest-bearing debt. Adding $8.7
million to the Company's enterprise value results in a derived
value of $75.2 million. Consequently, I find that based on a
DCF analysis, PSI's going concern value at the time of the
Merger was $75.2 million.
2. Comparable Companies Approach
Merrill Lynch's comparable companies analysis also reliably
depicts the fair value of PSI at the time of the Merger.22 Using
this approach, Merrill Lynch analyzed market capitalization
and market value multiples for publicly traded biotechnology
and biopharmaceutical companies that focused on drug
delivery technology. Aside from focusing on drug delivery
companies, Merrill Lynch took other precautions to ensure
that the comparable companies were sufficiently similar to
PSI. It excluded companies with revenues greater than $150
million and also left out companies with no commercially
launched products on the market. In the end, Merrill Lynch
found five companies that focused on drug delivery, were
of similar size, and had products in similar stages to that
of PSI. Based on multiples derived from the comparable
companies, Merrill Lynch determined that PSI's enterprise
value ranged from $57,843,000 to $71,482,000.23 I will use
the midpoint of this range, which is $64,662,500. Similar
to the DCF analysis, the enterprise value deduced from the
comparable companies analysis must be adjusted to reflect
PSI's cash or cash equivalents and interest-bearing debt as of
June 30, 1999. Adding $8.7 million results in a derived value
of $73,362,500.24
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*12  Merrill Lynch's DCF and comparable companies
analyses were both reliable measures of going concern value.
As such, I will average their results, which leads to a going
concern value of $74,281,250. This value must be adjusted
to reflect the repurchase of MMV's substantial holdings of
PSI's common stock. MMV's 37,200 shares of common stock
were repurchased by the Company immediately prior to the
merger for $9,899,204. The purchase price of $9,899,204
is subtracted from the going concern value of $74,281,250,
which yields an adjusted fair equity value of $64,382,046.
Reducing the shares issued and outstanding to 57,800 and
dividing that number into $64,382,046 yields a per share
value of $1,114.
D. Post-Merger Interest
Section 262(i) of the DGCL provides in pertinent part that
after appraising the shares:
The Court shall direct the payment of the fair value of the
shares, together with interest, if any, by the surviving or
resulting corporation to the stockholders entitled thereto.
Interest may be simple or compound, as the Court may
direct.
Both parties agree that interest should be awarded at the
compound rate of 8.31%. They disagree, however, on the
proper compounding interval. Relying on several recent
decisions of this court, Gray contends that interest should
be compounded on a monthly basis.25 Gray also bases this
conclusion on the fact that PSI loaned funds to CNI a few
months prior to the Merger at a rate of 10% compounded
monthly. I agree with Gray and find that in the present context
it is appropriate to compound interest on a monthly basis.
E. Fees and Expenses
Section 262 of the DGCL provides that “[t]he costs of the
[appraisal] proceeding may be determined by the Court [of
Chancery] and taxed upon the parties as the Court deems
equitable in the circumstances.”26 This statute was interpreted
in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, where the Delaware Supreme
Court stated, “[i]n the absence of an equitable exception, the
plaintiff in an appraisal proceeding should bear the burden of
paying its own expert witnesses and attorneys.”27
Gray relies on the argument that CPSI proceeded in bad faith,
for two reasons. First, Gray argues that Penny's valuation
is equivalent to the MMV repurchase price, which Storm
described as a “steal.” Second, Gray argues that he demanded
appraisal in reliance on the Merrill Lynch analysis that
was provided to him by PSI management in connection
with the Merger. As such, Gray contends that Respondent's
disavowal of the Merrill Lynch valuation is “unprincipled”
and “inequitable.” Gray's first point is simply incorrect. The
MMV repurchase price and the per share value deduced by
Penny were not “equivalent.” Penny's valuation of $458 per
share was significantly higher than the $266 repurchase price
offered to MMV. Gray's second point is closer to the mark
but, ultimately, unpersuasive because Gray did not rely on the
Merrill Lynch analysis in this litigation. Instead, he obtained
and tried to persuade the court to adopt the work of his
own ill-qualified and unreliable expert. In sum, I find that
Gray has failed to prove an equitable exception and, thus, he
should bear the burden of paying his own expert witness and
attorney's fees.
IV. Conclusion
*13  For all the foregoing reasons, I determine that the fair
value of each share of PSI's common stock, as of the date of
the Merger, was $1,114 and, thus, will enter an order awarding
Petitioner a total of $659,488 plus interest at the rate of 8.31%,
compounded monthly. The parties are directed to present an
order of final judgment in conformity with this opinion within
10 days of this date.
All Citations
Not Reported in A.2d, 2002 WL 853549, 28 Del. J. Corp. L.
291
Footnotes
1 A physician's IND (investigational new drug) allows a physician to treat patients under a specific protocol. In the present
case, Dr. Neal's protocol was to treat patients using the drug Dinoprostone without the use of any inhibitors.
2 Systemic drugs such as Viagra affect the entire systemic circulation of the body. Unlike systemic drugs, locally acting
drugs such as the ED Product are designed to affect a specific part of the body without causing systemic reactions or
side effects.
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3 Willson testified that, based on Dr. Neal's representations, he initially classified the inhibitor as GRAS. Willson further
stated that his initial classification changed when Affiliated Research Centers, a clinical trials organization, informed him
that combining the inhibitor with Dinoprostone presented a substantial risk and would be required by the FDA to undergo
extensive preclinical testing.
4 Trial transcript (“Tr.”) at 400.
5 Tr. at 400.
6 This may refer to the fact that several officers of PSI and others at Controlled Therapeutics (Scotland) Ltd. (“CTS”), a
subsidiary product development and manufacturing facility, were given samples to the product to try on themselves.
7 At a price of $266 per share, PSI had an implied value of approximately $25 million at the time it repurchased MMV's
shares.
8 This is not surprising because at the time the Company's financial projections were submitted to Merrill Lynch, PSI
management possessed a significant percentage of PSI common stock and it was in their best interest to obtain a high
valuation of PSI. This would provide management a greater ownership interest in the newly formed CPSI.
9 Davis also conducted a comparable companies analysis and a comparable M & A transactions analysis. For reasons
discussed hereafter, he concluded that neither approach was appropriate in valuing PSI and that fair value is best
characterized by the DCF analysis.
10 M.P.M. Enterprises, Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 795 (Del.1999); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d
289, 299 (Del.1996) (failure to value the company as a going concern may result in an understatement of fair value).
11 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
12 Gilbert v. MPM Enterprises, Inc., 709 A.2d 663, 667 (Del. Ch.1997).
13 The benefit of having an independent expert was recognized in Gilbert, where then Vice Chancellor (now Justice) Steele
noted in footnote 8: “This clear tendency of experts to provide an extreme value most favorable for their client encourages
disagreement in every area of the proceeding. Weighing of these numerous minor areas of conflict, and not necessarily
the interpretation of financial models, is perhaps the best reason for this Court to consider appointing an independent
expert to sort through the clutter submitted.” Id. at 667 n. 8.
14 Petitioner also relies on the Merrill Lynch valuation in his post-trial reply brief, more or less to the exclusion of his own
trial expert whose report and opinion were both easily attacked.
15 Davis incorrectly assumed that interest income would be retained by the Company and not distributed to shareholders.
Unlike Penny and Merrill Lynch, Davis failed to make any adjustments to the interest income projections, thus resulting
in a substantial overvaluation.
16 Davis's comparable companies analysis also contained several errors. I will not delve into the specifics of those errors
because Gray conceded that the methodology used in the comparable companies approach was not useful in the present
context.
17 Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, Del. Ch., C.A. No. 7959, slip op. at 49, Jacobs, V.C. (Feb. 22, 1988), aff'd, 564 A.2d 1137
(Del.1989).
18 Terminal value is calculated by multiplying terminal year revenues or EBIT by figures derived from Penny's examination
of comparable companies.
19 The comparable companies taken together had a market capitalization with a median 24 times higher than PSI. The
median revenue of the comparable companies was 12 times larger than PSI.
20 In re Radiology Assoc., Inc. Lit., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch.1991).
21 Kahn v. Household Acquisition Corp., 591 A.2d 166, 175 (Del.1991).
22 This comparable companies analysis was prepared when Merrill Lynch worked for both PSI and CNI. Consequently,
there was no bias in the assignment and Merrill Lynch had no incentive to artificially inflate or shrink the value of PSI.
Moreover, Respondent's criticism of the Merrill Lynch valuation appears to be directed solely at the DCF analysis.
23 The enterprise value of $57,843,000 was determined by applying a multiple of 6.63x to PSI's revenues in the twelve
months ending April 27, 1999. Ideally, the revenue multiple of 6.63x should be multiplied by PSI's LTM revenues ending
June 30, 1999, however, neither party has presented that figure to the court. The enterprise value of $71,482,000 was
determined by applying a multiple of 14.1x to PSI's projected 2000 Net Income.
24 Merrill Lynch did not adjust this result by applying either a control premium or an illiquidity discount. Neither party
challenges this approach.
25 See Onti, Inc. v. Integra Bank, Del. Ch., Consol. C.A. No. 14514, Chandler, C., slip op. at 51 (May 26, 1999) (awarding
interest compounded monthly); Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., Del. Ch., C.A. No. 12334, Chandler, C., slip
op. at 39 (Aug. 26, 1997) (“the dual purposes of compensation and restitution may only be served by a compounding
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interval at least as frequent as one month”), aff'd, 708 A.2d 630 (Del.1998); Hintmann v. Fred Weber, Inc., Del. Ch., C.A.
No. 12839, Steele, V.C., slip op. at 33 (Feb. 17, 1998) (awarding interest “adjusted and compounded monthly”).
26 8 Del. C. § 262(j).
27 684 A.2d 289, 301 (Del.1996).
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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*1  This matter requires me to perform a statutory appraisal
to determine the “fair value” of the stock of CKx, Inc. What
is the fair value of an asset? For a simple asset—a piece
of real property, for instance—it is the market value. If a
trustee were to sell property held in trust, such a sale could
be challenged by the beneficiary on a number of grounds.
It would be odd, however, if the sale were an arms-length,
disinterested transaction after an adequate market canvas and
auction, yet the challenge was that the price received did not
represent “fair” value. It would be odder still if the beneficiary
presented as evidence of this proposition a post-sale appraisal,
relying on speculative future income from the property not
currently being realized, and stating that, notwithstanding
the sales price, the true value was more than twice that
received; and if the trustee's rebuttal involved a second post-
facto appraisal indicating that the sales price was higher than
the fair value of the parcel. In such a case, the appraisals
would be viewed by this Court, not as some Platonic ideal
of “true value,” but as estimates—educated guesses—as to
what price could be achieved by exposing the property to
the market. A law-trained judge would have scant grounds
to substitute his own appraisal for those of the real-estate
valuation experts, and would have no reason to second-guess
the market price absent demonstration of self-dealing or a
flawed sales process.
I am faced with a similar situation in this much more complex
venue of the sale of a corporate enterprise. The Petitioners
are stockholders in a corporation, CKx, who have opted for
appraisal rather than the cash-out price received in the sale
of CKx to an acquirer. The sales process here has been
challenged, reviewed and found free of fiduciary and process
irregularities.1 The company was sold after a full market
canvas and auction. Under our appraisal statute, I am to
determine the fair value of the shares as a going concern.
The parties have submitted expert valuations of the company,
ranging from an amount below the sales price (submitted
by the Respondents) to more than twice the sales price
(submitted by the Petitioners). Our statute and the interpreting
case law direct that I not rely presumptively on the price
achieved by exposing the company to the market. I must
evaluate “all relevant factors,” and arrive at a going-concern
value inclusive of any assets not properly accounted for
in the sale, but exclusive of synergy value that may have
been captured by the seller.2 In part, this directive represents
the greater complexity in valuing, marketing and selling an
ongoing corporate enterprise, in contrast to the simple sale of
an asset, such as a parcel of real estate. Typically, therefore,
this Court has relied on expert valuation, such as those
employing discounted cash flow and comparable company
analyses, to determine statutory fair value. Even so, market
value—where reliably derived—remains among the “relevant
factors” for arriving at fair value. In this particular case, CKx
presents significant and atypical valuation challenges, for
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the reasons I describe below. In particular, the unpredictable
nature of the income stream from the company's primary asset
renders the apparent precision of the expert witnesses' cash
flow valuation illusory. Because neither party has presented
a reasonable alternative valuation method, and because I find
the sales price here a reliable indicator of value, I find that a
use of the merger price to determine fair value is appropriate
in this matter.
*2  I. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Enterprise
Prior to the CKx–Apollo merger, CKx was publically traded
on NASDAQ.3 CKx was formed by Robert F.X. Sillerman,
a businessman with experience in managing and investing in
media and entertainment companies, including radio, concert
promotion, sports management, and television.4 When CKx
and Apollo merged, Sillerman was the company's largest
stockholder, owning 20.6% of the company.5 Sillerman
created CKx to own and manage iconic entertainment
properties. CKx's business strategy arose from the premise
that the ever-increasing number of entertainment distribution
channels—including computer, smartphone, tablet, and
television—would lead to an ever-increasing demand for
original content. Sillerman and CKx management believed
that technology would result in consumers focusing less
on the distribution channel and more on the content they
were interested in, thereby allowing content owners to reap
increasing returns.6
In pursuit of this strategy, CKx focused on acquiring the
rights to iconic entertainment properties. As of 2010, CKx's
most significant assets were: (1) 19 Entertainment, which
owned rights to the number-one-rated television show, the
singing competition American Idol,7 as well as the successful
competitive dance show So You Think You Can Dance
(“Dance”); (2) Elvis Presley Enterprises, which owned the
rights to the name, image, and likeness of entertainer Elvis
Presley, as well as some rights to Presley's recorded music
catalog; and (3) Muhammad Ali Enterprises, which owned the
name, likeness, and image of the boxing champion.8 Though
CKx also owned other assets, these three, and particularly
American Idol, were by far the most valuable. In fact,
American Idol and its related assets were responsible for
approximately 60–75% of CKx's cash flow.9
B. CKx's Business as of the Merger Date
CKx's principle challenge was how to deal with the
maturation of the American Idol franchise. From its peak in
2006 until the time of the merger in 2011, American Idol
had suffered five seasons of declining ratings.10 During that
period, American Idol 's Nielsen ratings fell by almost 50%
among the lucrative 18–49 demographic.11 American Idol
also faced increasing competition from other reality shows
featuring musical competition. Particularly problematic in
the summer of 2011 was the looming threat of the talent-
competition show X–Factor.12 X–Factor was the brainchild
of former American Idol “judge” and prominent personality,
Simon Cowell. Cowell's success with a show similar to X–
Factor in the United Kingdom suggested that his show could
pose a serious threat to American Idol.13
*3  Compounding the economic uncertainty was the pending
expiration of the contract between American Idol 's network
distributor, Fox, and 19 Entertainment. At the time of the
merger, the agreement between 19 Entertainment and Fox
was set to expire, and the parties had not yet agreed to
a new contract.14 The key area of disagreement was the
amount of fixed licensing fees that Fox would pay for the
right to broadcast the show.15 Although American Idol was
one of Fox's most popular, and most profitable, shows,
CKx's negotiation leverage was limited.16 Because Fox held a
perpetual license to renew its exclusive contract to broadcast
American Idol, CKx could not threaten to shop the show
to an alternative network.17 The Respondent contends that
CKx's only practical leverage was that if Fox exercised its
option to renew the American Idol contract, CKx could refuse
to produce programming in excess of 37 hours for a given
season.18 American Idol had been producing over 50 hours
of programming in the most recent seasons.19 In other words,
CKx could extract meaningful concessions from Fox only if
it could convince Fox that CKx was willing to cut off its nose
to spite its face. In addition to the uncertainties surrounding
American Idol 's prospects for future growth, Dance —which
had always been a much less popular show than American
Idol —also faced declining ratings.20
However, notwithstanding the declining ratings for CKx's
two most popular television programs, other developments
in the television marketplace suggested that both programs,
especially American Idol, could continue to generate
significant revenue for CKx. The network television industry
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has been experiencing declining ratings but increasing
advertising revenue for many years.21 Accordingly, for any
particular program, an absolute ratings decline could be offset
by an increase in a show's relative market share. At the
time of the merger, American Idol remained the number one
show on television. The Petitioners argue that as fewer and
fewer shows attract the type of mass audience enjoyed by
American Idol, the program's value could actually increase,
notwithstanding its declining ratings. At least one member of
CKx management held that view at the time of the merger.22
C. Sales Process
In 2007, CKx's prospects were bright enough that Sillerman
himself sought to buy out the public shareholders at a price
of $13.75 per share.23 However, his bid failed as “the recent
deterioration of credit conditions in the overall market had
made it uneconomic to execute the financing.”24 Perhaps
because the collapse of the Sillerman buyout was caused by
factors outside the parties' control, CKx management and
the market at large believed that a sale of the company was
imminent. As a result, CKx executed eight confidentiality
agreements with both strategic and private equity bidders
asserting some interest in the company.
The Petitioners contend that between 2008 and 2011, the
possible sale of CKx disrupted the company's acquisition
strategy.25 Despite the confidentiality agreements, no
proposals had arisen out of Sillerman's bid, which in
itself had unproductively lengthened the sales process by
sixteen months.26 As a result, the Board “concluded that
ongoing sale discussions were likely to be unproductive
and disruptive....”27 CKx CFO Tom Benson's testimony
confirmed that management viewed the process as
“unproductive” and “disruptive” as well, testifying that he
had discussed with director Bryan Bloom the fact that
prospective acquisition targets had been reluctant to sell to
CKx because of “the questions regarding the future ownership
of the company.”28 After concluding that a possible sale was
harming its business, CKx made a public announcement in
October 2010 that “it was no longer discussing a potential
sale of the Company or of a controlling stake in the
Company.”29 By taking down the figurative “for sale” sign
and refocusing on its strategy of acquiring and developing
valuable entertainment content, CKx hoped to overcome its
recent inability to make valuable acquisitions.
*4  In May of 2011, just one month before consummating
the merger with Apollo, CKx began exploring a purchase of
Sharp Entertainment, a television production company that
focused on reality and event-based programming and was
expected to generate about $11 million in operating income in
2011, roughly double its 2010 earnings.30 Sharp had produced
several popular reality shows, including the Travel Channel's
Man v. Food, the highest rated program in channel history.31
Sharp employed 160 people, most of whom were responsible
for producing and editing the more than thirty television
shows in the company's portfolio. Benson testified that CKx
was involved in “advanced discussions over price and terms”
before the Apollo transaction closed.32
The Sharp acquisition was not the only business opportunity
that CKx developed after announcing its intentions to forgo
a sale of the company. CKx's announcement that it was no
longer for sale had the ironic—but perhaps not unintended
—consequence of eliciting renewed interest from private
equity funds looking to purchase CKx. Among the newly
interested bidders were Apollo, the Gores Group (“Gores”),
and Prometheus/Guggenheim (“Guggenheim”).33 On March
18, 2011, Gores and financial sponsor “Party B” offered to
purchase CKx for $4.75 per share.34 On March 21, 2011,
Guggenheim and financial sponsor “Party C” proposed an
offer price of $4.50 per share.35 Then, on March 23, 2011,
Apollo offered $5.00 per share.36 After receiving these offers,
the Board considered its options and decided to again pursue
a sale of the company, but to do so expeditiously in an
attempt to avoid sending negative signals to the market or to
distract CKx management.37 The Board retained Gleacher as
its financial advisor, since Gleacher had assisted the company
during Sillerman's attempted buyout in 2007.38 Gleacher
would receive a success fee of $4 million on the successful
completion of a transaction.39
The Board directed Gleacher to run an auction among
the interested buyers as well as solicit interest from third
parties.40 Interested bidders would be given three weeks to
conduct due diligence and negotiate a transaction.41 The
three parties who had already submitted bids were told
that they were required to submit their final, fully-funded
and committed offers by May 6, 2013.42 On April 18,
2013, Gleacher reached out to other potential bidders,43
including three prospective financial buyers and nine strategic
acquirers.44 As a result, two financial buyers (and no
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strategic buyers) expressed interest by signing confidentiality
agreements.45
On April 27, 2013, the Board met to discuss the status of the
negotiations with the various bidders.46 Gleacher informed
the Board that Apollo and Party B were the only bidders that
had conducted any due diligence, and that the two prospective
financial bidders who had signed confidentiality agreements
were no longer interested in conducting due diligence or
pursuing an acquisition of CKx.47 Gleacher also informed the
Board that neither of the two remaining interested bidders had
raised their offer price above the initial non-binding bids.48 To
incentivize Gleacher to solicit bids exceeding $5.50 per share,
the CKx Board modified the terms of Gleacher's engagement
letter so as to provide for additional compensation if the
merger price were to exceed $5.50 per share.49 In addition,
Sillerman spoke with both Apollo and Party B to express his
support of each party's proposed transaction.50
*5  Ultimately, Apollo submitted a bid to purchase CKx
for $5.50 per share, and Party B submitted a bid for $5.60
per share.51 Despite the marginally lower price, the Board
ultimately selected the Apollo bid because Party B's financing
was uncertain,52 and because the Apollo bid granted CKx
the right to seek specific performance in certain instances,
while the Party B bid lacked any such right.53 Gleacher
opined that the Apollo transaction represented a fair price
to CKx stockholders, and the CKx Board accepted Apollo's
bid.54 Bryan Bloom was the only director who dissented.55
Although class action litigation was brought challenging the
Apollo transaction, it was ultimately settled in exchange for
some additional disclosures and a slight modification to the
termination fee.56
D. Management Projections
It was in connection with expressions of interest from
potential acquirers that CKx management created its five-
year projections (the “Management Projections”).57 Tom
Benson, the CFO and one of the original founders of CKx,
instructed Scott Frosch, CKx's Vice President for Finance,
to make certain assumptions in preparing the Management
Projections, including an assumption that revenues under
the to-be-negotiated American Idol contract would increase
by approximately $20 million each year.58 The parties now
contest whether this estimate of future revenues from Fox was
a genuine prediction or a marketing ploy designed to produce
a high bid from potential acquirers.
Benson himself described his thought process when he asked
Frosch to include the additional $20 million in payments from
Fox:
Q. Why did you ask Mr. Frosch to build in another $20
million?
A. Again, at that time we were in conversations with
Fox. We had no actual agreement. We were making an
assumption about what might happen when that deal
ultimately was consummated. And I thought, for purposes
of evaluating the company's value in a sale scenario or
providing projections to a prospective buyer, that we ought
to take a more optimistic view.
*6  Obviously there were a number of potential outcomes
from that conversation. But if we were going to evaluate
the value of the company versus a potential sale of the
company, we ought to look at a better case scenario—
best case scenario for the performance of the company
on its own and match that up with what buyers might be
interested in paying for the assets.59
Benson further testified that he was not making a prediction
as to the most likely outcome of the Fox negotiations,
but instead was projecting the “more optimistic or most
optimistic” possible outcome, to give CKx the best possible
negotiating position with potential buyers.60 In deposition,
Frosh indicated that he had a similar mindset, stating that
“[i]t would be fair to say that this document was prepared
for an outside seller with probably an optimistic view of
what we thought the company was going to do for the next
couple years.”61 Michael Ferrel, CKx's CEO, also testified
in deposition that a $20 million increase in payments from
Fox constituted “the very outside best scenario” that could
result from the negotiations.62 Notwithstanding the fact that
this estimate was considered the best possible outcome of
the Fox negotiations, management believed such a result was
“potentially achievable.”63
The Petitioners do not, for the most part, dispute
the characterization of the Management Projections as
“optimistic.” Rather, they simply argue that the fact that these
projections were optimistic is entirely consistent with the fact
that they were also management's best estimate of CKx's
future financial performance.
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They point to Ferrel's testimony that the Management
Projections were the “best estimate at the time of what
a forward five-year projection would look like,”64 and
that management relied on that forecast in the ordinary
course of business.65 Furthermore, Benson did not deny
Ferrel's characterization of the Management Projections as
the company's “best estimate,” testifying that management
“had a great deal of discussion around those projections
and thought that that was a reasonable estimate of what the
incremental revenue might be.”66 Also, in addition to being
provided to potential buyers, the Management Projections
were used in presentations to the company's lenders for the
purposes of assessing the credit risk of CKx.67
The Petitioners also contend that the Respondent inaccurately
characterized the nature of the Fox negotiations, and that the
negotiation dynamics between Fox and CKx in fact supported
a prediction that CKx could obtain increased economic
benefits from Fox. In August of 2010, well before CKx
began the auction that ultimately resulted in the sale of the
company to Apollo, Benson sent an email to Frosch outlining
the many factors “support[ing] the fact that it is in Fox's
self-interest to pay substantially more for the show in the
upcoming re-negotiation in order to get [CKx] to agree to
not reduce the number of hours we produce each year.”68
Most importantly, Benson noted that industry estimates put
Fox's total American Idol revenues at $800–$900 million
dollars per season, commanding 2.6 times as much per half-
hour of advertizing sales as the next highest rated prime time
broadcast show, Two and a Half Men.69 Benson also pointed
to additional benefits that American Idol generated for Fox:
*7  1) The huge lead in audience for the time slots
following Idol which Fox has used to launch key
new shows including House and Glee and to generate
additional viewers for the 10 pm news telecasts....
2) Increased value of promotional slots within the Idol
telecast which Fox uses to generate more viewers across
their entire network schedule.
3) Ability to package [American Idol] with other inventory
to maximize ad rates across their entire schedule.
4) Incremental payments for product placement within the
show from the likes of Coke, Ford and AT & T which
aren't otherwise captured in the above numbers.
5) Halo effect of being the # 1 network in overall viewers
in the 18–49 category over the past few years which
has been driven almost entirely from the performance of
Idol.70
Benson concluded that “Fox is making unprecedented profits
[from] the show.”71 Months later, in March 2011, Benson sent
another email to Ferrel and Sillerman stating that “[i]nvestors
also seem to be waking up to the importance of American Idol
to Fox and the potential leverage we have provided we play
hardball with them.”72
Other members of CKx management also made bullish
statements as to the potential outcome of the Fox negotiations.
COO Kraig Fox testified at deposition that CKx's right to
produce only 37 hours of American Idol programming when
the Fox network had previously broadcast more than 50
hours in a single season gave CKx substantial bargaining
power, despite Fox's exclusive broadcast rights.73 Fox also
testified that management was convinced that the increasing
value of content would lead to increased licensing revenues,
notwithstanding some declines in absolute ratings numbers.74
Furthermore, there were a variety of different ways in which
a new Fox contract could result in increasing payments to
CKx besides a simple increase in the fixed license fee,
including additional reimbursements from Fox for payments
made by CKx to key American Idol talent—namely, host
Ryan Seacrest and executive producer Nigel Lythgoe—as
well as additional rights to profits from internet sales of
American Idol content.75 And then, as it turned out, the 2010
season of American Idol was incredibly successful, boasting
increased ratings notwithstanding the departure of iconic
judge Simon Cowell.76 The fact that American Idol's ratings
had declined substantially under the previous Fox contract
remained, however, as did Fox's strong negotiation position
as holder of exclusive broadcast rights, and its stated intention
to negotiate reduced licensing payments.77
E. Expert Valuations
*8  The Petitioners' expert witness, Robert Reilly, utilized
a variety of valuation methods—the discounted cash flow
(“DCF”) method, a “guideline” publicly traded company
method, and a “guideline” merged and acquired company
method78—in valuing CKx stock as of the merger date,
and concluded that the fair value was $11.02 per share.79
The Respondent's expert witness, Jeffrey Cohen, conducted a
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discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis in which he concluded
that the value of CKx was $4.41 per share.80
Though the gulf between the two estimates is wide, the
disparate prices are the result of just a few different
assumptions. First, and most significantly, Cohen and Reilly
use different figures in their five-year cash flow projections.
Cohen disregarded the forecasted $20 million increase in
fixed licensing fees under the to-be-negotiated American
Idol contract that was initially included in the Management
Projections, instead assuming that the fees from Fox would
grow at four percent per year for five years.81 Reilly did
not adjust the cash flows he used in his DCF analysis, and
relied wholly on the revenues forecast in the Management
Projections.82 Second, Cohen and Reilly used different
growth rates to calculate the terminal value in their DCF
analyses. Reilly used a long-term nominal growth rate of
4%,83 while Cohen used a long-term nominal growth rate
of 0%.84 Finally, Reilly and Cohen used different estimates
for CKx's weighted-average cost of capital (“WACC”),
principally as a result of using different betas and size
premia.85
F. Nature and Stage of the Proceedings
I presided over a three-day trial in this matter from March 11,
2013 through March 13, 2013. The parties provided post-trial
briefing, and I heard post-trial oral argument on August 14,
2013. This is my Post–Trial Opinion.
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Appraisal Statute
The appraisal statute, 8 Del. C. § 262, provides stockholders
who choose not to participate in certain merger transactions
an opportunity to seek appraisal in this Court.86 When a
stockholder has so chosen, Section 262 provides that:
[T]he Court shall determine the fair value of the
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from
the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon
the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining
such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant
factors.87
The principal constraint on my analysis is that I must limit
my valuation to the firm's value as a going concern88 by
excluding “the speculative elements of value that may arise
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger.”89
*9  Our Supreme Court has interpreted the language of
Section 262(h)—which provides for consideration of all
relevant factors—to preclude the use of “inflexible rules”
or presumptions favoring any particular valuation method or
analysis.90 Rather, Section 262 “vests the Chancellor and
Vice Chancellors with significant discretion” to consider
the data and use the valuation methodologies they deem
appropriate.91 For example, this Court has the latitude to
“select one of the parties' valuation models as its general
framework, or fashion its own, to determine fair value in an
appraisal proceeding.”92
Both parties bear the burden of establishing fair value
by a preponderance of the evidence.93 In assessing the
evidence presented at trial, I may consider “proof of
value by any techniques or methods which are generally
considered acceptable in the financial community and
otherwise admissible in court.”94 “Among the techniques that
Delaware courts have relied on to determine the fair value
of shares are the DCF approach, the comparable transactions
approach, and comparable companies analyses.”95 This Court
has also relied on the merger price itself as evidence of fair
value, “so long as the process leading to the transaction is
a reliable indicator of value and merger-specific value is
excluded.”96
B. “Guideline” Companies and Transactions
First, I will not rely on either of Reilly's “guideline” analyses:
the guideline publicly traded company (“GPTC”) analysis,
or the guideline merged and acquired company (“GMAC”)
analysis. “The true utility of a comparable company approach
is dependent on the similarity between the company the
court is valuing and the companies used for comparison.”97
Here, the evidence is abundantly clear that the “guideline”
companies used by Reilly are not truly comparable to CKx.
In fact, Reilly admitted at trial that he found no companies
he could describe as “comparable” to CKx, which was
why he labeled his analyses as consisting of “guideline”
public companies and acquisitions.98 Reilly's trial testimony
confirmed important differences between the “guideline”
companies and CKx: none of the guideline companies were of
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comparable size; none owned assets resembling the assets of
CKx; and none competed with CKx or utilized a comparable
business model.99 Notwithstanding these weaknesses in
Reilly's “guideline” valuation methodology, the GPTC and
GMAC analyses constituted 40% of his estimate of CKx's
value. Accordingly, I cannot rely on the conclusion reached
in Reilly's report in determining the fair value of CKx.
C. Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
Second, the deficiencies of both DCF analyses lead me to
conclude that they are unreliable measures of CKx's value.
DCF, in theory, is not a difficult calculation to make—
five-year cash flow projections combined with a terminal
value are discounted to their present value to produce an
overall enterprise value. However, without reliable five-year
projections, any values generated by a DCF analysis are
meaningless. The reliability of a DCF analysis therefore
depends, critically, “on the reliability of the inputs to
the model.”100 Under Delaware appraisal law, “[w]hen
management projections are made in the ordinary course of
business, they are generally deemed reliable.”101 But this
Court has disregarded management projections where the
company's use of such projections was unprecedented, where
the projections were created in anticipation of litigation,
or where the projections were created for the purpose of
obtaining benefits outside the company's ordinary course of
business.102
*10  Here, the evidence is overwhelming that the disputed
portion of management projections—the $20 million increase
in licensing fees from Fox—was not prepared in the
ordinary course of business, and was otherwise unreliable.
Management provided inconsistent testimony as to what,
exactly, its basis was for making such a prediction in the
first place. Though the record includes substantial evidence
that management was bullish regarding the likely outcome of
the Fox negotiations, Benson's own trial testimony indicates
that he had low expectations that CKx could realize any
additional value from the new Fox contract.103 Indeed,
Benson testified that Fox had indicated that it wanted its
licensing costs to go down, not up.104 The weight of the
evidence adduced at trial supports a conclusion that the
“optimistic” management projections were made not because
they constituted management's estimate of the most likely
outcome of contract negotiations, but because a high estimate
of future licensing payments from Fox could generate value
for CKx in the short-term in the form of lower interest rates
and a potentially higher merger price. Accordingly, the use by
Reilly of projections based on a $20 million increase in Idol
revenue leads to a speculative DCF valuation.
On the other hand, as the Petitioners accurately point out,
there were numerous ways in which the economic benefit
to CKx under the contract could have improved. Benson
testified that different options were on the table in the Fox
negotiations, including variable fees that would be tied to
the show's financial performance, or reimbursements to CKx
for the costs of its contracts with Ryan Seacrest and Nigel
Lythgoe.105 Simply ignoring that fundamental uncertainty
does not make it disappear. Accordingly, I cannot conclude
that Cohen's prediction that CKx would receive marginal
additional value from a new contract with Fox is any more
reliable than management's prediction that the increased
benefit would be $20 million per year.
For the same reasons that management was unable to
confidently predict the outcome of negotiations for, and
therefore the likely revenue generated by, the American Idol
contract, I do not have any basis to determine whether
cash flows under that contract would have increased by
$20 million per year, $0 per year, or some figure in
between. The result of the Fox contract negotiations would
be a one-time, unpredictable, irreversible, and immitigable
increase or decrease in the fixed licensing fee. Unlike
normal projections, which also involve some level of
uncertainty, here, management attempted to account for
a single superseding event beyond the company's control
involving idiosyncratic actors making decisions that would
have a large effect on the company's future value. The
evidence before me indicates that management believed that
predicting the outcome of those negotiations would be little
more than guesswork. The offhand, almost casual manner in
which the fees were generated—Benson simply told Frosh to
assume their existence—indicates that this was not a serious
estimate.
I therefore find that I cannot employ a DCF analysis in
this case for the same reason that the Court in Doft &
Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc. declined to rely on a DCF
analysis.106 There, as here, management had prepared a set of
uncertain and therefore unreliable financial projections.107 In
Travelocity.com, the uncertainty of management projections
arose from the inherent unpredictability of the financial
performance of a travel and booking company in the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.108
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The Court disregarded the DCF analyses in that case,
one based on management projections, and the other on
the projections of a valuation expert, because “the degree
of speculation and uncertainty characterizing the future
prospects of Travelocity and the industry in which it operates
ma[de] a DCF analysis of marginal utility as a valuation
technique.”109 Here, I come to the same conclusion. The
future revenue streams generated by American Idol when the
merger took place were in a state of flux. Initial internal
estimates of those revenues were markedly lower than
projections provided to potential buyers and lenders.110 It
is apparent that a $20 million change in estimated future
licensing fees would have a significant impact on per-share
value.111
*11  The unreliability of the revenue estimates, both
including and excluding the $20 million estimate, is a serious
impediment to creating a reliable DCF analysis. As noted
above, “methods of valuation, including a discounted cash
flow analysis, are only as good as the inputs to the model.”112
Because I have little confidence in the reliability of using
or excluding the estimated $20 million increase in revenues
under the to-be-negotiated American Idol contract, I conclude
that a DCF analysis is not the appropriate method of valuation
in this case. Without projections of cash flows to discount,
I cannot calculate the enterprise's fair value with a DCF
analysis.113
D. Merger Price
In the absence of comparable companies or transactions to
guide a comparable companies analysis or a comparable
transactions analysis, and without reliable projections to
discount in a DCF analysis, I rely on the merger price as
the best and most reliable indication of CKx's value. This
Court has previously recognized that “an arms-length merger
price resulting from an effective market check is entitled to
great weight in an appraisal.”114 Indeed, when this Court has
evaluated claims that transactions between a corporation and
its fiduciaries were not entirely fair, we have identified the
paradigm of an arms-length negotiation or public auction as
the standard against which an interested transaction should be
compared.115 In at least one case involving judicial appraisal
under Section 262, the Court decided to place 100% weight
on the merger price.116
The Petitioners argue that the Supreme Court's decision
in Golden Telecom117 and this Court's analysis of Golden
Telecom in Merlon Capital v. 3M Cogent118 stand for the
proposition that merger price is now irrelevant in an appraisal
context and that I am required to accord it no weight
when determining fair value.119 However, I read those cases
differently.
*12  The appellants in Golden Telecom asked the Supreme
Court to reform Delaware appraisal law by imposing a
new presumption in favor of merger price as evidence of
fair value.120 The Supreme Court declined to take up that
invitation, stating:
Requiring the Court of Chancery to defer—conclusively
or presumptively—to the merger price, even in the face
of a pristine, unchallenged transactional process, would
contravene the unambiguous language of the statute and the
reasoned holdings of our precedent.... [W]hile it is difficult
for the Chancellor and Vice Chancellors to assess wildly
divergent expert opinions regarding value, inflexible rules
governing appraisal provide little additional benefit in
determining “fair value” because of the already high costs
of appraisal actions. Appraisal is, by design, a flexible
process. Therefore, we reject Golden's contention that the
Vice Chancellor erred by insufficiently deferring to the
merger price, and we reject its call to establish a rule
requiring the Court of Chancery to defer to the merger
price in any appraisal proceeding.121
The Supreme Court's holding is clear. The Court of Chancery
has a statutory mandate to consider “all relevant factors”
in conducting an appraisal proceeding, and, accordingly,
the Supreme Court declined to impose a presumption
systematically favoring one of those factors—merger price—
over the others. The Petitioner's position here, that I should
ignore the merger price in appraising CKx, is in my view
directly at odds with the holding and rationale of Golden
Telecom, which is that the Court of Chancery has an obligation
to consider all relevant factors, and that no per se rule
should presumptively or conclusively exclude any of those
factors from consideration. In fact, the ruling in Golden
Telecom—like the appraisal statute itself—is inclusive, rather
than exclusive. It recognizes that differing circumstances may
support reliance on one or another valuation method under
the particular circumstances there presented, and provides a
trial court with latitude to consider “all relevant factors” to
determine fair value.
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Further, Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent is entirely
consistent with the expansive holding of Golden Telecom. In
3M Cogent, the Court declined to rely on merger price where a
DCF analysis was available to reliably measure the company's
value.122 Furthermore, the deficiencies that made the merger
price irrelevant in 3M Cogent are not at issue here.123 Here,
the Respondent has consistently pointed to the merger price as
supporting its valuation, even when it sought to prove an even
lower value through Cohen's DCF analysis. Furthermore, as I
will discuss shortly, I am allowing the parties additional time
to develop further evidence of what portion, if any, of the
merger price consists of excludable synergies, as opposed to
going-concern value.
*13  Having concluded that our law recognizes merger price
as an acceptable factor that I may consider in conducting my
appraisal of CKx, I also find that the evidence demonstrates
in this case, where no comparable companies, comparable
transactions, or reliable cash flow projections exist, that the
merger price is the most reliable indicator of value.124 The
record and the trial testimony support a conclusion that the
process by which CKx was marketed to potential buyers
was thorough, effective, and free from any spectre of self-
interest or disloyalty. This is not a case where a controlling
stockholder froze out a minority stockholder.125 Nor is this a
case where the only evidence that a merger price was the result
of “market” forces was a post-signing go-shop period (which
failed to produce competing bids) relied on to demonstrate
that the transaction represented market price, and thus fair
value.126
Here, multiple entities made unsolicited, credible bids for
CKx in March 2011. The Board immediately engaged in
a conscientious process with the assistance of a reputable
financial advisor, Gleacher, to maximize the price. The Board
and its advisors successfully instigated a bidding war for CKx,
and also canvassed the market for other potentially interested
bidders. One aspect of the process that has been criticized by
the Petitioner here is the haste with which the sales process
advanced. However, there is no evidence in the record to
suggest that any bidder was deterred by the expedited pace of
the sale, and it was the Petitioner's representative on the CKx
Board, Bryan Bloom, who was most insistent that the merger
process be resolved quickly. As Bloom himself explained at
trial, there was a sound business justification for that decision:
the uncertainty that CKx faced from being publicly shopped
impaired CKx's ability to acquire content. Of course, the issue
in this case is fair value, not fiduciary duty. The relevant point
is that market exposure comes with a downside, and there
is no evidence to suggest that the timeline compromised the
effectiveness of the process. None of the bidders contacted by
Gleacher asked for more time, or otherwise indicated that they
were deterred by the CKx Board's deadlines.127 Accordingly,
I find that the process that generated the merger price supports
a conclusion that the merger price is a relevant factor in
determining CKx's fair value. I come to the same conclusion
that the Court did in Union Illinois : “[f]or me (as a law-
trained judge) to second-guess the price that resulted from that
process involves an exercise in hubris and, at best, reasoned
guess-work.”128 My conclusion that merger price must be the
primary factor in determining fair value is justified in light of
the absence of any other reliable valuation analysis.
*14  The Petitioners did engage an expert witness, Dr. Laura
Robinson, an economist, who testified to the inadequacy of
the merger process in obtaining a fair price for CKx. Although
the Respondents filed motions to exclude her testimony, I
need not address those motions, because I found the substance
of her opinion unpersuasive, and I decline to rely on it.
Robinson opined that the CKx auction process was ineffective
because it failed to conform to what is known in auction
theory as a second-price, sealed bid auction, or a Vickrey
auction, in honor of William Vickrey, an economist who
won the Nobel prize in economics for his work in auction
theory.129 A Vickrey auction works by having each bidder
submit one secret bid, with the highest bidder winning the
right to acquire the asset at the price of the second-highest
bidder.130 The Vickrey auction is designed to deal with
the problem that exists in conventional sealed-bid auctions,
where bidders are reluctant to bid at their reserve prices,
because if they win they will gain no surplus.131 By giving
winning bidders a slight discount, bidders will bid their
reserve price and still know that they will reap some surplus.
A Vickrey auction theoretically produces the same result, or
nearly the same result, as a traditional English auction.132
Robinson argued that the process undertaken by the CKx
Board here was not designed to elicit the highest possible
bid, and therefore likely failed to deliver the best possible
price for shareholders. She pointed to evidence that Ferrel
communicated with the bidders during the auction process;
that Sillerman communicated with bidders about price and the
behavior of other bidders; and that Gleacher informed Apollo
that Party B's final bid was not fully financed. Robinson
summed up her criticism by saying, “[s]o there are a lot
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of parties telling a lot of other people what's going on and
conveying information, which is not appropriate in a well-
run auction process which is geared toward maximizing
shareholder value.”133
I disagree with the conclusions reached by Dr. Robinson.
Nothing in our jurisprudence suggests that an auction process
need conform to any theoretical standard, whether a pure
English auction, a second-price sealed bid, or Vickrey
auction, or any other auction format. Furthermore, all
the evidence that Robinson points to as departures from
the Vickrey auction can be explained if one views the
CKx auction process as a traditional English auction, in
which bidders raise their prices until only one bidder
remains, obtaining the same theoretical result as the Vickrey
auction.134 Here, the evidence indicates that the bidders
were in fact engaged in a process resembling the English
ascending-bid auction, as the bidding started low, and
progressed until Apollo submitted the winning bid.135 In
an English auction, bidders are naturally aware of each
other's bids, yet it still produces a price equal to the
second-highest bidder's reserve price (plus one bid increment,
to guarantee victory).136 Furthermore, Robinson did not
fully acknowledge the reality that, despite its theoretical
usefulness, the Vickrey auction remains rare in practice,
perhaps because it depends, crucially, on the integrity of the
auctioneer to not cheat the high bidder.137 In short, even if
I were to accept Robinson's premise—which I do not—that
I must look to auction theory to determine whether the sales
process here produced the best possible bid, I find that the
evidence suggests that it did.
E. Going–Concern Value
*15  As nearly every Delaware appraisal case makes clear,
the objective of an appraisal is to determine the going-
concern value of the target company's equity. The evidence
that has been admitted so far suggests that there are few, if
any, synergies for Apollo in this transaction. Because there
is limited evidence in the record concerning the existence
and amount of synergies that Apollo sought to realize in its
acquisition of CKx, I will allow the parties, if they so desire,
the opportunity to provide additional evidence on this limited
issue.
III. CONCLUSION
In this appraisal action, I am charged with considering all
relevant factors bearing on fair value. An arms-length sales
price—exclusive of synergies—generated at auction is one
such factor. Other relevant factors typically include DCF
analyses, comparable companies analyses and comparable
transaction analyses. For the reasons explained above, the
latter are either unreliable or unavailable here. Accordingly,
I find the sales price to be the most relevant exemplar of
valuation available. The parties should confer and advise on
how they intend to supplement the record to account for
portions of the sales price representing the synergy value of
the transaction, if any.
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124 The Respondents also suggest that in addition to merger price, CKx's stock trading price suggests that the fair value of
the company is significantly lower than that advocated by the Petitioners. However, because there is some evidence that
stock price may have undervalued the company due to the company's inability to make acquisitions while it was up for
sale, and because it is not unlikely that the stock price failed to reflect material non-public information available to bidders
who signed confidentiality agreements, I find that the merger price is a better indicator of fair value here.
125 See, e.g., Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, 11 A.3d 214 (Del.2010) (rejecting merger price as a good indication
of fair value where the target was purchased by an acquirer controlled by the target's two largest stockholders, who
threatened to block any alternative transactions).
126 See, e.g., In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (declining to give weight to the
merger price in an appraisal action where “the trial record did not focus extensively on the quality of marketing Orchard
by Dimensional or the utility of the ‘go shop’ provision contained in the merger agreement, which could obviously have
been affected by Dimensional's voting power and expressed interest to acquire all of Orchard for itself.”).
127 Trial Tr. 724:10–11 (Cooling).
128 Union Illinois 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 359 (Del. Ch.2004).
129 Trial Tr. 303:18–304:2 (Robinson).
130 Trial Tr. 304:20–305:6 (Robinson).
131 Id.
132 David Lucking–Reiley, Vickrey Auctions in Practice: From Nineteenth–Century Philately to Twenty–First–Century E–
Commerce, 14 J. Econ. Perspectives 183, 183 (2000).
133 Trial Tr. 306:22–307:2 (Robinson).
134 Lucking–Reiley, supra note 125, at 183.
135 Although Apollo's bid was technically $0.10 per share less than the bid from Party B, that does not change the analysis of
the auction process. The certainty of financing and favorable deal terms were legitimate factors for the Board to consider
when choosing the winning bidder: the various bidders were competing along more dimensions than just price.
136 Lucking–Reiley, supra note 125, at 183.
137 Id. at 188.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
*1  GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor
Each block of marble, Michelangelo believed (or purported to
believe) contained a sculpture; the sculptor's job was merely
to pitch the overburden to reveal the beauty within. Early
jurists believed (or purported to believe) something similar
about common law; that it existed in perfect form, awaiting
“finding” by the judge.1 By contrast, even Blackstone would
expect that statutory law would be an explicit, if blunt, tool
of justice; manufactured, rather than revealed. Our appraisal
statute, Section 262 of the DGCL,2 is an exception. Broth
of many cooks and opaque of intent, it provides every
opportunity for judicial sculpting.3
The latest pitching of stone from the underlying statutory
body occurred in our Supreme Court's recent decisions in
DFC and Dell.4 Those cases, in distilled form, provide that
the statute requires that, where a petitioner is entitled to a
determination of the fair value of her stock, the trial judge
must consider “all relevant factors,”5 and that no presumption
in favor of transaction price obtains. Where, however,
transaction price represents an unhindered, informed, and
competitive market valuation, the trial judge must give
particular and serious consideration to transaction price
as evidence of fair value. Where information necessary
for participants in the market to make a bid is widely
disseminated, and where the terms of the transaction are not
structurally prohibitive or unduly limiting to such market
participation, the trial court in its determination of fair value
must take into consideration the transaction price as set
by the market. I will refer to transactions compliant with
such conditions by the shorthand “Dell Compliant.” In sum,
while no presumption in favor of transaction price obtains, a
transaction that demonstrates an unhindered, informed, and
competitive market value is at least first among equals of
valuation methodologies in deciding fair value. Where a
transaction price is used to determine fair value, synergies
transferred to the sellers must be deducted, to the extent they
represent “element[s] of value arising from the ... merger”
itself.6
This matter is before me seeking a post-trial finding of the
fair value of AOL Inc. (“Respondent,” the “Company,” or
“AOL”) under the appraisal statute. Because the seminal
cases referenced above issued during the pendency of this
matter, I asked the parties to supplement the briefing to
reference the instruction that DFC and Dell supply. I note
that, throughout that helpful briefing, both the Respondent
and Petitioners continue to advocate for my reliance on
financial metrics rather than transaction price.7 Applying the
Dell criteria of information distribution and barriers to entry
with respect to market participation in evaluating whether
the transaction here is Dell Compliant, I find the matter a
close question. AOL was widely known to be in play, the
Company talked to numerous potential purchasers in relation
to the sale of part (or all) of AOL, the no-shop period running
post-agreement was not protected by a prohibitive break-
up fee, and the actions of the AOL unaffiliated directors
appear compliant with their fiduciary duties. No topping offer
emerged. Nonetheless, the merger agreement was protected
by a no-shop and matching right provisions. Moreover, the
statements made by AOL's CEO, who negotiated the deal, in
my view signaled to potential market participants that the deal
was “done,” and that they need not bother making an offer.
- 173 -
In re AOL Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2018)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
*2  Market participants at this level are not shrinking violets,
nor are they barnacles that are happy players during a
favorable tide, but shut tight at its ebb. Nonetheless, I find
the unusually preclusive statements by the CEO, in light of
the other attributes of this transaction, such that I cannot be
assured that a less restrictive environment was unlikely to
have resulted in a higher price for AOL. Accordingly, I am
unable to ascribe fair value solely to market price.
Having rejected transaction price as the sole determinant
of value, I find myself further unable, in a principled way,
to assign it any weight as a portion of my fair value
determination. It is difficult, in other words, to ascribe to a
non–Dell–Compliant sales price (on non-arbitrary grounds)
25%, or 75%, or any particular weight in a fair value
determination. Therefore, I take the parties' suggestion to
ascribe full weight to a discounted cash flow analysis. I
relegate transaction price to a role as a check on that DCF
valuation: any such valuation significantly departing from
even the problematic deal price here should cause me to
closely revisit my assumptions.
After consideration of the experts' reports provided by the
parties, and after addressing the differences between the
parties in the proper construction of a DCF valuation, in light
of the evidence at trial, I find that the fair value of AOL stock
at the time of the merger was $48.70 per share. This is my
post-trial decision on fair value; my reasoning follows.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Company
AOL was a well-known8 global media technology company
with a range of digital brands, services, and products
that it provided to advertisers, consumers, subscribers, and
publishers.9 AOL underwent significant changes in both
perception and fortune after its apex in 2002, when it had more
than twenty-six million subscribers in the United States and
$9 billion in revenues.10 AOL spun off as a public company
from parent Time Warner in 2009, with Tim Armstrong
named as Chairman and CEO.11 After the spin-off, AOL
shrank, ultimately to five million subscribers.12 AOL faced
substantial competition by 2014 and found itself in need of
extensive consumer data to shift its desired focus to the online
advertising industry.13 In order to compete, AOL purchased
a number of “content” and “ad-tech” companies, such as
the Huffington Post, TechCrunch, Thing Labs, Inc., Adapt.tv,
and Vidible.14 These and other purchases allowed AOL to
reposition itself as an ad tech company.15
*3  AOL organized itself into three segments: Membership,
Brands, and Platforms.16 The Membership Group included
the legacy dial-up internet and search services.17 The Brands
Group included the Huffington Post, TechCrunch, MapQuest,
and other content providers.18 The Platforms Group provided
automated online advertising services for advertisers and
publishers across multiple device and media formats.19 As
with other companies of similar size, AOL was closely
followed by numerous analysts.20
B. Initial Discussions and Negotiation
Similar to other boards of directors, the AOL board of
directions (the “AOL Board” or the “Board”) “regularly
review[ed] and assess[ed] the Company's business strategies
and objectives,” in order to “enhanc[e] stockholder value.”21
The AOL Board frequently considered many types of
transactions and partnerships with other companies.22 “In
addition, the Company and its representatives [were]
routinely approached by other companies and their
representatives regarding possible transactions.”23 Several
of those included inquiries from Silver Lake,24 Tomorrow
Focus,25 Axel Springer,26 Providence Equity,27 and Hellman
& Friedman.28
In June 2014, at the request of Verizon Communications
Inc. (“Verizon”), AOL CEO Armstrong and Verizon CEO
Lowell McAdam “discussed ongoing and emerging trends in
their respective industries” at a media finance conference.29
In October 2014, Verizon management contacted AOL to
propose an initial meeting regarding “potential partnership
opportunities” and the two CEOs met again that November.30
A Verizon subsidiary and AOL entered into a confidentiality
agreement in late November.31
In early December, representatives of AOL and Verizon met
over three days to discuss “several potential collaborative
opportunities,” although McAdam informed Armstrong
that “Verizon had no interest in the acquisition of
the entire Company or of a majority interest in the
Company.”32 In addition, AOL held a preliminary discussion
with Comcast, a global telecommunications conglomerate,
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“regarding a potential transaction involving all or part of
AOL's businesses” on December 9, 2014.33 McAdam and
Armstrong spoke again by phone in mid-December 2014 and
met in mid-January 2015 to “explore a joint venture.”34
AOL management discussed a potential Verizon transaction
with the AOL Board during their January 2015 meeting.35 In
January 2015, rumors about a potential transaction involving
AOL leaked and caused AOL's stock price to rise.36
In February 2015, Verizon presented AOL with a high-level
term sheet for a potential joint venture and the parties met
several times to discuss it that February and March and
continue with due diligence.37 Verizon was not the only suitor
for a deal with AOL. An AOL executive emailed Armstrong
on February 20, 2015 that:
Given the [Verizon] news in the press, the [AT&T]
President of Advertising has express [sic] a very strong
interest in having broader strategic conversation with us.
They want a bite at the apple and don't want to be boxed
out by [Verizon]. If we are going to move forward here we
should engage at the CEO level is my view.38
*4  Armstrong responded:
I know ... the [AT&T] CEO well—but we should discuss
this .... We need to be ethical (not suggesting you were
suggesting that—and know this is natural with press and
BD—but me calling CEO of AT&T feels like a bridge too
far).39
Armstrong described his rationale for this answer during trial:
Q. And why did you say that calling the CEO of AT&T in
these circumstances was a bridge too far?
A. Well, I think that from where we were at the time period
and knowing what we knew about AT&T and knowing
what we knew about Verizon, the risk of having Verizon
walk away at this point was much higher than the upside
of trying to get AT&T involved when they were clearly
outsourcing their core business in our core area to us,
overall. So it just did not seem like a smart move.
Q. Why were you concerned that a contact with AT&T
might cause Verizon to walk away?
A. I think one is Verizon was upset about the leak. And I
think in the situation in a deal negotiation where, you know,
we're in negotiations with Verizon, AT&T is not a real
candidate, and we go to them, [Verizon CEO and Chairman
McAdam], I think, is a very ethical person and somebody
that, you know, he would take this the wrong way and we
would risk losing the deal.40
Armstrong explained during his deposition that the AT&T
overture was not “somebody senior at AT&T speaking for
AT&T. This [was] somebody at the division that [AT&T was]
looking to outsource to us, talking to one of our lower-level
[business development] people.”41 In a later explanation to
Verizon executive Marni Walden about these discussions with
AT&T, Armstrong described these as “advanced discussions
to launch a new strategic partnership. At the core of the
discussions was AT&T's content and service portal, which has
been powered for Yahoo for many years.”42
Fox, a multinational mass media corporation, also contacted
AOL to express interest in AOL's platforms and brands
businesses on February 26, 2015.43 Private equity firm
General Atlantic contacted AOL in March 2015 “to discuss
an acquisition of certain of the Company's assets” and entered
into a confidentiality agreement on March 7, 2015.44 General
Atlantic conducted limited preliminary diligence on these
assets.45 Fox entered into a confidentiality agreement with
AOL and listened to a presentation by AOL on March 9,
2015.46
C. Sales Process
On March 25, 2015, Verizon proposed obtaining majority
ownership of AOL for the first time.47 The AOL Board began
to meet weekly to “review the deal landscape, including the
potential transaction with Verizon.”48
AOL declined to conduct an auction. Fredric Reynolds,
AOL's lead director, explained why AOL did not pursue an
auction during his deposition:
Q: Could you please explain why, in your view or in the
view of the board as a whole, you thought it was not
desirable for AOL to run an auction?
*5  A: Again, I think, if I wasn't clear, I think in a business
that has to do with technology and content, that it's a very
fragile business, and letting the world know that you're
for sale impacts your relationship with your—with your
competitors for sure, but also with your partners, be they
publishers, being the search companies, being the talent
that you want to attract.
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Those are all very difficult relationships that I think are
almost impossible to be managed if a media company or a
technology company is for sale.
I—I don't recall any large technology or large media
company ever putting itself up for sale. I think, as
evidenced last week, AT&T buys Time Warner. There was
not an auction of that. It's just a very, very—it's unusual, but
technology and media companies don't have hard assets,
they don't have long-term contracts that make airplanes or
iPhones or anything like that. It's all ephemeral.49
Reynolds stated that “the company was not for sale and it was
purposeful that it not be for sale”50 and that the Board did “not
auction[ ] the company. We had had no intention of auctioning
the company.”51
Discussions between AOL and Verizon continued in early
April, and McAdam “raised the possibility of a 100%
acquisition of the Company with Mr. Armstrong” on April
8, 2015.52 Comcast entered into a confidentiality agreement
with AOL that day, but declined to proceed any further with
a transaction.53
On April 12, 2015, AOL management discussed the Verizon
transaction with the Board, including “the emphasis that
[Verizon] ... put on their ability to retain the Company's
management.”54 The Board “requested that Mr. Armstrong
keep the Board apprised of these discussions as they
progressed” but authorized further discussions with Verizon
regarding both the transaction and management retention.55
AOL opened a data room to Verizon on April 13, 2015.56
Verizon's counsel engaged AOL's counsel in a discussion on
April 14, 2015 about “the importance to Verizon of retaining
the Company's CEO and others on its management team and
Verizon's desire to engage in a discussion with Mr. Armstrong
regarding such future employment arrangements.”57 AOL's
counsel informed Verizon that “Verizon's views had been
discussed with the Board and that the Board had authorized
Mr. Armstrong to engage in such discussions.”58 McAdam
and Armstrong met again on April 17, 2015 to “discuss
the potential integration of AOL and its personnel into
Verizon's business.”59 During this period, Fox made several
diligence calls to AOL, but did not contact AOL for further
information.60
Verizon sent a draft merger agreement to AOL on April 22,
2015.61 The AOL Board met on April 26, 2015 to discuss
the draft agreement, the deal landscape, “the possibility of
seeking alternative offers,” Verizon's “emphasi[s] ... [on]
the retention of the Company's management team,” and
AOL's continued retention of Allen & Company (“Allen
& Co.”) as its financial advisor.62 AOL returned a revised
draft merger agreement to Verizon on April 27, 2015 that
proposed changes to a number of terms, including termination
rights, the non-solicitation provision, antitrust approval, and
others.63 Verizon management spoke with Armstrong on
April 30, 2015 about “the importance to Verizon that AOL's
talent continue at the Company following the Merger and
indicated that employment arrangements would be structured
by Verizon to include compensation opportunities tied to the
performance of the Company and in aggregate amounts at
least comparable to current compensation opportunities.”64
However, “[n]o specific details of such compensation
arrangements were discussed.”65
*6  AOL and Verizon exchanged draft agreements on May
1 and May 3, 2015.66 The AOL Board discussed these drafts
and “the importance that Verizon was placing on the retention
of the Company's management team and Verizon's desire for
employment and retention arrangements” on May 3, 2015.67
On May 4, 2015, a consortium including, among others,
General Atlantic, Axel Spring SE, and Huffington Post CEO
and founder Arianna Huffington, submitted a letter to AOL
indicating its willingness to purchase a 51% stake in AOL's
Huffington Post asset for approximately $500 million.68
On a May 7, 2015 phone call, Verizon informed AOL that
Verizon “was planning to submit a formal offer to acquire the
entire Company.”69 The AOL representative indicated that
AOL expected a price per share “in the 50s” but the Verizon
representative indicated that it would be “in the high 40s.”70
Verizon also indicated that it would present Armstrong with
a specific employment proposal.71 AOL reported financial
results that beat analysts' expectations on May 8, 2015.72
On May 8, 2015, a Verizon representative made an oral
offer of $47.00 per share for AOL.73 An AOL representative
countered and Verizon agreed to pay $50.00 per share in
cash.74 Verizon stated that “there was no further room for
negotiation with respect to the offer price and that if this price
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was not of interest, Verizon was prepared to withdraw its
offer.”75 Verizon submitted a written offer at $50 later that
day. The AOL Board discussed the offer, and counsel from
the two companies negotiated certain terms.76
Armstrong phoned a Verizon representative on May 9, 2015
to request a higher price but was told “that there was no
further room for negotiation with respect to the offer price,”
although Verizon agreed to lower the termination fee from
4.5% to 3.5%.77 The AOL Board discussed the developments
that same day.78
The parties exchanged additional draft agreements and
Verizon delivered a draft employment letter offer to
Armstrong on May 10, 2015.79 “Mr. Armstrong had no
conversations with Verizon regarding the draft letter prior to
the conclusion of the Company's next Board meeting.”80
On May 11, 2015, the AOL Board discussed the Verizon
merger agreement with management and its legal and
financial advisors.81 The Board then “unanimously voted
to approve the Merger Agreement.”82 Later that day,
“Verizon informed Mr. Armstrong that they were unwilling
to proceed with a transaction without his agreement to terms”
of employment and Armstrong and Verizon came to an
agreement.83
The Verizon board of directors also approved the merger
agreement, which was executed on May 11, 2015 (the
“Merger Agreement” or “Agreement”).84 The deal was
announced on May 12, 2015.85 According to Armstrong, “a
couple of days after [the] Verizon acquisition was announced,
AT&T terminated contract negotiations and asked us to stop
all development on product and content based on general
sensitivities to competitor concerns, data separation, etc.”86
*7  In a CNBC television interview on the day the merger
was announced, Armstrong gave this account of how the
Verizon deal came together:
Interviewer: Hey, Tim, couple of quick things. Help us with
this first. Was there an auction? Give us back story here.
Meaning, who went to whom? How did this happen?
Armstrong: You know, basically, this happened in a very
natural way and no auction. Basically over the course of
time I sat down last summer at the Sun Valley conference
and we talked about where the world was going and we
have been big partners and we were kind of reviewing what
the companies were doing together. That sort of kicked off
sort of a natural progression to where we are today and
I think facilitated by Nancy of Allen and Company and
David Shapiro we were able to basically bring this deal
together in a way that I think was incredibly natural. If you
look at the two visions on the companies and the platforms
and both companies were doing the same thing.
Interviewer: It's trading slightly above the premium right
now. you didn't shop this to anybody else?
Armstrong: No, I'm committed to doing the deal with
Verizon and I think that as we chose each other because
that's the path we're on. I gave the team at Verizon my word
that, you know, [w]e're in a place where this deal is going
to happen and we're excited about it.
...
Interviewer: Not to push you on it, but why not pursue an
auction?
Armstrong: You know, Andrew, I think the process of
where we are as a company right now and the process we
went through and knew you guys covered, lots of rumors
about AOL in general. So, if somebody, we have always
been a public company and been available. If somebody
wanted to come do a deal with us, they would have done
it. The Verizon deal was built around the strategy of where
we're going.87
D. Merger and Subsequent Events
The Merger Agreement contained a no-shop provision, a
3.5% termination fee of $150 million, and unlimited three-
day matching rights.88 Stockholders were informed that
the Merger Agreement allowed for the “ability to accept a
superior proposal.”89 Verizon was “[p]repared for market
action but expect[ed] limited interest from media/technology
strategics and financial sponsors” due to its assessment of
a “limited interloper risk given [the] current sale status
with [a] lack of full company buyers.”90 No topping bidder
emerged.91 More than 60% of AOL's outstanding common
shares were tendered and the merger closed on June 23, 2015
(the “Valuation Date”).92
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The Petitioners filed for appraisal rights under Section 262
of the DGCL.93 Six appraisal petitions were filed, which are
consolidated in this action.94 The parties and experts agree
that a DCF analysis is the most appropriate valuation method
in this matter.95 My analysis follows.
II. WAS THE SALES PROCESS DELL COMPLIANT?
*8  The appraisal remedy was created by statute to
allow dissenting stockholders an “independent judicial
determination of the fair value of their shares.”96 Because
neither party bears the burden of proof, “in reality, the
‘burden’ falls on the judge to determine fair value,
using ‘all relevant factors.’ ”97 The fair value of those
shares is “exclusive of any element of value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation,”98 and calculated based on the “operative
reality of the company”99 as of “the date of the merger.”100
The court should view the company as a standalone
“going concern”101 or an “on-going enterprise, occupying a
particular market position in the light of future prospects.”102
Because the court values the “corporation itself,” a minority
discount103 and “any synergies or other value expected from
the merger giving rise to the appraisal proceeding itself must
be disregarded.”104 Accordingly, petitioning stockholders
are given their “proportionate interest” of the value of the
corporation on the date of the merger, plus interest.105
Because each transaction is unique, “[a]ppraisal is, by design,
a flexible process.”106 However, “the clash of contrary, and
often antagonistic, expert opinions” with “widely divergent
views” is a common feature of the genre.107 As further
described below, there is “no perfect methodology for arriving
at fair value for a given set of facts.”108
The Supreme Court has “reject[ed] requests for the adoption
of a presumption that the deal price reflects fair value if
certain preconditions are met, such as when the merger
is the product of arm's-length negotiation and a robust,
non-conflicted market check, and where bidders had full
information and few, if any, barriers to bid for the deal.”109
Indeed, the Supreme Court doubts its ability “to craft, on
a general basis, the precise pre-conditions that would be
necessary to invoke a presumption of that kind.110 That said,
the Supreme Court in DFC stated:
Although there is no presumption in favor of the deal
price, under the conditions found [in DFC] by the Court
of Chancery, economic principles suggest that the best
evidence of fair value was the deal price, as it resulted from
an open process, informed by robust public information,
and easy access to deeper, non-public information, in which
many parties with an incentive to make a profit had a
chance to bid.111
A. The Sales Process Was Not “Dell Compliant”
The question before me is whether the sales process here
is Dell Compliant. A transaction is Dell Compliant where
(i) information was sufficiently disseminated to potential
bidders, so that (ii) an informed sale could take place, (iii)
without undue impediments imposed by the deal structure
itself. In other words, before I may consider the deal price as
persuasive evidence of statutory fair value, I must find that
the deal process developed fair market value. I conclude that,
under the unique circumstances of this case, the sales process
was insufficient to this task, and the deal price is not the best
evidence of fair value.
*9  The AOL Board made a deliberate decision that
stockholder value would not be maximized through an
auction, and instead decided to pursue potential bidders
individually by direct contact through bankers and other
sources. Given the dynamics of AOL's particular industry,
this decision appears reasonable. However, if front-end
information sharing is truncated or limited, the post-
agreement period should be correspondingly robust, so to
ensure that information is sufficiently disseminated that an
informed sale can take place and bids can be received without
disabling impediments.
Despite statements by AOL's leadership that AOL was not
for sale, the persistent market rumors seem to indicate that
the market understood that the Company was likely in play.
AOL was well-covered by analysts, traded frequently, and
generally known in the market. AOL approached, and was
approached by, a number of potential buyers of some (or all)
of the Company, several of whom entered into confidentiality
agreements and conducted due diligence.
AOL appears to have engaged with anyone that indicated
a serious interest in doing a deal.112 On the front end,
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the market canvas appears sufficient so long as interested
parties could submit bids on the back end without disabling
impediments.
However, here my concern arises. Immediately after
announcement of the transaction, Armstrong gave a public
interview and stated:
I'm committed to doing the deal with Verizon and I think
that as we chose each other because that's the path we're
on. I gave the team at Verizon my word that, you know,
[w]e're in a place where this deal is going to happen and
we're excited about it.113
Armstrong's post-Agreement statements to the press about
giving his “word” to Verizon could reasonably cause potential
bidders to pause when combined with the deal protections
here. In Dell, by comparison, the merger agreement included
one-time matching rights until the stockholder vote; a
forty-five day go-shop period; and termination fees of
approximately 1% of the equity value during the go-shop
or approximately 2% afterward.114 Here, a termination fee
of 3.5% and a forty-two day window between agreement
and closing would probably not deter bids by themselves.
But that period was constrained by a no-shop provision,
combined with: (i) the declared intent of the acting CEO to
consummate a deal with Verizon, (ii) the CEO's prospect of
post-merger employment with Verizon, (iii) unlimited three-
day matching rights, and (iv) the fact that Verizon already
had ninety days between expressing interest in acquiring the
entire company and signing the Merger Agreement, including
seventy-one days of data room access. Cumulatively, these
factors make for a considerable risk of informational and
structural disadvantages dissuading any prospective bidder.
In Dell, after the “bankers canvassed the interest of sixty-
seven parties, including twenty possible strategic acquirers
during the go-shop,” the “more likely explanation for the
lack of a higher bid [was] that the deal market was already
robust and that a topping bid involved a serious risk of
overpayment,” which “suggest[ed] the price [was] already at
a level that [was] fair.”115 Here, given Armstrong's statements
and situation, together with significantly less canvassing and
stronger post-agreement protections than in Dell, I am less
confident that is true. I cannot say that, under these conditions,
deal price is the “best evidence of fair value ... as it resulted
from an open process, informed by robust public information,
and easy access to deeper, non-public information, in which
many parties with an incentive to make a profit had a chance
to bid.”116
B. Deal Price as a Check
*10  “The dependability of a transaction price is only as
strong as the process by which it was negotiated.”117 I find the
deal price is not sufficient evidence of fair value to warrant
deference, but it is still useful to an extent. I will use it as a
“check” in my determination of fair value, although I decline
to give the deal price explicit weight in that determination.
Given the process here, a determination of fair value via
financial metrics that results in a valuation grossly deviant
from deal price, under these circumstances, should give me
reason to revisit my assumptions. In this way, the deal price
operates as a check in my determination of fair value.118
The parties have not suggested a principled way to use deal
price under the circumstances here, in a blended valuation of
deal price and other valuation metrics, and none occurs to me.
Instead, the parties agree, and I concur, that a discounted cash
flow analysis is the best way to value the Company.119 I turn
to that now.
III. FAIR VALUE AND DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW
ANALYSIS
A. Use of Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
Under 8 Del. C. § 262, to determine “fair value,” a court
must value a corporation as a “going concern” according
to the corporation's “operative reality” as of the date of the
merger.120 Further, a court “must take into consideration all
factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the
fixing of value,” and consider “facts which were known or
which could be ascertained as of the date of merger.”121
The court retains discretion to use “different valuation
methodologies” so long as the court justifies that exercise of
discretion “in a manner supported by the record before it.”122
The court must derive the fair value of the shares “exclusive of
any element arising from the accomplishment or expectation
of the merger.”123 When using a DCF analysis, “this Court
has recognized that management is, as a general proposition,
in the best position to know the business and, therefore,
prepare projections” in the “ordinary course of business.”124
With these general principles in mind, I turn to my valuation
of AOL.
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I rely primarily upon a DCF analysis, as “[b]oth experts
agree that the DCF is the best and most reliable way to
value AOL as a going concern as of the merger date.”125
A DCF analysis, “although complex in practice, is rooted
around a simple principle: the value of the company at the
time of the merger is simply the sum of its future cash
flows discounted back to present value.”126 Further, a DCF
analysis “is only as reliable as the inputs relied upon and the
assumptions underlying those inputs.”127 However, “the use
of math should not obscure the necessarily more subjective
exercise in judgment that a valuation exercise requires.”128
I also acknowledge the Dell court's recent delineation of the
weaknesses of the method:
*11  Although widely considered the best tool for valuing
companies when there is no credible market information
and no market check, DCF valuations involve many inputs
—all subject to disagreement by well-compensated and
highly credentialed experts—and even slight differences in
these inputs can produce large valuation gaps.129
The Petitioners hired a well-qualified academic, Dr. Bradford
Cornell, a visiting professor at the California Institute of
Technology, as their expert witness. Cornell performed a
financial analysis, and concluded that the fair value of AOL
stock was $68.98 per share.130 For reasons not necessary
to detail, however, the Respondent questioned Dr. Cornell's
impartiality in this matter, and the Petitioners seem content
to use the DCF model presented by the Respondent's expert
as a starting point for my analysis. Accordingly, I start with
the DCF valuation provided by that expert, Professor Daniel
Fischel, and consider the Petitioners' limited arguments that
certain assumption or inputs in that valuation must be
changed.
Fischel opined that the fair value of AOL stock was $44.85
per share.131 The Petitioners' disagreements with the Fischel
analysis are limited, although the effects of that disagreement
on the calculation of fair value are vast. The parties dispute
only four items: (1) the proper cash flow projections for the
DCF; (2) the operative reality assumed in the DCF with regard
to two deals with Microsoft and one deal with Millennial
Media Inc.; (3) the proper projection period and terminal
growth rate; and (4) how much of AOL's cash balance must
be added back after the DCF. I discuss each in turn.
B. Disputed Addition and Inputs
1. Cash Flow Projections
“The most important input necessary for performing a proper
DCF is a projection of the subject company's cash flows.
Without a reliable estimate of cash flows, a DCF analysis is
simply a guess.”132 The parties point to three potential sets of
cash flow projections. The projections relied on by Fischel in
his analysis, which I use as a starting point, are management's
long-term plan for 2015 (the “Management Projections” or
the “LTP”).133 Fischel selected these projections because they
were “described as the ‘best currently available estimates and
judgements of [AOL]'s management as to the future operating
and financial performance of [AOL],’ and were used by
AOL's financial advisor Allen in its May 11, 2015 fairness
opinion.”134 The Petitioners encourage me to use either of
two other projections relied on by Cornell. The first is based
on ten-year projections that AOL submitted to Deloitte for a
tax impairment analysis (the “Deloitte Projections”).135 The
second, (the “Disputed Projections”), contained substantial
differences, compared to the Management Projections, in
working capital requirements and was sent by AOL to
Verizon's advisors in April 2015. I find that the best estimate
of cash flow projections is the Management Projections, made
in the regular course of business, for the reasons that follow.
*12  The Management Projections were completed in mid-
February 2015 and presented to the AOL Board.136 The
AOL Board created four-year long-term plans as a part of
its annual internal budgeting process.137 AOL executives
testified that the LTP did not include costs or risks from
specific acquisitions or transactions;138 however, the LTP
assumed that AOL would fill strategic gaps in areas such as
mobile supply, shifting demographics, and consumer data.139
AOL financial advisor Allen & Co. sent the Management
Projections to Verizon, albeit without AOL management's
sign off.140
The Deloitte Projections were created after AOL hired
Deloitte to perform a goodwill impairment valuation of
the Company using a set of ten-year projections developed
by AOL for this purpose.141 AOL CFO Dykstra testified
that she did not create the Deloitte Projections for non-tax
purposes.142 These projections were created through inputs
provided by AOL Senior Vice President of Financial Planning
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and Analysis Michael Nolan,143 after which “[Deloitte] ...
r[a]n it through their standard model.”144 According to
Cornell, a DCF analysis based on the Deloitte Projections—
instead of the Management Projections—values AOL stock
at $55.36 per share.145
The Disputed Projections were created when Allen & Co.
expressed concern, in April 2015, that AOL's projected
working capital “appear[ed] to be materially different
from research estimates”146 AOL prepared and sent
another version of the working capital projections—
the Disputed Projections—with different assumptions to
Verizon's advisors.147 AOL CFO of Platforms Nick Bellomo
stated that he “reviewed the numbers that were shared [with
Verizon] to “mak[e] them more optimistic” in order to
“decrease[ ] the change in working capital, which would have
had an increase in cash flow for the business, which would
ultimately increase the valuation of the business under certain
valuation methodologies.”148 Bellomo stated that it was his
“understanding that the valuation that was initially floated
to AOL for the purchase of AOL may [have] be[en] taken
down unless these numbers were improved.”149 Allen & Co.
director Isani explained to AOL Senior Vice President Mark
Roszkowski on February 8, 2015 that:
I think we should be presenting a robust opportunity case to
[Verizon]—and as is typical for these processes, it will vary
from budget. For internal purposes and record keeping, we
should have the bridge btw that case and the board budget
as well as document the rationale for the gap.
*13  However, for the dialogue with [Verizon], we present
only the robust case and completely own it as “the” plan.
Typically we would not show board minutes as this is not
a corporate deal (this case is tricky as the asset represents a
large portion of total value). They will ask is this budget and
we will have to rehearse the answer. But for a process like
this it is not typical for the financials to be revised upward
from the conservative board/budget ones
(Should probably also connect w/ legal to get their input
into the caveats for documenting the gap).150
AOL management sometimes referred to the
Disputed Projections as “aspirational” in their internal
correspondence.151 There is also contemporaneous
correspondence and trial testimony that the Disputed
Projections were created with the assumption that AOL would
become part of Verizon.152
*14  I note that other evidence challenges this narrative. The
Disputed Projections were created after a rigorous internal
process that involved input from a variety of departments
within AOL.153 Certain of AOL's employees signed off
on the projections while they were unaware of a potential
or likely sale to Verizon.154 The Disputed Projections
were submitted to Verizon and explained to AOL's Board,
apparently as though they were current projections.155 There
are emails between AOL employees that refer to the LRP as
being “incorrect” and outdated.156 The Petitioners contend
that AOL's goal for more leverage to decrease day sales
outstanding (thus decreasing the required working capital and
thereby improving cash flow) could have occurred outside of
an anticipated deal with Verizon, although an exact method is
left unspecified.157
I find that the Management Projections are in fact
management's best estimate as of the Valuation Date. While
a close call, the record indicates that the Disputed Projections
were most likely created as a marketing tool in AOL's
attempted sale of itself to Verizon. My purpose here is to
determine the fair value of AOL, and not AOL's value as-
advertised. I am not persuaded that the Disputed Projections
represent the most recent and valid projections used by AOL
management prior to the Valuation Date.
Finally, I find that the goodwill impairment projections
are not pertinent to my DCF analysis here. The purpose
behind any set of projections matters because it determines
the appropriateness of various assumptions that must be
made. The Deloitte Projections were made for the goodwill
impairment analysis—a tax-driven assessment with a host of
required assumptions that should not, in these circumstances,
be used for a DCF analysis. While certain assumptions may
be appropriate for a tax analysis, those same assumptions may
be nonsensical for valuation purposes. Consequently, I use the
Management Projections in my DCF analysis.
2. Pending Transactions as of the Merger
*15  I start with the following assumptions. “The
determination of fair value must be based on all relevant
factors, including ... elements of future value, where
appropriate.”158 “[A]ny ... facts which were known or which
could be ascertained as of the date of the merger and which
throw any light on [the] future prospects of the merged
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corporation” must be considered in fixing fair value.159 A
corporation “must be valued as a going concern based upon
the ‘operative reality’ of the company as of the time of the
merger.”160 I must exclude speculative costs or revenues,
however.161 Mere “actions in furtherance” of a potential
transaction, without a manifest ability to proceed, should not
be valued as part of a company's operative reality.162
The Petitioners argue that three potential deals were part
of AOL's operative reality, and that any fair value analysis
of AOL must include these transactions.163 These include:
(i) AOL's acquisition of Millennial, a programmatic mobile
advertising platform;164 (ii) a deal for Microsoft's Bing search
engine to replace Google in powering search results on
AOL properties (the “Search Deal”),165 and (iii) a ten-year
commercial partnership for AOL to run the sales of display,
mobile, and video ads on Microsoft properties in the United
States and eight international markets (the “Display Deal”)
(the Display Deal and Search Deal are together referred to
as the “Microsoft Deals”).166 Fischel did not ascribe value
to these transactions in his DCF analysis.167 For each of
these transactions I ask: (i) if the transaction was part of the
“operative reality” of the Company as of the Valuation Date,
and (ii) if so, was the transaction appropriately valued in the
LTP. I will adjust my Fischel-based DCF analysis to include
the financial impact of those transactions that were part of the
Company's operative reality on the Valuation Date but which
were not included in the LTP.
a. Operative Reality
i. Description of the Deals
As mentioned, the Display Deal allowed AOL to run the sale
of display, mobile, and video ads on Microsoft properties
such as Xbox, Skype, Outlook, MSN, and others in the
United States and eight other markets.168 After months of
negotiation,169 Microsoft and AOL traded draft term sheets
at least through May 2015.170 Armstrong testified that the
Display Deal “could have blown up at any time” because of,
among other things, uncertainty surrounding the customers
and the Microsoft employees AOL would need to onboard.171
Armstrong confirmed in a May 14, 2015 email that AOL
expected to close the Display Deal on May 27, 2015.172
Nevertheless, AOL pushed back the Microsoft announcement
until after the Verizon announcement.173 AOL signed an
agreement for the Display Deal with Microsoft on June 28,
2015 and announced the transaction on June 30, 2015.174 The
Petitioners imply that the Display Deal contributes $2.57 per
share if included under Fischel's DCF Model.175
*16  The Search Deal replaced a soon-to-expire contract with
Google to allow Microsoft's Bing search engine to power
advertising and results on AOL's properties.176 Similar to the
Display Deal, AOL planned to close the Search Deal on May
27, 2015 but delayed until after the Verizon announcement.177
An AOL presentation from June 10, 2015 included the key
terms, financial projections, and other business implications
of the Search Deal.178 The Search Deal closed on June 26,
2015.179 Microsoft and AOL announced the Microsoft Deals
on June 30, 2015.180 The Petitioners do not quantify the
impact of the Search Deal but instead urge me to “select a
DCF value slightly above the median to account for the value
added by the Microsoft Search Deal, which was accretive to
free cash flow beginning in 2016.”181
The path of Millennial Media, Inc. (“Millennial”) to an
acquisition by AOL (the “Millennial Deal”) was more
circuitous than the Microsoft Deals. After conducting initial
diligence, AOL passed on buying Millennial in late 2014
but resumed preliminary diligence in February 2015.182 AOL
paused its diligence in April 2015 until Millennial announced
its quarterly earnings.183 In May 2015, Armstrong told the
AOL Board that Millennial might “secure another offer in the
near term, but we are willing to take that risk.”184 Armstrong
made a non-binding offer to Millennial for $2.10 per share
on June 5, 2015, “conditioned on exclusivity,” and stated
that “AOL was prepared to move expeditiously to negotiate
and sign a definitive agreement to effect the transaction.”185
AOL sent a “written, non-binding proposal ... reflecting the
terms of the June 5 Proposal, and which also included an
exclusivity period to negotiate a transaction between the
parties until July 17, 2015.”186 On June 10, 2015, Millennial
opened a data room to AOL and its advisors.187 On June 15,
2015, Millennial and AOL signed an agreement to negotiate
exclusively until July 17, 2015, and “which contained a
standstill provision that would terminate if the Company
entered into a definitive agreement with a third party to effect
a business combination.”188 Representatives of AOL and
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Millennial met on June 17–19, 2015 to discuss Millennial's
“financials, business operations, product and technology, real
estate and security infrastructure.”189 On June 23, 2015,
Verizon closed the merger with AOL.190
On June 30, 2015, AOL's counsel “circulated a first draft of
the Merger Agreement,” followed by two weeks of meetings,
discussions, and negotiations.191 The parties discussed:
[T]he scope of the representations and warranties, the
benefits to be offered to the Company's employees
following the transaction, the conduct of the Company's
business between signing and closing of the transaction, the
parties' respective conditions to closing, AOL's obligation
to indemnify and maintain insurance for the Company's
directors and officers, the rights of the parties to terminate
the transaction, and the amount and conditions of payment
by the Company of the termination fee and expense
reimbursement described above.192
*17  The SEC sent Millennial a letter “notifying [Millennial]
that the SEC was conducting an information investigation”
for fraud starting in July 2015.193 After the expiration of the
exclusivity agreement, Millennial attempted to auction itself
to six other buyers, but AOL was the only party to submit a
proposal.194 AOL, by then under Verizon, agreed to pay $1.75
per share to acquire Millennial on September 2, 2015.195
AOL signed the Millennial Deal on September 3, 2015.196
The Millennial Deal closed on October 23, 2015.197 The
Petitioners argue that the Millennial Deal contributes $4.14
per share if included under Fischel's DCF model.198
ii. Conclusions
I find that the Display Deal was part of the operative reality
of AOL as of the Valuation Date. I am persuaded by the
level of certainty in that transaction, given AOL's internal
correspondence and the concrete plans for an announcement
date. I also find that the Search Deal was part of the operative
reality of AOL as of the Valuation Date. I am persuaded by
the apparent certainty of the transaction, based on internal
correspondence and presentations, that this transaction was
one that both sides fully expected to occur. However, I find
that the Millennial Deal was not part of AOL's operative
reality as of the Valuation Date. AOL had taken a number
of steps toward a transaction, such as sending a non-binding
offer subject to an exclusivity period, beginning the due
diligence process, and meeting with executives. However, no
merger agreement drafts had been exchanged and weeks of
negotiations, a robust due diligence process, and an entire
auction yet remained. The actions taken by AOL before the
Valuation Date showed substantial interest in a transaction but
are not, to my mind, sufficiently certain as to be part of the
operative reality of AOL on the Valuation Date.
b. LTP Assumptions
The second question is whether the operative reality of AOL
as of the Valuation Date, including the relevant transactions
mentioned above, was properly included in the LTP. Because
I find that the Millennial Deal was not part of the operative
reality of AOL on the Valuation Date, I need not answer the
second question for that particular transaction. In essence,
the question before me is this: what is the scope of the
assumptions made in the LTP? The Petitioners urge me to
view them narrowly—these specific deals were not assumed
—making the Microsoft Deals additive to the Management
Projections. The Respondent, by contrast, urges me to view
them broadly—the LTP assumes that strategic gaps will be
filled and these transactions merely fill that role—so that the
LTP remains as management's best prediction of future cash
flows and the Microsoft Deals should not be additive. My
attempt to differentiate the new ingredients from those already
baked in is below.
i. The Display Deal
The Display Deal and its relation to the LTP were
specifically discussed internally after the AOL–Verizon
merger. AOL executive Roszkowski explained to Verizon
executive Walden in a September 3, 2015 email that the
Microsoft and Millennial Deals were “accretive to [the LTP],
but should not be a straight addition to revenue and margin”
and that “the [ ] LTP assumed deals like MSFT and that
[AOL] would close [its] mobile technology/talent gap.”199
Roszkowski later testified that AOL's LTP was “optimistic ...
and ... included assumptions that [AOL] [would] solve[ ] for
key strategic capability gaps” so that the Microsoft Deals
“actually made the long-term plan more certain” and could
not be a “straight ... addition” to the LTP.200 The Display Deal
included a number of risks, including adding approximately
1,270 Microsoft employees in nine countries.201 The parties
also dispute smaller, non-dispositive issues.202
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*18  The parties give me two choices with regard to the
Display Deal: add the full value of the Display Deal as
urged by the Petitioners, implicitly worth $2.57, or decline
to add it to the LTP, as the Respondent recommends. I find
that the Display Deal was, at least, partially accretive. I am
convinced that AOL internally viewed it as at least partially
additive to its LTP as evidenced by its internal presentations
and communications, but I also suspect that it should not be
entirely additive. Because I lack the information necessary to
cut a finer slice in this instance, I add the full $2.57 per share
to my DCF analysis. In other words, the record gives me no
basis that another value for the display deal is less arbitrary
than $2.57 per share.
ii. The Search Deal
Neither Fischel nor Cornell included the Search Deal in
their DCF analyses,203 purportedly because “AOL did not
produce detailed forecasts for the Search Deal.”204 The LTP
initially assumed that a new search deal with Google would be
less favorable to AOL than the previous deal.205 Armstrong
testified that the Search Deal, together with the Display Deal,
was “meant as a mitigation to the search money that we would
lose when we switched from Google at the end of that year to
Microsoft. But it was unlikely that the Microsoft deal would
make up for the search loss that we were going to experience
overall.”206 However, a June 10, 2015 AOL presentation
included financial projections that explicitly portrayed the
Search Deal as additive to AOL's OIBDA in comparison with
the LTP.207
I find that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the
Search Deal is, at least minimally, additive to the LTP. The
record is lacking in a principled way to account for the Search
Deal, however. The Petitioners do no more than urge me to
“select a number slightly higher than the mid-point share price
to account for the Search Deal's benefits.”208 I find fair value,
therefore, is best expressed by omitting any speculation as to
the value to AOL of the pending Search Deal. In other words,
the record gives me no basis to find that another value for
the Search Deal is less arbitrary than $0. I also note that I
have included the full value of the Display Deal as accretive to
value, potentially overstating fair value, and I find it prudent
not to exaggerate that effect by adding speculative value here.
3. Projection Period
Any DCF analysis must include a post-projection period of
valuation into perpetuity at a steady state. This case is a now-
classic appraisal story of “the tale of two companies.” AOL
was divided into three segments: two parts small and rapidly
growing; one senescent. The question before me is, in the
context of four-year projections, ending with two segments
enjoying high growth rates and a quiescent third segment,
what is the best way to view the terminal period?
Fischel selected 3.25% as the perpetuity growth rate for
AOL.209 Fischel noted that the “perpetuity growth rates
reported by analysts and advisors ranged from 1.0% to 6.6%,
with a median of 2.5% and an average of 2.9%.”210 Fischel
then averaged the 2.9% perpetuity growth rate given by
analysts and advisors with the 4.6% long-term GDP growth
estimate and 2.3% long-term inflation rate, resulting in an
average rate of 3.28%.211 Fischel reduced the perpetuity
growth rate to 3.25% due to his concern that “AOL's
Membership segment was the largest contributor to AOIBDA
and was declining, so this may overstate the expected growth
rate for the firm.”212 However, Fischel noted that because
“AOL Projections do not provide estimates beyond 2018 ...
there is some possibility that AOL could experience growth
in the short term at a rate higher than inflation due to
higher growth in the Platforms and Brands segments or
even potential acquisitions.”213 Lastly, Fischel tested the
“sensitivity of the implied value of AOL's common shares
to the perpetuity growth rate by using a range of 3.0% to
3.5%.”214
*19  Unsurprisingly, the Petitioners characterize Fischel's
perpetuity growth rate of 3.25% as “flawed” because,
they say, combined with his use of a two-stage model,
Fischel insufficiently accounts for AOL's high growth rate
prior to reaching steady state.215 The Petitioners argue
that a three-stage DCF is more appropriate here because
“academic literature [such as that by Professor Damodaran]
counsels that if the growth in the final forecast year is
well above the terminal growth rate, then a three-stage
model is preferred.”216 The Petitioners point to Fischel's
agreement, that two of the AOL businesses were experiencing
“hypergrowth”217 at the end of the two-stage projection
period used by Fischel, as evidence that a two-stage model is
- 184 -
In re AOL Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2018)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 13
inappropriate here.218 The Petitioners illustrate this lost value
using a chart:219
As an alternative, the Petitioners advocate using the ten-year
Deloitte projections used for the tax impairment analysis to
account for the post-Management Projections growth gap
described above.220 I have already rejected this approach, for
reasons set out above; I also note that AOL management did
not believe it could reliably forecast beyond four years.221
In a fast-paced industry with significant fluctuations, where
management is hesitant to project beyond four years, using
a three-stage DCF model or a ten-year projection period
seems particularly brazen. I find that a two-stage model is
appropriate under these circumstances. However, I agree with
the Petitioners that Fischel's two-stage model and perpetuity
growth rate of 3.25% do not accurately capture the trajectories
of the two divisions of AOL that were in hypergrowth
at the end of the Management Projection period, despite
the presence of the aforementioned senescent “You've Got
Mail” laggard. I find a perpetuity growth rate of 3.5% more
accurately captures AOL's prospects after the Management
Projection period ends. When a 3.5% perpetuity growth rate
is applied to Fischel's DCF model, the fair value of AOL stock
increases by $1.28 per share.222
4. Cash Balance
*20  The value of working capital that is required “to fund [a
company's] ongoing operations ... is already reflected in one
sense in the discounted present value of those operations.”;
any balance of cash not so required is “ ‘excess’ and may be
added to the discounted cash flow.”223 Fischel and Cornell
agree that any such balance should be added back to the
valuation for AOL after the DCF analysis. Fischel cites to
Professor Aswath Damodaran for the financial valuation rule
that “only cash in excess of the minimum cash balance needed
for operations should be included in a DCF.”224
The cash on hand of the Company on the Valuation Date
was $554 million.225 Fischel adds $404 million at the end
of the DCF but reserves $150 million as working capital, an
asset necessary to develop the return on investment that is
represented in the DCF.226 Cornell adds back AOL's entire
cash balance of $554 million.227 The Petitioners contend that
the $150 million “minimum balance” is “litigation driven”228
by pointing to (i) Verizon's and AOL's advisors purportedly
opposite position in their valuations229 and (ii) AOL's historic
dips below $150 million cash on hand in 2014.230 They
contend that none of this cash should be excluded and that no
working cash exclusion is appropriate.
I am not persuaded that, in evaluating the fair value of AOL
under these circumstances, I should add back all of the cash
of AOL, implicitly assuming that zero working capital would
be required to achieve the returns that the DCF analysis
projects. While I recognize that AOL dropped below $150
million in cash in the recent past, which the Petitioners point
to as evidence that the minimum cash balance is a litigation
façade, I also acknowledge that historical dips in cash reserves
pertain to a different time period with different capital
requirements. The preponderance of the evidence indicates
that this not a litigation-driven argument.231 I instead find
that the withholding of $150 million as working capital is
reasonable and decline to add it back into the DCF.
IV. CONCLUSION
*21  In arriving at fair value, for the reasons discussed above,
I give full weight to my DCF valuation. I begin with Fischel's
DCF valuation of $44.85 and add $1.28 per share232 for the
adjustment to a 3.5% perpetuity growth rate and $2.57 per
share to include the Display Deal as part of AOL's operative
reality. My DCF analysis therefore results in a fair value
of $48.70 per share. While the deal process was not Dell
Compliant and thus not entitled to deference as a reliable
indicator of fair value, it was sufficiently robust that I use the
deal price as a “check” on my analysis, while granting it zero
explicit weight. I note that value derived from my DCF does
not deviate grossly from the deal price of $50.
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I am cognizant, however, that I am saying two seemingly
incongruent things; namely, that AOL's deal process was
insufficient to warrant deal price deference at $50 per share
—because, due to deal deficiencies, the sales price may
not capture the full fair value of the Company—while also
holding, based on my DCF analysis, that the value of AOL
stock is even lower, at $48.70 per share. One explanation for
this incongruity is that a deal price may contain synergies that
have been shared with the seller in the deal but that are not
properly included in fair value.
For the reasons described above, I hold that the fair value of
AOL stock was $48.70 per share on the Valuation Date. The
Petitioners are entitled to the fair value of their shares together
with interest at the statutory rate. The parties should confer
and provide a form of order consistent with this Memorandum
Opinion.
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and advertising technology? A. Yes.”), 106:11–15 (“One of those markets was mobile advertising. And to deliver—to
participate in that market and to build capability, AOL was one of the opportunities we saw to enter the market quickly
and to have a reasonable starting point.”); Trial Tr. 333:13–19 (Marni Walden, head of Verizon's Product Innovation and
New Businesses division, spoke with Armstrong about Verizon's interest in AOL's “ad tech capabilities”).
16 JX1180 at 3.
17 JX0968 (AOL 10K filed on December 31, 2014) at 8.
18 Id. at 8.
19 JX1180 at 4.
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20 See, e.g., JX1803 (examining JMP Securities, Our Thoughts on Verizon's $50 per share Offer for AOL: Maintain Market
Perform Rating, May 12, 2015).
21 JX1851 (the “Solicitation” or “AOL Schedule 14D–9”) at 16.
22 Id.
23 Id.








32 Id. at 16–17.
33 AOL Schedule 14D–9 at 17.
34 Id. at 17.
35 Id.
36 Stipulated Joint Pre–Trial Order, Ex. A; JX1974 (quoting AOL CEO Armstrong about rumors surrounding AOL).
37 Id. at 18.
38 JX0902 at 1.
39 Id.
40 Trial Tr. 490:1–20 (Armstrong).
41 Id. at 543:16–19.
42 JX1958 at 1 (June 22, 2015 email from Armstrong to Walden).





48 Id. at 19.
49 JX2210 (Reynolds Dep.) at 119:8–120:4.
50 Id. at 84:17–18.
51 Id. at 85:5–8.
52 Id.
53 AOL Schedule 14D–9 at 19.
54 JX1293 at 3.
55 Id.










66 Id. at 20–21.
67 Id. at 21.
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76 Id. at 21–22.
77 Id. at 22; JX1755 at 3 (May 11, 2015 Verizon internal slideshow about the sales process stated that “Verizon did not
communicate any flexibility on price, but signaled flexibility on break fee.” Verizon submitted an offer of $47 per share







84 Id. at 23.
85 Id.
86 JX1958 at 1 (June 22, 2015 email from Armstrong to Walden).
87 JX1794 at 6.
88 AOL Schedule 14D–9 at 222, 24–25; Trial Tr. 796:13–20 (Reynolds) (“We were encouraged that there—the deal was
drafted in a way that would allow an unfettered bid from a third party and it would enhance our shareholders' value.”).
89 AOL Schedule 14D–9 at 21.
90 JX1755 at 14 (including a Verizon internal presentation from May 11, 2015).
91 Trial Tr. 796:21–22 (Reynolds).
92 Stipulated Joint Pre–Trial Order ¶¶ 8–9.
93 8 Del. C. § 262.
94 Stipulated Joint Pre–Trial Order ¶ 2–3.
95 Sept. 19, 2017 Oral Arg. Tr. 25:4–8.
96 Dell, Inc., 2017 WL 6375829, at *12 (citing Ala. By–Products Corp. v. Cede & Co. ex rel. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc.,
657 A.2d 254, 258 (Del. 1995) ).
97 In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 399726, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (citations omitted).
98 8 Del. C. § 262.
99 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 525 (Del. 1999).
100 Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Del. 1989).
101 Id. at 1145.
102 In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1218 (Del. 1992).
103 Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1144.
104 Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 507 (Del. Ch. 2010), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).
105 Cavalier Oil Corp., 564 A.2d at 1144.
106 Golden Telecom, Inc., 11 A.3d at 218.
107 In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d at 1222.
108 Dell, Inc., 2017 WL 6375829, at *15 (citing DFC Global Corp., 172 A.3d at 348–49, 351).
109 Dell, Inc., 2017 WL 6375829, at *14 (citing DFC Global Corp., 172 A.3d at 348).
110 DFC Global Corp., 172 A.3d at 366.
111 Id. at 349.
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112 The Petitioners point to the fact that AT&T's potential approach was rebuffed. However, given the circumstances here,
including the record evidence that there was a fear that engaging with AT&T would discourage or endanger the developing
deal with Verizon, lack of engagement with AT&T, pre-Agreement, appears reasonable.
113 JX1794 at 6.
114 Dell, Inc., 2017 WL 6375829, at *6–7.
115 Dell, Inc., 2017 WL 6375829, at *21, 24.
116 DFC Global Corp., 172 A.3d at 349.
117 Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 WL 2069417, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015).
118 AOL stock publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. The unaffected stock price was $42.59, and the merger price
was thus at a premium to the unaffected trading price. As with deal price, an efficiently derived stock trading price can
serve as a check on a fair value analysis. Recently, this Court in Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks,
Inc., 2018 WL 922139 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018), found an efficiently derived trading price to be fair value. I note that no
party has advocated such here, and that no evidence concerning the efficiency of the market for AOL stock is before
me. Moreover, the use of trading price to determine fair value requires a number of assumptions that, to my mind, are
best made or rejected after being subject to a forensic and adversarial presentation by interested parties. Thus, I do not
consider stock trading price further.
119 See supra note 7. Because I do not explicitly give weight to the deal price, I need not address certain related issues,
such as the calculation of synergies.
120 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., 737 A.2d at 525.
121 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983) (quoting Tri–Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del.
1950) ).
122 DFC Global Corp., 172 A.3d at 35 1.
123 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
124 In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 399726, at *18.
125 Sept. 19, 2017 Oral Arg. Tr. 25:5–8.
126 In re of SWS Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 2334852, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2017).
127 Id.
128 Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 896 (Del. Ch. 2001).
129 Dell, Inc., 2017 WL 6375829, at *28.
130 Trial Tr. 108:17–21 (Cornell).
131 Trial Tr. 1065:6–9 (Fischel).
132 Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 332 (Del. Ch. 2006).
133 JX0917; JX0921 at 46.
134 JX2255 (Fischel Report) ¶ 41; AOL Schedule 14D–9 at 24.
135 Trial Tr. 649:19–650:3 (Dykstra).
136 JX0917; JX0921 at 46.
137 Trial Tr. 355:17–22 (AOL CFO of Platforms Bellomo), 641:17–642:10 (AOL CFO Dykstra).
138 Id. at 363:10–13 (quoting AOL CFO of Platforms Bellomo's response that the LTP did not “account for the cost of
acquiring Millennial Media or integrating it”); JX1248 (quoting an email from AOL CFO of Platforms Bellomo to another
AOL employee: “[I]s our LTP a tough case to achieve on an organic basis?” “[T]he current LTP does not assume any
acquisitions ....”).
139 Trial Tr. 361:19–364:16 (Bellomo); JX1712 at 3 (“Major Product/Solution Improvement Assumptions”).
140 Trial Tr. 889:13–22 (Roszkowski); JX1332; JX1457; JX2991; JX1286.
141 Trial Tr. 649:19–650:3 (Dykstra).
142 Id. at 653:22–654:10 (Dykstra) (“I wouldn't use them for formal valuation purposes for a different purpose. I mean, this
goodwill impairment testing is a different purpose, to just judge whether you have a non-cash impairment charge for that
period ... It was a different process, different people involved.”).
143 Trial Tr. 650:12–13 (Dykstra).
144 Id. at 650:21–23 (Dykstra).
145 Pet'rs' Opening Br. Ex. A.
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146 JX1266 (quoting email from Allen & Co. that “[w]e have included [net working capital] from the LRP as well, which appears
to be materially different from research estimates, are we sure the numbers we have for NWC are correct?”); see also
JX2473 (quoting an internal AOL email from May 8, 2015 that the “increase in working capital seems crazy high”).
147 Trial Tr. 371:5–15 (Bellomo); Id. at 832:16–833:7, 835:22–836:2 (Allen & Co. director Isani) (“Q. And what do you
understand the purpose of these [Disputed] cash flow projections to be? A. To make a case to Verizon on how the cash
flow could be improved over time, should the company successfully deploy certain efforts.”); but see id. at 827:7–828:2
(Isani) (agreeing that “it was typical in these processes to present a robust opportunity case to a potential buyer”).
148 Id. at 370:14–18 (Bellomo).
149 Id. at 371:1–4.
150 JX0819 at 1–2 (citing emails between AOL and Allen & Co. executives); accord Trial Tr. 311:7–312:3 (Doherty).
151 Trial Tr. 656:19–21 (Dykstra) (“So we did that exercise and came up with a more aspirational set of working capital
projections.”); JX1691 (quoting a May 10, 2015 email from Dykstra to Roszkowski that “[w]e are going to note to the board
at the meeting tomorrow that we provided a more aspirational cash flow to the [Verizon] team as part of the process and
we'll need to note the differences at a very high level to the cash flow we provide to the board”); JX1748 (quoting an email
from AOL Senior Vice President of Financial Planning & Analysis Michael Nolan to Dykstra on May 10, 2015 that “[b]elow
[financial projections] compare[ ] base case vs aspiration as well as revised tax comment” and refer[ ] to an assumption
that “improved work capital driven by DSO [days sales outstanding] and DPO [days payable outstanding] improvement
initiatives planned in LRP,” which allegedly could only be achieved by a Verizon acquisition of AOL).
152 Trial Tr. 656:5–21, 658:23–659:8 (Dykstra) (“I believe they were talking about the exercise of taking a ... stretch or
aspirational approach to looking to see what numbers we could tweak in the model, and things that would be impacted by
Verizon if they were there with us ....)”, 662:4–663:12 (“[W]e went back and said what if we could stretch and Verizon could
help us improve some of the dynamics in our cash flow, and collections in particular.”); Id. at 896:20–897:20 (Roszkowski);
JX1690 (quoting same email as JX1691); Trial Tr. 371:16–373:15 (Bellomo); Id. at 656:5–657:20, 662:4–663:16 (“Q. And
when you wrote about the “more aspirational cash flow given to Verizon,” to what are you referring? A. I'm referring to
that exercise that we talked about, where we went back and said what if we could stretch and Verizon could help us
improve some of the dynamics in our cash flow, and collections in particular.”), 695:3–9 (Dykstra) (“Again, I've said that the
additional assumptions were assuming we would get better leverage with Verizon.”); Trial Tr. 835:4–836:2 (Isani); Id. at
892:2–10, 893:11–23 (Roszkowski); JX1286 (working capital would improve if AOL had “more leverage on both payment
terms and ability to collect ....”); JX1452 at 1 (quoting internal LionTree emails in April 2015 that “AOL is assuming ...
more scale” would lead to “a faster collection time”); JX1306 (April 14, 2015 email from Allen & Co. to AOL executives
that an assumed change in working capital would be due to “[m]ore leverage over advertisers and publishers”); JX1419
(April 18, 2015 email from Allen & Co. to Verizon financial advisors including a “Net Working Capital Overview” with a
“[c]hange in net working capital projections by segment”).
153 JX1280 (noting the Disputed Projections were prepared after “an internal review of the LRP”); JX1423 (quoting an internal
AOL email chain discussing the change in projection assumptions in advance of a call); JX1414 (detailing the extensive
internal input into the Disputed Projections from Corporate Development, Financial Planning & Analysis, and Allen & Co.);
JX1398 at 1 (quoting an AOL finance team email of April 17, 2015 that the updated working capital projections resulted
in “no change in AOIBDA [free cash flow] or end cash”).
154 JX1437 (quoting Allen & Co. director Isani in an April 20, 2015 email that: “FYI—[AOL] will also have their controller Lara
sweet [sic] join the call at noon. PLEASE NOTE: Lara is not aware of the change in the structure to a 100% deal. As
such, please continue to provide the context that the discussion is re: a deal with the last 80/20 public minority structure”);
JX1434 at 1 (citing email to show that Lara Sweet, AOL's Controller was unaware of the potential Verizon transaction
when she endorsed the Updated Projection); JX1411 at 1 (Armstrong e-mail to the Board, outside counsel, Allen & Co.,
and Dykstra, and Roszkowski, stating “[i]t is really important you know that the main people represented on this email
are the limited set of people that have information on our deals”).
155 Trial Tr. 715:20–716:24 (Dykstra) (agreeing that Dykstra “t[old] the board the difference in cash flows at a very high level”
after the Disputed Projections had been sent to Verizon).
156 JX2451 at 2 (quoting an internal AOL email that “AJ can send you the LRP—caveat being that it is incorrect and does
not reflect the updated numbers per all discussions since that time”); JX1406 (quoting internal email from Allen & Co.
on April 18, 2015 that “[w]e have already told [Verizon] all old numbers should be disregarded as they are not correct,
however they would still like to have a call”).
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157 Pet'rs Answering Post–Trial Br. 17 (“The documents cited by Respondent generally assert that working capital would
improve if AOL had more scale or leverage (which AOL could obtain in ways other than an acquisition by Verizon) among
several other strategies AOL had employed to improve working capital.”).
158 Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001).
159 Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., 880 A.2d 206 at 222 (Del. 2005).
160 Ala. By–Prods. Corp. v. Neal, 588 A.2d 255, 256–67 (Del. 1991); M.G. Bancorporation, Inc, 737 A.2d at 525; LongPath
Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2015 WL 4540443, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015).
161 Ramtron, 2015 WL 4540443, at *13 & n.113; see also M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., 737 A.2d at 525; Ala. By–Prods. Corp.,
588 A.2d at 256–67.
162 Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 WL 1569818, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012).
163 Pet'rs' Answering Br. 47.
164 JX2076 at 2–3 (citing August 25, 2015 internal Verizon proposal for merger agreement with Millennial); Trial Tr. 48:6–7
(“Millennial Media ... is basically a programmatic mobile platform ....”).
165 JX2008 (including an “Advertising Sales and Services Agreement” executed on June 30, 2015).
166 JX2441 (including a “Sales Partnership Agreement for AOL's Operation of [Microsoft's] Display and Video Advertising
Monetization” executed on June 23, 2015).
167 See JX2346 (LTP) at Tab I. A.2 Key assumptions (displaying unawareness of Search Deal in statement that “[n]ew search
deal terms set in for 2016. This will negatively impact revenue and bottom line for Core”).
168 JX2441.
169 JX2009 at 1 (quoting AOL executive that the MSFT deal “was 9 months of long drawn out internal and external
negotiation”).
170 JX2412 (citing May 7, 2015 email from Bain to AOL: “Deal terms are still in flux; we anticipate having final terms on Friday
5/8, with some work still to be done on PMP terms.”); JX2413 (quoting May 8, 2015 internal AOL email with “the latest
term sheet” with updates about “[AOL's] latest reconciliation on terms with [Microsoft]”).
171 Trial Tr. 510:4–8, 12–13 (Armstrong).
172 JX1816 at 1 (email from Armstrong to AOL executives on May 14, 2015).
173 JX2425 (quoting email from AOL executive Roszkowski to another AOL employee on June 2, 2015 to hold off on
announcing the Display Deal until after the Verizon announcement).
174 JX2008 at 38–39 (Display); JX1997.
175 Pet'rs' Answering Br. 46–47 (stating that the Millennial and Display Deals contribute $6.71 per share and that the Millennial
Deal accounts for $4.14 per share of that contribution). I note that Cornell examines the Millennial and Display Deals as
combined. Pet'rs' Post–Trial Answering Br., Ex. A.
176 JX2008; Trial Tr. 512:12–20 (Armstrong); JX2146.
177 JX1816 at 1 (email from Armstrong to AOL executives on May 14, 2015); JX2425 (quoting email from AOL executive
Roszkowski to another AOL employee on June 2, 2015 to hold off on announcing the Display Deal until after the Verizon
announcement).
178 JX2433.
179 JX2146 at 1–2 (including a copy of the Search Deal agreement); JX1997 (including an internal AOL email circulating
the signature pages). The parties dispute whether the Search Deal closed on June 26 or 28, 2015; the distinction is not
material to my decision here.
180 JX2008; JX2146.
181 Pet'rs' Answering Br. 47.
182 JX0663 at 1; JX2112 at 14.
183 JX1476 at 1.
184 JX1595 at 2.
185 JX2112 (Millennial Schedule 14D–9) at 17.
186 Id. at 18.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 19.
189 Id.
190 Stipulated Joint Pre–Trial Order ¶ 9.
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191 Id.
192 Id. ¶ 20.
193 JX2112 (Millennial Schedule 14D–9) at 19–20.
194 Id. at 20–24, 26 (“AOL was the only party to submit a proposal to acquire Millennial”);
195 Id. at 23; JX2988.
196 JX2112 at 25.
197 JX2130 at 2.
198 Pet'rs' Answering Br. 47.
199 JX2100 at 1 (emphases added); see also Trial Tr. 578:15–579:17, 582:7–18 (Doherty) (“Q. And in your view, Mr. Doherty,
could you simply add the projections relating to the new Microsoft deal on top of the prior management projections? A.
No. Not at all. I mean, two reasons. Number one, I felt it was already pretty much baked into their plan; and, number
two, we didn't have a set of projections.”).
200 Id. at 901:3–14 (AOL head of corporate development Roszkowski); see also id. at 343:1–7 (Verizon EVP Walden); Id.
at 314:1–19 (Verizon SVP Doherty).
201 Tr. 374:15–375:12 (Bellomo); Tr. 512:2–513:8 (Armstrong); JX1993 at 6, 13–15 (quoting a June 25, 2015 internal Verizon
slide deck explaining the deal and its risks and benefits to AOL and Verizon, including employee integration schedules);
JX2008 at 9–16, 22–23 (“Advertising Sales and Services Agreement” between AOL and Microsoft dated June 30, 2015).
202 The parties dispute the meaning of “delivered value” in an exhibit (JX2436) as either “revenue that is delivered to AOL
and Microsoft on account of the deal” (Resp't's Answering Br. 57) or “by definition ... additive” (Pet'rs' Opening Br. 59).
The parties also dispute a slide (JX2441 at 8) that was either “apparently put together by a Bain consultant and never
shared outside a small group of AOL's management, showing how AOL might be able to perform as part of Verizon, with
illustrative numbers added on to AOL's long-term plan” (Resp't's Answering Br. 57) or as evidence that AOL viewed the
Display and Millennial Deals as directly additive to the LTP (Pet'rs' Opening Br. 59–60).
203 Trial Tr. 232:18–19 (Cornell); JX2255 ¶ 41 n.90 (Fischel Report).
204 Pet'rs' Opening Br. 56.
205 JX2346 at Tab I. A.2 Key assumptions [for AOL's LTP] (“New search deal terms set in for 2016. This will negatively
impact revenue and bottom line for Core.”).
206 Trial Tr. 512:12–20 (Armstrong).
207 JX1906_VZ–0056420 at 5–6 (comparing difference in Search Deal projections to “AOL May 2015 Outlook + 2016–18
Long Term Plan”).
208 Pet'rs' Opening Br. 56.
209 JX2255 ¶ 54 (Fischel Report).
210 Id. ¶ 52.
211 Id. ¶ 54.
212 Id. ¶ 54 n.104.
213 Id. ¶ 53.
214 Id. ¶ 54 n.104.
215 Pet'rs' Post–Trial Opening Br. 64.
216 Id. at 65.
217 Trial Tr. 1105:20–1106:2 (Fischel) (“Q. Okay. Now, two of the AOL business segments experienced hypergrowth at the
end of the projection period that you used. Correct? A. That's right. Q. And AOL did not reach a steady state at the end
of the projection period. Correct? A. I think that's fair.”).
218 Pet'rs' Post–Trial Answering Br. 50.
219 Pet'rs' Post–Trial Opening Br. 66.
220 Id. at 66–67; JX2277 (Cornell Report) ¶¶ 89–92.
221 Resp't's Opening Post–Trial Br. 74; Trial Tr. 642:11–23 (Dykstra) (“Q. Why did you only project out four years as part
of the long-term planning process? A. It was very difficult to go beyond four years. You know, we were in businesses
and markets where the world was changing pretty quickly. I mean, digital marketing really was just coming into play, so
it was moving fast. We—it's difficult to predict advertising trends to begin with.”); JX2233 at 112:22–113:5 (Eoin Ryan
Dep., former AOL head of investor relations and now AOL head of financial planning); Trial Tr. 642:11–23 (Dykstra);
JX2233 at 112:22–113:5 (Ryan Dep.).
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222 I use the Fischel model the parties provided to calculate my DCF. I note that Fischel's model includes a broken reference
(#REF!) in Ex. N on the “AOL Dilutive Results (lexicon)” tab at cell BJ4. The reference impacts calculations made in the
“DCF” tab regarding the shares outstanding at cell B16. I input “85.1” into cell B16 in accordance with Fischel's Report at
JX2255 ¶ 57, which states that “AOL had approximately 85.1 million fully diluted shares outstanding as of the Valuation
Date.” The result was a $1.28 per share difference when applying a 3.5% perpetuity growth rate, or $46.13 per share.
The parties may address any concerns with this approach before the Final Order.
223 Neal v. Ala. By–Products Corp., 1990 WL 109243, at *16 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990), aff'd, 588 A.2d 255 (Del. 1991).
224 JX2255 at 36 (citing Aswath Damodaran, Dealing with Cash, Cross Holdings and Other Non–Operating Assets:
Approaches and Implications, working paper, Sept. 2005, at 12) (“Damodaran”).
225 JX2255 (Fischel Report) ¶ 55 (including “cash and equivalents of $530 million plus assets held for sale of $24 million”).
226 Id.
227 JX2277 (Cornell Report) at 134.
228 Pet'rs Post–Trial Opening Br. 69.
229 See JX1546 at 12 (Guggenheim) (showing $477 million cash in an enterprise value analysis); JX2319 (Allen) at Tabs
“WholeCo Multiple Val,” “SOTP–Mult” (showing each as incorporating $493 million cash under a multiple-based valuation
analysis), “WholeCo DCF (Old CF),” (including $493 million cash in calculating the weighted average cost of capital). I
note that the Petitioners do not clearly point to an example of where Allen & Co. added back all of AOL's cash balance
after a DCF analysis.
230 See, e.g., JX2267 (excerpt of AOL June 30, 2014 10–Q showing cash and equivalents of $136.2 million); JX2268 (excerpt
of AOL March 31, 2014 10–Q showing cash and equivalents of $123.5 million); Trial Tr. (Dykstra) 764:1–2 (“I don't
remember when we first came up with the [$150 million] minimum cash [goal].”).
231 Trial Tr. 765:4–7 (AOL CFO Karen Dykstra) (“I said we had a goal of maintaining $150 million. We felt that that should
be our minimum cash balance. We felt that that was prudent.”); JX00921 at 31 (Feb. 27, 2015 AOL Board Agenda: “To
balance our growth strategy with cash management objectives, our goals are to maintain ... at least $150m of cash on
hand, using the credit facility for strategic transactions (share repurchases and M&A transactions).”).
232 See supra note 222.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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*1  I am tasked with determining the “fair value” of shares of
a publicly-traded company, in this case shares formerly held
by the Petitioners, who were cashed out in the purchase of
Ancestry, Inc. (“Ancestry” or the “Company”) by a private
equity investor, Permira Advisors, LLC (“Permira”). The
sale was at a 40% premium to the market price untainted
by the auction process, which process itself involved a
market canvas and uncovered a motivated buyer. The price
paid stockholders who tendered in the sale was $32. The
Petitioners' valuation expert proved something of a moving
target; he argued that the fair value of a share of Ancestry
stock at the time of the merger was as high as $47, but at least
$42.81. The Respondent's expert opined that fair value was
$30.63, despite the fact that the buyer, a non-strategic investor
with actual money at risk, was willing to pay more.
I have commented elsewhere on the difficulties, if not outright
incongruities, of a law-trained judge determining fair value
of a company in light of an auction sale, aided by experts
offering wildly different opinions on value. I will not repeat
those comments here.1 It is worth noting, however, that this
task is made particularly difficult for the bench judge, not
simply because his training may not provide a background
well-suited to the process, but also because of the way the
statute is constructed. A judge in Chancery is the finder
of fact, and is frequently charged to make difficult factual
determinations that may be without his area of expertise. The
saving judicial crutch in such situations is the burden of proof.
The party with the burden must explain why its version of
the facts is the more plausible in a way comprehensible and
convincing to the trier of fact; if not, it has failed to carry
its burden, and the judge's duty is accordingly clear. A judge
in a bench trial relies, therefore, on the burden of proof; he
holds on to it like a shipwreck victim grasps a floating deck-
chair or an ex-smoker hoards his last piece of nicotine gum.
Section 262 is unusual in that it purports explicitly to allocate
the burden of proof to the petitioner and the respondent, an
allocation not meaningful in light of the fact that no default
exists if the burden is not met; in reality, the “burden” falls on
the judge to determine fair value, using “all relevant factors.”2
Here, therefore, I must independently review those factors
to determine “fair value,” the price per share to which the
Petitioners are entitled. The results of my analysis are set out
below.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS
A. The Business of Ancestry
Ancestry is described as “a pioneer and the leader in the
online family research market,” having “digitized, indexed,
and added” to its websites “more than 12 billion historical
records ... over the past 18 years.”3 It “is the world's
largest online family history resource,”4 and has over two
million subscribers.5 The Company also recently launched
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AncestryDNA, selling $99 DNA test kits, though the
subscription services are still its most significant source of
revenue.6
*2  In November 2009, Ancestry became a publicly-traded
company, trading at $13.50 per share.7 Several months later,
in March 2010, the show Who Do You Think You Are?,
for which Ancestry was the financial and research sponsor,
began airing on Friday nights on NBC.8 This show featured
celebrities learning more about their own family histories;
Ancestry provided all of the research for these episodes.9
Additionally, “Ancestry purchased product integration and
advertising on the show, which generated substantial new
interest in its services.”10
This show, which aired on NBC for three seasons, was
a “massive catalyst for growth.”11 Between 2009 and
2011 in particular, Ancestry experienced an unprecedented
acceleration of new subscribers—the “North Star metric”
for this subscription business—leading to strong growth in
revenue and EBITDA.12 By early 2011, Ancestry stock was
trading at over $40 per share.13 The show was ultimately
cancelled in May 2012, the same day that it was nominated
for an Emmy award.14
1. Key Metrics
As an internet-based, subscription-driven company,
Ancestry's key business metrics include gross subscriber
additions (“GSAs”), churn, and subscriber acquisition cost
(“SAC”). GSAs “measure the total number of new customers
who purchase a subscription during any given period.”15
Churn measures the number of cancelled subscriptions in
a given period, represented as a percentage of the total
subscriber base.16 Finally, SAC measures the “efficiency of
[Ancestry's] marketing and advertising programs in acquiring
new subscribers” by calculating the average cost of each new
subscriber.17
Howard Hochhauser, Ancestry's CFO and COO, testified at
trial that SAC is an important driver of EBITDA because
marketing costs are Ancestry's largest variable costs.18 Churn
is a proxy for the “health of [the] existing business.”19 Churn,
together with GSAs, gives a picture of the subscriber base in
a given period; as a subscription business, these two metrics
make up the all-important “hamster wheel of new people
coming in and people existing at the same time.”20
2. Competitive Forces
Ancestry faces several competitive forces, including a
number of start-up companies21 and an increasing amount of
free archived information more readily accessible by internet
search engines.22 Additionally, the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter Day Saints operates a website that has resulted
in a “competitive dynamic” for Ancestry.23 The website,
FamilySearch.org, provides free online access to some of
the Church's extensive resources—the Church has aggregated
“what's recognized as the world's largest collection of data
and content that would be valuable for people researching
their family history.”24 This collection previously enticed
interested individuals to travel to Salt Lake City, but the
FamilySearch.org website has begun digitizing the collection
and “includes a lot of the same features and functionality” as
Ancestry.com.25
B. The Sales Process
*3  By early 2012, Ancestry stock was trading in the
low-$20s. Around that time, “[i]nterest rates were at a
record low,” and the Company was approached by a few
private equity firms.26 After receiving these unsolicited
overtures, Ancestry's board began exploring strategic options
for the Company. Ancestry's nine-member board included
six independent directors, the Company's CEO, Timothy
Sullivan, and two directors who were principals at
Spectrum Equity (“Spectrum”), which at that time owned
approximately 30% of the Company.27
At an April 19, 2012 board meeting, Qatalyst Partners
(“Qatalyst”), a financial advisor, made a presentation
to Ancestry's directors.28 In this “state of the union”29
presentation, Qatalyst raised as among its concerns that
Ancestry “was getting people that were less engaged in the
hobby” and who would not maintain their subscriptions,
though the Company's subscription base had been growing
as a result of Who Do You Think You Are?.30 Qatalyst noted
that Ancestry's subscription-based service raised questions
regarding “the size of Ancestry's available market, [and]
the degree to which Ancestry had already saturated that
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market.’’31 As Jonathan Turner, a Qatalyst Partner, testified
at deposition:
There are only so many people who are interested and have
the time to be able to devote a significant amount of their
free time to genealogy and using the company's product and
be willing to pay for it. And that was a—that was a concern
because once the company hit ... single-digit millions of
subscribers, at this point the business was largely U.S. with
a little bit of—a little bit of U.K. How many people left are
there?32
The future of Who Do You Think You Are? was also uncertain,
largely due to declining ratings;33 as noted, the show was
cancelled the month following this meeting, just as the auction
process began.
1. The Auction Process
Given the board's go-ahead, the auction process commenced
in May 2012. Qatalyst reached out to a group of potential
strategic buyers and financial sponsors including preeminent
private equity firms and strategic partners that “the company
had had some contact with at various times in the past
or that Qatalyst thought might be particularly interested in
the business.’’34 In early June, news of the auction process
was leaked, and on June 6, Bloomberg published an article
detailing the previously confidential process.35 After the
news of a potential sale of Ancestry became public, additional
parties contacted the Company to express interest; Qatalyst
ultimately held discussions with fourteen potential bidders,
six potential strategic buyers and eight financial sponsors.36
*4  By June, nine potential bidders had signed non-disclosure
agreements, thereafter receiving confidential information
about the Company and meeting with management, including
Ancestry's CEO and CFO.37 Ultimately, seven potential
bidders submitted non-binding preliminary indications of
interest, with bids falling in a range from $30–$31 to $35–
$38.38
Following these preliminary expressions, the Company
invited the three highest bidders, including Permira, to engage
in full diligence.39 According to Ancestry's CEO Timothy
Sullivan, during this extensive diligence process, these
bidders “developed to varying degrees some real negativity
about the company's prospects,” which “significantly
changed all of their views about value and ... go-forward
strategies.”40 Some of these bidders worked with their
consultants to develop, based on data provided in diligence,
detailed analyses of important metrics such as “renewal data
and the engagement among different segments.”41 These
cohort analyses “broke down the different cohorts of people
that joined a year ago or six months ago or three months
ago, and sought to track the retention rates of similar
groups of cohorts at different times.”42 The Company had
not previously conducted similar studies.43 The conclusions
drawn from these studies were not favorable, showing
declining trends across every cohort of monthly subscribers,
at a time when these subscribers accounted for 60% of
Ancestry's business.44 Hochhauser characterized this data as
“the two-by-four over the head[;] ‘Hey, guys, not sure you're
aware of this, but this is pretty important.’ ”45
Qatalyst had set a deadline of early August for submission
of final bids. When no party submitted a bid by that
deadline,46 and despite the existence of a don't-ask-don't-
waive provision, a fourth bidder, Hellman & Friedman (“H
& F”), was re-invited into the process.47 Although initially
enthusiastic to engage in the due diligence process, H & F
became concerned after familiarizing itself with Ancestry's
data and did not submit a bid.48
*5  At this point, the Company hired Goldman Sachs to
“make some recommendations for what the company could
do as an ongoing stand-alone public company.”49 As Sullivan
noted at trial, “[I]t was really the sort of Plan B option, as we
referred to it internally.”50
Meanwhile, the Company pursued the sales process. With
two parties maintaining their interest in the Company,
a partnership between these bidders was explored, but
ultimately unsuccessful.51 On October 3, 2012, Permira
submitted a bid of $31.52 Permira raised its bid to $31.25, and
ultimately to $32, after further negotiation.53 During these
final price negotiations, Turner sent an email to Sullivan
expressing, “I told [Brian Ruder of Permira] that $32 was our
line in the sand and we would not take anything less than that
to the board.”54 Sullivan responded, in part:
I would strongly urge that we communicate even more
clearly to Brian tomorrow morning the following:
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1. If we hit Monday morning with him at $31.99 or lower,
we are done. There will be no additional counter offer.
We are done and moving on [ ] with [the] press release[,]
Q3 numbers[,] stock buy-back plans, etc[.] At least this is
my personal view and one that I will share actively with
the [board]. I will shave, put on a nice shirt, and throw
myself energetically back into the job of being a public
company CEO[,] with the extra vendetta of making the
entire private equity industry look like idiots over the
next couple of years.
2. If we hit Monday morning with him at $32.25, I will be
an active advocate for this deal. I feel strongly that this
is a price that is fair to shareholders.
3. If we hit Monday morning and we are between $32 and
$32.24, I will largely defer to the independent members
of the [board]. I might support the deal at this level, but
I will not lead the charge to have it approved. This is
a modest toughening of my previous position, but I am
flabbergasted by his incrementalism, and I do not want
this to drift into next week....55
At trial, he explained that this language was meant to provide
Turner with “some words, a real stick ... that he could use to
advance his negotiations with Mr. Ruder.”56 Sullivan further
clarified that “this was a calculated ... effort” as the Company
had “determined that there was a reasonable chance [it] could
get Permira to up their bid to [$]32,” so he was using this
as “a tactic to ... draw a line in the sand and ... lead Permira
to believe that below [$]32, it wasn't going to happen.”57 It
was, in short, intended as “a little bit of dramatic flourish.”58
As noted, after active negotiation, Permira eventually offered
$32.
On October 18, the board reviewed Permira's proposal, as
well as a Qatalyst presentation on its fairness opinion.59 At
this meeting, the board approved the merger with Permira.
The $32 price represented a 41% premium on the unaffected
trading price of Company stock.60 On October 21, Ancestry
entered into a merger agreement with Permira affiliates
Global Generations International, Inc. (“Global”) and its
wholly owned subsidiary, Global Generations Merger Sub
Inc. (“Merger Sub”).61
*6  The merger was announced on October 22. During the
two-month period between the announcement of the merger
and the closing, no topping bid emerged, despite a fiduciary
out clause in the merger agreement.62 On December 27, 2012,
a majority of Company stockholders approved the merger; in
fact, 99% of voting shares voted in favor of this transaction.63
On December 28 (the “Merger Date”), Ancestry merged with
Merger Sub, with Ancestry as the surviving corporation.
Ancestry is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Global.
2. Management Projections
Ancestry did not prepare management projections in the
ordinary course of business; the projections prepared in
connection with the sales process were “the first time that
[Ancestry had] ever done long-term projections.”64 In fact,
“[u]p until that point [May 2012,] [Ancestry] had frankly
never done anything out past [ ] one year.”65
Hochhauser worked with Curtis Tripoli, head of Ancestry's
financial planning and analysis (“FP & A”) group, and
his team, as well as Sullivan, in preparing the Company's
projections.66 The goal was to “come up with a set of
optimistic projections that we could stand in front of a room
and walk through and present, but that we know are going to
be very optimistic.”67 The motivation to be optimistic derived
in part from the belief that potential bidders were “going to cut
back or discount what we say, so we want to give ourselves
some room or some cushion.”68
a. The May Projections
In early May, a set of projections was developed that
addressed the key metrics of Ancestry's business—GSAs,
churn, and SAC (the “Initial May Projections”). According
to Sullivan “the view was that these were forecasts that were
going to be used by people that were going to ... potentially
bid to buy the company. And so we determined that we wanted
those to certainly be optimistic, even aggressive.”69
Hochhauser presented these projections to the Company's
directors at a May 15 board meeting.70 Hochhauser noted
in a May 14 email to the board enclosing materials for the
meeting that he had adjusted the projections to account for
NBC's recent cancellation of Who Do You Think You Are?.71
After reviewing these projections, “the board's push-back was
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that you guys really need to turn—you know, be a touch more
aggressive here and accelerate your growth.”72
Hochhauser took the board's “feedback [to] try to make
[the projections] more aggressive” and in fact “made them
slightly more aggressive.”73 In these new projections (the
“May Sales Projections,” and collectively with the Initial May
Projections, the “May Projections”), management “turned
the dials—GSA, SAC, churn—as much as [they] could
while maintaining ... credibility.”74 Specifically, “to go much
beyond what [management] did, you would have to assume
some new business, creation of new business.”75 These
updated projections were presented to and approved by the
board, and provided to interested parties during the sales
process.
b. The October Projections
*7  After receiving the May Sales Projections, some
bidders commented that the assumptions were optimistic and
aggressive.76 That fall, partly in response to bidder feedback,
management developed a new set of projections (the “October
Projections”). Qatalyst had also been “pretty clear ... that they
likely couldn't render a fairness opinion based upon those
May numbers.”77 As Hochhauser put it, “[i]f we're selling
the company, the board would need to have the best set
of numbers they could possibly have to make an important
decision.”78
To develop the October Projections, Hochhauser, working
with Curtis, and others in Ancestry's FP & A group, along
with Sullivan, underwent the “[s]ame process mechanically”
as they had for the May Projections.79 In August, however,
the budget process had begun,80 and the Company “had
actualized or closed the months leading up through
September.”81 Accordingly, “2012 was sort of a tighter set of
numbers.”82
The updated numbers, in addition to the incorporation
of bidder feedback, led to projections that were more
conservative than the May Sales Projections previously
approved by the board and provided to bidders.83 As
Hochhauser noted, in this set of projections, management
—“shooting for the bull's eye of numbers”—was “not trying
to be optimistic or pessimistic. We're trying to be right down
the middle.”84 Sullivan relayed that the “philosophy” behind
these projections was “accuracy.”85
On October 11, the October Projections were finalized.
These Projections included two scenarios—Scenario A and
Scenario B (the “Scenarios”)—which were not weighted;
instead, they were meant to act as outer “goalposts” of a range,
with the goal being “to just look between the two of them.”86
At trial, management opined that these were the best estimates
of the Company's future performance.87 Notably, however, at
the time the Scenarios were being created, management was
also contemplating equity rollovers into the new company.
3. Equity Rollover
Because Ancestry was engaging with a private equity bidder,
Sullivan understood that there could be an expectation
that he would rollover around 50% of his equity into
the new company.88 In anticipation of this rollover,
Sullivan conducted several calculations, which he also
sent to Hochhauser and Turner in an email that ended:
“ANCESTRY.COM IS GOING TO BE HUGE!!!!!”89 At
trial, Sullivan described this exclamation as “a bit of an ironic
flourish,” noting that:
After months of really being beat down from prices that
we thought we would be able to get at the beginning of
the process to a low price, I was offering to use the fact
that I was now prepared to roll over a big chunk of my
equity to actually, you know, use that as an argument or
a point of leverage to take to these buyers and show that,
you know, look, the CEO is serious. The CEO thinks it's
going to be huge. So I guess its tongue-in-cheek or ironic
or something.90
*8  Additionally, Sullivan ran his own calculations involving
Company stock and its potential reaction to a transaction
with a private equity buyer; he shared these calculations with
Hochhauser in emails entitled “incredible hack” and “hack
version 2.”91 At trial, Sullivan explained that he “meant to
convey something simple. It's a doodle. It's not ... a formal
analysis or projection of any kind. Just sort of a ... really, really
simple little hack of a model.”92
A third iteration of Sullivan's analyses contained two
columns, one for “Take Private” and one for “Stay Public.”93
Though this third model has EBITDA for 2016 under the
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“Take Private” column, Sullivan disavowed that this was a
projection of EBITDA for 2016, reiterating:
[I]t's not a formal projection or, you know, forecast of any
kind. It's just a simple exercise. I did this on my own, just to
try to get a sense of, as I said earlier, the difference between
how the P & L would work as a leveraged company versus
as a, you know, continued stay-public company where,
rather than pay debt service, we would continue to buy
back shares. What I was really trying to do is understand
the mechanics of staying public versus the mechanics of
staying private, not in any way, you know, doing a genuine
forecast.94
Notably, in light of Sullivan's attempt to minimize the
importance of them, the “hacks” were much more optimistic
than the October Projections.95
Throughout negotiations, as Permira raised its offer, it
required increased equity rollover from management and
Spectrum, Ancestry's then-largest stockholder. Ultimately, at
$32 per share, management agreed to rollover a total of $82
million in equity,96 which included 80% of Sullivan's stock;97
Spectrum rolled over $100 million, which represented
approximately 25% of its Ancestry stock.98
C. The Appraisal Remedy
Ancestry received written demands for appraisal dated
December 6, 2012 from Cede & Co., nominee for The
Depository Trust Company (“DTC”) and record holder of
the 160,000 shares over which Petitioners Merlin Partners
LP (“Merlin”) and The Ancora Merger Arbitrage Fund,
LP (“Ancora” and, together with Merlin, the “Merlin
Petitioners”) assert beneficial ownership. Ancestry received
a written appraisal demand dated December 18, 2012 from
Cede & Co. as record owner of the 1,255,000 shares for
which Merion Capital, L.P. (“Merion”) asserts beneficial
ownership.99
D. Experts' Valuations
The experts of both the Petitioners and Respondent relied
exclusively on a discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis
to value Ancestry as of the Merger Date, as opposed
to comparable companies and comparable transactions
analyses, recognizing that the latter would be irrelevant or
unhelpful here, given Ancestry's unique business and the
concomitant difficulty of finding comparable companies or
transactions.100
*9  The Petitioners' expert, William S. Wisialowski, initially
opined that Ancestry was valued at $42.97; after making
certain corrections to his analysis, he adjusted this valuation
to $43.65,101 then to $43.05.102 At his deposition, however,
Wisialowski testified that, “[b]ased on the information that
was given to [him],” he would not provide a fairness opinion
at a price below $47 per share.103 Finally, at trial, Wisialowski
opined that the value of Ancestry was “at least” $42.81
per share;104 $42.81 is more than 30% higher than the
merger price, resulting in a discrepancy of approximately
$500 million between the two values.105
The Respondent's expert, Gregg A. Jarrell, arrived at a value
of $30.63 per share.106 In arriving at $30.63, Jarrell testified
that “the $32 is within that range from a discounted cash
flow analysis. And that provides a great deal of comfort
to me that the discounted cash flow analysis has validity,
is economically meaningful.”107 Wisialowski's analysis, by
comparison, resulted in a “big discrepancy” between the value
of the Company and the merger price.108 As Jarrell testified:
[I]f that were me that was faced up with that big
discrepancy, I would have to try to find out a way to
reconcile those two numbers, or why would these smart,
professional, profit-oriented professional private equity
investors leave that much money on the table? Why
wouldn't someone pay $33 for this company if, in fact,
it were validly worth [$]42 to [$]47 as a stand-alone
company? You know, that's a huge valuation gap and that's
a lot of implied profit that's been left on the table. And that,
to my mind, would create a lot of discomfort regarding my
DCF valuation.109
1. Valuation Background
By way of brief background, and to provide context
before recounting the experts' respective calculations and
assumptions,
[t]he basic premise underlying the DCF methodology is
that the value of a company is equal to the value of its
projected future cash flows, discounted at the opportunity
cost of capital. Put simply, the DCF method involves three
basic components: (i) cash flow projections; (ii) a terminal
value; and (iii) a discount rate.110
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The method “involves several discrete steps”111:
First, one estimates the values of future cash flows
for a discrete period, based, where possible, on
contemporaneous management projections. Then, the
value of the entity attributable to cash flows expected after
the end of the discrete period must be estimated to produce
a so-called terminal value, preferably using a perpetual
growth model. Finally, the value of the cash flows for the
discrete period and the terminal value must be discounted
back using the capital asset pricing model or “CAPM.”112
*10  In this case, the experts disagreed on each of these
components—the projections to use for future cash flows, the
terminal value, and the discount rate—and the components
that make up each of those, in addition to the role of stock-
based compensation. I describe the discrepancies in the inputs
of Wisialowski and Jarrell, and their respective rationales,
below.113
2. Projections
Wisialowski developed a set of “blended” management
projections, which weighted the Initial May Projections and
October Scenario B equally. Wisialowski testified that his
arrival at this weighting did not involve much precision.114
He did not attempt to determine the probability of either
projection occurring; instead, he testified at trial that he “was
tempering—[he] was mixing the projections to say maybe
they were half right on this growth rate and half right on this
growth rate and put those together.”115 He explained: “What I
try to do is come up with what I felt was a minimum defensible
conservative valuation of the company.”116
*11  Jarrell, on the other hand, relied exclusively on
the October Projections, weighting both October Scenarios
equally.117 He opined that the October Projections were
more reliable because they incorporated bidder feedback, the
realities of the auction process, and other information that
management had learned since May; they were also closer to
Wall Street estimates.118
3. Terminal Value
Calculating terminal value involves four key components:
perpetuity growth rate, the EBIT margin, the “plowback”
ratio, and the projected tax rate.119
As for perpetuity growth rate, Wisialowski adopted 3.0%,
which he characterized as the most conservative assumption
in his entire model.120 Jarrell agreed that this was “on the low
side,” and adopted a 4.5% growth rate.121 This difference did
not garner much discussion at trial, comparatively speaking,
as both choices could be seen as conservative for their
respective sides. That is, had Wisialowski adopted a higher
growth rate, his valuation could have been more favorable to
the Petitioners; had Jarrell adopted a lower growth rate, his
valuation could have been more favorable to the Respondent.
The remaining three components generated a more vigorous
dispute.
First, Jarrell and Wisialowski disagreed as to whether it was
necessary to normalize EBIT margins during the perpetuity
period—Jarrell believed it necessary; Wisialowski did not.
Normalization of EBIT margins is based on the idea that the
EBIT projection for the last year of the projections period may
not be appropriate to apply in perpetuity; as Jarrell explained
at trial:
The perpetuity period, in theory, is a period where you're in
long-run competitive equilibrium. In long-run competitive
equilibrium, there's a tendency for margins to be lower than
they are in the forecast period because competition in the
long run is more fierce than it is in the short run. Any
barriers to entry that Ancestry has in the short run, owing to
whatever advantages that they've generated, tend to erode
in the long run rather than get better, and that reflects itself
as competition for price, and the margin goes down.122
Thus, rather than apply the projected margin for the final
year of the projections period in perpetuity, Jarrell averaged
the projected margins and used that figure, which had been
“normalized to a sustainable level,” in calculating terminal
value.123 He averaged the projected EBIT margins for 2013
through 2016 (as projected in Scenarios A and B), resulting
in a normalized EBIT margin of 26.1% for Scenario A and
27.3% for Scenario B, as compared to the historical actual
EBIT margin of 18.2% for the years 2004–2012, and the
actual EBIT margin of 26.3% for the year 2012.124
The Petitioners criticized Jarrell's approach on two grounds,
first asserting that normalization “was unnecessary given the
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pessimistic outlook already adopted by the Scenarios.”125
Second, they contend, even if one were to normalize,
“normalized profit margins should reflect the midpoint of
the company's business cycle,” because “[a]s the company
reaches a steady state, the cost structure evolves and becomes
stable.”126 Because Ancestry had been growing, “the average
margins used by Jarrell would not reflect a mid-point of
its business cycle,” and “Jarrell conducted no analysis to
determine whether his EBIT margin assumption during the
perpetuity period was the midpoint of Ancestry's business
cycle.”127
*12  While criticizing Jarrell's approach, the Petitioners
offered little in the way of substantive support of
Wisialowski's approach, other than to characterize it as
“appropriate[ ],” “given Ancestry's consistent trend of
increasing margins.”128 Wisialowski used 38.8% in his
terminal period calculation, which is his EBITDA margin
projection for 2016, and is higher than any margin Ancestry
ever achieved.129 Wisialowski arrived at 38.8% by blending
the projected EBITDA margins from the last projected year
of each of the Initial May Projections and October's Scenario
B.130 Jarrell noted that, had Wisialowski normalized his
EBITDA margins, his figure would have been 37.3%.131 The
effect of this discrepancy is to drive the terminal value, and
thus the DCF, of the respective experts further apart; i.e.,
the Petitioners' expert's valuation comes out higher, and the
Respondent's expert's valuation comes out lower.132
Second, the experts arrived at different plowback ratios,
which is the percentage of net operating profit after tax that is
reinvested in capital expenditures. The idea is that “[i]n order
to adequately support a perpetual growth rate in excess of
expected inflation (i.e., positive real growth), a firm will need
to reinvest in capital expenditures at a sustainable rate that is
above that of projected depreciation.’’133 Jarrell's plowback
ratio was 12% of his terminal period cash flows, which he
arrived at by considering plowback for Scenarios A and B
(12.1% and 11.5%, respectively), and the historical plowback,
which was 11.9%.134 In light of his 4.5% perpetuity growth
rate, with 2% expected inflation, this 12% plowback ratio
implied a return on investment of 22.8% going forward—“a
very pro increases-value assumption.’’135 By comparison,
Wisialowski used a 4.8% plowback ratio and criticized
Jarrell's higher figure.136 Jarrell noted, however, that because
of Wisialowski's 3% perpetuity growth rate, again assuming
2% expected inflation, Wisialowski's projected return on
investment comes out to 22.6%;137 in other words, the
assumptions used by each expert result, essentially, in a wash.
Finally, as to projected tax rate, Jarrell used 38%, while
Wisialowski used 35%. “This difference has a material effect
on the valuation—if Jarrell had used a 35% tax rate, it would
raise his valuation by $0.97; if Wisialowski used a 38% tax
rate, [ ] it would lower his valuation by $1.17.”138 Jarrell's
marginal tax rate figure is based on historical actual effective
tax rates, which the Petitioners criticized as improper and not
representative of the Company's future.139 Jarrell defended
his figure by suggesting that, although an average tax rate
may be lower than a marginal rate, one cannot rely, in
perpetuity, on whatever variables resulted in a lower tax rate
in a given year.140 He found it more reasonable to remain
consistent with the Company's long-term historical average
tax rate.141 Wisialowski arrived at 35% by using 34%—a
figure presented by PricewaterhouseCoopers in a presentation
to Permira as to the likely tax rate “for the foreseeable future,”
but not explicitly a tax rate in perpetuity—and adding 1%, to
“[be] conservative.”142
4. Discount Rate
Wisialowski calculated a discount rate of 10.96%,143 while
Jarrell calculated 11.71%.144 This resulted in a $4.27 per
share difference in their valuations.145 The discrepancy turns
largely on the experts' respective “beta”—that is, discount for
risk based on the stock's movement as compared to the market
—calculations; Wisialowski calculated beta of 1.107,146 later
updated to 1.095,147 while Jarrell calculated 1.30.148
*13  Key inputs in beta calculations include the market
proxy, the observation period, and the sample period.149 The
experts used different inputs on all accounts, at least in their
initial reports; they ultimately agreed on the most appropriate
sample period, while remaining in disagreement over the
market proxy and observation period.150
First, the experts used different market proxies in their
regression analyses. Wisialowski “selected the beta resulting
from the regression of ACOM [Ancestry stock] against
the NASDAQ Composite for all data since its IPO on a
weekly basis.”151 Wisialowski opted to use NASDAQ as the
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market proxy because he believed it to contain a number of
companies similar to Ancestry. He then applied this beta to
an S & P 500–based equity risk premium, though his report
identified that a NASDAQ-derived beta should be multiplied
by a NASDAQ equity risk premium.152 Jarrell used the S
& P 500 as his market proxy for the regression analysis.153
In post-trial briefing, the Petitioners asserted that they “[do]
not take issue with regressing Ancestry's weekly beta against
the S & P 500 if a weekly observation period is used, which
results in a beta of 1.137.”154
Second, Wisialowski and Jarrell used different observation
periods, which can be daily, weekly, or monthly. Wisialowski
used a weekly observation period, while Jarrell used
a monthly period. Wisialowski characterized this as the
“biggest difference” in their respective calculations.155
Wisialowski testified that many valuations use monthly data,
but that, for Ancestry, this resulted in only 30 data points,
whereas using 36 to 60 is recommended; thus, he used weekly
data to generate more points.156 Jarrell testified that daily
or weekly trading prices can include statistical “noise” that
affects the accuracy of the beta calculation, but noted that,
“all else equal, the more observations, the better in terms of
statistical precision.”157 He used a monthly period, which he
described as “sort of the standard of the services,”158 having
found “noise” when he conducted further calculations.159
Third, while Wisialowski observed the period from the
IPO through the date of the merger in his initial report,
Jarrell excluded the period in which the auction process had
become public. In his rebuttal report and at trial, Wisialowski
conceded that Jarrell's approach was sound.160 However,
Wisialowski testified that when he adjusted the time period
to use Jarrell's approach, his beta decreased, thus driving a
further gap between the experts' calculations.161
5. Stock–Based Compensation
*14  Wisialowski, in his initial DCF analysis, did not
take into account Ancestry's practice of providing stock-
based compensation (“SBC”) to its employees.162 Jarrell,
by contrast, contends that a failure to account for SBC
expenses within a DCF model may result in overvaluation.163
Scenarios A and B of the October Projections did not include
projections for SBC, however; he instead used a figure—
3.2% of revenues—taken from the May Projections.164
In his rebuttal report, Wisialowski “built a model to estimate
the number of options granted each year and the future
stock price of Ancestry in order to measure the cash flow
required to eliminate any dilution from future option grants
and their exercise.”165 For his model, he maintained his
50/50 weighting of the May Projections with Scenario B,
but, as noted, because the October Projections did not
include SBC projections, Wisialowski chose 1%, which he
said was based on “total personnel expense and SBC of
23.5% for Scenario B, which is slightly higher than the
combined figure for the [May Projections].”166 Ultimately,
he calculated a difference in share value of approximately
$0.50.167 Wisialowski explained that he decided
not to include any impact for SBC in my DCF analysis
because adding the future stock trading price adds yet
another level of assumptions which are difficult to prove.
That being said, I strongly believe that my estimates are
conservative and Jarrell's are just plain wrong. I continue
to believe that non-inclusion of SBC expense in FCF for
purposes of a DCF-based valuation is the proper treatment
and the treatment recognized by this Court.168
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Following the announcement of the merger, several plaintiffs
filed actions in this Court, alleging, among other things,
that the merger price was inadequate and the sales process
was flawed. In November, these actions were consolidated,
and on December 17, 2012, then-Chancellor Strine heard
oral argument on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction. He denied this motion from the bench.169 In
March 2013, these plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint,
which the defendants moved to dismiss. Oral argument was
held on September 27, 2013, with then-Chancellor Strine
granting the defendants' motion following argument.170
*15  On January 3, 2013, Merion filed a Verified Petition
for Appraisal pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 262. Also on January 3,
the Merlin Petitioners filed a Petition for Appraisal of Stock.
On June 24, these actions were consolidated. Collectively, the
Petitioners owned 1,415,000 shares of common stock as of
the Merger Date.
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On May 9, 2014, shortly before trial, Ancestry filed a Motion
for Summary Judgment, arguing that Merion lacked standing
because it could not demonstrate that its shares were not
voted in favor of the merger. I postponed consideration of that
Motion until after full briefing and oral argument, which was
completed in October. I denied the Motion in a Memorandum
Opinion dated January 5, 2015.171
III. APPRAISAL ANALYSIS
A. The Appraisal Standard
Characterized as, at one time, a liquidity option and,
more recently, as a check on opportunism, the appraisal
statute allows dissenting stockholders to receive judicially-
determined fair value of their stock.172 After determining that
appraisal petitioners have standing, as I have done here,173
the Court shall determine the fair value of the
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from
the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon
the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining
such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant
factors.174
“Appraisal is, by design, a flexible process.”175 Section 262
“vests the Chancellor and Vice Chancellors with significant
discretion to consider ‘all relevant factors’ and determine
the going concern value of the underlying company.”176 Our
Supreme Court has declined to “graft common law gloss on
the statute,” in light of the General Assembly's determination
that this Court's consideration of “all relevant factors” is fair,
albeit imperfect.177 Thus, and in the absence of “inflexible
rules governing appraisal,”178 “it is within the Court of
Chancery's discretion to select one of the parties' valuation
models as its general framework, or fashion its own, to
determine fair value in the appraisal proceeding.”179
Although the Supreme Court “has defined ‘fair value’ as the
value to a stockholder of the firm as a going concern, as
opposed to the firm's value in the context of an acquisition
or other transaction,”180 this Court has relied on the merger
price as an indicia of fair value, “so long as the process leading
to the transaction is a reliable indicator of value and merger-
specific value is excluded.”181 In fact, this Court has held,
where
the transaction giving rise to the appraisal resulted from
an arm's-length process between two independent parties,
and [ ] no structural impediments existed that might
materially distort “the crucible of objective market reality,”
a reviewing court should give substantial evidentiary
weight to the merger price as an indicator of fair value.182
B. Ancestry's Fair Value
*16  In an appraisal action, as pointed out above, “[b]oth
parties bear the burden of establishing fair value by a
preponderance of the evidence,” which effectively means that
neither party has the burden, and the burden instead falls on
this Court.183 Upon consideration of the sales process, the
experts' opinions, and my own DCF analysis, conducted in
light of certain concerns with both experts' analyses, I find that
Ancestry's value as of the Merger Date is $32. To explain that
conclusion, I turn first to the evidence of valuation reflected
in the market price.
1. The Sales Process
The sales process was reasonable, wide-ranging and produced
a motivated buyer. It has been approved of, as free from the
taint of breaches of fiduciary duty, by this Court. In a bench
ruling denying motion for a preliminary injunction, then-
Chancellor Strine noted that: “The process looked like they
segmented the market carefully, logical people were [brought]
in, a competent banker who appears at every turn to have
done sensible things, ran it.”184 The Court characterized that
process as one “that had a lot of vibrancy and integrity”:
I think they tried to kick the tires. I think that even when
I look at the communications by Mr. Sullivan, I think they
were trying to get these buyers to pay as full a price as
possible. They were trying to create a competitive dynamic.
Given that and given the ability of stockholders to vote for
themselves, I'm disinclined to take it out of their hands.... I
think given the market test that was done here, I'm poorly
positioned to take that risk for [the stockholders], and I'm
not prepared to do so.185
In dismissing the amended complaint pursuant to Court
of Chancery Rule 12(b)(6), the Court concluded that “the
plaintiffs have not pled facts that raise an inference that any of
the director defendants, much less a majority of them, suffered
from disabling conflicts that would give rise to a breach of
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the duty of loyalty.”186 In considering the process as a whole,
which the Court characterized as “logical” and as “an open
door to a range of people,”187 and, specifically addressing
Spectrum's and management's equity rollovers, the Court
concluded, “[P]ut simply, there's no non-conclusory factual
allegations in the complaint from which I can conceivably
infer that Spectrum, Sullivan, or Hochhauser, or any of the
Ancestry directors, had any conflict of interest.”188
Of course, a conclusion that a sale was conducted by directors
who complied with their duties of loyalty is not dispositive of
the question of whether that sale generated fair value.189 But
the process here, described in full earlier in this Memorandum
Opinion, appears to me to represent an auction of the
Company that is unlikely to have left significant stockholder
value unaccounted for.190 On the other hand, as is typical
in a non-strategic acquisition, I find no synergies that are
likely to have pushed the purchase price above fair value.
The Defendant's expert, although arguing that fair value is
somewhat below the sales price, concedes as much.191
*17  It is within that context of the auction process, which
generated a sale price of $32 per share, that I turn first to
a significant issue in Ancestry's valuation—its projections—
before turning to the evidence of value by way of the experts'
opinions.
2. Company Projections
Both sets of projections that formed the basis of discounted
cash flow analyses and provided the underpinnings of
the experts' respective valuations are imperfect. Ancestry's
management made no business projections in the regular
course of business; its first set of long-term projections,
the Initial May Projections, were made aggressive to
bolster a potential sale of the company and revised after
encouragement by the board to be even more aggressive,
resulting in the May Sales Projections.192 Notably, one
particular assumption underlying these projections—that
churn would decrease over time—was directly called into
question by potential bidders during their due diligence
processes.193
The October Scenarios are also questionable. They were made
in light of an understanding that the May Projections could not
support a fairness opinion for the proposed transaction and at
a time when management was contemplating large rollovers
of their own positions in Ancestry stock. I note that at the
same time management was creating the October Scenarios,
the CEO was doing private projection ‘‘hacks,” anticipating
joyfully a possible growth rate for his rollover interest
substantially greater than those management projections.
Nonetheless, I find the Scenarios more reliable than the May
Projections. Testimony indicated that the October Scenarios
were management's best estimates as of the time of the
merger. They included hard numbers, rather than projections,
for several additional months of data compared to the May
Projections. The Scenarios also took into account feedback
from the Company's financial advisor, relayed from bidders,
that the May Projections were too optimistic.
It is within this context that I turn to the experts' analyses.
The Petitioners' expert, Wisialowski, contended that the May
Sales Projections were so unsupportably rosy that potential
investors lost confidence in management; thus, he focused
instead on the Initial May Projections. The Initial May
Projections were not approved by the board and were not
presented to bidders. Notably, the Initial May Projections
that the Wisialowski champions were only marginally more
conservative than the May Sales Projections he rejects.194
Notwithstanding his support for the Initial May Projections,
I conclude that Wisialowski believed that a DCF based on
the Initial May Projections alone (which, again, he contended
to be the more conservative of the May Projections) would
itself be unsupportably high.195 Ultimately, he used a blended
projection from the Initial May Projections and the better
case October Scenario, which Scenario he contended was
tainted and unsupportably low,196 yet still incorporated into
his valuation. It is unclear how “blending’’ two unsupportable
sets of projections gives a number on which this Court can
rely.197
*18  The Respondent's expert, Jarrell, relied solely on the
October Projections, because management represented them
as the best prediction as of the date of the merger. Again, I note
that those projections were (1) not developed in the ordinary
course of business, (2) done in light of the information that
the banker would be unable to provide a fairness opinion
based on management's May Projections, and (3) done at a
time when management knew that it would be rolling over
its own equity in the company rather than being cashed out.
Therefore, a DCF based on these projections leaves room for
doubt. That said, this Court has recognized that management
is, as a general proposition, in the best position to know the
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business and, therefore, prepare projections; “in a number
of cases Delaware Courts have relied on projections that
were prepared by management outside of the ordinary course
of business and with the possibility of litigation.’’198 As
described below, therefore, and despite the factors that make
the October Projections problematic, I find that an equal
weighting of the Scenarios is a better platform on which
to base a DCF analysis than a blend of the Initial May
Projections and the best case October Scenario, as employed
by Wisialowski.
3. DCF Analysis
While I will not burden this Memorandum Opinion by
reciting the qualifications of the competing experts here, I
note that both are respected in their field, and well qualified
to offer valuation opinions. That said, I find each respective
approach less than fully persuasive. It is clear to me that
the Petitioners' expert tailored his DCF analysis by blending
together what he described as the “unbelievable” best case
October Scenario199 with the Initial May Projections simply
in order to come up with a number that was “defensible”200—
that is, higher than the merger price, but not astronomically
so as would have been the case if he used the more “reliable”
projection alone. The Respondent's expert candidly suggested
that, if he had reached a valuation that departed from the
merger price by as much as the Petitioners' expert, he “would
have to tried to find out a way to reconcile those two
numbers,” in other words, he would have tailored his analysis
to fit the merger price.201 Neither of these approaches gives
great confidence in the DCF analysis of either expert, since
both appear to be result-oriented riffs on the market price.202
Ultimately, I am faced with an appraisal action where an open
auction process has set a market price, where both parties'
experts agree that there are no comparable companies to
use for purposes of valuation, and where management did
not create projections in the normal course of business, thus
giving reason to question management projections, which
were done in light of the transaction and in the context
of obtaining a fairness opinion. As Wisialowski repeatedly
testified, he saw it as his job to “torture the numbers until
they confess[ed].”203 I note that (beyond any moral concerns)
it is well-known that the problem with relying on torture is
the possibility of false confession.204 Accordingly, my own
analysis of the value of Ancestry follows.
*19  While the concept of a DCF valuation—that value is
derived from the sum of future revenue discounted to present
value—is quite simple, the calculation itself is complex.
The following discussion is laden with formulas through
which the discount rate and terminal value are arrived at.
I freely admit that the formulas did not spring form the
mind of this judge, softened as it has been by a liberal
arts education. Footnotes indicate the derivation of each,
principally taken from the reports of the experts. I also found
Vice Chancellor Parsons' lucid explanation of calculations
of value via discounted cash flow in Merion Capital, L.P.
v. 3M Cogent, Inc.205 helpful. Although I will address, with
specificity, the experts' contentions and my findings with
respect thereto, I find that, as a general matter, Jarrell was
more credible and his analysis is more likely to result in a
fair value of Ancestry. I diverge with him on two significant
points: first, his beta calculation, and specifically, his use
of a monthly observation period; and second, his use of
a 4.5% growth rate coupled with a 12% plowback ratio.
I will discuss my findings as they specifically relate to
the evidence offered by the two experts, but I am largely
adopting the methodology advanced by Jarrell. Employing
that methodology, my valuation of Ancestry as of the Merger
Date, based solely on a DCF analysis, is $31.79.
As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether a two-stage or
three-stage discounted cash flow method is most appropriate.
This issue turns largely on the projections upon which I rely,
and, as discussed below, I rely on the October Projections
in my analysis. Accordingly, I agree here with Jarrell that a
three-stage model is unnecessary.206
a. Projections
Driving the bulk of the substantial valuation differential
between the analyses performed by Jarrell and Wisialowski
is the key input: management projections. Jarrell relies on
the October Scenarios, despite evidence suggesting that they
were produced in light of the need to justify the sales price.
Wisialowski, on the other hand, created his own projections,
by blending the Initial May Forecast with the best case
October Scenario, presumably because relying solely on the
Initial May Forecast—which Wisialowski touts as the most
reliable—would produce a valuation so high as to be likely
rejected out-of-hand. The evidence suggests that the May
projections were created to drive a high sales price; like the
October Scenarios, they were not created in the ordinary
course of business.
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This Court has expressed skepticism in past cases as to
management-prepared projections when those projections
are not made in the ordinary course, and are instead
made in contemplation of the sale of the company.207 But
management is uniquely situated in its knowledge of the
Company, and while management projections are imperfect,
hindsight-driven post hoc “projections” are more so; notably,
both experts here rely on (different) management projections.
Thus, and for the reasons set out above, I find it most
appropriate here to rely upon the October Scenarios, as Jarrell
did. These projections represented management's best view
of the Company,208 and as discussed above, I do not find
the May Projections to be reliable. Therefore, I will rely
exclusively on the October Projections, weighing Scenarios A
and B at 50% each because management declined to present
either Scenario as more likely.
b. Terminal Value
The experts disagreed as to the appropriate perpetuity growth
rate, but Jarrell pointed out that, in light of their respective
plowback ratios, the differences were not particularly
significant. That is, with Jarrell's perpetuity growth rate and
plowback ratio, the rate of return on investment would be
22.8%, while Wisialowski's figures would generate a 22.6%
return on investment. Ultimately, in light of this Court's
prior methodology, where it has assumed zero plowback,
and Jarrell's forthright statement that Wisialowski's lower
plowback rate was reasonable in relation to his lower growth
rate, I am adopting Wisialowski's figures, a 3% growth rate
and 4.8% plowback, here.209
*20  The more significant of their disputes concerns the
normalization of EBIT margins. Jarrell found it important to
normalize, while Wisialowski did not; the Petitioners argue
that normalization was not necessary given the pessimistic
view of the Scenarios Jarrell used. Because I find the
October Projections to be management's best view of the
Company going forward, not necessarily a pessimistic one,
normalization is appropriate.210 I find Jarrell's averaging of
the 2013 through 2016 EBIT margin projections, which figure
was then used as his future projection, appropriate. This
results in a normalized EBIT margin of 26.1% for Scenario A
and 27.3% for Scenario B.
Finally, the experts disagreed over the appropriate tax rate.
Although I sympathize with the Petitioners' contention that
few (if any) companies pay their marginal tax rates in
perpetuity, it strikes me as overly speculative to apply the
current tax rate in perpetuity. I agree with this Court's
approach in Henke v. Trilithic Inc. to use the marginal tax
rate “[b]ecause of the transitory nature of tax deductions and
credits.”211
Because I find weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”)
to be 10.71%, as discussed below, and I am otherwise
adopting Jarrell's methodology here, including his calculation
of NOPAT that includes a working capital adjustment, also
discussed below,212 the terminal value is calculated using the











Thus, the Terminal Value for Scenario A is $1,538.51 million;
for Scenario B it is $1,692.86 million. As discounted to the
present value as of the Merger Date, the Terminal Value is
$1,077.57 million for Scenario A and $1,185.68 million for
Scenario B.214
c. Discount Rate
I cannot adopt either expert's discount rate in full. In
calculating beta, Wisialowski used NASDAQ as the market
proxy; I find that the S & P 500 is a more suitable
market proxy in light of its broader sampling of the
market. Wisialowski also initially used an inappropriate
measurement period, running through the Merger Date,
which failed to account for increases in stock price once
the auction process became public. I find that Jarrell, on
the other hand, should have used weekly data, rather than
monthly, to generate a larger sample size, notwithstanding
his assertion that daily inputs involved statistical “noise.’’
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Jarrell's monthly data generated 30 data points, to which
he attributes a 99% confidence level.215 However, the
valuation literature suggests using at least 36 data points, with
some sources suggesting at least 60,216 and Jarrell did not
adequately explain why, specifically, a weekly input would be
inappropriate here.217
*21  Using a weekly observation period, S & P 500 as the
market proxy, and an observation period from the Company's
IPO through June 5, 2012, just before news of the auction
broke, I find beta to be 1.137.218
The parties agreed that the appropriate risk-free rate is 2.47%,
but disagreed as to the equity risk premium. While both
agreed that a supply-side equity risk premium from the
Ibbotson Yearbook is appropriate, they disagree as to which
years of data to use. Wisialowski relied upon the 2013
Yearbook, which included data from 1926 through 2012, to
derive an ERP of 6.11%. Jarrell used the 2012 Yearbook,
containing data from 1926 through 2011, to derive an ERP of
6.14%.
This same disagreement as to the proper edition of Ibbotson's
underlies the experts' disagreement as to the appropriate
equity-size premium. Wisialowski, relying on the 2013
Yearbook, reached a premium of 1.73%, while Jarrell, relying
on the 2012 Yearbook, reached a 1.75% premium. At trial,
Jarrell testified that he used the 2012 edition because the
Merger Date was December 28, 2012, and it is his practice
to use the data that would have been available to investors
as of the merger date; the 2013 Yearbook itself would
not be available until after the merger closed. He candidly
stated, however, that this was “not a big deal” and that he
understood why Wisialowski would use the newer book.219
The Petitioners argued in post-trial briefing that the 2013
Yearbook was more appropriate because it included “data
from 2012 that—with the exception of a single trading
day—was known or knowable on December 28, 2012.”220
Ultimately, I agree with Wisialowski's approach to use actual
data available in the 2013 edition, especially since the Merger
Date was so close to the end of the year and the 2013 edition
would not have contained any information not available as of
the Merger Date, aside from one day of trading information.
Jarrell assumed 5% debt in Ancestry's capital structure;
Wisialowski did not include any. The Petitioners contend
that had Wisialowski included 5% debt, his valuation would
have increased by $0.38, and thus, they do not object to
my use of Jarrell's capital structure assumption.221 Under
Jarrell's assumptions, the cost of debt is 3.81%.222 He also
applied a 38% tax rate, which, as discussed above, I find to
be appropriate.
Both experts calculated the discount rate using the WACC
methodology, which I therefore adopt. WACC is calculated
as follows223:
WACC = [KD × WD x (1 - t) ] + (KE × WE)
Where:
KD = Cost of debt capital = 3.81%
WD = Average weight of debt in capital structure = 5%
t = Effective tax rate for the company = 38%
KE = Cost of equity capital = 11.15%, as calculated
below
WE = Average weight of equity capital in capital
structure = 95%
To calculate the cost of equity capital, both experts used the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (‘‘CAPM’’), which is calculated
as follows:
*22  KE = RF + (β × RERP) + RESP
Where:
RF = Risk-free rate = 2.47%
β = Beta = 1.137
RERP = Equity risk premium = 6.11%
RESP = Equity size premium = 1.73%
KE = 11.15%
Thus, WACC = [.0381 × .05 × (1 - .38) ] + (.1115 × .95)
= .1071, or 10.71%
d. Stock–Based Compensation
As an internet-based company, Ancestry is not alone in its
practice of compensating employees heavily with stock. The
effect of that practice is significant in a valuation of such a
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company. Jarrell included SBC in his valuation by deducting
the non-cash stock expense from EBIT, treating it as tax
deductible to approximate the anticipated deductions when
options are exercised, and not adding this expense back.224
Jarrell used the projected SBC as a percentage of revenue
item from the May Sales Projections and the 2012 full-year
forecasted results from mid-December 2012, both of which
amounted to 3.2%, and applied this to Scenarios A and B, and
into perpetuity.225
The Petitioners point out that this approach has not yet
been endorsed by this Court. In fact, in Merion Capital,
L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., Vice Chancellor Parsons rejected
that respondent's contention that SBC should be treated as
a cash expense, having found it to have failed to show that
SBC would “have any effect on the actual cash flows of the
Company.’’226 Nevertheless, the Court agreed that “it makes
sense to adjust earnings to take into account the dilutive
effect of SBC.’’227 To that end, Wisialowski's rebuttal report
attempted to consider the dilutive effect of SBC using a self-
created model, but ultimately declined to “include any impact
for SBC in [his] DCF analyses.’’228
What is clear to me is that, once it reaches a material level,
SBC must in some manner be accounted for in order to reach
a reasonable calculation of fair value. The real dispute is
how to do so, whether by measuring its dilutive effect or by
accounting for it in expenses. Here, the Petitioners dispute
Jarrell's approach, but do not offer a reliable alternative for
my consideration. I find Jarrell's approach to be reasonable,
and I am adopting it here.
e. Other Issues Bearing on Enterprise Value
On several other points, the experts diverged, to varying
degrees, some of which are alluded to in my analysis above.
First, Wisialowski excluded deferred revenues as part of free
cash flows, which would have otherwise increased his value
by $2.89 per share. Jarrell advocated for including them in
free cash flows as a necessary working capital item needed “to
adjust accounting data to cash flow data.’’229 The Petitioners
contend Wisialowski “took the objective and correct route
of excluding deferred revenues, which had the impact of
lowering his per-share valuation.”230 I presume, from this
statement, that the Petitioners do not object to my adherence
to Jarrell's approach on this matter.
*23  Second, as to excess cash added to the DCF value,
Jarrell's figure was $32.9 million, using the Company's cash
position minus its debt on December 31, 2012. Wisialowski's
used $14 million, calculated based on a 2013 Permira
report, indicating $44 million cash at closing, from which he
subtracted his estimated four weeks' operating expenses of
$30 million. In post-trial briefing, the Petitioners submitted
that they “[have] no objection to the Court's use of Jarrell's
excess cash assumption.”231
Finally, while Wisialowski did not initially estimate the value
of the Company's net operating losses, the experts ultimately
agreed that the present value of NOL tax shields is $4.4
million.232 “Merion does not object to including the value of
Ancestry's NOLs in the Court's determination of the fair value
of Ancestry's stock as of the Valuation Date.”233
These three topics, while not generating as much dispute as
other components of the valuation analysis, are nevertheless
important to the valuation because of their bearing on
enterprise value. I ultimately find, based on my review of
the experts' reports and trial testimony, Jarrell's approach
on these topics to be the most reasonable, and I adopt his
methodologies.
f. My Valuation Results
Ancestry's calculated equity value is the sum of its enterprise
value plus net cash. Its enterprise value is the sum of the
present value of free cash flows during the projection period,
the present value of the NOL tax benefit, and the present value
of the terminal value based on constant growth.234
Using a DCF analysis, for Scenario A, I calculated $30.33
as the price per share. For Scenario B, I calculated $33.24
as the price per share. Weighted equally, the value derived
from discounted cash flow is $31.79.235 The actual market
price as determined by the sale is $32. These are the two
competing valuations that the statutory ‘‘all relevant factors’’
directive charges me to take into account. The question
becomes, should I rely on the DCF to reach fair value, using
what appears to be a relatively untainted market-derived
valuation as a check, or should my analysis be the reverse?
Because the inputs here, the October Scenarios (as well as the
alternative May Projections) are problematic for the reasons
addressed at length above, and because the sales process here
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was robust,236 I find fair value in these circumstances best
represented by the market price. The DCF valuation I have
described is close to the market, and gives me comfort that
no undetected factor skewed the sales process. I note that
my DCF value—while higher than Jarrell's—is still below
that paid by the actual acquirer without apparent synergies;
it would be hubristic indeed to advance my estimate of value
over that of an entity for which investment represents a real
—not merely an academic—risk, by insisting that such entity
paid too much.
V. CONCLUSION
*24  For the foregoing reasons, I find that the merger price
of $32 is the best indicator of Ancestry's fair value as of the
Merger Date. The Petitioners are entitled to interest at the
legal rate. The parties should confer and submit an appropriate
form of order consistent with this Opinion.
All Citations
Not Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2015 WL 399726
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171 See In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 66825 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015).
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Orchard Enterprises, Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (“[T]he court may not adopt an ‘either-or’
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185 Id. at 232:5–233:4.
186 In re Ancestry.com Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. 7988–CS, at 73:14–18 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2013) (TRANSCRIPT).
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188 Id. at 95:4–8.
189 I note that Ancestry had a charter provision exculpating directors for breaches of the duty of care; the actions of the board,
therefore, were not even reviewed in the fiduciary duty action for gross negligence in the conduct of the sale. Nothing in
the record before me, however, leads me to the conclusion that the sales process was fundamentally flawed.
190 The Petitioners and Wisialowski argue that the merger price was ultimately the product of a financing issue, rather than
a valuation issue. See, e.g., JX 212 ¶¶ 54–55; Merion Capital L.P.'s Post–Trial Br. at 82. In support, they point to an
email between Sullivan and Turner during the negotiation process, in which Sullivan colorfully describes his stance on the
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a deal at $33 was primarily a source of funds question ... rather than a valuation question.” JX 162. As Sullivan explained
at trial, that email also shows that, in order to “call [Permira's] bluff” that it would not pay more than it had previously
offered, supposedly because it could not obtain financing, management and Spectrum would roll over a larger portion
of their equity, thus driving up the price Permira was willing to pay. See Trial Tr. 38:9–24 (Sullivan). I found Sullivan's
testimony on the context of this email credible, and I do not think his statement about financing should be afforded the
weight the Petitioners suggest, particularly when taken in light of the broader context of the auction that produced no
buyer willing to pay more.
191 Jarrell opined, “Since Permira is a financial acquirer and not a strategic partner, the $32 merger price presumably does
not contain any significant synergies that might result from combining the operations of Ancestry with any complementary
operating business.” JX 209 ¶ 107. He went on further to discuss certain “public-to-private cost savings,” which he
estimated to be $0.11 per share, but did not deduct them from the merger price since he was unable to determine whether
the savings were included in it.
192 See, e.g., Trial Tr. 133:2–6 (Hochhauser).
193 See id. at 143:8–144:18 (Hochhauser).
194 Wisialowski found the May Sales Projections sufficiently divorced from reality that he opined that, in his view, they may
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proposition I find dubious, but interesting in light of his acceptance of the similar Initial May Projections. See Trial Tr.
260:13–24 (Wisialowski); JX 221 ¶ 197 (“[T]he lack of credibility caused by the fact that the [May Sales] Projections could
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207 See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
208 I rely on the Scenarios for my DCF analysis for the reasons I have described, despite their preparation in light of the
fact that the May Projections might not have supported a fairness opinion, and not withstanding their deviation from the
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209 See Trial Tr. 663:21–664:2 (Jarrell).
210 And although the Petitioners criticize Jarrell's calculation for failing to determine whether his projected normalized margins
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212 See infra text accompanying notes 229, 230.
213 See JX 209 ¶¶ 192–211.
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215 JX 209 ¶ 179 & n. 220.
216 See, e.g., Trial Tr. 353:12–23 (Wisialowski).
217 I note that Jarrell took the extra step of calculating a daily sum beta to compare his monthly beta to a daily beta, and found,
after that analysis, “noise” in the daily beta calculation. But it is not clear why he did not consider (or, if he did, why he did
not include in his report) the effect of weekly data. See JX 209 ¶ 179. In his rebuttal, Jarrell identified “three significant
flaws” from which Wisialowski's beta suffered; none of them involved Wisialowski's use of weekly data. See JX 219 ¶ 36.
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218 The Petitioners have helpfully conceded that they are not opposed to my use of 1.137 as beta. See Merion Capital L.P.'s
Post–Trial Br. at 66; Joinder of Pet'rs Merlin Partners LP and AAMAF, LP in Post–Trial Br.
219 Trial Tr. 629:5–19 (Jarrell).
220 Merion Capital L.P.'s Post–Trial Br. at 67.
221 Id. at 60.
222 JX 209 Ex. 17.
223 These formulas were helpfully laid out in Merion Capital LP v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 WL 3793896, at *14 (Del. Ch. July
8, 2013), judgment entered sub nom. Merion Capital, L.P v. 3M Cogent, Inc. (Del. Ch. July 23, 2013).
224 Id. at ¶ 164 & n. 195.
225 Id. at ¶ 159.
226 2013 WL 3793896, at *13.
227 Id.
228 JX 221 ¶ 138.
229 Jarrell Dep. at 345:4–23; see also Trial Tr. 272:5–9 (Wisialowski); JX 216 ¶ 154.
230 Merion Capital L.P.'s Post–Trial Br. at 58–59.
231 Id. at 59; see also Joinder of Pet'rs Merlin Partners LP and AAMAF, LP in Post–Trial Br.
232 See JX 209 ¶ 153; JX 216 ¶ 157.
233 Merion Capital L.P.'s Post–Trial Br. at 57; see also Joinder of Pet'rs Merlin Partners LP and AAMAF, LP in Post–Trial Br.
234 See, e.g., JX 209 ¶ 214.
235 In the interest of transparency, my calculations are as follows:
Enterprise Value = DCF + PV of NOL tax benefit + PV of Terminal Value. See, e.g., JX 209 ¶ 214. The DCF is based on
the October Projections, discounted to the mid-year. The parties agree upon my use of $4.4 million for the PV of NOL
tax benefit. See supra note 233. Thus, with numbers expressed in millions of dollars:
Enterprise ValueA = 355.31 + 4.4 + 1077.57 = 1437.28
Enterprise ValueB = 393.51 + 4.4 + 1185.68 = 1583.59
Equity Value = Enterprise Value + Net Cash. See, e.g., JX 209 ¶ 214. The parties agree on my use of $32.9 million for
net cash. See supra note 231. Thus, with numbers expressed in millions of dollars:
Equity ValueA = 1437.28 + 32.9 = 1470.18
Equity ValueB = 1583.59 + 32.9 = 1616.49
The per-share price is determined by adding the Equity Values, above, to the cumulative exercise proceeds of options
outstanding, then dividing that sum by the number of fully diluted shares. See JX 209 Ex. 19. Thus:
Price per share [Scenario A] = 1470.18 million 56.1 million =$30.33
50,317,969
Price per share [Scenario B] = 1616.49 million 56.1 million = $ 33.24.
50,317,969
236 See In re Ancestry.com Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. 7988–CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012) (TRANSCRIPT).
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
LASTER, V.C.
*1  The petitioners brought this statutory appraisal
proceeding to determine the fair value of the common stock of
Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc. The valuation's effective date
is July 1, 2016, when TransCanada Corporation completed
its acquisition of Columbia (the “Merger”). Pursuant to an
agreement and plan of merger dated March 17, 2016 (the
“Merger Agreement”), each share of Columbia common
stock was converted into the right to receive $25.50 in cash,
subject to each stockholder's right to eschew the consideration
and seek appraisal. This post-trial decision finds that the fair
value of Columbia's common stock on the effective date was
$25.50 per share.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The evidentiary record is vast.1 After an initial spat during the
pre-trial process, the parties agreed to 716 stipulations of fact,
which were a welcome contribution. During a five-day trial,
the parties submitted 1,472 exhibits, including twenty-one
deposition transcripts.2 Nine fact witnesses and five experts
testified live. The following factual findings represent the
court's effort to distill this record.
A. Columbia
At the time of the Merger, Columbia was a Delaware
corporation whose common stock traded actively on the New
York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbol “CPGX.”
Columbia developed, owned, and operated natural gas
pipeline, storage, and other midstream assets. As a midstream
company, Columbia did not own or sell the commodities that
it transported or stored. Columbia's success depended on its
contracts with shippers and producers.
Columbia's primary operating asset consisted of 15,000 miles
of interstate gas pipelines running from New York to the Gulf
of Mexico. The pipelines served the strategically important
Marcellus and Utica natural gas basins in Pennsylvania, Ohio,
and West Virginia. Columbia's growth-oriented business plan
sought to exploit a production boom in the Marcellus and
Utica basins by expanding its pipeline network and selling the
additional capacity. See PTO ¶ 248. The plan required billions
of dollars in capital expenditures, which in turn required large
amounts of low-cost financing.
*2  Columbia itself was a holding company. Its principal
asset was an 84.3% interest in Columbia OpCo LP (“OpCo”),
which owned Columbia's operating assets. Columbia's largest
business divisions operated interstate pipelines. Smaller
divisions operated gas-gathering and processing systems.
Columbia also owned a 100% general partner interest and a
46.5% limited partner interest in Columbia Pipeline Partners,
L.P. (“CPPL”), a master limited partnership (“MLP”) whose
common units traded on the New York Stock Exchange.
CPPL owned the other 15.7% interest in OpCo.
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Columbia's business plan depended upon using CPPL to raise
equity financing for Columbia's growth projects. To raise
capital using an MLP, a sponsor like Columbia sells assets
to the MLP, receiving cash in return. Because the MLP is a
pass-through entity, it can raise capital at a lower cost than
the sponsor.3 Columbia planned to use a variant of the typical
method. Rather than having CPPL buy assets from Columbia,
CPPL would buy newly issued interests in OpCo, which
would use the proceeds to fund Columbia's growth plan.4
Given the magnitude of Columbia's capital needs, analysts
expected that CPPL could own over 60% of OpCo by 2020.
See, e.g., JX 258 at 13.
B. NiSource
When the process leading to the Merger began, Columbia was
not yet a public company. It was a subsidiary of NiSource
Inc., a publicly traded utility company that today serves
approximately four million customers in seven states.
In 2005, Robert Skaggs, Jr. became the CEO of NiSource.
He also served as chairman of its board of directors. In 2013,
Skaggs told the NiSource directors that he wanted to retire
in a few years. See Taylor Dep. 93. For planning purposes,
Skaggs's financial advisor used a target retirement date of
March 31, 2016, and cautioned that “the single greatest risk”
to Skaggs's retirement plan was his “single company stock
position in NiSource.” JX 163.
Stephen Smith was NiSource's CFO. Smith, who was fifty-
two years old in 2013, considered fifty-five to be the “magical
age” to retire. Smith Dep. 97–98; see JX 199. He too targeted
a retirement date in 2016.
Since 2008, Lazard Frères & Co. had been evaluating a
spinoff of Columbia as part of its regular work for NiSource.
See JX 98 at 7–9. Lazard believed that a spinoff could unlock
major value for NiSource.5 In January 2014, Lazard made a
presentation to the NiSource board. Consistent with Lazard's
advice, Skaggs and Smith pitched forming CPPL as part of
the spinoff to provide a financing vehicle for Columbia. See
JX 91. For much of 2014, the NiSource board weighed its
options.
*3  In summer 2014, The Deal reported that Dominion
Resources Inc. was trying to buy NiSource. The article
described Skaggs as “a willing seller” but only in an all-cash
deal at a 20% premium. JX 142.
C. The Spinoff
On September 28, 2014, NiSource announced that it would
spin off Columbia as a separate public company. NiSource
also announced the formation of CPPL as the “primary
funding source” for Columbia's growth capital. JX 182 at 15.
CPPL would go public in early 2015. Columbia would follow
later that year.
Columbia's post-spinoff business plan contemplated “a
potential capital investment opportunity of $12–15 billion
over the next 10 years, positioning the company to provide
enhanced earnings and dividend growth driven by its
projected net investment growth.” JX 174. The largest
components were pipeline expansion and modernization. JX
182 at 14. If all went according to plan, then Columbia would
triple in size. See PTO ¶ 291. The plan envisioned funding the
growth by having CPPL issue equity over a sustained period.6
In December 2014, the NiSource board signed off on Skaggs
and Smith leaving NiSource and joining Columbia. Skaggs
would become CEO and chairman of the board for Columbia
and CPPL; Smith would become CFO of both entities. Skaggs
and Smith made the move partly because they did not “want
to work forever.” JX 208. By this time, two investment banks
had told Smith that Columbia would “trade too rich to sell,”
and Smith sought a third view from Goldman Sachs & Co.
See id. Goldman believed Skaggs and Smith were eyeing “a
sale in near term.” Id.
*4  On February 11, 2015, CPPL closed its initial public
offering, generating net proceeds of approximately $1.17
billion. Under Columbia's business plan, CPPL did not plan
to raise additional equity until 2016. JX 304 at 28. In the
meantime, Columbia planned to draw over $500 million from
a revolving credit facility. Id.
As part of the spinoff, Columbia borrowed $2.75 billion
through a private placement of debt securities. Columbia used
the proceeds to make a $1.45 billion cash distribution to
NiSource and to refinance its existing debt. See id. Moody's
Investors Service rated Columbia's debt at Baa2, one notch
above non-investment grade. PTO ¶ 262. Columbia's debt
level meant that it could not borrow additional capital to fund
its business plan and would have to rely on CPPL. See JX
466; JX 1339.
Columbia anticipated that it would become an acquisition
target after the spinoff. As part of its pre-transaction planning,
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Columbia engaged Lazard as its financial advisor.7 As of May
2015, Lazard categorized the potential acquirers into four
tiers, ranked by their ability to pay and likelihood of interest.
The first tier consisted of Kinder Morgan, Inc. and Energy
Transfer Equity, L.P. The second tier included TransCanada,
Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Dominion, Spectra Energy
Corp., NextEra Energy, Enbridge Inc., and The Williams
Companies. See JX 300 at 35; Mir Dep. 136–48.
On May 28, 2015, Lazard contacted TransCanada and
mentioned that Columbia might be for sale after the spinoff.
JX 311. A contemporaneous memorandum from Skaggs's
financial advisor made the point directly: “[Skaggs] noted
that [Columbia] could be purchased as early as Q3/Q4 of
2015. I think they are already working on getting themselves
sold before they even split. This was the intention all along.
[Skaggs] sees himself only staying on through July of 2016.”
JX 324.
In June 2015, Lazard advised TransCanada against “opening
a dialogue” until after the spinoff. JX 335. Doing so could
jeopardize the spinoff's tax-free status, which required that
NiSource not spin off Columbia in anticipation of a sale.
See JX 311. Internally, TransCanada discussed that “absent a
knock out offer, [Columbia] will likely go for a market check
(to maximize proceeds), which we should be prepared for.”
JX 335.
On July 1, 2015, NiSource completed the spinoff. On its first
day of trading, Columbia's stock closed at $30.34 per share.
From the spinoff until the Merger, Columbia's board of
directors (the “Board”) consisted of Skaggs and six outside
directors. The lead independent director was Sigmund
Cornelius, an oil and gas veteran who had worked in the
pipeline industry and as the CFO of ConocoPhillips. The other
directors were Marty Kittrell, Lee Nutter, Deborah Parker,
Lester Silverman, and Teresa Taylor. Most had served as
directors of NiSource before the spinoff.
D. Early Interest From Possible Buyers
On July 2, 2015, Columbia engaged Goldman to advise
on any unsolicited acquisition proposals. JX 347. Over the
next two weeks, Dominion and Spectra contacted Skaggs
to discuss potential strategic transactions. See PTO ¶¶ 391–
93. Skaggs viewed the Spectra outreach as trivial, but
thought Dominion was worth exploring. See JX 359 (Skaggs
classifying Spectra outreach as “casual pass” and Dominion
as “notable/substantive”).
*5  On July 20, 2015, Dominion expressed interest in buying
Columbia for $32.50 to $35.50 per share, half stock and
half cash. Lazard's contemporaneous discounted cash flow
(“DCF”) analysis valued Columbia at $30.75 per share, 5%
higher than the trading price. See PTO ¶ 395. After discussing
the expression of interest with the Board and receiving advice
from Lazard and Goldman, Skaggs asked Dominion to raise
its price to the “upper-$30s.” See id. ¶¶ 397–98.
On August 12, 2015, Columbia and Dominion entered into
a non-disclosure agreement (an “NDA”). PTO ¶ 400; see
JX 416. The parties began due diligence, but on August
31, Dominion disengaged. Citing a decline in Columbia's
stock price amid general stock market volatility, Dominion
indicated that even its floor of $32.50 per share had become
too high. See PTO ¶ 406.
By the end of August 2015, Columbia's stock price had fallen
to around $25 per share. By late September, it had fallen to
around $18 per share.
Meanwhile, TransCanada continued to examine Columbia
as an acquisition target. See JX 458. TransCanada's Senior
Vice President for Strategy and Corporate Development,
François Poirier, was friends with Smith and asked him to
dinner on October 26. See JX 487. It seems likely that
other companies were studying Columbia as well, but it is
unclear to what extent other firms were included in the scope
of discovery. The petitioners issued subpoenas to Spectra,
Berkshire, Dominion, and NextEra. See Dkts. 132, 170, 176,
217. They also obtained discovery from Goldman and Lazard.
E. The Equity Overhang
During fall 2015, the energy markets deteriorated, and the
market for issuances of equity by MLPs was “effectively
closed.” JX 466; see, e.g., Kittrell Tr. 1053–54 (citing “sea
change” in MLP market that “has continued to this day”). The
new market dynamics meant that Columbia could no longer
use CPPL to raise equity. See JX 466. With $1 billion in short-
term funding needs and no capacity to take on more debt,
Columbia had to consider issuing equity itself, even though
its cost of equity had spiked too.8
The confluence of problems created an “equity overhang.” JX
466. If investors feared that Columbia could not obtain the
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capital to achieve anticipated growth rates, then they would
bid down the stock. The lower price would force Columbia
to issue more equity to raise the same amount of capital, and
Columbia could become “mired in a vicious cycle of issuing
more and more equity at lower and lower prices.”9
*6  In a memorandum to the Board dated October 16, 2015,
Skaggs summarized Columbia's situation, identifying both
problems and potential solutions:
• “[T]he latest intrinsic value studies (which assume that
we're able to fully manage CPG's financing, project
execution, and counter-party risks) would suggest that
CPG's value has dropped roughly 30%.”
• “Required Equity Financing: We've raised almost $4
billion of capital (CPPL equity and CPGX debt) – at a
very attractive cost of capital – during the first half of '15
to launch CPG as a standalone company. Recall: because
of our investment grade credit rating commitments, CPG
cannot issue long-term debt until 2018. Consequently,
to support CPG's committed growth program AND
maintain our investment grade credit ratings, CPG or
CPPL still must issue between $3 billion and $4 billion
of equity (i.e., +/- 65% of CPG's current equity market
capitalization) over the next three years (i.e., $1+ billion
of equity per year).”
• “Track 1 – ‘Stay the Course’. Prepare to issue ~$1.0+
billion (~15% of CPG) of CPGX equity at +/-$18/share
by mid-January.... The current thinking is that we would
need to execute the transaction prior to our YE earnings
disclosure (2/15) – when we are set to announce yet
another increase (~$500 million) in our annual Cap-Ex
plan (i.e., a near-term expansion of the equity overhang).
Downside: if this approach doesn't alleviate the equity
overhang (and rather than a positive reaction, CPGX/
CPPL languishes), we face the real threat of ongoing
value erosion.”
• “Track 2 – ‘Seek a Balance Sheet’. Explore whether
Dominion or a select group of blue chip strategic players
(e.g., MidAmerican ( [Berkshire Hathaway Energy] ),
Sempra, Enbridge, TransCanada, and perhaps Spectra)
would have a legitimate interest in CPG – at a price that's
within CPG's intrinsic value range.... This approach
would be an attempt to capture/optimize CPG's intrinsic
value (i.e., avoid selling 15% of CPGX at a deep
discount); position shareholders to participate in the
potential growth of the combined enterprise; fully fund
our growth plan, and exert a measure of control over
the fate of our employees and other key stakeholders.
Downside: We believe there is no downside in ‘soft’
overtures to any or all of these potential counterparties.
This approach shouldn't ‘put us in play.’ ”
JX 466.
At a Board meeting held on October 19 and 20, 2015, Skaggs
recommended a dual-track strategy in which Columbia would
prepare for an equity offering while engaging in exploratory
talks with potential strategic or financing partners. PTO ¶ 422.
The Board agreed.
F. Renewed Talks With Possible Buyers
On October 26, 2015, Skaggs renewed talks with Dominion.
Skaggs offered exclusivity in return for a prompt offer of
approximately $28 per share, but he expected Dominion to
respond “in the 20–25% premium zip code ($24–$25).”10
That night Smith met with Poirier, who said that TransCanada
wanted to buy Columbia. PTO ¶ 426; JX 487.
On October 29, 2015, the Board decided to wait to hear from
Dominion before responding to TransCanada. JX 1399 at
2. The Board determined that Columbia would have to sell
substantial public equity unless it received a merger proposal
for “around $28 per share.” PTO ¶ 428.
*7  On November 2, 2015, Dominion indicated that it could
not offer $28 per share. Dominion proposed either (i) an
all-stock merger with Dominion and its partner NextEra at
an undefined “modest premium” or (ii) a Dominion equity
investment in certain Columbia subsidiaries or joint ventures.
See id. ¶ 430. That day, Columbia's stock closed at $21.12.
Goldman believed that at this point, Columbia was trading
“very close to ‘dcf’ value, against a backdrop of having traded
at a discount to dcf value.” JX 505.
On November 7, 2015, Skaggs followed up with Dominion
about the Dominion/NextEra structure. PTO ¶ 436. On
November 9, Columbia and TransCanada entered into an
NDA. Id. ¶ 437. Over the next week, Columbia entered into
additional NDAs with Dominion, NextEra, and Berkshire
Hathaway Energy, and the NDA counterparties began
conducting due diligence.11
Each NDA contained a standstill provision that prohibited
the counterparty from making any offer to buy Columbia
securities without the Board's prior written invitation. Most
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of the standstills lasted eighteen months. Each contained
a feature colloquially known as a “don't-ask-don't-waive”
provision (a “DADW”), which prohibited the counterparty
from “making a request to amend or waive” the standstill or
the NDA's confidentiality restrictions. E.g., JX 526 § 3.
Although due diligence was getting off the ground, Columbia
management did not think they could delay an equity offering
beyond early December 2015. And waiting until the last
possible minute to raise equity exposed Columbia to risk.
On November 17, 2015, the Board authorized management
to proceed with the equity offering as early as the week of
November 30. PTO ¶ 456.
On November 24, 2015, TransCanada expressed interest in
an all-cash acquisition at $25 to $26 per share. Berkshire
expressed interest in an all-cash acquisition at $23.50 per
share. Both expressions of interest were conditioned on
further diligence. Berkshire warned that an equity offering
would “kill [its] conversation” with Columbia. Id. ¶ 477.
On November 25, 2015, the Board decided to terminate
merger talks and proceed with the equity offering.
Columbia sent letters to Dominion, NextEra, Berkshire, and
TransCanada instructing them to destroy the confidential
information they had received under their NDAs. NextEra
was disappointed to lose the opportunity, but Dominion was
happy to go elsewhere. Dominion had already reached out
to Questar Corporation, and in February 2016, Dominion
announced that it was buying Questar for $4.4 billion,
effectively ending any prospect for a Columbia-Dominion
merger. See, e.g., PTO ¶ 478; JX 890.
Skaggs called TransCanada and Berkshire personally to reject
their offers. TransCanada's CEO, Russell Girling, asked if
Columbia would forego the equity offering if TransCanada
“close[d] the gap between $26 and $28 and we get it done
before Christmas.” JX 588; see also JX 575 at 4. Skaggs said
no. He explained that Columbia could not risk a failed deal
followed by a more expensive equity offering in 2016. See
PTO ¶ 476; Skaggs Tr. 875–77; see also JX 594.
*8  The same day, Smith told Poirier that Columbia
“probably” would want to pick up merger talks “in a few
months.” JX 588; accord Poirier Tr. 384. Poirier believed that
Columbia could have delayed its equity raise until January,
but that Columbia went ahead to improve its bargaining
position. Poirier also doubted whether Columbia's directors
shared management's enthusiasm for a deal. JX 594.
G. The Equity Offering
After the market closed on December 1, 2015, Columbia
announced an equity offering at $17.50 per share. PTO ¶ 480.
Columbia's stock had closed that day at $19.05. Id. ¶ 481.
The below-market offering was oversubscribed and raised
net proceeds of $1.4 billion. At trial, Skaggs described the
offering as “an unmitigated disaster” because Columbia had
“sold 25 percent of the company at 17.50.” Skaggs Tr. 890.
Columbia had solved its short-term funding needs, but the
overhang would persist without a long-term solution. See JX
1060 at 6; Poirier Tr. 450; Skaggs Dep. 139.
After the equity offering, Skaggs met with Columbia's
directors individually to pitch them on selling the company.
He emphasized that the business plan involved a “significant
amount of execution risk (both financial and operational).”
JX 646.
In mid-December 2015, Poirier called Smith to reiterate
TransCanada's interest in a deal. They scheduled a meeting
for January. Smith Tr. 236–37. Smith involved Skaggs and
Goldman, but no one told the Board that Smith was continuing
talks with TransCanada.12 Internally, TransCanada believed
that the equity offering had made a deal “more challenging
from a valuation standpoint,” but regarded Columbia as a
“very strategic” target. Poirier Tr. 445; accord Marchand Tr.
482.
H. The Poirier Meeting
On January 5, 2016, Smith emailed Columbia's draft
2016 management projections to Poirier. JX 680. Goldman
prepared talking points for Smith to use with Poirier, and
Skaggs approved them. See JX 679 (talking points advising
that TransCanada could “avoid an auction process” with
a “preemptive” price because “every dollar matters a lot
to our Board”); Smith Tr. 248. The talking points were
tailored to respond to positions TransCanada had taken during
negotiations in November 2015, including TransCanada's
stance that it was “not inclined to participate in an auction
process” because it would take “resources to get[ ] fully
comfortable with the growth projects.” JX 575 at 4; see JX
589; JX 590. TransCanada had signaled that it would pay
extra for exclusivity, and internally it was describing its price
strategy as “preemptive.” See JX 575 at 4.
On January 7, 2016, Smith met with Poirier. Smith
literally handed him the list of talking points. Smith Tr.
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247–48. Smith stressed that TransCanada was unlikely
to face competition from major strategic players, telling
TransCanada in substance that Columbia had “ ‘eliminated’
the competition.”13 By doing so, Smith contravened
Goldman's advice from 2015 to the effect that “[c]ompetition
(real or perceived) is the best way to drive bidders to their
point of indifference.” JX 505.
*9  Poirier and Smith portrayed these unusual tactics as a
good-faith effort to entice TransCanada to bid by assuring
TransCanada that it would be worthwhile to engage in due
diligence.14 But TransCanada was going to bid anyway,
as it had before. It seems intuitive that Smith's assurance
about TransCanada not facing competition would have
undermined Columbia's bargaining leverage. At the same
time, it is not clear how much of an effect the disclosure
had, because TransCanada already knew about the company-
specific problems that its competitors faced. See Poirier Tr.
435–36 (referring to “other potential suitors being distracted”
as “public knowledge”).
Regardless, on January 25, 2016, Girling called Skaggs to
express interest in an all-cash acquisition in the range of $25
to $28 per share, similar to what TransCanada had proposed
in November 2018. PTO ¶ 516. That day, Columbia's stock
closed at $17.25.
I. TransCanada Obtains Exclusivity.
In the weeks leading up to Girling's indication of interest,
Skaggs had held a second round of one-on-one meetings with
the Columbia directors, “priming them for a TC bid.” JX
1466; see id. (Goldman indicating that Skaggs was “getting
questions from the Board ‘would you take $26 per share’
– he said every day it gets harder to say no”). Lazard had
advised Columbia's management that “[w]hile your valuation
has swung widely, the $25–28 range is a sensible one given
what we have concluded is your DCF value right now.” JX
742.
On January 28 and 29, 2016, the Board met with senior
management, Goldman, and Columbia's legal counsel from
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. TransCanada had indicated
that it would not proceed unless granted exclusivity. The
Columbia team considered whether to solicit alternative
suitors like Dominion or Spectra. The Board determined
that TransCanada's indicative range offered a significant
premium that outweighed the costs of exclusivity. See PTO
¶ 519; Kittrell Tr. 1061–62 (citing Goldman and Lazard's
recommendation); Taylor Tr. 1273–74 (citing high odds of
closing and “great” premium).
On February 1, 2016, Columbia granted TransCanada
exclusivity through March 2, 2016, which they later extended
by six days (the “Exclusivity Agreement”). PTO ¶¶ 523, 551.
In simplified terms, Columbia could not accept or facilitate
an acquisition proposal from anyone but TransCanada,
except that in response to a “bona fide written unsolicited
Transaction Proposal that did not result from a breach of”
the Exclusivity Agreement, Columbia could engage with
another party upon notice to TransCanada. In long form, the
Exclusivity Agreement provided that Columbia could not
(a) solicit, initiate, encourage or accept any proposals or
offers from any third person, other than [TransCanada],
(i) relating to any acquisition or purchase of all or any
material portion of the assets of [Columbia] or any of its
subsidiaries, (ii) to enter into any merger, consolidation,
reorganization, recapitalization, share exchange or other
business combination transaction with [Columbia] or any
subsidiary of [Columbia], (iii) to enter into any other
extraordinary business transaction involving or otherwise
relating to [Columbia] or any subsidiary of [Columbia], or
(iv) relating to any acquisition or purchase of all or any
material portion of the capital stock of [Columbia] or any
subsidiary of [Columbia] (any proposal or offer described
in any of clauses (i) through (iv) being a “Transaction
Proposal”), or
*10  (b) participate in any discussions, conversations,
negotiations or other communications regarding, furnish
to any other person any information with respect to, or
otherwise knowingly facilitate or encourage any effort
or attempt by any other person to effect a Transaction
Proposal;
provided that in response to a bona fide written unsolicited
Transaction Proposal that did not result from a breach
of this letter agreement (an “Unsolicited Proposal”)
[Columbia] may, after providing notice to [TransCanada]
as required by this letter agreement,
(1) enter into or participate in any discussions,
conversations, negotiations or other communications with
the person making the Unsolicited Proposal regarding such
Unsolicited Proposal,
(2) furnish to the person making the Unsolicited Proposal
any information in furtherance of such Unsolicited
Proposal (provided that to the extent such information
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has not been previously provided to [TransCanada],
[Columbia] shall promptly provide such information to
[TransCanada] ) or
(3) approve, recommend, declare advisable or accept,
or propose to approve, recommend, declare advisable
or accept, or enter into an agreement with respect to,
an Unsolicited Proposal or any subsequent Transaction
Proposal made by such person as a result of the discussions,
conversations and negotiations or other communications
described in clause (1), if the Board of Directors of
[Columbia] determines in good faith, after consultation
with its outside legal counsel, that the failure to do so would
reasonably be expected to be a breach of its fiduciary duties
under applicable law.
JX 832 (formatting altered). The Exclusivity Agreement
further provided that
[Columbia] immediately shall cease and cause to
be terminated all existing discussions, conversations,
negotiations and other communications with all third
persons conducted heretofore with respect to any of the
foregoing. [Columbia] shall
(x) notify [TransCanada] promptly (and in any event within
24 hours) if any Unsolicited Proposal, or any substantive
inquiry or contact with any person with respect thereto, is
made and
(y) in any such notice to [TransCanada], indicate the
material terms and conditions of such Unsolicited Proposal,
inquiry or contact, in the case of clause (y), except to the
extent the Board of Directors of [Columbia] determines in
good faith, after consultation with its outside legal counsel,
that providing such information would not be in the best
interests of [Columbia] and its stockholders.
Id. (formatting altered).
J. TransCanada Conducts Due Diligence.
On February 4, 2016, Columbia sent TransCanada a draft
of the Merger Agreement. By February 5, TransCanada
had sixty-nine personnel accessing Columbia's data room.
JX 784. A subset of the personnel comprised a clean
team that received access to Columbia's customer contracts,
enabling TransCanada to assess Columbia's counterparty risk
by examining its customers' creditworthiness. See Poirier Tr.
401–03. The parties have referred to these important contracts
as “precedent agreements.”15
*11  TransCanada had indicated that it would submit a bid
by February 24, 2016, with the caveat that it needed backing
from credit rating agencies. On February 19, the credit
rating agencies warned TransCanada that acquiring Columbia
could result in a downgrade. One said that TransCanada
was “buying a BBB-mid asset and adding leverage.” JX
827. The other “observed that the resulting leverage from
the transaction would be high in a difficult market with
heightened counterparty concerns.” PTO ¶ 535. On February
24, Girling told Skaggs that TransCanada needed more time to
develop a financing plan that allowed it to pay $25 to $28 per
share without hurting its credit rating. Id. ¶ 544. Meanwhile,
Columbia and TransCanada continued to exchange drafts of
the Merger Agreement.
K. Columbia Demands A Price.
On March 4, 2016, the Board directed management to
demand a merger proposal from TransCanada. On March 5,
TransCanada offered $24 per share, below the low end of the
range it had cited to secure exclusivity. Smith told Poirier
that he could not recommend $24 per share to the Board,
but could recommend $26.50. See PTO ¶ 563. TransCanada
came back at $25.25, which it characterized as its best and
final offer. Id. When Skaggs called Girling to reject the offer,
Girling said: “I guess that's it.” JX 901. Skaggs told the Board
that TransCanada was unlikely to reengage and that “[i]n the
meantime, we have stopped all deal-work.” Id. Poirier told
Smith that TransCanada lacked room to move on price. PTO
¶ 566.
With merger talks on hold, TransCanada's management
debated how to justify paying more. Id. ¶ 568; JX 912; see
JX 907. Its CFO, Don Marchand, thought a deal “at $26
would be off-the-charts in terms of premium paid and the
market reaction could be quite tepid.” PTO ¶ 568. He believed
the transaction was “priced close to perfection at the $25.25
offer level.” Id. TransCanada's COO thought Columbia was
“playing ... poker to see where our barf price is.” JX 911
at 3. Poirier suggested floating a number like $25.75 or
$26, then asking Columbia for another month to find capital
and sort out credit rating issues. JX 905 at 3. To fund the
Merger, TransCanada ultimately would sell more than $7
billion in assets and raise over $3 billion through the largest
subscription receipts offering in Canadian history. JX 939; JX
1008 at 8, 13–14.
On March 6, 2016, TransCanada's management conveyed
that they could support a price above $25.25 per share if
Columbia's management would support a price below $26.50.
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See PTO ¶ 569. After consulting with Skaggs and Cornelius,
Smith asked Poirier to offer $26 per share. Id. ¶¶ 570–71.
Poirier replied that TransCanada's board needed until March
9 to make a decision.
L. The Wall Street Journal Leaks The Merger Talks.
On March 8, 2016, Columbia learned that the Wall Street
Journal was preparing a story about TransCanada being in
advanced discussions to acquire Columbia. TransCanada's
exclusivity expired that night. Id. ¶¶ 579–81.
On March 9, 2016, TransCanada made a revised offer at
$26 per share, with 90% of the consideration in cash and
10% in TransCanada stock. The offer was subject to market
conditions and feedback from credit rating agencies and
TransCanada's underwriters.
On March 10, 2016, the Board convened to discuss
TransCanada's proposal.16 Skaggs reminded the Board that
TransCanada's exclusivity had expired. JX 1399 at 13. The
Board discussed that the news story could lead to inbound
offers. After the meeting, the Wall Street Journal broke the
story.17
M. Spectra Reaches Out.
*12  After seeing the article, Spectra emailed Skaggs to
propose merger talks.18 On March 11, 2016, the Board
decided to renew TransCanada's exclusivity through March
18, subject to further evaluation of Spectra. The Board
also instructed management to waive the standstills with
Berkshire, Dominion, and NextEra. See JX 1399 at 15; see
also JX 950. The next day, management sent emails waiving
the standstills. PTO ¶¶ 603–05.
On the morning of March 12, 2016, the Board determined
that Spectra was unlikely to propose a deal superior to
TransCanada's latest offer. See JX 1399 at 15–16. Around
this time, everyone at Columbia acted as if TransCanada's
exclusivity had already been renewed. The Board approved
a script “to use with Spectra and other inbounds.” JX 964.
It stated: “We will not comment on market speculation or
rumors. With respect to indications of interest in pursuing a
transaction, we will not respond to anything other than serious
written proposals.” JX 1399 at 15–16.
Based on advice from Goldman and Sullivan & Cromwell,
Skaggs proposed to send the script to TransCanada. He
described this move as a way to reassure TransCanada that its
deal remained on track, and to pressure TransCanada to agree
to an “expedited” closing. See JX 964. After the Board met on
March 12, Columbia's in-house counsel asked TransCanada
to approve the script:
[O]ur board has agreed to the renewal of the EA for one
week subject to your agreement that this scripted response
would not violate the terms of the EA (both in terms of the
inbound received in the EA's gap period and going forward
until signing, which unfortunately, given the leak, there is
a potential that we will receive additional inquiries). Please
confirm via response to this email that [TransCanada] is
in agreement with this condition/interpretation and we will
send over the new EA.
JX 968 at 2. Asking TransCanada whether the script violated
the Exclusivity Agreement made no sense. Exclusivity
had expired days before. Columbia's in-house counsel also
conveyed to TransCanada that Columbia had received “an
inbound from a credible, large, midstream player,” without
saying who it was. JX 973.
The Board had instructed Goldman to screen Spectra's calls so
that Spectra could not talk directly with management. See JX
957; JX 1399 at 15–16. On March 12, Spectra's CFO called
Goldman, and Goldman read the script. See JX 974 (Spectra's
CFO: “[The Goldman banker] said he had to read from a script
that had two messages.”). The Spectra CFO told Goldman
that “any indication of interest would have to be conditioned
on further due diligence.” Id. Spectra said it could “move
quickly” and “be more specific subject to diligence,” but the
script did not allow for that option. JX 970. As one Goldman
banker put it: “Does [Spectra] ‘get it’ that they aren't going
to get diligence without a written proposal?” Id. The inverted
approach effectively shut out Spectra. TransCanada had not
bid without due diligence, and no one else was going to either.
See, e.g., JX 1399 at 3 (discussing TransCanada's need for “30
to 45 days of due diligence in order to firm up the potential
offer”).
*13  Later on March 12, Spectra's head of M&A made a
follow-up call. He said to expect a written offer in the “next
few days” absent a “major bust.” JX 992. The banker who
took the call found Spectra's assurance credible, but Skaggs
and Smith were not interested.19 The Board-approved script
meant that Columbia could only entertain a “serious written
proposal,” which Smith defined as
a bona fide proposal that says I will pay you X for your
company. Hard and fast. No outs. No anything. No way
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to wiggle out of anything. This is going to happen. You're
going to pay whatever you're going to pay per share and
we're going to sign that agreement and we're done. I don't
know of any company that would do that in that short of
a timeframe.
Smith Tr. 272. Spectra never made a written offer, and
TransCanada never faced competition or a meaningful threat
of competition from the anonymous yet “credible, large”
industry player that Columbia's management had described.
See Poirier Tr. 417–18.
N. TransCanada Changes Its Offer.
On March 14, 2016, Columbia renewed TransCanada's
exclusivity through March 18, making it retroactive to March
12. PTO ¶ 617; see JX 978. After the renewal, Skaggs
learned that TransCanada was revising its offer. See JX 1005;
JX 1006. Citing execution risk with the stock component,
TransCanada reduced its offer from $26 per share to $25.50,
all cash. PTO ¶ 618. TransCanada threatened that if Columbia
did not accept its reduced offer, then TransCanada would
“issue a press release within the next few days indicating its
acquisition discussions had been terminated.” Id. Exclusivity
terminated automatically upon receipt of TransCanada's
reduced offer. See JX 978.
At a telephonic meeting held the same day, the Board
acknowledged that TransCanada was pushing Columbia to act
before Spectra could make an offer.20 The Board decided to
proceed with TransCanada as long as the termination fee in
the Merger Agreement did not exceed 3% of equity value. See
id. On March 15, 2016, Columbia and TransCanada agreed to
a termination fee of 3%.
O. The Board Approves The Merger Agreement.
On March 16 and 17, 2016, the Board convened to
consider the Merger. Sullivan & Cromwell reviewed the
Merger Agreement. Goldman and Lazard opined that the
consideration was fair to Columbia's stockholders. Goldman
presented a DCF analysis that valued Columbia's stock at
$18.64–$23.50 per share. JX 1016 at 107. Lazard's DCF
ranges valued the stock at $18.88–$24.38 per share on a
sum-of-the-parts basis and at $20.00–$25.50 per share on
a consolidated basis. Id. at 80; JX 1136 at 75–76. Other
valuation methods generated higher and lower ranges.21
The Board determined that there was a serious risk that
TransCanada would withdraw its offer if Columbia delayed
signing to buy time for Spectra. The Board also determined
that Spectra was unlikely to make a competitive offer, if it
made one at all.22
*14  At the conclusion of the meeting, the Board
unanimously approved the Merger Agreement. Its terms
provided for (i) a $309 million termination fee equal to 3%
of the Merger's equity value, (ii) a no-shop provision, and
(iii) a fiduciary out that the Board could exercise after giving
TransCanada four days to match any superior proposal. JX
1025 §§ 4.02, 7.02(b).
P. Columbia's Stockholders Approve the Merger.
Columbia held a special meeting of stockholders on June
22, 2016, to consider the Merger. Holders of 73.9% of the
outstanding shares voted in favor of the Merger. Holders of
95.3% of the shares present in person or by proxy at the
meeting voted in favor of the Merger. PTO ¶¶ 5–6. The
Merger closed on July 1, 2016.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
“An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy
intended to provide shareholders dissenting from a merger on
grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a judicial
determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value) of their
shareholdings.” Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor
I), 542 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Del. 1988). Section 262(h) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law states that
the Court shall determine the fair value of the
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from
the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon
the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining
such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant
factors.
8 Del. C. § 262(h). The statute thus places the obligation to
determine the fair value of the shares squarely on the court.
Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publ'rs, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 361
(Del. 1997).
Because of the statutory mandate, the allocation of the burden
of proof in an appraisal proceeding differs from a traditional
liability proceeding. “In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both
sides have the burden of proving their respective valuation
positions ....” M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513,
520 (Del. 1999). “No presumption, favorable or unfavorable,
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attaches to either side's valuation ....” Pinson v. Campbell-
Taggart, Inc., 1989 WL 17438, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1989).
“Each party also bears the burden of proving the constituent
elements of its valuation position ..., including the propriety
of a particular method, modification, discount, or premium.”
Jesse A. Finkelstein & John D. Hendershot, Appraisal Rights
in Mergers and Consolidations, Corp. Prac. Series (BNA) No.
38-5th, at A-90 (2010 & 2017 Supp.) [hereinafter Appraisal
Rights].
As in other civil cases, the standard of proof in an
appraisal proceeding is a preponderance of the evidence.
M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 520. A party is not required to
prove its valuation conclusion, the related valuation inputs,
or its underlying factual contentions by clear and convincing
evidence or to exacting certainty. See Triton Constr. Co. v. E.
Shore Elec. Servs., Inc., 2009 WL 1387115, at *6 (Del. Ch.
May 18, 2009), aff'd, 2010 WL 376924 (Del. Jan. 14, 2010)
(ORDER). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means
proof that something is more likely than not. It means that
certain evidence, when compared to the evidence opposed to
it, has the more convincing force and makes you believe that
something is more likely true than not.” Agilent Techs., Inc. v.
Kirkland, 2010 WL 610725, at *13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
*15  “In discharging its statutory mandate, the Court of
Chancery has discretion to select one of the parties' valuation
models as its general framework or to fashion its own.” M.G.
Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 525–26. “The Court may evaluate
the valuation opinions submitted by the parties, select the
most representative analysis, and then make appropriate
adjustments to the resulting valuation.” Appraisal Rights,
supra, at A-31 (collecting cases). The court also may “make
its own independent valuation calculation by ... adapting or
blending the factual assumptions of the parties' experts.”
M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 524. It is also “entirely proper
for the Court of Chancery to adopt any one expert's model,
methodology, and mathematical calculations, in toto, if that
valuation is supported by credible evidence and withstands a
critical judicial analysis on the record.” Id. at 526. “If neither
party satisfies its burden, however, the court must then use its
own independent judgment to determine fair value.” Gholl v.
eMachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24,
2004).
In Tri-Continental Corporation v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71 (Del.
1950), the Delaware Supreme Court explained in detail the
concept of value that the appraisal statute employs:
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is
that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has
been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a
going concern. By value of the stockholder's proportionate
interest in the corporate enterprise is meant the true or
intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the
merger. In determining what figure represents the true or
intrinsic value, ... the courts must take into consideration all
factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the
fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset value, dividends,
earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other
facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of
the date of the merger and which throw any light on future
prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent
to an inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholder's
interest, but must be considered ....23
Subsequent Delaware Supreme Court decisions have adhered
consistently to this definition of value.24 Most recently, the
Delaware Supreme Court reiterated that “[f]air value is ...
the value of the company to the stockholder as a going
concern,” i.e. the stockholder's “proportionate interest in a
going concern.” Verition P'rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba
Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 132–33 (Del. 2019).
*16  The trial court's “ultimate goal in an appraisal
proceeding is to determine the ‘fair or intrinsic value’ of
each share on the closing date of the merger.” Dell, Inc.
v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177
A.3d 1, 20 (Del. 2017) (quoting Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at
1142–43). To accomplish this task, “the court should first
envisage the entire pre-merger company as a ‘going concern,’
as a standalone entity, and assess its value as such.” Id.
(quoting Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144). When doing so,
the corporation “must be valued as a going concern based
upon the ‘operative reality’ of the company as of the time of
the merger,” taking into account its particular market position
in light of future prospects. M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at
525 (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor
IV), 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996)); accord Dell, 177 A.3d
at 20. The concept of the corporation's “operative reality”
is important because “[t]he underlying assumption in an
appraisal valuation is that the dissenting shareholders would
be willing to maintain their investment position had the
merger not occurred.” Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 298.
Consequently, the trial court must assess “the value of the
company ... as a going concern, rather than its value to a third
party as an acquisition.” M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731
A.2d 790, 795 (Del. 1999).
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“The time for determining the value of a dissenter's shares
is the point just before the merger transaction ‘on the date
of the merger.’ ” Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-33 (quoting
Technicolor I, 542 A.2d at 1187). Put differently, the valuation
date is the date on which the merger closes. Technicolor IV,
684 A.2d at 298; accord M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 525.
If the value of the corporation changes between the signing
of the merger agreement and the closing, then the fair value
determination must be measured by the “operative reality”
of the corporation at the effective time of the merger. See
Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 298.
The statutory obligation to make a single determination
of a corporation's value introduces an impression of false
precision into appraisal jurisprudence.
[I]t is one of the conceits of our law that we purport
to declare something as elusive as the fair value of
an entity on a given date .... [V]aluation decisions are
impossible to make with anything approaching complete
confidence. Valuing an entity is a difficult intellectual
exercise, especially when business and financial experts
are able to organize data in support of wildly divergent
valuations for the same entity. For a judge who is not an
expert in corporate finance, one can do little more than
try to detect gross distortions in the experts' opinions. This
effort should, therefore, not be understood, as a matter
of intellectual honesty, as resulting in the fair value of a
corporation on a given date. The value of a corporation
is not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values,
and the judge's task is to assign one particular value
within this range as the most reasonable value in light of
all the relevant evidence and based on considerations of
fairness.25
Because the determination of fair value follows a litigated
proceeding, the issues that the court considers and the
outcome it reaches depend in large part on the arguments
advanced and the evidence presented.
An argument may carry the day in a particular case
if counsel advance it skillfully and present persuasive
evidence to support it. The same argument may not prevail
in another case if the proponents fail to generate a similarly
persuasive level of probative evidence or if the opponents
respond effectively.
Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., L.P., 2016
WL 7324170, at *16 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016). Likewise,
the approach that an expert espouses may have met “the
approval of this court on prior occasions,” but may be
rejected in a later case if not presented persuasively or if “the
relevant professional community has mined additional data
and pondered the reliability of past practice and come, by a
healthy weight of reasoned opinion, to believe that a different
practice should become the norm ....” Global GT LP v. Golden
Telecom, Inc. (Golden Telecom Trial), 993 A.2d 497, 517
(Del. Ch.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).
*17  In this case, the parties proposed three valuation
indicators: (i) the deal price minus synergies, (ii) Columbia's
unaffected trading price, and (iii) a DCF analysis. The
petitioners relied on the DCF analysis. The respondent
relied on the other two metrics. Although technically the
respondent in an appraisal proceeding is the surviving
company, the acquirer is typically the real party in interest
on the respondent's side of the case. In this case, that party
is TransCanada. Reflecting this reality, this decision refers to
the respondent's arguments as TransCanada's.
A. Deal Price
TransCanada contends that the deal price of $25.50 per share
is a reliable indicator of fair value if adjusted downward
to eliminate elements of value arising from the Merger.
The petitioners argue that the deal price should receive no
weight, but that if it does receive weight, then it should
be adjusted upward to reflect improvements in value that
Columbia experienced between signing and closing. As the
proponent of using the deal price, TransCanada bore the
burden of establishing its persuasiveness. Each side bore the
burden of proving its respective adjustments.
1. Guidance Regarding How To Approach The Deal
Price
In three recent decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court has
endorsed using the deal price in an arm's-length transaction
as evidence of fair value.26 In each decision, the Delaware
Supreme Court weighed in on aspects of the sale process that
made the deal price a reliable indicator of fair value, both
by describing guiding principles and by applying them to the
facts of the case. These important decisions illuminate what
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The first decision—DFC—involved the acquisition of a
payday lender (DFC Global) by a private equity firm (Lone
Star). In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp. (DFC Trial), 2016
WL 3753123, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016) (subsequent
history omitted). The respondent urged the court to rely on
the deal price as the most reliable evidence of fair value. Id.
To assess the deal price, the trial court examined the strength
of the sale process, explaining that the deal price “is reliable
only when the market conditions leading to the transaction are
conducive to achieving a fair price.” Id.
The pre-signing sale process for DFC Global lasted two years,
but proceeded in fits and starts. In April 2012, DFC Global
hired a banker to explore a sale to a private equity firm. Id.
at *3. The banker selected six firms, and a seventh expressed
interest independently. By September 2012, none had bid, and
the banker spent the next year reaching out to another thirty-
five private equity firms and three potential strategic buyers.
In September 2013, two private equity firms—Crestview
Partners and J.C. Flowers & Co.—expressed interest in a
joint acquisition. In December 2013, Lone Star expressed
interest in a transaction at $12.16 per share. After Crestview
withdrew from the joint bid, J.C. Flowers expressed interest
in a transaction at $13.50 per share.
During due diligence, DFC Global provided both bidders with
a lowered set of projections, leading Lone Star to reduce its
expression of interest to $11 per share. In March 2014, DFC
Global entered into exclusive negotiations with Lone Star.
During the exclusivity period, DFC Global provided an even
lower forecast, and Lone Star dropped its formal bid to $9.50
per share. Lone Star gave DFC Global twenty-four hours to
accept, but later extended the deadline by five days. DFC
Global accepted, and the parties announced the transaction
publicly on April 2, 2014. It closed on June 13, 2014. Id. at *4.
*18  In the appraisal proceeding, the court first worked
through the parties' DCF valuations and the respondent's
comparable-companies analysis. Having done so, the court
turned to the deal price, describing it as “an appropriate factor
to consider” and observing that the company “was purchased
by a third-party buyer in an arm's-length sale” after a process
that “lasted approximately two years and involved [DFC
Global's] advisor reaching out to dozens of financial sponsors
as well as several potential strategic buyers.” Id. at *21.
The court noted that the deal “did not involve the potential
conflicts of interest inherent in a management buyout or
negotiations to retain existing management ....” Id. Instead,
Lone Star took the opposite approach and replaced most of
the key executives. Id. At the same time, the court expressed
concern that DFC Global was facing a period of regulatory
uncertainty in which it could not access its full range of
strategic options. The evidence also indicated that Lone Star
had “focused its attention on achieving a certain internal
rate of return and on reaching a deal within its financing
constraints, rather than on [DFC Global's] fair value.” Id. at
*22. The trial court also observed that Lone Star had secured
exclusivity during a critical phase of the sale process and
pressured the company into the final price with an exploding
offer. Id. at *23. The post-signing phase, by contrast, was
relatively open, with a termination fee that “was reasonable
and bifurcated to allow for a reduced fee in the event of a
superior proposal.” Id.
The trial court ultimately concluded that each of the three
indicators that the parties advanced—the DCF analysis, the
comparable-companies analysis, and the deal price—had
limitations. But all three provided meaningful insight into
DFC Global's value, and all three fell within a reasonable
range. The court therefore averaged them, arriving at a
valuation of $10.21 per share. Id. That outcome reflected a
premium of 7.5% over the deal price of $9.50 per share.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed. In its
first argument for reversal, the respondent contended that
the Delaware Supreme Court should presume that the deal
price reflects fair value under specified conditions, effectively
asking the Delaware Supreme Court to overrule its decision
in Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, 11 A.3d 214
(Del. 2010). There, the high court had rejected a similar
request to establish a presumption, explaining that “Section
262(h) neither dictates nor even contemplates that the Court
of Chancery should consider the transactional market price of
the underlying company. Rather, in determining ‘fair value,’
the statute instructs that the court ‘shall take into account all
relevant factors.’ ” Id. at 217 (quoting 8 Del. C. § 262(h)). The
Golden Telecom decision observed that “[r]equiring the Court
of Chancery to defer—conclusively or presumptively—to the
merger price, even in the face of a pristine, unchallenged
transactional process, would contravene the unambiguous
language of the statute and the reasoned holdings of our
precedent.” Id. at 218.
In DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court again declined to
establish a presumption, but cautioned that its
refusal to craft a statutory presumption in favor of the deal
price when certain conditions pertain does not in any way
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signal our ignorance to the economic reality that the sale
value resulting from a robust market check will often be
the most reliable evidence of fair value, and that second-
guessing the value arrived upon by the collective views of
many sophisticated parties with a real stake in the matter
is hazardous.
DFC, 172 A.3d at 366. The justices also cautioned that
“we have little quibble with the economic argument that the
price of a merger that results from a robust market check,
against the back drop of a rich information base and a
welcoming environment for potential buyers, is probative of
the company's fair value.” Id.
The Delaware Supreme Court then elaborated on what fair
value means when evaluating a deal price:
[F]air value is just that, “fair.” It does not mean the highest
possible price that a company might have sold for had
Warren Buffett negotiated for it on his best day and the
Lenape who sold Manhattan on their worst.... Capitalism is
rough and ready, and the purpose of an appraisal is not to
make sure that the petitioners get the highest conceivable
value that might have been procured had every domino
fallen out of the company's way; rather, it is to make sure
that they receive fair compensation for their shares in the
sense that it reflects what they deserve to receive based
on what would fairly be given to them in an arm's-length
transaction.
*19  Id. at 370–71.
Addressing the merits, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's determination of fair value, noting that the trial
court had made the following post-trial findings of fact:
i) the transaction resulted from a robust market search that
lasted approximately two years in which financial and
strategic buyers had an open opportunity to buy without
inhibition of deal protections;
ii) the company was purchased by a third party in an arm's
length sale; and
iii) there was no hint of self-interest that compromised the
market check.
Id. at 349 (formatting altered). The high court further
observed that
[a]lthough there is no presumption in favor of the deal
price, under the conditions found by the Court of Chancery,
economic principles suggest that the best evidence of fair
value was the deal price, as it resulted from an open
process, informed by robust public information, and easy
access to deeper, non-public information, in which many
parties with an incentive to make a profit had a chance to
bid.
Id.
The Delaware Supreme Court cited “the failure of other
buyers to pursue the company when they had a free chance
to do so” as one of several “objective factors that support
the fairness of the price paid ....” Id. at 376. The high court
also observed that Lone Star “was subjected to a competitive
process of bidding[.]” Id. at 350. That finding was supported
by the competition between Lone Star and J.C. Flowers before
signing and the passive market check after signing. The
Delaware Supreme Court also explained that “the fact that
the ultimate buyer was alone at the end provides no basis for
suspicion” given the trial court's findings that
i) there was no conflict of interest;
ii) [DFC Global's investment banker] had approached
every logical buyer;
iii) no one was willing to bid more in the months leading
up to the transaction before management significantly
adjusted downward its projections; and
iv) management continued to miss its targets after Lone
Star was the only buyer remaining.
Id. at 376 (formatting altered). The Delaware Supreme Court
found that “the record does not include the sorts of flaws in the
sale process that could lead one to reasonably suspect that the
ultimate price paid by Lone Star was not reflective of DFC's
fair value.” Id.
Based on this analysis, the Delaware Supreme Court
determined that the Court of Chancery's “decision to give
one-third weight to each metric was unexplained and in
tension with the Court of Chancery's own findings about
the robustness of the market check.” Id. at 388. The senior
tribunal therefore remanded the case for the trial court to
“reassess [its] conclusion as to fair value in light of our
decision.” Id. at 388–89.
b. Dell
The second decision—Dell—involved a management buyout
of Dell Inc. in which its founder and CEO (Michael Dell)
teamed up with a private equity firm (Silver Lake) to acquire
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the company. When the merger agreement was signed, the
deal price was $13.65 per share. With the stockholder vote
trending against the merger, the buyout group increased its
bid to $13.75 per share (the “Final Merger Consideration”).
*20  The respondent contended that the Final Merger
Consideration was the best evidence of Dell's fair value on the
closing date. In re Appraisal of Dell Inc. (Dell Trial), 2016
WL 3186538, at *21 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016) (subsequent
history omitted). To analyze this contention, the trial court
separately examined the pre- and post-signing phases of the
transaction process.
The trial court found that bidding during the pre-signing phase
had not produced fair value. Three factors contributed to
this determination: (i) the bidders' use of leveraged-buyout
models to price their bids, (ii) evidence that the stock market
had undervalued Dell by focusing on its disappointing short-
term prospects, and (iii) limited pre-signing competition. See
id. at *29–37.
For present purposes, the third factor is most pertinent.
The trial court determined that pre-signing competition was
limited because Dell's special committee only invited one
other private equity firm to compete with Silver Lake at any
given time, and all of the firms priced the deal using the
same leveraged-buyout financing model that Silver Lake had
used. See id. at *9–10, *30–31, *37. The committee did not
approach strategic buyers during the pre-signing phase, in part
because one of the committee's financial advisors (Evercore)
discouraged the committee from contacting a wider universe
of buyers until the go-shop process, when the advisor would
earn a premium for generating a higher bid. Id. at *6, *11. The
committee's other financial advisor (JPMorgan) expressed
concern about the absence of a competitive dynamic and its
effect on the bidding. See id. at *6, *37.
Having found that the pre-signing phase failed to support
the reliability of the deal price, the trial court examined
whether the post-signing phase validated it. The merger
agreement contemplated a go-shop period, and during this
phase, two financial sponsors emerged with competing
recapitalizations. In response, and to secure a favorable
stockholder vote, the buyout group increased its price to
the Final Merger Consideration. Id. at *14, *16–18, *37–
38. The trial court found that the results of the go-shop
ruled out a large gap between the Final Merger Consideration
and fair value, because if Dell's value had approached
what the petitioners claimed, then a strategic bidder would
have intervened. But the trial court also concluded that
impediments to bidding undercut the reliability of the go-
shop as a price-discovery tool, citing (i) the magnitude of
the transaction, (ii) Mr. Dell's participation in the buyout
group, including his financial incentives as a net buyer of
shares and his valuable relationships with customers, and
(iii) information asymmetries between the buyout group and
competing bidders. See id. at *40–44.
Having concluded that the respondent did not carry its burden
of proving the reliability of the deal price, the trial court relied
on a DCF analysis. After resolving various disputes between
the parties, the trial court made a fair-value determination
of $17.62 per share, a result 28% over the deal price. This
outcome appeared consistent with the result from the sale
process, because it exceeded what a financial sponsor would
pay under a leveraged-buyout model, but was below the level
where the valuation gap would be sufficiently attractive for a
strategic buyer to intervene. It suggested that the company's
best option was to remain independent and ride out what
appeared to be a trough in the stock price. The trial court
perceived that this dynamic permitted the buyout group to
take the company private at a premium to market but at a
discount to fair value. See id. at *51.
*21  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed.
Consistent with its earlier decisions in Golden Telecom
and DFC, the high court stressed that that “there is no
requirement that the court assign some mathematical weight
to the deal price ....” Dell, 177 A.3d at 23. But on the facts
presented, the high court held that the trial court “erred in not
assigning any mathematical weight to the deal price” under
circumstances suggesting that “the deal price deserved heavy,
if not dispositive weight.” Id.; accord id. at 30 (“Overall, the
weight of evidence shows that Dell's deal price has heavy, if
not overriding, probative value.”).
The Delaware Supreme Court explained that Dell's sale
process featured “fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach
to all logical buyers, and the chance for any topping bidder
to have the support of Mr. Dell's own votes ....” Id. at 35.
In reaching this conclusion, the Delaware Supreme Court
viewed the pre-signing process favorably, noting that (i) the
members of the special committee who ran the sale process
were “independent, experienced ... and armed with the power
to say ‘no,’ ” (ii) the committee persuaded the buyout group
to raise its bid six times, from an initial range of $11.22-
to-$12.16 to $13.65, and (iii) there was “[n]othing in the
record [that] suggests that increased competition would have
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produced a better result.” Id. at 11, 28. The Delaware Supreme
Court also cited “leaks that Dell was exploring strategic
alternatives,” which corroborated Evercore's assumption that
“interested parties would have approached the Company
before the go-shop if serious about pursuing a deal.” Id. at
28. Finally, the high court cited JPMorgan's view that “any
other financial sponsor would have bid in the same ballpark
as Silver Lake.” Id.
The Delaware Supreme Court also viewed the post-signing
process favorably. The high court cited the number of parties
that the committee's bankers contacted and the fact that the
go-shop's structure was more flexible than other go-shops. Id.
at 29. As with its assessment of the pre-signing phase, the
Delaware Supreme Court stressed the absence of evidence
that another party was interested in proceeding, explaining
that “[f]air value entails at minimum a price some buyer is
willing to pay—not a price at which no class of buyers in the
market would pay.” Id.; see id. at 32, 34. The absence of a
higher bid meant “that the deal market was already robust and
that a topping bid involved a serious risk of overpayment[,]”
which in turn “suggests the price is already at a level that is
fair.” Id. at 33.
Although it reversed the trial court's finding of fair value, the
Delaware Supreme Court did not require that the trial court
adopt the deal price: “Despite the sound economic and policy
reasons supporting the use of the deal price as the fair value
award on remand, we will not give in to the temptation to
dictate that result.” Id. at 44. The high court left it to the trial
judge to reach his own conclusion, while “giv[ing] the [trial
judge] the discretion on remand to enter judgment at the deal
price if he so chooses, with no further proceedings.” Id.
c. Aruba
The third decision—Aruba—involved the acquisition of a
technology company (Aruba Networks) by a much larger
competitor (Hewlett-Packard). See Verition P'rs Master Fund
Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc. (Aruba Trial), 2018 WL 922139
(Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (subsequent history omitted). The
respondent asked the court to give heavy weight to the deal
price. To evaluate its reliability, the trial court examined
the sale process in light of the Delaware Supreme Court's
decisions in Dell and DFC.
*22  The pre-signing sale process in Aruba had two phases.
In late August 2014, HP approached Aruba about a deal. Id.
at *7–8. Aruba hired an investment banker (Qatalyst), and the
banker and Aruba management anticipated obtaining a deal
for around $30 per share. Id. at *9. The companies entered
into an NDA that restricted HP from speaking with Aruba
management about post-transaction employment, and HP
began conducting due diligence. After receiving projections
from Aruba, HP determined that with synergies, the pro forma
value of acquiring Aruba was as high as $32.05 per share.
Id. at *11. Meanwhile, Qatalyst identified thirteen potential
partners and approached five of them. For reasons having
“nothing to do with price,” none was interested. Id. at *10.
Despite the restriction in the NDA, HP asked Aruba's CEO,
Dominic Orr, to take on a key role with the combined
entity. Orr replied that he had no objection. Id. at *11. The
parties seemed to be making progress towards a deal, but
the HP board of directors balked at making a bid without
further analysis, recalling the fallout from HP's disastrous
acquisition of Autonomy Corporation PLC in 2011. By the
end of November 2014, Orr felt the process had dragged on
long enough, and with the approval of the Aruba board, he
terminated the discussions. Id. at *12.
For its part, HP continued to evaluate an acquisition of Aruba.
In December 2014, HP tapped Barclays Capital Inc. as its
financial advisor, a firm that had worked for Aruba and had
been trying for months to secure the sell-side engagement. Id.
at *13. On January 21, 2015, HP's CEO met Orr for dinner.
During the meeting, when HP's CEO proposed resuming
merger talks, Orr responded positively and suggested trying
to announce a deal by early March. But HP's CEO also told
Orr that because Qatalyst had represented Autonomy when
HP acquired it, HP would not proceed if Aruba used Qatalyst.
Id. at *14.
The Aruba board decided to move forward with the deal and
informed Qatalyst about HP's ukase. Aruba was obligated to
pay Qatalyst a fee in the event of a successful transaction, so
it kept Qatalyst on as a behind-the-scenes advisor. From then
on, Qatalyst's primary goal was to repair its relationship with
HP, and Qatalyst regarded a successful sale of Aruba to HP
as a key step in the right direction. Aruba also needed a new
HP-facing banker. It hired Evercore, a firm that was trying to
establish a presence in Silicon Valley. During the sale process,
Evercore likewise sought to please HP, viewing HP as a major
source of future business. See id. at *9, *15–16, *19, *21.
The ensuing negotiations proceeded quickly. HP had
anticipated making an opening bid of $24 per share, but after
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Orr's enthusiastic response, HP opened at $23.25 per share. Id.
at *16–17. Qatalyst reached out to a sixth potential strategic
partner, but it was not interested. Id. at *17. The Aruba board
decided to counter at $29 per share. Evercore conveyed the
number to Barclays, but when Barclays dismissed it, Evercore
emphasized Aruba's desire to announce a deal quickly. Id. at
*17–18. On February 10, 2015, twenty days after HP resumed
discussions with Orr, the Aruba board agreed to a price of
$24.67 per share. Id. at *19. The parties negotiated a merger
agreement, and on March 1, 2015, the Aruba board approved
it.
The post-signing phase was uneventful. On March 2, 2015,
Aruba and HP announced the merger. The merger agreement
(i) contained a no-shop clause subject to a fiduciary out, (ii)
conditioned the out for an unsolicited superior proposal on
compliance with an unlimited match right that gave HP five
days to match the first superior proposal and two days to
match any subsequent increase, and (iii) required Aruba to
pay HP a termination fee of $90 million, representing 3% of
the Aruba's equity value. No competing bidder emerged, and
on May 1, 2015, Aruba's stockholders approved the merger.
Id. at *21–22.
*23  The trial court found that under Dell and DFC, Aruba's
sale process was sufficiently reliable to make the deal price a
persuasive indicator of fair value. The HP-Aruba transaction
was an arm's-length merger. The ultimate decision-makers
for Aruba—the board and the stockholders—did not face any
conflicts of interest. During the sale process, Aruba extracted
price increases from HP. There was also evidence that the
deal price credited Aruba with a portion of the substantial
synergies that the merger would create. And the merger
agreement's deal protections were relatively customary and
would not have supported a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty. Id. at *36–38. The trial court therefore viewed the HP-
Aruba merger as “a run-of-the-mill, third party-deal,” where
“[n]othing about it appears exploitive.” Id. at *38.
The trial court next turned to the petitioners' specific
challenges to the deal price. The petitioners argued that deal
price resulted from a closed-off sale process in which HP
had not faced a meaningful threat of competition. Id. at
*39. The trial court rejected that contention, noting that the
petitioners failed “to point to a likely bidder and make a
persuasive showing that increased competition would have
led to a better result.” Id. (citing Dell, 177 A.3d at 28–29,
32, 34). The petitioners proved that HP knew that it did not
face a meaningful threat of competition, but they did not show
that anyone else would have paid more. Id. at *41. Instead,
the record showed that none of the six parties that Qatalyst
contacted was willing to bid, and no one emerged between
signing and closing. Id.
The petitioners next argued that the negotiators' incentives
undermined the sale process, citing the desire of Aruba's
bankers to cater to HP and the more subtly divergent interests
of Aruba's CEO. The trial court found that although the
petitioners proved that Aruba could have negotiated more
aggressively, they did not prove that “the bankers, [the CEO],
the Aruba Board, and the stockholders who approved the
transaction all accepted a deal price that left a portion of
Aruba's fundamental value on the table.” Id. at *44.
In other portions of the decision, the trial court found that
Aruba's unaffected trading price was a reliable indicator
of fair value and rejected the parties' DCF valuations as
unreliable. These holdings left the trial court with two reliable
valuation indicators: the unaffected trading price and the deal
price. The trial court determined that the unaffected trading
price was the better measure of the fair value of Aruba's
shares. See id. at *53–55.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed. The high
court found that the trial court had incorrectly relied on
the unaffected trading price, but it accepted the trial court's
finding that the deal price was a reliable indicator of fair value.
Aruba, 210 A.3d at 141–42.
Addressing the petitioners' claim that the sale process lacked
a competitive bidding dynamic, the Delaware Supreme Court
explained that the trial court had misinterpreted DFC and Dell
as downplaying the value of competition. See id. at 136. The
Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that
when there is an open opportunity for many buyers to buy
and only a few bid (or even just one bids), that does not
necessarily mean that there is a failure of competition; it
may just mean that the target's value is not sufficiently
enticing to buyers to engender a bidding war above the
winning price.
Id. The high court then applied this principle to the facts in
Aruba:
Aruba approached other logical strategic buyers prior to
signing the deal with HP, and none of those potential buyers
were interested. Then, after signing and the announcement
of the deal, still no other buyer emerged even though the
merger agreement allowed for superior bids. It cannot be
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that an open chance for buyers to bid signals a market
failure simply because buyers do not believe the asset on
sale is sufficiently valuable for them to engage in a bidding
contest against each other. If that were the jurisprudential
conclusion, then the judiciary would itself infuse assets
with extra value by virtue of the fact that no actual market
participants saw enough value to pay a higher price. That
sort of alchemy has no rational basis in economics.
*24  Id. On the facts presented, the level of competition in
Aruba was sufficient to support the reliability of the deal
price.
The Delaware Supreme Court also explained that
a buyer in possession of material nonpublic information
about the seller is in a strong position (and is uniquely
incentivized) to properly value the seller when agreeing to
buy the company at a particular deal price, and that view of
value should be given considerable weight by the Court of
Chancery absent deficiencies in the deal process.
Id. at 137. The high court observed that HP and Aruba went
“back and forth over price” and that HP had “access to
nonpublic information to supplement its consideration of the
public information available to stock market buyers ....” Id.
at 139. The Delaware Supreme Court elsewhere emphasized
that “HP had signed a confidentiality agreement, done
exclusive due diligence, gotten access to material nonpublic
information,” and “had a much sharper incentive to engage in
price discovery than an ordinary trader because it was seeking
to acquire all shares.” Id. at 140. On the facts presented, the
extent of the negotiations in Aruba was sufficient to support
the reliability of the deal price.
The high court ultimately concluded that Aruba's sale process
was sufficiently reliable to render the deal price the best
measure of fair value. The Delaware Supreme Court declined
to use the trial court's estimate of the deal price minus
synergies, instead adopting HP's contemporaneous synergies
estimate and remanding with instructions that “final judgment
be entered for the petitioners in the amount of $19.10 per share
plus any interest to which the petitioners are entitled.” Id. at
142.
2. Applying The Delaware Supreme Court's Precedents
To This Case
The Delaware Supreme Court's precedents indicate that the
sale process in this case was sufficiently reliable to make
the deal price a persuasive indicator of fair value. These
authorities call for rejecting the petitioners' challenges to the
sale process.
a. Objective Indicia Of Deal-Price Fairness
When assessing whether a sale process results in fair value, it
is critical to recall that “fair value is just that, ‘fair.’ ” DFC,
172 A.3d at 370. “[T]he key inquiry is whether the dissenters
got fair value and were not exploited.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33.
“The issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has
extracted the highest possible bid.” Id. Rather, “the purpose
of an appraisal is ... to make that [the petitioners] receive fair
compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects what
they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to
them in an arm's-length transaction.” DFC, 172 A.3d at 370–
71.
When applying this standard, the Delaware Supreme Court
has cited “objective indicia” that “suggest[ ] that the deal price
was a fair price.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 28; accord DFC, 172 A.3d
at 376. In each of its recent decisions, the Delaware Supreme
Court found that the objective indicia outweighed the sale
processes' shortcomings. In this case, a similar analysis shows
that the deal price is a reliable indicator of fair value.
*25  First, the Merger was an arm's-length transaction with
a third party. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (citing fact that “the
company was purchased by a third party in an arm's length
sale” as factor supporting fairness of deal price). TransCanada
was a pure outsider with no prior stock ownership in
Columbia.
Second, the Board did not labor under any conflicts of
interest. Six of the Board's seven members were experienced
outside directors. Cf. Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (citing fact
that special committee was “composed of independent,
experienced directors and armed with the power to say ‘no’
” as factor supporting fairness of deal price). Columbia's
stockholders were widely dispersed, and the petitioners have
not identified divergent interests among them.
Third, TransCanada conducted due diligence and received
confidential insights about Columbia's value.27 Like the
acquirer in Aruba, TransCanada “had signed a confidentiality
agreement, done exclusive due diligence, gotten access to
material nonpublic information,” and had a “sharp[ ] incentive
to engage in price discovery ... because it was seeking to
acquire all shares.” Aruba, 210 A.3d at 140.
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Fourth, during the first pre-signing phase, Columbia
contacted other potential buyers, and those parties failed to
pursue a merger when they had a free chance to do so. See
DFC, 172 A.3d at 376 (citing “failure of other buyers to
pursue the company when they had a free chance to do so” as
factor supporting fairness of deal price). The degree of pre-
signing interaction is similar to or compares favorably with
the facts in the Delaware Supreme Court precedents.28
Fifth, Columbia negotiated with TransCanada and extracted
multiple price increases. See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 139 (citing
“back and forth over price”); Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (citing
fact that special committee “persuaded Silver Lake to raise
its bid six times”). After TransCanada offered $24 per share,
Columbia said no. When TransCanada raised its offer to
$25.25, Columbia again said no. The deal price of $25.50
per share was more than any other party had ever seriously
offered, including before the equity offering when Columbia
sold 25% of its stock for less than its trading price.
*26  Finally, no bidders emerged during the post-signing
phase, which is a factor that the Delaware Supreme Court has
stressed when evaluating a sale process.29 The suite of deal
protections in the Merger Agreement fell within the norm,
making the absence of a topping bid significant.
Considering these factors as a whole, the sale process that led
to the Merger bore objective indicia of fairness that rendered
the deal price a reliable indicator of fair value.
b. Management Conflicts
As their central theme in this case, the petitioners argue that
Skaggs and Smith engineered a fire sale of Columbia to obtain
personal benefits.30 They cite evidence that both had targeted
a 2016 retirement date. E.g., JX 163; JX 251. Each had a
change-in-control agreement that paid out triple the sum of
his base salary and target annual bonus if he retired after a sale
of Columbia. If the sale occurred after July 1, 2018, then the
multiple would drop from triple to double. PTO ¶¶ 206, 217;
Taylor Tr. 1263. When Columbia separated from NiSource,
both joined Columbia knowing that it was likely to be an
acquisition target. According to the petitioners, the executives
then strived to engineer a near-term sale, knowing they would
come out ahead even in a sale at less than fair value.
The Aruba decision involved a sale process where the
top executive and the company's investment bankers had
conflicting incentives. The CEO wanted to retire, but he
cared deeply about the company and its employees. When
HP proposed to acquire Aruba and keep the CEO on to
integrate the companies, it offered the perfect path “to an
honorable personal and professional exit.” Aruba Trial, 2018
WL 922139, at *5; see id. at *43 (analyzing CEO's conflict).
Aruba's investment bankers faced more direct conflicts
because both wanted to curry favor with HP. Qatalyst was
desperate to save its Silicon Valley franchise, and Evercore
was auditioning for future business. Id. at *43. The trial court
acknowledged the petitioners' concerns, but found that the
conflicting incentives did not undermine the deal price as an
indicator of fair value:
The evidence does not convince me that the bankers, Orr,
the Aruba Board, and the stockholders who approved the
transaction all accepted a deal price that left a portion of
Aruba's fundamental value on the table. Perhaps different
negotiators could have extracted a greater share of the
synergies from HP in the form of a higher deal price. Maybe
if Orr had been less eager, or if Qatalyst had not been
relegated to the back room, then HP would have opened
at $24 per share. Perhaps with a brash Qatalyst banker
leading the negotiations, unhampered by the Autonomy
incident, Aruba might have negotiated more effectively and
gotten HP above $25 per share. An outcome along these
lines would have resulted in HP sharing a greater portion
of the anticipated synergies with Aruba's stockholders. It
would not have changed Aruba's standalone value. Hence,
it would not have affected Aruba's fair value for purposes
of an appraisal.
*27  Id. at *44. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court
accepted the reliability of the deal price as a valuation
indicator and used it when making its own fair value
determination. Aruba, 210 A.3d at 141–42.
The Dell decision also involved a conflict: Mr. Dell, the
company's founder and top executive, was a buy-side
participant in the management buyout and would emerge from
the transaction with a controlling stake. He did not lead the
negotiations on the sell side (that task fell to the special
committee), but the trial court regarded his involvement as
a factor cutting against the reliability of the deal price. For
example, the trial court found that Mr. Dell gave the buyout
group a leg-up given his relationships within the company and
his knowledge of its business, and the trial court accepted the
testimony of a sale-process expert that if bidders competed
to pay more than what Mr. Dell's group would pay, then they
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risked a winner's curse. Dell Trial, 2016 WL 3186538, at *42–
43. Mr. Dell also was a net purchaser of shares in the buyout,
so any increase in the deal price cost him money.
If Mr. Dell kept the size of his investment constant as
the deal value increased, then Silver Lake would have to
pay more and would demand a greater ownership stake
in the post-transaction entity. Subramanian showed that if
Mr. Dell wanted to maintain 75% ownership of the post-
transaction entity, then he would have to contribute an
additional $250 million for each $1 increase in the deal
price. If Mr. Dell did not contribute any additional equity
and relied on Silver Lake to fund the increase, then he
would lose control of the post-transaction entity at a deal
price above $15.73 per share. Because Mr. Dell was a net
buyer, any party considering an overbid would understand
that a higher price would not be well received by the most
important person at the Company.
Id. at *43 (footnote omitted). These factors did not make
Mr. Dell's involvement with the buyout group preclusive,
as that term is used in an enhanced scrutiny case, because
Mr. Dell testified credibly that he was willing to work with
any bidder, and there was evidence that two of the buyout
group's competitors had questioned Mr. Dell's value. But for
purposes of price discovery in an appraisal case, the trial
court perceived that Mr. Dell's involvement and incentives
undermined the effectiveness of the sale process and the
reliability of the deal price. Id. at *44.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that Mr. Dell's
involvement in the buyout group had not undermined the sale
process. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 32–33. The high court noted
that “the [trial court] did not identify any possible bidders that
were actually deterred because of Mr. Dell's status.” Id. at
34. The Delaware Supreme Court also emphasized Mr. Dell's
willingness to work with rival bidders during due diligence
and the absence of evidence that Mr. Dell would have left the
company if a rival bidder prevailed. Id. at 32–34. The high
court concluded that the lack of a higher bid did not call into
question the sale process, because “[i]f a deal price is at a
level where the next upward move by a topping bidder has a
material risk of being a self-destructive curse, that suggests
the price is already at a level that is fair.” Id. at 33.
*28  In this case, management's divergent interests fell short
of the conflicts that failed to undermine the sale process
in Dell. The alignment issue confronting Skaggs and Smith
more closely resembled the negotiators' incentives in Aruba.
Like Aruba's CEO and its bankers, Skaggs and Smith had
personal reasons to secure a deal under circumstances where
disinterested participants might have preferred a standalone
option: Their change-in-control benefits incentivized them
to favor selling Columbia before 2018. To minimize the
risk of missing that window, it was safer to act sooner
rather than later. See In re Rural Metro Corp., 88 A.3d
54, 94–95 (Del. Ch. 2014) (discussing how incentives
of contingently compensated representative are generally
aligned with principal's but diverge over whether to do a deal
at all), aff'd sub nom. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129
A.3d 816 (Del. 2015).
But Skaggs and Smith also had countervailing incentives to
pursue the best deal possible. Their change-in-control benefits
included significant equity components that appreciated with
a higher deal price. After the Merger, Skaggs retired and
received change-in-control payments totaling $26.8 million,
with over $19 million from equity awards. Skaggs received
an additional $30 million when the Merger cashed out his
nearly 1.2 million shares and phantom shares of Columbia
stock. Smith similarly retired and received change-in-control
payments totaling $10.9 million, with over $7.3 million from
equity awards. PTO ¶¶ 654, 656; JX 1370 at 17–18; see JX
1346 ¶¶ 12, 27.
When directors or their affiliates own “material” amounts
of common stock, it aligns their interests with other
stockholders by giving them a “motivation to seek the
highest price” and the “personal incentive as stockholders
to think about the trade off between selling now and the
risks of not doing so.”
Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 670–71 (Del. Ch.
2014) (quoting In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d
573, 600 (Del. Ch. 2010)); see also Lender Processing, 2016
WL 7324170, at *22 (discussing incentive to maximize deal
price where target managers were net sellers and would not
retain jobs post-merger). That said, the equity components
in the change-in-control benefits did not fully solve the
alignment problem, because their contingent nature made
their recipients more averse to losing a deal, thereby limiting
their incentive to push for the final nickel or quarter. See
Rural Metro, 88 A.3d at 94–95 (discussing how incentives
of contingently compensated representative and principal
diverge during final negotiations).
In sum, there is evidence to support the petitioners' theory, and
I have considered it seriously. Ultimately, however, I cannot
credit it. Although Skaggs and Smith wanted to retire, they
were professionals who took pride in their jobs and wanted to
do the right thing. They were not going to arrange a fire sale
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for below Columbia's standalone value, and the Board would
not have let them.
Consistent with their incentives and professional
responsibilities, Skaggs and Smith rejected opportunities for
a quick sale. When Dominion expressed interest at an all-time
high valuation, Skaggs demanded more. Instead of taking
what they could get from Berkshire or TransCanada in fall
2015, Skaggs and Smith recommended a dilutive equity raise.
JX 534; JX 1399 at 2–3. When Columbia told TransCanada
that it was pursuing the equity raise, Girling offered a prompt
deal at a higher price. JX 588. Skaggs thought that was
too risky for Columbia and declined. A Columbia director
recognized that by pursuing the equity raise, Skaggs and
Smith had opted for “BIG, at least near, financial hits to your
net worth.” JX 621.
When negotiations with TransCanada resumed, Skaggs
remained focused on obtaining a fair price. While awaiting
TransCanada's formal offer in February 2016, Skaggs told
Cornelius that “if the cash portion of the initial salvo [is]
below $25, I would be inclined to not even counter.” JX 855.
When TransCanada offered $24, Skaggs and Smith said it
was a nonstarter. See PTO ¶ 563. TransCanada came back at
$25.25, and Skaggs recommended that the Board reject it. JX
1399 at 10; Skaggs Tr. 908–10; see Cornelius Tr. 1142–43.
The Board agreed, and after Skaggs told Girling, Lazard and
Skaggs believed the deal had died and that Columbia would
be proceeding with its standalone plan. See JX 901; JX 906;
JX 913.
*29  The most troubling event in the deal timeline is Smith's
one-on-one meeting with Poirier, when he explained that
TransCanada lacked competition. But Columbia did not take
TransCanada's $24 per share offer, or even its $25.25 offer.
Skaggs and the Board held out for a higher price, ultimately
obtaining the Merger consideration of $25.50.
There is some evidence that if the Board had said no to $25.50
per share, then TransCanada would have looked for ways to
go back up to $26. See Poirier Tr. 420–21. That prospect
is insufficient to undermine the deal price for appraisal
purposes. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 33 (explaining that fair value
in an appraisal is not a measure of “whether a negotiator has
extracted the highest possible bid”); accord DFC, 172 A.3d
at 370.
The evidence does not convince me that the Skaggs, Smith,
and the Board accepted a deal price that left a portion of
Columbia's fundamental value on the table. As in Aruba,
perhaps different negotiators could have done better. If they
had, then the higher price would have resulted in TransCanada
sharing a portion of the anticipated synergies with Columbia's
stockholders. It would not have affected whether Columbia's
stockholders received fair value.
c. Claims Of Favoritism During The Pre-Signing Process
In their second attack on the sale process, the petitioners
contend that the pre-signing phase “yields no reliable
indication of fair value” because Columbia favored
TransCanada over opportunities with other buyers. See Dkt.
428 at 73–74. It is true that Columbia began to favor
TransCanada over time, but that was because a deal with
TransCanada offered higher and more certain value than the
alternatives.
The Aruba decision illustrates how a targeted pre-signing
process can evolve to focus on a single bidder without
undermining the deal price as an indicator of fair value.
There, the initial phase of the sale process involved outreach
to five potential strategic partners, and Aruba's banker later
contacted a sixth. All declined to bid. During the second
phase of the process, Aruba effectively engaged in a single-
bidder negotiation with HP, and the petitioners proved that HP
knew that it did not face a meaningful threat of competition.
Aruba Trial, 2018 WL 922139, at *40–41. As the high court
made clear on appeal, this fact pattern did not mean that
there was insufficient competition, nor did it render the deal
price unfair. See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136 (“[W]hen there is
an open opportunity for many buyers to buy and only a few
bid (or even just one bids), that does not necessarily mean
that there is a failure of competition; it may just mean that the
target's value is not sufficiently enticing to buyers to engender
a bidding war above the winning price.”).
The sale process in this case followed a similar pattern. It is
true that Columbia did not treat all bidders identically, but
Columbia's actions did not result in an ineffective sale process
or unreliable deal price. Rather than favoring TransCanada
throughout, Columbia initially expected Dominion to be
the logical buyer. After TransCanada's unsolicited outreach
to Smith in October 2015, Columbia remained focused on
Dominion, believing that it could pay more. See PTO ¶ 428.
In early November 2015, when Dominion said it could not
meet the Board's ask of $28 per share, Lazard recommended
broadening the process with private outreach to TransCanada,
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Berkshire, and Spectra to “put pressure on [Dominion].” JX
503 at 2–3. Goldman agreed and recommended conducting
a broader market test only if the private process failed to
produce a bid materially greater than $24 per share. See JX
505.
*30  The targeted pre-signing process ultimately included
Dominion, NextEra, TransCanada, and Berkshire, but not
Spectra. The petitioners fault Columbia for not pursuing
Spectra, but they failed to prove that more vigorous pursuit
“would have produced a better result.” Dell, 177 A.3d at
28. On November 3, 2015, Spectra's CEO emailed Skaggs
to request a meeting or telephone call “in the next couple
of weeks to discuss what we may be able to accomplish
together.” JX 500. The two talked by phone on November 9.
During the call, Spectra's CEO “referenced potential strategic
opportunities for Columbia and Spectra, but provided no
specifics ... and did not request a follow-up meeting or
conversation.” PTO ¶ 438. Skaggs told Spectra to move
quickly, because otherwise Columbia would end talks and
proceed with an equity offering. Skaggs Tr. 960; see id. at
871. After the call, Spectra went “radio silent.” Skaggs Tr.
879; accord JX 541. On November 17, Skaggs reported to the
Board that Spectra's CEO “had again expressed interest in a
potential strategic transaction ... but had only spoken in terms
of generic transaction considerations and had not provided
a specific, actionable proposal or requested a substantive
follow-up.” PTO ¶ 456. In a November 25 update to the
Board, Skaggs confirmed that “no additional word had been
received” from Spectra. Id. ¶ 471. Spectra had a “free chance”
to pursue Columbia during the pre-signing phase. DFC, 172
A.3d at 376. Spectra's failure to act does not undermine the
fairness of the deal price.
The petitioners next claim that Columbia gave more
information to TransCanada than to others in November 2015.
The simple answer is that the bidders requested different
levels of information. Berkshire was the most demanding.31
TransCanada was next, and both TransCanada and Berkshire
asked for redacted precedent agreements. Dominion did not
receive them because it did not ask.
The petitioners also complain that Skaggs gave TransCanada
and Berkshire an informal bid deadline of November 24,
2015, without sharing the deadline with Dominion. Columbia
told all of the parties it contacted to act quickly before
Columbia pivoted to an equity offering, so Dominion
knew there was time pressure. See Skaggs Tr. 960–61.
By November 22, because of extensive interactions with
TransCanada and Berkshire, Columbia management expected
imminent indications of interest from those firms. Dominion
“ha[d] been radio silent.” JX 569. Sure enough, TransCanada
and Berkshire made prompt bids, and Dominion did not.
The petitioners cite an email from November 25, 2015
in which Dominion's partner, NextEra, expressed surprise
when Columbia called off the sale process to pursue an
equity offering, saying that the deadline “was news to us
—we were working on it.” JX 592. Dominion and NextEra
knew they had to move quickly, and had they been more
interested, they would have. There is no evidence that an
expression of interest from Dominion and NextEra would
have been sufficiently competitive and sufficiently actionable
to cause Columbia to forego the equity offering and agree to
a preemptive transaction at a higher value than the Merger.
The petitioners likewise claim that Columbia unduly favored
TransCanada after the equity offering. As it did throughout the
process, Columbia pursued the best opportunity. Columbia
first focused on Dominion. Because of Dominion's reticence,
Columbia next focused on Berkshire and TransCanada. After
the equity offering, Berkshire withdrew for good, calling
Columbia's business model “fundamentally broken.” See JX
547. TransCanada, by contrast, called to express continued
interest. That call spurred Smith's meeting with TransCanada
in January 2016. See Smith Tr. 323; accord id. at 234.
As with the evidence regarding management conflicts,
Smith's one-on-one meeting with Poirier is the most serious
evidence of favoritism towards TransCanada. But as noted
in the section on management's incentives, Columbia did not
take TransCanada's $24 per share offer, or even its $25.25
offer. Skaggs and the Board forced Columbia to pay $25.50.
The results of Columbia's negotiations compare favorably
with the facts in Aruba and DFC. During the meat of the
negotiations in Aruba, the company focused exclusively
on HP, which knew that it was not facing competition.
HP had anticipated offering $24 per share and then giving
ground. When Aruba's CEO responded with enthusiasm to
HP's approach, HP instead made an opening bid of $23.25.
Although HP later increased its bid, after adjusting for a
corrected share count, HP described the deal price of $24.67
as “the new $24.00.” See Aruba Trial, 2018 WL 922139, at
*39–41. Likewise, in DFC, Lone Star was the only bidder that
negotiated price with DFC Global, and rather than increasing
its bid, Lone Star lowered it twice. See DFC Trial, 2016 WL
3753123, at *3–4.
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*31  The petitioners make similar arguments about
Columbia's decision to grant exclusivity to TransCanada and
to treat the exclusivity as effectively remaining in place even
after it terminated. As with Smith's meeting with Poirier, the
fact that only one bidder bids “does not necessarily mean
that there is a failure of competition ....” Aruba, 210 A.3d
at 136. The trial court in DFC found that DFC Global had
granted Lone Star exclusivity at an inopportune point in the
negotiations and that Lone Star had pressured the company
with an exploding offer. See DFC Trial, 2016 WL 3753123, at
*23. But those factors did not undermine the reliability of the
deal price given the objective indicia of fairness that were also
present in this case. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 349–50, 375–76.
As with their arguments about management incentives, the
petitioners have mustered evidence that supports their theory
of bidder favoritism, but they failed to show that Columbia
favored TransCanada to a degree that left fundamental value
on the table. The Board and management believed that
TransCanada was the optimal buyer to pursue, which is why
they gave TransCanada exclusivity and continued to deal
with TransCanada. See PTO ¶ 519. Put simply, “[n]othing in
the record suggests that increased competition would have
produced a better result.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 28.
d. The Standstills
The petitioners appear to argue that the standstills distinguish
this case from those where the deal price was reliable
despite weak interest from potential suitors. They assert
that Columbia permitted TransCanada to breach its standstill
by reengaging after the equity offering, while at the same
time failing to waive the standstills that bound rival bidders.
Although the Board ultimately waived the standstills with
Dominion, NextEra, and Berkshire in March 2016, the
petitioners say it should have done so sooner, claiming that
by that point TransCanada had an insurmountable head start
towards a transaction.
Each party that engaged with Columbia during fall 2015
entered into an NDA containing a standstill provision
substantially in the form of the following:
In consideration for being furnished with Evaluation
Material by [Columbia], each Party (each such Party
in such context, the “Standstill Party”) agrees that until
the date that is eighteen months after the date of this
[NDA], unless [Columbia's] board of directors otherwise
so specifically requests in writing in advance, the Standstill
Party shall not, and shall cause its Representatives not to ...
directly or indirectly,
(A) acquire or offer to acquire, or seek, propose or
agree to acquire ... beneficial ownership ... or constructive
economic ownership ... of any securities or material assets
of [Columbia], including rights or options to acquire such
ownership,
(B) seek or propose to influence, advise, change or control
the management, board of directors, governing instruments
or policies or affairs of [Columbia], including by means of
a solicitation of proxies ..., contacting any person relating
to any of the matters set forth in this [NDA] or seeking to
influence, advise or direct the vote of any holder of voting
securities of [Columbia] or making a request to amend or
waive this provision or any other provision of this Section
3 or of Section 1 or Section 2 or
(C) make any public disclosure, or take any action that
could require the other Party to make any public disclosure,
with respect to any of the matters that are the subject of this
[NDA]....
JX 526 § 3 (formatting altered); see PTO ¶ 455. The standstills
prohibited the counterparties from “seek[ing]” to acquire
Columbia or influence its management without the Board's
prior written invitation.
*32  The petitioners proved at trial that TransCanada
breached its standstill several times. The first breach occurred
in mid-December 2015, when Poirier called Smith to convey
TransCanada's continued interest in acquiring Columbia. The
second breach occurred when Poirier and Smith met in
January 2016. There are other instances.32
The petitioners posit that but for their own standstills,
Berkshire, Dominion, or NextEra would have competed with
TransCanada in spring 2016, driving up the deal price. But
there is no evidence that Dominion or NextEra had any
interest in reengaging with Columbia after the equity offering,
and Berkshire refused to do so.33
*33  In March 2016, Columbia waived the standstills. If
Berkshire, Dominion, or NextEra wanted to bid, then they
could have done so in the post-signing phase (but they did
not). Their failure to do so resembles the fact pattern in
Aruba, which cited the absence of bidding during a passive
post-signing market check as supporting the fairness of the
price. See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136 (“[A]fter signing and the
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announcement of the deal, still no other buyer emerged even
though the merger agreement allowed for superior bids.”).
The DFC decision also involved a passive post-signing
market check in which no bidders emerged. DFC, 172 A.3d
at 359.
The evidence does not show that the standstills undermined
the fairness of the deal price. None of the standstill parties
wanted to bid, and they in fact did not bid.
e. Claims About An Information Vacuum
In a variant of their arguments about bidder favoritism, the
petitioners contend that Skaggs and Smith misled the Board or
otherwise ran the sale process unsupervised. They posit that
but for these actions, the Board would have engaged more
vigorously with other bidders. If credited, these arguments
would show that the Board could have gotten more than fair
value, but they would not show that the deal price fell below
that mark. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 370 (noting that “the purpose
of an appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the
highest conceivable value that might have been procured had
every domino fallen out of the company's way”).
On different facts, fraud on the board could lead to a
deal price below fair value. In this case, the petitioners'
assertions are largely unsupported. The Board received a
steady flow of information, with Skaggs regularly keeping
the directors informed through written memos, presentations
during meetings, and one-on-one communications.34
The petitioners contend that Skaggs misled the Board in
November 2015 by failing to report that Spectra asked for
a meeting, but Skaggs testified credibly that he regarded
Spectra's passes as “casual passes” that “weren't serious.”
Skaggs Tr. 946. The petitioners also say that Skaggs should
have told the Board that he gave TransCanada and Berkshire
a bid deadline of November 24, 2015, without sharing the
deadline with the other suitors. The better view of the
evidence is that Skaggs told all of the interested parties that
they had to move quickly before Columbia pivoted to an
equity offering in December. TransCanada and Berkshire
received more specific guidance because they showed the
most interest. The petitioners also assert that Skaggs should
have told the Board that not all suitors received the same due
diligence in November 2015, but the bidders got what they
requested.
As with the petitioners' other challenges to the sale process,
their best argument centers on Smith's meeting with Poirier
on January 7, 2016. Smith sent Poirier confidential due
diligence materials and assured him that TransCanada faced
no competition. The Board did not authorize the meeting
or the disclosures.35 And although Skaggs generally was
forthcoming with the Board, in this instance Skaggs told the
Board that TransCanada had reached out to Smith, without
mentioning that Smith met with Poirier and without reporting
Smith's unauthorized disclosures. See JX 698.
*34  The petitioners have identified a flaw in the process, but
they have not shown that it led to a price below fair value.
After Poirier's meeting with Smith, TransCanada proposed a
price range similar to its indication from before the equity
offering. Columbia declined and pushed back.
The petitioners also assert that when the Board met on January
28 and 29, 2016, Skaggs “manipulate[d] the Board into
approving a TransCanada bid.” Dkt. 428 at 21–22. Skaggs
presented a chart discussing what the directors “would have
to believe” about Columbia's future trading price to reject a
merger proposal at $26 per share, and Skaggs recommended
that the Columbia directors accept an offer at $26 unless they
believed Columbia would trade at $30.11 in 2017. JX 753 at 9.
Goldman prepared the initial version of the chart, and at trial,
the petitioners pressed Skaggs on why his version omitted a
column which showed that the directors should be indifferent
to an offer at $26 per share if they believed Columbia would
trade at $27.69 at a 8.5% cost of equity in 2016. See Skaggs.
Tr. 982–90. In reality, Skaggs' chart was Goldman's summary
of the other charts it had prepared. Compare JX 753 at 9,
with JX 726 at 4. The absent column came from a chart that
Skaggs did not present. Skaggs did not mislead the Board by
presenting the summary chart in its entirety.
Finally, the petitioners fault Skaggs for not telling the Board
that on March 12, 2016, Spectra requested due diligence
and promised a written offer “in the next few days,” or that
Goldman thought Spectra was “serious.” JX 992. The Board
had previously approved a script that required a “serious
written proposal” as a condition to diligence. Skaggs prepared
for an offer from Spectra by having Goldman get an ability-
to-pay analysis ready. See JX 1009. Goldman determined that
at a price of $25.50, Spectra risked a credit downgrade and
dilution until 2019.36 Spectra never made a written offer.
The petitioners did not prove that the Board was misled
or deprived of material information. The petitioners did
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prove that management at times knew more about the sale
process, which is inevitable because directors do not run
companies on a day-to-day basis. The record does not show
that informational differences led to a deal price below fair
value.
f. The Stockholder Vote
In an entire fairness case, the unitary entire fairness standard
“embraces questions of when the transaction was timed,
how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the
directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the
stockholders were obtained.” Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). Drawing on an entire fairness
case, TransCanada posits that the informed approval of
disinterested stockholders, especially by a large margin, “is
compelling evidence that the price was fair.” ACP Master,
Ltd. v. Sprint Corp., 2017 WL 3421142, at *29 (Del. Ch.
July 21, 2017), aff'd, 2018 WL 1905256 (Del. Apr. 23,
2018) (ORDER). The petitioners take the opposite tack
and argue that if they can show defects in the stockholder
approval process, such as disclosure violations, then that
should undermine a claim that the deal price reflects fair
value.
*35  It is not self-evident that stockholder approval should
have the same implications for an appraisal proceeding as
an entire fairness case, given that the former is a statutory
remedy that turns solely on inadequacy of price, while the
latter is a liability proceeding in which the entire fairness
test is used to determine whether fiduciaries have breached
their duties.37 The entire fairness test can apply to a wide
range of transactions, only some of which require stockholder
approval under the Delaware General Corporation Law. A
complex body of law governs the extent to which stockholder
approval lowers the standard of review from entire fairness
to the business judgment rule, shifts who bears the burden
of proving fairness, or operates as evidence of fairness
under the unitary entire fairness test. See, e.g., ACP Master,
2017 WL 3421142, at *16–19, *29. When an appraisal
proceeding follows a long-form merger like the one in this
case, stockholder approval is a statutory prerequisite. See 8
Del. C. § 251(c). The Merger would not have closed (and
appraisal rights would not have been triggered) unless the
stockholders approved the transaction. How different levels
of stockholder approval should affect the valuation inquiry is
something that our cases have yet to work out.
In this case, TransCanada argues that holders of
approximately 95.3% of the shares that were present in person
or by proxy at Columbia's meeting of stockholders favored the
Merger. Under Delaware law, a merger requires the approval
of holders of a majority of the outstanding shares, making that
the appropriate denominator for consideration. See 8 Del. C.
§ 251(c). Under this voting standard, a non-vote counts the
same as a “no” vote. In Columbia's case, holders of 73.9%
of its shares voted in favor of the Merger, making the rate
of approval perhaps not as high as it might appear. Neither
side introduced expert testimony or other evidence that would
enable the court to assess the degree to which this level of
approval reflected an endorsement of the deal price, other than
recognizing the obvious fact that a majority of the outstanding
shares approved it.
The petitioners argue that the court should not give any
weight to stockholder approval in this case because the
proxy statement that Columbia distributed to its stockholders
was materially misleading. See JX 1136 (the “Proxy”). The
petitioners cite a list of issues, but three are most significant.
The first concerns an omission and a misleading partial
disclosure about Columbia's NDAs. The Proxy disclosed that
Columbia had entered into NDAs in November 2015 with
Parties B, C, and D, but the Proxy did not disclose that the
NDAs contained standstills, much less DADWs. The Proxy
then disclosed misleadingly that “[u]nlike TransCanada,
none of Party B, Party C or Party D sought to re-
engage in discussions with [Columbia] after discussions were
terminated in November 2015.” Id. at 46. The Proxy failed
to provide the additional disclosure that all four parties
were subject to standstills with DADWs, that TransCanada
breached its standstill, and that Columbia opted to ignore
TransCanada's breach.
In an effort to blunt these issues, TransCanada points out that
the Proxy disclosed that “none of Party A, Party B, Party
C or Party D would be subject to standstill obligations that
would prohibit them from making an unsolicited proposal to
the Board following announcement of entry into the merger
agreement with TransCanada.” Id. at 60. TransCanada cites
a secondary source indicating that some 80% of surveyed
NDAs contained standstills and 64% contained DADWs, then
argues that stockholders should have known that the NDAs
contained these restrictions and that Columbia waived them.
Stockholders should not have had to guess about whether the
NDAs contained these powerful provisions, and while it was
true that the restrictions did not apply post-signing, the Proxy
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created the misleading impression that Parties B, C, and D
were not bound by standstills during the pre-signing period.
*36  These problems with the Proxy were material. A
reasonable stockholder would have found it significant that
TransCanada and Parties B, C, and D were bound by
standstills in fall 2015 and that TransCanada was permitted to
breach its standstill to pursue the Merger. A leading treatise
on mergers and acquisitions identifies benefits to standstills,
but also warns of potential dangers.
[I]t may well be that the presence of [standstill] provisions
will cause third parties to put their highest and best
prices on the table in any pre-signing market check or
auction since, for them, there will be no “tomorrow.”
However, such provisions, especially if coupled with either
a provision that prohibits the target from waiving the
prohibition or one which does not permit the third party
from requesting [sic] a waiver undercuts the effectiveness
of the post-signing market check.
Lou R. Kling & Eileen T. Nugent, Negotiated Acquisitions of
Companies, Subsidiaries and Divisions § 4.04[6][b], at 4-92
(2019 ed.) (footnotes omitted). The limitations imposed by
the standstills and DADWs made their presence material to
Columbia's stockholders.
The petitioners next cite the Proxy's failure to disclose
that Skaggs and Smith were planning to retire in 2016.
TransCanada disputes the factual claim, arguing that Skaggs
was open to continuing work and observing that the Board
wanted Smith to stay on as CFO after the Merger. It was
not inevitable that Skaggs or Smith would retire in 2016, but
they wanted to and did. See, e.g., JX 1034 (Smith asking
advisor immediately after signing: “[D]o you think I can retire
now?”). Although this decision has found that Skaggs and
Smith's desire to retire did not undermine the sale process,
a reasonable stockholder would have regarded their plans
as material. See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926
A.2d 94, 114 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[A] reasonable stockholder
would want to know an important economic motivation of
the negotiator singularly employed by a board to obtain the
best price for the stockholders, when that motivation could
rationally lead that negotiator to favor a deal at a less than
optimal price, because the procession of a deal was more
important to him, given his overall economic interest, than
only doing a deal at the right price.”).
Finally, the petitioners cite the Proxy's partial disclosure
regarding Smith's meeting with Poirier on January 7, 2016.
See JX 1136 at 46. The Proxy failed to mention that Smith
invited a bid and told Poirier that TransCanada did not
face competition. TransCanada downplays the meeting as
preliminary and immaterial given the generous deal price.
Stockholders could decide how much weight to give the
information, but the information itself was material.
The petitioners proved that the Proxy contained material
misstatements and omissions. In light of the flawed Proxy,
this decision does not give any weight to the stockholder vote
for purposes of evaluating the reliability of the deal price.
g. The Deal Protections
The petitioners contend that the deal protection measures
in the Merger Agreement undermined the effectiveness of
the sale process. Under the Delaware Supreme Court's
precedents, the deal protections did not have that effect.
The Merger Agreement contained a no-shop clause with
a fiduciary out. As is customary, the Merger Agreement
provided broadly that Columbia could not solicit, provide
information to, or engage in discussions with any party
other than TransCanada, then created an exception identifying
circumstances under which Columbia could respond to an
interested party. The first half of Section 4.02(a) of the Merger
Agreement established the broad prohibition, stating:
*37  The Company agrees that, except as permitted by
this Section 4.02, neither it nor any of its Subsidiaries
nor any of the officers and directors of it or its
Subsidiaries shall, and it shall instruct and use its
reasonable best efforts to cause its and its Subsidiaries'
employees, investment bankers, attorneys, accountants and
other advisors or representatives (such officers, directors,
employees, investment bankers, attorneys, accountants
and other advisors or representatives, collectively,
“Representatives”) not to, directly or indirectly:
(i) initiate, solicit or encourage any, or the making of
any, inquiry, indication of interest, proposal or offer that
constitutes, or could reasonably be expected to lead to, any
Acquisition Proposal;
(ii) engage in, continue or otherwise participate in any
discussions or negotiations regarding, or provide any
information or data to any Person relating to, any inquiry,
indication of interest, proposal or offer that constitutes, or
could reasonably be expected to lead to, an Acquisition
Proposal; or
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(iii) otherwise knowingly facilitate any effort or attempt to
make any inquiry, indication of interest, proposal or offer
that constitutes, or could reasonably be expected to lead to,
an Acquisition Proposal.
JX 1025 § 4.02(a) (the “No-Shop Clause”) (formatting
altered).
The second half of Section 4.02(a) of the Merger Agreement
carved out the exception to the general prohibition. It stated:
Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing to the contrary,
prior to the time the Company Requisite Vote is obtained,
the Company may, subject to the Company providing prior
notice to Parent,
(A) provide information in response to a request therefor
by a Person who has made a bona fide written Acquisition
Proposal that did not result from a breach of this Section
4.02 if the Company receives from the Person requesting
such information an executed confidentiality agreement
on terms not less restrictive to the other party than
those contained in the Confidentiality Agreement (it being
understood that such confidentiality agreement need not
prohibit the making, or amendment, of an Acquisition
Proposal but which shall not prohibit the Company from
fulfilling its obligations under this Section 4.02); provided,
however, that the Company shall promptly after the
execution thereof provide a true and complete copy to
Parent of any such confidentiality agreement and any such
information to the extent not previously provided to Parent,
in each case, redacted, if necessary, to remove the identity
of the Person making the proposal or offer; or
(B) engage or participate in any discussions or negotiations
with any Person who has made such an unsolicited bona
fide written Acquisition Proposal, if and only to the extent
that,
(x) prior to taking any action described in clause (A)
or (B) above, the board of directors of the Company
determines in good faith (after consultation with its
outside legal counsel) that the failure to take such action
would reasonably be expected to result in a breach of the
directors' fiduciary duties under applicable Law and
(y) in each such case referred to in clause (A) or
(B) above, the board of directors of the Company has
determined in good faith based on the information then
available and after consultation with its outside legal
counsel and its financial advisor that such Acquisition
Proposal either constitutes a Superior Proposal or
could reasonably be expected to result in a Superior
Proposal....
Id. § 4.02(a) (the “Superior-Proposal Out”) (formatting
altered).
*38  Importantly for present purposes, the Superior-Proposal
Out permitted Columbia to provide due diligence information
in response to “a request therefor by a Person who has
made a bona fide written Acquisition Proposal,” subject
only to the bidder entering into an NDA “on terms not
less restrictive to the other party than those contained in”
the NDA with TransCanada. It also provided that the NDA
did not have to contain a standstill, thereby eschewing the
deal lawyer's trick of turning the requirement that the bidder
sign an equivalent confidentiality agreement into a powerful
backdoor defensive measure. The provision also authorized
Columbia to redact the name of the person making written
Acquisition Proposal. This aspect of the provision did not
require a superior-proposal determination before furnishing
due diligence, nor did it impose any delay before Columbia
could comply. Cf. In re Compellent Techs., Inc. S'holder
Litig., 2011 WL 6382523, at *6–8 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2011)
(discussing a radically buyer-friendly version of superior-
proposal out and possible alternative formulations). The
definition of Acquisition Proposal made this aspect of the
provision easy to satisfy by defining that term as
any proposal or offer ... relating to any transaction or series
of transactions involving
(A) any direct or indirect sale, lease, transfer, exchange,
acquisition or purchase of any assets or one or more
businesses that constitute more than fifteen percent (15%)
of the net revenues, net income, or assets of the Company
and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, or more than fifteen
percent (15%) of the total voting power of any class of
equity securities of the Company,
(B) any direct or indirect sale, exchange, transfer or
other disposition, tender offer or exchange offer or similar
transaction that, if consummated, would result in any
Person or “group” ... acquiring beneficial or record
ownership of more than fifteen percent (15%) of the total
voting power of any class of securities of the Company, or
(C) any merger, reorganization, consolidation, share
exchange, business combination, recapitalization,
liquidation, joint venture, partnership, dissolution or
similar transaction involving the Company (or any
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Subsidiary or Subsidiaries ... whose business constitutes
more than fifteen percent (15%) of the net revenues, net
income or consolidated assets of the Company and its
Subsidiaries, taken as a whole).
JX 1025 § 4.02(b)(i) (formatting altered).
The Superior-Proposal Out required that before engaging or
participating in any discussions or negotiations, Columbia
had to made additional determinations. First, the Board
had to determine “in good faith (after consultation with its
outside legal counsel) that the failure to take such action
would reasonably be expected to result in a breach of the
directors' fiduciary duties under applicable Law.” Second,
the Board had to determine that the Acquisition Proposal
“either constitutes a Superior Proposal or could reasonably
be expected to result in a Superior Proposal,” with that term
defined as
a bona fide written Acquisition Proposal that did not
result from a breach of this Section 4.02 relating to any
acquisition or purchase by a Person or group of Persons of
(A) assets that generate more than fifty percent (50%) of
the consolidated total revenues of the Company and its
Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, (B) assets that constitute
more than fifty percent (50%) of the consolidated total
assets of the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a
whole, or (C) more than fifty percent (50%) of the total
voting power of the equity securities of the Company,
in each case, that the board of directors of the Company
determines in good faith (after consultation with its
financial advisor and outside legal counsel)
[1] is reasonably likely to be consummated in accordance
with its terms, taking into account
(x) the timing and likelihood of consummation of the
proposal (including whether such Acquisition Proposal
is contingent on receipt of third party financing or
is terminable by the acquiring Person or group upon
payment of a termination fee),
*39  (y) all legal, financial and regulatory aspects of the
Acquisition Proposal and
(z) the Person or group making the Acquisition Proposal
(including in respect of the potential effects of any
actions that might be required by any Government
Antitrust Entity in connection with the consummation of
such transaction), and
[2] if consummated, would result in a transaction more
favorable to the Company's stockholders from a financial
point of view than the Merger.
Id. § 4.02(b)(ii) (formatting altered; Arabic numerals added).
This dimension of the Superior-Proposal Out contained
relatively middle-of-the-road standards for its exercise. Cf.
Compellent, 2011 WL 6382523, at *6–8.
The Merger Agreement also contained a no-change-of-
recommendation provision with its own fiduciary out. As with
the structure of the No-Shop Clause and Superior-Proposal
Out, the provision first broadly prohibited the Board from
taking any action or agreeing to take any action to (i) change
its recommendation in favor of the Merger, (ii) recommend
any Acquisition Proposal, (iii) cause or permit Columbia
to enter into any letter of intent, agreement in principle,
acquisition agreement, or merger agreement regarding any
Acquisition Proposal, other than a confidentiality agreement
as contemplated by the Superior-Proposal Out, or (iv) take
any action to exempt an Acquisition Proposal from any
takeover statute. JX 1025 § 4.02(c). The Merger Agreement
then provided that if Columbia received a Superior Proposal
and the Board determined that its fiduciary duties required
it, then the Board could change its recommendation or, if
it wished, terminate the Merger Agreement for purposes
of entering into an agreement with respect to Superior
Proposal. Before taking either step, Columbia had to give
TransCanada notice that the Board intended to take that
action, and TransCanada then would have four business days
to match the Superior Proposal. The matching right was
unlimited, and any new or revised Superior Proposal triggered
an additional matching period of four business days. The
pertinent provisions stated:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary set forth in [the
no-change-of-recommendation provision], prior to the time
[that stockholder approval of the Merger] is obtained and
so long as the Company is in compliance with [No-Shop
Clause]:
(i) the board of directors of the Company may
(A) effect a Change of Recommendation in response to
a Superior Proposal that is not otherwise withdrawn at
the time of the Change of Recommendation or
(B) cause the Company to terminate this Agreement
for the purpose of entering into a definitive agreement
with respect to a Superior Proposal that is not otherwise
withdrawn at the time of such termination (provided
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that the Company shall have paid the Termination
Payment prior to or concurrently with such termination),
which definitive agreement the Company shall enter
into concurrently with or immediately following such
termination,
in either case, if and only if the board of directors of the
Company determines in good faith (after consultation
with its financial advisor and outside legal counsel) that
the failure to take any such action would be inconsistent
with the directors' fiduciary duties under applicable Law;
provided, however, that the board of directors of the
Company may not take any such action unless
*40  (1) the Company first provides written notice to
Parent (a “Superior Proposal Notice”) advising Parent
that the board of directors of the Company intends
to either effect a Change of Recommendation or
terminate this Agreement pursuant to Section 7.01(c)
(i), which notice shall specify the reasons therefor
and include the material terms and conditions of the
applicable Superior Proposal and attach a copy of the
most current draft of any written agreement relating
thereto,
(2) during the four (4) Business Day period following
receipt by Parent of the Superior Proposal Notice
(the “Superior Proposal Negotiation Period”) (it being
understood that the first Business Day following
the day on which a Superior Proposal Notice is
received shall be the first day of the Superior Proposal
Negotiation Period), the Company negotiates in good
faith with Parent and its Representatives, to the extent
requested by Parent, with respect to any revisions to
the terms of the transactions contemplated by this
Agreement proposed by Parent; provided, however,
that if during any Superior Proposal Negotiation
Period there shall occur any subsequent amendment to
any material term of the applicable Superior Proposal,
the Company shall provide a new Superior Proposal
Notice and a new Superior Proposal Negotiation
Period shall commence (provided that, with respect to
any Superior Proposal, each new Superior Proposal
Negotiation Period that commences shall be for a
period of four (4) days, except that in no event
shall any new Superior Proposal Negotiation Period
shorten the four (4) Business Day duration of the first
Superior Proposal Negotiation Period) and
(3) at or after 5:00 p.m., New York City time, on
the last day of the Superior Proposal Negotiation
Period, the board of directors of the Company (after
consultation with its financial advisor and outside
legal counsel) determines that the Superior Proposal
would continue to be a Superior Proposal, taking into
account any changes to the terms of this Agreement
theretofore agreed to by Parent in writing ....
Id. § 4.02(d)(i) (formatting altered). A separate fiduciary
out permitted the Board to change its recommendation in
response to an “Intervening Event,” defined as “an event,
fact, occurrence, development or circumstance that was not
known to” the Board “as of the date of this Agreement
(or if known, the consequences of which were not known
to the board of directors of the Company as of the date
of this Agreement) ....” Id. § 4.02(d)(ii). Unlike with a
Superior Proposal, the Board could not terminate the Merger
Agreement in response to an Intervening Event.
If the Board terminated the Merger Agreement in response
to a Superior Proposal or if Columbia's stockholders failed
to approve the Merger, then Columbia was required to
(i) pay TransCanada a $309 million termination fee and
(ii) reimburse TransCanada for “authorization, preparation,
negotiation, execution and performance” expenses not to
exceed $40 million. Id. § 7.02(c). Those amounts represented
3.42% of the total equity value of the Merger, which was
$10.2 billion. TransCanada believed that a Superior Proposal
would “effectively require total consideration greater than
$26.27 per share” because the termination fee was equivalent
to 77 cents per share, or roughly 3% of $25.50. JX 1093 at 6.
The $40 million expense reimbursement would increase the
per-share figure by another 10 cents.
Although these provisions created obstacles for competing
bidders, they did not undermine the sale process for appraisal
purposes. Commentators have perceived that under the
Delaware Supreme Court's recent appraisal decisions, a sale
process will function as a reliable indicator of fair value if
it would pass muster if reviewed under enhanced scrutiny in
a breach of fiduciary duty case.38 The combination of deal
protection measures would not have supported a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty.39
*41  The facts of Aruba involved a similar suite of deal
protections. The merger agreement in that case “prohibited
Aruba from soliciting competing offers and required the
Aruba Board to continue to support the merger, subject to a
- 244 -
In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 29
fiduciary out and an out for an unsolicited superior proposal”
and included a termination fee equal to 3% of the merger's
equity value. Aruba Trial, 2018 WL 922139, at *21, *38.
The matching rights were similar too: HP had “an unlimited
match right, with five days to match the first superior proposal
and two days to match any subsequent increase, and during
the match period Aruba had to negotiate exclusively and in
good faith with HP.” Id. at *38 (footnote omitted). Viewing
the deal protections holistically, the Delaware Supreme Court
found that potential buyers had an open chance to bid, which
supported the high court's use of a deal-price-less-synergies
metric to establish fair value. See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136.
The outcome in Aruba comports with guidance from a
frequently cited treatise, which identifies “critical aspects” of
a merger agreement that does not “preclude or impermissibly
impede a post-signing market check.” Kling & Nugent, supra,
§ 4.04[6][b], at 4-89 to -90.
First, the economics of the executed agreement must be
such that it does not unduly impede the ability of third
parties to make competing bids. Types of arrangements
that might raise questions in this regard include asset lock-
ups, stock lock-ups, no-shops, force-the-vote provisions,
and termination fees. The operative word is “unduly;” the
impact will vary depending upon the actual type of device
involved and its specific terms.
* * *
Second, the target should be permitted to disclose
confidential information to any third party who has on
its own (i.e., not been solicited) “shown up” in the sense
that it has submitted a proposal or, at a minimum, an
indication of interest which is, or which the target believes
is, reasonably likely to lead to (and who is capable of
consummating) a higher competing bid. In this regard,
the target should also be able to negotiate with such third
parties. This removes any informational advantage that the
initial (anointed) purchaser may have.
* * *
Finally, the target board of directors should have
the contractual right, without violating the acquisition
agreement, to withdraw or modify its recommendation to
shareholders with respect to the transaction provided for in
the executed acquisition agreement.
Id. at 4-90 to -94.1 (footnotes omitted). Using this framework,
the deal protections did not preclude or impermissibly
impede a post-signing market check. Columbia waived the
standstills with Dominion, NextEra, and Berkshire before
signing the Merger Agreement, so those provisions did not
operate as a constraint during the post-signing period. Any
party could obtain due diligence simply by submitting a
bona fide written Acquisition Proposal and entering into the
required confidentiality agreement; the initial Acquisition
Proposal did not itself have to be a Superior Proposal. If
the competing bidder then made an Acquisition Proposal that
either constituted or could reasonably be expected to result
in a Superior Proposal, and if the Board determined that its
fiduciary duties required it, then the Board could negotiate
with the competing bidder. And if the competing bidder
made a Superior Proposal that TransCanada was unable or
unwilling to match, then the Board could withdraw or modify
its recommendation in support of the Merger Agreement.
Going beyond what the treatise describes, Columbia could
take the additional step of terminating the Merger Agreement
and entering into an agreement regarding the Superior
Proposal, subject only to paying a termination fee and expense
reimbursement equal to 3.42% of the Merger's equity value.
The petitioners try to bolster their argument about the
deal protections by contending that the Proxy distorted the
informational content of the post-signing phase by creating
the false impression that Parties B, C, and D were never
subject to standstills, which they say a competing bidder
would take into account when deciding whether to intervene.
Under this view, if those parties and TransCanada had
been conducting due diligence in November 2015, and
if only TransCanada renewed its interest later on, then
a party considering a competing bid might reasonably
believe that TransCanada was paying top dollar because
only TransCanada had decided to proceed. Under those
circumstances, a potential competing bidder might view
Columbia as fully vetted and decline to bid because of the
winner's curse.40 But a potential topping bidder might be
more likely to take the risk of competing with TransCanada if
it perceived that TransCanada had been able to move forward
while standstills blocked its competitors. In that case, the
competing bidder might think there was value that had not yet
been priced.
*42  This argument presents a variation of the winner's-
curse theory that the Delaware Supreme Court rejected in
Dell. There, the trial court found that Mr. Dell's participation
gave the buyout group advantages that competing bidders
would struggle to overcome and which therefore would
deter bidding. See Dell Trial, 2016 WL 3186538, at *36,
*42–44. The Delaware Supreme Court explained that “the
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likelihood of a winner's curse can be mitigated through a due
diligence process where buyers have access to all necessary
information.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 32. The high court also cited
the trial court's observation that strategic buyers “are less
subject to the winner's curse because they typically possess
industry-specific expertise and have asset-specific valuations
that incorporate synergies.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized
the absence of evidence that another party was interested,
explaining that “[f]air value entails at minimum a price some
buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which no class of
buyers in the market would pay.” Id. at 29.
Similarly in this case, any competing bidder could gain
access to due diligence by submitting a bona fide written
Acquisition Proposal and entering into a confidential
agreement. Moreover, all of the likely bidders were strategic
buyers. Most importantly, the petitioners have not shown
that anyone would have made a topping bid. Columbia's
sale process involved most of the parties that its bankers
thought would be interested, including Berkshire, Dominion,
and NextEra. See JX 499. Each knew that it was subject to
a standstill, and each would have believed that others were
similarly bound. None wanted to buy Columbia at anything
near TransCanada's price. Spectra was never bound by a
standstill, yet did not bid. There is no persuasive evidence that
any other party wanted to bid. The evidence instead shows
that no one wanted to bid. As in Dell, the most plausible
explanation is that “a topping bid involved a serious risk of
overpayment.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33. That in turn suggests that
the deal price was “already at a level that is fair.” Id.
The petitioners failed to show that the Proxy distorted bidder
behavior during the post-signing phase. More broadly, the
petitioners failed to prove that the deal protection measures
undermined the validity of the deal price. The better view of
the evidence is that if a bidder had been serious, then it would
have come forward.
h. The Sale Process Was Reliable.
TransCanada proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
the sale process made the deal price a persuasive indicator of
fair value. The sale process was not perfect, and the petitioners
highlighted its flaws, but the facts of this case, when viewed
as a whole, compare favorably or are on par with the facts in
DFC, Dell, and Aruba.
In reaching this conclusion, I recognize the existence of other
decisions that have sought to apply the teachings of DFC
and Dell, and which have declined to rely on the deal price
as an indicator of fair value.41 The petitioners have cited
similarities between aspects of the sale processes in those
cases and aspects of the sale process in this case, arguing that
the deal price here was unreliable.
In this decision, I have attempted to adhere to the principles
expressed in DFC, Dell, and Aruba and to take into account
how those decisions applied those principles to the facts.
Those factual applications have important implications for the
outcome here.
I also continue to regard it as important that the Delaware
Supreme Court's decisions in Dell and DFC reversed trial
court decisions for failing to give adequate weight to the deal
price. In each case, the Delaware Supreme Court regarded the
sale process as sufficiently good that the deal price deserved
“heavy, if not dispositive, weight.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 23; see
DFC, 172 A.3d at 349, 351. The decisions did not address
when a sale process would be sufficiently bad that a trial
court could give the deal price no weight. The decisions
also did not address when a sale process that was not as
good would still be good enough for a trial court to give the
deal price weight. Technically, the holdings did not delineate
when a sale process was sufficiently good that the trial court
should give it heavy if not dispositive weight. The Delaware
Supreme Court could have believed the sale processes in
DFC and Dell warranted that level of consideration without
excluding the possibility that a not-as-good sale process could
deserve the same treatment. I thus do not believe that the
Delaware Supreme Court's favorable comments regarding
the sale processes in Dell and DFC establish minimum
requirements for other sale processes to meet before the deal
price can be considered as a persuasive indicator of fair value.
*43  The Aruba decision points in the same direction. There,
the trial court found the sale process to be sufficiently reliable
to use the deal price as a valuation indicator, but declined to
give it weight. The Delaware Supreme Court accepted that the
sale process was sufficiently reliable and used the deal price
as the exclusive basis for its own fair value determination.
As with Dell and DFC, the Aruba decision did not have to
address when a sale process was sufficiently bad that a trial
court could decline to rely on the deal price.
The sale process in this case had aspects that compare
favorably with the processes in DFC, Dell, and Aruba. It also
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had aspects that differed from the processes in those cases. On
balance, TransCanada proved that the deal price is a reliable
indicator of fair value.
3. The Synergies Deduction
“[I]t is widely assumed that the sale price in many M&A
deals includes a portion of the buyer's expected synergy gains,
which is part of the premium the winning buyer must pay to
prevail and obtain control.” DFC, 172 A.3d at 371. “In an
arm's-length, synergistic transaction, the deal price generally
will exceed fair value because target fiduciaries bargain
for a premium that includes ... a share of the anticipated
synergies ....” Olson v. ev3, Inc., 2011 WL 704409, at *10
(Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2011). “[S]ection 262(h) requires that the
Court of Chancery discern the going concern value of the
company irrespective of the synergies involved in a merger.”
M.P.M. Enters., 731 A.2d at 797. To derive an estimate of
fair value, the court must exclude “any synergies or other
value expected from the merger giving rise to the appraisal
proceeding itself ....” Golden Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 507.
“Of course, estimating synergies and allocating a reasonable
portion to the seller certainly involves imprecision, but no
more than other valuation methods, like a DCF analysis ....”
Aruba, 210 A.3d at 141.
TransCanada announced a total of $250 million in target
annual synergies, with $150 million attributable to cost
and revenue synergies and $100 attributable to financing
synergies. PTO ¶¶ 555, 632, 642; see Marchand Tr. 489–
490. The financing synergies resulted predominantly from
TransCanada generating funds at its lower cost of capital,
then channeling them through offshore financing structures to
generate tax advantages. Marchand Tr. 490.
The petitioners have questioned the financing synergies
because they were not labeled “synergies.” In a board
presentation, TransCanada labeled the cost and revenue
saving as “synergies” and the financing benefits as
“offshore.”42 The label is not dispositive. See Marchand Tr.
518. The Merger created value if it enabled TransCanada
to finance Columbia's business plan using its lower cost
of capital. To the extent that value is included in the
transaction price, it is value arising from the accomplishment
or expectation of the Merger that must be deducted under
Section 262(h).
TransCanada asked its valuation expert, Mark Zmijewski,
to value the synergies. Using a standard DCF methodology,
Zmijewski calculated the net present value of the synergies
at $4.64 per share. JX 1351 Ex. VI-3. Zmijewski did not use
a DCF analysis to value Columbia, and he disagreed with
many aspects of the DCF analysis prepared by the petitioners'
expert, so there is some irony in Zmijewski using it here.
In Highfields, this court declined to use a synergies estimate
that the respondent's expert prepared using a DCF analysis,
in part because the respondent's expert had not used a DCF
methodology when rendering his other valuation opinions.
See Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34,
60–61 (Del. Ch. 2007).
*44  The real question is the extent to which the deal
price included synergies. TransCanada's CFO testified that
the deal price included 100% of the estimated synergies.
See Marchand Tr. 490–91. Zmijewski tried to support
this testimony by analyzing the reaction of TransCanada's
stock to the announcement of the Merger. He found that
TransCanada's share price dropped, which was consistent
with the view that the Merger was a “bad deal for ...
TransCanada” and a “good deal for Columbia.” Zmijewski
Tr. 1447–48. Zmijewski's analysis operated at the level of the
overall deal price; it did not address the more detailed level
of the synergy deduction. See JX 1350 ¶¶ 63–65.
The contemporaneous evidence does not indicate that
TransCanada allocated synergies to Columbia, much less all
of the synergies. TransCanada relies on a presentation to
its board that references the full value of both the cost and
financing synergies and claims it shows that the synergies
were fully allocated to Columbia. See JX 935 at 12. The page
where these figures appear calculates transaction multiples
by taking enterprise values for Columbia that were implied
by various prices per share, then dividing those multiples by
EBITDA metrics, some of which add synergy figures. See id.
This table does not indicate that the synergies were allocated
to Columbia, and the “football field” page in the presentation
places the deal price comfortably within TransCanada's DCF
valuation of Columbia without synergies. See id. at 6.
TransCanada also observes that after Columbia rejected its
offer of $25.25 per share, Poirier suggested attempting to
identify additional synergies that could justify increasing the
offer. See JX 911 at 1, 4. TransCanada says that if it had not
already priced the synergies into its offer, then there would
have been no need to search for additional synergies. But the
email exchange shows a range of views among TransCanada
executives about the amount that TransCanada should be
willing to pay. The email does not suggest that TransCanada
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had topped out its bid with all of the synergies going to
Columbia.
Other internal TransCanada documents focus only on cost
synergy estimates of $150 million per year. See JX 878 at 48;
JX 886 at 28. One informative package of materials for the
TransCanada board of directors values Columbia at $26.51
per share using a DCF methodology, then values the cost
synergies at $1.93 per Columbia share, with a sensitivity
range of $1.89 to $2.61 per share. See JX 1008 at 54; accord
JX 1018 at 1, 24, 26. The deal price of $25.50 per share falls
comfortably within TransCanada's valuation ranges without
any allocation of synergies. See JX 1008 at 50; JX 1018
at 22; JX 1365 ¶¶ 91–92. It also appears, as TransCanada
argues, that there were many sources for merger-related value
creation that justified paying a premium over Columbia's
trading price, and the cost, revenue, and financing synergies
were simply the easiest to quantify. See, e.g., JX 1027
(synergy overview). But the fact that TransCanada perceived
synergies does not mean that the deal price included them.43
*45  Given this evidence, I am not able to credit
TransCanada's position that Columbia received 100% of
synergies worth $4.64 per share. TransCanada bore the
burden of proving a downward adjustment for synergies.
TransCanada did not meet its burden of proof. TransCanada
likely could have justified a smaller synergy deduction, but
it claimed a larger and unpersuasive one. This decision
therefore declines to make any downward adjustment to the
deal price.
4. Change In Value Between Signing And Closing
Because the valuation date in an appraisal is the date on which
the merger closes, fair value must be determined based on
the “operative reality” at the effective time. See Technicolor
IV, 684 A.2d at 298. The deal price provides an indication of
the value of the company on the date of signing. It does not
necessarily provide an indication of the value of the company
on the date of closing. In this case, over three months passed
between the signing of the Merger Agreement on March 17,
2016, and the closing of the Merger on July 1, 2016. The
petitioners contend that Columbia's value increased during
this period. As the party arguing for an upward adjustment to
the deal price, the petitioners bore the burden of proof on this
issue.
By treating the petitioners as having argued that Columbia's
value increased between signing and closing, this decision is
giving the petitioners the benefit of the doubt on an argument
they did not explicitly make. The petitioners argued that
if the court adopted Columbia's unaffected trading price as
an indicator of fair value, then it should make an upwards
adjustment because Columbia's value would have increased
by the time of closing. The petitioners did not make the same
argument about the deal price, but the same logic applies.
Using either the unaffected trading price or the deal price
results in a temporal gap between the valuation indicator and
the closing date. In this case, the date for the unaffected
trading price was March 9, 2016. The parties signed the
Merger Agreement on March 17. The deal closed on July 1.
The length of the intervening periods differs by only eight
days.
The problem with giving the petitioners the benefit of the
doubt on this argument is that they did not suggest a means of
adjusting the deal price to reflect the increases in value that
resulted from the factors they cite. Perhaps an expert could
have constructed a metric, but the petitioners in this case did
not provide one. For purposes of adjusting the deal price, the
petitioners failed to satisfy their burden of proof.
The petitioners' arguments for an upward adjustment are
also unpersuasive in their own right. They contend that
Columbia's value increased because the market for CPPL's
equity recovered and because commodity prices improved.
The petitioners did not provide persuasive evidence on either
point.
a. An Improved Market For CPPL Equity
In their first argument for an upward adjustment, the
petitioners contend that Columbia's value increased between
signing and closing because the market for CPPL's peers
recovered. They proposed using changes in indices of peer
companies to translate those developments into an increased
trading price for CPPL. They also cite circumstantial evidence
that CPPL's trading price was rising in late February and early
March 2016, possibly suggesting an upward trend that would
have continued if Columbia had not announced the Merger.
See Dkt. 390 Ex. D.
The petitioners' theory builds on the fact that after the spinoff,
CPPL's trading price declined as part of broader investor
dissatisfaction with MLPs. Columbia recognized that it could
not use CPPL to raise the growth capital needed for its
business plan, so it explored less attractive alternatives like a
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parent-level equity raise. The petitioners argue that if CPPL's
trading price had recovered, then Columbia could have used
CPPL to fund its business plan.
*46  As their primary evidence of a price change, the
petitioners cite the Alerian MLP Index and the Alerian
Natural Gas MLP Index (the “Gas Index”), both of which
improved by approximately 17% between signing and
closing.44 CPPL's price did not improve during the same
period; it fell. The petitioners address this difficulty by
pointing to two analyst reports and to internal emails from
a petitioner fund, which suggest that CPPL's trading price
dropped after the announcement of the Merger because
market participants feared that TransCanada would not
transfer assets to CPPL to the same degree as Columbia would
have on a standalone basis. See JX 1069 at 8; JX 1056; JX
1061.
There are several problems with the petitioners' reliance on
the indices. The broader Alerian MLP Index is a poor proxy
for CPPL. It consists of firms that transport or store energy
commodities generally, and it tends to tracks the price of
crude oil. See Jeffers Tr. 743–44; Jeffers Dep. 75; see also
JX 740 at 9–10. The Gas Index provides a better proxy,
but the petitioners' industry expert testified that the higher
prices and lower yields associated with that index resulted
from the announcement of the Merger, which restored the
market's faith in natural gas MLPs. See Goodof Tr. 151. To the
extent his testimony accurately captured the reasons for the
change, then any increase in value implied by the Gas Index
would have resulted from the accomplishment or expectation
of the Merger and would need to be excluded under Section
262(h). In actuality, TransCanada demonstrated that the lower
yields resulted from changes in the composition of the Gas
Index. See JX 1470; Goodof Tr. 152–54. TransCanada also
demonstrated that the lower yields did not reach the level that
Columbia needed to use CPPL to fund its business plan. See
Adamson Tr. 1338–39. The change in the Gas Index does not
persuasively support an increase in Columbia's value.
More broadly, Columbia's inability to raise growth capital
through CPPL reflected investors' wider concerns about
MLPs. Because of developments in the broader MLP
industry, this model of raising capital was fundamentally
broken. See JX 547; JX 1345 at 72–76. It was particularly
broken at Columbia, which faced additional difficulties in
raising capital because of its high debt load. See Adamson
Tr. 1332–37. A three-month uptick in the two Alerian indices
does not prove that Columbia fixed its model and does not
support an increase in Columbia's value.
b. An Improved Market For Commodities
In their second argument, the petitioners cite changes in
commodity prices. They point out that after the spinoff,
Columbia's trading price dropped as energy stocks fell out of
favor because of a decline in commodity prices. They argue
that as commodity prices recovered, energy stocks recovered.
They point out that between signing and closing, the prices of
natural gas and natural gas futures increased by 58.79% and
55.15%, respectively. See PTO ¶¶ 685, 690.
One difficulty with this argument is that Columbia's stock
price did not recover with commodity prices. It remained
stagnant until the Merger leaked on March 9, 2016. See
Dkt. 390 Ex. A. The bigger difficulty with this argument is
something everyone agrees on: Columbia's value does not
depend on commodity prices, except at the extremes when
ultra-low commodity prices could affect the creditworthiness
of Columbia's counterparties. See PTO ¶¶ 293–94. The
petitioners correctly point out that the declining stock market
hurt Columbia in fall 2015, and they say that the mirror-
image trend should benefit Columbia on the upside. But in fall
2015, the declining market hurt Columbia because it could
not use CPPL to raise equity capital. Columbia then faced the
prospect of raising equity capital by issuing its own shares
in a declining market, which would dilute Columbia's value
and threaten a downward spiral. The problems that Columbia
faced from a declining market did not reflect operational
problems. They reflected constrained financing alternatives.
The commodity-price story does not support an increase in
Columbia's value.
5. The Conclusion Regarding The Deal Price
*47  TransCanada proved that the deal price is a reliable
indicator of fair value. TransCanada failed to prove that
the consideration provided in the Merger included synergies
of $4.64 per share. The petitioners failed to prove that
Columbia's value increased between signing and closing,
and they failed to prove how any change in value could be
translated into an adjustment to the deal price. The market-
tested indicator for the fair value of Columbia is therefore
$25.50 per share.
B. The Unaffected Trading Price
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TransCanada contends that the unaffected trading price of
Columbia's stock is a strong indicator of Columbia's fair
value. The petitioners contend that the court should not give
any weight to Columbia's trading price. As the proponent
of this valuation metric, TransCanada bore the burden of
demonstrating its reliability.
Both sides retained experts who rendered opinions on the
persuasiveness of the unaffected trading price as an indicator
of fair value. TransCanada relied on Zmijewski, who is an
emeritus professor of finance at the University of Chicago
and a consultant at Charles River Associates. The petitioners
relied on Eric Talley, a professor of law at Columbia
University and co-director of the Millstein Center for Global
Markets and Corporate Ownership.
The parties debated many issues relating to the unaffected
trading price, including (i) whether the trading price could
provide insight into fundamental value, (ii) whether the
trading price contained an implicit minority discount, (iii)
whether investors lacked access to or the trading price
otherwise failed to incorporate material information about
Columbia's value, and (iv) whether investor sentiment about
broader trends in the energy markets artificially depressed
Columbia's trading price. This decision could devote many
pages to parsing through the competing expert testimony, the
parties' evidentiary showings, and their legal arguments.
Ultimately, however, Delaware precedent demonstrates that
a reliable trading price is not a prerequisite to a reliable
determination of fair value based on a deal-price-less-
synergies metric. Consequently, assuming TransCanada
failed to prove that the trading price was a reliable indicator
of fair value, that ruling would not undermine this court's
ability to rely on the deal price. Indeed, even if the petitioners
proved affirmatively that the trading price was an unreliable
indicator of fair value, that finding would not undermine
this court's ability to rely on the deal price. On the facts
of this case, the deal-price-less-synergies metric is the most
reliable approach, making the analysis of the trading price
comparatively unimportant.
The Delaware cases that have developed the deal-price-less-
synergies metric demonstrate that a reliable trading price is
not a prerequisite to a reliable deal-price-based determination
of fair value. The Union Illinois decision was the first
time a Delaware court deployed the deal-price-less-synergies
metric,45 and that decision used it as the exclusive basis for
valuing a privately held company. See Union Illinois, 847
A.2d at 343 (“UFG was not a public company and therefore its
shares were not listed for trading on a stock exchange.”). The
foundational decision for the deal-price-less-synergies metric
thus deployed it in the absence of any trading price, much
less a reliable trading price. See id. at 357, 364 (awarding “the
value of the Merger Price net of synergies” after finding that
the deal price was “the most reliable evidence of fair value”
and “giving 100% weight to that factor”).
*48  Three years after Union Illinois, the Highfields decision
was next to deploy the deal-price-less-synergies metric, and
the first to use it for a widely held, publicly traded firm. See
Highfields, 939 A.2d at 61 (giving 75% weight to deal-price-
less-synergies metric). The court regarded the trading price as
an unreliable indicator of fair value, because the “stock price
included an element of value reflecting merger speculation
leading up to [the merger's] announcement.” Id. at 58. Even
so, the court had no difficulty finding that after deducting
synergies, the deal price was a reliable indicator where it
“resulted from an arm's-length bargaining process where no
structural impediments existed that might prevent a topping
bid.” Id. at 59. The Highfields decision shows that the deal-
price-less-synergies metric does not require a reliable trading
price.
After Highfields, the deal-price metric lay dormant for six
years before returning to prominence in a string of five
decisions issued between 2013 and 2015.46 Each of those
decisions determined fair value based solely on the deal price,
and in finding that the deal price was reliable, each decision
focused predominantly on whether the merger resulted from
a “proper transactional process.”47 The decisions did not
view the reliability of the deal price as turning on the
reliability of the trading price. Only one of the decisions
considered the reliability of the trading price. In AutoInfo,
the petitioners argued that the company “was thinly traded
and lacked financial analyst coverage[,]” which led to “the
market underpric[ing] the company because it was ignorant of
its potential.” AutoInfo, 2015 WL 2069417, at *12. The court
rejected this argument as a basis for undermining the deal
price as an indicator of fair value, explaining that “the Merger
price does not reflect the value that a potentially uniformed
market attributed to AutoInfo.” Id. The court noted that the
deal price generated a premium of 22% over the unaffected
trading price and concluded that “[w]hile the market may
have been uninformed about AutoInfo before the sale process,
it subsequently gained ample information” by virtue of the
sale process. Id. The reliability of the sale process rendered
irrelevant the potential unreliability of the trading price.
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The decisions that followed Highfields and preceded the
Delaware Supreme Court's decision in DFC thus illustrate a
general rule that trading-price reliability is not a prerequisite
for deal-price reliability. DFC does not suggest a contrary
rule. The DFC decision cited with approval both Union
Illinois, where the trial court used the deal price for a privately
held company, and multiple post-Highfields rulings that had
relied on the deal price without regard to the trading price or
despite evidence that it was unreliable. See DFC, 172 A.3d
at 363 n.84.
*49  Dell also does not suggest a contrary rule. The Delaware
Supreme Court found that both the trading price and the deal
price were reliable indicators of value. See Dell, 177 A.3d at
5-7, 24-27, 35. The high court did not hold that its finding as
to the latter depended on the former. Instead, the Dell decision
regarded the trial court's treatment of the trading price and the
deal price as independent sources of error.
The Delaware Supreme Court's most recent appraisal decision
cuts the same way. In Aruba, the Delaware Supreme Court
held that the trial court erred by relying on the unaffected
trading price. The high court indicated that the trading price
was unreliable partly because the market had not received
information about Aruba's strong earnings. See Aruba, 210
A.3d at 138–39. At the same time, the decision accepted
the trial court's finding that the deal price was a reliable
valuation indicator. See id. at 141–42. The Delaware Supreme
Court pointed to HP's “access to nonpublic information
to supplement its consideration of the public information
available to stock market buyers,” including that it “knew
about Aruba's strong quarterly earnings before the market did,
and likely took that information into account when pricing the
deal.” Id. at 139. The reliability of the deal price thus operated
independently of the trading price. Like DFC, the Aruba
decision cited Union Illinois and Highfields with approval.
See id. at 135 n.41.
Based on these authorities, this decision does not have to
make a finding regarding the reliability of the trading price as
a condition to relying on the deal price. It remains conceivable
that there could be a case where the parties anchored deal
negotiations off the trading price, but this is not that case. All
of the bidders, including TransCanada, submitted expressions
of interest based on their views of Columbia's value. Although
the various parties at times referred to market premiums when
discussing bids or potential bids, the bids were not priced
at a premium over the trading price. TransCanada's chief
concern about the trading price was that Columbia might
demand a big premium, creating a risk of overpayment. See,
e.g., JX 594 (Poirier remarking that “[if] the stock trades up,
[Columbia's] pricing expectations will increase accordingly,
and this transaction will be challenging for us.”).
As in Aruba, TransCanada submitted its formal bids
after conducting extensive due diligence and receiving
considerable non-public information, including (i) long-term
management projections and (ii) the precedent agreements
that secured Columbia's growth projects. TransCanada and
Columbia then went back and forth over price based on
the confidential information that Columbia possessed and
TransCanada had obtained. These efforts “improved the
parties' ability to estimate” Columbia's “going-concern value
over that of the market as a whole.” Aruba, 210 A.3d at 139.
To reiterate, if the petitioners proved that the trading price
in this case was an unreliable indicator of fair value, then it
would not undermine the reliability of the deal price given
the manner in which Columbia proceeded. This decision
therefore has not parsed the parties' many arguments about the
trading price. I have considered that form of market evidence,
and having done so, I regard the deal price as a more reliable
indicator of value. Relying on the trading price would only
inject error into the fair value determination.
C. The Discounted Cash Flow Method
*50  The petitioners contend that the court should determine
Columbia's fair value using a DCF analysis prepared by
their expert, William Jeffers. He valued Columbia at $32.47
per share. TransCanada did not submit its own DCF
analysis. Instead, Zmijewski critiqued Jeffers's model. As
the proponent of valuing Columbia based on the work of
their expert, the petitioners bore the burden of proving the
reliability of his valuation.
The DCF method is a technique that is generally accepted in
the financial community. “While the particular assumptions
underlying its application may always be challenged in
any particular case, the validity of [the DCF] technique
qua valuation methodology is no longer open to question.”
Campbell-Taggart, 1989 WL 17438, at *8 n.11. It is a
“standard” method that “gives life to the finance principle that
firms should be valued based on the expected value of their
future cash flows, discounted to present value in a manner that
accounts for risk.” Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005
WL 2045640, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005).
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The DCF model entails three basic components: an
estimation of net cash flows that the firm will generate and
when, over some period; a terminal or residual value equal
to the future value, as of the end of the projection period,
of the firm's cash flows beyond the projection period; and
finally a cost of capital with which to discount to a present
value both the projected net cash flows and the estimated
terminal or residual value.
In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del.
Ch. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Dell and DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court cautioned
against using the DCF methodology when market-based
indicators are available. In Dell, the high court explained
that “[a]lthough widely considered the best tool for valuing
companies when there is no credible market information and
no market check, DCF valuations involve many inputs—
all subject to disagreement by well-compensated and highly
credentialed experts—and even slight differences in these
inputs can produce large valuation gaps.” Dell, 177 A.3d at
37–38. The high court warned that when market evidence
is available, “the Court of Chancery should be chary about
imposing the hazards that always come when a law-trained
judge is forced to make a point estimate of fair value based on
widely divergent partisan expert testimony.” Id. at 35. Making
the same point conversely in DFC, the Delaware Supreme
Court advised that a DCF model should be used in appraisal
proceedings “when the respondent company was not public
or was not sold in an open market check ....” DFC, 172 A.3d
at 369 n.118. The high court commented that “a singular
discounted cash flow model is often most helpful when there
isn't an observable market price.” Id. at 370.
This case is not one where a DCF valuation is likely to
provide a reliable indication of fair value. Columbia was
publicly traded, widely held, and sold in a process that began
with pre-signing outreach and finished with an open, albeit
passive, post-signing market check. Jeffers's valuation of
$32.47 per share stands in contrast with contemporaneous
market evidence.
• Jeffers's valuation is 27% higher than the deal price of
$25.50 per share.
• Jeffers's valuation is 64% higher than the unaffected
trading price of $19.75 per share.48
• Jeffers's opinion that the value of Columbia materially
exceeded the deal price conflicts with the market
behavior of other potential strategic acquirers who had
shown interest in Columbia, and who did not step
forward to top TransCanada's price.
*51  Dell and DFC teach that a trial court should have
greater confidence in market indicators and less confidence in
a divergent expert determination. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 35–
38; DFC, 172 A.3d at 369–70 & n.118.
Consistent with the Delaware Supreme Court's observations
in Dell and DFC, Jeffers's DCF valuation had many inputs,
and Zmijewski questioned a number of them. The proper
choices were matters of legitimate debate, and the outcome of
those debates generated large swings in the valuation output.
For Columbia, the swings were particularly large because
management's business plan (the “0&12 Plan”) forecasted
major capital expenditures between 2016 and 2021, resulting
in projected negative cash flow of nearly $4 billion during
that period. See Zmijewski Tr. 1457–58. As a result, all
of the positive value derived from the terminal period. In
Jeffers's calculation, the terminal value represented 125%
of his valuation of Columbia. Jeffers Tr. 783–85. Given
this fact, small changes in the assumptions and inputs that
generated the terminal value, such as the discount rate,
growth rate, or base-year free cash flow, had a much larger
effect on the valuation of Columbia than they would on a
typical valuation. See Zmijewski Tr. 1457–58. This court has
questioned the utility of a DCF in a case where the terminal
value represented 97% of the result, finding that “[t]his back-
loading highlights the very real risks” presented by using that
methodology and “undermin[ing] the reliability of applying
the DCF technique.”49
*52  For example, Jeffers used a beta derived from a five-
year regression of weekly returns. Based on his review of
the forward pricing curves for natural gas and crude oil,
Zmijewski argued that Jeffers should have used a shorter
period. Zmijewski also pointed out that Columbia's financial
advisors both used betas derived from two-year regressions
of weekly observations, and TransCanada's financial advisor
used a beta derived from a one-year regression of daily
observations. Using a two-year regression of weekly returns
would lower the output of the Jeffers DCF model to $18.10
per share. See Zmijewski Tr, 1463–67; JX 1368 ¶ 94.
In another example, Jeffers separately valued Columbia's
three sources of cash flow: its operating income, its
distributions from its limited partner interest in CPPL, and
its distributions from its general partner interest in CPPL.
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But Zmijewski pointed out that Jeffers treated all three as if
they were subject to identical risks, thereby underestimating
the cost of capital for the limited partner and general partner
interests. Correcting Jeffers's discount rates for these cash
flows would lower his valuation to a range of $18.96 to $19.23
per share. See Zmijewski Tr. 1458–60; JX 1368 ¶ 108.
A final example involves the terminal value calculation.
Jeffers used a perpetuity growth rate of 3%. The Proxy
indicates that Lazard's DCF analysis implied perpetuity
growth rates from 1.4% to 1.9%, and that Goldman's was 1%
to 2%. See JX 1136 at 65, 75. Reducing Jeffers's terminal
growth rate to 1.5% would lower his valuation to $17.28 per
share. See JX 1368 Ex. V-2.
The wide swings in output that result from legitimate debate
over reasonable inputs undermine the reliability of Jeffers's
DCF model. And the experts' debates went further, with
Zmijewski raising significant questions about the reliability
of the Jeffers model's core input (Columbia's management
projections). Although the preparation of the 0&12 Plan
started with a bottoms-up process, senior management added
a “growth wedge” or “initiative layer” to meet top-down
targets. Zmijewski Tr. 1454–56; see also JX 491. These add-
ons assumed significant returns on unidentified projects that
lacked customers or regulatory approval. See Adamson Tr.
1317–18; Skaggs Tr. 881–82; Mayo Dep. 273. This too raised
fundamental questions about the reliability of Jeffers's DCF
analysis as a whole.
If this were a case where a reliable market-based metric was
not available, then the court might have to call the balls and
strikes of the valuation inputs. In this case, the DCF technique
“is necessarily a second-best method to derive value.” Union
Illinois, 847 A.2d at 359. This decision therefore does not use
it. See Solera, 2018 WL 3625644, at *32.
III. CONCLUSION
The fair value of Columbia's common stock at the effective
date was $25.50 per share. The legal rate of interest,
compounded quarterly, shall accrue on the appraised value
from the effective date until the date of payment. The parties
shall cooperate on a form of final order. If there are additional
issues for the court to resolve before entering a final order,
then the parties shall submit a joint letter within fourteen days
that identifies them and proposes a path to conclude this case
at the trial level.
All Citations
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Footnotes
1 Citations in the form “PTO ¶ ––” refer to stipulated facts in the pre-trial order. Dkt. 397. Citations in the form “[Name] Tr.”
refer to witness testimony from the trial transcript. Citations in the form “[Name] Dep.” refer to witness testimony from a
deposition transcript. Citations in the form “JX ––– at ––” refer to a trial exhibit with the page designated by the last three
digits of the control or JX number or, if the document lacked a control or JX number, by the internal page number. If a
trial exhibit used paragraph numbers, then references are by paragraph.
2 The parties designated the transcripts as joint exhibits rather than lodging them separately. The JX designations made
it more difficult to determine during briefing when a deposition transcript was being cited and whose testimony it was.
It would be more helpful to have the deposition transcripts lodged and collected in a separate binder, then cited in the
form “[Name] Dep.” I offer this point not to criticize the parties' approach, which was a reasonable one, but rather as a
suggestion for the future.
3 See Tom Miesner, A Practical Guide to US Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Economics, 8 J. Pipeline Eng'g 111, 112
(2009); Matthew J. McCabe, Comment, Master Limited Partnerships' Cost of Capital Conundrum, 17 U. Pa. J. Bus. L.
319, 325 (2014).
4 JX 258 at 2; see JX 886 at 34 (“[Columbia's] ‘Drop Downs’ are atypical in that the transaction is effected through [CPPL]
acquiring incremental interests in OpCo .... [Columbia's] interest in OpCo is accordingly diluted down.”).
5 See id. at 46 (Lazard anticipating stock-price improvement of up to $12 per share; observing that NiSource traded “at a
premium valuation relative to its diversified utility peers, but at a discount to the blended consolidated multiple implied
by MLP valuations for [Columbia]”); see also JX 231 at 2 (consulting firm remarking in January 2015 that despite “40%
drop in gas price since 2014” and “pressure” on “[g]as basin economics,” that “original [spinoff] rationale holds: Utilities
and [Columbia] are separate businesses, the market is supportive of focused players, growth stories and risk profiles
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are different”). See generally Mir Dep. 55–73. As anticipated, separating NiSource, Columbia, and CPPL increased their
total market capitalization by approximately $4 billion. See JX 404 at 6.
6 See Mir Tr. 1197 (“[T]he business plan was dependent on being able to raise a lot of equity through the MLP, CPPL. The
MLPs at the time were the de facto means of raising equity for pipeline and midstream projects.”); JX 300 at 20 (Lazard
warning that Columbia's “[f]inancing plan [was] highly dependent on CPPL's ability to issue equity at attractive terms over
time”); JX 480 at 7 (Lazard identifying upside of “[s]trong access to capital and low cost of CPPL equity” and downside
of “CPPL unable to access equity market at attractive terms (potentially requiring [Columbia] to issue equity)”); JX 214
at 17 (CPPL IPO pitch materials indicating CPPL's equity would “be the primary source of new funding for Columbia
OpCo expansion capital projects”); JX 277 at 4 (analyst report identifying risks like “highly leveraged balance sheet,”
growth plan's execution risk, and “financing strategy which relies almost completely on [CPPL's] ability to access the
equity capital markets during the next several years”); see also Kittrell Tr. 1052 (“As part of the spin, we had been able
to launch [CPPL] in January of 2015 and raise just over a billion dollars. We also had done a series of debt financings
as of the spin for about $3 billion. So that gave Columbia $4 billion of permanent capital to kind of come out of the chute
with as a standalone independent company. That still left $3 to 4 billion of capital that we were going to need for '16,
'17, and '18.”); JX 96 at 12 (Lazard observing that the “most successful” MLPs had “low-risk assets and visible growth
opportunities, driven by either organic investments or dropdowns from a supportive general partner that is motivated to
grow IDR distributions [to itself]”).
7 JX 167; see Mir Tr. 1195–97. Pre-spinoff, the operative entity was Columbia Energy Group, but for simplicity this decision
uses “Columbia.”
8 See id. Compare JX 753 at 4 (Skaggs explaining in January 2016 that “for CPPL to be a viable equity currency,” prices
would have to improve to at least $21 per unit by 2017 and at least $27 per unit by 2018), with Dkt. 390 Ex. D (stipulated
CPPL price chart showing prices below $14 per unit in late 2015).
9 Id.; see id. (“[I]f there is a real or perceived expectation of reduced growth rates, all the more pressure is placed on
the value of CPG's currencies, thereby exacerbating the challenge.”); Mir Tr. 1198–1202 (discussing equity overhang
at Columbia and CPPL levels); JX 1351 ¶¶ 100–01 (respondent's expert opining that “disruption in the MLP market
and [Columbia's] equity overhang could have forced [Columbia] into issuing increasingly large numbers of shares to
raise equity as the market drove down the value of [Columbia] shares in expectation of repeated [Columbia] equity
issuances” (citing Jonathan Berk & Peter DeMarzo, Corporate Finance 888 (4th ed. 2017)).
10 Id. ¶ 425; see Skaggs Tr. 862–63; Cornelius Tr. 1133–34; see also JX 493.
11 Id. ¶¶ 442–49, 452–54. Goldman regarded Berkshire and TransCanada as the most likely buyers, followed by Dominion.
See, e.g., JX 499 (“We know D[ominion] is interested, but at a price.”). Poirier expected an auction. See JX 528. He
encouraged his colleagues to act quickly because Columbia had a “massive financing overhang” and was preparing to
“prefund[ ] [its] 2016/17 capex with a $1bn equity issuance.” Id.
12 See PTO ¶ 500; Smith Tr. 248; see also JX 646 (Goldman: “[TransCanada] indicated that they could be ~$28.00/share.”);
Poirier Dep. 148 (“The goal posts of 26 and 30 would translate to 24 and 28 post equity issuance.”).
13 See JX 736 at 11; id. (noting that Dominion (“capital, HSR”), Enbridge (“complex structure”), Energy Transfer Equity
(“overextended”), and Kinder Morgan (“out of the market”) were unlikely to be suitors for Columbia); Poirier Dep. 149–52.
14 See Smith Tr. 343 (“It was to negotiate with him, to basically say ... the market is in disarray. There are number of, you
know, big players that are dealing with issues. This is your opportunity, you know, to step up to the plate and make an
offer that will get the attention of the board.”); Poirier Dep. 150–51 (framing Smith's approach as “encouragement to
dedicate time and resources” by describing TransCanada's strong odds of success at the right price); Poirier Tr. 435 (“He
was simply trying to encourage us to be aggressive, that there was an opportunity for us to acquire this company.”).
15 Broadly speaking, precedent agreements address future customer needs and can help justify pipeline expansion to
regulators. E.g., Mayo Dep. 277 (“[Precedent agreements are] the agreements signed before the final contract.”).
Columbia's precedent agreements covered infrastructure construction and defined the quantities of natural gas to
transport, transportation path, and terms of service. PTO ¶ 280. A party with access to the precedent agreements could
discern whether a given Columbia customer “was an ExxonMobil” or “a single B grade producer” prone to default in a
downturn. See Marchand Tr. 526; see also JX 815 (TransCanada due diligence memo finding credit terms relatively
disappointing yet “normal for U.S. regulated natural gas pipeline projects”); JX 829 (analyst report stating that Columbia
“requires credit support for non-I grade customers equivalent to 12–24 months of demand charges”).
16 In internal emails exchanged on March 10, 2016, TransCanada's bankers discussed that “[t]he [Columbia] board is
freaking out and told the management team to get a deal done with ‘whatever it takes’ .. Oddly, the [Columbia] team
has relayed this info to [TransCanada].” JX 938. This exchange could suggest that there was a path for Columbia to
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extract additional merger consideration from TransCanada, but the petitioners have not briefed this document, and I take
no position on it.
17 See Ben Dummett et al., Keystone Pipeline Operator TransCanada in Takeover Talks, Wall St. J., March 10, 2016,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/keystone-pipeline-operator-transcanada-in-takeover-talks-1457627686 (“TransCanada ...
is in takeover talks with Columbia Pipeline Group Inc., a U.S. natural-gas pipeline operator with a market value of about
$9 billion. The companies could reach a deal in the coming weeks, according to people familiar with the matter.”).
18 JX 949. Goldman received calls too. See JX 951 at 3 (“One question [Skaggs] asked is shd [sic] we let [TransCanada]
know we are getting calls.”); see also JX 948 (Goldman banker indicating “[n]ot a lot of interest [from Columbia's
management] in engaging with Spectra. Would be all-stock deal, they don't love Spectra's assets.”).
19 See id. (Smith email to Goldman and management: “We need to think about what the protocol is if we get a letter.
Presumably, the Board would have to respond officially, we would have to notify [TransCanada] and we should think
about what our response is if they make it public after being rebuked.”); Skaggs Tr. 1021–22 (“Q. ... During this stage
when you were getting an inbound call from the CEO of Spectra, an inbound e-mail from the CEO of Spectra, a call from
the CFO of Spectra to Goldman Sachs, and a call from the chief development officer of Goldman Sachs, did you, Mr.
Skaggs, or another member of management, do anything to respond to Spectra? And since I'm going to anticipate what
you're going to say, other than tell Goldman to look at the script. A. That was it, sir. Q. So the answer's no. A. No.”).
20 See JX 1399 at 17 (“The Board ... acknowledged that proceeding with TransCanada on the expedited timetable would
mean that the Company would potentially be entering into the merger agreement without having the opportunity to
consider [the] formal proposal from Spectra” that Goldman expected to arrive “in the next few days.”).
21 See, e.g., JX 1016 at 78–79, 107; JX 1136 at 66, 74–77.
22 See PTO ¶ 625. The Board made a related determination that the renewed Exclusivity Agreement prohibited Columbia
from soliciting an offer from Spectra or anyone else. See id. That was inaccurate. The renewed Exclusivity Agreement
expired upon “written notification to [Columbia] that [TransCanada] has determined that it is no longer interested in
pursuing a Potential Transaction on terms at least as favorable to the stockholders of [Columbia] as the terms discussed ...
on March 10, 2016.” JX 978 at 4. TransCanada's March 10 proposal offered $26 per share. TransCanada's reduced
offer of $25.50 per share terminated exclusivity. But if the Columbia directors had considered this fact, it would not have
changed how they proceeded. When exclusivity terminated the first time, the Board acted as if it remained in place, and
the script used with Spectra was the functional equivalent of exclusivity. See JX 968. The Board worried about losing
the TransCanada offer, and it regarded that risk as outweighing the benefit of an expedited solicitation process involving
other bidders.
23 Id. at 72. Although Battye is the seminal Delaware Supreme Court case on point, Chancellor Josiah Wolcott initially
established the meaning of “value” under the appraisal statute in Chicago Corporation v. Munds, 172 A. 452 (Del. Ch.
1934). Citing the “material variance” between the Delaware appraisal statute, which used “value,” and the comparable
New Jersey statute that served as a model for the Delaware statute, which used “full market value,” Chancellor Wolcott
held that the plain language of the statute required “value” to be determined on a “going concern” basis. Id. at 453–55. But
see Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Gp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 355–56 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“This requirement that the
valuation inquiry focus on valuing the entity as a going concern has sometimes been confused as a requirement of § 262's
literal terms. It is not.”). The going-concern standard also tracks the judicially endorsed account in which the appraisal
statute arose “as a means to compensate shareholders of Delaware corporations for the loss of their common law right to
prevent a merger or consolidation by refusal to consent to such transactions.” See, e.g., Alabama By-Products Corp. v.
Cede & Co., 657 A.2d 254, 258 (Del. 1995). As Battye explains, the appraisal statute calls for valuing the corporation as a
going concern, using its operative reality as it then existed as a standalone entity, because that is the alternative that the
dissenters wished to maintain. Battye, 74 A.2d at 72. Commentators have questioned the accuracy of the historical trade-
off, but it remains part of the foundational understanding that has informed the concept of fair value. See Lawrence A.
Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. Corp. L. 119, 130 n.52
(2005) (“The historical accuracy of this trade-off story is questionable, however, given the fact that the appraisal remedy
was often added well after the adoption of statutes permitting mergers without unanimous consent.” (citing Robert B.
Thompson, Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 Geo L.J. 1, 14 (1995))).
24 See, e.g., Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 222 (Del. 2005); Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747
A.2d 549, 553 (Del. 2000); Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802 (Del. 1992); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564
A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989); Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 141 (Del. 1980); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 1975).
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25 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003), as revised (July 9, 2004), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005); accord Finkelstein v. Liberty Dig., Inc., 2005 WL
1074364, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005) (“The judges of this court are unremittingly mindful of the fact that a judicially
selected determination of fair value is just that, a law-trained judge's estimate that bears little resemblance to a scientific
measurement of a physical reality. Cloaking such estimates in grand terms like ‘intrinsic value’ does not obscure this
hard truth from any informed commentator.”).
26 See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 135; Dell, 177 A.3d at 23; DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value P'rs, 172 A.3d 346, 367 (Del. 2017).
27 See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 137 (emphasizing that buyer armed with “material nonpublic information about the seller is in a
strong position (and is uniquely incentivized) to properly value the seller”). But see In re Dunkin' Donuts S'holders Litig.,
1990 WL 189120, at *9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1990) (“A bidder's objective is to identify an underpriced corporation and ...
acquire it at the lowest price possible.”); cf. DFC, 172 A.3d at 374 n.145 (rejecting reliance on evidence indicating buyer's
contemporaneous belief that it purchased target “at trough pricing”; commenting that “it is in tension with the statute itself
to argue that the subjective view of post-merger value of the acquirer can be used to value the respondent company in
an appraisal”; observing “[t]hat a buyer views itself as having struck a good deal is far from reliable evidence that the
resulting price from a competitive bidding process is an unreliable indicator of fair value”).
28 See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136–39, 142 (adopting deal price less synergies as fair value where company's banker contacted
six potential buyers after HP's initial outreach, none were interested, sale process terminated, and sale process later
resumed as single-bidder engagement with HP); Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (finding competitive pre-signing process where
Silver Lake competed one-at-a-time with interested parties); DFC, 172 A.3d at 350, 376 (finding “competitive process of
bidding” where company's banker contacted “every logical buyer,” three expressed interest, and two named a preliminary
price with one dropping out before serious negotiations commenced).
29 See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136 (“It cannot be that an open chance for buyers to bid signals a market failure simply because
buyers do not believe the asset on sale is sufficiently valuable for them to engage in a bidding contest against each
other.”); Dell, 177 A.3d at 29 (“Fair value entails at a minimum a price some buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which
no class of buyers in the market would pay.”); id. at 33 (finding that absence of higher bid meant “that the deal market
was already robust and that a topping bid involved serious risk of overpayment,” which “suggests the price is already
at a level that is fair”).
30 At times, the petitioners also targeted a third executive—Glen Kettering—who served as President of Columbia. He was
less involved in the sale process than Skaggs and Smith, and the petitioners never deposed him. Although Kettering
retired after the Merger and received change-in-control benefits, the evidence does not support the contention that he
pushed for an early sale.
31 Smith Tr. 316; see JX 562 (Goldman describing Berkshire's requests as atypically granular for “early [ ] M&A dialogue”);
JX 555 (Berkshire requesting separate operating models for each OpCo subsidiary); JX 550 (detailed Berkshire diligence
questionnaire); JX 565 (same); JX 568 (same); JX 551 (responding to Berkshire request about MLP tax structure); JX
554 (same). See generally PTO ¶¶ 460–66 (describing Berkshire diligence).
32 E.g., JX 746 (Skaggs writing to Board on January 26, 2016: “Consistent with our recent one-on-one conversations about
a potential inbound overture, TransCanada's ... CEO called me on Monday afternoon (1/25) to outline a proposition to
acquire CPG.”).
Before Poirier and Smith met in January 2016, Poirier assured Smith that he could share due diligence materials without
TransCanada breaching the standstill. See JX 485 at 2 (“My understanding is that our respective counsels have talked,
and that we are ok to proceed with exchanging information. As we destroyed all non public [sic] information, in addition
to the data room index, would it be possible to receive again the information you previously sent, including the board
summaries?”). At trial, Poirier unpersuasively rationalized his overtures to Smith as complying with the standstill because
he “wasn't submitting a formal offer for the company.” Poirier Tr. 387. Poirier is an experienced investment banker. He
should have understood the standstill's scope. When pushed, he cited unspecified legal advice from TransCanada's
counsel. See id.; id. at 454.
On January 22, 2016, TransCanada's in-house counsel drafted an email to Columbia's in-house counsel opining that
an upcoming call between Girling and Skaggs would not breach the standstill, because although “there may be some
broad discussion regarding valuation of [Columbia],” Girling would not make an offer to buy. JX 735. The point of talking
numbers was to facilitate a bid, thus breaching the standstill. TransCanada's in-house counsel concluded her email by
seeking confirmation that TransCanada would not breach the standstill “in the event [that it made] a verbal or written offer
or proposal.” Id. That request effectively sought waiver of the DADW, also a breach.
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33 The petitioners advance a similar argument about the threat of massive tax liability deterring potential acquirers from
buying Columbia. NiSource spun off Columbia in a tax-free transaction, but an acquirer could become liable for the tax if
it had negotiated to buy Columbia before the spinoff and then bought it afterwards. See I.R.C. § 355(c)(2), (e); Tres. Reg.
§ 1.355-7(b)(3)(iii); Rev. Rul. 2005-2 C.B. 684. The petitioners cite an April 2016 email in which TransCanada's CFO
cited “rumblings, that we are unable to confirm or refute, that Enbridge may have had prior discussions with NiSource that
could impact the tax-free status of the spin of Columbia.” JX 1108. With the potential exception of TransCanada, there is
no direct evidence of anyone negotiating with NiSource before the spinoff. See, e.g., JX 311 (circumstantial evidence of
TransCanada and Lazard engaging in talks before spinoff). The petitioner failed to carry their burden of proof on this issue.
34 By February 2016, Skaggs was updating the Board on an at least weekly basis. See, e.g., JX 780; JX 785; JX 806; JX
808; JX 830; JX 846; JX 852; JX 855. By March, Skaggs was updating the Board on a near-daily basis. See, e.g., JX
874; JX 913; JX 929; JX 939; JX 945; JX 962; JX 964; JX 995; JX 1004; JX 1007; JX 1010.
35 See, e.g., Kittrell Tr. 1107–08 (“Q.... And it's fair to say that the board never authorized management to tell any potential
bidder that Columbia had eliminated the competition for a competing bid. Right? A. The board would never have given
that specific direction.”); accord Kittrell Dep. 164 (describing Smith's strategy as “counterintuitive”).
36 See JX 1022; JX 1016 at 20; see also Mir Tr. 1212 (describing Lazard's view that Spectra was “not a credible or capable
buyer”).
37 See generally Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 41 Del. J. Corp. L. 279, 320–25
(2017) (comparing appraisal with fiduciary review with primary focus on deals without a controlling stockholder); Charles
Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1551, 1607–
09 (2015) (same).
38 Compare Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Finding the Right Balance in Appraisal Litigation: Deal Price,
Deal Process, and Synergies, 73 Bus. Law. 961, 962 (2018) (commending outcomes in Dell and DFC and arguing that
“the Delaware courts' treatment of the use of the deal price to determine fair value does and should mirror the treatment
of shareholder class action fiduciary duty litigation”), and id. at 982–83 (citing Dell and DFC and observing, “What we
discern from the case law, however, is a tendency to rely on deal price to measure fair value where the transaction would
survive enhanced judicial scrutiny .... Thus, in order to determine whether to use the deal price to establish fair value, the
Delaware courts are engaging in the same sort of scrutiny they would have applied under Revlon if the case were one
challenging the merger as in breach of the directors' fiduciary duties.” (footnote omitted)), with Charles Korsmo & Minor
Myers, The Flawed Corporate Finance of Dell and DFC Global, 68 Emory L.J. 221, 269 (2018) (criticizing Dell and DFC
as “conflat[ing] questions of fiduciary duty liability with the valuation questions central to appraisal disputes”).
39 See, e.g., Dent v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2014 WL 2931180, at *8–10 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014) (rejecting fiduciary challenge
to “(1) a no-solicitation provision; (2) a standstill provision; (3) a change in recommendation provision; (4) information
rights for [the acquirer]; and (5) a $5 million termination fee” where termination fee represented 4.5% of equity value and
change-of-recommendation provision included unlimited match right); In re Novell, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2013 WL 322560,
at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2013) (describing “the no solicitation provision, the matching rights provision, and the termination
fee” as “customary and well within the range permitted under Delaware law” and observing that “[t]he mere inclusion
of such routine terms does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty”); In re Answers Corp. S'holders Litig., 2011 WL
1366780, at *4 & n.47 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2011) (describing “a termination fee plus expense reimbursement of 4.4% of the
Proposed Transaction's equity value, a no solicitation clause, a ‘no-talk’ provision limiting the Board's ability to discuss
an alternative transaction with an unsolicited bidder, a matching rights provision, and a force-the-vote requirement” as
“standard merger terms” that “do not alone constitute breaches of fiduciary duty” (quoting In re 3Com S'holders Litig.,
2009 WL 5173804, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009))); In re Atheros Commc'ns, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL 864928, at
*7 n.61 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011) (same analysis for no-solicitation provision, matching right, and termination fee); In re
3Com, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 & n.37 (also same analysis for no-solicitation provision, matching right, and termination
fee (collecting authorities)).
40 Cf. In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S'holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1015 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[I]n his scholarly work Subramanian
argues that [the] combination of a termination fee and matching rights raises the fears second bidders have of suffering
a ‘winner's curse.’ This is the anxiety that a first bidder will match the initial topping bid, only to refuse to match the next
topping gambit, leaving the second bidder having paid more than was economically rational. This fear, Subramanian
points out, is further exacerbated by the common circumstance that first bidders often have superior information on the
target, and presumably know when to say when. Of course, the other side of this story is that the first bidder has taken
the risk, suffered the search and opportunity costs, and done the due diligence required to establish the bidding floor.”).
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41 See Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Cos., 2018 WL 3602940, at *23–27 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2018); In re
Appraisal of AOL, Inc., 2018 WL 1037450, at *8–10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018) (subsequent history omitted). After post-
trial briefing and argument in this case, this court took a similar approach in In re Appraisal of Jarden Corporation, 2019
WL 3244085, at *24–25 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2019).
42 JX 935 at 12. In the presentation, TransCanada estimated $150 million in financing synergies. TransCanada lowered
this estimate to $100 million for purposes of communicating to the markets, viewing the lower number as more realistic
and achievable. See Marchand Tr. 494–96.
43 The petitioners argue that the alternative is zero, relying on an article from 1987 that Zmijewski cited in his report. See
JX 9. The authors examined a sample of tender offers from 1963 to 1984 and observed that “[o]nly when competing
bids are actually made do we observe greater returns to target shareholders and a dissipation of the initial gains to the
stockholders of the bidding firms.” Id. at 22–23. The petitioners argue that Columbia never solicited competing bids, so
Columbia could not have extracted any synergies. The article does not support this claim. It finds that targets extract a
share of surplus even in single-bidder contests, but also finds that only in multi-bidder contests do the returns to bidders
dissipate. The article thus supports the view that TransCanada did not share all of its synergies with Columbia. It does
not support the view that TransCanada did not share any of its synergies with Columbia.
44 The petitioners also rely on a Wells Fargo research report that mentions that certain MLPs had success raising capital
in 2016, but it did not focus on natural gas MLPs. See JX 1468. The successful equity raises largely involved blue-chip
sponsors, offered preferred units that Columbia could not support because of its debt load, or were completed through
at-the-market raises, a technique that could not have sustained Columbia's business plan. See Adamson Tr. 1333–40,
1406–09.
45 As precedent for the deal-price-less-synergies metric, the Union Illinois decision cited three cases: M.P.M. Enterprises,
Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Company, 1993 WL 208763 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993), and Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc.,
1991 WL 29303 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991). See Union Illinois, 847 A.2d at 343 (citing the three cases and stating that
“our case law recognizes that when there is an open opportunity to buy a company, the resulting market price is reliable
evidence of fair value”).
The Pabst decision appears to be the first Delaware case to determine fair value by drawing on the pricing of the deal
that gave rise to the appraisal proceeding, but the Pabst court did so in a manner that differed from Union Illinois. After a
public auction involving competitive bidding by multiple suitors, G. Heileman Brewing Company acquired Pabst Brewing
Company through a structurally coercive, two-tiered tender offer, in which Heileman paid $32 per share in the first step and
squeezed out the remaining stockholders in the back-end merger for a package of subordinated debentures with a face
value of $24 per share. Pabst, 1993 WL 208763, at *2, *8. The court rejected all of the parties' valuation methods, forcing
the court to “make a determination based upon its own analysis.” Id. at *8. The court reached a fair value conclusion of
$27 per share by blending the front-end and back-end consideration to reach a value of $29.50, and then deducting a
control premium, which the court estimated “did not exceed $2.50 per share.” Id. at *8, *10. The court did not equate the
control premium with a synergies-based deduction.
After Pabst, the concept of a deal price metric next surfaced in M.P.M. Enterprises. The petitioners were minority
stockholders in privately held company that was sold to a third-party buyer. The trial court valued the company using a
DCF analysis. The respondent appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by failing to give weight to the transaction
price and relying heavily on Van de Walle, a breach of fiduciary duty action in which a controlled company was sold to
a third party and all stockholders received consideration having the same value. As one of many reasons for entering
judgment in favor of the defendants, the Van de Walle court cited the arm's-length negotiations between the seller and
the buyer. In an eloquent turn of phrase that has figured prominently in twenty-first century appraisal decisions, the Van
de Walle court observed that “[t]he fact that a transaction price was forged in the crucible of objective market reality (as
distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought process of a valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence that
the price is fair.” 1991 WL 29303, at *17. In M.P.M. Enterprises, however, the Delaware Supreme Court distinguished
Van de Walle as a breach of fiduciary duty case and observed that “[a] fair merger price in the context of a breach of
fiduciary duty claim will not always be a fair value in the context of determining going concern value.” 731 A.2d at 797.
The high court did express agreement with “the general statement made by the Court in Van de Walle” to the effect that
“[a] merger price resulting from arms-length negotiations where there are no claims of collusion is a very strong indication
of fair value.” Id. But the high court again cautioned that “in an appraisal action, that merger price must be accompanied
by evidence tending to show that it represent the going concern value of the company rather than just the value of the
company to one specific buyer.” Id. Citing the trial court's broad discretion when assessing fair value, the high court in
M.P.M. Enterprises affirmed the trial court.
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46 Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015 WL 6164771 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron
Int'l Corp., 2015 WL 4540443 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015); Merlin P'rs LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 WL 2069417 (Del. Ch. Apr.
30, 2015); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 399726 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015); Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx,
Inc., 2013 WL 5878807 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013). At the trial level in Golden Telecom, this court stated that “an arms-length
merger price resulting from an effective market check is entitled to great weight in an appraisal.” Golden Telecom Trial,
993 A.2d at 507. The trial court in Golden Telecom declined to apply the deal-price-less-synergies metric on the facts of
the case because two large stockholders holding a combined 44% of the equity stood on both sides of the transaction
and a special committee treated the deal as if the company had a controlling stockholder. Id. at 508–09.
47 Ramtron, 2015 WL 4540443, at *20; see BMC, 2015 WL 6164771, at *14 (“robust, arm's-length sales process”);
Ancestry.com, 2015 WL 399726, at *16 (“[T]he process here ... appears to me to represent an auction of the Company
that is unlikely to have left significant stockholder value unaccounted for.”).
48 For reasons previously discussed, this decision has not relied on the unaffected trading price as a valuation metric and
has not made a finding as to whether or not the trading price was reliable. The significant distance between the trading
price of $19.75 and expert valuation of $32.47 per share is nevertheless worth observing, because it suggests that at
least one of these metrics, and possibly both, is wrong.
49 Union Illinois, 847 A.2d at 361; see In re Appraisal of Solera Hldgs., Inc., 2018 WL 3625644, at *32 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2018)
(discounting petitioners' DCF analysis in part because “nearly 88% of the petitioners' enterprise valuation is attributable
to periods after the five year Hybrid Case Projections”). In Union Illinois and Solera, as in this case, growth rates drove
the back-loading of the valuation. In other decisions, when valuators used an exit multiple to derive the terminal value,
this court has criticized valuations where a high percentage of value resulted from the terminal period because “the
entire exercise amounts to little more than a special case of the comparable companies approach.” Gray v. Cytokine
Pharmasciences, Inc., 2002 WL 853549, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002) (criticizing a valuation on this basis where the
terminal value accounted for over 75% of the total value); see Gholl, 2004 WL 2847865, at *13 (criticizing discounted cash
flow valuation where exit multiples method for calculating terminal year value resulted in the terminal value representing
over 70% of its total present value); Prescott Gp. Small Cap. v. Coleman Co., Inc., 2004 WL 2059515, at *24-25 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 8, 2004) (same criticism of terminal value derived using exit multiple method that comprised 70% to 80% of
present value).
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
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*1  This statutory appraisal action arises from a merger
whereby Newell Rubbermaid, Inc. (“Newell”) acquired
Jarden Corporation (“Jarden” or the “Company”) (the
“Merger”) for cash and stock totaling $59.21 per share (the
“Merger Price”). Petitioners, Verition Partners Master Fund
Ltd., Verition Multi-Strategy Master Fund Ltd., Fir Tree Value
Master Fund, LP and Fir Tree Capital Opportunity Master
Fund, LP (together “Petitioners”), were Jarden stockholders
on the Merger's effective date and seek a judicial appraisal of
the fair value of their Jarden shares as of that date.
At the close of the trial, I observed, “[w]e are in the
classic case where ... very-well credentialed experts are miles
apart.... There's some explaining that is required here to
understand how it is that two very well-credentialed, I think,
well-intended experts view this company so fundamentally
differently.”1 This observation was prompted by the all-
too-frequently encountered disparity in the experts' opinions
regarding Jarden's fair value. Jarden's expert, Dr. Glenn
Hubbard, applying a discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis,
opines that Jarden's fair value as of the Merger was $48.01
per share. Petitioners' expert, Dr. Mark Zmijewski, applying
a comparable companies analysis, contends that Jarden's fair
value as of the Merger was $71.35 per share. To put the
disparity in context, Dr. Zmijewski's valuation implies that the
market mispriced Jarden by over $5 billion.
In a statutory appraisal action, the trial court's function is
to appraise the “fair value” of the dissenting stockholder's
“shares of stock” by “tak[ing] into account all relevant
factors.”2 The statute does not define “fair value” but our
courts understand the term to mean the petitioner's “pro rata
share of the appraised company's value as a going concern.”3
This definition of fair value “is a jurisprudential, rather
than purely economic, construct.”4 Even so, the remarkably
broad “all relevant factors” mandate necessarily leads the
court deep into the weeds of economics and corporate
finance. These are places law-trained judges should not go
without the guidance of experts trained in these disciplines.
In other words, corporate finance is not law. The appraisal
exercise is, at bottom, a fact-finding exercise, and our courts
must appreciate that, by functional imperative, the evidence,
including expert evidence, in one appraisal case will be
different from the evidence presented in any other appraisal
case. Different evidence, of course, can lead to different
decision paths and different outcomes. After all, the appraisal
exercise prescribed by the governing statute contemplates a
trial—a good, old-fashioned trial—where the parties carry
burdens of proof, present their evidence in hopes of meeting
that burden and subject their adversary's evidence to the
“crucible of cross-examination” in keeping with the traditions
of our adversarial process of civil justice.5
*2  Our Supreme Court has had several opportunities
recently to provide direction with regard to certain frames
of reference this court should consider while performing the
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statutory appraisal function.6 I will not recount those holdings
here as they are well known. Suffice it to say, as I approached
my deliberation of the evidence in this case, my “takeaway”
from the Supreme Court's recent direction reduced to this:
“What is necessary in any particular [appraisal] case [ ] is for
the Court of Chancery to explain its [fair value calculus] in
a manner that is grounded in the record before it.”7 That is
what this court endeavors to do after every trial and what I
have endeavored to do here.8
The parties have reveled in the statutory mandate that the
court consider “all relevant factors.” Indeed, they have
joined issue on nearly every possible indicator of fair value
imaginable, including market indicators (unaffected market
price, deal price less synergies, Jarden stock offerings shortly
before the Merger) and traditional valuation methodologies
(comparable companies and DCF analyses).9 The result: an
unfortunately long opinion, made so by a sense that I needed
to traverse every road the parties waived me down right to
the bitter end, even if that road did not lead to the desired fair
value destination. Appraisal litigation can be unwieldy. This
is one of those cases. Apologies in advance to those who read
on.
I begin my fair value analysis where I believe I must—
with the market evidence.10 As explained below, I have
found Jarden's unaffected market price of $48.31 per share
is a reliable indicator of its fair value at the time of the
Merger. This finding is supported by credible, unrebutted
expert testimony from Dr. Hubbard, including an event
study that analyzed the market's response to earnings
and other material announcements. Dr. Hubbard's expert
analysis of the Unaffected Market Price is corroborated by
credible evidence, including that Jarden had no controlling
stockholder, its public float was 93.9%, it was well covered by
numerous professional stock analysts, its stock was heavily
traded and it enjoyed a narrow bid-ask spread. As important,
there was no credible evidence that material information
bearing on Jarden's fair value was withheld from the market
as of the Merger. This market evidence was persuasive
and I have given it substantial weight in my fair value
determination.
*3  As noted, the Merger consideration, or “deal price,”
was $59.21 per share. Respondent proffers this evidence as a
reliable indicator fair value, particularly when synergies are
“backed out” as required by our law.11 Petitioners respond
that the sale process leading to the Merger was highly flawed
because Jarden's lead negotiator was willing to sell Jarden
on the cheap and the Jarden board of directors (the “Board”)
failed to test the market before agreeing to sell the Company
to Newell. After considering the evidence, I agree with
Petitioners that the sale process left much to be desired.
Jarden's lead negotiator acted with little to no oversight by
the Board and, in doing so, got way out in front of the Board
and Jarden's financial advisors in suggesting to Newell a price
range the Board would accept to sell the Company before
negotiations began in earnest. There was no pre-signing or
post-signing market check. Moreover, the contemporaneous
evidence regarding deal synergies was conflicting and the
parties' experts acknowledged that valuing the synergies and
assessing which party took that value in the Merger was
especially difficult in this case. For these reasons, I have
placed little weight on the deal price less synergies beyond
considering that evidence as a “reality check” on my final fair
value determination.
As additional market evidence of Jarden's fair value,
Respondent points to Jarden's decision to finance a sizeable
acquisition just prior to the Merger (in the midst of
negotiations) with an equity offering valued at $49.00 per
share. When the market reacted poorly to the acquisition,
Jarden announced that it would buy back up to $50 million
in Jarden shares at prices up to $49.00 per share as a
signal of confidence to the market. This contemporaneous
evidence of Jarden management's internal valuation of the
Company, performed to facilitate Jarden's acquisition strategy
in furtherance of its standalone operations, is relevant market
evidence of fair value. While far from dispositive, Jarden's
internal efforts to value itself as a going concern for business,
not litigation, purposes provides a useful input.
In keeping with their theme that the market evidence is not
reliable, Petitioners have focused on “traditional valuation
methodologies” to carry their burden of proving Jarden's fair
value as of the Merger. Their valuation expert opines that a
comparable company/market multiples analysis provides the
best evidence of fair value, and that methodology supports
his conclusion that Jarden's fair value at the Merger was
$71.35 per share. The credibility, or not, of this methodology
depends in large measure on the quality of the comparables.
And then the appraiser must select an appropriate multiple.
After considering the evidence, I am satisfied that Petitioners'
comparable companies analysis is not credible because Jarden
had no reliable comparables. Consequently, I give no weight
to the results derived from this valuation approach.
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Not surprisingly, both parties proffered expert evidence
regarding Jarden's fair value based on DCF and, not
surprisingly, the experts' DCF analyses yielded results that
were solar systems apart. After carefully reviewing the
evidence, including the valuation treatises submitted as
evidence in support of the experts' conclusions, I am satisfied
that both experts utilized inputs in their DCF models that
were not justified and that skewed the results.12 Accordingly,
I have utilized the most credible components of both expert's
analyses to conduct my own DCF valuation, in my best
effort to obey our appraisal statute's “command that the Court
of Chancery undertake an ‘independent’ assessment of fair
value” when performing its mandated appraisal function.13
As explained below, my DCF analysis reveals a valuation of
$48.13 per share.
*4  After considering all relevant factors, I have appraised
Jarden's fair value as of the Merger at $48.31 per share.
This value, derived from the unaffected market price, is
consistent with Jarden's DCF value and the less reliable, but
still relevant, deal price less synergies value.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I recite the facts as I find them by a preponderance of the
evidence after a four-day trial beginning in June 2018. That
evidence consisted of testimony from twenty-eight witnesses
(twenty-five fact witnesses, some presented live and some by
deposition, and three live expert witnesses) along with more
than 2,000 exhibits. To the extent I have relied upon evidence
to which an objection was raised but not resolved at trial, I
will explain the bases for my decision to admit the evidence
at the time I first discuss it.
A. Parties and Relevant Non-Parties
Prior to its acquisition by Newell on April 15, 2016 (the
“Merger Date”), Jarden was a consumer products company
that held a diversified portfolio of over 120 quality brands.14
This portfolio included well-known goods like Ball jars,
Coleman sporting goods, Crock-Pot appliances and Yankee
Candle candles.15 Jarden was incorporated in Delaware with
headquarters in Boca Raton, Florida, and corporate offices
in Norwalk, Connecticut and Miami, Florida.16 Prior to the
Merger, Jarden traded on the New York Stock Exchange.17
Following the Merger, the combined company was re-named
Newell Brands, Inc. (“Newell Brands”).18
Petitioners are Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd., Verition
Multi-Strategy Master Fund Ltd., Fir Tree Value Master
Fund, LP and Fir Tree Capital Opportunity Master Fund,
LP.19 Petitioners acquired their Jarden shares after the
announcement of the Merger and were stockholders as of
the Merger Date. They collectively hold 2,435,971 shares of
Jarden common stock.
B. The Company
Jarden traces its origins to Alltrista Corporation, a company
that was spun off in 1993 from Ball Corporation's canning
business.20 In 2000, Martin Franklin and Ian Ashken acquired
Alltrista after having initiated a stockholder campaign
to unseat Alltrista's board and senior management.21 By
2001, Franklin and Ashken served as Alltrista's Chief
Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, respectively,
and renamed the company Jarden.22 In August 2003, James
Lillie joined the Jarden team as Chief Operating Officer.23
Their shared goal was to create the “best consumer products
company in the world.”24
Franklin served as CEO and Chairman of the Board until
2011,25 when Jarden reorganized its management structure.
The Company created the “Office of the Chairman,”
comprising Franklin as Executive Chairman, Ashken as Vice
Chairman and CFO,26 and Lillie as CEO.27 As a result of
this reorganization, Franklin surrendered direct control of
Jarden's day-to-day operations, but remained chiefly in charge
of capital distribution and M&A activity.28 Lillie and Ashken
took over the day-to-day operation of the Company.29 Ashken
also maintained a dominant role in Jarden's financial planning
and acquisitions.30
*5  As a holding company,31 Jarden maintained a unique,
decentralized structure. Its various businesses functioned
autonomously, allowing them to pursue outside opportunities
and synergies.32 The respective business unit heads exercised
full control over the development of their individual
strategic plans.33 Even so, the businesses stayed in constant
communication with Jarden senior management regarding
operations.34
C. Jarden Experiences Strong Growth from 2001–2015
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Jarden pursued a two-pronged growth strategy, focusing on
internal growth and growth via acquisitions.35 In this regard,
management set a goal of 3 to 5% annual internal revenue
growth,36 10 to 15% earnings per share (“EPS”) growth, 3 to
5% organic top-line growth, 7 to 10% EBITDA growth and
20 to 50 basis points of gross margin growth.37 These targets
produced laudable results. From 2010 through 2015, Jarden
saw average organic yearly revenue growth of 4.8%, the top
of its targeted range.38 In fact, Jarden was regarded as “best in
class by any measure in terms of shareholder returns over 15
years, 10 years, 5 years, 3 years, 1 year.”39 Jarden's margins
experienced continued expansion and it met or exceeded its
guidance in all but one quarter of its existence.40 By 2015,
Jarden generated over $1.2 billion in segment earnings and
revenues of almost $9 billion.41 This reflected an increase in
revenue of 4.8% year over year in fiscal year 2015.42
Given its impressive results, it is not surprising that Jarden's
stock performed well and traded efficiently. In 2012, Jarden
joined the “S&P 400.”43 By the end of 2015, Jarden's
market capitalization topped $10.2 billion, placing it among
the top 20% of all US publicly traded firms.44 More
than twenty professional financial analysts followed Jarden,
reporting regularly on the Company's business operations and
forecasts.45 In addition to its high average trading volume,
Jarden's “bid-ask spread” was just 0.02% and its public
float was approximately 94% of its outstanding stock.46
Jarden's stock trading price historically responded to the
announcement of value-relevant information as one would
expect in a semi-strong efficient market.47
M&A drove Jarden's growth.48 With Franklin at the helm,
Jarden acquired over 40 companies and brands, its stock grew
over 5,000% and its sales progressed from approximately
$305 million in 2001 to over $8.6 billion in 2015.49 Franklin
and his team were not only well-known “deal-makers” in the
public markets,50 they were among “the best performers in
the sector.”51
*6  Under Franklin's leadership, Jarden management
constructed a well-conceived convention for singling-out
and completing acquisitions.52 Jarden avoided acquisitions
that would insert it in spaces where major pure-play
competitors, like Proctor & Gamble, operated.53 Jarden,
instead, concentrated on acquiring top brands in niche
markets.54 This strategy developed secure trenches that
presented barriers to others who might look to compete with
Jarden's niche product lines.55 It also enabled Jarden globally
to expand its brands.56
D. Jarden Shifts Its Strategic Focus
Jarden's businesses sold their products across a vast spread
of distribution channels, including business-to-business,
direct-to-consumer (“DTC”), e-commerce retailers, and
club, department store, drug, grocery and sporting goods
retailers.57 In 2014, Jarden committed to expanding its DTC
operations by promoting then-Vice President of International
Development, Leo Trautwein, to Vice President of Direct
to Consumer and Revenue Development. Trautwein, along
with Jarden management, developed a DTC Council that
comprised of representatives from Jarden and each of its
individual business units.58 The DTC Council aimed to detect
DTC best practices and put in place DTC initiatives.59 It
set meaningful benchmarks to enhance DTC sales.60 In their
July 2015 Board presentation, Jarden management expected
online sales to represent 13% of Jarden's total sales by 2019,
equating to 15.9% of total EBITDA.61 The DTC initiative,
on the other hand, was expected to yield a 55–60% return
on investment.62 As it turned out, from 2012 through 2016,
Jarden's DTC e-commerce sales (i.e., not including brick and
mortar DTC sales) experienced a more than 270% increase
in five years—expanding from roughly $237 million to $643
million.63
E. Jarden Makes Two Major Acquisitions Just Prior to
the Merger
Jarden completed two of the largest acquisitions in its history
in 2015. In July 2015, Jarden acquired the Waddington
Group, Inc. for approximately $1.35 billion.64 Waddington
manufactures plastic consumables for the $14 billion U.S.
food sector market.65 The acquisition was projected to yield
revenue of $840 million in 2016 with an approximately 20%
EBITDA margin.66
In November 2015, Jarden acquired the parent company of
Jostens, Inc. for $1.5 billion.67 Jostens was a market leader
in manufacturing and marketing yearbooks, rings, caps and
gowns, diplomas, regalia and varsity jackets, mainly selling to
schools, universities and professional sports leagues.68 Jarden
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predicted the Jostens acquisition would not only offer Jarden
“unique access to the difficult-to-enter academic market,”69
but also would allow Jarden to grow a number of its existing
distribution channels and develop new ones, intensifying
Jarden's DTC impact.70 Jostens provided superior market
positions, steady financial performance, strong margins and
attractive cash flow to Jarden's portfolio.71 Indeed, Jostens'
gross margins were anticipated to better Jarden's overall
margins and, in fact, the transaction was instantly accretive.72
*7  Overall, Jarden anticipated that these two acquisitions
would push Jarden's total annual revenues over the $10 billion
threshold. At the same time, however, they simultaneously
would increase Jarden's debt to a point where Jarden would
be unable to make another substantial acquisition for at least
another year.73
F. Franklin Considers a Sale of Jarden
Jarden was not Franklin's only business interest. In 2013,
Franklin founded Platform Specialty Products Corporation
(“Platform”), a specialty chemicals production company, with
financial backing from Bill Ackman.74 In 2014, Franklin
founded Nomad Foods Ltd. (“Nomad”), a frozen foods
company headquartered in the U.K.75 Franklin also ran
a “family investment vehicle” called Mariposa Capital.76
Mariposa entities often acquired orphan brands, like its
acquisition of Royal Oak in 2016.77 In 2017, after the Merger,
Franklin created a special purpose acquisition vehicle, J2
Acquisition Limited (“J2”), that raised more than $1 billion
in order to buy consumer-focused brands.78 Franklin also
looked forward to pursuing business ventures with his sons,
as his father did with him.79
In early July 2015, during a meeting between Franklin
and Roland Phillips of Centerview Partners relating to
Nomad, Phillips mentioned that Newell's CEO, Michael Polk,
wanted to meet Franklin.80 As discussed below, Newell had
previously retained Centerview to assist with Newell's search
for transformative M&A opportunities.81 Understanding that
Polk would likely want to talk about a Newell/Jarden
transaction, Franklin told Phillips he would take the meeting,
he “would gladly take equity, [and he] ha[d] no issue with
someone else running the combined business.”82
Later that month, Franklin met with Bill Ackman, his
Platform partner, and expressed his willingness to sell Jarden
so he could devote more energy to Platform and Nomad.83
Ackman emailed Warren Buffett the following day and
indicated that Franklin would entertain a negotiated sale of
Jarden to Berkshire Hathaway.84
Franklin was not authorized by the Board to entertain
discussions regarding a sale of Jarden nor did he disclose to
the Board his discussions with Phillips or Ackman.85
G. Newell and Franklin Meet
*8  Like Jarden, Newell was a major consumer products
company with a vast portfolio of products sold under brands
like Sharpie, Paper Mate, Elmer's, Rubbermaid, Lenox, Graco
and Baby Jogger.86 In 2011, Newell implemented a strategic
roadmap known as the “Growth Game Plan” under the
direction of its new CEO, Polk.87 This plan incorporated
an initiative known as “Project Renewal” to streamline the
Company's business structure and decrease costs.88
For many years, Newell operated as a traditional holding
company, much as Jarden did, owning several portfolio
businesses that essentially functioned as independent
companies.89 In 2010, Newell retooled by implementing
an integrated operating company model as contemplated by
Project Renewal.90 Newell “delayered the structure of the
company, ... releas[ing] a whole bunch of money” that was
invested back into Newell's brands.91 As a result, Newell
doubled its brand expenditures, creating fast-tracked growth
and amplified margins for its business.92 By the fall of
2014, Newell realized that the “investment firepower” Project
Renewal generated “was going to wane” by late 2018.93 It
needed a new growth plan.
In late 2014, Newell initiated a strategy of pursuing
“transformational M&A” opportunities that would generate
larger scale and market share in its central businesses, in
addition to new prospects for growth.94 This new strategy
prompted Newell to engage Centerview to produce a list
of possible targets for Newell and to arrange “get-to-know-
you meetings” as requested.95 While Jarden was included
on Centerview's list, it was the target “least familiar” to
Newell since it “had been built [steadily] through acquisitions
from 2001 onward” and was, therefore, in Newell's eyes,
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a “relatively new company.”96 Polk had reservations about
Jarden because it was seen as a “company of diversified niche
categories,” when Polk was “looking for scaled brands and
big, global categories.”97 Even so, Polk asked Centerview to
arrange the “get-to-know-you meeting” with Franklin.98 As
noted, Franklin agreed to take the meeting.99
Franklin and Polk's first meeting took place at the Barclays'
investor “Back-to-School” conference on September 9,
2015 (the “Back-to-School Meeting”).100 The conversation
exposed their different perspectives regarding the roles they
played at their respective companies—Franklin defined his
role at Jarden as creating value and “[t]hat's it,” while Polk
defined his role at Newell as building stronger brands and
a stronger company.101 In other words, Franklin focused on
M&A, while Polk concentrated on organic growth.102 Near
the meeting's end, Franklin directed the conversation to where
he believed Polk wanted it to go by confirming that his
team was open to “strategically connecting” with Newell.103
The meeting closed with both Franklin and Polk agreeing to
continue the conversation about a potential deal.104
*9  Polk reported back to the Newell board that Franklin “cut
straight to the chase about being willing to sell his company
and offered a deeper discussion over the next few weeks.”105
At this point, however, Franklin still had not informed
Jarden's Board that he was entertaining Newell's overture.106
Indeed, it was not until several days after the Back-to-School
meeting that Franklin made individual calls to members of the
Board to let them know about his discussions with Polk.107
For his part, Polk warmed quickly to the idea of acquiring
Jarden, believing that Jarden would provide scale and
immediate cost synergies once Newell consolidated Jarden's
operations per Project Renewal.108 As Polk explained, “we
believed we had the potential, based on what we could see
through the public data, to apply the playbook we'd just run on
Newell Rubbermaid to a broader set of categories that looked
very similar to the categories that we were managing as part
of [Newell].”109
On October 5, 2015, Franklin and Polk met again, this time
on Franklin's yacht in Miami, along with Ashken, Lillie and
Mark Tarchetti, Newell's then-Chief Development Officer
(the “Boat Meeting”).110 While Franklin informally provided
some advance notice of the Boat Meeting to certain members
of the Board, he did not obtain Board approval to meet with
Newell and certainly did not have Board approval to discuss
the financial parameters of a deal.111 But that is precisely what
he did.
*10  Franklin advised Newell's team that Newell's offer for
Jarden would have to “start with a six” and would have to
include a significant cash component if Newell's goal was
to gain control of the combined company.112 According to
Franklin, he arrived at this number based, in part, on his
understanding of Jarden's value as determined in connection
with the Jostens acquisition which was underway as of the
Boat Meeting.113 He also wanted to state a number he
believed Newell had the “ability to pay,”114 and he assumed
a price of $70.00 or higher was “laughable.”115 At the time
of the Boat Meeting, Jarden's stock was trading in the high
$40s.116 Therefore, by this metric, a price “starting with
a six,” by any measure, would be a premium for Jarden's
stockholders.117 According to Franklin, even if $60 per share
undervalued Jarden,118 Franklin believed Jarden stockholders
would reap additional value by sharing in the upside of the
Merger with stock in the combined company.119
On the other side of the table, Polk expressed Newell's hope
that a merger would open substantial synergies given the
Newell team's demonstrated ability to consolidate business
functions and utilize the resulting cost savings to produce
growth.120 Jarden's team had a more modest outlook on
possible synergies in the early stages of the discussions, but
became progressively more “excited” by the opportunity to
unlock significant transaction synergies as the negotiations
advanced.121
Although he had not sought Board approval to meet with
Newell, Franklin briefed the Board on the Boat Meeting
within a matter of days, including his admonition to Newell
that an offer would need to “start with a six.”122 The
Board was supportive and encouraged Franklin and his team
to continue the discussions with Newell within Franklin's
outlined parameters.123
Jarden did not formally engage Barclays until November
2015. Even so, Franklin contacted Welsh, his personal
Barclays banker, on October 16, 2015, after the Boat
Meeting.124 Franklin told Welsh he already signaled to
Newell that Jarden would agree to sell at $60 per share and
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instructed him to start developing an analysis supporting a
transaction in the range of $60–$69 per share.125
H. The Ebb and Flow of the Negotiations
*11  On October 9, 2015, Newell distributed a press release
revealing that Tarchetti and another executive would leave
Newell at the end of the year.126 Franklin was “very upset”
Polk had not informed him that “his chief lieutenant” was on
his way out of Newell.127 Franklin was so upset, in fact, that
he entertained the idea of “stopping the conversations at that
point” because he “didn't want to look stupid in front of [the
Jarden] board ... [by] having a conversation with someone
that wasn't serious.”128 Within days of the announcement,
Franklin and Polk had a “tough conversation” where Polk
explained that Tarchetti would stay with Newell if the parties
agreed to a deal.129 After this, Franklin “got over it” and
negotiations continued.130
As the parties were discussing a Jarden/Newell combination,
Jarden was closing the Jostens deal. On October 14, 2015,
Jarden announced it would acquire Jostens and finance
the acquisition through an equity offering priced at $49.00
per share and additional debt.131 The next day, Jarden
presented five-year projections to potential financing sources
that reflected net sales growth of 3.1% (the “Lender
Presentation”).132
The market reacted negatively to the Jostens acquisition.133
Jarden's stock price dropped approximately 12% over the
following two weeks and analysts' reduced their Jarden price
targets accordingly.134 The Board determined that Jarden
needed to project confidence to the market. Accordingly, in
early November 2015, it approved a stock buy-back up to
$50 million at prices capped at $49.00 per share.135 Jarden
ultimately repurchased 276,417 shares on November 2, 2015,
at an average price of $45.96 per share, and repurchased an
additional 775,685 shares on November 3, 2015, at an average
price of $48.05 per share.136
On October 15, 2015, Franklin caused Jarden to enter into a
mutual confidentiality and standstill agreement with Newell,
and the parties began preliminary due diligence.137 True to
form, Franklin did not seek Board authorization to begin
diligence on Jarden's behalf.138 The next day, also without the
Board's authorization, Franklin and Polk spoke on the phone
to continue negotiations on the cash and stock components of
a deal, and Franklin introduced the concept of Jarden taking
seats on the combined company's board.139
On October 22, 2015, Franklin, Ashken and Lillie met
with Newell representatives at Jarden's offices in Norwalk,
Connecticut (the “Norwalk Meeting”) and shared non-
public information, including a set of three-year financial
projections.140 The three-year projections, apparently created
in connection with the negotiations, incorporated financials
for both the Waddington and Jostens acquisitions,141 and
forecast 5% revenue growth, i.e., growth at the high end of
Jarden's historic guidance range of 3% to 5%.142
*12  Entering into negotiations with Newell, Jarden had set
the market standard for average annual revenue growth within
the 3% to 5% range.143 These growth figures were meant
to reflect Jarden's “organic growth” range, but they included
revenue from “tuck-in” acquisitions, where a Jarden portfolio
company would acquire a target.144 Other public companies
operating as holding companies typically do not include
tuck-in acquisitions when projecting “organic growth.”145
Nevertheless, even when tuck-in acquisitions are excluded,
Jarden generally performed in line with its target growth
range.146
At trial, Lillie justified giving Newell projections at the
very top of the Company's 3%–5% guidance range by
explaining that 5% was a “round number[ ].”147 He went on
to explain that, while the projections given to Newell were not
“wildly optimistic,” Jarden internally projected growth “in
the fours.”148 Polk took notice of Jarden's “really aggressive”
projections.149 He and his team determined that it was best to
stick with the 3.1% growth projections as stated in the Lender
Presentation when evaluating the transaction.150
In November 2015, Jarden's financial advisor, Barclays,
asked Jarden management for projections extended to
2020.151 In response, Lillie told Barclays to “extrapolate out”
the three-year forecast at a continuing growth rate of 5% (the
“November Projections”).152 Barclays used these five-year
projections in its analyses of the potential transaction and in
its fairness opinion.153
In addition to negotiating price terms during the Norwalk
Meeting, Newell and Franklin began to discuss specifics
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regarding change-in-control payments that would be due to
Franklin, Ashken and Lillie in the event of a merger.154
And, again, Franklin did not seek Board approval before
undertaking these discussions.155
Following the Norwalk Meeting, Franklin, Ashken, Lillie
and John Welsh of Barclays on behalf of Jarden,
and Polk and Tarchetti on behalf of Newell, met for
dinner.156 Franklin believed whether the transaction would
be consummated depended on whether Tarchetti stayed at
Newell.157 Accordingly, he asked Tarchetti to share his
thoughts on the potential transaction.158 Tarchetti declined to
respond, explaining he believed Newell still lacked adequate
information to evaluate the transaction.159 Franklin was not
happy.
*13  After this “difficult dinner” among the negotiators,
Franklin told Ashken and Lillie, “I'm done. I don't want to deal
with this.”160 Likewise, Polk said he thought about “pull[ing]
the plug” on the negotiations.161 After a “conciliatory” call
between Lillie and Tarchetti, however, the parties decided not
to “let a bad dinner get in the way of looking at whether this
makes sense[,]” and negotiations continued.162
The Board held its first formal meeting to discuss a potential
Newell transaction on October 28, 2015.163 There was no
discussion of a pre-signing market check.164 Instead, the
Board focused its attention on Newell and directed that
negotiations continue.165
In the meantime, Newell retained both Goldman Sachs
(“Goldman”) and Bain & Company (“Bain”) as additional
financial advisors to assist in evaluating a possible acquisition
of Jarden.166 Tasked with performing a thorough evaluation
of Jarden's product categories, Bain's initial assessment
was that Jarden's portfolio demonstrated strong performance
across many promising product segments,167 but its historic
organic growth rate, once “tuck-in” acquisitions were
separated, was at most 3.5%.168 Early in the process,
Centerview had projected that potential synergies of $500
million to $900 million would result from a combination with
Jarden.169 By the end of October 2015, Bain was estimating
that the combination had the “potential to create $700M–
$800M in cost synergies.”170 Bain's assessment encompassed
“annualized savings” that would recur annually.171
Through due diligence, Newell discovered “almost every deal
Jarden had done, which were profound in number, had been
left standalone with almost no cost synergies or revenue
synergies realized.”172 As a result of this holding company
structure, Newell and its advisors believed that Jarden
presented a substantial opportunity to replicate Newell's
Project Renewal success by combining Jarden's businesses
into Newell's operating company structure.173
I. Newell Makes an Offer and Jarden Negotiates
*14  On November 10–11, 2015, the Newell board met
to discuss, among other things, whether to make an offer
to acquire Jarden.174 On the first day, Tarchetti presented
the results of the diligence efforts so far, in addition to
management's perspective on the benefits of a merger with
Jarden.175 On the second day, Bain and Goldman presented
their analysis of potential synergies.176 Bain opined that
the potential Newell/Jarden “combination would enable ~
$600M in cost savings opportunities, with potential upside
to ~$700M.”177 Goldman appraised cost synergies based
on comparable transactions ranging from 2.1% to 14.0%
of revenue, with a median of 10.0%, translating to roughly
$850 million of annual cost synergies resulting from the
acquisition.178
Despite Bain and Goldman's synergies estimates, Newell
and its advisors structured their deal model on an estimate
of $500 million in annual cost synergies.179 With this
estimate, Newell's model priced Jarden at $57.00 to $61.00
per share.180 Within these parameters, the Newell board
understood that if its management team did not realize the
$500 million synergies estimate, then Newell shareholders
would not receive any increase in EPS.181 After the advisors'
presentations, the Newell board authorized management to
negotiate an acquisition of Jarden at a price between $57.00
and $60.00 per share, with cash consideration up to $21.00
per share.182
On November 12, 2015, Polk sent Franklin an offer whereby
Newell would acquire Jarden in a cash-and-stock transaction
consisting of $20.00 cash plus a fixed exchange ratio of
0.823 Newell shares for each share of Jarden common stock,
representing total per share consideration of $57.00.183 The
offer reflected an 18% premium over Jarden's then-current
share price ($48.19) and a 19% premium to Jarden's 30-
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day volume-weighted average share price ($47.89). Newell
arrived at the cash and stock mix to preserve Newell's
investment grade credit rating and dividend policy.184 Polk's
offer letter made clear that Newell “expect[ed] that Mr.
Franklin would join the Newell Brands Board of Directors
given the role he has played in Jarden's performance and
strategy to date,” and allowed that Newell was “open to
adjusting the size of our board and taking on a limited number
of [additional] members from Jarden's board.”185
The Board met that day to discuss Newell's offer.186 Barclays
made a presentation regarding the adequacy of Newell's
$57.00 offer in which it provided a preliminary valuation
of Jarden based on Jarden's historic market price as well
as comparable companies, precedent transactions and DCF
analyses.187
While the $57.00 per share offer was higher than Jarden's
stock had ever traded, the Board unanimously decided “it was
not inclined to engage in discussions and possible negotiation
with [Newell] on the economic terms set forth in the [offer]
[l]etter,” and authorized management to “seek to obtain a
revised proposal with more favorable proposed terms.”188
The Board “emphasized that the Company was not for sale
and that it would consider a potential business combination
with [Newell] only on terms that appropriately valued
the relative contribution (including revenue and EBITDA)
of each standalone company to the pro forma combined
company.”189
*15  The Board authorized Franklin to continue negotiations
with Newell, but did not authorize him to make a counteroffer
because, as director Robert Wood testified, doing so would
“tie their hands.”190 Franklin, however, recalled, “the board
basically authorized [him] to go back and have further
discussions and ... push the envelope to try to come back to
them with an enhanced offer from Newell.”191
During the November 12 Board meeting, Franklin suggested
that the Board formally engage Barclays as the lead banker
for the Company and UBS Group AG as “co-investment
banker.”192 Jarden thought a transaction of this magnitude
justified having two banks on board to guide the Company
through the process.193 Barclays, in particular, had a
longstanding, fruitful relationship with Franklin and it knew
Jarden well.194 Accordingly, Franklin believed Barclays was
positioned to provide Jarden with “genuine good advice” on
the potential merger.195 And he believed UBS would serve
as a well-informed source for “second opinions.”196 The
retention of UBS, however, did cause Jarden director Ros
L'Esperance to recuse herself from all deliberations and votes
of the Board, as she led UBS's Client Corporate Solutions
Group.197
*16  On November 16, 2015, Jarden and Newell, along with
their financial advisors, met to continue negotiations over
the potential transaction.198 In advance of the meeting with
Newell, the Jarden management team scheduled an evening
Board dinner anticipating there would be new developments
in the negotiations that would require the Board's prompt
attention.199 In yet another demonstration of Franklin getting
ahead of his Board, Franklin announced to the Newell team
at the outset of the meeting that their $57.00 offer was too
low and then made a counteroffer of $63.00 per share—
$21.00 in cash with the balance in stock of the combined
company.200 The Newell team balked. Not only did they
decline the counteroffer on the spot, they also refused to raise
their $57.00 offer.201 Discussions turned “acrimonious” and
the meeting abruptly adjourned.202
After the meeting, Ashken emailed the Board to advise that
the parties were at impasse and there was no need for the
scheduled Board dinner.203 According to Ashken, “[a]s far as
we were concerned the deal was dead.”204
J. Newell Increases Its Offer
On November 21, 2015, Newell submitted a revised offer to
acquire Jarden for $21.00 in cash plus a floating exchange
ratio between 0.85 to 0.92 Newell shares for each Jarden
share to be determined based on Newell's trailing 10-day
unaffected volume weighted average price (“VWAP”) at the
time of signing, with a target price of $60.00 per share.205
This revised proposal was a 30% premium over Jarden's then-
current stock price ($46.33) and a 27% premium over Jarden's
30-day VWAP ($47.43). Newell reiterated that it expected
the potential merger to produce annual cost synergies of
approximately $500 million.206 It also renewed its offer for
Franklin, Ashken, Lillie and a new independent director to
join the board of the combined company.207
The Board convened the following day to discuss the $60.00
per share offer. After discussions with its financial advisers,
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the Board determined that the offer would be accepted and
that Newell would be granted exclusivity during a period of
confirmatory due diligence.208 Outside director Robert Wood
testified that the Board viewed the revised offer “much more
favorably,”209 and explained that while the Board thought
Jarden's forecast of 5% growth over the next three years
was achievable, “the [B]oard's level of concern [regarding
future growth] was higher” following recent acquisitions.210
Specifically, the Board had come to appreciate that Jarden
could not sustain historic growth without pursuing “bigger
and bigger acquisitions,” a strategy the Company had found
was increasingly difficult to execute.211 As a result, Wood
and the other directors believed the $60.00 offer provided
more value for shareholders than Jarden could deliver as a
standalone company.212
*17  Franklin believed the $60.00 offer represented a 13.5x
EBITDA multiple, “a high multiple, by any standard, for our
business ... [and] the highest multiple, by far, our company
would have ever traded or been valued.”213 By way of
comparison, just a few weeks before Newell delivered its
revised offer, Jarden had acquired Jostens for $1.5 billion,
representing a 7.5x EBITDA multiple.214 The Board also
concluded that Jarden stockholders stood to benefit from any
synergies on top of the $500 million estimate baked into
the purchase price, by remaining invested in the combined
company following the Merger.215
As noted, the Board agreed to mutual exclusivity.216 This,
of course, disabled any market check prior to consummation
of the Merger.217 The Board thought “Newell was the
best and most likely acquirer of our business” and there
were no other “companies that had the same fit in terms
of synergies and ability to pay as Newell.”218 From the
Board's perspective, Jarden was a “very diverse business”
operating in siloed industries that were not of interest to
other large consumer product companies.219 Accordingly,
the Board and management understood that Jarden would
likely continue standalone unless a unique opportunity for a
business combination came along.220 Newell provided that
opportunity.
K. Jarden and Newell Finalize Deal Documents
Over November 29 and 30, 2015, Jarden and Newell
convened at Jarden's Norwalk, Connecticut offices, where
the Newell team continued its diligence and presented its
strategic plan for the combined company.221 Both Newell
and Jarden knew from the outset that a deal could only be
done if a substantial portion of the consideration was Newell
stock.222 Because Newell understood this and appreciated
the magnitude and significance of Jarden's assets to the
combined company, Newell committed that certain Jarden
directors would be offered a seat on the Newell board post-
closing.223 Newell specifically wanted Franklin to sit on the
combined board to provide a positive signal to the market of
his confidence in the future of the combined company.224
*18  The parties understood that Newell's management team
would lead the combined company since capturing synergies
through the implementation of Project Renewal was the
“logic for the deal.”225 Franklin, Ashken and Lillie each were
subject to two-year non-competition covenants in event they
were terminated following a change of control.226 Newell
wanted to draw out these non-competition covenants to
four years.227 It also wanted to have access to Franklin,
Ashken and Lillie as consultants post-closing if needed.228
Accordingly, Newell, Franklin, Ashken and Lillie negotiated
an “Advisory Services Agreement” that extended their non-
competes but also provided for Mariposa (on behalf of the
three executives) to be paid an annual consulting fee of $4
million for three years ($12 million in total).229 The Advisory
Services Agreement provided that Mariposa “shall, upon the
request of [Newell], devote up to an average of 120 hours
per fiscal quarter” to Newell, and that Franklin and Ashken
waived “any and all fees and compensation” they would have
ordinarily received as directors of Newell during the term of
the agreement.230
L. The Leak
On December 7, 2015, The Wall Street Journal reported
that Newell and Jarden were discussing a potential business
combination, though the article did not reveal the specifics
of who would be buying whom or the transaction
consideration.231 In reaction to this news, Newell's shares
traded up 7.4%, closing at $48.16 and Jarden's shares traded
up 3.7%, closing at $50.09.232
Following the leak, and resulting impact on the companies'
stock prices, the parties agreed that it no longer made sense
to calculate the final exchange ratio based upon the 10-day
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trailing VWAP as of the day of signing.233 Ashken contacted
Tarchetti to re-negotiate and the parties ultimately settled on a
fixed ratio of 0.862,234 resulting in total merger consideration
at that time of $60.03 based upon Newell's closing stock price
on December 11, 2015.235
The 10-day trailing VWAP through the last unaffected day
prior to the leak, was $44.60.236 If Jarden held firm to the
original agreement, on top of the $21.00 in cash, Jarden
stockholders would have received 0.874 shares of Newell
stock for every share of Jarden stock they owned.237 In other
words, Jarden stockholders would have received $120 million
more in consideration if not for the renegotiation.
M. Jarden and Newell Stockholders Approve the
Merger
*19  On December 10, 2015, the Board met to discuss the
status of negotiations and to assess whether the transaction
continued to make sense. Lillie opened the meeting
by presenting the 2015 estimated financial results that
demonstrated 4.4% growth in organic net sales over 2014.238
Barclays also presented a summary of the transaction's
proposed terms and an analysis of Jarden's standalone
value.239 The meeting minutes emphasize that “the Company
has not been and is not currently for sale and that remaining
independent (as a standalone entity) is the sole alternative
to the proposed business combination with Newell, which
offers unique revenue and cost synergies and long-term value
accretion opportunities for the Company's stockholders.”240
Jarden's negotiating team had been discussing change of
control payments with Newell for several weeks but raised
the subject with the Board for the first time at the December
10 meeting.241 Ashken recommended to the Board that he,
Franklin and Lillie receive their 2017 and 2018 Restricted
Stock Awards (“RSAs”) should the transaction with Newell
be approved.242 The RSAs would not have been due under
the existing employment agreements but Franklin's team
instructed Barclays to include the RSAs in the shares
outstanding calculation used for its valuation analyses of
the transaction and they had already presented that share
calculation to Newell.243 John Capps, Jarden's General
Counsel, advised the Board that Jarden was legally obligated
to grant the RSAs even though the agreements themselves
were, at best, ambiguous on the point.244 Ultimately, the
Board's Compensation Committee recommended that the
Board award the 2017 and 2018 RSAs.245
The Board met next on December 13, 2015. Barclays
presented the revised proposed deal terms and its revised
valuation of Jarden as a standalone company.246 Barclays
also orally presented its opinion that the proposed merger
was fair from a financial point of view to Jarden and its
stockholders.247 After hearing from Barclays and reviewing
the final deal terms, the Board approved the Merger.248
The Board also approved the separation agreements and
amendments to the employment agreements with Franklin,
Ashken and Lillie.249 The final Merger Agreement provided
that Jarden stockholders would receive 0.862 shares of
Newell stock plus $21.00 in cash for each Jarden share,
representing a value as of signing of $60.03.250
*20  The Newell board also met on December 13 to consider
the final transaction terms and to receive Goldman and
Centerview's final presentations.251 In their analyses, both
Goldman and Centerview used five-year projections for
Jarden, assuming 3.1% revenue growth during FY18–20,
consistent with the Lender Presentation and below the 5%
revenue growth forecast in the November Projections.252
Goldman maintained its estimate of $500 million in annual
cost synergies.253 Centerview estimated $500–$700 million
in synergies.254 After the presentations by its advisors,
the Newell board approved the terms of the final Merger
Agreement and the parties announced the Merger.255
N. The Market Reacts
The Merger announcement, released on December 14, 2015,
stated “[Newell] anticipates incremental annualized cost
synergies of approximately $500 million over four years.”256
In response to the announcement, Jarden's stock price closed
at $54.09, roughly 12% above the unaffected trading price
of $48.31 from December 4, 2015.257 The delta between
Jarden's stock price and the implied Merger Price (i.e.,
the merger arbitrage spread) slowly narrowed following the
announcement and ultimately converged in the days leading
up to the closing.258
Newell's stock price rose 7.4% on December 7, 2015,
when financial media outlets first reported the parties were
negotiating.259 When the final terms of the transaction were
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made public on December 14, 2015, however, Newell's
stock price declined by 6.9% to $42.15.260 After accounting
for market fluctuations, Newell's stock price after the
announcement of the Merger terms reflected, at best, a neutral
market response.261
On February 26, 2016, Jarden reported its 2015 year-end
results, including a considerable loss in operating income and
net income as compared to the prior two years.262 A few days
later, on February 29, 2016, Lillie shared weak results for the
first quarter of 2016 with the Board.263 Lillie also shared the
final 2016 budget, which was adjusted downward to reflect
year-end revenue of $9.79 billion (as compared to the $10.15
billion in the November Projections).264
*21  During March and April 2016, before the Merger
closed, Jarden management prepared updated multi-year
projections for the period 2016 to 2020 (the “April
Projections”).265 The original version of the April Projections
reflected a “bottoms up build” from the business units and
forecast a 4.4% compound annual revenue growth rate.266
This was well below the 5.0% forecast in the November
Projections.267
Jarden and Newell stockholders voted to approve the Merger
on April 15, 2016.268 As of the closing, the mix of cash and
Newell shares valued Jarden at $59.21 per share.269
O. Post-Closing
By January 2016, Bain shortened the time Newell would
realize $500 million in recurring annual cost synergies from
four years to three.270 By May 2016, Bain raised its projection
of potential cost savings to a range of $900 million to $1
billion.271 In February 2017, Newell announced it would
meet the initial estimate of $500 million in annual cost
synergies by Q3 2018, and doubled the size of its total
cost synergy target from $500 million to $1 billion, to be
reached by 2021.272 Newell also announced its intention to
divest several businesses—both historical Jarden and Newell
—and to exit certain product lines.273 In early 2018, Newell
announced it would sell businesses accounting for almost
50% of its customer base and approximately one-third of its
revenue.274
The Jarden/Newell integration did not go smoothly.275
Newell Brands (the combined company) faced an uphill
battle with the divestitures of highly-profitable and valuable
businesses.276 In early 2018, Franklin resigned from the
Newell Brands board in spectacular fashion, publicly
proclaiming that Polk was “ruining the company” and calling
for Polk's ouster.277 Ashken, L'Esperance and long-time
Newell director, Dominico De Sole, left the Newell Brands
board soon after.278
*22  After leaving, Franklin, Ashken and Lillie united with
Starboard Value LP, an activist hedge fund, to advance a
slate of directors to challenge the Newell Brands board.279
Carl Icahn entered the mix and ultimately was successful
in placing his slate of five directors on the Newell Brands
board, thereby effectively ending the Franklin/Starboard-led
challenge.280 In the fallout of the proxy contest, Tarchetti,
President of Newell Brands, resigned.281
P. Procedural Posture
Between June 14, 2016 and August 12, 2016, four petitions
for appraisal were filed in connection with the Merger.282
By order of the Court dated October 3, 2016, the four
appraisal actions were consolidated.283 On July 5, 2017,
Merion Capital LP, Merion Capital II LP and Merion
Capital ERISA LP were dismissed from the consolidated
action after reaching settlement agreements with Jarden.284
On July 7, 2017, Dunham Monthly Distribution Fund,
WCM Alternatives: Event-Driven Fund, Westchester Merger
Arbitrage Strategy sleeve of the JNL Multi-Manager
Alternative Fund, JNL/Westchester Capital Even Driven
Fund, WCM Master Trust, The Merger Fund, The Merger
Fund VL and SCA JP Morgan Westchester were also
dismissed, again after reaching settlement agreements with
Jarden.285
The Court held a four-day trial in June 2018. Three experts
testified. For Petitioners, Dr. Mark Zmijewski evaluated the
standalone value of Jarden on the Merger Date by conducting
a market multiples analysis and a DCF analysis, ultimately
relying on his multiples (comparable company) analysis for
his fair value conclusion. He opined that Jarden's fair value on
the Merger Date was $71.35 per share. Dr. Zmijewski holds
the Charles T. Horngren Professorship at the University of
Chicago Booth School of Business.
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For Respondent, Dr. Glenn Hubbard evaluated the standalone
value of Jarden on the Merger Date by analyzing market
evidence, including Jarden's unaffected market price and
the Merger Price less synergies, and traditional valuation
methodologies, including comparable companies and DCF.
Based on his DCF analysis, which he correlated to the market
evidence, Dr. Hubbard opined that Jarden's fair value on the
Merger Date was $48.01 per share. Dr. Hubbard holds the
Russell L. Carson Professorship in Finance and Economics
in the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University,
where he is also the Dean.286
Respondent also presented the testimony of Dr. Marc Zenner,
a retired investment banker. Dr. Zenner testified that the
projected synergies estimates reported in the joint proxy
statement issued by Jarden and Newell in connection with
the Merger were conservative and that the synergies were
taken by Jarden stockholders. He also opined that the Board's
decision not to hold an auction for Jarden was reasonable
because Jarden's size and diverse product portfolio made it
unlikely that a merger partner more suitable than Newell
would have emerged.
*23  Following post-trial briefing and argument, the Court
wrote to the parties, as previewed at the conclusion of post-
trial oral argument, to advise that it would postpone the
issuance of its post-trial opinion in this case until our Supreme
Court issued its decision in Aruba.287 The parties submitted
brief (and unsolicited) letters regarding Aruba on April 30
and May 1, 2019, at which time the matter was submitted for
decision.
II. ANALYSIS
Delaware's appraisal statute, 8 Del. C. § 262(h) provides, in
part:
Through [the appraisal] proceeding, the Court shall
determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any
element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to
be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court
shall take into account all relevant factors.288
“Section 262(h) unambiguously calls upon the Court of
Chancery to perform an independent evaluation of ‘fair value’
at the time of a transaction ... [and] vests the Chancellor
and Vice Chancellors with significant discretion to consider
‘all relevant factors’ and determine the going concern value
of the underlying company.”289 “By instructing the court to
‘take into account all relevant factors’ in determining fair
value, the statute requires the Court of Chancery to give
fair consideration to ‘proof of value by any techniques or
methods which are generally considered acceptable in the
financial community and otherwise admissible in court.’ ”290
Since “ ‘[e]very company is different; [and] every merger
is different,’ the appraisal endeavor is ‘by design, a flexible
process.’ ”291
I have carefully considered all relevant factors. I have
weighed those factors according to the credible evidence
in the record and applied “accepted financial principles” as
derived from that evidence.292 To follow is my independent
evaluation of Jarden's fair value as informed by my findings
of fact.
A. Merger Price Less Synergies
Respondent has proffered the Merger Price less synergies
as a reliable indicator of fair value, and for good reason.
Our Supreme Court has stated, “a buyer in possession of
material nonpublic information about the seller is in a strong
position (and is uniquely incentivized) to properly value the
seller when agreeing to buy the company at a particular deal
price, and that view of value should be given considerable
weight by the Court of Chancery absent deficiencies in
the deal process.”293 This court has heeded the Supreme
Court's guidance and regularly rests its appraisal analysis
on the premise that when a transaction price represents
an unhindered, informed and competitive market valuation,
that price “is at least first among equals of valuation
methodologies in deciding fair value.”294
In PetSmart, I observed, “[a]fter years of striving for it, Vince
Lombardi finally arrived at the understanding that perfection
in human endeavors is not attainable.”295 “Even in the best
case, a process to facilitate the sale of a company, constructed
as it must be by the humans who manage the company and
their human advisors, will not be perfect.”296 With that said,
I am mindful of our Supreme Court's guidance in Dell, where
the Court observed that certain factors, including “fair play,
low barriers to entry, [and] outreach to all logical buyers,”
are reflective of the kind of “robust sale process” that will
discover a company's fair value.297
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*24  The “sale process” for Jarden, if one can call it that,
raises concerns. To be sure, there was no need for a full-blown
auction of Jarden. In this regard, Dr. Zenner's testimony,
corroborated by other evidence, was credible.298 Moreover,
there were signs of arms-length, provocative negotiating
between Jarden and Newell.299 This is not surprising given
that Jarden's negotiators owned millions of Jarden's shares
and had every incentive to negotiate a good deal.300 But the
evidence revealed a troubling theme. Franklin immediately
took charge and, consistent with a stereotypical “cut to the
chase” CEO mentality,301 he laid Jarden's cards on the table
before the negotiations began in earnest and before the Board
and its financial advisors had a chance to formulate a plan.
Petitioners are right to complain that Franklin's approach may
well have set an artificial ceiling on what Newell was willing
to pay.
Franklin did not inform the Board he was meeting with
Polk at the Back-to-School Meeting or the Boat Meeting,
and he certainly did not receive authority from the Board
to suggest a price (“beginning with a 6”) at which the
Board might agree to sell the Company.302 Franklin made
counteroffers unauthorized by the Board.303 He negotiated
his change-in-control compensation with no authorization
from (or knowledge of) the Board.304 And he recommended
Barclays as the lead financial advisor for the deal without fully
disclosing his prior substantial relationship with the bank, just
as he nudged the Board to hire UBS as a second banker as a
“kiss” in gratitude for its prior uncompensated work for the
Company.305
*25  As factfinder, these flaws in the sale process, coupled
with the fact that there was no effort to test the Merger
Price through any post-signing market check, raise legitimate
questions regarding the usefulness of the Merger Price as an
indicator of fair value.306 As explained below, the difficulty
in assessing the extent to which Newell ceded synergies to
Jarden in the Merger makes the Merger Price less synergies
an even less reliable indicator of fair value.
In Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software Inc., the court
set forth a useful framework to approach the appraisal
statute's mandate that the court appraise “the fair value
of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger
or consolidation.”307 BMC recommends a “two-step
analysis[:]” “first, were synergies realized from the deal; and
if so, were they captured by the sellers in the deal price?”308
There is no dispute here that synergies were realized in the
Merger, as one would expect when two strategic partners
combine.309 Indeed, the synergies created the “logic for the
deal” from Newell's perspective.310 The first announcement
of the Merger stated, “[Newell] anticipates incremental
annualized cost synergies of approximately $500 million over
four years.”311 This remained the case through the release of
the joint proxy statement.312 Internally, Newell believed the
$500 million estimate was conservative.313 Nevertheless, the
experts have focused on the expected synergies as disclosed
in the joint proxy statement ($500 million), and they have
assumed that estimate is accurate.314 In the absence of any
real expert analysis of the issue, I have no basis in the evidence
to depart from that assumption.
As for whether Jarden captured the synergies in the Merger,
the evidence is less clear. There is evidence in the trial record
that would suggest Newell believed it was not paying any
of the synergies at the $59.21 per share Merger Price.315
During negotiations, Polk told his board that if Newell could
“get the deal done between $60 and $65 [per share], we
are basically getting the synergies with no value ascribed to
them.”316 After the Merger, Polk further suggested that the
premium over market price that Newell paid in the Merger
was not for synergies but instead was for control of the
combined company.317 Polk explained, “Jarden shareholders
get a premium versus their current stock price for [Jarden].
The Newell shareholders get ownership of [Jarden], and
after the synergies are delivered, the future value creation
that comes through the new combination.”318 Even Franklin
questioned whether the premium to market price that Newell
paid was for control of the combined entity.319
*26  On the other hand, Jarden points out that there is
evidence Newell was keenly aware of synergies and that
it was incorporating synergies into its value thesis for the
Merger.320 Dr. Hubbard supported Jarden's view of the
evidence that Jarden stockholders realized the value of the
synergies by conducting two separate analyses. First, he
performed a “discounted value of cash flows” analysis, in
which the expected future cash flows from the synergies
(net of the costs to achieve them) were discounted to their
value as of the Merger Date, to conclude that the synergies
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had a value of $4.2 billion, or $17.43 per Jarden share.
This happens to line up nicely with the delta between
the unaffected market price ($48.31) and the Merger Price
($59.21), indicating that the delta, or premium, represented
expected synergies.321 He then prepared a market-based
analysis of the expected synergy value in which he observed
that the rise in stock price of both companies after the leak
of merger negotiations revealed that the market appreciated
the presence of significant synergies. The fact that Newell's
stock price fell when Jarden's rose after announcement of the
Merger indicates the market appreciated that the anticipated
synergies would accrue to the Jarden stockholders.322
Jarden bears the burden of demonstrating “what, if any,
portion of [the synergies] value was included in the price-per-
share ....”323 The evidence on this point stands in equipoise.
It is difficult to square Polk's contemporaneous assessment
of where the synergies would land with Newell's internal
valuation exercises and Dr. Hubbard's straightforward
analysis of the issue. Given the state of the evidence, I give
little weight to the Merger Price less synergies evidence
when assessing fair value.324 Not because I believe the
Merger created no synergies. And not because I believe that
Jarden stockholders probably did not receive the value of the
synergies that were created by the deal. I place less weight on
this market-based valuation approach in this case because the
sales process was not well-conceived or well-executed and
the expert analysis of the transaction synergies raised more
questions than it answered.
B. Unaffected Market Price
Jarden has proffered its unaffected stock trading price, $48.31
per share (the “Unaffected Market Price”), as strong evidence
of the Company's fair value.325 According to Jarden, “[t]his
value impounded the collective judgments of thousands of
stockholders, as well as the more than twenty professional
analysts that followed Jarden.”326 Jarden supports its position
that the Unaffected Market Price is indicative of fair value
with detailed analysis from Dr. Hubbard.327 Petitioners
elected not to counter that evidence with expert evidence of
their own.328 Instead, they attacked Dr. Hubbard's opinion
as lacking in doctrinal and factual foundation. For reasons
explained below, I find Dr. Hubbard's analysis of the
reliability of Jarden's Unaffected Market Price as an indicator
of fair value both credible and persuasive.
1. The Market for Jarden's Stock Was Efficient
*27  In an efficient stock market, “a company's market price
quickly reflects publicly available information.”329 In this
environment, the company's trading price “balances investors'
willingness to buy and sell the shares in light of [available]
information, and thus represents their consensus view as to
the value of the equity in the company.”330 Efficient markets
aggregate all available information and quickly digest new
information, which is then reflected by proportionate changes
in market price.331 When the market is efficient, the trading
price of a company's stock can be a proxy for fair value.332
As Dr. Hubbard explained, several factors support the
conclusion that Jarden's stock traded in a semi-strong efficient
market.333 The stock was traded on the New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”) and Jarden became a member of the
S&P 400 index in 2012.334 In 2015, Jarden's shares traded
with a daily and weekly average trading volume in the top
25% of the S&P 500.335 High trading volume contributes to
the efficiency of the market.336 Jarden's market capitalization
of approximately $10.2 billion placed it in the top 20% of
all publicly traded firms.337 High market capitalization leads
to greater “interest in the security being analyzed,” which, in
turn, “increases the likelihood that new information will be
quickly incorporated into the stock price.”338
Jarden had no controlling shareholder.339 In fact, Jarden
had a 94% public float.340 A high public float is another
factor indicating an efficient market for Jarden's stock
because the more holders of a security that are not insiders
with access to non-public information, the more likely
the market will demand that information be released for
public consumption.341 Jarden stock exhibited a “bid-ask
spread” of only 0.02%.342 A narrow bid-ask spread indicates
minimal information asymmetry between insiders and the
public markets and, as a result, higher market efficiency.343
Approximately twenty professional market analysts covered
and disseminated reports on Jarden in the year prior to
the Merger Date.344 Jarden exhibited no serial correlation,
meaning there were no patterns detached from events or news
from the Company that would enable the market to divine
future price movements based purely on past performance.345
Additionally, Jarden's Unaffected Market Price aligned with
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options market pricing, suggesting there were no arbitrage
opportunities for Jarden stock.346
*28  Dr. Hubbard summarized the factors allowing him to
conclude that Jarden's stock traded in a semi-strong efficient
market in a helpful chart:
For context, and to illustrate that Jarden's stock price
historically reacted appropriately to material information, Dr.
Hubbard performed an event study to trace how, in the two
years prior to the Merger, Jarden's stock price responded
quickly and appropriately to earnings announcements and
other performance guidance, even when the news was
unanticipated.347 In each instance, Dr. Hubbard traced the
public disclosure of material information, the reaction of
analysts to the information and the commensurate adjustment,
up or down depending upon whether the news was positive or
negative, in the trading price of the stock.348
The evidence shows that Jarden's stock reached a pre-Merger
peak of $56.25 on July 20, 2015, and then declined gradually
over the next few months in response to poor earnings
reports.349 The decline was marked by low quarterly growth
and it prompted Jarden to lower its guidance for the second
and third quarters of 2015.350 Jarden's stock price recovered
somewhat in the fourth quarter and closed at $48.31 on
December 4, 2015 (i.e., the Unaffected Market Price).351
After The Wall Street Journal article reported on the merger
negotiations the following Monday, Jarden's stock price rose
and continued to rise to $54.09 on December 14, 2015, the
day Jarden and Newell officially announced the Merger.352
The steady climb continued following the announcement and
then plateaued before the calendar year ended.353 Jarden's
stock price oscillated between $59.00 and $50.00 until early
March 2016.354 In March, as the negotiations finalized and
the Merger Date neared, Jarden's share price approached
but never exceeded the Merger Price of $59.21.355 As Dr.
Hubbard explained:
The fact that Jarden's stock price never closed above the
Merger Price is a strong indicator that fair value is no
greater than the Merger Price. If investors believed that
the Company was worth materially more, then one would
expect to see the market price exceeding the Merger Price
in anticipation of a topping bid. In more than five percent
of M&A deals since 2001, the merger arbitrage spread the
day after the merger announcement was negative, implying
that the market expected a topping bid.356
Newell's stock also traded in an efficient market and the
market's reaction to the announcement of the Merger with
respect to Newell's trading price provides further evidence
that the Unaffected Market Price is reflective of Jarden's
fair value.357 Newell's stock price jumped after the leak of
negotiations when the terms of the deal were unknown.358
The market reacted differently, however, when the terms of
the Merger were announced. Newell's stock price dropped
significantly (6.9%). Dr. Hubbard explained the significance:
“The initial positive reaction to the deal rumors suggests
that the market was hopeful that some value would accrue
to Newell, but after learning the terms of the deal and
additional information about synergies, the market reassessed
and shifted the value from Newell to Jarden.”359
*29  After carefully reviewing the evidence, I am satisfied
that Jarden's Unaffected Market Price is a powerful indicator
of Jarden's fair value on the Merger Date. Petitioners' attempts
to undermine this evidence, as explained below, were not
persuasive.
2. Petitioners Did Not Persuasively Rebut Jarden's
Market Evidence
Petitioners mount three challenges to the reliability of
Jarden's Unaffected Market Price: (a) as of the date fixed
for the Unaffected Market Price (December 4, 2015), the
market lacked material information concerning Jarden (i.e.,
information asymmetry) that skewed the trading price; (b) the
Unaffected Market Price must be adjusted to account for a
so-called “conglomerate discount” and a “minority discount;”
and (c) the Unaffected Market Price was stale by the time the
Merger closed on April 15, 2016.360 I address each in turn.
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a. Information Asymmetry
According to Dr. Zmijewski, Jarden's market-based evidence
should be disregarded because the market lacked material
information as of the date fixed for Jarden's Unaffected
Market Price.361 Dr. Zmijewski cited the decline in the
federal risk-free rate, the rise in Jarden's share price and the
divergence between Jarden management and market analysts'
projections for Jarden's future performance as reasons the
Unaffected Market Price was not a reliable indicator of
fair value.362 Importantly, Dr. Zmijewski also observed
that Jarden stockholders had no access to the November
Projections as of the date fixed for the Unaffected Market
Price. The evidence supports the factual predicates for these
observations, but it does not support a conclusion that the
absent facts resulted in the kind of information asymmetry
that would render the Unaffected Market Price unreliable.
As for the decline in the federal risk-free rate, Dr. Zmijewski
states that, “[a]ll else equal, the decline in the risk-free rate
results in an increase in Jarden's Fair Value,” and goes on
to argue that because the federal risk-free rate declined from
December 2015 to April 2016, Jarden's fair value must be
higher than the Unaffected Market Price.363 Interest rates
on U.S. Treasury 20-year constant maturity bills declined
19%, from 2.65% to 2.14%, between December 4, 2015 and
April 15, 2016.364 Dr. Hubbard conceded that, if “all else”
were, in fact, “equal,” as Dr. Zmijewski posited, then Jarden's
fair value would increase as the risk-free rate decreased.365
But then Dr. Hubbard exposed the flaw in Dr. Zmijewski's
elephant-sized assumption that “all else” remained “equal.”
Specifically, Dr. Hubbard referred directly to market data
showing that, as the interest rate on 20-Year Treasury Bonds
declined between December 2015 and April 2016, stock
prices in general, represented by the S&P 500 Market Index,
did not increase in response.366 Contrary to Dr. Zmijewski's
“all else equal” assumption, the evidence shows that the stock
market declined just as the risk-free rate declined.367 In other
words, the correlation that supports the supposed information
asymmetry is no correlation at all.
*30  Regarding the lack of consensus between Jarden
management and third-party analysts' projections, Dr.
Hubbard emphasized the qualitative difference between
unvarnished raw information tracking Jarden's performance
and well-reasoned opinions about Jarden's prospects.368
Jarden's revenue projections for 2016, 2017, and 2018 were
1.0%, 1.7% and 2.6% higher, respectively, than financial
analysts' consensus forecast.369 Jarden's EBITDA projections
for 2016, 2017 and 2018 were 1.3%, 6.6% and 9.0% higher,
respectively, than financial analysts' consensus forecasts.
Jarden's November Projections incorporated this data but
were not released to the public until March 2016, and thus
would not have been incorporated into the Unaffected Market
Price.370 But is this evidence of information asymmetry? Dr.
Hubbard hypothesized the answer is no.371
To test his hypothesis, Dr. Hubbard turned to his event
study. The November Projections were disclosed in the joint
proxy in March 2016. If the November Projections revealed
information not previously incorporated in Jarden's stock
price, Hubbard reasoned, then both Jarden and Newell's stock
price should have proportionately reflected that information.
In other words, if the November Projections justified more
value (according to Dr. Zmijewski substantially more value),
then Newell's stock price should have increased substantially
to reflect that Newell was acquiring Jarden at less than fair
value.372 But, of course, that is not what happened; Jarden's
stock price climbed while Newell's stock price dropped.373
Moreover, Jarden's April Projections lowered the Company's
financial guidance to forecasts more in line with the analysts'
earlier projections.374 Dr. Hubbard persuasively opined that
the April Projection's convergence with the analysts' forecasts
was a strong indication that the difference between the
November Projections (as disclosed in the joint proxy) and
the analysts' projections was not attributable to unreasonable
market pessimism, but instead showed that market analysts
had more accurately estimated Jarden's 2016 outlook than
Jarden's management (who may have been motivated by
factors other than actual anticipated results when making their
forecasts).375
The credible evidence reflects no information asymmetry.
The market was well informed and the Unaffected Market
Price reflects all material information.
b. The Conglomerate and Minority Discounts
Dr. Zmijewski also criticizes Dr. Hubbard's Unaffected
Market Price analysis because it does not account for Jarden's
massively diversified portfolio of operating companies (the
conglomerate discount) and does not adjust for embedded
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agency costs (the minority discount).376 Here again, Dr.
Zmijewski flags the issues but makes no attempt to quantify
their impact, if any.377
*31  As for the conglomerate discount, the evidence does not
support that this is even “a thing,” meaning it is not clear that
this notion is accepted within the academy or among valuation
professionals.378 With that said, there is evidence that
Jarden's unique structure and diversified portfolio did pose
valuation challenges. Newell's Tarchetti described Jarden as
a “fast-changing company” that was difficult to appraise, in
part, due to its complexity and tendency to grow and evolve
at any point in time.379 Even so, the Company's high trading
volume and the intense scrutiny paid it by market analysts
has convinced me that the market understood Jarden's holding
company structure as an operative reality, considered the high
overhead costs associated with decentralized management
and imputed those factors into Jarden's Unaffected Market
Price.380
The minority discount, likewise, does not fit here. For a
company without a controlling stockholder, the premise is
that the appraiser must consider the conflict of interest
between Company management and a diffuse stockholder
base and account for minority trading multiples.381 Setting
aside that Petitioners have offered no credible evidentiary
basis to quantify any minority discount here, I see no basis to
even try given that the foundation for applying the discount
has not been laid. Jarden's management was well known
to stockholders and well known to the market. But for the
Merger, they were not going anywhere as the Company
was not for sale.382 As Dr. Hubbard explained, under these
circumstances, Jarden's agency costs were embedded in its
operative reality and reflected in its Unaffected Market
Price.383
c. Staleness of the Unaffected Market Price
Petitioners also argue that the Unaffected Market Price was
stale as of the Merger Date.384 I disagree. There is no
evidence to suggest that Jarden gained value from the date set
for the Unaffected Market Price and the closing of the Merger,
or that the market was deprived of information that might
have been perceived as enhancing value. Indeed, following
a period where Jarden had been especially acquisitive, the
Company was experiencing declines in operating income
and net income and management was giving the Board
revised, more conservative projections for 2016.385 The April
Projections forecasted reduced revenue growth and increased
working capital investment for FY17–20.386 This is not a
case where the credible evidence reveals that the Unaffected
Market Price was demonstrably below Jarden's fair value as
of the Merger.
* * * * * * * * * *
After carefully considering the evidence, I find that the
Unaffected Market Price is a reliable indicator of Jarden's
value as a going concern on the Merger Date. I have given it
substantial weight in my assessment of fair value.
C. The Other Market Evidence
As Jarden was negotiating with Newell, it was also pursuing
an acquisition of Jostens. To raise capital for that deal, Jarden
initiated a share offering priced at $49.00 per share.387 At
the time, the stock was trading in the mid-$40s.388 When the
market reacted poorly to the Jostens acquisition, and the stock
price fell, the Board believed it needed to send a signal that the
Company and its management were optimistic about Jostens.
So it authorized a $50 million stock buyback,389 and it set the
price cap again at $49.00 because, after internal assessments,
it believed that price reflected Jarden's value.390 Ultimately,
Jarden repurchased 276,417 shares on November 2, 2015, at
an average price of $45.96 per share, and another 775,685
shares on November 3, 2015, at an average price of $48.05
per share.391 This evidence is by no means dispositive. But
it is persuasive evidence that, in the weeks leading up to the
leak of the merger negotiations, uncluttered by transactional
or forensic incentives, both the Company and the market saw
Jarden's value well below what Petitioners seek here.
D. Comparable Companies
*32  Both parties' experts performed comparable companies
analyses to estimate Jarden's value relative to sets of proposed
peer firms. Applying his comparable companies analysis, Dr.
Zmijewski concluded that Jarden's fair value on the Merger
Date, based on Jarden's 2016 forecasted EBITDA using the
90th, 75th and 50th percentiles of his peer set, was $81.44,
$70.49 and $66.30, respectively.392 Based on Jarden's 2017
forecasted EBITDA, the market multiples based-valuation
using the 90th, 75th and 50th percentiles of his peer set,
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revealed a per share value of $77.39, $72.20 and $65.56,
respectively.393 For his part, Dr. Hubbard disclaimed the
efficacy of a comparable companies valuation for Jarden, but
then performed his own comparable analysis for the sake
of completeness, resulting in a value range of $40.12 to
$55.21 per share.394 Before addressing the experts' divergent
analyses and conclusions, it is useful to review basic concepts,
separated from forensics.
1. The Comparable Companies Methodology
As a threshold matter, before a comparable companies
multiples analysis can be undertaken with any measure
of reliability, it is necessary to establish a suitable peer
group through appropriate empirical analysis.395 In fact,
nearly every text in the record states that the accuracy of a
multiples-based valuation depends entirely on the existence
of comparable peers:
• Holthausen & Zmijewski (JX 242): “While selecting
comparable companies might not appear to be too
difficult, we often quickly conclude that not many, if
any, companies are truly comparable to the company we
are valuing for purposes of a market multiple valuation
once we understand all the different dimensions of
comparability and begin to analyze the potential
comparable companies ... simply selecting close
competitors is not sufficient to ensure the companies
are comparable, as we observe a substantial amount of
variation in multiples within an industry.”396
• Koller (JX 2516): “Selecting the right peer group is
critical to coming up with a reasonable valuation using
multiples.”397
• Damodaran (JX 2515): “... finding similar and
comparable firms is often a challenge, and frequently we
have to accept firms that are different from the firm being
valued on one dimension or the other. When this is the
case, we have to either explicitly or implicitly control for
differences across firms on growth, risk, and cash flow
measures.”398
• Berk & DeMarzo (JX 2032): “Of course, firms are not
identical. Thus, the usefulness of a valuation multiple
will depend on the nature of the differences between
firms and the sensitivity of the multiples to these
differences.”399
McKinsey recommends beginning the peer group
identification process with the Standard Industrial
Classification (“SIC”) or Global Industry Classification
Standard (“GICS”) codes.400 While these codes are a good
starting point for selecting a peer group, the industry-specific
company lists they produce require significant refinement to
identify truly comparable firms.401
To isolate a relevant peer group from a larger industry data
set, the appraiser must identify firms with similar risk profiles,
costs of capital, return on invested capital and growth.402 It
is better to have a smaller number of peers that truly compete
in the same markets with similar products than including
aspirational or nearly comparable companies.403 In order
effectively to narrow down a list of potential comparables
according to growth and risk, the analysis must consider
whether the companies have similar “value drivers” as the
target.404 As Dr. Zmijewski described in his text:
*33  [A] company's product lines, customer types,
market segments, types of operation, and so forth are
all important aspects to consider when we identify
comparable companies. Even after all these are taken into
consideration, two companies can be in the same industry
yet not be comparable on all of the characteristics that are
important for a market multiple valuation.405
In addition, the finance literature advises against relying
on peers provided by the target company's management.
This reasoning reflects common sense; optimistic executives
often provide “aspirational peers” rather than companies that
actually compete head-to-head with their firm.406
The importance of selecting a proper peer set in the
performance of a proper comparable companies analysis
cannot be overstated. Because this threshold task is so
important, and yet so difficult, the valuation treatises
generally view the comparable companies methodology as
inferior to other methodologies: “a key shortcoming of the
comparables approach is that it does not take into account
the important differences among firms,” therefore “[u]sing
a valuation multiple based on comparables is best viewed
as a ‘shortcut’ to the discounted cash flow methods of
valuation.”407
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If, and only if, a proper peer set can be selected, the
next step in the comparable companies analysis is to
select an appropriate multiple and then determine where
on the distribution of peers the target company falls.408
The Enterprise Value to EBITDA multiples valuation (“EV/
EBITDA”) is widely accepted as the most reliable data
set for a comparable companies analysis.409 In this regard,
it appears that the preference is to use forward-looking
projections instead of a firm's historical earnings data.410
Forward-looking multiples are deemed more consistent with
the principles of valuation, especially in the context of
estimating the present value of a company as a going
concern.411 Projections generally exhibit less variation across
peer companies compared to historical data, and although
long-term earnings projections are favored, one- and two-year
forecasts are reliable when they uniformly represent the firm's
long-term prospects.412
*34  With these generally accepted features of a proper
comparable companies valuation in mind, I turn to the experts'
comparable companies valuation of Jarden.
2. The Experts Attempt But Fail to Select a Valid Peer Set
Both experts developed their peer set by drawing from the
peer set developed by Barclays in its valuation work for
the Company with regard to the Merger. They then made
adjustments based on their own sense of comparability.
For his part, Dr. Zmijewski conceded that he “did not
do any qualitative assessment of any inherent differences
between the Jarden business and the business of its peers
companies.”413 Giving such deference to the peer set selected
by management, without any meaningful, independent
assessment of comparability, is not useful and, frankly, not
credible.414 Dr. Zmijewski made no mention of GICS or SIC
codes in his report and there is no indication that he employed
them, or any other objective criteria, in his selection of a peer
set.415
Failing to ground his peer set in any objective methodology
is all the more problematic given Dr. Zmijewski's apparent
willingness to adjust the management/Barclays' peer set when
it suited him to yield a higher valuation for Jarden. As
stated in his report, Dr. Zmijewski excluded Kimberly-Clark
Corporation and Colgate-Palmolive Company, which were
both included in the Barclays list, because both companies
maintain a significantly larger market capitalization than
Jarden and the other comparables.416 The notion that a
company with a very large market capitalization is not a
true peer of a company with a relatively smaller market
capitalization has a certain lay appeal. But Dr. Zmijewski's
own text makes clear that “there is no theoretical model
we are aware of that includes size as a determinant of
market multiples.”417 It may well be that Kimberly-Clark
and Colgate-Palmolive are not “comparables” for Jarden, but
the absence of any meaningful analysis or explanation in Dr.
Zmijewski's report leaves the Court with no way to determine
if the exclusion was arbitrary or principled.418
*35  Before addressing Dr. Hubbard's peer set, it must
be emphasized that Dr. Hubbard does not sponsor the
comparable companies methodology as the appropriate
means by which to assess Jarden's fair value.419 His preferred
methodology is DCF.420 Nevertheless, Dr. Hubbard engaged
with Dr. Zmijewski on comparable companies and, not
surprisingly, reached a very different conclusion after doing
so.
Dr. Hubbard assessed Jarden's peers by using GICS codes.421
He then cited to over a dozen industry analyst reports that
corroborated his peer set, which included companies that were
larger and smaller than Jarden and companies that were not on
the Barclays list.422 Once he completed his peer set, however,
Dr. Hubbard emphasized his view that Jarden's unique and
highly diversified portfolio of businesses, its aggressively
acquisitive growth strategy and its holding company structure
made the selection of a valid peer set for a comparable
companies analysis a fundamentally flawed exercise since
Jarden “lack[ed] truly comparable peers.”423
After carefully reviewing the evidence, I am convinced that
Dr. Hubbard is correct—Jarden had no comparable peers, at
least not as developed in the credible evidence presented at
trial. Under these circumstances, the fact that Dr. Zmijewski
engaged in no real analysis when developing his peer set is
not surprising.424
Having found that the first, and most important, element of
a proper comparable companies analysis is lacking in this
record, I give the experts' comparable companies conclusions
no weight in my fair value determination.425 Accordingly, I
move next to the parties' competing DCF valuations.
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E. Discounted Cash Flow
*36  As I approach the parties' fantastically divergent
conclusions following their DCF analyses, I am mindful of
our Supreme Court's admonition that, tempting as it is to
select the entirety of one expert's analysis over the other's,
my review of the experts' opinions must not be presumptively
binary:
The role of the Court of Chancery has evolved over time
to the present requirement that the court independently
determine the value of the shares that are the subject
of the appraisal action. Even though today a Chancellor
may be faced with wildly divergent values presented by
the parties' experts, the acceptance of one expert's value,
in toto, creates the risk that the favored expert will be
accorded a status greater than that of the now eliminated
[expert appraiser]. This is not to say that the selection of
one expert to the total exclusion of another is, in itself,
an arbitrary act. The testimony of a thoroughly discredited
witness, expert or lay, is subject to rejection under the usual
standards which govern receipt of such evidence. The nub
of the present appeal is not merely that the Chancellor made
an uncritical acceptance of the evidence of SAP's appraiser
but that he announced in advance that he intended to choose
between absolutes.426
As I discuss below, in many important respects, the experts
have utilized very different inputs in their DCF models
leading to a substantial delta between their ultimate DCF
valuations—Dr. Zmijewski's DCF valuation produced a range
of $70.36 and $70.40 per share;427 Dr. Hubbard's DCF
valuation is $48.01 per share.428 The number and degree of
their differences has necessitated the lengthy discussion that
follows. For reasons I explain, I have adopted some of both
expert's inputs to construct my own DCF model. Based on
that model, my DCF valuation is $48.13 per share.
I begin by noting where the experts agree. First, they
agree that DCF is a widely used and industry-accepted
means of calculating the value of a corporation as a going
concern. Dr. Hubbard likes DCF best to value Jarden, while
Dr. Zmijewski uses his DCF valuation to corroborate his
comparable companies analysis.429 Both experts used the
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (“WACC”) method to
determine the appropriate discount rate. Both agreed that
the November Projections were the appropriate cash flow
forecasts upon which their DCF models should be based. Both
largely agreed on the required net investment to drive growth
through the year 2020, which is the last year included in
the November Projections. And both agreed that the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) was appropriate to calculate
Jarden's Cost of Equity. Because I see no basis in the evidence
to depart from these stipulations, I adopt them without further
analysis.
*37  The bulk of the experts' disagreements relate to how
Jarden will perform in the terminal period beyond the
November Projections' explicit forecasts.430 I address and do
my best to resolve each of the disagreements below.
1. Jarden's Future Cash Flows
As noted, both experts used the November Projections
for their DCF analyses.431 Even so, both made different
adjustments to the projections to calculate Jarden's unlevered
free cash flows.432 After reviewing the adjustments, I
find that their adjustments for EBITDA, depreciation and
amortization, and Dr. Zmijewski's adjustment for projected
taxes, are appropriate.433 These adjustments yield the






















Using Jarden's NOPAT, I have calculated Jarden's unlevered
free cash flows for each projection year by: (1) adding
back depreciation; (2) deducting Jarden's year-over-year
change in working capital; and (3) deducting Jarden's capital
expenditures. These adjustments track those made by Dr.
Hubbard (albeit at a 35% marginal rate),435 and yield the
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2. Jarden's Terminal Value
Jarden's terminal value is the value of the Company beyond
the discrete projection period as defined in a discounted future
earnings model (“Terminal Value”).436 In the context of the
experts' DCF analyses for Jarden, Terminal Value refers to
Jarden's estimated value taking into account all future cash
flows at the end of the November Projection's explicit forecast
period assuming a stable growth rate in perpetuity.437
Dr. Zmijewski's Terminal Value calculation and
accompanying analysis mostly relies on his comparable
companies analysis,438 which I have found not reliable for
reasons already stated. Dr. Hubbard used a formula developed
by McKinsey & Co. to calculate Jarden's Terminal Value. The
McKinsey formula involves dividing the value of cash flow
in the Terminal Period by the difference between the Discount
Rate (the rate at which future cash flows are discounted to
present) and Jarden's Terminal Growth Rate.439 According
to Dr. Hubbard, this formula generally provides that “all
else remaining equal,” a company's terminal value is larger
when cash flow is high, and the discount rate is low or the
growth rate is high.440 The “all else remaining equal” caveat,
Hubbard explains, assumes that increased growth will be
supported by increased investment which, in turn, reduces
cash flow.441 In other words, increasing investment in the
Terminal Period will proportionately reduce Jarden's cash
flow and thereby lower Jarden's measurable value in the
Terminal Period. To calculate Jarden's Terminal Value, it is
necessary to estimate its Terminal Growth Rate, Terminal
Investment Rate and Discount Rate.
a. Terminal Growth Rate
*38  “Of all the inputs into a discounted cash flow
valuation model, none creates as much angst as estimating the
[terminal] growth rate. Part of the reason for it is that small
changes in the [terminal] growth rate can change the terminal
value significantly[.]”442 The terminal growth rate (“TGR”)
describes Jarden's long-term growth in revenue, earnings and
cash flow in the Terminal Period, which includes the years
starting in 2021 and onward. Since acquisitions are typically
not considered in organic growth rate calculations,443 a
key question is whether Jarden's several tuck-in acquisitions
should be included in the TGR.444
Both experts measure Jarden's TGR based on estimates of
U.S. nominal GDP growth and long-term economic inflation.
This method makes sense and is generally accepted.445 The
experts disagreed, however, as to what forecast sources
provide the most useful data.446
Dr. Zmijewski derived a 2.1% projected long-term inflation
rate from four estimates of U.S. economic outlooks and
an expected nominal GDP growth rate of 4.3% from
three projections of U.S. GDP growth.447 Based on these
projections, Dr. Zmijewski applied the midpoint of 3.2%,
which he asserts is a reasonable long-term growth rate
for Jarden.448 Dr. Zmijewski's TGR analysis included an
assessment of the Company's acquisition-driven and organic
growth, and the results showed Jarden's historic organic
growth rate to be roughly 3.1%.449 As corroboration, Dr.
Zmijewski emphasized that key players in the Merger
projected that Jarden would grow between 2.0% to 4.0%
annually in perpetuity.450
For his Composite DCF calculation, Dr. Zmijewski used
the 2.1% projected U.S. inflationary growth rate as Jarden's
TGR.451 Dr. Zmijewski explained he used U.S. inflation
as Jarden's TGR as a “conservative” measure because the
Composite DCF relies on calculations supplemented by
comparable companies data, and Jarden's long-term growth
was estimated to be much higher than any of the companies
in Dr. Zmijewski's peer set.452 For his Jarden-Specific DCF
analysis, Dr. Zmijewski set Jarden's TGR at 3.2%, which he
suggested conforms to the other Jarden-only measurements
and calculations in that valuation.453
Dr. Hubbard's report set Jarden's TGR at 2.5% based on
several inflation and nominal GDP growth forecasts for the
U.S. economy and the European Union's Eurozone.454 He
noted that his TGR comports with the TGR utilized by
Goldman Sachs and Centerview in advising Newell, both of
which used a TGR of 2.0% in their valuations of Jarden.455
He also pointed to analyst reports by Deutsche Bank and
RBC Capital that estimated Jarden's TGR at 1.5% and 2.5%,
respectively.456 Finally, he noted that his TGR is consistent
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with Jarden's historic organic growth, which he determined
to be 2.2% annually.457 With all these factors considered,
Dr. Hubbard concluded that his 2.5% TGR falls squarely
between his estimated range of inflation and nominal GDP
and aligns well with Jarden's historic organic growth when
fairly adjusted for “tuck-in” acquisitions.458
*39  Dr. Zmijewski took issue with Dr. Hubbard's
adjustments for “tuck-ins” because the adjustments result in
double counting certain companies that did not fit Jarden's
definition of a “tuck-in.”459 Dr. Hubbard conceded this
error, revised his analysis and found Jarden's organic, non-
acquisitive growth rate to be 3.2% annually.460 Despite his
upward revision to Jarden's historic organic growth, Dr.
Hubbard did not change his 2.5% TGR estimate.461
Jarden's “tuck-in” acquisitions, although relatively small in
scale, are acquisition-driven growth, not organic growth.462
Accordingly, Dr. Hubbard's attempt to account for “tuck-in”
acquisitions when estimating Jarden's TGR is well taken. Dr.
Hubbard's reluctance, however, to acknowledge the impact
of his organic growth rate miscalculation on his estimate of
Jarden's TGR is not.463 Moreover, considering Dr. Hubbard's
revised 3.2% historic organic growth rate in light of his
economic research supporting long-run inflation in the range
of 2.0% annually, and nominal GDP growth in the range of
4.07% annually, with a midpoint of roughly 3.04%,464 Dr.
Hubbard's 2.5% TGR is not supported.
Dr. Zmijewski calculated Jarden's historic organic growth
rate to be 3.1%.465 His economic research supported U.S.
long-run inflation at 2.1% annually and nominal GDP growth
at 4.3% annually.466 And his estimates are within one-
or two-tenths of a percentage point of Dr. Hubbard's. The
midpoint of each experts' inflation and GDP estimates is
approximately 3.1%, which aligns with Dr. Hubbard's 3.2%
revised historic organic growth rate and Dr. Zmijewski's 3.2%
midpoint TGR in his Jarden-Specific DCF.467 The literature
recommends a conservative approach to estimating long-
term growth rates for a DCF valuation, in recognition that
many companies experience cyclical growth in relation to the
overall economy.468 Jarden was considered a GDP growth
business.469
Based on these factors, and the credible evidence in the trial
record, I apply a 3.1% TGR. In my view, this reflects the most
credible aspects of the experts' analyses and comports with
the most persuasive view of Jarden's historic growth.
b. Terminal Investment Rate
The experts' disagreement over the terminal investment rate
(“TIR”) accounts for 87% of the disparity in their DCF
valuations.470 In other words, of the $22.39 difference
between Dr. Hubbard's DCF per share value of $48.01 and
Dr. Zmijewski's DCF per share value of $70.40, $19.56 is
attributable to the disagreement over Jarden's TIR. After
carefully considering the experts' analyses of TIR, and
exposing what I believe to be flaws in both, I have determined
that an appropriate TIR for Jarden is 27.75%.
*40  The disagreement between the experts boils down
to whether Dr. Hubbard improperly relied upon accounting
theory when calculating TIR.471 Dr. Zmijewski's approach
to Jarden's TIR aligns, in concept, with the Bradley-Jarrell
Plowback Formula, which provides, in broad terms, that
the rate of reinvestment must be measured by what is
realistically required to drive real growth.472 Real growth,
under the plowback paradigm, is measured by the delta
between the company's growth rate and inflationary growth,
which is driven by the greater economy and not cash
reinvestment.473 In other words, as Jarden's growth slowed
over time and became steadier, the Company required less
capital expenditure to drive real growth because a greater
percentage of its overall growth was driven by inflation
and broader economic factors. According to Dr. Zmijewski,
because Jarden was a steady-growth company that expected
lower growth in the Terminal Period, it required a much lower
TIR, which he calculated at only 4.9%.474
Dr. Hubbard calculated TIR by applying a formula from
McKinsey & Co.475 The McKinsey formula posits that
a company's return on invested capital (“ROIC”) should
converge towards its WACC over time.476 The formula rests
on the premise that a company operating in a competitive
industry will not “have both high and rising forever returns
on invested capital.”477 Applying the McKinsey formula,478
Dr. Hubbard used 2.5% as his TGR and 7.38% as his WACC/
ROIC, yielding a TIR of 33.9%.479
Dr. Zmijewski expressed four principal criticisms of Dr.
Hubbard's application of the McKinsey formula.480 First,
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according to Dr. Zmijewski, Dr. Hubbard incorrectly assumes
that any new investment Jarden made starting in 2021 would
not create any value.481 Second, Dr. Zmijewski believes
Dr. Hubbard improperly defined investments to include only
working capital and capital expenditures, which, according
to Dr. Zmijewski, is the accounting definition of investments
(meaning “what you put on a balance sheet”) that does not
account for real world economics.482 In other words, Dr.
Hubbard's definition of investment excludes research and
development, advertising and human capital expenditures that
would create value for Jarden in years beyond 2021.483 Third,
Dr. Hubbard's definition of net investment as investment
above depreciation is, again, an accounting definition that
does not fit when calculating TIR.484 Fourth, Dr. Hubbard
improperly calculated WACC by “using accounting rates of
return” instead of “economic rates of return,” which do “not
measure the same thing.”485
*41  Dr. Hubbard's testimony that, in competitive industries,
the return on new invested capital should equal the company's
WACC was credible, and it is supported by the valuation
treatises.486 Although I found credible Dr. Hubbard's well-
reasoned premise that companies like Jarden cannot maintain
growth without sufficient investment to drive growth above
inflation over time, his relatively high TIR raises at least
yellow flags. At first glance, the empirical analysis Dr.
Hubbard undertook to support his 33.9% TIR appears
reasonable, particularly given Jarden's historic investment
rates, which averaged roughly 26.9% of comparable growth
over six years.487 But why study six years here when Dr.
Hubbard's TGR estimation was premised on five years of
Jarden's historic growth?488 By including the sixth year,
2010, in his calculation, Dr. Hubbard was able to reach a
significantly higher number for Jarden's historical average
growth. After excluding the 2010 investment rate of 64.3%,
Jarden's five-year average investment rate is 21.6%.
In view of Jarden's five-year 21.6% average historic
investment rate, Dr. Zmijewski's 4.6% TIR is too low; it
unreasonably assumes rising ROIC for more than 40 years
into the Terminal Period, unreasonably assumes all new
investment in the Terminal Period will be comprised entirely
of working capital, and is based on a methodology that
conflicts with the valuation goal of striking a balance between
investment and growth.489 The November Projection's
forecast of net investment in 2021 at 9.8%, likewise, stands
out as low relative to Jarden's five-year average investment
rate. The midpoint of Dr. Hubbard's 33.9% TIR and Jarden
management's projected 9.8% TIR is roughly 21.8%. With
a calculated TGR of 3.1%, which coincides with Jarden's
historic organic growth rate, the appropriate TIR should
reflect Jarden's historic investment rate but account for a
slight increase to accommodate sustained growth in the
Terminal Period. The credible evidence, in my view, supports
a TIR for Jarden of 27.75%.490
c. Jarden's Weighted Average Cost of Capital/Discount
Rate
As previously stated, both experts' DCF models used Jarden's
WACC as the input for the Discount Rate in the DCF
formula.491 The Discount Rate converts Jarden's future cash
flows from the November Projections to present value as of
the Merger Date.492 WACC reflects Jarden's cost of equity
and debt financing and the relative weight of each in Jarden's
capital structure.493 Given that a DCF valuation is meant to
calculate Jarden's value as a going concern, the components
relied upon to calculate WACC should represent Jarden's
prospective outlook.494 The experts agreed on one of the
relevant inputs to calculate Jarden's WACC, the risk-free rate
of return. They differed, however, in their respective estimates
of Jarden's capital structure, beta, equity risk premium, and
whether a size premium was appropriate.495 I address each
issue below.
*42  The application of a discount rate to financial
projections converts the target company's future income
stream at its expected opportunity cost of capital to its present
value.496 A company's WACC represents the cost (to the
company) of financing its business operations; it comprises
the weighted average of the company's cost of debt and
equity:497
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i. Jarden's Capital Structure
A company's capital structure indicates what percentage of its
activities is financed by debt and what percentage is financed
by equity.498 Determining the correct capital structure is
essential to WACC because without a clear picture of a
company's debt-to-equity ratio, the cost of financing future
operations will be improperly weighted.499
Both experts recognized the impact of the substantial amount
of convertible debt in Jarden's capital structure.500 Jarden's
convertible debt conceptually existed as both debt and equity
components in its capital structure, and both experts valued
the debt and equity components of Jarden's convertible notes
separately.501
Dr. Zmijewski calculated Jarden's capital structure based on
Jarden's median capital structure ratios in the last four quarters
before December 4, 2015.502 According to the previous year's
ratios, Dr. Zmijewski selected a Jarden capitalization ratio of
69% combined equity and 31% debt.503
For his part, Dr. Hubbard examined Jarden's capital structure
ratio for the five years prior to the Merger.504 He noted that
Jarden maintained a debt level of roughly 50% from the last
quarter of 2010 through 2011, but beginning in 2012, Jarden's
debt to equity ratio began shifting due to Jarden's increased
acquisition activity.505 As Jarden stepped up acquisitions
between 2012 and 2015, its total debt nearly doubled but its
equity value expanded in even greater proportions.506 By the
third quarter of 2015, Jarden's market capitalization nearly
tripled and its capital structure had shifted from nearly a
50:50 ratio to 37.5% debt and 62.5% equity.507 Following
the Yankee Candle acquisition in 2013, Jarden's goal was to
de-lever itself to three times its bank leverage-to-EBITDA
ratio.508
Dr. Hubbard observed that, in order to capture Jarden's value
as a going concern, the capital structure ratio used in the
WACC analysis should reflect Jarden's long-run target capital
structure.509 He concluded that, because Jarden was on a
trajectory of lower debt leading up to the Merger, and its long-
term goal was to achieve an even lower debt-to-equity ratio,
Jarden's average debt in the one-year period before the Merger
was the best estimate of Jarden's target capital structure for
WACC.510 Based on that judgment, Dr. Hubbard calculated a
capital structure equal to Jarden's one-year average ratios of
36.1% debt and 63.9% equity.511
*43  The valuation literature suggests that because of the
increased use of convertible securities, assessing the debt-to-
EBITDA ratio alongside capital structure helps build a more
comprehensive picture of a company's leverage risk.512 Both
experts were cognizant of the effect of Jarden's convertible
securities on its capital structure, and Dr. Hubbard went on
to consider changes in Jarden's debt-to-EBITDA ratio and the
corresponding effect on Jarden's future leverage risk.513
The two experts relied on one year of debt-to-equity
information to calculate their capital structure estimates. Dr.
Zmijewski calculated Jarden's capital structure according to
its median debt-to-equity ratios prior to the unaffected trading
date of December 4, 2015.514 That is where Dr. Zmijewski's
analysis ended. Dr. Hubbard made a similar assessment of
Jarden's capital structure as it stood just prior to the unaffected
trading date, but did not end his analysis there. Instead,
Dr. Hubbard assessed Jarden's target debt-to-EBITDA ratios,
which reflected the capital structure Jarden set as a forward-
looking goal well before merger negotiations began.515
This further analysis makes sense. The cost of capital analysis
should be based on target debt-to-equity ratios instead of
current ratios.516 Target capital structure represents the
ratios expected to prevail over the life of the business and
the literature stresses that relying solely on current capital
structure can distort the cost of capital analysis.517 Overly
optimistic capital structure targets must be accounted for
if they are expected to take many years to be realized.518
Jarden's target capital structure and debt-to-EBITDA ratio
was not overly optimistic under the circumstances. As of
2015's third quarter, Jarden's leverage had shifted downward
to 37.5% as its market capitalization grew,519 and Jarden
planned to continue its deleveraging strategy until it reached
a debt-to-EBITDA ratio of 3.0x.520 Adjusting Jarden's 37.5%
debt as of September 30, 2015, to conform to its target
leverage ratio would lower Jarden's debt ratio to 33.3%.521
Based on the dramatic swings in Jarden's capital structure in
the five years prior to the Merger, a 4.2% deleveraging was
well within Jarden's ability to achieve in the short term.
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Because Dr. Hubbard's analysis conservatively includes
Jarden's forward-looking target capital structure in his
capitalization analysis, I adopt Dr. Hubbard's capital structure
of 63.9% equity and 36.1% debt.522 Accordingly, I adopt
Hubbard's estimated equity and debt values for Jarden at
$10,596,000,000 and $5,043,000,000, respectively.523
ii. Jarden's Cost of Debt
A company's cost of debt reflects “the current cost to the
firm of borrowing funds to finance projects.”524 Generally, it
is derived from three variables: (1) the riskless rate, (2) the
default risk (and associated default spread) of the company
and (3) the tax advantage associated with debt.525
*44  Dr. Zmijewski estimated Jarden's after-tax Cost of Debt
at 2.8%.526 He arrived at this figure by calculating a Debt
Beta of 0.36 based on Moody's Long-Term Corporate Family
Rating of Ba3 for Jarden as of December 4, 2015, and the Duff
& Phelps debt beta estimate for Ba debt as of March 2016.527
Dr. Hubbard estimated Jarden's Cost of Debt based on a tax
adjusted yield to maturity rate of 5.30%.528 This yielded a
Cost of Debt of 3.2%.529
I agree with Dr. Zmijewski that calculating the cost of below-
investment-grade debt by using yield to maturity sets the cost
of debt too high.530 I adopt his Cost of Debt of 2.8%
iii. Jarden's Tax Rate
Jarden's tax rate is 35%, which is the top marginal corporate
tax rate for U.S. companies at the time of the Merger.531
iv. Jarden's Cost of Equity
Establishing an accurate Cost of Equity is an essential
subcomponent of Jarden's WACC. Both experts used the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (“CAPM”) to calculate Jarden's
cost of equity capital.532 This approach calculates Jarden's
risk separately from systematic risk to produce a reliable
estimate of Jarden's Cost of Equity.533 CAPM has four
components: the risk-free rate, equity beta, equity risk
premium, and if necessary, a size premium.534 Following
CAPM, a company's cost of equity is calculated as follows:535
• The Risk-Free Rate
The only point of agreement between the experts in the
WACC analysis is the risk-free rate of return. Both experts set
their analyses' risk-free rate at the 20-year constant maturity
U.S. Treasury Bonds return as of the Merger.536 That rate
was 2.14%.537 Relying on 20-year U.S. Treasury Bonds for
the risk-free rate is universally accepted practice in corporate
valuation.538
• Beta
Beta, in short, is a measurement of the systemic risk that
a particular security adds to a market portfolio.539 The
consensus from the corporate finance literature in the record is
that the conventional approach for estimating equity beta for a
publicly traded company, like Jarden, is through a regression
analysis of the historical returns of its stock against the returns
of a market index.540 In other words, equity beta is derived
by assessing a stock's sensitivity to and correlation with
changes in the aggregate market. A beta regression analysis
requires three parameter-setting choices. First, the time period
for measuring returns must be established.541 Second, the
return interval at which measurements will be taken over the
duration of the designated time period must be specified.542
Third, an appropriate market index must be identified that
will represent the cumulative market over time as a control to
measure the target company's market price.543
*45  The experts disagreed on the relevant time periods and
return intervals to use in their regression analyses. From the
evidence, it appears the most appropriate (and commonly
used) parameters are two- or five-year time periods and
weekly or monthly return intervals.544
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The control market index should be one developed from the
exchange where the target company's stock trades.545 For
companies traded on the NYSE, like Jarden, it is reasonable
to use either the NYSE Composite or the S&P 500 Index.546
The experts agreed that the S&P 500 is an appropriate market
index and both used the S&P 500 as their control to measure
Jarden.547
In addition, both experts relied on Jarden's historical market
returns data and estimated Jarden-specific betas. Yet, they
disputed whether it was necessary to balance Jarden's beta
with betas estimated from historical returns of comparable
companies.
In his report, Dr. Zmijewski calculated two equity betas to use
in his Jarden-Specific DCF and Composite DCF analyses. To
estimate Jarden's beta as of the Merger Date, Dr. Zmijewski
measured the equity beta for Jarden and for each of a list
of comparable companies based on five years of weekly
returns ending on the Merger Date.548 He then performed a
regression analysis for each company against the S&P 500
for the same period that showed Jarden's unlevered beta was
1.04 and that the unlevered beta for his comparable companies
(plus Jarden) was 0.86.549 Finally, he made adjustments
to account for Jarden's cash and other financial assets and
relevered each beta to produce a Jarden-specific equity beta
of 1.24 (the “Jarden-Specific Beta”) and a combined equity
beta for his comparable companies (plus Jarden) of 1.01 (the
“Composite Beta”).550
Dr. Hubbard's regression analysis yielded an equity beta
of 1.18 (the “Hubbard Beta”) that was based on Jarden's
daily returns for one year ending on December 4, 2015.551
Unlike Dr. Zmijewski, Dr. Hubbard did not balance his
Jarden-specific beta regression analysis with beta estimates of
comparable companies. Instead, he regressed Jarden's single
year daily returns against the S&P 500 during the one-year
period and calculated an unlevered beta of 0.771.552 Like Dr.
Zmijewski, he then adjusted for cash and financial assets and
re-levered the beta to produce a Jarden equity beta of 1.18.553
Dr. Hubbard also calculated Jarden-specific betas from two
years of weekly returns and five years of monthly returns,
but ultimately decided to use the single year daily returns
beta to mitigate the potential confounding effects of several
large acquisitions Jarden completed in the five years prior to
the Merger.554 Dr. Hubbard explained that he chose the year
ending on December 4, 2015, in order to avoid contaminating
his regression analysis with news of the possible merger.555
*46  The literature in the record supports the use
of comparable companies in a beta regression because
companies in the same industry face similar “operating
risks” and therefore should have similar operating betas.556
This, of course, assumes that “truly” comparable peers
exist that can meaningfully be compared to the target
company.557 Here again, Dr. Zmijewski failed convincingly
to demonstrate that his comparable companies shared
similar risk profiles with Jarden.558 As Dr. Hubbard
persuasively testified, Dr. Zmijewski provided no analysis
or discussion to support this assumption.559 Without a
thorough explanation and corroborating evidence of how
Dr. Zmijewski's comparable companies had risk profiles
comparable to Jarden's “complex”560 and “unique”561
structure and business model, I am disinclined to consider on
Dr. Zmijewski's Composite Beta.
Jarden's stock consistently traded in the upper quartile of
market volume on the NYSE from 2011 to 2015.562 And
its share price had a positive correlation with the market, as
defined by the S&P 500, throughout the same time period.563
With this in mind, I am persuaded that Dr. Hubbard's decision
to use daily interval measurements is reasonable, and his
opinion that Jarden's market returns data provide a reliable
measurement of Jarden's beta is supported by the literature in
the record.564
Dr. Hubbard corroborated his calculated beta with a second
regression using two-year weekly returns that yielded
a Jarden-specific beta of 1.22.565 Dr. Zmijewski's beta
estimates were derived from a five-year period of weekly
returns, and his Jarden-specific analysis produced a beta of
1.24 for Jarden alone.566 The spread between Dr. Hubbard's
beta and Dr. Zmijewski's Jarden-specific beta is 0.06, which,
according to the literature, suggests that the Jarden-specific
beta estimates have a low error rate across different time and
interval measurements.567 A narrow error rate between firm-
specific beta estimates of different intervals and time periods
indicates the estimates are converging on the company's true
beta.568
Moreover, it is important to note that, when estimating beta,
the goal is to evaluate Jarden's future beta, and by extension,
- 286 -
In re Appraisal of Jarden Corporation, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 28
the sensitivity of Jarden's share price to future market risk
as predicted by its historical performance.569 Because betas
generally converge on the general market beta (1.0) over
time,570 and Jarden, by all indicators, was a mature, highly
traded company, I am satisfied that Dr. Hubbard's beta (1.18)
is a reasonable estimate of Jarden's share price sensitivity to
future market risk.
• Equity Risk Premium
*47  Equity Risk Premium (“ERP”) “captures the
compensation per unit of risk that investors demand in order
to hold risky investments rather than riskless investments.”571
The experts' disagreement over the proper methodology
for estimating Jarden's ERP reflects the lack of consensus
regarding this issue within the valuation community at
large.572 One aspect of the broader debate that has played
out here is whether to approach ERP as Long-Term Historical
ERP, Supply-Side ERP, or an adjusted hybrid ERP derived
from the available data. As explained by Dr. Hubbard, when
appraisers estimate ERP from Long-Term Historical ERP,
they consult historical data regarding stock premiums, in
his case from 1926 through 2015.573 As explained by Dr.
Zmijewski, Supply-Side ERP incorporates adjustments to the
Long-Term Historical ERP to account for a long-term decline
in risk premiums that upwardly bias the Long-Term Historical
rate in order more effectively to represent recent market
conditions.574
Dr. Zmijewski set Jarden's ERP at the Supply-Side ERP
estimate of 6.03%.575 Dr. Hubbard determined the proper
ERP to be 6.47%, which is the mid-point between the
Long-Term Historical ERP and Supply-Side ERP.576 After
considering the evidence, I am satisfied that Dr. Zmijewski's
estimate of ERP reflects a more principled approach. First,
there is strong support for the use of the forward-looking
Supply-Side ERP in the valuation literature.577 Second, as
Dr. Zmijewski persuasively observes, Dr. Hubbard's “mid-
point” ERP estimate is unexplained and appears to lack any
methodological foundation.578
• Size Premium
Dr. Zmijewski opined that a size premium must be
incorporated in the calculation of Jarden's equity cost
of capital given that, according to the Duff & Phelps
classification, Jarden is within the second decile of public
companies, which justifies a size premium of 0.57%.579 Dr.
Hubbard implied that a Size Premium was not necessary but
provided no credible explanation for that position.580 The
valuation texts in the record make the point that beta captures
some, but not all of a company's size premium and that a
size premium is an empirically observed correction to the
CAPM.581 I agree with Dr. Zmijewski and the literature that
the CAPM should include a size premium when appropriate,
as here, and adopt his size premium of 0.57% for Jarden.
* * * * * * * * * *
Dr. Zmijewski calculated a Composite Cost of Equity, but for
reasons previously stated, I have disregarded estimates based
on Jarden's so-called comparable companies. Dr. Zmijewski
calculated a Jarden-specific Cost of Equity at 10.21%.582 Dr.
Hubbard calculated Jarden's Cost of Equity at 9.74%.583 In
my view, for reasons stated, neither view lines up entirely
with the credible evidence. Accordingly, I have calculated
Jarden's Cost of Equity with the following CAPM inputs
that reflect what I deem proven by a preponderance of the
evidence: Dr. Hubbard's Beta of 1.18, Dr. Zmijewski's Equity-
Risk Premium of 6.03%, Dr. Zmijewski's Size Premium of
0.57% and both experts' risk-free rate of 2.14%. With these
inputs, I have calculated Jarden's Cost of Equity to be 9.83%.
Jarden's Calculated WACC: Dr. Zmijewski calculated a
Jarden-Specific WACC of 7.88%.584 Dr. Hubbard calculated
a WACC of 7.38%.585 Once again, for reasons stated, I have
found that neither experts' calculated WACC is supported
entirely by the credible evidence. Instead, I calculate WACC
with the following inputs: a 9.83% Cost of Equity, a 2.8%
Cost of Debt, a 35% marginal tax rate and a capital structure
of 63.9% equity and 36.1% debt. These inputs yield a WACC
of 6.94% for Jarden.586 Thus, I adopt a Discount Rate of
6.94%.587
3. The Final Calculation of Terminal Value
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Based on the credible evidence, I calculate Jarden's terminal
value to be $17.7 billion, using the following equation:588
In order to arrive at the unlevered free cash flow for year
2021, I subtracted the predicted revenue for 2021 from the
predicted capital expenditures for 2021.589 The predicted
revenue for 2021 is $12.9 billion, 4.964% higher than
the 2020 revenue.590 The predicted capital expenditure for
2021 is $334 million, 2.6% higher than the 2020 capital
expenditure.591
4. The DCF Calculation of Fair Value
Using 6.94% as the Discount Rate, I calculate Jarden's
enterprise value using the following formula:592
The final adjusted enterprise value is $16.6 billion.593
5. Jarden-Specific Adjustments to the DCF Valuation
*49  In order to determine the final share price under a DCF
approach, the appraiser must account for Jarden's excess cash
and debt in its enterprise value.594 Dr. Hubbard additionally
adjusts for tax effects related to future profits not captured
by tax rates, liability from net unrecognized tax benefits and
pensions.595 I do not find any of Dr. Hubbard's arguments for
these additional adjustments persuasive and, in any event, his
proposed further adjustments have a marginal impact on the
final share value.596
a. Excess Cash
Companies commonly keep liquid cash in order to conduct
their operations.597 If the company holds more cash than
necessary, the surplus is a source of value to the equity holders
and must be added to the DCF valuation.598 Jarden held $799
million of cash and cash equivalents at the end of the first
quarter of 2016.599 As of the Merger, Jarden required $50
million in cash for working capital purposes.600 The excess
cash balance, or the difference between the total cash and the
required cash, is $749 million, which I add to the enterprise
value.
b. Nonconvertible Debt
As of March 31, 2016, Jarden's non-convertible debt totaled
$5.04 billion.601 Debt is a claim on the assets of the firm
and must, therefore, be subtracted from the DCF enterprise
value.602
c. Convertible Debt
To measure the value of Jarden's unconverted convertible
notes at the Merger Date, Dr. Hubbard uses a standard options
pricing methodology to estimate the embedded warrants
value since they are economically analogous to an option on
Jarden's common stock.603 This formula relies on various
inputs for each series of notes, including the time remaining
until maturity, the conversion price, the current value of
Jarden's stock, the risk-free rate and the expected volatility
of Jarden's stock returns.604 Using these inputs, Dr. Hubbard
estimated the equity components of the convertible notes to be
$0.71 billion in total at the Merger Date.605 He further valued
the debt component of the convertible notes by discounting
the remaining coupons and principal value of each note at
Jarden's 5.3% cost of debt. In total, the value of the debt
component of the convertible notes is $1.00 billion. The
total value of Jarden's convertible securities is the sum of
the debt and equity components. At the Merger Date, the
value of Jarden's convertible debt totaled $1.71 billion.606 Dr.
Hubbard's approach was conservative, made sense and I adopt
it here.
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6. Number of Shares
I calculate the shares outstanding, following Dr. Zmijewski's
calculation,607 by subtracting the Jarden stock awards
issuable to executives in connection with the merger
transactions and the Jarden common stock expected to
be issued upon assumed conversion of outstanding Jarden
convertible notes from the total estimated shares of Jarden's
common stock entitled to the Merger consideration. With
these inputs, the total amount of outstanding shares and
restricted stock units as of the Merger was 219.9 million
common shares.608
7. Equity Value per Share from DCF Analysis
*50  After adding non-operating assets to the enterprise
value, and subtracting non-operating liabilities, Jarden's
equity value as of the Merger Date was $10.59 billion. On a
per share basis, the DCF valuation is $48.13.
REMAINDER OF PAGE INTENTIALLY LEFT BLANK
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8. The DCF Valuation Comports With the Market
Evidence
As indicated above, I have determined that the Unaffected
Market Price, $48.31, is a reliable indicator of Jarden's fair
value as of the Merger Date. While I have questioned the
reliability of the Merger price less synergies approach, I
recognize that the most reliable estimate of fair value under
that approach is approximately $46.21. My DCF valuation
yields a fair value of $48.13. What stands out here, of course,
is that Petitioners' proffered estimate of fair value for Jarden
of $71.35 is, to put it mildly, an outlier.
Based on the preponderance of evidence, I am satisfied
that the Unaffected Market Price is the best evidence of
Jarden's fair value on the Merger Date. Insofar as I am
obliged to articulate a principled, evidence-based explanation
for the delta between the Unaffected Market Price and the
DCF valuation (here, $0.18 per share), I am satisfied the
difference reflects the subjective imperfections of the DCF
methodology. The DCF valuation corroborates the most
persuasive market evidence and provides comfort that I have
appraised Jarden as best as the credible evidence allows.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I have found the fair value of
Jarden shares as of the Merger was $48.31 per share. The legal
rate of interest, compounded quarterly, shall accrue from the
date of closing to the date of payment. The parties shall confer
and submit an implementing order and final judgment within
ten days.
All Citations
Not Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2019 WL 3244085
Footnotes
1 Trial Tr. 1315:21–1316:5.
2 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
3 DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value P'rs, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 367 (Del. 2017). DFC explained that the statutory definition
of fair value has been distilled further to require the court “to value the company on its stand-alone value.” Id. at 368.
4 Id. at 367 (citing Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Hartnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989)). As the Court further explained, “the definition
of fair value used in appraisal cases is a jurisprudential concept that has certain nuances that neither an economist
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nor market participant would usually consider when either valuing a minority block of shares or a public company as a
whole.” Id.
5 Gilbert v. M.P.M. Enters., Inc., 1998 WL 229439, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 1998) (noting that while certain approaches
to a DCF valuation might be endorsed in other cases, the experts endorsing those approaches had not been “subject
to the crucible of cross-examination” in the appraisal trial conducted by the court and the court would not consider their
testimony from other cases). See also Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 7324170, at *16
(Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (noting that the “relevant factors” informing the fair value determination will “vary from case to
case depending on the nature of the [acquired] company”); DFC, 172 A.3d at 388 (observing: “[i]n some cases, it may
be that a single valuation metric is the most reliable evidence of fair value and that giving weight to another factor will
do nothing but distort that best estimate. In other cases, it may be necessary to consider two or more factors.”); D.R.E.
702 (recognizing that lay fact-finders may rely upon expert testimony when the expert's “scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”). In this
regard, it is worth noting that submitting the fair value determination to a “court-appointed ‘appraiser’ ” was “essentially
required practice under the appraisal statute before 1976.” Lawrence A. Hammermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Finding the
Right Balance in Appraisal Litigation: Deal Price, Deal Process, and Synergies, 73 Bus. Law 961, 976 (2018). Now that
expert “appraisers” have been “eliminated as a statutory requirement,” it is for the court to decide fair value based on its
assessment of the factual evidence presented at trial, including expert evidence, using traditional fact-finding methods. Id.
6 See DFC, 172 A.3d 346; Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017); Verition
P'rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 2019 WL 1614026 (Del. Apr. 16, 2019).
7 DFC, 172 A.3d at 388.
8 In this regard, I reiterate with renewed appreciation then-Chancellor Chandler's astute observation in the Technicolor,
Inc. appraisal saga:
[V]aluation decisions are impossible to make with anything approaching complete confidence. Valuing an entity is a
difficult intellectual exercise, especially when business and financial experts are able to organize data in support of
wildly divergent valuations for the same entity. For a judge who is not expert in corporate finance, one can do little
more than try to detect gross distortions in the experts' opinions. This effort should, therefore, not be understood, as a
matter of intellectual honesty, as resulting in the fair value of a corporation on a given date. The value of a corporation
is not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values, and the judge's task is to assign one particular value
within this range as the most reasonable value in light of all the relevant evidence and based on the considerations
of fairness.
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 875 A.2d 602 (Del. 2005), withdrawn from bound volume, opinion amended and superseded, 884 A.2d 26
(Del. 2005).
9 Respondent's expert undertook a precedent transactions analysis as well but the parties did not engage on this valuation
approach at trial, so I will not address it here. See JX 1816 at ¶11.
10 DFC, 172 A.3d at 369–70 (observing that “[m]arket prices are typically viewed [as] superior to other valuation techniques
because, unlike, e.g., a single person's [DCF] model, the market price should distill the collective judgment of the many
based on all the publicly available information about a given company and the value of its shares.”).
11 See ACP Master, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp., 2017 WL 3421142, at *31 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2017) (collecting cases and noting
that if the court were to rely upon “deal price, it would have to determine the value of synergies and back them out.”).
12 To the extent the parties sought to rely upon valuation texts or articles addressing valuation methodologies, they were
directed to submit these sources as evidence in the case. Unlike a law review article cited by a party in support of
a legal proposition, a text or scholarly article addressing economic or valuation principles contains factual matter, the
admissibility of which must be tested under Delaware's Uniform Rules of Evidence. In my view, it is not proper for parties
to an appraisal case, or any other case for that matter, to refer to, or expect the court sua sponte to refer to, a scholarly
work addressing a matter that has been the subject of expert testimony without first having the work received as evidence
in the case or at least tested under evidentiary standards. Nor is it proper, in my view, for parties to an appraisal case to
cite to decisions of this court, or our Supreme Court, for the proposition that a particular valuation methodology should be
applied to value the target company. While legal authority may support the contention that a valuation methodology has
been accepted by Delaware courts as generally reliable, I see no value in referring to the factual conclusions of another
court in another case while appraising the fair value of another company when attempting to fulfill the statutory mandate
that I determine the fair value of this Company.
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13 Dell, 177 A.3d at 21 (quoting Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 218 (Del. 2010) (emphasis in original));
see also Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004) (noting that both parties bear a
burden of proof in a statutory appraisal trial and holding that, “[i]f neither party satisfies its burden ... the court must then
use its own independent business judgment to determine fair value.”).
14 Stip. Joint Pre-Trial Order (“PTO”) ¶¶1, 6, 36.
15 PTO ¶41. Trial Tr. 49:20–50:10 (Lillie). Because consumable household staples primarily comprised Jarden's product
offerings, Jarden's growth correlated to Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) growth. JX 860 at 1 (“As we suspected [Jarden]





20 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 5:14–18.
21 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 77:11–17.
22 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 9:3–5; JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 5:20–25.
23 PTO ¶62.
24 JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 195:17–23.
25 PTO ¶54.
26 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 8:24–11:5.
27 Trial Tr. 368:3–19 (Franklin).
28 Trial Tr. 367:15–22, 467:20–22 (Franklin).
29 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 11:9–10, 15:20–22.
30 Id. at 10:20–11:10.
31 PTO ¶38.
32 JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 11:5–12:24, 49:6–50:13.
33 JX 502 at 5; JX 1804 (Polk Dep.) at 17:15–21.
34 Id.
35 JX 502 at 6.
36 Id. at 21.
37 JX 1192 at 11; JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 11:5–14; JX 1775 (Sansone Dep.) at 101:5–20, 146:21–147:3.
38 JX 786 at 17.
39 Trial Tr. 423:1–9 (Franklin).
40 Trial Tr. 451:14–18, 451:19–21(Franklin); Trial Tr. 81:10–11 (Lillie) (“Q. That was one quarter miss in 13 years? A. Yes.”);
JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 265:16–266:7.
41 Trial Tr. 53:12–24 (Lillie); JX 1459 (“Consistent with its guidance, the Company expects that net sales for 2015 will be
approximately $8.6 billion”).
42 JX 1519 at 47.
43 See JX 1816 at ¶47. The S&P 400 refers to the Standard & Poor's MidCap 400 index.
44 Id.
45 Id. at ¶¶46–48 and Figure 11; JX 1439.
46 JX 1816 at ¶¶45–48.
47 Id. at ¶¶48–50; see also Trial Tr. 1019:24–1020:23 (Hubbard).
48 Trial Tr. 370:17–18 (Franklin) (“We were building a business, both organically and by acquisition.”); JX 578 at 33.
49 JX 1519 at 40, 44; JX 30 at 36; JX 502 at 19; JX 1459.
50 JX 1519 at 40.
51 Trial Tr. 125:12–22 (Gross); JX 502 at 25; JX 1773 (Talwar Dep.) at 21:19–22:3, 27:6–10.
52 The strategy included targeting: (i) category-leading positions in niche consumer markets; (ii) with recurring revenue and
margin growth channels; (iii) robust cash flow characteristics, including substantial EBITDA multiples; (iv) a successful
management team; and (v) strong transaction valuations, with value-generating presynergies. JX 502 at 25.
53 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 24:25–25:21; JX 1773 (Talwar Dep.) at 28:4–13.
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54 Id.
55 JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 133:2–21; JX 1773 (Talwar Dep.) at 27:11–24.
56 JX 502 at 11.
[We] ... looked at everything. Again, it goes back to being professional opportunists, in terms of building a business.
You've got to—you know, we were a fairly unusual group. We started from a $200 million business 15 years prior, to
becoming a 10-plus billion dollar business 15 years later. It wasn't done from sitting behind a desk. We were building
a business, both organically and by acquisition.
Trial Tr. 370:11–18 (Franklin).
57 PTO ¶40.
58 JX 763 at 25.
59 JX 514 at 10.
60 JX 1393.
61 JX 763 at 22.
62 Id. at 17.
63 JX 1795 at 21.
64 PTO ¶110.
65 JX 527 at 23, 26.
66 Id. at 23; JX 606 at 3–4.
67 PTO ¶113.
68 JX 726 at 15.
69 Id.
70 Trial Tr. 455:3–9 (Franklin) (“Q. And in 2015, you were spending real money on direct-to-consumer and expanding your
distribution channels. Correct? A. Well, we bought a business that expanded our distribution capabilities. We bought
Jostens for the same kind of reason. It gave us a different access into schools.”).
71 JX 726 at 11; JX 823 at 3–4.
72 JX 726 at 12.
73 JX 1816 at ¶¶46–48, Figure 11; JX 1439.
74 PTO ¶234. As of the Merger Date, Ashken was a director of Platform. Id. ¶61; JX 576 at 2.
75 PTO ¶235. As of the Merger Date, Lillie was a director of Nomad. Id. ¶63.
76 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 359:15–16; PTO ¶97. Lillie and Ashken were also investors in Mariposa. Trial Tr. 527:11–
13 (Franklin).
77 PTO ¶282. But for the Merger, Franklin would have pursued the Royal Oak transaction for Jarden. Trial Tr. 559:4–560:5
(Franklin). Jarden's lead independent director, Michael Gross, also participated in the Royal Oak acquisition. Id.; JX 1807
(Gross Dep.) at 14:22–15:10. Gross and Franklin have been close personal friends for 30 years. JX 1807 (Gross Dep.)
at 15:14–18.
78 PTO ¶249; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 93:7–8. Ashken and Lillie were also investors in J2. JX 1770.
79 JX 765; JX 1804 (Polk Dep.) at 71:20–72:12; JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 164:14–165:3.
80 JX 533; JX 490; PTO ¶125; Trial Tr. 584:12–585:24 (Polk). Phillips previously worked opposite Franklin in a transaction
with Nomad. Trial Tr. 585:14–18 (Polk); Trial Tr. 373:6–18 (Franklin).
81 Trial Tr. 576:5–13 (Polk); JX 490; JX 524; PTO ¶123.
82 JX 533; PTO ¶125.
83 JX 576 at 2.
84 Id.
85 JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 28:9–19; JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 121:10–122:3; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 157:25–158:14.
86 PTO ¶79. Newell was a member of the NYSE and the S&P 500. PTO ¶84. It was followed by at least 16 financial analysts
and, like Jarden, its stock exhibited the attributes of a narrow “bid-ask spread,” a high average trading volume and a
large public float. JX 1816 at ¶57, Figure 15.
87 Trial Tr. 566:21–567:8 (Polk).
88 Trial Tr. 567:9–569:3 (Polk); see also Trial Tr. 721:22–722:5 (Torres).
89 PTO ¶80. Trial Tr. 566:11–20 (Polk).
90 Trial Tr. 566:11–20 (Polk).
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91 Trial Tr. 567:20–569:3 (Polk).
92 Trial Tr. 571:2–7 (Polk).
93 Trial Tr. 571:20–572:2 (Polk).
94 Trial Tr. 572:6–574:19 (Polk).
95 Trial Tr. 576:12–582:1 (Polk). See JX 655; JX 860.
96 Trial Tr. 581:10–17 (Polk).
97 Trial Tr. 581:18–582:1 (Polk).
98 Trial Tr. 584:12–24 (Polk); Tr. 373:19–24 (Franklin).
99 Trial Tr. 375:5–14 (Franklin). As Franklin explained, “[i]f a CEO wants to meet with me, I'll always want to meet with him.”
Trial Tr. 376:17–20 (Franklin).
100 JX 902; PTO ¶¶127, 129.
101 Trial Tr. 588:3–13 (Polk).
102 Trial Tr. 586:14–21 (Polk).
103 Trial Tr. 376:13–20 (Franklin); Tr. 588:22–589:7 (Polk).
104 JX 902 at 2.
105 Id.
106 JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 54:13–22; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 25:2–7, 26:10–19. The Board met on September 28,
2015, but the minutes do not reflect any discussion of a potential transaction with Newell or Franklin's September 9th
meeting with Polk. See JX 691; PTO ¶131.
107 Trial Tr. 378:24–380:18, 480:16–17 (Franklin); JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 57:2–23, 58:22–59:3 (Franklin called board
members to advise them on meeting); JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 26:24–27:12 (same); JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 28:20–
29:8, 33:20–34:4 (same).
108 Trial Tr. 566:9–20 (Polk).
109 Trial Tr. 598:10–16 (Polk); JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 29:18–30:9, 32:10–33:9 (explaining Jarden “was by far the most
likely [acquisition] candidate to reapply the Newell Rubbermaid business model” of consolidation, which “could release
a large amount of value”).
110 JX 685 at 2; JX 902 at 2; PTO ¶132. Trial Tr. 383:23–384:8 (Franklin). Following the Merger, Tarchetti became the
President of the combined entity. JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 14:17–21.
111 JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 58:9–21; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 31:12–25; PTO ¶133. I note that Franklin's testimony
that he did not intend to negotiate definitive deal parameters during the Boat Meeting was credible. Trial Tr. 486:11–
16 (Franklin). It appears, instead, that Franklin intended to lay out certain expectations and then “tell[ ] [the] Newell
[team that] if they had different expectations, they shouldn't bother spending time, effort, and money.” Trial Tr. 489:14–17
(Franklin). As Franklin explained, “I didn't want to go down the path of having any real substantive conversations unless
they understood that we were looking for a real premium.” Trial Tr. 469:2–22 (Franklin); see also Trial Tr. 384:21–385:2
(Franklin); JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 64:4–9 (explaining “we sort of made it very clear that Jarden wasn't for sale; but
if we got an extraordinary offer our job was to create value for our shareholders, so we would always listen to whatever
Mike had to say”).
112 JX 1794 (Christian Dep.) at 159:9–160:14; JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 72:2–3; JX 1804 (Polk Dep.) at 85:24–86:7; JX
1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 305:24–306:10; PTO ¶134.
113 JX 2502; JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 64:17–65:4, 97:14–98:2; JX 1785 (LeConey Dep.) at 27:10–21; Trial Tr. 369:22–
370:2, 471:11–472:16 (Franklin). While Jarden had asked Barclays to prepare some preliminary combination models and
to do some “rough math” prior to the Boat Meeting (Trial Tr. 472:7–8 (Franklin); JX 688), Jarden had no formal analysis
of its standalone value, nor had it retained a financial advisor when Franklin set the range for a transaction at $60–$69
per share. JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 135:14–136:3; Trial Tr. 470:18–471:8 (Franklin).
114 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 95:15–19. See also Trial Tr. 473:24–475:1 (Franklin) (explaining his sense of Newell's financial
limits).
115 Trial Tr. 391:24–392:10 (Franklin).
116 Trial Tr. 385:10–14 (Franklin).
117 Trial Tr. 385:24–386:4 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 666:6–7 (Polk) (“And I interpreted that to be between 60 and 69, which is a
very wide range.”); see also JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 65:21–23 (referring to a price in the $60s as “a very, very, very,
very full price”).
118 Trial Tr. 474:14–475:1 (Franklin); JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 103:3–13.
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119 Trial Tr. 475:18–476:22 (Franklin).
120 Trial Tr. 598:3–16 (Polk) (explaining that “the logic for the deal” was the expectation of synergies by recreating the success
of Project Renewal); see also JX 674 at 2 (Polk noting that “there are tons of synergies because they have not done what
we have done with Renewal (they are a holding company)”) (emphasis in original).
121 Trial Tr. 387:13–388:23 (Franklin); see also Trial Tr. 664:3–665:8 (Polk).
122 Trial Tr. 391:24–392:10 (Franklin).
123 JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 60:5–13 (discussing Franklin's view that any offer “needed to start with a 6 handle” and
explaining that “[g]iven where the stock was trading, that made a lot of sense”); see also JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 49:3–11.
124 Trial Tr. 548:22–549:4 (Franklin); JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 135:14–136:3.
125 JX 769; JX 785; JX 915; JX 977; JX 1073; JX 1203; JX 1862; Trial Tr. 550:16–20 (Franklin); JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at
137:22–138:18.
126 Trial Tr. 392:8–15 (Franklin); see also JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 62:23–63:2.
127 Trial Tr. 392:16–393:6 (Franklin).
128 Id.
129 Trial Tr. 393:7–394:2 (Franklin).
130 Id.
131 JX 2502 at 2, 10.
132 JX 775.
133 JX 871 at 1; JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 259:14–261:13.
134 On October 13, 2015, the day prior to the Jostens announcement, Jarden's stock price was $50.69. Jarden's stock price
fell to $44.80 by the end of October 2015. PTO Ex. A; see also JX 1816 at ¶¶66–68.
135 Trial Tr. 404:1–9 (Franklin). Franklin testified, “we were buyers up to [$]49, which we considered full value at the time.”
Trial Tr. 404:16–18 (Franklin).
136 JX 900 at 2.
137 JX 1565 at 85; PTO ¶135. Trial Tr. 394:23–395:4 (Franklin).
138 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 136:12–15; JX 1565 at 85. See Trial Tr. 492:5–10 (Franklin) (explaining Jarden's Board learned
of the confidentiality agreement).
139 PTO ¶136.
140 JX 786 at 110; PTO ¶138; Trial Tr. 396:17–397:2 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 602:24–603:15 (Polk).
141 JX 786 at 110; JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 131:7–12, 148:6–149:5.
142 JX 786 at 111; see also Trial Tr. 827:19–828:11 (Waldron).
143 JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 24:16–25:8.
144 Tuck-in acquisitions usually amounted to less than 1% of Jarden's yearly revenue. See, e.g., JX 380 at 11; JX 1778
(Ashken Dep.) at 20:6–16; JX 432 at 5; JX 380 at 3, 11.
145 Trial Tr. 929:9–930:9 (Zenner).
146 JX 1816 at ¶30; JX 1831, Ex. 5A. Jarden achieved “organic growth” of 4% (including tuck-in acquisitions) and adjusted
organic growth of 3.2% (excluding all acquisitions), from 2011 to 2015. Id.
147 Trial Tr. 106:13–107:3 (Lillie).
148 Trial Tr. 106:1–9 (Lillie); JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 252:15–253:6.
149 Trial Tr. 604:3–12 (Polk) (explaining Newell did not use Jarden's projections because “I didn't believe 6 percent and 5
percent compounded. Those were really aggressive growth rates in the environment.”); see also id. 604:22–605:21 (Polk)
(explaining that Newell utilized more realistic projections when analyzing Jarden's value).
150 JX 1252 at 12; JX 1247 at 29.
151 JX 927 at 1.
152 Id.
153 JX 1045 at 31; JX 1205 at 44. With only minor adjustments for 2015 year-end actuals, the November Projections were
also included in the Company's proxy statement regarding the Merger.
154 JX 791 (Tarchetti told a colleague that “Martin change of control” was on a list of discussion points Franklin brought to
the meeting on October 22); JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 33:20–35:4.
155 JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 38:12–16, 67:13–25; JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 89:6–8; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 67:12–
15, 68:11–13.
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156 Trial Tr. 397:8–10, 399:6–10 (Franklin); see also JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 154:4–10.
157 Trial Tr. 397:15–398:4 (Franklin) (“I thought it was a little odd that, you know, a potential $20 billion transaction would all
hinge on the whims of the guy who is not the CEO, who is not even on the board ....”).
158 Id.
159 Trial Tr. 398:5–20 (Franklin); JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 201:6–202:7.
160 Trial Tr. 398:16–20 (Franklin).
161 Trial Tr. 615:5–14 (Polk); see also JX 799 at 2.
162 JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 221:24–222:9; Trial Tr. 398:21–399:5 (Franklin).
163 JX 815; PTO ¶140; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 35:9–36:17; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 58:9–14.
164 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 94:22–95:6; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 46:17–20; JX 1785 (LeConey Dep.) at 87:2–13; JX 1789
(Welsh Dep.) at 162:20–163:9.
165 JX 815.
166 JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 246:17–247:7; Trial Tr. 725:7–14 (Torres).
167 Trial Tr. 734:12–14 (Torres). Bain continued to analyze Jarden's category growth rates through closing. It eventually
determined that Jarden's categories “were relatively weak and were actually losing market share,” like the Coleman brand
that lost distribution to dominant outlets such as WalMart. This prompted Bain to downgrade its category growth rate
for Jarden to 2.5% as of closing. Trial Tr. 737:16–738:8 (Torres). When additional information became available post-
closing, Bain further decreased Jarden's category growth rate to 2.2%. Trial Tr. 739:2–8 (Torres).
168 Trial Tr. 753:1–7 (Torres).
169 Trial Tr. 600:16–601:7 (Polk); see also JX 1309 at 80.
170 JX 706 at 3; Trial Tr. 746:22–23 (Torres).
171 Trial Tr. 741:4–742:2 (Torres).
172 JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 251:9–14; Trial Tr. 722:8–16 (Torres).
173 Trial Tr. 598:10–16, 686:17–687:13 (Polk) (the “logic for the deal” was to apply the Newell integration playbook to Jarden's
businesses); see also id. 699:6–9 (Polk) (“the costs associated with [Jarden's] decentralized model, that's where the
synergies were”).
174 JX 957 at 1.
175 Id. at 1–2.
176 Id. at 3 (Bain “highlighted three key benefits of the deal: transformational scale; high cost synergies; and likely above
average revenue synergies due to channel overlap and the ability to apply the Growth Game Plan to selected categories
at [Jarden]”).
177 JX 973 at 42; Trial Tr. 767:2–24 (Torres).
178 JX 943 at 11.
179 Trial Tr. 614:4–18, 678:12–16 (Polk).
180 Id.
181 Trial Tr. 678:12–16 (Polk) (“The deal architecture assumed $500 million of gross synergies. If we didn't deliver $500
million of gross synergies, we would not have delivered the operating margin outcomes, and we would not have delivered
accretive EPS.”).
182 Trial Tr. 616:12–23 (Polk); JX 957 at 9.
183 JX 986; PTO ¶142.
184 JX 986 at 2.
185 Id.
186 JX 976 at 1–2; PTO ¶143.
187 JX 977.
188 JX 976 at 2–3; Trial Tr. 405:12–16 (Franklin).
189 JX 976 at 2; PTO ¶145.
190 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 91:22–25; see also JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 48:3–8 (“Q. Did Jarden to your knowledge ever
make a counteroffer to Newell? A. Not that I'm aware of. Q. Did the Board ever discuss parameters of the counteroffer?
A. Not that I'm aware of.”).
191 Trial Tr. 406:2–5 (Franklin).
192 JX 976 at 3.
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193 Trial Tr. 562:4–5 (Franklin) (“The board wanted a second advisor.”); see also JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 100:12–101:6.
194 Trial Tr. 407:2–15 (Franklin). Barclays earned about $180 million from all of Franklin's businesses, including nearly $70
million from Platform alone in the four years between Platform's founding and the Merger Date. JX 1805; Trial Tr. 546:11–
17 (Franklin). Barclays' history with Franklin and his businesses earned Franklin “Platinum client” status. JX 438; JX 1789
(Welsh Dep.) at 50:25–54:4. The Board made no inquiry regarding the thickness of Franklin's relationship with Barclays
and there is no indication that either Franklin or Barclays made any effort to disclose their past relationships to the Board.
See JX 976; JX 1070.
195 Trial Tr. 407:16–408:3 (Franklin).
196 Trial Tr. 560:22–24 (Franklin). Franklin explained to the Board that UBS had done work for the Company in the past
for free, and described the UBS engagement in connection with the Newell transaction as giving UBS a “kiss.” Trial Tr.
561:19–562:12 (Franklin) (“I described it at one point as giving them a kiss. It was a way of saying thanks for all the work
that you've done that you didn't get compensated for. We—you know, you're on par with a couple of other firms to do this
advisory work for us for the board, and we're happy to have you do that work.”). Petitioners argue that this means UBS
was paid for doing no work and that the payment diverted value from stockholders. This is not a fair characterization of
UBS's role. The record reflects that UBS prepared Board decks, led discussions at Board meetings and was generally
available to the Board as a sounding board. Trial Tr. 560:22–24 (Franklin); JX 1785 (LeConey Dep.) at 35:23–36:10.
Whether UBS's compensation was fully earned is beyond the scope of this appraisal proceeding.
197 Trial Tr. 408:4–15 (Franklin); JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 44:10–14; JX 976 at 3; PTO ¶146. See JX 1565 at 89 (“With
respect to UBS, it was noted that Ms. Ros L'Esperance is the Head of Client Corporate Solutions of UBS, and as such
she would be recused from all deliberations and votes of the Jarden board, if any, in respect of the possible business
combination with Newell Rubbermaid.”).
198 Trial Tr. 408:24–409:8 (Franklin); JX 1001 at 1.
199 Trial Tr. 411:4–10 (Franklin).
200 Trial Tr. 409:1–8 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 618:24–619:3 (Polk); JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 214:2–9; JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at
297:3–12, 300:8–16; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 48:3–8; JX 1016 at 3; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 91:15–92:2; PTO ¶148.
201 Trial Tr. 410:2–7 (Franklin).
202 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 116:22–119:20 (“[A]s we explained to them, we were not sellers. If you want to buy it, buy it.
But don't waste our time. And it was a pretty acrimonious meeting. And it didn't make any difference to us whether we
bought or sold.”); see also Trial Tr. 410:8–24 (Franklin).
203 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 116:13–21.
204 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 119:6–9. Franklin similarly explained: “I went back to the board and said, This deal is dead.
We tried to get a better offer out of them, and they refused.” Trial Tr. 504:23–505:1 (Franklin).
205 JX 1069; JX 1066 at 2; JX 1149; PTO ¶153; JX 1064 at 2; see also Trial Tr. 619:18–620:5 (Polk) ($21.00 was “the limit
to what we could afford” in cash consideration). According to Franklin, Newell “blinked” and agreed to increase its offer.
Trial Tr. 412:19–413:2 (Franklin).
206 JX 1064 at 3; see also JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 307:4–8 (“So by this stage, we'd obviously recommended to the board
that we should try to consummate the transaction because we believed the synergies would create a lot of value for
both parties.”).
207 JX 1064 at 3.
208 JX 1070 at 2; PTO ¶¶155, 157. Franklin went over the terms of the revised offer, discussing the increased proposed
cash consideration from $20.00 to $21.00 per share and the formula for determining the exchange ratio. JX 1070 at 1.
Barclays also presented its analysis of the updated offer, including a revised valuation analysis of Jarden as a standalone
company. JX 1079 at 27–28.
209 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 112:5–6.
210 Id. at 55:7–15.
211 Id. at 55:10–56:9.
212 Id. at 49:3–11. See also JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 68:19–23, 69:23–70:4 (“When we looked at it and we thought, you
know, if we can realize something that begins with a 6 for our shareholders is that more than we could expect if we
continue to run the operations and did all the stuff? And we felt the answer was yes.”).
213 Trial Tr. 415:2–11 (Franklin).
214 Trial Tr. 415:19–23 (Franklin).
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215 Trial Tr. 684:13–685:22 (Polk) (explaining that $500 million in synergies was assumed in the deal model, but “if there's
future value to be created, more synergies, more growth, then any equity owner benefits from that”); see also Trial Tr.
415:2–15 (Franklin). Franklin described the $60.00 offer as “a full and fair price by any measure.” Trial Tr. 444:5–10
(Franklin).
216 JX 1070 at 2–3; PTO ¶¶155, 157. During the exclusivity period, Franklin and Ashken continued to negotiate the terms
of the Merger Agreement, but also negotiated for Franklin, Ashken, and Lillie to continue with the combined company as
paid consultants through Mariposa. See JX 906; JX 1061; JX 1074.
217 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 102:6–8 (explaining the Board's view that “it would not be value enhancing and perhaps very
distracting to management to run an auction”). Respondent acknowledges that the Board never considered authorizing
its bankers to reach out to other potential strategic buyers or financial sponsors. Id. at 94:22–95:6.
218 Id. at 100:13–23.
219 Trial Tr. 419:21–420:5 (Franklin); see also Trial Tr. 918:10–921:11 (Zenner) (explaining that other large consumer product
companies had targeted businesses and were probably not interested in a diversified company like Jarden). Until Newell
surfaced, no potential acquirer had expressed interest in Jarden during its entire 15-year history. Trial Tr. 425:10–13
(Franklin).
220 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 129:2–130:14; JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 65:5–10.
221 JX 1565 at 90; JX 1116 at 194–242.
222 Trial Tr. 475:2–7 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 617:5–18 (Polk).
223 Trial Tr. 621:9–13 (Polk).
224 Trial Tr. 620:17–20 (Polk); Trial Tr. 406:24–407:1 (Franklin) (“[I]t would almost look odd if I didn't agree to serve as a
director in the go-forward company.”); JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 120:3–16, 124:6–18 (discussing Franklin's role as the
“face of Jarden” and the importance of having Franklin on the board of the combined entity, which would serve as an
endorsement of the Merger); JX 1803 (Cowhig Dep.) at 153:24–154:3.
225 Trial Tr. 686:17–687:13 (Polk) (“We wanted as part of—the deal terms, to get control of the company. Because there
was no way that, without our leadership of the change agenda, those synergies were going to be realized.”); JX 1778
(Ashken Dep.) at 153:15–19.
226 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 163:13–14.
227 Id. at 163:14–19 (explaining Newell was “very keen to have [the noncompete period] be four years” because Newell “had
had a bad experience” before with competition from a past executive); see also JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 58:16–59:9
(noting Newell was “requiring that the management team extend their non-compete agreements from two to four years,”
which was a “big ask” since management was in the prime of their careers).
228 Trial Tr. 526:18–20 (Franklin); JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 347:15–349:7.
229 JX 1233 at 2–3.
230 Id.
231 JX 1150 at 1–2; JX 1148; PTO ¶164. According to one witness, Newell's counsel leaked news of the Merger to a reporter.
JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 322:23–323:9.
232 PTO, Exs. A, B.
233 Trial Tr. 424:1–5 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 658:16–659:2 (Polk) (explaining that after the leak, Newell “had to” negotiate a fixed
exchange rate because “we would have had exposure, potentially, if the stock had run one way or the other”); JX 1779
(Tarchetti Dep.) at 325:17–23 (fixing the exchange ratio was “in the interest of both parties because the stock prices were
very volatile, and it was against the spirit of the agreement to not reflect the fact that there had been a leak”); JX 1778
(Ashken Dep.) at 136:12–17 (same).
234 JX 1195 at 1.
235 JX 1241 at 5; Trial Tr. 507:1–19 (Franklin).
236 JX 1218 at 2. Had Jarden negotiated for a 0.90 exchange ratio, Jarden stockholders would have received $380 million
in additional equity. Id.
237 Id.
238 JX 1207 at 3.
239 JX 1205.
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243 JX 906 at rows 15–17; JX 1057; JX 1072 at 1–2.
244 JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 158:15–159:5. In addition to his work as Jarden's General Counsel, Capps has served as General
Counsel for Platform since 2016. S&P Global Market Intelligence, Platform Specialty Products (ESI:NYSE) (2019). Capps
was also to be a beneficiary of any grant of 2017 and 2018 RSAs. JX 1565 at 146–147.
245 JX 1231 at 18. There is no evidence the Compensation Committee ever looked at the employment agreements. JX 1231
at 16; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 66:12–22, 81:15–82:2 (“I don't even know if I've seen it before.”).
246 JX 1232; JX 1231 at 2.
247 JX 1231 at 2; see JX 1255. Barclays delivered its written fairness opinion the following day. JX 1255.
248 JX 1231 at 4. The Jarden board reiterated “its belief that the combined company's long-term value, prospects and benefits
from the merger would exceed the value that could be realized by Jarden's stockholders were Jarden to continue operating
on a stand-alone (independent) basis.” Id. at 3.
249 Id. at 4, 9. The amended employment agreements for Franklin, Ashken and Lillie extended the term of their non-competes
upon termination from two years to four years. JX 1326 at 15. They also confirmed the acceleration of certain RSAs
in connection with the transaction. JX 1326 at 15; see also Trial Tr. 638:11–16 (Polk) (explaining that the negotiations
concerning the RSAs were between the Jarden executives and the Jarden board). Franklin, Ashken and Lillie had three-
year “evergreen” employment agreements. Under those agreements, they each were guaranteed their 2017 and 2018
RSAs, which the Board agreed to grant prior to the Merger. JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 142:23–143:4, 146:4–7; Trial Tr.
517:9–19 (Franklin). Using Newell's stock price as of the Merger Date to determine the exchange ratio cash equivalent,
Franklin received a total of $71.04 per share in Merger-related consideration, Ashken received a total of $76.11 per share
and Lillie received an equivalent of $81.69 per share. JX 1818 at ¶40.
250 JX 1231 at 2. The final Merger consideration represented a premium of 24.3% over the unaffected market price of $48.31
on December 4, 2015 (the last day of trading before the leak) and a premium of 24% over the VWAP of $48.35 for the
30-day period prior to December 11, 2015. Id.
251 JX 1251 at 1–2.
252 JX 1252 at 12; JX 1247 at 29; see also JX 775 at 5. Newell also used numbers in line with the Lender Presentation
projections in its internal modeling and in the presentation made to rating agencies on December 7, 2015. JX 1154 at 41.
253 JX 1230 at 10.
254 JX 1228 at 7. Bain's report in advance of the meeting estimated total annual synergies ranging from $585 million to $1
billion, comprised of $500–$700 million in cost synergies and $85–$320 million in revenue synergies. JX 1139 at 50.
Bain was “very comfortable” Newell would meet at least the low end of its estimate range. Trial Tr. 773:14–22, 774:17–
775:6 (Torres).
255 PTO ¶¶179, 181.
256 JX 1269 at 3.
257 PTO, Ex. A.
258 JX 1816 at ¶53. Jarden's stock price never closed above the implied Merger price prior to closing. Id. at ¶54.
259 Id. at ¶58.
260 Id. at ¶59.
261 Id. at ¶¶59–60.
262 JX 1519 at 68. Net income fell by nearly 40% as compared to 2014 year-end. Id. Jarden also adjusted its guidance
downward twice during 2015. JX 454 at 4, 17, 41. And, in November 2015, Lillie advised investors that Q4 2015 organic
growth would be in the 2–4% range, not the 3–5% range as earlier reported. JX 1034 at 1.
263 JX 1514 at 1–2; see also Trial Tr. 622:15–17 (Polk) (noting that Jarden fell below its goals for Q1 2016).
264 Id.; Trial Tr. 440:22–441:1 (Franklin); see also JX 1510; Trial Tr. 823:13–19, 856:1–6 (Waldron). The 2016 budget
assumed Jarden would remain a standalone company. Trial Tr. 830:16–21 (Waldron).
265 JX 1562 (revised multi-year plan projecting $9.816 billion in total revenue); see also Trial Tr. 833:5–834:11 (Waldron).
Newell asked for a copy of Jarden's updated multi-year plan in mid-March 2016, which Jarden provided. Trial Tr. 833:5–
834:11 (Waldron). Newell later asked Jarden to reevaluate the operating cash flow assumptions in the plan. After doing
this, Jarden circulated a revised version on April 1, 2016. Trial Tr. 832:24–838:3 (Waldron). See also JX 1563; JX 1597;
JX 1598. While this revision included minor adjustments, the annual revenue and EBITDA projections remained the same
as those estimated in the unrevised plan. Id.
266 Trial Tr. 834:12–835:11 (Waldron).
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267 JX 1598; JX 1565; see also JX 1826 at ¶88, Figure 16. Newell incorporated the revised multi-year plan into its own multi-
year forecast. Newell's forecast, however, assumed growth at 3.5%. JX 1691 at 95; Trial Tr. 626:4–627:15 (Polk).
268 PTO ¶183. Over 97% of voting Jarden stockholders approved the Merger (representing 83% of the outstanding shares).
JX 1663 at 7.
269 JX 1816 at ¶10. The per share decrease in consideration from $60.03 to $59.21 reflects the change in Newell's stock
price from signing to closing.
270 Trial Tr. 780:14–781:2 (Torres); see also JX 1373 at 11.
271 Trial Tr. 781:18–782:20 (Torres); JX 1691 at 7.
272 Trial Tr. 783:4–784:7 (Torres).
273 JX 1666; JX 2015; Trial Tr. 447:16–18 (Franklin); Trial Tr. 796:22–797:11, 798:20–799:11, 800:20–801:24, 802:18–804:3
(Torres).
274 JX 1801; JX 1802; Trial Tr. 802:18–803:4 (Torres). Franklin strongly objected to this strategy. JX 1808; JX 1809; JX
1825; JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 16:9–14.
275 JX 1803 (Cowhig Dep.) at 191:13–20.
276 Newell Brands announced an agreement to sell Waddington in April 2018 for $2.3 billion, almost $1 billion more than the
price Jarden paid less than three years prior. Trial Tr. 450:18–451:2 (Franklin) (“Q. Okay. Waddington, you bought for
1.35 million [sic] in July of 2015. Correct? A. Correct. Q. And Newell sold that business this year for 2.3 billion. Right?
A. Correct. Q. They made almost a billion on that. Right? A. Yes.”).
277 Trial Tr. 447:2–11 (Franklin); JX 1808; JX 1809; JX 1823; JX 1834.
278 JX 1803 (Cowhig Dep.) at 184:17–188:12; JX 1809.
279 Trial Tr. 447:12–15 (Franklin); JX 1809.
280 JX 1822.





286 The expert reports were submitted under seal. At the close of this case, the Court will unseal the reports. Perhaps
the legal and business academies will find interesting, and worthy of study and classroom discussion, how two such
well-credentialed experts in their fields reached such wildly divergent conclusions regarding the fair value of the same
company as of the same date.
287 D.I. 154.
288 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
289 DFC, 172 A.3d at 364 (quoting 8 Del. C. § 262(h)).
290 Dell, 177 A.3d at 21 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983)).
291 Id.
292 Id. at 22.
293 Aruba, 2019 WL 1614026, at *6.
294 In re Appraisal of AOL Inc., 2018 WL 1037450, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018). See also In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc.,
2017 WL 2303599, at *27 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (collecting cases).
295 In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, at *27 (citing Chuck Carlson, Game of My Life: 25 Stories of Packer
Football (Sports Pub. 2004) (quoting Coach Lombardi as opening his first Packers team meeting in 1959, after twenty
years of coaching, by saying: “Gentleman, we are going to relentlessly chase perfection, knowing full well we will not
catch it, because nothing is perfect.”)).
296 Id. (citing Merlin P'rs LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 WL 2069417, at *14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015) (observing that no “real-
world sales process” will live up to “a perfect, theoretical model”)).
297 Dell, Inc., 177 A.3d at 35.
298 Dr. Zenner testified that auctions are less effective as companies increase in scale and complexity. Trial Tr. 915:3–14,
916:17–917:17 (Zenner). For sale transactions over $5.4 billion, as here, only one in five are the product of an auction.
Id.; JX 1817, App'x C-5. See also JX 1827 at ¶¶53–54 (explaining that the most logical strategic partners were too small
to buy the Company); JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 101:18–102:11 (Jarden routinely “looked at likely people we could have
business combinations with or that we could acquire ... [and] didn't think there was anybody out there who would come
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in and make a preemptive offer to buy the company”); Trial Tr. 921:12–923:16 (Zenner); JX 1817 at ¶95 (explaining that
financial sponsors were not interested in Jarden because its leverage was too high); Trial Tr. 419:6–8 (Franklin) (“In 15
years of building the company, I haven't had one company come and sort of make an offer to buy Jarden.”); JX 1789
(Welsh Dep.) at 143:5–10 (“The combination with Newell was viewed to be a highly strategic combination that couldn't
necessarily be replicated with other counterparties....”); JX 1785 (LeConey Dep.) at 88:3–4 (“UBS was not aware of any
other buyers that were interested in acquiring all of Jarden.”).
299 Trial Tr. 504:23–505:1 (Franklin) (“I went back to the board and said, This deal is dead. We tried to get a better offer out
of them, and they refused.”); JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) at 119:6–9; see also JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 41:3–15.
300 JX 1816 at ¶169, Figure 23.
301 I appreciate Franklin was no longer CEO when he negotiated with Newell. With regard to M&A, however, his role as
Executive Chairman was tantamount to that of a typical CEO. Trial Tr. 367:15–22, 467:20–22 (Franklin).
302 JX 1788 (L'Esperance Dep.) at 54:13–22, 58:9–21, 121:10–122:3; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 25:2–7, 26:10–19, 31:12–
25, 32:2–17, 157:25–158:14. Franklin's revelation at the Boat Meeting that he would like to exit from Jarden in order to
have more time to pursue business ventures with his sons also made an impression on Polk and, when coupled with his
direction regarding an acceptable offer price, likely communicated to Newell that he was eager, maybe overly eager, to
do a deal. See JX 765 (Tarchetti reporting that Franklin revealed “his desire for an exit, which as the company figurehead
is difficult. He says he would like to inve[st] in business with his sons having taken some money off the table (assuming
he has about 0.5bn if this happened”)); Trial Tr. 71:20–72:12 (Polk); Trial Tr. 164:14–165:3 (Tarchetti). There is other
evidence in the record that Franklin was perceived as an anxious seller. See JX 576 (Bill Ackman's July 2015 email to
Warren Buffett, copying Franklin, attempting to interest Buffett in acquiring Jarden); JX 533; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at
157:25–158:14; JX 860 (Centerview set up the first meeting between Franklin and Polk, marketing Jarden to Newell as
a “willing seller.”); JX 902 at 2 (Polk stating that Franklin “cut straight to the chase” about his willingness to sell Jarden).
303 JX 1807 (Gross Dep.) at 38:12–16, 48:3–8, 67:13–25; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 72:9–18, 91:15–92:2; JX 1788
(L'Esperance Dep.) at 89:6–8.
304 JX 1049. The Board justified the compensation awards after the fact. JX 1212 at 15; JX 1565 at 146. Moreover, as Franklin
and Ashken were telling Newell they were entitled to the 2017 and 2018 RSAs, Jarden's Compensation Committee had
not discussed the possibility of awarding those grants. JX 1145; JX 1202. The Board was told by in-house counsel Capps
—who was also receiving 2017 and 2018 RSAs—that Jarden was contractually obligated to make these awards even
though the agreements at issue were not clear on the point. JX 1629 at 5; JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 158:15–159:5. There
are other troubling facts relating to the change-in-control payments, including that Franklin arranged for his long-time legal
counsel to advise the Board with respect to the payments and the payments ultimately resulted in the lead negotiators
for Jarden receiving substantially more in Merger consideration than Jarden's other stockholders. See JX 1145; JX 1234;
JX 1235; JX 1236; Trial Tr. 534:18–536:11–18 (Franklin); JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 362:20–22. Respondent argues
the RSAs that made up most of the Merger consideration differential Franklin and the other Jarden managers received
were owed to them “in the regular course absent a sale.” Resp't Jarden Corp.'s Opening Post-Trial Br. (“ROB”) at 57.
The Merger agreement, however, terminated the employment contracts under which the RSAs were granted. See JX
1235. Franklin and the other Jarden managers claimed they were contractually owed the 2017 and 2018 RSAs under
their employment agreements before the separation agreements even existed. JX 906 at rows 15–17; JX 1057; JX 1072;
JX 1786 (Wood Dep.) at 158:15–159:5. The Board then justified the disconnect by explaining the 2017 and 2018 RSAs
served as consideration for the commitment to add two more years to the non-compete covenants. JX 1565 at 146. Of
course, when the dust settled, the separation agreements extended the term of the non-compete covenants by only one
year. JX 1234; JX 1235; JX 1236.
305 JX 1805; Trial Tr. 546:11–17 (Franklin); JX 438; JX 1789 (Welsh Dep.) at 50:25–54:4; JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) at 269:6–
19.
306 By so finding, I do not intend to suggest that Franklin or any Jarden fiduciary breached any fiduciary duty. That inquiry
is beyond the scope of this appraisal proceeding. See In re Unocal Expl. Corp. S'holders Litig., 793 A.2d 329, 340 (Del.
Ch. 2000) (noting that a breach of fiduciary finding is beyond the scope of statutory appraisal).
307 Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software Inc., 2015 WL 6164771 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015).
308 Id. at *17.
309 JX 1817 at ¶¶32–33, 41–43.
310 Trial Tr. 686:17–687:13 (Polk) (“We wanted as part of—the deal terms, to get control of the company. Because there
was no way that, without our leadership of the change agenda, those synergies were going to be realized.”); JX 1778
(Ashken Dep.) at 153:15–19.
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311 JX 1269 at 3.
312 JX 1565 at 85.
313 JX 1228 at 7. Bain had estimated synergies ranging from $585 million to $1 billion, comprised of $500–$700 million in
cost synergies and $85–$320 million in revenue synergies. JX 1139 at 50.
314 JX 1817 at ¶40; JX 1816 at ¶183;
315 JX 1100 at 18; JX 1804 (Polk Dep.) at 100:2–5, 101:15–16.
316 JX 1100 at 18.
317 Trial Tr. 649:5–8 (Polk); JX 2022 (“The premium is designed to get Newell management control.”); JX 1804 (Polk Dep.)
at 100:2–5, 101:15–16 (When asked “how did you come to the conclusion that a modest premium to their current market
valuation would give Newell control,” Polk responded “I knew that it was a quid pro quo” and “[i]f we were going to pay a
premium for the asset, we need management control.”). Of course, Polk clarified that control was necessary to achieve
the synergies since Newell was not satisfied that Jarden management would take the steps needed to create synergies.
See Trial Tr. 686:17–22 (Polk).
318 JX 1804 (Polk Dep.) at 115:4–9.
319 Trial Tr. 476:3–5 (Franklin).
320 Trial Tr. 598:10–21, 599:14–600:6, 614:4–18, 678:12–6 (Polk); JX 1803 (Cowhig Dep.) at 62:20–63:2; JX 1779 (Tarchetti
Dep.) at 29:6–30:9; JX 674 at 2 (September 2015 Polk email, emphasizing the “tons of synergies” to be realized by
employing the Project Renewal strategy) (emphasis in original); Trial Tr. 725:7–14, 742:3–743:19 (Torres); JX 973 at 36;
JX 1139 at 50, 56; JX 1565 at 67.
321 JX 1816 at ¶¶181–83; JX 1831 at ¶4, Figure 25; Trial Tr. 1087:23–1091:9 (Hubbard).
322 JX 1816 at ¶188 (“These results indicate that the market expected nearly all of the synergy value to accrue to Jarden
shareholders, consistent with academic research finding that most of the benefits of mergers accrue to target-firm
shareholders.”); Trial Tr. 1090:18–20 (Hubbard).
323 BMC Software, 2015 WL 6164771, at *17.
324 To be clear, and as explained below, I am satisfied from the evidence that the Merger Price exceeded fair value. It is less
clear, however, what exactly justified the premium Newell was willing to pay for Jarden. This is partially a product of the
complications in valuing synergies where the merger consideration includes stock, versus a strictly cash-for-stock merger.
In such a transaction, shareholders of both constituent corporations remain shareholders in the continuing combined
enterprise. Thus, both groups—acquirer shareholders and target shareholders—are able to participate pro rata in
gains arising out of the merger. Therefore, a premium to the target's shareholders cannot be justified, as in a cash
acquisition, on the premise that it is the only way to permit those shareholders to share in the gains arising from
the merger.
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some Consequences in the Law of Director
Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 881, 884 (2003).
325 As noted, news of the potential merger between Jarden and Newell leaked to the public on Monday, December 7,
2015. See JX 1150 at 1–2; JX 1148; PTO ¶164; JX 1164; Liz Hoffman, Dana Mattioli & Dana Cimilluca, Newell
Rubbermaid, Jarden in Merger Talks, The Wall Street Journal (2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/newell-rubbermaid-
jarden-in-merger-talks-1449521419 (last visited July 19, 2019). The last day Jarden stock was traded without being
affected by news of the merger negotiations was Friday, December 4, 2015. JX 1231 at 2. On that day, Jarden stock
closed at $48.31 per share. JX 1816 at ¶47.
326 ROB at 2.
327 Trial Tr. 1267:17–1268:5 (Hubbard) (“I've seen nothing in the record that would suggest to me the unaffected stock price
is not the right anchor [for fair value].”).
328 Trial Tr. 323:15–326:14 (Zmijewski). See also Trial Tr. 1021:2–9 (Hubbard) (“Does Dr. Zmijewski in his reports dispute
that either Newell or Jarden traded in an efficient market? A. Not in his reports, no. Q. And did you hear that in his
testimony? A. I did not. I was present, and I didn't hear that.”).
329 JX 1816 at ¶45. See also JX 2032, Jonathan Berk & Peter DeMarzo, Corporate Finance 301 (Pearson Education Limited,
4th ed. 2017) (“Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance”); JX 2515, Aswath Damodaran, Investment Valuation: Tools and
Techniques for Determining the Value of Any Asset 4 (Wiley, 3d ed. 2012) (Damodaran, Investment Valuation); JX 2516,
Tim Koller et al., McKinsey & Co., Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies 37–38 (Wiley, 6th ed.
2015) (“Koller, Valuation”).
330 JX 1816 at ¶45.
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331 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 302.
332 JX 1816 at ¶45; Trial Tr. 323:15–324:4 (Zmijewski) (acknowledging that one “can look to stock price to corroborate a fair
value conclusion”); Trial Tr. 1017:11–14 (Hubbard) (“For the unaffected stock price to be relevant, Your Honor, to your
consideration, you need to believe that it's an unbiased indicator of the value of the firm. That's an efficient market.”).
333 Dr. Hubbard stated,
[t]here are tests for whether a market is efficient, tests that economists suggest, but tests that have been widely used
in courts. So I used a number of factors that capture the scope of the firm, whether analysts follow it, transactions
cost, liquidity, and so on. I do those tests for both Jarden and Newell and conclude that both trade in an efficient
market, semi-strong form.
Trial Tr. 1017:11–14 (Hubbard).
334 Resp't Jarden Corp.'s Pre-Trial Br. at 6.
335 JX 1816 at ¶44, Figure 10.
336 JX 242, Robert W. Holthausen & Mark E. Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation: Theory, Evidence & Practice 301–03
(Cambridge Business Publishers, 1st ed. 2014) (“Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation”).
337 JX 1345, Duff & Phelps LLC, 2016 Valuation Handbook: Guide to Cost of Capital (Chapter 3) 9 (John Wiley, 2016) (“Duff
& Phelps, Valuation Handbook”).
338 JX 1816 at ¶46.
339 Id. at ¶48.
340 Id.
341 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 73.
342 JX 1816 at ¶¶47–48.
343 Id. at ¶47.
344 Id. at ¶48.
345 Id.
346 Id.; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 73 (“The term efficient market is also sometimes used to describe
a market that, along with other properties, is without arbitrage opportunities.”) (emphasis in original).
347 JX 1816 at ¶49; JX 2514 at 8–11; Trial Tr. 1019:2–16 (Hubbard).
348 Id.
349 JX 1816 at ¶51.
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Id. at ¶52.
353 Id. at ¶¶52–53.
354 Id.
355 Id. at ¶54.
356 Id.
357 The Merger marks the rare instance where two public companies of comparable size, comparable capital structure and
comparable stock trading patterns combine. As Dr. Hubbard explained, for most of the reasons one can conclude that
Jarden traded in an efficient market, the same can be said for Newell. Id., Figure 15.
358 Id. at ¶58.
359 Id. at ¶60. See also id. at ¶62 (“According to the analysts covering Newell at the time, consumer recession fears, merger
integration risks, and the high initial leverage resulting from the Merger were key factors affecting Newell's stock price.”).
360 Jarden is justified in pointing out that while he raised the criticisms, Dr. Zmijewski did “not explicitly opine on whether or
not any of these factors actually depressed Jarden's [unaffected] market price relative to fair value.” JX 1826 at ¶98. See
also JX 1828 at ¶90 (Dr. Zmijewski making observations regarding the Unaffected Market Price but not correlating them).
361 JX 1828 at ¶90; JX 1826 at ¶98.
362 Id.
363 JX 1818 at ¶30.
364 Id. at ¶¶29–31.
365 JX 1826 at ¶¶99–100.
366 Id., Figure 17.
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367 Id.
368 Id. at ¶¶101–04.
369 JX 1818 at ¶31.
370 Id.
371 Trial Tr. 1022:21–1023:14 (Hubbard).
372 JX 1826 at ¶¶101–04.
373 Id. at ¶¶103–04. I acknowledge, and understand, Petitioners' “tethering” argument, but I reject it as not supported by the
credible evidence. The argument is that the market was not efficient as of the Merger because, after the announcement
of the Merger, “Jarden's stock price was tethered to Newell and to the perception of the stockholders of both companies
that there was a large risk that Jarden could not be successfully integrated.” Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. at 60. Newell's
stockholders may have reacted to that risk, as reflected in the stock's performance after the announcement, but there
is no evidence that Jarden's stockholders, or the market, associated that risk with Jarden. See Trial Tr. 1020:12–23
(Hubbard); JX 2514 at 9; JX 1816 at ¶¶184–90.
374 JX 1826, Figures 18, 19.
375 Id. That the November Projections did not really move the needle is not surprising. They were optimistic, to be sure, but
their projected growth was consistent with prior forecasts, albeit at the top of the range. JX 927 at 1; Trial Tr. 106:1–
107:3 (Lillie). They were also not out of line with the views of several of the many analysts that followed the Company.
See, e.g., JX 1401; JX 1407; JX 1439.
376 JX 1818 at ¶¶37–39.
377 JX 1826 at ¶¶108–12; JX 2505 (Zmijewski Dep.) 318:23–319:4, 320:8–11. Dr. Zmijewski's opinion that the market had
not assessed Jarden's acquisitions of Jostens and Waddington, as best I can tell, is nothing more than speculation. The
fact that the market reacted poorly to the Jostens acquisition does not mean it did not understand it. Nor is there credible
evidence that the market did not know, or understand, that Jarden had leveraged up to do the Jostens and Waddington
deals.
378 Trial Tr. 1029:3–9 (Hubbard) (“academics differ in opinions on whether there is or isn't [a conglomerate discount]”); JX
1826 at ¶111 & n.176 (citing academic commentary rejecting the notion of a conglomerate discount).
379 JX 1779 (Tarchetti Dep.) at 32–33.
380 JX 1826 at ¶¶108–10; Trial Tr. 1029:10-21 (Hubbard); Trial Tr. 335:9–21 (Zmijewski) (“Q. So the holding company
structure of Jarden, whatever its affects may be, were the operative reality of Jarden. Correct? As of the merger date?
A. That's true.”).
381 JX 2505 (Zmijewski Dep.) at 319:22–320:16; JX 1818 at ¶¶37–39.
382 JX 1778 (Ashken Dep.) 117:10–17; Trial Tr. 378:14–17 (Franklin).
383 JX 1826 at ¶¶106–07. See also JX 59, Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of
the “Implicit Minority Discount” in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2007).
384 JX 1818 at ¶30.
385 JX 1519 at 68; JX 1514 at 2.
386 JX 1562; Trial Tr. 821:6–828:1, 830:7–835:11 (Waldron).
387 JX 2502.
388 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) 201:19–24.
389 Trial Tr. 404:1–9 (Franklin); JX 900.
390 JX 1780 (Franklin Dep.) 241:11–14.
391 JX 900 at 2.
392 Id. at 65.
393 Id. It is not entirely clear to me that Dr. Zmijewski feels as strongly about his comparable companies valuation of Jarden
as Petitioners do. See JX 1828 at ¶8 (“I do not consider revenue multiples to be reliable to value Jarden ....”).
394 JX 1816 at ¶200.
395 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 510, 527–30; Trial Tr. 1068:13–15 (Hubbard) (“If you use [a]
comparables [analysis], you have to be sure they are really comparable or you are introducing error yourself.”).
396 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 527–29.
397 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 345.
398 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 20.
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399 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 296.
400 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 345–46.
401 Id. at 346; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 528–29.
402 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 346. See also JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 710; Damodaran, Investment
Valuation at 462 (“A comparable firm is one with cash flows, growth potential, and growth risk similar to the firm being
valued .... The implicit assumption being made here is that firms in the same sector have similar risk, growth, and cash
flow profiles and therefore can be compared with much more legitimacy”).
403 Id. Trial Tr. 1068:13–15 (Hubbard) (“I mean, it's really just a restatement of garbage in, garbage out. If you don't have
genuine comparables, you're not going to get much out of the approach.”)
404 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 529–30.
405 Id. at 529.
406 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 346.
407 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 296–97 (emphasis supplied). See Trial Tr. 1068:13–15 (Hubbard)
(“Given the difficulty of finding comparables for this company in particular, this is a methodology that I used for
completeness and for the record for the Court, but it would not be a principal method I would advocate that the Court
center on.”). See also JX 1826 at ¶17.
408 JX 1816 at ¶194; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 335 (“Empirical evidence shows that forward-looking multiples are indeed
more accurate predictors of value than historical multiples are.”).
409 The EBITDA multiples valuation is generally considered more reliable than a revenue multiples approach because the
EBITDA approach accounts for firms' operating efficiency and is not affected by leverage differences between firms. JX
2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 710.
410 Id. at 710, 714; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 334–36; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 532.
411 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 334; Trial Tr. 159:7–14 (Zmijewski) (“Well, value is derived from what's going to happen or
what you expect to happen in the future, so looking forward is always better than looks backward.... If historical information
doesn't predict the future, it's not useful at all. It's only the forward-looking information that's useful.”).
412 Id. at 335–36.
413 Trial Tr. 294:16–20 (Zmijewski); JX 1818 at ¶55 (“I base my set of comparable companies on those companies identified
by Jarden's CEO, Mr. Lillie and the comparable companies used by Jarden's financial advisor, Barclays.”); JX 1828 at
¶¶68–70. I note it is not clear that Dr. Zmijewski drew his peer set from the right Barclays list. The list endorsed by
management was prepared by Barclays' equity analyst team while Dr. Zmijewski drew his list from the one prepared by
Barclays' investment banking team. Trial Tr. 264:23–268:14 (Zmijewski). Moreover, I find Dr. Zmijewski's narrow focus
on the Barclays list as the sole basis for his comparable companies peculiar given the extent to which he is critical of the
Barclays Fairness Opinion. See JX 1818 at ¶¶1–42; JX 1826 at ¶¶46–47.
414 JX 1826 at ¶17; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 346; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 511 (“The key
issues in valuing companies using market multiples are choosing appropriate comparable companies that would be priced
similar to the company being valued and the making adjustments to the financial numbers used so that distortions to the
valuation do not arise from accounting differences or certain events that can affect the financial statements in ways that
render the numbers less useful for a market multiple valuation.”). Dr. Zmijewski's decision apparently to ignore Barclays'
qualification that its peer set would have to be adjusted to account for qualitative differences between Jarden and the
peer set was never adequately explained. Trial Tr. 294:24–296:24 (Zmijewski); JX 1565 at 127–28; JX 1205 at 11, 17.
415 JX 1816 at ¶¶194–96.
416 JX 1818 at ¶57.
417 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 525. Given his willingness to defer to peer sets prepared by
others, it is surprising that Dr. Zmijewski failed to reconcile his exclusion of Kimberly-Clark and Colgate-Palmolive from
his peer set with the fact that those companies were included in the peer sets developed by several of the analysts who
followed Jarden. JX 1826 at ¶¶43–45.
418 Dr. Hubbard flagged Dr. Zmijewski's size discrepancy in his rebuttal report. As Dr. Hubbard noted, although the market
capitalization of Kimberly-Clark and Colgate-Palmolive were, respectively, 4.6 and 6.0 times larger relative to Jarden,
three of Dr. Zmijewski's selected peers were correspondingly smaller than Jarden. JX 1826 at ¶¶40–43. WD-40 Company,
Energizer Holdings and Helen of Troy were 7.3, 3.9 and 3.7 times smaller than Jarden, respectively, yet each of
these firms remained in Dr. Zmijewski's peer set. Id. Dr. Zmijewski provided no credible justification for the disparate,
asymmetrical treatment of large and small companies in his peer set. Id. See also Trial Tr. 935:6–936:17 (Zenner); JX
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1827 at ¶¶45–47 (credibly addressing the fallacy created by Dr. Zmijewski's inconsistent approach to exclusion and
inclusion of comparables based on size).
419 JX 1826 at ¶¶15–17.
420 Trial Tr. 1103:21–24 (Hubbard).
421 JX 1816 at ¶195.
422 JX 1826 at ¶¶38–35. Dr. Hubbard's peer set included firms with core business lines comparable to Jarden's core business,
namely housewares, household appliances, consumer durables, apparel and personal products industry actors. JX 1816
at ¶195.
423 JX 1826 at ¶17.
424 JX 1818 at ¶¶55–57. As noted, Dr. Zmijewski offered no empirical analysis of Jarden's growth, risk, or value drivers as
compared to any of the firms in his peer group. Id. But see JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at
529–30 (“... simply selecting close competitors is not sufficient to ensure the companies are comparable .... Once we
identify competitors, we analyze both the company being valued and the competitors with respect to characteristics that
determine the variation in market multiples—such as future growth prospects, risk future profitability, and future expected
investment requirements.”).
425 The party sponsoring a comparable companies valuation has the burden of proving that the target has validly assessed
peers. See In re Appraisal of SWS Gp., Inc., 2017 WL 2334852, at *10 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2017). Petitioners have not met
that burden. In reaching this conclusion, I am mindful that Jarden, itself, employed a comparable companies analysis,
among other approaches, when it performed internal valuations. But Petitioners have not proffered those valuations
as evidence of Jarden's fair value. Instead, they have presented Dr. Zmijewski's version of a comparable companies
analysis, which differed substantially from the Company's valuations. Accordingly, they had the burden of proving that
the Zmijewski comparable companies valuation was a reliable indicator of fair value. For reasons I have explained, I have
determined they have not carried that burden. In other words, the fact the Company employed comparable companies
analyses in the past to value Jarden might be evidence that the methodology can work for Jarden, but the appraiser
still has to apply the methodology in a principled way. That principled application of the methodology is what is lacking
here. As a final note, for what it's worth, I did find Dr. Zmijewski's approach to selecting a proper multiple for Jarden
to be more credible than Dr. Hubbard's approach, particularly given that he focused his multiples analysis on Jarden's
2016 and 2017 projected earnings, as prescribed in the valuation texts, while Dr. Hubbard based his multiples analysis
on Jarden's historical EBITDA and revenue data. Compare JX 1818 at ¶¶74–76 (Zmijewski) with JX 1816 at ¶¶194–
200. See JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 710, 714; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 334–36; JX 242,
Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 532 (expressing preference for using forward-looking projections over
a firm's historical earnings data when determining a proper multiple). Of course, this observation is worth little given the
lack of credible evidence that Dr. Zmijewski created a proper peer set.
426 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publ'rs, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 361 (Del. 1997). See also M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737
A.2d 513, 525–26 (Del. 1999) (reiterating the Chancellor's role “as an independent appraiser” and observing that “[i]n
discharging its statutory mandate, the Court of Chancery has the discretion to select one of the parties' valuation models
as its general framework or to fashion its own”).
427 Dr. Zmijewski made two DCF calculations: an industry-specific DCF, which incorporated his comparable companies
analyses (“Composite DCF”), and a Jarden-specific DCF (“Jarden-Specific DCF”). JX 1818 at ¶¶70–72.
428 JX 1816 at ¶149; JX 1831 at ¶3.
429 Pet'rs' Pre-Trial Br. at 33.
430 JX 2514 at 14. Indeed, as Jarden points out, “over 83% of value in each of [Dr.] Zmijewski's DCFs is from the terminal
period.” Resp't Jarden Corp.'s Answering Post-Trial Br. at 60.
431 JX 1565 at 143.
432 JX 1816 at ¶¶75–78, Ex. 9; JX 1818 at ¶51, Ex. VI-7A.
433 I adopt Dr. Zmijewski's 35.0% marginal tax rate for Jarden because Dr. Hubbard made no effort to support his effective
tax rate of 36.3%. JX 1816 at ¶¶96–97; JX 1828 at ¶¶9–11. A 35% marginal tax rate comports with the tax rates applied
by Barclays, Centerview, Goldman Sachs and Jarden management—all of which set Jarden's marginal tax rate between
33% and 35%. JX 1828 at ¶¶9–10, 24.
434 JX 1816 at ¶¶75–78, Ex. 9; JX 1818 at ¶51, Ex. VI-7A.
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435 JX 1816 at ¶¶75–78, Ex. 9. I track Dr. Zmijewski's free cash flows analysis with respect to the tax rate because I agree
with him that Dr. Hubbard's approach to estimating Jarden's tax rate in the projected years is not adequately supported.
JX 1828 at ¶¶9–11.
436 JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 256.
437 Id. (“[W]e estimate the value of the remaining free cash flow beyond the forecast horizon by including a[ ] ... one-time
cash flow at the end of the forecast horizon .... [The terminal value] represents the market value (as of the last forecast
period) of the free cash flow ... at all future dates.”).
438 Trial Tr. 300:17–24 (Zmijewski) (“I paired the comparable companies risk assessment with a lower growth rate because
the comparable companies ... were expected to perform at a lower growth rate. And for the Jarden-specific risk
assessment, I used the midpoint of the expected inflation and expected GDP growth.”)
439 JX 1816 at ¶¶84–85.
440 Id.
441 Id.
442 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 308.
443 Trial Tr. 930:2–9 (Zenner) (“So it's a little bit like saying I baked gluten-free bread for you, but I added some wheat
because the consistency is going to be better. So it's kind of saying I'm providing organic growth, but I'm adding some
tuck-in transactions.”).
444 For Jarden, “tuck-ins” were defined as an acquisition where the target company's last twelve months (“LTM”) of revenue
was less than 1.0% of Jarden's LTM revenue. JX 1828 at ¶¶46–47.
445 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 306–07 (“no firm can grow forever at a rate higher than the growth rate
of the economy in which it operates”); JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 122.
446 JX 1816 at ¶¶87–92; JX 1818 at ¶¶52–53.
447 JX 1818 at ¶¶52–53.
448 Id. at ¶¶53–54.
449 JX 1828 at ¶¶46–47.
450 JX 1818 at ¶¶52–54, Ex. VI-2. Polk estimated Jarden would grow at 3.0% (mirroring U.S. GDP growth), while Bain
forecasted Jarden's growth to be between 2.0% and 4.0%. Id.
451 Id. at ¶¶67–69.
452 Id.
453 Id. at ¶¶70–72.
454 JX 1816 at ¶¶86–92.
455 Id. at ¶¶89–90, Figure 20.
456 Id. at ¶¶89–92, Ex. 5A.
457 JX 1826 at ¶¶32–34, Figure 6. Dr. Hubbard maintains that the Company's 3.0% to 5.0% growth projections in the years
following 2015 do not agree with its 2.2% historic organic growth because management incorrectly failed to account for
“tuck-in” acquisitions. Id.; JX 1816 at ¶¶90–92.
458 JX 1816 at ¶¶90–92, Ex. 5A; JX 1826 at ¶¶32–34, Figure 6.
459 JX 1828 at ¶¶46–48.
460 Trial Tr. at 1116–18 (Hubbard); JX 1831 at ¶8.
461 JX 1831 at ¶8.
462 JX 1826 at ¶32 (“[I]n recent history, tuck-ins contributed approximately 1.8 percentage points to the “organic” growth
reported by management, indicating that Jarden would need to continue tuck-in acquisitions in order to achieve the five
percent growth in the Proxy Projections.”).
463 Trial Tr. at 1116–18 (Hubbard); JX 1831 at ¶8.
464 JX 1816 at ¶¶86–90.
465 JX 1828 at ¶¶46–48.
466 JX 1818 at ¶¶52–53.
467 I note that the literature cautions against relying on comparable companies when estimating terminal value because
inconsistencies in projected growth rates between the target company and those of the peer group can either overvalue
or undervalue the target business. JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 212.
468 Trial Tr. 215:20–216:17 (Zmijewski); JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 216–17.
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469 JX 1818 at ¶¶52–53.
470 JX 1816 at ¶¶149–150; JX 1818 at ¶¶70–72; JX 1831 at ¶3.
471 Trial Tr. 195:18–20 (Zmijewski) (“He's using accounting data as if it were economic concepts. That doesn't work. And so
that's my major disagreement with him.”); Trial Tr. 197:14–17 (Zmijewski) (“These are all economic concepts. They're not
—you can't sort of say here's an accounting number and it matches this. These are economic concepts, not accounting
concepts”).
472 JX 63; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 235–37.
473 Id.; JX 1828 at ¶¶37–38.
474 JX 1828 at ¶¶34–35, 45. Dr. Zmijewski never expressly sets his TIR at 4.9%, but implicitly determines that net investment
in 2021 and onward will equal $60 million, or approximately 4.9% of operating profits. JX 1826 at ¶¶54–55, 62, 66–67,
Figure 14. Dr. Zmijewski also assumed that depreciation will equal capital expenditures in the Terminal Period, and that
Jarden's cash investment required to drive terminal growth will grow coequally with Jarden's other financial metrics. JX
1818, Ex. VI-6A (Dr. Zmijewski made some adjustments to the historical financial data such that normalized depreciation
is equal to normalized capital expenditures of $308 million).
475 Trial Tr. 1045:21–1046:2 (Hubbard).
476 JX 1816 at ¶94.
477 Trial Tr. 1055:16–18 (Hubbard).
478 IR = g/RONIC, where g is the terminal growth rate and RONIC is the return on new invested capital. JX 1816 at ¶94; JX
2516, Koller, Valuation at 31; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 312–14.
479 JX 1816 at ¶94. As discussed in more detail below, Dr. Hubbard calculates WACC as follows: Jarden's capital structure
weights 36.1% debt and 63.9% equity, coupled with a cost of debt (after tax) of 3.20% and a cost of equity of 9.74%,
results in a WACC of 7.38%. JX 1816 at ¶128, Ex. 15.
480 Trial Tr. 196:9 (Zmijewski) (“Well, I have four issues.”).
481 Trial Tr. 196:11–16 (Zmijewski).
482 Trial Tr. 197:19–198:17 (Zmijewski).
483 Trial Tr. 198:7–15 (Zmijewski).
484 Trial Tr. 198:18–199:6 (Zmijewski).
485 Trial Tr. 199:7–11 (Zmijewski).
486 Trial Tr. 1046:11–1049:23 (Hubbard); JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 102, 250–56; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment
Valuation at 291, 299–300.
487 JX 1816 at ¶¶93–95, Ex. 10A; JX 1826 at ¶¶54–61.
488 JX 1816, Exs. 5A–5D (compare Ex. 10A starting at FY10 with Exs. 5A, C, D starting at FY11).
489 Trial Tr. 1055:14–18 (Hubbard) (“I just don't know of firms and industries that have both high and rising forever returns on
invested capital.”); Trial Tr. 1051:12–16 (Hubbard) (“you can't simply change your growth, particularly your real growth,
which is what is being done in this experiment, and not have any additional investment”); JX 2514 at 21 (a graph depicting
the dramatically outsized ROIC implicated by Dr. Zmijewski's TIR); JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 19; JX 2515, Damodaran,
Investment Valuation at 302; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 711.
490 This sets the TIR at the midpoint between Dr. Hubbard's TIR of 33.9% and Jarden's historic average investment rate of
21.6%. It also assumes a ROIC for Jarden of 11.2%, which is reasonable given Jarden's innovative and highly acquisitive
growth strategy and a WACC of 6.94% (as discussed below). JX 1828 at ¶39.
491 Trial Tr. 1066:21–23 (Hubbard) (“Q. And if we could, did you estimate the weighted average cost of capital for purposes of
your DCF analysis? A. I did. Both Professor Zmijewski and I tendered estimates of the weighted average cost of capital.”);
JX 1816 at ¶¶98–129; JX 1818 at ¶¶65–66.
492 JX 1816 at ¶¶98–99.
493 Id.; JX 1818 at ¶¶46–49; Trial Tr. 190:1–3 (Zmijewski) (“[WACC] is a standard calculation. You calculate the equity costs
of capital, the after-tax debt cost of capital. You weight those two.”).
494 Id.; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 295–97.
495 Trial Tr. 244:2–6 (Zmijewski) (“[W]e have the same risk-free rate. We have a different equity risk premium, a slightly
different beta. He doesn't use a size premium. I do. So we have some differences in our calculations here.”).
496 JX 1818 at ¶68; JX 1816 at ¶98; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 269.
497 JX 1818 at ¶49; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 269–72.
498 JX 1816 at ¶99; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 215–19.
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499 See Trial Tr. 1070:2–6 (Hubbard).
500 JX 1816 at ¶¶100–03; JX 1818 at ¶63.
501 Id.
502 JX 1818 at ¶64.
503 Id.
504 JX 1816 at ¶98.
505 Id. at ¶¶100–04, Figure 21.
506 Id.
507 Id.
508 Id. at ¶¶100–07, Figure 21; JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 86–87.
509 JX 1816 at ¶¶98–99.
510 Id. at ¶¶104–05.
511 Id.
512 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 217.
513 JX 1816 at ¶¶100–07, Figure 21; JX 1818 at ¶63. See also Trial Tr. 161 (Zmijewski) (explaining how he accounted for
convertible securities).
514 JX 1818 at ¶64.
515 JX 1816 at ¶¶103–07, Figure 21.
516 JX 1816 at ¶105; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 295–97.
517 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 295–97.
518 Id. at 295; JX 1816.
519 JX 1816.
520 Id. at ¶¶100–07, Figure 21; JX 1777 (Lillie Dep.) at 86–87.
521 JX 1816 at ¶¶103–07, Figure 21.
522 Id. at ¶105.
523 Id., Ex. 11A.
524 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 211. See also JX 1816 at ¶106; JX 1818 at ¶63.
525 Id.
526 JX 1818, Ex. VI-5.
527 Id. at ¶64.
528 JX 1816 at ¶¶108–09. Trial Tr. 1218:11–13 (Hubbard) (Q. “You measured Jarden's cost of debt by using yield to maturity.
Correct? A. I did.”).
529 Id.
530 JX 1828 at ¶20; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 412 (“When the firm's debt is risky, however, the debt
yield will overestimate the debt cost of capital, with the magnitude of the error increasing with the riskiness of the debt.”).
531 Trial Tr. 1213:16–18 (Hubbard).
532 JX 1818 at ¶64; JX 1816 at ¶110.
533 Id.
534 JX 1816 at ¶110; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 278–87; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 385–92.
535 JX 1818 at ¶64; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 279; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 208; JX 2032, Berk
& DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 387.
536 JX 1816 at ¶111; JX 1818 at ¶64.
537 Id.
538 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 155; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 275–76; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo,
Corporate Finance at 411–12.
539 JX 1818 at ¶58; JX 1816 at ¶112; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 279; JX 1345, Duff & Phelps, Valuation Handbook at
2–14; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 183; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 413. See
Trial Tr. 187:10–13 (Zmijewski) (“beta is a measure of risk of a company or an asset that you—that you can measure
statistically using a statistical model.”).
540 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 183. See also JX 1816 at ¶¶113–20.
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544 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 283–84. See JX 1816 at ¶114.
545 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 188.
546 Id.; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 413. See JX 1816 at ¶115.
547 JX 1816 at ¶¶111–20; JX 1818 at ¶¶58–61.
548 JX 1818 at ¶¶58–61.
549 Id. at ¶¶60–61, Ex. VI-4.
550 Id. at ¶¶59–61, Ex. VI-5; JX 1828 at ¶16. Dr. Zmijewski explained that the Jarden-Specific Beta was higher due to a “lack
of precision relative to the precision [of] using a set of comparable companies” and because of Jarden's higher long-term
growth relative to that of his comparable companies. JX 1818 at ¶¶60–61.
551 JX 1816 at ¶¶114–16.
552 Id. at ¶¶117–20.
553 Id.
554 Id. at ¶¶114–16. Dr. Hubbard noted that the single year daily beta of 1.18 was “not substantially different” from his two-
year weekly beta of 1.22. Id. at ¶¶117–20.
555 Id. at ¶¶114–16.
556 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 286.
557 Id. at 283–85; JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 306 (“... if we have a set of truly comparable
companies, we feel we can gain precision in our estimate of the cost of capital by using multiple companies.”) (emphasis
supplied).
558 JX 1828 at ¶¶12–16.
559 Trial Tr. 1068:13–1069:15 (Hubbard); JX 1826 at ¶¶72–75.
560 JX 1818 at ¶29 (“More specifically, I discuss ... complexity of Jarden's information and holding company (or platform)
business model strategy”).
561 Trial Tr. 104:7–105:18 (Lillie), 262:19–263:23 (Zmijewski) (“None of those companies is an apple-to-apple comparison
to Jarden or each other. Comparable Companies—there just isn't any such thing as a twin company. It doesn't exist.”).
562 JX 1816 at ¶¶45–50. In addition, both experts' beta estimates are positive, which indicates a parallel correlation with
changes in the overall market.
563 JX 1816 at ¶¶112–20.
564 Id.; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 284; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation 183, 187–95.
565 Id.
566 JX 1818 at ¶¶58–61.
567 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 192–95; JX 1816, Ex. 22F; JX 1818 at ¶¶60–61.
568 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 286; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 192–93.
569 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 281; JX 2032, Berk & DeMarzo, Corporate Finance at 413; JX 241, Holthausen & Zmijewski,
Corporate Valuation at 295.
570 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 187.
571 JX 1816 at ¶121.
572 See Trial Tr. 1072:2–4 (Hubbard) (“So the question is, what is the equity risk premium. And this is one where economists
have a range of views.”).
573 JX 1816 at ¶¶122–24. See Trial Tr. 1072:5–8 (Hubbard) (“My own view in my own work and in the work I'm tendering
here is that the so-called historical risk premium is the best measure of the equity risk premium.”). See also JX 2515,
Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 161 (“In practice, we usually estimate the risk premium by looking at the historical
premium earned by stocks over default-free securities over long time periods.”).
574 JX 1828 at ¶18. See Trial Tr. 1072:8–15 (Hubbard) (“There is an alternative view ... a so-called supply-side risk premium.
I'm not quite sure why that word, because it's not about supply and demand, it's really about whether you include price
earnings multiples expansion. That number is lower.”) See also JX 1345, Duff & Phelps, Valuation Handbook at 11.
575 JX 1828 at ¶17.
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576 JX 1816 at ¶126. Dr. Hubbard took the mid-point of the Long-Term Historical ERP at 6.9% and Supply-Side ERP at 6.03%
to produce his 6.47% ERP estimate for Jarden. Trial Tr. 1072:16–19 (Hubbard) (“I prefer the historical risk premium. I'm
cognizant of the fact Delaware courts have also paid attention to the supply-side risk premium. So I picked the midpoint
of the two.”).
577 JX 1345, Duff & Phelps, Valuation Handbook at 5.
578 JX 1828 at ¶18. The lower Supply-Side ERP is supported by Duff & Phelps' later recommended estimates of adjusted
Long-Term ERP of 5.0% as of March 31, 2018. See Trial Tr. 1073:1–4 (Hubbard) (“But if one's view is your interest
in supply side is governed by Duff & Phelps' recommendation, Duff & Phelps has, indeed, changed its recommended
approach.”).
579 JX 1818 at ¶64.
580 JX 1826 at ¶78; Trial Tr. at 1078:4–9 (Hubbard) (“I don't have a size premium. He does. My quibble is more the way he's
estimated it, given the data source he has. But, again, for the Court's consideration in the interest of the Court's time,
I don't think these are super important.”).
581 JX 242, Holthausen & Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation at 320–21 (discussing the “empirical evidence that the CAPM
overstates the returns to large firms and understates the returns to small firms”).
582 JX 1818, Ex. VI-5.
583 JX 1816 at ¶127.
584 JX 1818 at ¶66.
585 JX 1816 at ¶11.
586 I note that this WACC is within the range calculated by Centerview but below the WACC calculated by Goldman Sachs,
Deutsche Bank, RBC and Barclays.
587 JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 295–97.
588 JX 1816 at ¶95; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 313.
589 See JX 1818 at ¶51.
590 I took the average of the revenue growth rates for the provided fiscal years of 2017–20 to determine the percentage
increase.
591 I took the average of the capital expenditure growth rates for the provided fiscal years of 2017–20 to determine the
percentage increase.
592 JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 585. See JX 1818 at ¶60.
593 In other words, I added the discounted cash flows from each time period in the FY16–FY21 range—$558 million, $646
million, $675 million, $687 million, $698 million, $13.3 billion respectively—to arrive at the total enterprise value.
594 JX 1818 at ¶¶69–72; JX 1816 at ¶¶130–47.
595 JX 1816 at ¶¶143–47.
596 See Trial Tr. 1079:17–21 (Hubbard) (“Maybe I should start with the bottom line. If you were to look at all of these
[enterprise value adjustments], they're a little over a dollar a share, and I think $1.06 altogether, because they go in
different directions.”).
597 JX 1816 at ¶139.
598 Trial Tr. 1081:17–20 (Hubbard) (“[E]ssentially you want to add back excess cash that the company has. And we both
agree on that, and we both agree on what the total cash was. It was $799 million.”).
599 JX 1816 at ¶140.
600 Id.
601 Id. at ¶141.
602 Id.; JX 2516, Koller, Valuation at 309; JX 2515, Damodaran, Investment Valuation at 440.
603 JX 1816 at ¶142.
604 Id., Ex. 18C.
605 Id., Ex. 18A.
606 Id.
607 JX 1818 at ¶70. Dr. Hubbard adjusted his final share count number to align with Dr. Zmijewski's number after double
counting Jarden's restricted stock. JX 1831.
608 JX 1565 at 242.
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609 As explained above, the DCF Analysis makes the following assumptions: WACC equals 6.9%; Terminal Growth equals
3.1%; ROIC equals 11.2%; FY21 Revenue Growth equals 5%; FY21 Capital Expenditure as a percent of Revenue equals
2.6%; Fully Diluted Share Count equals 219.9 million.
610 Drs. Hubbard and Zmijewski both agree on Jarden's Revenue numbers for FY16–FY20 reported in Standard and Poor's
Capital IQ. See JX 1816, Ex. 9; JX 1818, Ex. VI-7A.
611 Drs. Hubbard and Zmijewski both agree on Jarden's Capital Expenditure numbers for FY16–FY20 as derived from
Standard and Poor's Capital IQ and Jarden's FY10-15 10K. See JX 1816, Ex. 9; JX 1818, Ex. VI-1.
612 Time Period is calculated based on the mid-year convention used by Dr. Hubbard. JX 1816, Ex. 16. I note, for 2016, the
mid-point uses the period from April 15, 2016 to December 31, 2016. Id.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
BOUCHARD, C.
*1  In this appraisal action, the court must determine the
fair value of petitioners' shares of Solera Holdings, Inc. as of
March 3, 2016, when Vista Equity Partners acquired Solera
for $55.85 per share, or approximately $3.85 billion in total
equity value, in a merger transaction. Unsurprisingly, the
parties have widely divergent views on this question.
Relying solely on a discounted cash flow analysis, petitioners
contend that the fair value of their shares is $84.65 per share
—approximately 51.6% over the deal price. Until recently,
respondent consistently argued that the “best evidence” of the
fair value of Solera shares is the deal price less estimated
synergies, equating to $53.95 per share. After an appraisal
decision in another case recently used the “unaffected market
price” of a company's stock to determine fair value, however,
respondent changed its position to argue for the same measure
of value here, which respondent contends is $36.39 per share
—about 35% below the deal price.
Over the past year, our Supreme Court twice has heavily
endorsed the application of market efficiency principles in
appraisal actions. With that guidance in mind, and after
carefully considering all relevant factors, my independent
determination is that the fair value of petitioners' shares is the
deal price less estimated synergies—i.e., $53.95 per share.
As discussed below, the record reflects that Solera was sold in
an open process that, although not perfect, was characterized
by many objective indicia of reliability. The merger was the
product of a two-month outreach to large private equity firms
followed by a six-week auction conducted by an independent
and fully authorized special committee of the board, which
contacted eleven financial and seven strategic firms. Public
disclosures made clear to the market that the company was for
sale. The special committee had competent legal and financial
advisors and the power to say no to an underpriced bid, which
it did twice, without the safety net of another bid. The merger
price of $55.85 proved to be a market-clearing price through
a 28-day go-shop that the special committee secured as a
condition of the deal with Vista, one which afforded favorable
terms to allow a key strategic competitor of Solera to continue
to bid for the company.
The record further suggests that the sales process was
conducted against the backdrop of an efficient and well-
functioning market for Solera's stock. Before the merger, for
example, Solera had a deep base of public stockholders, its
shares were actively traded on the New York Stock Exchange
and were covered by numerous analysts, and its debt was
closely monitored by ratings agencies.
In short, the sales process delivered for Solera stockholders
the value obtainable in a bona fide arm's-length transaction
and provides the most reliable evidence of fair value.
Accordingly, I give the deal price, after adjusting for
synergies in accordance with longstanding precedent, sole
and dispositive weight in determining the fair value of
petitioners' shares as of the date of the merger.
I. BACKGROUND
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*2  The facts recited in this opinion are my findings based
on the testimony and documentary evidence submitted during
a five-day trial. The record includes over 400 stipulations of
fact in the Stipulated Joint Pre-Trial Order (“PTO”),1 over
1,000 trial exhibits, including fourteen deposition transcripts,
and the live testimony of four fact witnesses and three expert
witnesses. I accord the evidence the weight and credibility I
find it deserves.
A. The Parties
Respondent Solera Holdings, Inc. (“Solera” or the
“Company”) is a Delaware corporation with headquarters
in Westlake, Texas.2 Solera was founded in 2005 and was
publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange from May
2007 until March 3, 2016, when it was acquired by an affiliate
of Vista Equity Partners (“Vista”) in a merger transaction (the
“Merger”).3
From Solera's inception through the Merger, Tony Aquila
served as Chairman of the Board of Directors (the “Board”),
Chief Executive Officer, and President of Solera.4 Over
this time period, Aquila made all top-level decisions
about product innovation, corporate marketing, and investor
relation efforts.5 After the Merger, Aquila remained the CEO
of Solera.6
Petitioners consist of seven funds that were stockholders
of Solera at the time of the Merger: Muirfield Value
Partners LP, Fir Tree Value Master Fund, L.P., Fir Tree
Capital Opportunity Master Fund, L.P., BlueMountain Credit
Alternatives Master Fund L.P., BlueMountain Summit
Trading L.P., BlueMountain Foinaven Master Fund L.P.,
and BlueMountain Logan Opportunities Master Fund L.P.
Petitioners collectively hold 3,987,021 shares of Solera
common stock that are eligible for appraisal.7
B. Solera's Business
In early 2005, Aquila founded Solera with aspirations to bring
about a digital evolution of the insurance industry, starting
with the processing of automotive insurance claims.8 Aquila
viewed Solera as a potential disruptor, akin to Amazon.com,
Inc., in its specific industry.9
Solera, in its current form, is a global leader in data
and software for automotive, home ownership, and digital
identity management.10 At the time of the Merger, Solera's
business consisted of three main platforms: (i) Risk
Management Solutions; (ii) Service, Maintenance, and
Repair; and (iii) Customer Retention Management.11 The
Risk Management Solutions platform helps insurers digitize
and streamline the claims process with respect to automotive
and property content claims.12 The Service, Maintenance,
and Repair platform digitally assists car technicians and auto
service centers to diagnose and repair vehicles efficiently,
accurately, and profitably, and to identify and source
original equipment manufacturer and aftermarket automotive
parts.13 The Customer Retention Management platform
provides consumer-centric and data-driven digital marketing
solutions for businesses that serve the auto ownership
lifecycle, including property and casualty insurers, vehicle
manufacturers, car dealerships, and financing providers.14
Solera was operating in 78 countries at the time of the
Merger.15
C. Solera Expands Aggressively Through Acquisitions
*3  Solera's business was not always so diverse. During the
Company's early years, the vast majority of Solera's revenues
was derived from claims processing.16 But the claims
business was facing pressure17 as a result of maturation,18
advances in automotive technology like collision avoidance
and self-driving cars,19 and competition.20
In August 2012, Aquila implemented a plan called “Mission
2020” to increase Solera's revenue and EBITDA through
acquisitions and diversification.21 Solera aspired to become
a “cognitive data and software and services company” that
would address the entire lifecycle of a car.22
The Mission 2020 goals included growing revenue from
$790 million in fiscal year 2012 to $2 billion by fiscal year
2020, and increasing adjusted EBITDA from $345 million
to $800 million over that same period.23 To meet these
benchmarks, Solera implemented its “Leverage. Diversify.
Disrupt.” (“LDD”) business strategy.24
LDD was a three-pronged strategy. First, Solera sought
to “leverage” its claims processing revenue in a given
geographic area to gain a foothold in that area. Second,
Solera sought to “diversify” its service offerings in the
given geographic area. Third, Solera's longer-term objective
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was to “disrupt” the market by integrating its service
offerings such that vehicle owners and homeowners could
use Solera's software to manage their purchases, maintenance,
and insurance claims all in one place.25
D. The Market's Reaction to LDD
Between the formulation of Mission 2020 and the Merger,
Solera invested approximately $2.1 billion in acquisitions.26
These acquisitions often were “scarcity value transactions”
that involved Solera paying a premium for unique assets.27
The multiples Solera paid in these acquisitions not only were
relatively high but were increasing over time, generating
lower returns on invested capital.28 As a result, Solera's
leverage increased while its EPS essentially remained flat and
its EBITDA margins shrank.29
Some analysts were skeptical of Solera's evolution-through-
acquisitions strategy, taking a “show me” approach to the
Company.30 These analysts struggled to understand Solera's
diversification plan31 and complained that management's lack
of transparency about the Company's strategy impeded their
ability to value Solera appropriately.32 Aquila, the Board,
and other analysts believed that the market misunderstood
Solera's value proposition and that its stock traded at a
substantial discount to fair value.33
Compounding the challenges Solera was facing in the equity
markets, Solera was encountering difficulties in the debt
markets. Solera needed to have access to debt financing
to execute its acquisition strategy, but by the time of the
Merger, Solera was unable to find lenders willing to finance
its deals due to its highly-levered balance sheet. For example,
upon the announcement that Solera planned to issue tack-
on notes in November 2014, “the proceeds of which, along
with balance sheet cash, [were] expected to effect a strategic
acquisition,” Moody's Investors Service downgraded Solera's
credit rating from Ba2 to Ba3.34 Moody's noted that “the
company has been actively pursuing acquisitions, often at
very high purchase multiples,” and warned that “[r]atings
could be downgraded [further] if the company undertakes
acquisitions that, after integration, fail to realize targeted
margins.”35
*4  In late May 2015, management began discussing an $850
million notes offering with Goldman Sachs, the proceeds of
which the Company planned to use to fund acquisitions and
refinance outstanding debt.36 The offering fell approximately
$11.5 million short, and Goldman was forced to absorb the
notes that it could not sell into the market.37 In July 2015,
Moody's downgraded Solera again,38 commenting “[t]he
ongoing, cumulative impacts of debt assumed for acquisitions
and for the buyout of its joint venture partner's 50%
share ... plus ramped up share buybacks and dividends, have
pushed Moody's expectations for [Solera's] intermediate-term
leverage to approximately 7.0 times, a level high even for a
B1-rated credit.”39 As Aquila testified, Solera was “out of
runway” shortly before the Merger to execute the rest of its
acquisition strategy because creditors were unwilling to loan
funds to Solera at tolerable interest rates.40
E. Aquila Expresses Displeasure with his Compensation
at Solera
Solera's stock price affected Aquila personally. His
compensation was tied to “total shareholder return,” and the
majority of his stock options were underwater.41 Aquila did
not receive a performance bonus in 2011, 2012, or 2013.42
In February 2015, he emailed Thomas Dattilo, Chair of
the Compensation Committee, saying “I've poured a great
deal of time, inventions and sacrifice during this time in
the company's transition and I really need to get something
meaningful for it.”43 At one point, Aquila threatened to leave
Solera if his compensation was not reconfigured.44
The Board recognized Aquila's value to the Company
and took his request and threat to leave seriously. Dattilo
commented “the way [S]olera is structured, we would
probably need three people to replace him, and even that
would not really fulfill the Solera requirements because of the
pervasive founder[']s culture found there. ... Solera possibly
couldn't exist without Tony.”45 Although the Compensation
Committee was looking for a solution to address Aquila's
underwater stock options, they ultimately “didn't get it
done.”46
F. Aquila Privately Explores a Sale of Solera
Around the time that Aquila complained to the Board about
his compensation, he began to engage in informal discussions
with private equity firms regarding a potential transaction
to take the Company private. In December 2014, Aquila
was introduced to David Baron, an investment banker at
Rothschild Inc. (“Rothschild”).47 Aquila and Baron met again
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in January 2015, when they “talked through a bunch of
buy-side ideas” and Aquila expressed his frustration at the
disconnect between Solera's stock price performance relative
to its peers and his own views on the Company's growth
opportunities.48
In March 2015, Aquila was introduced to Orlando Bravo,
a founder of the private equity firm Thoma Bravo LLC
(“Thoma Bravo”), and Robert Smith, the founder of Vista.49
Before these two meetings, Aquila was aware that both
Thoma Bravo and Vista recently had launched new multi-
billion dollar funds.50
On April 29, 2015, Baron contacted Brett Watson, the head
of Koch Equity, to tell him, without identifying Solera as the
target, about an opportunity to invest in preferred equity.51
Baron wrote in an email to Watson: “I'd like you to speak for
as much of pref[erred stock] as possible – Ceo objective is to
try to get control back[.] I'm going to clear it w[ith] chairman/
ceo next week.”52
*5  On May 4, 2015, Baron travelled to Aquila's ranch in
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, bringing with him a presentation
book that included leverage buyout (“LBO”) analyses that
the two had previously discussed.53 Two days later, during
an earnings call on May 6, Aquila raised the possibility of
taking Solera private as a means of returning money to its
stockholders while still pursuing its growth strategy:
Q (Analyst): And just if I can bring that around to [the
Solera CFO's] comment about being opportunistic in share
repurchases when you think the stock is detached from
intrinsic value, you haven't bought a lot of stock. So how
do we square that circle in terms of what you think the
Company is worth today?
A (Aquila): Look, you're bringing up a great point. So,
look, it is a chicken-or-egg story. We're going to make
some of you happy, which we're trying to go down—we're
trying to keep the ball down the middle of the fairway.
We definitely like to hit the long ball as much as we can.
But in reality, we have to do what we're doing, and we
have to thread the needle the way we are. Our only other
alternative is either to take up leverage, buy stock right now.
That's going to cause a ratings issue. That's going to cause
some dislocation. We want to buy content because we want
double-digit businesses in the emerging content world as
apps take a different role on your phone to manage your
risks and your asset. So when you think of that, we've done
a decent job. We bought, I don't know, $300 million worth
of stock back since we did the stock buying program, and
our average price is, like, $52, $53.
So we're kind of dealing with all the factors—we got the
short game playing out there. And we've got to thread the
needle. And the only other option to that is to go private
and take all the shares out.54
Aquila testified that this comment was “not preplanned,” and
he was not “trying to suggest that [going private] was a
decision that had been made.”55
A few days later, on May 11, 2015, Aquila met with Smith
from Vista and his partner Christian Sowul in Austin, Texas.56
After the meeting, Sowul followed up with Baron, saying
“we are very interested. [T]ony sounded like now is the time.
[N]ext 4-6 weeks.”57
Also on May 11, the Board commenced a series of meetings
and dinners in Dallas, Texas.58 Before these meetings,
Aquila discussed with every Board member the possibility
of pursuing strategic alternatives, given that Solera was “out
of runway” to execute its growth-by-acquisition strategy.59
Company director Stuart Yarbrough encouraged Aquila to
have these conversations with the other directors, and
explained that the Board felt Solera was “being criticized in
the market” and knew that the Company was paying higher
multiples for larger acquisitions.60
On May 12, 2015, Company director Michael Lehman
emailed Yarbrough and Larry Sonsini of the law firm Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati about the possibility of retaining
his firm to assist in reviewing strategic alternatives. Lehman
stated in the email: “Tony and the board have just begun
conversations about ‘evaluating strategic alternatives,’ ” of
which “[o]ne of the more attractive conceptual alternatives
is a ‘going private,’ which would likely mean that the CEO
would have significant stake in that entity [ ] (think Dell
computer type transaction).”61
*6  In an executive session on May 13, the Board
unanimously agreed that Aquila should “test the waters” with
financial sponsors.62 In doing so, the Board recognized that
Aquila would probably have a significant equity stake in a
private Solera, posing an “inherent” conflict in his outreach to
private equity firms.63 The Board authorized Aquila to “put
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together a target list” of large private equity firms and to “go
have discussions and see what the interest was.”64 The Board
decided to start with private equity firms and add strategic
firms later in the process because it believed that strategic
firms presented a greater risk of leaks65 and an interested
strategic bidder could get up to speed quickly.66 The Board
also wanted to focus on larger private equity firms to avoid
the complexity of firms having to partner with each other.67
At this stage, the Board prohibited “any use of nonpublic
information.”68
G. A Special Committee is Formed after Aquila “Tests
the Waters”
Between May 13 and June 1, 2015, Aquila, with assistance
from Rothschild, contacted nine private equity firms:
Pamplona, Silver Lake, Apax, Access Industries, Hellman
& Friedman, Vista, Blackstone, CVC Capital Partners, and
Thoma Bravo.69 Aquila and Rothschild had follow-up contact
with at least Silver Lake,70 Blackstone,71 and Thoma Bravo72
between June 1 and July 14, 2015. After his meeting
with Aquila, Orlando Bravo emailed Baron, saying “Unreal
meeting. I love Tony man. We want to do this deal.”73 On
July 18, 2015, Aquila reported back to the Board that Thoma
Bravo was going to make an offer for Solera.74
On July 19, 2015, Thoma Bravo submitted an indication of
interest to purchase Solera at a price between $56-$58 per
share. In the letter submitting their bid, Thoma Bravo stated
that they “are contemplating this deal solely in the context of
being able to partner with Tony Aquila and his management
team.”75
On July 20, 2015, the Board discussed the indication of
interest received from Thoma Bravo and formed a special
committee of independent directors to review the Company's
strategic alternatives (the “Special Committee”).76 The
Special Committee consisted of Yarbrough (Chairman),
Dattilo, and Patrick Campbell, each of whom had served on
multiple boards and had extensive M & A experience.77 The
Special Committee was granted the “full power and authority
of the Board” to review, evaluate, negotiate, recommend, or
reject any proposed transaction or strategic alternatives.78
The Board resolution establishing the Special Committee
further provided that “the Board shall not recommend a
Possible Transaction or alternative thereto for approval by
the Company's stockholders or otherwise approve a Possible
Transaction or alternative thereto without a prior favorable
recommendation of such Possible Transaction or alternative
thereto by the Special Committee.”79
H. The Special Committee Begins its Work
On July 30, 2015, the Special Committee met with its legal
advisors, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP and Richards, Layton
& Finger P.A., and financial advisor Centerview Partners
LLC (“Centerview”).80 Rothschild remained active in the
sales process and was formally engaged to represent the
Company,81 but, in reality, it also continued to represent
Aquila personally.82
*7  At its July 30 meeting, the Special Committee approved
a list of potential buyers to approach, including six strategic
companies that were selected based on their business
initiatives and stated future plans, and six financial sponsors
(including Vista) that were selected based on their experience
and interest in the technology and information services
industry and their capability to execute and finance a
transaction of this size.83 The Special Committee also
distributed to management a short document that Sullivan &
Cromwell prepared concerning senior management contacts
with prospective bidders, which, aptly for a company
focused on the automotive industry, was referred to as
the “Rules of the Road.”84 The document stated, among
other things, that “senior management must treat potential
Bidders equally” and refrain from “any discussions with any
Bidder representatives relating to any future compensation,
retention or investment arrangements, without approval by
the independent directors.”85
Between July 30 and August 4, 2015, Centerview contacted
11 private equity firms and 6 potential strategic bidders,
including Google and Yahoo!, the two that Special Committee
Chair Yarbrough believed were most likely to bid.86 Aquila
already had “tested the waters” with some of the private equity
firms that the Special Committee contacted. All six strategic
firms contacted declined to explore a transaction involving
Solera.87 At this time, the Special Committee did not contact
IHS Inc. (“IHS”), another possible strategic acquirer, because
IHS was one of Solera's key competitors and the Special
Committee had “a low level of confidence” in IHS's ability to
finance a transaction.88
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From time to time, Aquila, through Rothschild and his
legal counsel, Kirkland & Ellis LLP,89 apprised the Special
Committee on his thoughts about the sales process. On July
30, 2015, Baron told the Special Committee's legal and
financial advisors in an email that Aquila did not want IHS
included in the sales process, stating “fishing expedition, too
competitive, need 50% stock ...”90
On August 3, 2015, Aquila's counsel sent the Special
Committee a proposed “Management Retention Program.”91
This proposal stated that “an incremental $75 million cash
retention pool” should be created to align management
and shareholder incentives, and to “enhance impartiality of
management among all potential buyers.”92 The proposal
warned that under the current compensation plan, “the
program inadequately aligns management's interests with
those of stockholders and exposes the Company to risks of
losing key managers through closing” of a transaction.93
Solera did not implement this proposed “Management
Retention Program,” but the Compensation Committee did
award Aquila a $15 million bonus in August 2015.94
I. The Special Committee Solicits First-Round Bids and
News of the Sales Process Leaks
By August 11, 2015, Yarbrough viewed “the state of the world
to be one where if there's going to be a deal, it's going to
be with a private equity firm.”95 On August 10, 2015, at
the direction of the Special Committee, Centerview sent a
letter to the five remaining parties inviting them to submit
first-round bids by August 17, 2015.96 These parties had
signed confidentiality agreements and were provided Board-
approved five-year projections for the Company, which were
based on projections created in the normal course of business
but then modified in connection with the sales process (the
“Hybrid Case Projections”).97 Before the August 17 bid
deadline, Baron spoke to certain potential bidders directly
without involving Centerview.98
*8  By August 17, 2015, two potential bidders had dropped
out of the sales process, believing “that they would not be able
to submit competitive bids.”99 The remaining three financial
sponsors provided indications of interest: Vista offered $63
per share, Thoma Bravo offered $60 per share, and Pamplona
offered $60-$62 per share.100 Each made clear that they
wanted Aquila's participation in the deal.101
On August 19, 2015, news of the sales process leaked when
Bloomberg reported that Solera was “exploring a sale that has
attracted interest from private equity firms.”102 The next day,
the Company issued a press release announcing that it had
formed the Special Committee and that it was contemplating
a sale.103 Also on August 20, the Financial Times reported
that Vista was “considering a bid of $63 per share” and that
Thoma Bravo and Pamplona were “considering separate bids
for $62 per share.”104
In a further development on August 20, Advent International
Corporation, a private equity firm, reached out to Centerview
and Rothschild separately to express interest in the
Company.105 Centerview confirmed to Baron that it planned
to ignore the inquiry,106 about which the members of the
Special Committee were never informed.107 The Special
Committee also was not made aware of interest that
Providence Equity Partners, L.L.C.,108 another private equity
firm, expressed to Centerview on August 26.109 When
Centerview made Baron aware of this inquiry, he responded:
“Too late obv[iously] but Tony not a fan ...”110 Neither
Advent nor Providence gave any indication as to the price
they would be willing to pay for Solera or the amount of time
they would need to get up to speed.111
During the August 22-23, 2015 weekend, Smith traveled to
Aquila's ranch en route to his own ranch in Colorado.112
Before the meeting, Smith's team at Vista researched the size
of the option pools that Vista had offered management in
its “recent take privates” so that Smith would “know the
comps before his meeting with [T]ony.”113 Aquila did not
have authorization from the Special Committee to discuss his
post-transaction compensation at this time.114 Shortly after
the meeting, Vista began to model a 9% option pool with a
1% long-term incentive plan (LTIP), up from the 5% option
pool with a 1% LTIP that Vista had modeled before Aquila's
meeting with Smith.115
J. IHS Expresses Interest in a Potential Transaction
On August 21, 2015, IHS contacted Centerview to express its
interest in a potential acquisition of Solera at an unspecified
valuation and financing structure.116 By August 23, IHS
suggested that it would be able to submit a bid in excess of
$63 per share, and it indicated that it could complete due
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diligence and execute definitive transaction documents within
ten calendar days despite not yet having received nonpublic
information.117 The parties entered into a confidentiality
agreement on August 24.118
*9  On August 26, 2015, senior representatives of IHS,
including its CFO, attended a meeting with the Company's
management, before which Aquila had a one-on-one
conversation with IHS's CFO for 90 minutes.119 Centerview
requested numerous times that IHS's CEO Jerre Stead
attend the management meeting, but he declined even
though the acquisition would have been the largest in IHS's
history.120 By August 27, Solera had provided IHS with
non-public Company information, including the Hybrid Case
Projections.121
On September 1, IHS submitted a bid of $55-$58 per share,
comprised of 75% cash and 25% stock, and included “highly
confident” letters from financing sources.122 On September
2, Aquila travelled separately to meet with Stead personally,
who commented that IHS was “looking at another big deal as
well.”123 The next day, IHS submitted a revised bid of $60
per share, but did not specify the mix of consideration and did
not include any indication of financing commitments.124 IHS
said it could complete diligence “within a matter of days.”125
K. The Special Committee Negotiates with Potential
Buyers
On September 4, 2015, Vista and Thoma Bravo submitted
revised bids.126 Pamplona had dropped out of the sales
process by this point,127 and the Special Committee felt like
it was “moving backwards” in its negotiations with IHS.128
Both of the active bidders lowered their offers. Thoma Bravo
lowered its bid to $56 per share, attributing the drop to
“challenges in availability and terms of financing (both debt
and equity) due in part to turbulence in global financial
markets.”129 Vista lowered its bid to $55 per share, but
subsequently indicated that it could increase its price to
$56 per share.130 Vista explained that it dropped its bid
because of changes to Solera's balance sheet, increased
financing costs, and a decline in Vista's forecasted EBITDA
for Solera.131 Unbeknownst to Solera, one of the reasons
Vista lowered its bid is that it had made a spreadsheet error
in its financial model before submitting its first-round bid,
resulting in the model overstating Solera's future equity value
by approximately $1.9 billion.132 If this error had been
noticed and corrected, Vista's first-round bid would have been
closer to $55 per share, rather than $63 per share.133
On September 5, 2015, Aquila signaled that he was willing
to roll over $15 million of his Solera shares in a transaction
with any bidder.134 That day, the Special Committee met135
and decided to press for more from the bidders, proposing to
Vista that it either raise its price to $58 per share, or agree
to a go-shop and reduced termination fee to enable Solera to
continue discussions with IHS.136 Vista agreed to the go-shop
and the termination fee reduction on September 7, but also
told Centerview that day that one of its anticipated sources
of equity financing had withdrawn its commitment and that it
would need additional time to obtain replacement financing
to support its bid.137
*10  On September 8, Vista lowered its bid to $53 per
share.138 Vista told Solera that its bid would expire at
midnight, and that “[a]fter midnight, we will not be spending
any more time on” Solera.139 The Special Committee rejected
Vista's bid as inadequate that same day,140 and decided “to
let the process play out.”141 The Special Committee set
September 11, 2015 as a deadline for Vista and Thoma Bravo
to make final bids.142 On September 9, Bloomberg reported
that Solera had received bids from Vista and Thoma Bravo,
and that the Company was “nearing a deal to sell itself for
about $53 a share.”143
When September 11 arrived, Thoma Bravo offered $54
per share, expiring at midnight and contingent on Solera
“shutting off dividends” and reducing advisory fees.144 The
Special Committee said “no.”145 The press again reported
in real time, with Reuters writing that Vista and Thoma
Bravo had “made offers that failed to meet Solera's valuation
expectations,” and that Solera was “trying to sell itself
to another company”—IHS—“rather than an investment
firm.”146
The next morning, on September 12, Vista submitted an all-
cash, fully financed revised bid of $55.85 per share that
also included the go-shop and termination fee provisions the
Special Committee had requested.147 The Special Committee
tried to push Vista up to $56 per share, but Vista refused,
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saying $55.85 was its best and final offer.148 Centerview
opined that $55.85 per share was fair, from a financial point
of view, to Solera stockholders.149 Later in the day on
September 12, the Special Committee accepted Vista's offer
after receiving Centerview's fairness opinion, and the Board
approved the transaction.150 On September 13, the Company
and Vista entered into a definitive merger agreement (the
“Merger Agreement”).151
L. The Go-Shop Period Expires and the Merger Closes
On September 13, 2015, Solera announced the proposed
Merger.152 The press release stated that the purchase price
valued Solera at approximately $6.5 billion, including net
debt, “represent[ing] an unaffected premium of 53% over
Solera's closing share price of $36.39 on August 3, 2015.”153
In advance of the press release, Baron sent a celebratory email
to his colleagues, in which he noted “we were the architects
with the CEO from the beginning as to how to engineer the
process from start to finish.”154 The next morning, an internal
email of the Fir Tree petitioners praised the transaction as
yielding a “Good price!”155
The Merger Agreement provided for a 28-day go-shop period
during which the termination fee would be 1% of the equity
value for any offer made by IHS, a reduction from the 3%
termination fee applicable to any other potential buyer.156
The Special Committee reached out to IHS the day after
signing the Merger Agreement and gave IHS nearly full
access to the approximately 12,000-document data room that
the private equity firms had been given access to during the
pre-signing sales process.157
*11  On September 29, 2015, with two weeks left in the
go-shop, IHS informed Solera that it would not pursue
an acquisition of the Company. IHS noted that it “was
appreciative of the go-shop provisions negotiated in the
merger agreement ... and the fact that [Solera] had provided
equal access to information in order for IHS to consider a
bid.”158 On October 5, 2015, Solera issued its preliminary
proxy statement, which disclosed a summary of the Hybrid
Case Projections.159 The go-shop expired on October 11,
without Solera receiving any alternative proposals.160
On October 15, 2015, Vista sent Aquila a proposed
compensation package, offering Aquila the opportunity to
obtain up to 6% of Solera's fully-diluted equity.161 This
amount was later revised up, with Vista offering Aquila up
to 10% of the fully-diluted equity. Under the revised plan,
Aquila would invest $45 million in the deal—$15 million
worth of his shares of Solera and $30 million borrowed from
Vista.162 Vista's proposal positioned Aquila to earn up to
$969.6 million over a seven-year period if Vista achieved a
four-times cash-on-cash return.163
On October 30, 2015, Solera issued its definitive proxy
statement concerning the proposed Merger, which also
included a summary of the Hybrid Case Projections.164 On
December 8, Solera's stockholders voted to approve the
Merger. Of the Company's outstanding shares, approximately
65.4% voted in favor, approximately 10.9% voted against,
and approximately 3.4% abstained.165 The Merger closed
on March 3, 2016.166 The next day, Aquila signed a new
employment agreement with Solera.167
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On March 7 and March 10, 2016, petitioners filed their
petitions for appraisal. The court consolidated the petitions on
March 30, 2016. A five-day trial was held in June 2017, and
post-trial argument was held on December 4, 2017.
At the conclusion of the post-trial argument, the court asked
the parties to confer to see if they could agree on an expert
the court might appoint to opine on a significant issue of
disagreement concerning the methods the parties' experts
used to determine the terminal period investment rate in
their discounted cash flow analyses. On December 19, 2017,
the parties advised the court that they were unable to reach
agreement on a suggested expert and each submitted two
candidates for the court's consideration.
On February 22, 2018, Solera filed a motion requesting
the opportunity to submit supplemental briefs to address
the implications of certain appraisal decisions issued after
the post-trial argument. The court granted this motion on
February 26, 2018, noting in its order that it had “made
no decision about whether to proceed with an independent
expert” and would “revisit the issue after reviewing the
supplemental submissions.”168 Supplemental briefing was
completed on April 6, 2018.169
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
Petitioners request appraisal of their shares of Solera under
8 Del. C. § 262. “An action seeking appraisal is intended
to provide shareholders who dissent from a merger, on
the basis of the inadequacy of the offering price, with a
judicial determination of the fair value of their shares.”170
Respondent has not disputed petitioners' eligibility for an
appraisal of their shares.
*12  In an appraisal action, the court has a statutory mandate
to:
[D]etermine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any
element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to
be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court
shall take into account all relevant factors.171
Appraisal excludes any value resulting from the merger,
including synergies that may arise,172 because “[t]he basic
concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the
stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has been
taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going
concern.”173 In valuing a company as a “going concern” at
the time of a merger, the court must take into consideration the
“operative reality”174 of the company, viewing the company
as “occupying a particular market position in the light of
future prospects.”175 A dissenting stockholder is then entitled
to his proportionate interest in the going concern.176
In using “all relevant factors” to determine fair value, the
court has significant discretion to use the valuation methods it
deems appropriate, including the parties' proposed valuation
frameworks, or one of the court's own fashioning.177 This
court has relied on a number of different approaches to
determine fair value, including comparable company and
precedent transaction analyses, a discounted cash flow model,
and the merger price.178 “This Court may not adopt at the
outset an ‘either-or’ approach, thereby accepting uncritically
the valuation of one party, as it is the Court's duty to determine
the core issue of fair value on the appraisal date.”179 “In an
appraisal proceeding, the burden to establish fair value by a
preponderance of the evidence rests on both the petitioner and
the respondent.”180
B. DFC, Dell, and Recent Court of Chancery Appraisal
Decisions
*13  Over the past year, the Delaware Supreme Court has
issued two decisions providing important guidance for the
Court of Chancery in appraisal proceedings: DFC Global
Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.181 and Dell,
Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd.182
Given their importance, a brief discussion of each case is
appropriate at the outset.
In DFC, petitioners sought appraisal of shares they held
in a publicly traded payday lending firm, DFC, that was
purchased by a private equity firm.183 This court attempted to
determine the fair value of DFC's shares by equally weighting
three measures of value: a discounted cash flow model, a
comparable company analysis, and the transaction price.184
The court gave equal weight to these three measures of value
because it found that each similarly suffered from limitations
arising from the tumultuous regulatory environment that was
swirling around DFC during the period leading up to its
sale.185 The court's analysis resulted in a fair value of DFC at
approximately 8% above the transaction price.186
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the
trial court.187 Based on its own review of the trial record, the
Supreme Court held that the Court of Chancery's decision to
afford only one-third weight to the transaction price was “not
rationally supported by the record,”188 explaining:
Although there is no presumption in favor of the deal
price ... economic principles suggest that the best evidence
of fair value was the deal price, as it resulted from an open
process, informed by robust public information, and easy
access to deeper, non-public information, in which many
parties with an incentive to make a profit had a chance to
bid.189
The Supreme Court further explained that the purpose of
appraisal “is not to make sure that the petitioners get the
highest conceivable value,” but rather “to make sure that they
receive fair compensation for their shares in the sense that it
reflects what they deserve to receive based on what would
fairly be given to them in an arm's-length transaction.”190
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*14  According to the Supreme Court, “[m]arket prices
are typically viewed superior to other valuation techniques
because, unlike, e.g., a single person's discounted cash flow
model, the market price should distill the collective judgment
of the many based on all the publicly available information
about a given company and the value of its shares.”191
The “collective judgment of the many” may include that
of “equity analysts, equity buyers, debt analysts, [and] debt
providers.”192 The Supreme Court cautioned that “[t]his, of
course, is not to say that the market price is always right,
but that one should have little confidence she can be the
special one able to outwit the larger universe of equally avid
capitalists with an incentive to reap rewards by buying the
asset if it is too cheaply priced.”193
Several months after deciding DFC, the Supreme Court
reiterated the same appraisal thesis in Dell, where the
trial court had reached a determination of fair value at
approximately 28% above the transaction price.194 In Dell,
the Supreme Court found that the Court of Chancery erred
by relying completely on a discounted cash flow analysis
and affording zero weight to market data, i.e., the stock price
and the deal price, because “the evidence suggests that the
market for Dell's shares was actually efficient and, therefore,
likely a possible proxy for fair value.”195 With respect to the
company's stock price, the Supreme Court explained:
Dell's stock traded on the NASDAQ under the ticker
symbol DELL. The Company's market capitalization of
more than $20 billion ranked it in the top third of the S &
P 500. Dell had a deep public float and was actively traded
as more than 5% of Dell's shares were traded each week.
The stock had a bid-ask spread of approximately 0.08%.
It was also widely covered by equity analysts, and its
share price quickly reflected the market's view on breaking
developments.196
The Supreme Court thus held that “the record does not
adequately support the Court of Chancery's conclusion that
the market for Dell's stock was inefficient and that a valuation
gap in the Company's market trading price existed in advance
of the lengthy market check, an error that contributed to the
trial court's decision to disregard the deal price.”197
With respect to the deal price, the Supreme Court said that
“it is clear that Dell's sale process bore many of the same
objective indicia of reliability” as the one in DFC, which
“included that ‘every logical buyer’ was canvassed, and all
but the buyer refused to pursue the company when given
the opportunity; concerns about the company's long-term
viability (and its long-term debt's placement on negative
credit watch) prevented lenders from extending debt; and
the company repeatedly underperformed its projections.”198
Given leaks in the press that Dell was exploring a sale,
moreover, the world was put on notice of the possibility
of a transaction so that “any interested parties would have
approached the Company before the go-shop if serious about
pursuing a deal.”199
Dell's bankers canvassed the interest of 67 parties, including
20 possible strategic acquirers during the go-shop, and the
go-shop's overall design was relatively open and flexible.200
The special committee had the power to say “no,” and it
convinced the eventual buyer to raise its bid six times.201
The Supreme Court thus found that “[n]othing in the record
suggests that increased competition would have produced a
better result. [The financial advisor] also reasoned that any
other financial sponsor would have bid in the same ballpark
as [the buyer].”202 Significantly, the Court did not view a
dearth of strategic buyer interest as negatively impacting the
reliability of the deal price, explaining:
*15  Fair value entails at minimum a price some buyer
is willing to pay—not a price at which no class of buyers
in the market would pay. The Court of Chancery ignored
an important reality: if a company is one that no strategic
buyer is interested in buying, it does not suggest a higher
value, but a lower one.203
In sum, the Supreme Court held that “[o]verall, the weight
of evidence shows that Dell's deal price has heavy, if not
overriding, probative value.”204 It summarized its decision as
follows:
In so holding, we are not saying that the market is
always the best indicator of value, or that it should always
be granted some weight. We only note that, when the
evidence of market efficiency, fair play, low barriers to
entry, outreach to all logical buyers, and the chance for any
topping bidder to have the support of Mr. Dell's own votes
is so compelling, then failure to give the resulting price
heavy weight because the trial judge believes there was
mispricing missed by all the Dell stockholders, analysts,
and potential buyers abuses even the wide discretion
afforded the Court of Chancery in these difficult cases.205
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Shortly after Dell was decided, the Court of Chancery
rendered appraisal decisions in Verition Partners Master
Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc.206 and In re Appraisal of
AOL Inc.207
In Aruba, the court observed that the Supreme Court's
decisions in DFC and Dell “endorse using the deal price
in a third-party, arm's-length transaction as evidence of fair
value” and “caution against relying on discounted cash flow
analyses prepared by adversarial experts when reliable market
indicators are available.”208 The court further observed that
DFC and Dell “recognize that a deal price may include
synergies, and they endorse deriving an indication of fair
value by deducting synergies from the deal price.”209 Rather
than hold that the deal price less synergies represented fair
value, however, the Aruba court determined that fair value
was “the unaffected market price” of petitioners' shares,
which was more than 30% below the transaction price.210
The court identified “two major shortcomings” of its “deal-
price-less-synergies figure” that supported this conclusion
and explained its rationale for using the “unaffected market
price” as follows:
First, my deal-price-less-synergies figure is likely tainted
by human error. Estimating synergies requires exercises of
human judgment analogous to those involved in crafting
a discounted cash flow valuation. The Delaware Supreme
Court's preference for market indications over discounted
cash flow valuations counsels in favor of preferring market
indications over the similarly judgment-laden exercise of
backing out synergies.
Second, my deal-price-less-synergies figure continues to
incorporate an element of value derived from the merger
itself: the value that the acquirer creates by reducing agency
costs. A buyer's willingness to pay a premium over the
market price of a widely held firm reflects not only the
value of anticipated synergies but also the value created by
reducing agency costs. The petitioners are not entitled to
share in either element of value, because both arise from the
accomplishment or expectation of the merger. The synergy
deduction compensates for the one element of value arising
from the merger, but a further downward adjustment would
be necessary to address the other.
*16  Fortunately for a trial judge, once Delaware law has
embraced a traditional formulation of the efficient capital
markets hypothesis, the unaffected market price provides
a direct route to the same endpoint, at least for a company
that is widely traded and lacks a controlling stockholder.
Adjusting down from the deal price reaches, indirectly, the
result that the market price already provides.211
In AOL, the court similarly construed DFC and Dell to
mean that where “transaction price represents an unhindered,
informed, and competitive market valuation, the trial judge
must give particular and serious consideration to transaction
price as evidence of fair value” and that where “a transaction
price is used to determine fair value, synergies transferred to
the sellers must be deducted.”212 In doing so, the court coined
the phrase “Dell Compliant” to mean a transaction “where
(i) information was sufficiently disseminated to potential
bidders, so that (ii) an informed sale could take place, (iii)
without undue impediments imposed by the deal structure
itself.”213 The court found that the sales process did not
satisfy this standard and ultimately determined the fair value
of petitioners' shares based on its own discounted cash flow
analysis ($48.70 per share), which was about 2.6% less than
the deal price ($50 per share).214
C. The Parties' Contentions
Petitioners contend that the fair value of their shares is $84.65
per share—approximately 51.6% over the deal price. Their
sole support for this valuation is a discounted cash flow
model prepared by their expert, Bradford Cornell, Visiting
Professor of Financial Economics at the California Institute
of Technology.215 Cornell also performed a multiples-based
comparable company analysis “as a reasonableness check”
but gave it no weight in his valuation.216
Respondent's expert was Glenn Hubbard, the Dean and
Russell L. Carson Professor in Finance and Economics at
the Graduate School of Business of Columbia University,
as well as Professor of Economics at Columbia University.
He concluded that the “best evidence of Solera's value is
the market-generated Merger price [$55.85], adjusted for
synergies [$1.90] to $53.95.”217 Hubbard also conducted
a valuation based on a discounted cash flow model,
which resulted in a valuation of $53.15 per share,
but found the methodology to be less reliable in this
instance.218 Hubbard further considered, as a “check,”
Solera's historical valuation multiples, analysts' stock price
targets, and valuation multiples from comparable companies
and precedent transactions.219
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This sharp divide of $31.50 per share between the experts'
DCF models is the result of a number of disagreements
regarding the proper inputs and methods to use in the analysis.
The most significant disagreements are explained later.
*17  Throughout trial and post-trial briefing, respondent
consistently maintained that the best evidence of Solera's
value at the time of the Merger was the deal price minus
synergies. Seizing on the Aruba decision, respondent changed
course during supplemental briefing, arguing that “[i]n light
of recent cases, the best evidence of Solera's fair value is its
unaffected stock price of $36.39 per share.”220
D. Determination of Solera's Fair Value
I now turn to my own independent determination of the fair
value of Solera's shares with the guidance from DFC and
Dell in mind. Those decisions teach that deal price is “the
best evidence of fair value”221 when there was an “open
process,”222 meaning that the process is characterized by
“objective indicia of reliability.”223 Such “indicia” include
but, consistent with the mandate of the appraisal statute to
consider “all relevant factors,”224 are not limited to:
• “[R]obust public information,”225 comprised of the
stock price of a company with “a deep base of public
shareholders, and highly active trading,”226 and the
views of “equity analysts, equity buyers, debt analysts,
debt providers and others.”227
• “[E]asy access to deeper, non-public information,”228
where there is no discrimination between potential
buyers and cooperation from management helps
address any information asymmetries between potential
buyers.229
• “[M]any parties with an incentive to make a profit
had a chance to bid,”230 meaning that there was a
“robust market check”231 with “outreach to all logical
buyers”232 and a go-shop characterized by “low barriers
to entry”233 such that there is a realistic possibility of a
topping bid.
• A special committee, “composed of independent,
experienced directors and armed with that power to say
‘no,’ ”234 which is advised by competent legal and
financial advisors.
• “[N]o conflicts related to the transaction,”235 with the
company purchased by a third party in an arm's length
sale236 and “no hint of self-interest.”237
If the process was open, then “the deal price deserve[s] heavy,
if not dispositive, weight.”238 This is not to say that the market
is always correct: “In some cases, it may be that a single
valuation metric is the most reliable evidence of fair value
and that giving weight to another factor will do nothing but
distort that best estimate. In other cases, it may be necessary
to consider two or more factors.”239 Whichever route it takes,
however, the Court of Chancery is required to “justify its
methodology (or methodologies) according to the facts of the
case and relevant, accepted financial principles.”240
1. The Deal Price Less Synergies Deserves Dispositive
Weight
*18  For the reasons explained below, I find that the Merger
was the product of an open process that, although not perfect,
has the requisite objective indicia of reliability emphasized
in DFC and Dell. Thus, I conclude that the deal price, minus
synergies, is the best evidence of fair value and deserves
dispositive weight in this case. My consideration of the
evidence supporting this conclusion follows in three parts
focusing on (i) the opportunity many potential buyers had to
bid, (ii) the Special Committee's role in actively negotiating
an arm's-length transaction, and (iii) the evidence that the
market for Solera's stock was efficient and well-functioning.
a. Many Heterogeneous Potential Buyers Had a
Meaningful Opportunity to Bid
Appraisal decisions have placed weight on the deal
price when the process “involved a reasonable number
of participants and created credible competition” among
bidders.241 Here, Solera reached out to nine large private
equity funds in May and June 2015 during the “test the
waters” period.242 Then, after Thoma Bravo submitted an
indication of interest on July 19, 2015,243 the Special
Committee engaged with 18 potential bidders, 11 financial
and 7 strategic firms.244 As Hubbard testified, a “broad range
of sophisticated buyers,” both financial and strategic, had the
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chance to bid for Solera.245 Petitioners' own expert offered no
opinion “that more bidders should have been contacted.”246
Not only were the 18 potential bidders directly contacted and
aware that Solera could be acquired at the right price, but “the
whole universe of potential bidders was put on notice,”247
with increasing specificity over time, that the Company
was considering strategic alternatives.248 Aquila publicly
presaged the sales process during the Company's earnings call
on the May 6, 2015,249 and the Company confirmed it had
formed a Special Committee and was contemplating a sale on
August 20, 2015,250 the day after Bloomberg reported that
Solera was “exploring a sale that has attracted interest from
private equity firms.”251
The press revealed not only the identities of potential buyers,
but also the approximate amounts of their bids. On August
20, 2015, for example, the Financial Times reported that
Vista was “considering a bid of $63 per share,” with Thoma
Bravo and Pamplona “considering separate bids for $62 per
share.”252 On September 9, 2015, Bloomberg reported that
Solera had received bids from Vista and Thoma Bravo, and
that the Company was “nearing a deal to sell itself for about
$53 a share.”253 Two days later, Reuters wrote that Vista and
Thoma Bravo “had made offers that failed to meet Solera's
valuation expectations,” and that the Company was “trying
to sell itself to another company”—IHS—“rather than an
investment firm.”254 The visible threat of other buyers made
the sales process more competitive.255 Given these public
disclosures, any potential bidder knew in essentially real time
that Solera was exploring a sale and the approximate price
levels of the offers.256 Yet no one else ever seriously showed
up to make a topping bid.
*19  Petitioners point out that Advent and Providence were
excluded from the sales process, but whether either would
have bid competitively is unknown. Notably, when Advent
and Providence expressed interest to Solera's bankers, neither
provided any indication as to their ability to pay or their
sources of financing; rather, their introductory emails were
perfunctory, suggesting to me that they were just “kicking
the tires.”257 There also is no evidence that either of them
followed up to express any further interest in Solera, either
before or during the go-shop period.258
The fact that only one potential strategic bidder—IHS—made
a bid does not undermine the reliability of the sales process
as a price discovery tool. That six potential strategic acquirers
declined to explore a transaction involving Solera shows that
six sophisticated, profit-motivated actors were offered the
opportunity to participate in a sales process to acquire the
Company, yet none was interested enough to even sign a non-
disclosure agreement.259 As noted above, our Supreme Court
forcefully made this point in Dell:
The Court of Chancery stressed its view that the lack of
competition from a strategic buyer lowered the relevance
of the deal price. But its assessment that more bidders—
both strategic and financial—should have been involved
assumes there was some party interested in proceeding.
Nothing in the record indicates that was the case. Fair value
entails at a minimum a price some buyer is willing to pay—
not a price at which no class of buyers in the market would
pay. The Court of Chancery ignored an important reality:
if a company is one that no strategic buyer is interested
in buying, it does not suggest a higher value, but a lower
one.260
The record shows, furthermore, that the mere presence in the
sales process of IHS, as a strategic bidder that was one of
Solera's key competitors, incentivized the financial sponsors
to put forth more competitive bids.261
The record also reflects that the Company provided all
seriously interested bidders access to deeper, non-public
information after they signed non-disclosure agreements.
Although the Special Committee initially excluded IHS from
the process due to competitive concerns and doubts about
its ability to finance a deal,262 once news of the sales
process leaked out, the Special Committee worked promptly
to accommodate IHS. After IHS contacted Centerview on
August 21, 2015 to express interest,263 representatives of
Solera and IHS held a management meeting by August 26,264
and Solera provided IHS with the Hybrid Case Projections
by August 27.265 And, after IHS's CEO failed to attend
the management meeting on August 26, Aquila traveled
separately to meet him.266 IHS ultimately declined to make a
topping bid during the go-shop period, but it was not for lack
of access to information. Solera gave IHS nearly full access to
the approximately 12,000-document data room,267 and IHS
specifically commented that it “was appreciative of ... the
fact that [Solera] had provided equal access to information in
order for IHS to consider a bid.”268
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*20  Finally, I am not persuaded by petitioners' argument
that “[t]he sale of Solera took place against the backdrop
of extraordinary market volatility,” such that it “was not
the product of a well-functioning market.”269 According to
petitioners, the court should not rely on the Merger price
as evidence of fair value because there was macroeconomic
volatility, “evidenced by the VIX spiking to an [sic] historic
high [on August 24, 2015] and sharp declines in global equity
markets,”270 which constrained potential bidders' ability to
finance and willingness to enter a deal.271 In support of this
theory, petitioners called Dr. Elaine Buckberg as an expert on
market volatility.272
Buckberg testified that “investors are less willing to proceed
with investments in the face of substantial uncertainty and
volatility,” and that when investors “do decide to proceed
with an investment in the face of such uncertainty, they
would expect to be compensated for the additional risk with
a lower price.”273 In that vein, Yarbrough, the Chairman of
the Special Committee, candidly acknowledged that market
volatility impacted “the financing side, [it] was making it
more difficult on the debt financing side, and I think it also
trickled over into the equity piece, too.”274
As an initial factual matter, it is questionable whether the
level of market volatility during the sales process was as
extraordinary as petitioners suggest. On August 24, 2015,
the VIX closed at 40.74.275 Although petitioners describe
this as the VIX's “highest point since January 2009” and
“a level exceeded only six times in the VIX's twenty-seven
year history,”276 that assertion appears to be an exaggeration.
As Hubbard testified, the August 24 closing VIX has been
exceeded on 157 days in the VIX's history.277 The August 24
spike also was relatively short-lived. By August 28, just four
days after closing at 40.74, the VIX had fallen back to “about
26,” and had fallen further by September 11, the last trading
day before the Special Committee accepted Vista's $55.85
bid.278 Including the spike on August 24, the “average VIX
was 19.4 in August 2015 and 24.4 in September, as compared
to an average of 19.7 since 1990.”279
Even accepting that market volatility impacted the sales
process by increasing financing costs and decreasing the
price that financial sponsors were willing to pay, petitioners'
argument is unavailing in my opinion for two reasons. First,
Buckberg made no attempt to quantify the impact of volatility
on the Merger price.280 Second, and more importantly,
petitioners' position ignores that they are only entitled to the
fair value of Solera's stock at the time of the Merger, not to the
best price theoretically attainable had market conditions been
the most seller-friendly.281 As the Supreme Court pointedly
explained in DFC:
Capitalism is rough and ready, and the purpose of an
appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the
highest conceivable value that might have been procured
had every domino fallen out of the company's way; rather,
it is to make sure that they receive fair compensation for
their shares in the sense that it reflects what they deserve
to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in
an arm's-length transaction.282
*21  The record demonstrates that the Merger price “resulted
from an open process, informed by robust public information,
and easy access to deeper, non-public information, in which
many parties with an incentive to make a profit had a chance
to bid.”283 Thus, consistent with our high court's recent
teachings, economic principles suggest that the Merger price
is what petitioners “deserve to receive” for their shares.
b. A Fully-Empowered Special Committee Actively
Negotiated the Merger
Reliance on the deal price as evidence of fair value is
strengthened when independent representatives of a target
company actively negotiate with potential buyers and
demonstrate a real willingness to reject inadequate bids.284
Here, the record indicates that Solera's Special Committee
was both competent and effective.
On July 20, 2015, the day after receiving an indication
of interest from Thoma Bravo, the Board delegated to the
Special Committee the “full power and authority of the
Board” to review, evaluate, negotiate, recommend, or reject
any proposed transaction or strategic alternative.285 The
authorizing resolution further provided that Solera could not
do a deal without the Special Committee's approval.286 All
three directors on the Special Committee were independent
and experienced.287 Yarbrough, the Chairman of the Special
Committee, testified knowledgeably and forthrightly at trial
about the process undertaken by the Special Committee,
which was aided by reputable legal and financial advisors.288
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Petitioners tellingly make no effort to impugn the motives of
any of the members of the Special Committee.
The record also demonstrates that the Special Committee
actively engaged with the bidders, did not favor any one
in particular, and expressed a willingness to walk away
from bids that it did not find satisfactory. The Special
Committee twice rejected bids that it considered inadequate
—Vista's bid at $53 per share289 and Thoma Bravo's bid
at $54 per share290—each time without the safety net of
another offer.291 The Special Committee's initial decision
to defer inviting IHS into the sales process was reasonable,
given its concerns about protecting Solera's competitively
sensitive information and about IHS's ability to finance a
transaction.292 In any event, that decision became academic
after news of the sales process leaked in the press, at which
point the Company promptly engaged with IHS for over
two weeks before signing a deal with Vista. Critically, as
a condition of that deal, the Special Committee extracted
the right to conduct a go-shop and for a reduced 1%
termination fee for IHS (as opposed to 3% for other bidders)
to facilitate continued discussions with IHS.293 And, for
reasons explained below, the negotiations with all bidders
were not skewed by an artificially low stock price, since the
market for Solera's stock before the Merger appears to have
been efficient.294
*22  Finally, the evidence shows that the Special Committee
made a thoughtful, reasoned decision to accept Vista's “last
and final” offer at $55.85 after countering with $56 and
being rejected.295 Before the Special Committee did so,
Centerview counseled the Special Committee that “[i]t is
uncertain whether extending the process will result in higher
and fully financed offers, or will lead to further deterioration
in Vista's bid” and that the “Vista bid can act as a pricing floor
while IHS is given a further opportunity to bid at a reduced
termination fee pursuant to the go-shop negotiated by the
Committee.”296 As Yarbrough testified, with that advice in
mind, the Special Committee unanimously decided to accept
Vista's offer after comparing it to the Company's stand-alone
prospects:
We then asked for Centerview to go through a presentation
analysis of [Vista's bid], with the preliminary steps to
their fairness opinion. And then we ultimately had a vote
on it, discussed stand-alone, decided that we preferred
the 55.85 and moving forward with an all-cash, riskless
deal. And so we had a unanimous vote on the special
committee, and then we had a board meeting shortly
thereafter where Centerview again presented to the board.
We made our recommendation to the board and then the
board unanimously accepted the recommendation.297
In response to this evidence, petitioners advance essentially
two arguments challenging the integrity and quality of the
sales process. I address each in turn.
Petitioners' primary challenge is that Aquila's conflicts of
interest tainted the sales process through meetings he (with
Baron's assistance) held with private equity firms before,
and on one notable occasion after, the Special Committee
was formed. Although Solera's Board could have done a
better job of monitoring Aquila and his interactions with
potential buyers, particularly after the Special Committee was
in place, those interactions did not compromise the integrity
or effectiveness of the sales process in my opinion.
The reality is that Aquila's participation in a transaction was a
prerequisite for a financial sponsor to do a deal. As petitioners
put it, “Aquila is Solera.”298 Consistent with that reality, all
of the private equity firms that later submitted bids made
clear that those bids depended on Aquila continuing to lead
the Company.299 In other words, a go-private transaction
never would have been a possibility without buyers becoming
personally acquainted and comfortable with Aquila. Thus,
Aquila engaging in one-on-one conversations with private
equity firms before the Special Committee was formed had
the utility of gauging interest in the Company to see if
undertaking a formal sales process made sense. Critically,
there is no indication in the record that any of those contacts
predetermined or undermined the process when the Special
Committee took charge.
That said, once the Company had received an indication
of interest and put the Special Committee in place, the
Special Committee should have monitored Aquila's contacts
with potential bidders more carefully. Petitioners justifiably
criticize Aquila's private two-hour meeting with Vista in
August, shortly after which Vista began to model a larger
option pool for post-Merger Solera executives.300 Although
Aquila and Sowul (a principal at Vista) both testified that
compensation was not discussed during that meeting or at any
time before the deal with Vista was signed301—and there is no
direct evidence that it was—the timing is certainly suspicious
and casts doubt on whether Aquila abided by the “Rules of
the Road” advice the Special Committee's counsel provided,
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i.e., to refrain from discussing post-Merger employment and
compensation during the sales process.302 If best practices
had been followed, a representative of the Special Committee
would have accompanied Aquila to the August meeting with
Vista as a precaution.303
*23  Even if it is assumed that compensation discussions
did occur during this meeting, nothing in the record indicates
that any of Aquila's (or Baron's) actions before or during
the sales process compromised or undermined the Special
Committee's ability to negotiate a deal.304 The record is
devoid of any evidence, for example, that Aquila participated
in price discussions with any of the bidders or influenced the
outcome of a competitive sales process. Indeed, petitioners do
not contend that Aquila ever discussed price with the Special
Committee or any bidder, nor do they contend that he played
any role in the deliberations or decision-making process of
the Special Committee more generally.
Further, the record does not show that structural issues
inhibited the effectiveness of the go-shop.305 To the contrary,
IHS indicated that it appreciated that the Company was
transparent and facilitated its diligence. There also was a
lower termination fee if IHS submitted a topping bid. In short,
IHS had a realistic pathway to success,306 but it ultimately
decided not to submit a topping bid.
As a secondary matter, petitioners advance a one-paragraph
argument that the Merger was a de facto MBO (management
buyout) because the Special Committee “knew” that if Solera
was to be sold, it was going to be sold to a private equity
firm, and all the private equity firms made clear that they
“only wanted Solera if Aquila was part of the deal.”307
Petitioners thus contend that the Merger warrants “heightened
scrutiny.”308 This argument fails for essentially two reasons.
First, contrary to petitioners' characterization of the
transaction, the Merger did not have the requisite
characteristics of an MBO. Petitioners' own expert (Cornell)
agreed that the common definition of an MBO is a transaction
“where, when it was negotiated, senior management was
a participant in the transaction as an acquirer,” but then
conceded that the Merger was not an MBO because “it
was not a joint purchase between management and another
party.”309 During the sales process, Aquila did not have an
agreement with Vista or any other bidder to participate as
a buyer in a particular transaction.310 To the contrary, he
expressed a willingness to invest $15 million in a transaction
with any of the potential buyers, not just Vista.311 Further,
Aquila was a not an “acquirer” in the Merger312 because,
before the transaction, Aquila's holdings at the $55.85 per
share were worth approximately $55 million,313 and after
the Merger, Aquila invested $45 million into the post-Merger
company.314 In short, as Cornell admitted, the Merger was
not even “similar to an MBO.”315
*24  Second, petitioners contend that MBOs should be
subject to “heightened scrutiny” but fail to explain why. As
the Supreme Court stated in Dell, even though there may be
“theoretical characteristics” of an MBO that could “detract[ ]
from the reliability of the deal price,”316 the deal price that
results from an MBO is not inherently suspect or unreliable
per se.317 Here, to repeat, the Special Committee had the
full authority to control the sales process, and exercised
that authority by deciding which bidders to contact, how
to respond to bids, and ultimately whether to approve the
Merger.
c. The Equity and Debt Markets Corroborate that the Best
Evidence of Solera's Fair Value was the Merger Price
In DFC, the Supreme Court endorsed the economic
proposition that the “price at which [a company's] shares
trade is informative of fair value” in an appraisal action when
“the company had no conflicts related to the transaction,
a deep base of public shareholders, and highly active
trading,” because “that value reflects the judgments of
many stockholders about the company's future prospects,
based on public filings, industry information, and research
conducted by equity analysts.”318 The Court in Dell reiterated
the same point, explaining that in an efficient market “a
mass of investors quickly digests all publicly available
information about a company, and in trading the company's
stock, recalibrates its price to reflect the market's adjusted,
consensus valuation of the company.”319 My inference from
DFC and Dell is that the Supreme Court has emphasized this
point because the price of a widely dispersed stock traded
in an efficient market may provide an informative lower
bound in negotiations between parties in a potential sale of
control.320
Here, the record supports the conclusion that the market for
Solera's stock was efficient and well-functioning, since: (i)
- 327 -
In re Appraisal of Solera Holdings, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2018)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 17
Solera's market capitalization of about $3.5 billion placed it
in the middle of firms in the S & P MidCap 400 index;321
(ii) the stock was actively traded on the New York Stock
Exchange, as indicated by weekly trading volume of 4%
of shares outstanding;322 (iii) the stock had a relative bid-
ask spread of approximately 0.06%, in line with a number
of S & P MidCap 400 and S & P 500 companies;323 (iv)
the Company's short interest ratio indicated that, on average,
investors who had sold the stock short would be able to cover
their positions in about two days, which was faster than about
three-quarters of S & P 400 MidCap companies and about
half of S & P 500 companies;324 (v) at least eleven equity
analysts covered Solera during the year before the Merger;325
and (vi) Solera's stock price moved sharply as rumor of the
sales process leaked into the market.326
*25  The proxy statement for the Merger identified August
3, 2015 as the unaffected date for purposes of calculating a
premium.327 As of that date, a well-informed, liquid trading
market determined, before news of a potential transaction
leaked into the market, that the Company's stock was worth
$36.39.328 Significantly, research analysts' price targets had
been declining in the months before news of a potential
transaction, and these targets remained below the deal price
through announcement of the Merger.329 As Hubbard put it,
the takeaway from these two objective indications of value
is that “market participants playing with real money, looking
at the information that they have, don't think that the stock is
worth $55.85 during that period.”330
Despite these market realities, petitioners contend that Solera
was worth $84.65 per share—more than double its unaffected
stock price of $36.39 per share as of August 3.331 Although
one would expect a control block to trade at a higher price than
a minority block,332 petitioners are unable to explain such a
gaping disconnect between Solera's unaffected market price
and the Merger price.
Petitioners argue that the pre-Merger stock price was
artificially low because the market for Solera was not
efficient due to asymmetric information. More specifically,
petitioners contend that Solera was “poised to ‘harvest
returns’ ”333 from acquisitions it made between 2012
and 2015, but management struggled to disclose sufficient
information, due to competitive concerns, to allow the market
to value the Company properly.334 This argument ignores
evidence that many equity investors and analysts actually did
understand Solera's long-term plans, with some approving
of management's strategy but others not buying the story.335
Consider the following varied perspectives that analysts (and
one of the petitioners) expressed within just a few months
before news of the sales process leaked to the press:
[Editor's Note: The preceding image contains the reference
for footnotes336,337,338,339,340,341,342]
*26  These reviews suggest that there was disagreement in
the financial community over Solera's strategy, not that the
market as a whole did not understand it. Given the many
factors indicating that the market for the Company's stock was
efficient, the market presumably would have digested all of
these sentiments and incorporated them into Solera's stock
price. Yet Solera's pre-Merger unaffected stock price as of
August 3 was still only $36.39.
The debt market further corroborates that, given its operative
reality, Solera was not as valuable as petitioners contend.
Petitioners do not dispute that the debt market had run dry
for Solera as a public company as of the Merger. With its
leverage already rising, the Company made an acquisition in
November 2014, financing the deal with a $400 million notes
offering.343 Moody's promptly downgraded the Company's
credit rating from Ba2 to Ba3.344 In July 2015, after Solera
issued $850 million of senior unsecured notes to finance
another acquisition and retire outstanding debt, Moody's
downgraded Solera again, from Ba3 to B1.345 Further
exemplifying Solera's challenges in taking on additional debt
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to finance acquisitions, the July 2015 debt offering fell short,
and Goldman Sachs had to absorb $11.5 million of notes that
it was unable to syndicate into the market.346
By July 2015, “despite the lucrative fees that investment
bankers make from refinancing a large tranche of public
company debt and syndicating a new issue,”347 Solera had
run “out of runway” in the debt market.348 “In other words,
participants in the public bond markets weren't convinced
they would get their money back if they gave it to [Solera],
and [Solera] was not offering enough interest to compensate
investors for the risk they saw in the company.”349 Petitioners'
own expert admitted that the acquisition debt market for
Solera was tight at equity values greater than the Merger
price.350 In short, the debt market, like many equity market
participants, viewed Solera skeptically and perceived its
growth-by-acquisition strategy as laden with risk.351
*27  * * * * *
To summarize, the Merger was the product of a two-month
outreach to large private equity firms in May and June, a
six-week auction by an independent Special Committee that
solicited eleven private equity and seven strategic firms, and
public announcements that put a “For Sale” sign on the
Company. The Special Committee had competent advisors
and the power to say no to an underpriced bid, which it did
twice. The Merger price of $55.85 proved to be a market-
clearing price through a 28-day go-shop and a three-month
window-shop. No one was willing to pay more. Thus, as this
court once put it, the “logical explanation ... is self-evident”:
Solera “was not worth more” than $55.85 per share.352
2. Merger Fees Should not be Added to the Deal Price
Petitioners argue that, “if deal price is an indicator of fair
value,” the court should add nearly $450 million—or $6.51
per share—to the Merger price. According to petitioners, this
is the amount of transaction costs Vista incurred in connection
with the Merger for buyer fees and expenses, seller fees,
debt fees, and an “early participation premium” to retire
debt in connection with the transaction.353 Petitioners offer
no precedent or other legal support for this request. They
simply contend that these costs should be added because the
court's “focus should be on what Vista was actually willing to
spend to buy the Company.”354 This argument fails for two
independent reasons.
First, petitioners' argument cannot be squared with the
definition of “fair value” in the appraisal context that our
Supreme Court recently articulated in DFC when explaining
the purpose of appraisal:
[F]air value is just that, “fair.” It does not mean the
highest possible price that a company might have sold
for had Warren Buffet negotiated for it on his best day
and the Lenape who sold Manhattan on their worst. ...
[T]he purpose of appraisal is not to make sure that the
petitioners get the highest conceivable value that might
have been procured had every domino fallen out of the
company's way; rather, it is to make sure that they receive
fair compensation for their shares in the sense that it
reflects what they deserve to receive based on what would
fairly be given to them in an arm's-length transaction.355
The Merger price was the result of arm's-length bargaining
between the Special Committee and Vista. Perhaps Vista
would have been willing to pay more than $55.85 for the
Company, but that is irrelevant to the court's independent
determination of fair value as that term was explained in
DFC.356
*28  Second, policy concerns counsel against adding
transaction fees to the deal price in determining Solera's
fair value. If stockholders received payment for transaction
fees in appraisal proceedings, then it would compel rational
stockholders in even the most pristine deal processes to seek
appraisal to capture their share of the transaction costs (plus
interest) that otherwise would be unavailable to them in
any non-litigated arm's-length merger. This incentive would
undermine the underlying purpose of appraisal proceedings
as explained in DFC.
3. Deduction for Merger Synergies
The appraisal statute provides that “the Court shall determine
the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of
value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the
merger.”357 Thus, the “appraisal award excludes synergies in
accordance with the mandate of Delaware jurisprudence that
the subject company in an appraisal proceeding be valued as
a going concern.”358
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Synergies do not only arise in the strategic-buyer context.
It is recognized that synergies may exist when a financial
sponsor is an acquirer.359 As of trial, Vista owned 40 software
businesses, three of which (EagleView, Omnitracs, and
DealerSocket) Vista believed had significant “touch points”
with Solera from which synergies could be realized.360
Vista modeled out four different categories of synergies in
its financial analysis of the Company during the bidding
process.361 Respondent's expert presented evidence at trial
concerning three of those categories: portfolio company
revenue synergies, private company cost savings, and the tax
benefits of incremental leverage.362 In total, he calculated
total expected synergies of $6.12 per share.363 From there,
respondent's expert made a “conservative” estimate that 31%
of the value of the synergies—equating to $1.90 per share
—remained with the seller by using the lowest percentage
identified in one of three empirical studies.364
I find this evidence, which petitioners made no effort to rebut,
convincing.365 Deducting $1.90 from the Merger price of
$55.85 leads to a value of $53.95 per share. For all the reasons
discussed above, and based on my lack of confidence in the
DCF models advanced by the parties (as discussed next),
I conclude that this amount ($53.95 per share) is the best
evidence of the fair value of petitioners' shares of Solera at
the time of the Merger.
4. The Dueling Discounted Cash Flow Models
*29  Consistent with the court's duty to consider “all relevant
factors” in determining Solera's fair value,366 I consider next
the DCF models the parties' experts prepared. Compared with
a market-generated transaction price, “the use of alternative
valuation techniques like a DCF analysis is necessarily a
second-best method to derive value.”367
In this action, both parties' experts created “three-stage” DCF
models consisting of (i) the five-year Hybrid Case Projections
(fiscal years 2016 through 2020), (ii) a five-year transition
period (fiscal years 2021 through 2025), and (iii) a terminal
period beginning in fiscal year 2026.368 The outcome of
these models nonetheless resulted in widely divergent DCF
valuations—$84.65 per share for petitioners, and $53.15 per
share for respondent.
As a preliminary matter, I find comfort that respondent's DCF
analysis is in the same ballpark as the deal price less estimated
synergies.369 On the other side of the ledger, given my
conclusions about the quality of the sales process for Solera,
petitioners' DCF analysis strikes me as facially unbelievable
as it suggests that, in a transaction with an equity value of
approximately $3.85 billion at the deal price,370 potential
buyers left almost $2 billion on the table by not outbidding
Vista. Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that a DCF that
results in a valuation so substantially below the transaction
price may indeed lack “credibility on its face.”371
*30  “Delaware courts must remain mindful that ‘the DCF
method is [ ] subject to manipulation and guesswork [and
that] the valuation results that it generates in the setting of
a litigation [can be] volatile.”372 “[E]ven slight differences
in [a DCF's] inputs can produce large valuation gaps.”373
A number of factors explain the gaping difference between
petitioners' and respondent's DCF analyses, and, notably,
many of these disagreements relate to how to value Solera
into perpetuity. Such assumptions about Solera's business in
the terminal period, i.e., ten-plus years into the future, are
unavoidably tinged with a heavy dose of speculation.
I highlight below some of the major areas of disagreement
between the parties. This discussion is meant to be illustrative
and not exhaustive. All of these disagreements predictably
result in a higher asserted valuation by petitioners and a lower
asserted valuation by respondent.
The most significant point of contention in the DCF models
concerns the estimated amount of cash that Solera would
need to reinvest over the terminal period.374 This “plowback”
rate is the percentage of after-tax operating profits that the
Company would need to invest to grow at a specified rate into
perpetuity.375 Using the method identified in “many leading
valuation texts including Damodaran (2012) and Koller,
Goedhart and Wessels (2015),” which petitioners' expert has
called the “traditional model,”376 respondent argues that
the required reinvestment rate is 37.1%.377 Petitioners, on
the other hand, argue that the inflation plowback formula
published in articles written by Bradley and Jarrell should
be used, resulting in a required reinvestment rate of only
16.4%.378 According to petitioners, holding all else constant
in respondent's DCF analysis, the difference between using
these two reinvestment rates yields a huge $23.90 per share
difference in Solera's valuation.379
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Another notable area of disagreement in the DCF models
is Solera's return on invested capital (“ROIC”) in the
terminal period. Respondent assumed, consistent with “a
theory this court has repeatedly cited with approval,”380
that in the long run the present value of Solera's growth
opportunities would disappear due to increased competition,
so the Company's ROIC would gradually converge with its
weighted average costs of capital (“WACC”).381 Petitioners
disagree with applying the convergence model to Solera.
They contend that the Company possesses “moats” around its
business, such as barriers to entry, competitive advantages,
and market dominance, that will give it perpetual advantages
over potential competitors.382 Petitioners thus argue that
Solera will earn a return of 4.5% above its WACC in
perpetuity during the terminal period.383 When the court
asked petitioner's expert how he landed on 4.5%, his response
was candid: “It's a little bit of a finger in the wind.”384
*31  The parties also disagree about how to account for
stock-based compensation (“SBC”) in their DCF models,
both for the discrete period and the terminal period.
Respondent applied the “cash basis” method to stock-based
compensation expense, using the cash amount that the
Company would have to spend to account for SBC as a
normalized percentage of revenue.385 Petitioners did not
independently calculate SBC and instead used the Company's
projections.386 These projections were calculated on a book
basis, benchmarked to Solera's actual stock price, and
assumed to grow at 5% annually.387
The parties also handled the contingent tax liability attached
to Solera's foreign earnings very differently. As of the Merger,
the Company had earned approximately $1.2 billion in
foreign profits, for which it had only paid taxes where those
profits were earned.388 Solera historically designated these
profits as permanently reinvested earnings (“PRE”). Before
these earnings can be repatriated to the United States or paid
to stockholders, the Company must pay the residual tax, i.e.,
the marginal amount between the U.S. tax rate and the amount
already paid internationally.389 Respondent assumed that
$350 million of foreign earnings that had been de-designated
as PRE would be repatriated as of the Merger had there
not been a deal, and that the rest of Solera's foreign profits,
both past and future, would be repatriated on a rolling basis
following a five-year deferral period.390 This repatriation
would cause Solera to pay more in taxes, decreasing the
Company's value. Petitioners, by contrast, assumed that such
taxes would never be paid because they contend the timing
of repatriation is unknown and thus these tax liabilities are
speculative.391
Finally, the parties disagreed about the amount of cash to be
added back to Solera's enterprise value in order to convert it to
equity value. This court has repeatedly held that only “excess
cash” is to be added back.392 Solera had approximately
$480 million of cash at closing.393 During the sales process,
the Company's CFO did a country-by-country analysis and
determined that Solera needed $160 million to $165 million
to fund its operations.394 Respondent used that analysis to
deduct $165 million from the Company's $480 million of cash
at closing and added back the difference, i.e., $315 million.395
Petitioners, on the other hand, added back all of the $480
million, reasoning that “with modern computer technology, a
good CFO doesn't need any wasting cash,” and that “it would
require an incompetent corporate treasurer for a big chunk of
the cash balance to be wasting cash.”396
* * * * *
There are other points of disagreement in the parties' DCF
models, but it is not necessary to detail them here. As
explained above, the Merger price was the product of “an
open process, informed by robust public information, and
easy access to deeper, non-public information, in which many
parties with an incentive to make a profit had a chance
to bid.”397 Given the huge gap between petitioners' DCF
valuation and the Merger price, which I have found to be a
reliable indicator of value in accordance with the teachings
of DFC and Dell, I find petitioners' DCF valuation not to be
credible on its face and accord it no weight.398
*32  My decision to do so is corroborated by the fact that
nearly 88% of petitioners' enterprise valuation is attributable
to periods after the five-year Hybrid Case Projections.399 In
other words, petitioners' DCF valuation is largely a prediction
about the Company's operations many years into the future.
Such predictions, even when informed, are unavoidably
speculative, where small variances in a DCF's inputs can lead
to wide valuation swings.400
I also give no weight to respondent's DCF valuation, but
for a different reason. Although that valuation is close to
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my Merger price less synergies calculation, respondent's
own expert opined that his DCF valuation is “less reliable”
than the Merger price minus synergies valuation “given
the uncertainties ... surrounding several inputs to the DCF
valuation.”401 I agree, and will accord the value of the Merger
price minus synergies dispositive weight in this case.402
5. Respondent's Unaffected Stock Price Argument is
Unavailing
In the wake of our Supreme Court's decisions in DFC and
Dell, the Court of Chancery determined in Aruba that the
fair value of petitioners' shares in an appraisal proceeding
was the thirty-day average unaffected market price of the
company's shares, i.e., $17.13 per share.403 In reaching this
conclusion, Vice Chancellor Laster declined to adopt his deal
price ($24.67 per share) less synergies figure of $18.20 per
share because of his concerns that this figure (i) “likely was
tainted by human error,” and (ii) “continues to incorporate an
element of value derived from the merger itself: the value that
the acquirer creates by reducing agency costs.”404
In its supplemental brief, respondent argues that, “in light
of recent cases, the best evidence of Solera's fair value
is its unaffected stock price of $36.39 per share.”405 This
argument, which advocates for a fair value determination
about 35% below the deal price, reflects a dramatic
change of position that I find as facially incredible as
petitioners' DCF model. Before, during, and after trial (until
Aruba was decided), respondent and its highly credentialed
expert—a former chairman of the President's Council
of Economic Advisors406—consistently asserted that the
“market-generated Merger price, adjusted for synergies” of
$53.95 per share is the “best evidence of Solera's value” as of
the date the Merger.407 For the reasons explained above, the
court independently has come to the same conclusion.
Notably, nothing prevented respondent from advancing at
trial the “unaffected market price” argument the Aruba court
embraced. The scholarship underpinning the notion that both
synergies and agency costs are elements of value derived from
a merger that should be excluded under Section 262(h) has
been in the public domain for many years and was readily
available when this case was tried.408 Yet respondent made no
effort to advance this theory at trial and, thus, petitioners were
afforded no opportunity to respond to it. In this respect, I agree
with the sentiment Vice Chancellor Glasscock expressed in a
similar situation that “the use of trading price to determine fair
value requires a number of assumptions that ... are best made
or rejected after being subject to a forensic and adversarial
presentation by interested parties.”409
*33  As an example, even if one were to accept the legal
theory that agency costs represent an element of value derived
from the merger itself, little exists in the record to give
the court any comfort about Solera's true unaffected market
price. The $36.39 per share figure on which the Company
relies represents the closing price on a single day, August 3,
2015.410 Although the Company used that date in its proxy
statement as the unaffected date for purposes of calculating
a premium,411 and I have referenced it in this opinion a
number of times for context, the parties never litigated the
issue of Solera's unaffected market price and the court is in
no position based on the trial record to reliably make such a
determination.
With respect to the merits of the theory that agency costs
represent an element of value derived from the merger itself,
the Aruba court explained that the “concept of reduced agency
costs is the flipside of the benefits of control,” with the “key
point” being that “control creates value distinct from synergy
value.”412 This is because, as Professors Hamermesh and
Wachter explain, “the aggregation of the shares is value-
creating because a controller can then exercise the control
rights involving directing the strategy and managing the
firm.”413 They go on to argue that the “normative justification
for awarding the value of control to the controller parallels
the rationale for awarding the value of synergies to the
bidder. Efficiency requires that those who create an efficient
transaction—either through creating synergies or eliminating
agency costs—should receive the value that they create.”414
Significantly, however, a number of this court's appraisal
decisions, one of which was affirmed in relevant part on
appeal, suggest that the value of control is properly part
of the going concern and not an element of value that
must be excised under Section 262(h).415 In Le Beau v.
M.G. Bancorporation., Inc., for example, respondent used
a “capital market” approach that “involved deriving various
pricing multiples from selected publicly-traded companies,
and then applying those multiples to MGB,” the target
corporation.416 Then-Vice Chancellor Jacobs rejected the
methodology because it “results in a minority valuation.”417
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The Supreme Court affirmed this determination, explaining
that the trial court's conclusion that the “capital market
approach contained an inherent minority discount that
made its use legally impermissible in a statutory appraisal
proceeding [was] fully supported by the record evidence that
was before the Court of Chancery and the prior holdings of
this Court construing Section 262.”418
Similarly, in Borruso v. Communications Telesystems
International, Vice Chancellor Lamb held that “a control
premium should be added to adjust the market value of the
equity derived from the comparable company method.”419
The court explained it reasoning as follows:
*34  [T]he comparable company method of analysis
produces an equity valuation that inherently reflects a
minority discount, as the data used for purposes of
comparison is all derived from minority trading values
of the comparable companies. Because that value is not
fully reflective of the intrinsic worth of the corporation on
a going concern basis, this court has applied an explicit
control premium in calculating the fair value of the equity
in an appraisal proceeding.420
More recently, then-Vice Chancellor Strine took the same
approach in Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc.421 There, the
court approved adjusting a comparable companies analysis by
adding a control premium where “[w]hat is being corrected
for is the difference between the trading price of a minority
share and the trading price if all the shares were sold.”422
Our Supreme Court held long ago that the going concern
value of a company must be determined in an appraisal
case “irrespective of the synergies involved in a merger.”423
DFC and Dell both make the same point.424 Although
DFC and Dell are transformative decisions in my view
in their full-throated endorsement of applying market
efficiency principles in appraisal actions,425 I do not read
those decisions—both of which unmistakably emphasize the
probative value of deal price426—to suggest that agency costs
represent an element of value attributable to a merger separate
from synergies that must be excluded under Section 262(h).
Had that been the Supreme Court's intention, I believe it
would have said so explicitly.
Accordingly, I reject respondent's newly-minted argument
that Solera's closing price on August 3, 2015 of $36.39 is
the best evidence of Solera's fair value as of the date of the
Merger.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, petitioners are entitled to
$53.95 per share as the fair value of their shares of Solera,
plus interest accruing from the date the Merger closed, March
3, 2016, at the rate of 5% percent over the Federal Reserve
discount rate from time to time, compounded quarterly.427
The parties should confer and submit a form of implementing
order for the entry of final judgment consistent with this
opinion within ten business days. It is the court's intention
to unseal the expert reports in this case in their entirety
upon entry of a final judgment. If, however, a party believes
good cause exists to maintain any portion of any of the
expert reports under seal, that party must file a motion within
ten business days identifying the specific part that warrants
further confidential treatment and explaining the basis for
continuing such treatment.
*35  IT IS SO ORDERED.
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of return on its investment in exchange for undertaking the risk of an acquisition does not mean that the price it is willing
to pay is not a meaningful indication of fair value.”).
281 DFC, 172 A.3d at 370.
282 Id. at 370-71.
283 Id. at 349.
284 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (“The Committee, composed of independent, experienced directors and armed with the power
to say ‘no,’ persuaded [the bidder] to raise its bid six times. Nothing in the record suggests that increased competition
would have produced a better result.”); PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *30 (“Had the auction not generated an offer that
the Board deemed too good to pass up, I am satisfied that the Board was ready to pursue other initiatives as a standalone
company.”); Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *19 (“Reinforcing the threat of competition from other parties was
the realistic possibility that the Company would reject the [ ] bid and pursue a different alternative.”).
285 JX0359.0002.
286 Id.
287 Tr. 754-56, 771-72 (Yarbrough).
288 Id. at 776-78 (Yarbrough).
289 PTO ¶ 334.
290 Id. ¶ 338.
291 Tr. 806-07 (Yarbrough).
292 See PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *28 (emphasis in original) (“I note that the Board considered inviting the most likely
strategic partner ... into the process, but made the reasoned decision that, without a firm indication of interest from [the
competitor], the risks of providing [the company's] most direct competitor with unfettered access to [the company's] well-
stocked data room outweighed any potential reward. Nevertheless, the evidence revealed that the Board held the door
open for [the competitor] to join the auction if it expressed serious interest in making a bid.”).
293 PTO ¶¶ 325, 339, 350.
294 See infra Section III.D.1.c.
295 Tr. 807-08 (Yarbrough).
296 JX0633.0013.
297 Tr. 807-08 (Yarbrough).
298 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 4 (emphasis in original).
299 JX0340.0003 (“We are contemplating this deal solely in the context of being able to partner with Tony Aquila and his
management team.”) (Thoma Bravo); JX0464.0005 (“We have been impressed by the high caliber of the management
team we have met, and look forward to forming a successful and productive partnership with them and the other members
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of the Solera management team.”) (Vista); JX0464.0008 (“Our team is ecstatic about the opportunity to partner with Tony
and other members of senior management.”) (Pamplona).
300 JX0525; JX0541.
301 Tr. 452 (Aquila), 971-73 (Sowul).
302 Tr. 782-83 (Yarbrough); JX0380.0003-05.
303 See In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 117 (Del. Ch. 2007) (Strine, V.C.) (“I believe it would have been
preferable for the Special Committee to have had its chairman or, at the very least, its banker participate with [the CEO]
in negotiations with [the buyer]. By that means, there would be more assurance that [the CEO] would take a tough line
and avoid inappropriate discussions that would taint the process.”).
304 I view Baron's statement in an email to his colleagues at Rothschild that “we were the architects with the CEO from the
beginning as to how to engineer the process from start to finish” to be puffery. The email completely ignores Centerview's
role in the sales process, and Baron's statement that he is “excited to ... market the heck out of this for future business”
betrays his motivation for exaggerating his involvement in the transaction. Notably, three recipients of Baron's email were
his superiors at Rothschild. JX0670.0002.
305 Dell, 177 A.3d at 31-32.
306 Id.
307 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 26.
308 Id. at 27.
309 JX0902.0005; see also Tr. 148-49 (Cornell).
310 JX0899.0011.
311 Tr. 589 (Aquila).
312 Tr. 1034 (Hubbard) (“Q. Was Mr. Aquila a net buyer in this transaction? A. Not the way economists would use that term,
no. Q. And how do you understand that term? A. Actually, the economic definition is pretty much as the plain English. It
would mean contributing new cash as a net buyer. That did not happen.”).
313 JX0899.0009.
314 PTO ¶¶ 382-387.
315 Tr. 148-49 (Cornell).
316 Dell, 177 A.3d at 31.
317 See id. at 6 (noting that the features of an MBO transaction that may render the deal price unreliable “were largely absent”
in the Dell MBO).
318 DFC, 172 A.3d at 373.
319 Dell, 177 A.3d at 25 (citation omitted); see also JX0894.0034 (Hubbard expert report) (“In a well-functioning stock market,
a company's market price quickly reflects publicly available information. A market price balances investors' willingness to
buy and sell the shares in light of this information, and thus represents their consensus view as to the value of the equity
of the company. As a result, finance academics view market prices as an important indicator of intrinsic value absent
evidence of frictions that impede market efficiency.”).
320 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 27 n.131 (“This is evident as the court observed that the stock price anchors negotiations and, if
the stock price is low, the deal price necessarily might be low.”).
321 JX0894.0035. The S & P MidCap 400 contains 400 firms that are generally smaller than those in the S & P 500 but
“capture a period in the typical enterprise life cycle in which firms have successfully navigated the challenges inherent
to small companies, such as raising initial capital and managing early growth.” Mid Cap: A Sweet Spot for Performance,






326 See JX0842-43 (observing that Solera's stock rose more than ten percent on multiple times its normal daily trading volume
on August 4 and 5, 2015, and concluding that “this trading activity is consistent with trading on rumors of a transaction”).
327 PTO ¶ 363.
328 Id. ¶ 364 & Ex. A.
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329 Tr. 1052-53 (Hubbard); JX0894.0047-48.
330 Tr. 1053 (Hubbard). See also DFC, 172 A.3d at 369 (quoting Applebaum v. Avaya, Inc., 812 A.2d 880, 889-90 (Del.
2002) ) (“[A] well-informed, liquid trading market will provide a measure of fair value superior to any estimate the court
could impose.”).
331 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 4.
332 See, e.g., DFC, 172 A.3d at 369 n.117 (“One of the reasons, of course, why a control block trades at a different price
than a minority block is because a controller can determine key issues like dividend policy.”); IRA Tr. v. Crane, 2017 WL
7053964, at *7 n.54 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017) (“That control of a corporation has value is well-accepted.”).
333 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 6.
334 See, e.g., PTO ¶¶ 243-44.
335 Dell, 177 A.3d at 26-27; see also id. at 24 (“[A]nalysts scrutinized [the company's] long-range outlook when evaluating
the Company and setting price targets, and the market was capable of accounting for [the company's] recent mergers








343 Tr. 393-96 (Aquila).
344 JX0140.0003.
345 JX0310.0004.
346 Tr. 413-14 (Aquila); JX0318.0001.
347 DFC, 172 A.3d at 355.
348 Tr. 399-401 (Aquila).
349 DFC, 172 A.3d at 374.
350 See Tr. 114 (Cornell) (“[I]n this market condition, for whatever reason, there wasn't a lot of cheap debt available, and
that limited what a private equity firm's going to be able to pay and satisfy itself and its shareholders.”); see also DFC,
172 A.3d at 375 (“As is the case with refinancings, so too do banks like to lend and syndicate the acquisition debt for an
M & A transaction if they can get it done. That is how they make big profits. That lenders would not finance a buyout of
DFC at a higher valuation logically signals weakness in its future prospects, not that debt providers and equity buyers
were all mistaken. So did the fact that DFC's already non-investment grade debt suffered a downgrade in 2013 and then
was put on a negative credit watch in 2014.”).
351 See DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (“Like any factor relevant to a company's future performance, the market's collective judgment
of the effect of ... risk may turn out to be wrong, but established corporate finance theories suggest that the collective
judgment of the many is more likely to be accurate than any individual's guess. When the collective judgment involved,
as it did here, not just the views of the company stockholders, but also those of potential buyers of the entire company
and those of the company's debtholders with a self-interest in evaluating the regulatory risks facing the company, there
is more, not less, reason to give weight to the market's view of an important factor.”).
352 Highfields Capital. Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 60 (Del. Ch. 2007).
353 Pet'rs' Post-Trial Opening Br. 34-35.
354 Id. at 35.
355 DFC, 172 A.3d at 370-71 (emphasis added).
356 The Supreme Court also made clear that a deal price arrived at by using an LBO model can be the most reliable evidence
of fair value of a target company. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 350 (“[T]he fact that a financial buyer may demand a certain
rate of return on its investment in exchange for undertaking the risk of an acquisition does not mean that the price it is
willing to pay is not a meaningful indication of fair value.”).
357 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
358 Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Gp., Ltd., 847 A.2d, 340, 343 (Del. Ch. 2004) (Strine, V.C).
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359 See, e.g., PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *31 n.364 (citation omitted) (noting “synergies financial buyers may have with
target firms arising from other companies in their portfolio”); Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *17 n.14 (noting
that “a source of private value” to a financial buyer is “a synergistic portfolio company”).
360 Tr. 908-16 (Sowul); JX0613.0033.
361 Id. at 908-09 (Sowul).
362 Id. at 1045-48 (Hubbard); JX0894.0066-71.
363 Id. at 1045-46 (Hubbard); JX0894.0070-71.
364 Tr. 1047-48 (Hubbard); JX0894.0070-71. This 31% figure is the “median portion of synergies shared with the seller” as
determined by a 2013 Boston Consulting Group study of 365 deals. JX0894.0070-71. Although the appraisal statute
mandates excision of synergies specific to the merger at issue, this court has used general estimates of the percentage
of synergies shared, as provided by experts, to derive appraisal value from deal price. See Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 353 &
n.26 (relying on a “reasonable synergy discount” propounded by a party's expert).
365 See DFC, 172 A.3d at 371 (“Part of why the synergy excision issue can be important is that it is widely assumed that the
sales price in many M & A deals includes a portion of the buyer's expected synergy gains, which is part of the premium
the winning buyer must pay to prevail and obtain control.”).
366 See 8 Del. C. § 262(h) (“In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant factors.”); DFC,
172 A.3d at 388 (“But, in keeping with our refusal to establish a ‘presumption’ in favor of the deal price because of the
statute's broad mandate, we also conclude that the Court of Chancery must exercise its considerable discretion while
also explaining, with reference to the economic facts before it and corporate finance principles, why it is according a
certain weight to a certain indicator of value.”).
367 Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 359.
368 JX0894.0075 (Hubbard); JX0898.0098, 0124 (Cornell).
369 See S. Muio & Co. LLC v. Hallmark Entm't Invs. Co., 2011 WL 863007, at *20 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2011) (quoting Hanover
Direct, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2010 WL 3959399, at *2-3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 24, 2010) ) (noting that the court “gives more credit
and weight to experts who apply ‘multiple valuation techniques that support one another's conclusions’ and that ‘serve
to cross-check one another's results.’ ”), aff'd, 35 A.3d 419 (Del. 2011).
370 JX0835.
371 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 36 (citations omitted) (“As is common in appraisal proceedings, each party—petitioners and
the Company—enlisted highly paid, well-credentialed experts to produce DCF valuations. But their valuation landed
galaxies apart—diverging by approximately $28 billion, or 126%.... The Court of Chancery recognized that ‘[t]his is a
recurring problem,’ and even believed the ‘market data is sufficient to exclude the possibility, advocated by the petitioners'
expert, that the Merger undervalued the Company by $23 billion.’ Thus, the trial court found petitioners' valuation lacks
credibility on its face. We agree.”); PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, at *2 (“Moreover, the evidence does not reveal any
confounding factors that would have caused the massive market failure, to the tune of $4.5 billion (a 45% discrepancy).”);
Highfields, 939 A.2d at 52 (citation omitted) (disregarding analysis that was “markedly disparate from market price data
for [the company's] stock and other independent indicia of value”).
372 PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *40 n.439 (quoting William T. Allen, Securities Markets as Social Products: The Pretty
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 28 J. CORP. L. 551, 560 (2003) ).




377 JX0894.0082; Tr. 1067-68, 1189 (Hubbard).
378 JX0900.0027; Tr. 64-66, 77-81 (Cornell). Respondent not only argues that it is incorrect to apply Bradley/Jarrell, but that
petitioners also misapplied the formula. Specifically, respondent argues that petitioners erred by applying their Bradley/
Jarrell-derived investment rate to net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) instead of net cash flow (NCF). According to
respondent, this mistake resulted in improperly assuming away Solera's required maintenance investment into perpetuity.
Resp't's Post-Trial Opening Br. 47, 51-52.
379 Tr. 103; JX0900.0007-08.
380 PetSmart, 2017 WL 2303599, at *39; see also In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL 227634, at *4
n.16 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 2011) (stating that the convergence model is “a reflection of the widely-accepted assumption that
for companies in highly competitive industries with no competitive advantages, value-creating investment opportunities
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will be exhausted over a discrete forecast period, and beyond that point, any additional growth will be value-neutral,”
leading to “return on new investment in perpetuity [that] converge[s] to the company's cost of capital”); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL 161084, at *26 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (discussing that “profits above the cost of capital in
an industry will attract competitors, who will over some time period drive returns down to the point at which returns equal
the cost of capital”), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
381 Tr. 1085-87 (Hubbard).
382 JX0900.0028, 32.
383 JX0900.0031.
384 Tr. 242-43 (Cornell).
385 Id. at 1059-60 (Hubbard); JX0899.0043-44.
386 Id. at 57 (Cornell).
387 Id. at 1060 (Hubbard).
388 Id. at 692-93 (Giger).
389 Id. at 1094-97 (Hubbard).
390 Id. at 1094-98 (Hubbard).
391 Id. at 70-75 (Cornell); JX0900.0040-42.
392 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of SWS Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 2334852, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2017) (citation omitted) (“It is
true as a matter of valuation methodology that non-operating assets—including cash in excess of that needed to fund
the operations of the entity—are to be added to a DCF analysis.”).
393 Tr. 229 (Cornell).
394 Id. at 695 (Giger).
395 JX0894.0103; Tr. 1092-94 (Hubbard).
396 Tr. 67-68 (Cornell).
397 DFC, 172 A.3d at 349.
398 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 35 (“When ... an appraisal is brought in cases like this where a robust sale process [involving willing
buyers with thorough information and the time to make a bid] in fact occurred, the Court of Chancery should be chary
about imposing the hazards that always come when a law-trained judge is forced to make a point estimate of fair value
based on widely divergent partisan expert testimony.”); DFC, 172 A.3d at 379 (“Simply given the Court of Chancery's
own findings about the extensive market check, the value gap already reflected in the court's original discounted cash
flow estimate of $13.07 should have given the Court doubts about the reliability of its discounted cash flow analysis.”).
399 JX0898.0124.
400 See Dell, 177 A.3d at 37-38 (“Although widely considered the best tool for valuing companies when there is no credible
market information and no market check, DFC valuations involve many inputs—all subject to disagreement by well-
compensated and highly credentialed experts—and even slight differences in these inputs can produce large valuation
gaps.”).
401 JX0894.0126.
402 Given my conclusion to accord no weight to either side's DCF model, there is no need to retain a court-appointed expert
to resolve the parties' disagreement concerning the appropriate method to determine the investment rate for the terminal
period.
403 Aruba, 2018 WL 922139, at *1, 4.
404 Id. at *2-3.
405 Resp't's Suppl. Post-Trial Br. 5.
406 Tr. 1023 (Hubbard).
407 Resp't's Post-Trial Opening Br. 1 (emphasis added).
408 Aruba, 2018 WL 922139, at *3 n.16 (citing William J. Carney & Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the Nonexistent: The
Delaware Court's Struggle with Control Premiums, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 845, 847–48, 857–58, 861–66 (2003); Lawrence
A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1021,
1023–24, 1034–35, 1044, 1046–54, 1067 (2009); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling
Life of the “Implicit Minority Discount” in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 30–36, 49, 52, 60 (2007); Lawrence
A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. Corp. L. 119, 128,
132–33, 139–42 (2005) ).
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409 AOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *10 n.118.
410 PTO ¶ 79 & Ex. A.
411 Id. ¶ 363.
412 Aruba, 2018 WL 922139, at *3 n.17 (citations omitted).
413 Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 1021, 1052 (2009).
414 Id.
415 See id. (“Finally, do minority shareholders receive the value of control that is created by the aggregation of the shares
and the creation of a new controller? ... Embracing the concept of an ‘implicit minority discount,’ the courts would award
the dissenters [the value of control], on the theory that fair value should not be reduced for lack of control.”).
416 1998 WL 44993, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1998), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 737 A.2d 513.
417 Id. at *8.
418 M.G. Bancorporation., Inc., v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d at 523 (citation omitted).
419 753 A.2d 451, 452 (Del. Ch. 1999).
420 Id. at 458.
421 2005 WL 2045640 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005).
422 Id. at *18 (citing Borruso, 753 A.2d 451).
423 See Gilbert, 731 A.2d at 797 (“[S]ection 262(h) requires that the Court of Chancery discern the going concern value of
the company irrespective of the synergies involved in a merger.”).
424 Dell, 177 A.3d at 21; DFC, 172 A.3d at 371.
425 See Aruba., 2018 WL 2315943, at *8 & n.61 (reargument decision) (comparing DFC and Dell to how past “Supreme
Court decisions had treated the unaffected trading price as a valuation indicator”).
426 Dell, 177 A.3d at 30 (“Overall, the weight of evidence shows that Dell's deal price has heavy, if not overriding, probative
value.”); DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (“[E]conomic principles suggest that the best evidence of fair value was the deal price.”).
427 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
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Government Works.
- 345 -
In re of SWS Group, Inc., Not Reported in A.3d (2017)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
2017 WL 2334852
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK
COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Chancery of Delaware.
IN RE Appraisal OF SWS GROUP, INC.
C.A. No. 10554–VCG
|
Date Submitted: February 27, 2017
|
Date Decided: May 30, 2017
Attorneys and Law Firms
Marcus E. Montejo, Kevin H. Davenport, Eric J. Juray,
Chaz L. Enerio, of PRICKETT, JONES & ELLIOTT, P.A.,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Petitioners Merlin
Partners, LP and AAMAF, LP.
Kurt M. Heyman, Patricia L. Enerio, Melissa N. Donimirski,
of HEYMAN ENERIO GATTUSO & HIRZEL LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Petitioners Lone Star
Value Investors, LP and Lone Star Value Co–Invest II, LP.
Garrett B. Moritz, Eric D. Selden, Nicholas D. Mozal,
of ROSS ARONSTAM & MORITZ LLP, Wilmington,
Delaware; OF COUNSEL: William Savitt, Andrew J.H.
Cheung, Noah B. Yavitz, of WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN
& KATZ, New York, New York, Attorneys for Respondents
SWS Group, Inc. and Hilltop Securities Holdings LLC.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor
*1  The Petitioners here are former stockholders of SWS
Group Inc. (“SWS” or the “Company”), a Delaware
corporation. They are seeking a statutory appraisal of their
shares. The Company was exposed to the market in a sales
process. As this Court has noted, most recently in In Re
Appraisal of Petsmart, Inc.,1 a public sales process that
develops market value is often the best evidence of statutory
“fair value” as well. As noted below, however, the sale of
SWS was undertaken in conditions that make the price thus
derived unreliable as evidence of fair value, in my opinion.
Methods of valuation derived from comparable companies
are similarly unreliable here. I rely, therefore, on a discounted
cash flow (“DCF”) analysis to determine the fair value of
SWS, assisted by the learned but divergent opinions of the
parties' experts. My rationale for rejecting sale price, and my
resolution of the disputed issues involved in the competing
DCFs, follows.
This action arises from the Petitioners' statutory right to
receive a judicial determination of the fair value of their shares
of SWS. On January 1, 2015, SWS merged into a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Hilltop Holdings, Inc. (“Hilltop”), itself
a substantial creditor of SWS. SWS shareholders received
a mix of cash and stock worth $6.92. The Petitioners are
a series of funds holding appraisal-eligible shares of SWS.
The Petitioners bring this action challenging the merger
consideration as unfair. It is my statutory duty to determine
the fair value of the Petitioners' shares as of the date of the
merger.
This case presents two divergent narratives. The first is
that the Company was on the brink of a turnaround before
the sale, and had only been suffering due to unique and
unprecedented market conditions. The second is that the
Company had fundamental structural problems making it
difficult to compete at its size. The reality is somewhere in
the middle, in my view. The Company was a struggling bank
which had a chance to modestly improve its outlook around
the time of sale. It still faced a long climb, however.
Similarly, this case presents two divergent expert valuations.
Neither party attempts to invoke the deal price, but for
different reasons. The Petitioners argue that the sales process
was so hopelessly flawed that the deal price is irrelevant.
The Respondents argue that the deal price is improper here
because it includes large synergies inappropriate to statutory
fair value. Accordingly, neither party relies on price—though
the Respondents argue any valuation should be reconciled
or checked against the deal price. Each side instead relies
on traditional valuation methods. Those traditional valuation
methodologies result in almost mirror image valuations of
50% above and 50% below the deal price.
Upon review, I find the fair value of SWS as of the merger
date to be $6.38 per share.
I. FACTS
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The following are the facts as I find them after a four-day trial.
I accord the evidence presented the weight and credibility
I find it deserves. Because I do not find the merger price
reliable on the unique facts here, I decline to focus extensively
on the record as it relates to the sales process. In sum, as
recited below, I find that Petitioners' critiques of the sales
process, and Hilltop's influence on the process, are generally
supported. However, Petitioners' narrative that SWS was
a company on the verge of a turnaround lacks credible
factual support. Instead SWS consistently underperformed
management projections and there is minimal record support
that a turnaround was probable given its structural problems.
A. The Parties and Relevant Non–Parties
*2  There are several Petitioners in this action; each itself
an entity. There is no dispute that the remaining Petitioners'
shares are eligible for appraisal. A collective 7,438,453 SWS
common shares held by the Petitioners are at issue in this


































SWS was a relatively small bank holding company. SWS
entered a merger agreement with Hilltop on March 31, 2014
whereby SWS would merge into a subsidiary of Hilltop.4 That
merger was consummated on January 1, 2015.5
Hilltop itself became a bank holding company following its
acquisition of PlainsCapital in 2012.6 As discussed below,
Hilltop, together with Oak Hill Capital Partners (“Oak Hill”),
provided a substantial loan to SWS in 2011 that SWS needed
to maintain proper capital and liquidity levels.7 Pursuant to
the terms of the loan Hilltop's Chairman, Gerald J. Ford
(“Jerry Ford”), was appointed to SWS's board in 2011 and
remained a SWS director at all relevant times.8 Jerry Ford
has approximately forty years of experience in the bank
consolidation business, including certain successful sales.9
Jerry Ford's son, Jeremy Ford, is the President and co-CEO
of Hilltop.10 In 2011 Jeremy Ford was named as Hilltop's
designated “observer” on SWS's board, in connection with
the loan, which permitted him to attend meetings, and review
financial and operational reports “to oversee and protect
Hilltop's investment in SWS.”11
Oak Hill is a Texas based private equity firm which also
participated in the 2011 loan to SWS.12 In connection with the
loan, Oak Hill was also given a board seat and an “observer”
on SWS's board.13
B. The SWS Story
1. SWS's Background
SWS was a Delaware corporation, incorporated in 1972, that
traded on the New York Stock Exchange.14 SWS was a
bank holding company with two general business segments:
traditional banking (the “Bank”) and brokerage services
(the “Broker–Dealer”).15 Under the brokerage services
umbrella there were certain general sub-groups including
retail brokerage, institutional brokerage, and clearing.16
The banking segment operated eight offices throughout the
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southwest.17 SWS had significantly more locations and
resources dedicated to the brokerage business.18 In contrast to
a traditional bank, SWS had minimal retail deposits—instead
nearly 90% of SWS's deposits were derived from overnight
“sweep” accounts held by SWS's Broker–Dealer clients.19
That is, SWS's banking business lacked a “stand-alone deposit
base.”20 On an employee, asset, and revenue basis the Bank
was smaller than the Broker–Dealer.21 SWS's CFO explained
at trial that his view of the Company was that “really we were
a broker-dealer with a bank attached.”22
2. SWS Faces Difficulty
*3  SWS had a number of loans, backed by real estate
in North Texas, that became impaired following the Great
Recession.23 From 2007 to 2011 the Bank's non-performing
assets spiked from 2% of total assets to 6.6%.24 Federal
regulators reacted to the impairment of the Bank's assets.
First, in July 2010 the Bank entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding (“MOU”) with federal regulators.25 The MOU
subjected the Bank to additional regulation limiting certain
business and requiring higher capital ratios.26 Second, the
MOU was followed by a formal Cease and Desist order in
February 2011, similarly restricting the Bank's activities and
setting out heightened capital requirements.27
In light of this additional oversight and the need to improve
the Bank's capital position, SWS began seeking ways to
prop up the Bank. Initially, SWS attempted to transfer
capital from the Broker–Dealer to the Bank which included
a “fire sale” of assets, however, this failed to solve the
capital issue.28 In fact the transfer from the Broker–Dealer
to the Bank caused the Broker–Dealer business to drop
below threshold capital levels acceptable to counterparties
and threatened to impair the Broker–Dealer business line.29
SWS had preliminary discussions with Hilltop in the “early
fall of 2010 and entered into a non-disclosure agreement
with Hilltop,” which began due diligence review of SWS.30
SWS, however, upon advice of counsel and advisors elected
to pursue a public debt offering.31 In December 2010,
SWS attempted to raise capital through a public offering
of convertible unsecured debt, which failed due to lack of
investor demand.32 Thereafter, SWS returned to the private
market and finalized an arrangement with Oak Hill and
Hilltop (the “Credit Agreement”).
a. The Credit Agreement
The terms of the Credit Agreement were finalized in March
2011,33 and later approved by stockholders, before the
transaction closed on July 29, 2011.34 Pursuant to the Credit
Agreement, Oak Hill and Hilltop made a $100 million senior
unsecured loan to SWS at an interest rate of 8%.35 The Credit
Agreement provided that SWS would issue a warrant to
purchase 8,695,652 shares of SWS common stock to both Oak
Hill and Hilltop exercisable at $5.75 a share.36 As a frame of
reference, when SWS pulled its public offering in December
2010, SWS's trading price dropped to slightly below $4.00
a share.37 Absent exercise of the warrants, which would
eliminate the debt, or a permissible prepayment the loan
would mature in five years.38 Upon exercise of the warrants,
Oak Hill and Hilltop would own substantial positions in the
Company.39
The same day the Credit Agreement was finalized, SWS
entered into an Investor Rights Agreement with Oak Hill
and Hilltop that provided each company the right to appoint
a board member and a board “observer” to SWS's board.40
The Credit Agreement itself provided several protections to
Oak Hill and Hilltop. This included, for example, certain
anti-takeover clauses which would place the loan in default
if the board ceased to consist of a majority of “Continuing
Directors” or if any other stockholder acquired more than
24.9% of SWS stock.41 Importantly, a separate portion
of the Credit Agreement included a “covenant prohibiting
SWS from undergoing a ‘Fundamental Change’ ” which
was defined to include the sale of SWS (the “Merger
Covenant”).42 Hilltop was not willing to waive the Merger
Covenant during SWS's sales process.43 However, SWS was
permitted to prepay the loan under certain conditions44—
including if the stock price of SWS exceeded $8.625 for
twenty out of any thirty consecutive trading days.45 That
is, if the stock price reached such a point an acquirer could
essentially prepay the loan, and the Merger Covenant would
fall away.
*4  Around the time the Credit Agreement was being
negotiated and finalized, Sterne Agee Group, Inc. (“Sterne
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Agee”) approached SWS about a potential acquisition.46 On
March 26, 2011, Sterne Agee made an unsolicited conditional
offer to acquire SWS at $6.25 a share, which the board
rejected after attempts to “obtain further information about
the offer, including the source of funding and ability to
obtain bank regulatory approval ....”47 In rejecting the $6.25
proposal, the board framed the offer as “highly conditional”
and concluded that it “substantially undervalues the future
potential of SWS Group ....”48 SWS implemented defensive
measures in response to the offer.49 Stern Agee followed
up with a $7.50 per share cash offer on April 28, 2011.50
SWS rejected that follow-up offer on May 3, 2011 in favor
of the Credit Agreement with Hilltop and Oak Hill.51 In
rejecting the offer SWS's board “unanimously determined
that the Sterne Agee proposal is speculative, illusory, subject
to numerous contingencies and uncertainties, and is clearly
not in the best interests of SWS Group Stockholders.”52
The board cited numerous regulatory and financial barriers
that Sterne Agee would face that created serious questions
as to “Sterne Agee's ability to complete a transaction on a
timely basis.”53 Notably, Sterne Agee was not a bank holding
company and would need to secure unlikely regulatory
approval to facilitate an acquisition of SWS's Bank.54 The
SWS board found that the $7.50 bid would “deprive[ ]
stockholders of the long term value of their shares” pointing
out that the offer was at a substantial discount to SWS's book
value.55 Testimony at trial clarified that Sterne Agee was an
unlikely acquirer and never made an “actionable” offer.56
b. SWS after the Credit Agreement
Following the Credit Agreement, and the regulatory
interventions SWS implemented a plan to turn the business
around. The success of the “turnaround” was the subject of
substantial litigation effort.
From 2011 through 2014 SWS management prepared annual
budgets. The budgets were formulated by going to individual
business sector heads, collecting their projections, and then
aggregating them.57 Frequently, management would ask the
business heads for more “aspirational” goals or projections to
get numbers they were comfortable taking to the full board.58
Single year projections were then extrapolated out into three
year “strategic plans” which assumed each individual year's
budget would be met.59 SWS, however, never met its budget
between 2011 and 2014.60 In that vein, management forecasts
anticipated straight-line growth in revenue and profits, but
SWS failed to hit the targets and continued to lose money on
declining revenues.61
Robert Chereck became CEO of SWS in 2012, after being
recruited by Jerry Ford.62 Chereck helped to implement
changes at the Bank which ultimately led to the termination
of the Cease and Desist order in 2013, presumably because
the Bank had reached adequate capital levels and returned
to prudent lending.63 SWS was able to reduce its volume
of problem loans,64 but the Bank, overall, produced “very
disappointing results.”65 The Broker–Dealer business line
essentially remained stagnant.66 SWS was accruing “a
deferred tax asset” in the form of a net operating loss.67
In June 2013, the Company made an accounting decision
to write down, in the form of a valuation allowance,
approximately $30 million of its net operating losses, because
after several years of losses in a row, the Company did not
believe it would be able to generate “enough income in the
future to use up that operating loss in the requisite time
frame.”68 This decision was made in the context of an audited
accounting determination. I find that the decision—to provide
for a valuation allowance because it was more likely than
not that such losses could not be offset by income during the
requisite period69—implies that managements' straight-line
growth and profitability projections were optimistic.70
*5  The Respondents identify two “structural impediments”
to growth which they assert were demonstrated by the trial
record.71 First, the Respondents point to trial testimony
regarding SWS's size. For example, Tyree Miller of SWS's
board, testified that SWS “was subscale in every area”
and such lack of scale impeded growth.72 Both regulatory
requirements,73 and technology and back office costs,74
burdened the Bank at its scale, as it had a smaller base to
spread those costs across. Second, the Respondents point to
testimony that SWS was a “people business,” and that its
best assets were its people.75 This was particularly true of the
Broker–Dealer business and SWS's scale problems along with
its publicized regulatory and capital problems made it difficult
to retain client advisors. From 2009 to 2012 the Broker–
Dealer lost approximately one third of its client advisors.76
The Bank business at SWS also struggled to retain and recruit
loan officers in light of SWS's well-publicized woes.77 The
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Petitioners narrative is that following termination of the Cease
and Desist order and the changes implemented prompting
the termination, SWS was on the brink of a turnaround. All
parties agree that certain improvements were made to SWS's
problem assets78 and balance sheet. I find that the Company's
recent history and the record at trial supports the Respondents'
witnesses testimony that the Company would continue to face
an uphill climb to compete at its size going forward.79
By August 2013, the board was becoming frustrated by the
Company's performance and directed SWS's CEO to take
action—specifically to cut costs by 10% within thirty days.80
The purpose of these cuts was not to stimulate growth, but
rather to bring down the expense base in “an attempt to get
margins up.”81 By the end of the year, nearly all of the cuts
had been implemented. The savings expected were upwards
of $18 million82—which included eliminating over 100
jobs, including thirty-two revenue-producing employees.83
Around this time federal bank regulators were conducting
their annual review, which for the most part noted that SWS's
condition had improved, however, they raised a concern about
SWS's ability to repay the $100 million note.84 The board
remained concerned about the Company's condition and the
ability of SWS to pay off its loan to Hilltop, and return to
profitability and growth.85
3. The Sales Process
Prior to SWS launching a sales process there was noise
by analysts in the market that SWS was an acquisition
target,86 and that Hilltop, since it had recently become a
bank holding company via its acquisition of PlainsCapital,
was a likely fit for a synergies-driven transaction.87 SWS
stock traded higher upon this speculation. The analysts were
correct—prior to SWS launching a sales process Hilltop was
actively considering a purchase of SWS—and by October
2013 Jeremy Ford, Hilltop's board observer, had drafted an
analysis to present to Hilltop's directors in support of an SWS
acquisition.88 SWS was not aware of Hilltop's interest at this
time, however.89 In preparing his analysis Jeremy Ford had
access to information via his position as a board observer that
others in the market would not have had access to, including,
for example, loan tapes,90 SWS board meeting materials,91
and access to SWS management. At no time did Jeremy Ford
inform SWS of Hilltop's interest, that it was analyzing SWS
as a target, or that Hilltop was considering a tender offer.92
Hilltop's internal projections reveal that following integration
of PlainsCapital, an SWS acquisition would derive much
of its benefits from cost-savings in reduction of overhead
rather than SWS's stand-alone performance.93 Thus, Hilltop's
acquisition thesis was synergies-driven.94
*6  On January 9, 2014, Hilltop made an offer to acquire
SWS for $7.00 per share, payable in 50% cash and 50%
Hilltop stock.95 SWS's trading price on January 9, 2014—
with some merger speculation in the market but prior to
the announcement of the offer—was $6.06, and the one-
year average of SWS in the previous year was $5.92. SWS
responded by creating a Special Committee to consider
the offer on January 15, 2014.96 The Special Committee
“knew there were very, very strong synergy values already
partly reflected ...” in the initial offer but wanted to
“convince Hilltop” to share more of the synergies with SWS
shareholders.97
The process the Special Committee ran, and whether it was
independent or “straightjacketed,” was also the subject of
substantial litigation effort. As I do not rely on the deal price, I
need only briefly address the matter here. The Committee was
represented by legal and financial advisors.98 The financial
advisor retained by the Special Committee asked management
to update its most recent three year projections, which at
the time ended in June 2016, to run through the end of
calendar year 2017.99 While management dialed back some
of the growth assumptions, due to the failure to meet prior-
period projections,100 management projections were still
“optimistic” and projected growth and “net additions to the
business.”101 That is, the revised management projections
still relied on a number of favorable assumptions.102 A visual
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Following Hilltop's bid, the Special Committee's financial
advisor contacted seventeen potential merger partners for
SWS in early February 2014.104 Besides Hilltop, two other
entities expressed interest, as discussed below.
a. Esposito
Esposito is a small Dallas, Texas broker-dealer.105 Esposito
had approximately $10 million in capital.106 Esposito made
an expression of interest in SWS at $8.00 per share
on February 12, 2014, subject to a slew of conditions,
including securing financing.107 Shortly thereafter Esposito
released a press release publicizing its $8.00 expression
of interest.108 Esposito was unknown to the entire Special
Committee despite their decades of experience in the
area.109 Nonetheless the Special Committee engaged with
Esposito to try to obtain additional information regarding
its plans to finance the transaction and secure regulatory
approval.110 This revealed that Esposito would need the
assistance of another small regional bank—Triumph Bancorp,
who together with Esposito, would seek out $300 million
from three private equity firms to finance the deal.111
Certain communications indicate that SWS “stiff-armed”
Esposito.112 Stiff-armed, or otherwise, Esposito was not
able to pull together the requisite financing and secure a
path towards regulatory approval; thus, neither Esposito nor
Triumph made a formal offer.113
b. Stifel
*7  In February 2014, Stifel emerged as a second interested
acquirer. The parties heavily dispute whether Stifel was
truly interested and capable of consummating a transaction
with SWS. The Petitioners argue that Stifel was improperly
shut out of the sales process despite having the means
and the interest to submit a topping bid to Hilltop's
proposal. The Respondents' narrative is that Stifel had
a “reputation” and “history” of pursuing sales processes,
backing out, and poaching key employees.114 Nonetheless
the Special Committee instructed its financial advisor to
solicit interest from Stifel,115 and Stifel expressed interest at
$8.15 a share. The Respondents assert that Stifel was then
“difficult” in carrying out due-diligence, arguing that Stifel
insisted on “unusually personalized diligence.”116 SWS and
Stifel engaged in robust negotiation over a non-disclosure
agreement (“NDA”).117 The process of consummating a
NDA was protracted; Stifel finally signed it on March 18,
2014.118 The Special Committee, apparently dragging its feet,
did not countersign the NDA immediately,119 and by March
21, Stifel had withdrawn its signature.120
As discussed below, an initial handshake deal was reached
between Hilltop and SWS on approximately March 20, 2014.
Stifel, unaware of this, continued its expression of interest,
at a price above Hilltop's offer.121 This information was
taken to the Special Committee at a March 24, 2014 meeting,
which initially favored signing a NDA.122 However, when
this information was relayed to Jerry Ford he “blew his
top,” and demanded that the deal be signed with Hilltop
by March 31, 2014 or he was withdrawing his offer and
resigning from the board.123 Further Jerry Ford indicated
that Hilltop would not waive the Merger Covenant.124 A
NDA was eventually executed with Stifel, and by March 27,
2014 Stifel made a proposal at $8.65 a share.125 According
to Stifel's March 27 letter to SWS, the proposal was non-
binding and subject to due diligence, and Stifel stated that it
believed its proposal “would not be subject to blocking” by
the Merger Covenant.126 Stifel proposed to finish diligence
by March 31,127 and internal Stifel documents demonstrate
that its price was driven significantly by synergies.128 Stifel's
access to SWS's building and the diligence data room in
the days leading up to the March 31 deadline is in dispute.
The same is true for whether SWS and the committee
were adequately cooperating with Stifel, and whether Stifel's
interest at its announced price-point was genuine. Shortly
before the deadline the Special Committee asked Stifel if
it would raise its offer to $9.00 per share.129 Stifel was
not able to complete its diligence to its satisfaction and
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asked for an extension via letter of March 31, 2014.130 The
extension request also suggested that the Merger Covenant
now presented a problem for Stifel.131 No extension was
granted.
c. Hilltop and the Committee Recommendation
Hilltop's initial $7.00 per share offer was rejected by the
committee as “inadequate” and “undervalued” SWS per
the Special Committee's meeting minutes.132 As mentioned
above, however, at trial members of the Special Committee
testified to their belief that the initial offer significantly shared
synergies, and that going forward the object of bargaining
would be to extract additional synergy value for SWS
shareholders.133 On March 19, 2014 Hilltop raised its offer
to $7.50 a share with a ratio of 25% cash and 75% Hilltop
stock.134 The Special Committee countered at $8.00.135 On
March 20, while Stifel's NDA was still pending the Special
Committee met and instructed the financial advisor to ask
Hilltop to increase its offer to $7.75.136 Hilltop believed it had
a “handshake” deal at $7.75.137 As discussed above Hilltop
become upset at the prospect of another bidder entering
the picture, which it viewed as a “retrade” or suspected
negotiation tactic, and made clear that $7.75 was best and
final.138 Thus, Hilltop set the March 31, 2014 deadline to
accept or reject its offer.139
*8  The Special Committee met on March 31, 2014 to
consider Hilltop's offer and review the sales process.140
The Committee's financial advisor provided a fairness
opinion which opined the proposed transaction was fair to
SWS's stockholders.141 The financial advisor did, however,
recognize that the Company informed it that the Credit
Agreement may place “significant constraints on the
Company's ability to sell itself ....”142 As of the self-imposed
March 31 deadline Hilltop was the only acquirer that had
made a firm offer.143 The Committee viewed the offer as
“a very solid offer” that they knew could actually close
and determined that accepting it was the appropriate course
of action in light of the Company's “precarious financial
position.”144 Further, in light of the financial advisor's
opinion that the offer was fair, the committee recommended
it to the full board.145 The SWS board approved the merger
later that day on the terms described above: $7.75 a share with
75% Hilltop stock and 25% cash.146
4. Post–Deal Developments
Shortly after the deal was announced, certain Petitioners
started accumulating shares for appraisal investment funds.
The world of appraisal arbitrage does not lack for irony:
Included in these Petitioners' solicitations of investments was
the disclosure that a prime investment risk to their business
strategy of dissent from the merger was that a majority
of stockholders would do the same.147 In that case, the
deal would not close and they would remain investors in
SWS as a going concern.148 Prior to the record date for
the merger, Oak Hill exercised the majority of its warrants
on September 26, 2014, acquiring 6.5 million SWS shares
thereby eliminating $37.5 million in debt.149 On October
2, 2014, Hilltop exercised its warrants in full and received
approximately 8.7 million SWS shares, and as a result $50
million in SWS debt was eliminated.150 A proxy advisory
service noted that SWS's viability as a stand-alone entity was
harmed by both market conditions and its poor performance
over the past five years.151 However, this same proxy advisor,
although it supported the merger, also indicated that the
“merger consideration is clearly not the optimal outcome
of the 2014 sales process, but it may, cumulatively, be an
acceptable outcome when considering the entire 2011–2014
process.”152 SWS continued to struggle to turn a profit.
Financial results for fiscal year 2014, released on September
26, 2014 revealed a decline in net revenue from $271 million
to $266 million.153 While some sectors of SWS's business
improved, management forecasts were not met and SWS
recorded a net loss of $15.6 million.154 The merger was
approved by a special stockholder meeting on November 21,
2014 and closed on January 1, 2015. In the several months
between the announcement of the merger agreement and the
stockholder vote, no other bidder emerged. Due to fluctuation
in Hilltop's stock, the value of the merger consideration had
decreased to $6.92 per share.
C. The Experts
As is typical in these proceedings, the experts present vastly
divergent valuations. In sum, neither expert attempts to
invoke the deal price in light of the unique relationship
between the buyer and seller and the sales process outlined
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above. The Petitioners' expert, David Clarke, is a well-
seasoned valuation expert with over thirty-five years of
providing valuation opinions and expert testimony in various
types of valuation litigation.155 Clarke employed a valuation
which places 80% weight on his DCF analysis and 20%
on a comparable companies analysis. Clarke arrives at a
fair value of $9.61 per share, for a total value of SWS of
$483.4 million.156 The Petitioners offer several purported
explanations for the divergence from the deal price, including
flaws in the sales process, and the failure to account for
SWS being on the verge of a turnaround. The Respondents'
expert, Richard Ruback, a Corporate Finance Professor with
substantial experience in expert testimony, places 100%
weight on his DCF analysis.157 His analysis results in a $5.17
per share valuation. The Respondents' explanation for its
expert's valuation falling below the merger price is that certain
“shared synergies” are included in the merger price, but not
properly considered fair value in an appraisal action. The
experts' positions are discussed in more detail in the analysis
portion of this Memorandum Opinion.
D. Procedural History
*9  Several separate appraisal petitions were initially filed
in January 2015, and the petitions were later consolidated.
A four-day trial was held in September 2016, followed by
extensive post-trial briefing. After the conclusion of post-trial
briefing, closing argument was held on December 14, 2016.
At the conclusion of closing argument I requested that the
parties submit essentially a stipulated list of issues arising
from the evidence of value.158 That exercise proved helpful
in highlighting the differences between the parties. However,
it failed to result in a stipulated list of issues, and led to further
motion practice.159 What follows is my decision on the fair
value of SWS.
II. ANALYSIS
This is a statutory proceeding pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 262
(the “Appraisal Statute”). Once the procedural strictures are
met and entitlement to appraisal is perfected, the Appraisal
Statute provides shareholders who did not vote in favor of
certain transactions a statutory right to have this Court value
their shares.160 The only issue before me here is the value of
the Petitioners' shares.
The Appraisal Statute provides that “the Court shall
determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element
of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation
of the merger ....”161 Unlike traditional adversarial legal
proceedings, the burden of proof is not specifically allocated
to a party—rather the Court, via statute, has the duty
to determine the fair value of the shares.162 Therefore,
“[u]ltimately, both parties bear the burden of establishing
fair value by a preponderance of the evidence.”163 The
corporation is to be valued as a going concern,164 taking “into
account all relevant factors,”165 including the “ ‘operative
reality’ of the company as of the time of the merger.”166
That is, the fair value calculation focuses on “the value of the
company as a going concern, rather than its value to a third
party as an acquisition.”167
Despite the burden of articulating fair value ultimately falling
on the Court, I am, as a practical matter, generally guided in
my valuation by the adversarial presentations of the parties.
After evaluating those presentations and the trial record,
the Court may “select one of the parties' valuation models
as its general framework, or fashion its own, to determine
fair value in [an] appraisal proceeding.”168 The Court has
“significant discretion to use the valuation methods it deems
appropriate ....”169 That is, “appraisal is, by design, a flexible
process” and “vests the [Court] with significant discretion to
consider ‘all relevant factors' and determine the going concern
value of the underlying company.”170
A. The Appropriate Valuation Methodology Here
*10  A line of decisions in this Court have invoked the
merger price as the best indication of fair value.171 Certain
common threads run through these decisions making the
merger price, in those circumstances, the best indicator
available—including a sales process which exposed the
company sufficiently to the market such that if the market
valued the asset at a higher price, it is likely that a bidder
would have emerged.172 Similarly, cases invoking the merger
price generally involve a relatively clean sales process.
However, when the merger price represents a transfer to the
sellers of value arising solely from a merger, these additions
to deal price are properly removed from the calculation of fair
value.173
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In this case, in light of the facts recounted in the background
section of this Memorandum Opinion, certain structural
limitations unique to SWS make the application of the merger
price not the most reliable indicia of fair value. Neither party
relied on deal price to demonstrate fair value. Here, because of
the problematic process, including the probable effect on deal
price of the existence of the Credit Agreement under which
the acquirer exercised a partial veto power over competing
offers, I find it inappropriate to rely on deal price and instead
perform my statutory duty by employing traditional valuation
methodologies.
The parties have presented two valuation methodologies:
a comparable companies valuation by the Petitioners, and
dueling DCF analyses by both the Petitioners and the
Respondents. The selection of valuation methodologies is fact
specific and necessarily dependent on the support in the trial
record. A comparable companies analysis is appropriate only
where the companies selected are truly comparable.174 The
burden of establishing that companies used in the analysis are
actually comparable rests upon the party seeking to employ
the comparables method.175 The selected companies need not
be a perfect match; however, to be useful the methodology
must employ “a good sample of actual comparables.”176
Here the companies selected by Clarke in his comparable
company analysis diverge in significant ways from SWS in
terms of size, business lines, and performance. The record
reflects that SWS, because of its unique structure, size
and business model had few, if any, peers. Thus, finding
comparables is difficult. Clarke compounded this challenge
by selecting companies in both the Banking and Broker–
Dealer lines of business that were dissimilar in size to
SWS,177 some of which also had other characteristics making
them not truly comparable.178 On the facts of this case, I do
not find Clarke's comparable-companies analysis sufficiently
supported by the record to be reliable; thus, I employ the DCF
methodology exclusively here.
B. The Court's DCF
*11  Below I review the experts' positions on contested
inputs to the DCF valuation, and then decide the appropriate
value of each input in light of the record established at
trial and the law of this State. The DCF valuation, although
complex in practice, is rooted around a simple principle: the
value of the company at the time of the merger is simply the
sum of its future cash flows discounted back to present value.
The calculation, however, is only as reliable as the inputs
relied upon and the assumptions underlying those inputs.
Below, I select the inputs I find best supported by the factual
record.
1. The Appropriate Cash Flow Projections
This Court has long expressed its strong preference for
management projections. Naturally, prior appraisal decisions
have recognized that it is proper to be skeptical of “post hoc,
litigation-driven forecasts” by experts.179 Similarly, the cash
flow projections have been described by this Court as the
“most important input” in performing a DCF, and that absent
reliable projections “a DCF analysis is simply a guess.”180
Reliable management projections of cash flows in advance of
the merger are favored over litigation-facing expert derived
projections.181
As described earlier, management routinely prepared three-
year projections which, in connection with the sales
process, management extended at the request of the
Company's financial advisor to run through December
2017.182 All parties rely on these projections,183 with
reservations. The Petitioners refer to the management
projections as “Downside” projections because they had
been adjusted downward from previous projections.184
The Respondents characterize the projections as overly
optimistic, as SWS's actual performance “never came close
to Management Projections.”185 The Respondents' expert,
Ruback, takes the management projections as they are,
without adjustment.186 The Petitioners' expert, Clarke, made
several major adjustments to the management's projections of
cash flows. Clarke also chose to extend the projections by two
years.187
As do the parties, I adopt the management projections as my
starting point. I review each proposed alteration in light of the
record.
a. The 2018 and 2019 Extension
The first major alteration advanced by the Petitioners
is Clarke's extension of management projections for two
additional years. The Petitioners frame this issue as whether
SWS reached a “steady state” by the end of the management
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projections. They assert that a second-stage period of two
years, covering calendar years 2018 and 2019, is necessary to
“normalize SWS's financial performance before calculating
a terminal value.”188 The Petitioners' primary contention is
that as a matter of valuation methodology the Company
had not reached a “steady state” by the end of management
projections, thus it is necessary to extend the projection until
they reached such a state before performing the terminal value
calculation.189 The basis for the Petitioners' conclusion that
a steady state was not reached is that SWS's profit margin at
the end of management projections “was well below projected
comparable company margins ...” and that ROAA (return on
average assets) was not in line with peers.190
*12  There are a number of subsidiary assumptions necessary
to allow the Petitioners' premises to stand, and the extensions
to be factually supported. Those include that the so-called
peer firms are actually comparable,191 and that SWS, in
light of its scale problems, could ever have performance
similar to or greater than larger entities.192 Further, adopting
Clarke's specific projection extensions would require me to
find that SWS would continue an additional two years of
unprecedented straight-line growth, reaching a profit margin
far exceeding any management projections, despite the
Company's structural issues and performance problems.193 I
note that the Respondents' expert concluded that SWS had
reached a steady state, and did so based on SWS's ability to
perform against similar firms.194
I find the premises underlying the rationale for the extension
unsupported,195 and that Clarke's post hoc extensions to
management's projections are not proper here. On the eve of
the merger SWS was continuing to lose money on declining
revenues.196 Similarly, the record, on balance, supports a
finding that at the end of three years the Company would
reach a steady state.197 On the record before me, there is
inadequate evidence to support the extension of straight-
line unprecedented growth and I employ the three-year
management projections as the starting point.198
Ruback's DCF model uses management's three year
projections, as I have found supported here. Therefore, I
begin with Ruback's general model subject to the adjustments
set out below.199 That is, management's projections of net
income for calendar years 2015 through 2017 of $37,075,000,
$35,465,000 and $28,283,000, respectively serve as the
starting point for my calculation.200
b. The 2014 warrant exercise and SWS's Capital Level
*13  The next major adjustment advocated by the Petitioners
intertwines two issues: should the warrant exercise be
considered in valuing SWS,201 and what, if any, excess
regulatory capital SWS held should be distributed in the
valuation model. That is, if the warrant exercise is considered
part of the Company's operative reality as of the merger date,
in the Petitioners' view the Company will have less debt and
thus greater excess regulatory capital. The parties present me
with binary and divergent positions. They differ as to whether
the warrant exercise should be part of the operative reality
of the company as of the merger date. Partly as a result,
the Respondents and the Petitioners advocate that fair value
should include $0 and $117.5 million, respectively, as the
amount of excess regulatory capital distributable. I consider
their positions, below.
i. The Warrant Exercise was Part of SWS's Operative Reality
In an appraisal proceeding the Court is to exclude speculative
elements of value that arise from the “accomplishment or
expectation” of a merger.202 However, the “accomplishment
or expectation” of the merger exception is “narrow” and is
designed to eliminate speculative projections relating to the
completion of a merger.203 Further, the “narrow exclusion
does not encompass known elements of value, including those
which exist on the date of the merger ....”204 Here, it is
undisputed that the warrant exercises were known well in
advance of the merger closing: in fact, the record indicates
that the warrants were exercised to enable the holders “to
vote for the merger.”205 The shares issued in the warrant
exercise, totaling approximately 15,217,391, were all voted
in favor of the merger. The Respondents argue the warrant
exercise should be excluded and the changes it worked to
SWS's capital structure should not be considered.206 They
essentially advance a “but for” test; but for the merger these
warrants would not have been exercised when they were, and
therefore they are an element of value arising solely out of
the merger. Thus, they assert that I should use “the expected
capital structure of the target company as a going concern.”207
The Petitioners point out that the warrants had, in fact, been
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exercised prior to the date of the merger; the exercise was
not contingent or directly tethered to the merger itself, and
the resulting shares were voted in favor of the merger. Logic,
equity, and precedent, they argue, require the exercise of the
warrants to be considered part of the operative reality of SWS.
The exclusion of changes in value resulting from the
“accomplishment or expectation” of the merger is applied
narrowly. It is applied properly where the change in the
company is directly tied to merger.208 Here, two creditors
made the economic decision to exercise warrants in advance
of the merger, and prior to the record date, in order to vote
those shares in favor of the merger. That is, this case is unlike
certain other decisions of this Court which look to actions
taken by the subject company, with an eye towards the merger,
that changed the company's balance sheet.209 Here, I note,
the warrant shares are included in both parties' calculations of
the total number of shares outstanding over which to divide
SWS's total value in the per-share value calculation.210 I find
the operative reality as of the date of the merger was that the
warrants were exercised three months prior to close, by third
parties acting in their own self-interest, and that the exercise
was part of the Company's operative reality as of the merger
date.
ii. Excess Regulatory Capital
*14  The Petitioners argue that “excess capital must be
valued separately as a matter of law” and accounted for
in a valuation.211 It is true that excess cash not being
redeployed into the business must be added to the result
of the DCF valuation.212 The Petitioners argue the same
is true for excess regulatory capital in the context of a
bank holding company.213 The Respondents counter that the
Petitioners are improperly conflating regulatory capital with
freely distributable cash, and improperly assuming that a
massive distribution would have no effect on the company
meeting management projections, which do not envisage any
such bulk distributions.214
Here, the warrant exercise created some additional excess
regulatory capital. By regulatory capital I mean generally
the ratio which federal regulators require banks and bank
holding companies to maintain between their capital and
their assets.215 Capital in this context is roughly equivalent
to stockholder's equity.216 The exercise of the warrants did
not directly put a single cent into the company—that money
had already been received and deployed by the Company
upon execution of the Credit Agreement in 2011. Rather,
exercise of the warrants worked a capitalization change,
cancelling $87.5 million in debt owed in exchange for issuing
over 15 million shares in consideration for cancelling the
debt. That change increased regulatory capital. It did not,
necessarily, create excess capital in the sense of “excess cash”
or marketable securities beyond what was needed to run the
business to meet management projections.217
Clarke alters management projections by distributing to
shareholders $87.5 million in year one of his projections
(the year of the warrant conversion), and then $30 million
more in year three.218 Clarke's valuation model, which
distributes over $117 million in three years, while assuming
no impact on SWS's ability to generate cash flow, is hard to
accept on its face: it assumes that SWS would distribute to
shareholders over half of its pre-merger market capitalization
of $198 million with no effect on the Company or its income.
I also find Ruback's approach, making no alterations to
distribute excess regulatory capital in light of the structural
changes resulting from exercise of the warrants, somewhat
problematic. However, on the record here, I am persuaded that
his approach is correct given the treatment of cash flows in the
management projections. Importantly, management assumed
a warrant exercise in 2016, but they do not project excess cash
distributable as a result.219
*15  I have no way to judge, on the record, how much capital,
if any, would actually be distributable as of the merger date,
January 1, 2015, without altering downward management's
projections of cash flow as a result.220 Clarke's $87.5 million
immediate distribution is linked to the warrant exercise.221
Management projections were made on an assumption of
a warrant exercise in July 2016.222 Thus management's
projections included that transaction, yet declined to assume
a bulk distribution in projecting the Company's cash flows.
The record does not reflect any persuasive reason to second-
guess management's implied judgment. Further, I find it
facially unreasonable to assume, as does Clarke, that such a
distribution could be made without effect on the Company's
ability to generate cash flow consistent with the projections.
In addition, the record makes me doubtful, in light of SWS's
recent emergence from major regulatory intervention, and
its continuing business line in a highly regulated industry,
that such a massive distribution would be possible from a
regulatory prospective.223
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It is true as a matter of valuation methodology that non-
operating assets—including cash in excess of that needed to
fund the operations of the entity—are to be added to a DCF
analysis.224 The Petitioners seem to conflate distributable
cash or assets with a balance sheet increase in regulatory
capital as the result of the conversion of debt to equity in the
form of Hilltop and Oak Hill's new shares. The Petitioners
rely on In re PNB Holding Co. Shareholders Litigation225
for the proposition that excess regulatory capital must be
accounted for in valuing a bank holding company. I note that
PNB rejected a lump-sum distribution as proposed by Clarke's
valuation, however.226 Rather, the Court explained that there
was “no basis in equity” to add to the DCF calculation a one-
time dividend of excess regulatory capital.227
For the reasons above, I defer to management projections,
which assume a warrant exercise in July 2016. In light of the
fact that the operative reality here is that the warrants were
exercised earlier than implied in those projections, however,
other adjustments are proper, as discussed directly below.
c. Interest Expense Adjustments
*16  Because the warrant exercise occurred earlier than
management expected in its projections, I do find it
appropriate to reduce the interest expense accordingly to
reflect the Company's operative reality. That is, management
projections assumed a warrant exercise in July 2016, implying
interest payable through that date. Interest expense for the
gap between actual and projected exercise must be backed out
accordingly.
The warrant exercise removed $87.5 million in debt which
was owed at an 8% interest rate. This adjustment results
in the removal of $7 million in interest expense for 2015,
and $4.027 million for 2016.228 Given the assumed tax
rate of 35%,229 this reduction in interest expense has the
effect of increasing net income by $4.6 million in 2015 and
$2.6 million in 2016.230 Accordingly, I add these to the
management projections of net income in those two years.231
2. The Terminal Value Growth Rate
Clarke employed a 3.00% terminal growth rate after
performing his recommended adjustments to management
projections. Ruback set his terminal growth rate slightly
higher, at 3.35%, which he derived from the midpoint of the
long term-expected inflation rate of 2.3% and the long-term
expected economic growth rate of the economy at large of
4.4%.232 Ruback's rate was set without the major adjustments
to Company cash flows performed by Clarke. In his rebuttal
report Clarke accepts Ruback's growth rate as reasonable.233
On the facts here, I adopt 3.35% as the proper terminal growth
rate.
3. The Proper Discount Rate
Both parties and their experts rely on the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (“CAPM”) to calculate the cost of equity. The basic
CAPM formula employed here is the risk free rate, plus the
product of beta times the equity risk premium, plus the size
premium.234 The parties and their experts agree that the risk
free rate of return is 2.47%, but disagree as to the three other
inputs: the equity risk premium (“ERP”), equity beta, and size
premium.
a. Equity Risk Premium
The skirmish over this input is whether historical ERP or
supply-side ERP is the proper method for calculating ERP.
The Respondents concede that recent decisions of this Court
have adopted supply-side ERP, but observe that ERP must
be decided on the facts of each case.235 Here, Ruback used
an ERP of 7.0% which represents the applicable historical
ERP. Clarke, in contrast used the supply-side ERP of 6.21%.
While there was vigorous debate on this issue, I find that
the supply-side ERP provided by Clarke is proper here.236
While it is true that a case-by-case determination of ERP
remains appropriate, here there is no basis in the factual record
to deviate from what this Court has recently recognized as
essentially the default method in these actions.237 Therefore
the proper ERP here is 6.21%.
b. Beta
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*17  The experts also disagree as to the appropriate beta.
Clarke employs a beta of 1.10, whereas Ruback uses a beta
of 1.18.
Ruback derived his beta from SWS's performance rather
than peer returns, which Clarke employed. The Respondents
argue that the “peers” are not actually peers.238 Thus, the
Respondents argue that a more targeted, company-specific
beta, as employed by Ruback, is appropriate.239 Ruback used
two years of SWS weekly stock returns ending on January
3, 2014, that is, data from the two years preceding the
announcement of Hilltop's initial offer.240 I cannot accept
Ruback's beta on this record. Ruback's measurement period
covered times where a “merger froth” and corresponding
volatility were likely reflected in SWS's trading and price.241
Conveniently for the Respondents, Ruback's weekly two-year
lookback period reflects this; it yields a beta of 1.18, which
is higher than the five-year monthly lookback of 0.81 and the
five-year weekly lookback of 1.09.242
The Respondents argue that Clarke “supplied no explanation
for his beta.”243 Clarke, however, used multiple data
points:244 he surveyed possible betas and concluded a
blended median was proper.245 Clarke's beta was derived in
part, however, with reference to companies that were not
closely comparable.246
Clarke's beta has drawbacks, then, including the extent of
comparability to SWS of the entities from which he derived
it. Nonetheless, under the facts here I find it best comports
with the record. Therefore, I adopt Clarke's beta of 1.10.
c. Size Premium
The experts agree that a size premium is appropriate here
and that Duff & Phelps is the appropriate source to employ
to estimate the size premium. However, they disagree as
to which size premium should be used. Clarke uses a size
premium of 2.69%, whereas Ruback uses a size premium of
4.22%.
The divergence arises from the overall valuation of the
company. Each expert took a different approach to derive
the appropriate “decile” which thereby provides the size
premium. Ruback selected the size premium based on the
market capitalization of SWS prior to Hilltop's offer, which
was approximately $198.5 million.247 Clarke performed
calculations to arrive at a preliminary valuation based on
his DCF and other metrics, and used that value of $464
million to select the size premium for the decile in that
range.248 Ruback's approach places SWS in a decile that runs
from approximately $190 million to $301 million,249 whereas
Clarke's approach places SWS in a decile that runs from $301
million to $549 million.250
*18  The Respondents point out that Clarke's approach is
“circular,” and that his approach is only “occasionally used”
for computing size premiums for private companies where
market capitalization is not easily derived or reliable.251
Recent cases in this Court, I note, are consistent with the
criticism of Clarke's approach in selecting a size premium
in valuing this public company.252 The Petitioners counter
that while using market capitalization is generally appropriate
for public companies, the “capital structure” here (including
the large amount of outstanding warrants—17,391,304—
where the total shares outstanding were only 32,747,990)
makes the market capitalization approach imperfect and
inappropriate.253 They contend that SWS has enough in
common with a private company for an iterative calculation
to be appropriate.254 Both sides have presented some support
for their respective size premiums that I find persuasive. SWS
was a public company thus making it generally susceptible to
Ruback's market capitalization approach. However, it had a
substantial amount of in-the-money warrants and significant
influence by certain major creditors—making it in some ways
more analogous to a private company. I find it appropriate in
these circumstances to use the midpoint of these approaches,
and I find the applicable size premium is 3.46%.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, and using the valuation inputs
I have described, I find the “fair value” of the Petitioners
shares of SWS as of the date of the merger was $6.38. The
Petitioners are entitled to the fair value of their shares together
with interest at the statutory rate. I note that the fact that my
DCF analysis resulted in a value below the merger price is
not surprising: the record suggests that this was a synergies-
driven transaction whereby the acquirer shared value arising
from the merger with SWS.
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The parties should confer and provide a form of order
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion.
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202 8 Del C. § 262(h); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
203 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 299 (Del. 1996).
204 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
205 See Respondents' Post–Trial Opening Br. 66. Similarly, and unlike the facts in certain cases relied on by the Respondent,
here the warrant exercise was not conditioned in any way on the merger: here those exercising the warrants simply made
the independent decision to exercise in-the-money warrants before the record date to vote for the merger.
206 See Respondents' Post–Trial Answering Br. 38.
207 Id. at 40.
208 See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. JRC Acq. Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *7–8. (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (excluding debt incurred
to finance a merger, and distinguishing a case that included transactions with some relation to a merger as part of the
“operative reality” where those transactions were in place at the time of the merger).
209 See BMC Software, Inc., 2015 WL 6164771, at *13 (excluding excess cash the company conserved in contemplation of
the merger); Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 WL 1569818, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012) (employing the theoretical
capital structure the company would have maintained as a going concern where the company paid off all of its debt only
“as a condition of the Merger Agreement”).
210 See JX002 at Ex. 8; JX004 at 34.
211 Petitioners' Post–Trial Answering Br. 28 (relying, in part, on Gholl v. Emachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *13 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 24, 2004)).
212 See Gholl, 2004 WL 2847865, at *13 (observing that “in determining the fair value of a corporation, excess cash must
be added to the result of the DCF valuation”).
213 See Petitioners' Post–Trial Answering Br. 28 (arguing that “in the context of a bank holding company, Delaware law treats
excess capital the same way” as excess cash).
214 See Respondents' Post–Trial Answering Br. 31–37.
215 See, e.g., JX005 at 13 (explaining that “[r]egulatory capital is a book-value-based measurement that is specified by
government regulators” and that it “is not the same as excess cash readily available for distribution”).
216 See Trial Tr. 736:11–737:11 (Ruback) (explaining that what “excess capital means is that you have more equity
than required by regulators”); id. at 408:20–409:13 (Jeremy Ford) (explaining that “excess capital is really the equity
component, and it relates for these regulated businesses ...”).
217 See, e.g., id. at 205:17–206:19 (Chereck) (testifying to the impracticability of a dividend in 2014, and that the Company
“needed that capital to support the growth that we were projecting ...”).
218 JX001 at Schedule 2–A.
219 See Trial Tr. 261:20–262:11 (Edge); id. at 16:19–17:9 (Sterling). See also Respondents' Post–Trial Opening Br. 20
(arguing that management projections rested on the “favorable assumption” that “Oak Hill and Hilltop would exercise
their warrants in July 2016”).
220 See, e.g., Tr. 252:14–253:15 (Edge) (testifying to the de-facto requirement in the Broker–Dealer business of having $100
million in excess capital for counterparties to transact business with SWS, and that counterparties would cut SWS off
when they dropped below $100 million in excess capital).
221 JX001 at 30.
222 See supra note 219.
223 See, e.g., Trial Tr. 205:17–206:11 (Chereck) (testifying that in 2014 it would have been “very difficult” to get permission
from federal regulators to dividend bank capital up to the holding company level).
224 See Gholl, 2004 WL 2847865, at *13 (explaining that non-operating assets should be added to the valuation and that
“excess cash must be added to the result of the DCF valuation”).
225 In re PNB Holding Co. Shareholders Litig., 2006 WL 2403999 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006).
226 Id. at *26–28 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2006) (“Despite its high Tier–1 Ratio as of the Merger date, though, there is no basis in
equity to assume that [the bank] was required to premise the Merger price on a reduction of its starting Tier–1 Ratio.”).
The other case relied upon by the Petitioners, in support of the major lump sum distribution advanced here, involved a
discounted net income analysis of a small community bank where both experts agreed it was proper to distribute certain
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excess capital, and only disagreed as to the amount. See Petitioners' Post–Trial Answering Br. 28 n.133 (citing Dunmire
v. Farmers & Merchants Bancorp of W. Pa., Inc., 2016 WL 6651411, at *16 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2016)).
227 In re PNB, 2006 WL 2403999, at *26–27. I note the PNB Court observed, in rejecting a large lump-sum distribution, that
“it also is inappropriate to assume that PNB would retain cash simply to remain well above the well-capitalized threshold.”
Id. The PNB Court handled the excess regulatory capital issue by distributing income in the future, and only retaining
the amount required to remain at what the Court set as a reasonable capitalization level. Id. The evidence on which to
perform a similar calculation here is lacking on this record.
228 See JX001 at Schedule 2–D.
229 Id. See also JX005 at 16 n.51.
230 JX005 at 16 n.51. See also JX004 at 20 (indicating alterations to the interest expense result in an additional few cents
per share). I note that there is some apparent confusion or disagreement as to the proper tax treatment of this reduction
in interest expense. See JX004 at 9–C (adjusting net income by $7 million in 2015, but only $2.618 million in 2016, and
including a $6.791 million tax expense in 2016). I find the approach I employed above the line reasonable here, and
adopt it.
231 That is, I add 4.6 million and 2.6 million into cells A1 and B1, respectively, of Ruback's model. JX002 at Ex. 7.
232 Id. at 12.
233 JX004 at 23.
234 That is: Risk Free Rate + (Beta * Equity Risk Premium) + Size Premium = Cost of Equity.
235 See Respondents' Post–Trial Answering Br. 41.
236 See Glob. GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 517–18 (Del. Ch. 2010). See also In re Orchard Enterprises,
Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *19 (citing Golden Telecom and finding that the party advancing a historical risk-premium did
“not provide[ ] me with a persuasive reason to revisit the supply-side versus historical equity risk premium debate”).
237 See id. See also Gearreald, 2012 WL 1569818, at *10.
238 Respondents' Post–Trial Answering Br. 44.
239 Id.
240 JX002 at 16–17.
241 See, e.g., Respondents' Post–Trial Answering Br. 60 (arguing that “Petitioners are therefore wrong to say that the merger
froth in SWS's stock is speculative, because the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that the market anticipated a
synergies-driven deal for SWS, and likely one involving Hilltop”).
242 JX001 at Schedule 3–B. See also In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., 2016 WL 3753123, at *10 (observing that “[a] five-
year period is the most common for measuring beta and generally results in a more accurate measurement, although
two-year periods are used in certain circumstances”).
243 Respondents' Post–Trial Answering Br. 46.
244 See JX001 at 33.
245 Trial Tr. 541:21–543:22 (Clarke) (testifying to how he derived his beta and explaining that “I think it's appropriate, when
looking at beta, to get as many measurements as you can, to try to triangulate something that is supportable both by the
company itself and by peers”). See also JX001 at Schedule 3–B.
246 See JX001 at Schedule 3–B.
247 JX002 at 17; JX005 at 19. I note this market capitalization figure excludes the warrant exercise which I have found was
part of the Company's operative reality.
248 See JX001 at 34.
249 JX002 at 17.
250 JX001 at 34.
251 Respondents' Post–Trial Answering Br. 47–48.
252 See, e.g., Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 WL 3793896, at *19 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013) (observing that the
“Court of Chancery consistently has used market capitalization as the benchmark for selecting the equity size premium”).
See also In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., 2016 WL 3753123, at *14 (observing that “the size premium itself is calculated
using market value, when available, as it is here”).
253 Petitioners' Post–Trial Answering Br. 50.
254 Id. at 50–51.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
SLIGHTS, Vice Chancellor
*1  I would not be the first to observe that the trial of
an appraisal case under the Delaware General Corporation
Law presents unique challenges to the judicial factfinder.1
The petitioner bears a burden of proving the “fair value”
of his shares; the respondent bears a burden of proving the
“fair value” of the petitioner's shares; and then the judge,
as factfinder, assumes, in effect, a third burden to assign
a particular value “as the most reasonable [ ] in light of
all of the relevant evidence and based on considerations of
fairness.”2 The role assigned to the trial judge in this process
independently to review “all relevant factors” that may inform
the determination of fair value, if not unique, is certainly
unusual.3 It is unusual in the sense that the judge is not bound
by the positions on fair value espoused by either of the parties.
Indeed, the trial court commits error if it simply chooses
one party's position over the other without first assessing the
relevant factors on its own.4
Yet it cannot be overlooked that the judge's decision in
an appraisal case follows a trial—an honest-to-goodness,
adversarial trial—where the parties are incented to present
their best case, grounded in competent evidence, and to
subject their adversary's evidence to the discerning filter of
cross-examination. The trial court then reviews the evidence
the parties have placed in the trial record and does its best to
“distill the truth.”5 In this regard, at least, the appraisal trial is
no different from any other trial. The court's determination of
“fair value,” while based on “all relevant factors,” must still
be tethered to the evidence presented at trial. The appraisal
statute is not a license for judicial freestyling beyond the trial
record.
*2  This appraisal action follows a going-private merger in
which the public stockholders of PetSmart, Inc. (“PetSmart,”
the “Company” or the “Respondent”) received $83 per share
in cash from a private equity acquiror, BC Partners, Inc. (the
“Merger”). The Merger closed on March 11, 2015. Petitioners
declined the Merger consideration and demanded appraisal.
The battle lines staked here rest on positions that are well-
known to Delaware courts, the academy and those who
otherwise follow the evolving state of Delaware appraisal
litigation. The Respondent would have me determine fair
value by deferring to the price paid by a third-party purchaser
in an arm's-length transaction after an allegedly robust pre-
signing auction process. The Petitioners insist that “deal
price” is unreliable in this case for a variety of reasons and
urge me to determine fair value by employing a tried and
true valuation methodology, discounted cash flow (“DCF”).
The experts engaged by the parties, both well credentialed,
sponsor these differing views with unwavering commitment.
Indeed, the parties are so certain of their respective positions
on the fair value of PetSmart at the time of the Merger
that they insist I disregard the other's proffered methodology
entirely. The result: Respondent values PetSmart at $83 per
share; Petitioners value the same firm at $128.78 per share.
In this post-trial opinion, I conclude that the evidence
presented during trial points in only one direction—
Petitioners have failed to carry their burden of persuasion
that a DCF analysis provides a reliable measure of fair
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value in this case. The management projections upon which
Petitioners rely as the bedrock for their DCF analysis are, at
best, fanciful and I find no basis in the evidence to conclude
that a DCF analysis based on other projections of expected
cash flows would yield a result more reliable than the Merger
consideration. Nor is there a foundation in the evidence for
concluding that some other valuation methodology might
lead to a reliable determination of fair value. On the other
hand, I am satisfied Respondent has carried its burden of
demonstrating that the process leading to the Merger was
reasonably designed and properly implemented to attain the
fair value of the Company. Moreover, the evidence does not
reveal any confounding factors that would have caused the
massive market failure, to the tune of $4.5 billion (a 45%
discrepancy), that Petitioners allege occurred here. Based on
my review of all relevant factors, as found in the evidence, I
am satisfied that the deal price of $83 per share, “forged in the
crucible of objective market reality,”6 is the best indicator of
the fair value of PetSmart as of the closing of the Merger.7
I. BACKGROUND
*3  I recite the facts as I find them by a preponderance
of the evidence after a four-day trial beginning in October
2016. That evidence consisted of testimony from seventeen
witnesses (thirteen fact witnesses, some presented live and
some by deposition, and four live expert witnesses) along with
over 2300 exhibits. To the extent I have relied upon evidence
to which an objection was raised but not resolved at trial, I
will explain the bases for my decision to admit the evidence
at the time I first discuss it.
A. Parties and Relevant Non–Parties
Respondent, PetSmart, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with
headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona.8 It is one of the largest
retailers of pet products and services in North America.9 Prior
to the Merger, PetSmart's stock traded on NASDAQ.10 On
March 11, 2015, PetSmart was acquired by a consortium
of funds advised by BC Partners, Inc. and certain other
investment firms for $83.00 cash per share (the “Merger
Price”) in a merger.11 In connection with this transaction,
PetSmart merged into Argos Merger Sub Inc., with PetSmart
surviving as a wholly owned subsidiary of Argos Holdings
Inc.12
Petitioners are CF Skylos I LLC, CF Skylos II LLC, Third
Point Reinsurance (USA) Ltd., Third Point Reinsurance
Company Ltd., Third Point Partners Qualified L.P., Third
Point Offshore Master Fund L.P., Third Point Partners L.P.,
Third Point Ultra Master Fund L.P., Farallon Capital Partners,
L.P., Farallon Capital AA Investors, L.P., Farallon Capital
(AM) Investors, L.P., Farallon Capital Institutional Partners,
L.P., Farallon Capital Institutional Partners II, L.P., Farallon
Capital Institutional Partners III, L.P., Farallon Capital
Offshore Investors II, L.P., Noonday Offshore, Inc., Muirfield
Value Partners LP, HCN L.P., CAZ Halcyon Strategic
Opportunities Fund L.P., Halcyon Mount Bonnell Fund
L.P., Merlin Partners, LP, and AAMAF, LP (collectively,
“Petitioners”).13 Petitioners were stockholders of PetSmart as
of the Merger date and collectively held 10,713,225 shares of
PetSmart common stock.14
B. The Company
Founded in 1987, PetSmart is a pet specialty retailer.15
Its business consists of providing pet products, including
consumables and hardgoods,16 as well as pet services such
as pet grooming and boarding.17 At the time of the Merger,
PetSmart operated 1,404 stores in the United States, Canada,
and Puerto Rico and had annual revenues of approximately
$7 billion.18 The only other company in North America that
does what PetSmart does on the same scale is Petco Animal
Supplies, Inc. (“Petco”).19 PetSmart also faces competition
from big box stores like Target and WalMart, grocery stores
like Kroger, smaller chain and independent pet stores and
online retailers like Amazon.20
C. PetSmart Experiences Strong Growth from 2000–
2012
*4  PetSmart experienced significant positive growth each
year from 2000 to 2012.21 From 2000 to the onset of the
financial crisis in 2007, PetSmart achieved annual revenue
growth of 8–13%, significantly outperforming the retail
industry as a whole.22 PetSmart's annual revenue growth rate
declined in 2008 and 2009 (falling to 5% in 2009) during the
peak of the financial crisis but soon rebounded, reaching 11%
in 2012.23
PetSmart's growth was driven in significant part by favorable
dynamics in the pet industry from 2000 to 2008 coupled with
PetSmart's rapid increase in new store openings.24 From 2000
- 368 -
In re PetSmart, Inc., Not Reported in A.3d (2017)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3
to 2008, the pet industry benefitted from the convergence of
two industry-favorable trends: an increasing pet population
in North America and increasing spending per pet by North
American pet owners due to the trend described as pet
“humanization.”25 The period from 2000 to 2008 also saw
PetSmart more than double the number of its stores, from 484
stores in 2000 to 1,004 stores at the start of 2008.26 PetSmart's
store expansion was particularly rapid from 2004 to 2008,
when PetSmart opened 518 new stores.27 As these new stores
grew to their full sales potential, PetSmart experienced a
strong increase in its comparable store sales growth from
2009 to 2012.28
D. PetSmart's Performance Declines
PetSmart's growth began to stall in 2012.29 Between Q1
2012 and Q4 2013, PetSmart's comparable store sales growth
declined from 7.4% (in Q1 2012) to 1.4% (in Q4 2013),
and PetSmart's overall sales growth exhibited a general
downward trend.30 During this same period, PetSmart found
itself facing increasing competition and other headwinds on
multiple fronts.31 Along with this decline, PetSmart struggled
accurately to project its future performance, even quarter-by-
quarter. Indeed, management's forecasts were often off by
large margins.32
*5  PetSmart also experienced substantial management
turnover in 2013 and early 2014. In June 2013, PetSmart's
CEO and CFO both resigned.33 David Lenhardt, who had
previously served as PetSmart's President and COO, became
PetSmart's new CEO, and Carrie Teffner joined PetSmart as
its new CFO.34 PetSmart's then-President and COO, Joseph
O'Leary, left the Company in April 2014.35
New management pushed initiatives that precipitated
additional difficulties for PetSmart. In particular, under
Lenhardt's direction, PetSmart implemented a major
“consumables reset” in early 2014 through which it increased
store space for exclusively distributed premium pet foods
while reducing space for widely distributed value pet foods.36
This consumables reset was intended to drive growth in
PetSmart's sales and margins.37 As reflected in PetSmart's
disappointing Q1 2014 results, announced on May 21, 2014,
the consumables reset failed.38 PetSmart's comparable store
sales growth for Q1 2014 had declined to –0.6%, and its Q1
2014 net sales growth was only 1.1%.39
Following PetSmart's announcement of its Q1 2014 results,
PetSmart's stock price dropped 8% to $57.02.40 PetSmart's
Q1 2014 results, combined with the sharp decline in its stock
price, drew the ire of shareholders, including Longview Asset
Management LLC (“Longview”), then PetSmart's largest
stockholder. Longview was not bashful in communicating
its frustration with PetSmart's lackluster performance to both
members of management and PetSmart's board of directors
(the “Board”).41
E. PetSmart's Board Begins to Explore Strategic
Alternatives
*6  At a meeting on June 18, 2014, the Board received reports
on Longview's most recent communications and PetSmart's
poor results in Q1 2014.42 Morgan Stanley had been engaged
to advise the Board regarding its options in the wake of recent
events and, at the June 18 meeting, it gave a presentation on
PetSmart's valuation, capital structure and potential strategic
alternatives.43
In anticipation of the June 2014 meeting, PetSmart had
provided Morgan Stanley with PetSmart's strategic plan
and a set of financial projections prepared by PetSmart's
management (the “June 2014 Projections”). The June 2014
Projections were “very high level,”44 created “specifically
for Morgan Stanley,”45 and prepared in “[r]elatively short
order, in a matter of maybe not even a week”46 using
management's general financial planning framework (the
“fishbone” or “financial framework”).47 These projections
had not been approved by PetSmart's Board and were not
intended to inform PetSmart's business operations going
forward.48 Rather, the June 2014 Projections were prepared
“to be in line with what the board would have expected from
the financial framework, but [also] to give them directional
guidance in terms of what the impact of leveraging up to do
a significant share buyback would do.”49
Having reviewed PetSmart's strategic plan and the June
2014 Projections, Morgan Stanley presented the following
“preliminary conclusions” to PetSmart's Board at the June
2014 meeting: (1) “Based on management's forecasts
and [PetSmart's] recent share price decline, [PetSmart's]
stock appeared to be undervalued”;50 (2) “PetSmart
could optimize its capital structure and lower its cost
of capital by raising debt to accelerate its return of
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capital while still maintaining strategic flexibility”;51
and (3) “Given [PetSmart's] compelling cash flow and
return characteristics ..., Morgan Stanley expected financial
sponsors to be interested in a take-private transaction
[i.e., a leveraged buyout (“LBO”) ].”52 Morgan Stanley's
presentation to the Board also included a preliminary
assessment of PetSmart's value based on a DCF analysis,
which yielded a range of valuations for PetSmart of $100
per share (upside), $88 per share (base), and $77 per share
(downside).53
Following Morgan Stanley's presentation, the Board
discussed a range of possible strategic options, including:
(1) adhering to management's current strategic and operating
plans; (2) engaging in a significant leveraged recapitalization
(as described by Morgan Stanley); (3) pursuing an acquisition
of Pet360, Inc. (“Pet360”), an online pet business; (4)
pursuing a strategic combination with Petco; or (5) pursuing
a sale of the Company to a financial buyer.54 At the end
of the June 2014 meeting, the Board established an Ad
Hoc Advisory Committee of non-executive, independent
directors: Gregory Josefowicz, Rakesh Gangwal, and Thomas
Stemberg.55 The Board established the Ad Hoc Committee to
work with management and PetSmart's advisors to evaluate
options that would increase shareholder value (including a
leveraged recapitalization) and to develop one or more related
proposals for consideration by the Board.56 One of the goals
in forming the Ad Hoc Committee was to relieve some
of the pressure from PetSmart's “young management team”
during the Company's exploration of strategic alternatives
since management “was already under a lot of pressure to
perform.”57
F. Activist Investor JANA Partners Discloses Stake in
the Company and Urges Sale
*7  On July 3, 2014, JANA Partners LLC (“JANA”), an
activist hedge fund, disclosed in a Schedule 13D filing that
it had acquired a 9.9% stake in PetSmart.58 JANA stated its
view that PetSmart's stock was undervalued and disclosed
its intention to push PetSmart to pursue strategic alternatives
including a possible sale.59 Four days later, on July 7, 2014,
Longview publicly disclosed a letter it had sent to the Board
in response to JANA's filing that also encouraged the Board
to pursue a possible sale of the Company in addition to
examining other strategic alternatives.60
On July 10, 2014, JANA representatives met in person with
Lenhardt, Teffner, and Josefowicz.61 At that meeting, JANA's
representatives criticized PetSmart's Board and management
for pricing missteps, ineffective cost management, failure
to capitalize on growth opportunities and failure to respond
adequately to competitors.62 In light of these failures, JANA's
view was that PetSmart's only solution was to sell the
Company.63 That same day, Longview reiterated to PetSmart
its support for a possible sale of the Company.64
On July 11, 2014, the Board held a special meeting via
telephone.65 During the meeting, the Board received a
report on recent shareholder communications from JANA
and Longview and, with management's recommendation,
authorized the retention of J.P. Morgan Securities LLC
(“JPM”) as PetSmart's new financial advisor.66 A team from
JPM led by Anu Aiyengar presented JPM's preliminary
analysis of PetSmart's current situation and possible strategic
alternatives.67 This presentation included an overview
of preliminary valuation perspectives, selected capital
alternatives and selected strategic alternatives such as a
possible going-private transaction or the acquisition of
Petco.68 JPM also discussed certain steps that it would
undertake to assist the Board in evaluating alternatives
and making a decision, which included: (1) reviewing and
performing due diligence on PetSmart's business plan, which
management had provided to JPM; (2) assessing trends in
the pet sector; (3) asking strategic questions about possible
changes to PetSmart's business plan; (4) evaluating capital
and structural changes that could be considered in connection
with that plan, as alternatives to a sale of the business; (5)
considering acquisition scenarios; (6) comparing the potential
value to shareholders of executing PetSmart's business
plan (including recommending possible modifications and
capital and structural changes) with the potential value to
stockholders of a sale of PetSmart, and (7) assessing which
of these or other alternatives was more likely to maximize
shareholder value.69 While JANA had threatened a proxy
fight if PetSmart decided not to sell, the Board indicated to
JPM that it was prepared to take on that fight if it decided that
a sale was not in the best interests of the Company.70
G. PetSmart's Management Prepares Long–Term
Projections
*8  Following the July 11 meeting, PetSmart's management
began to prepare a set of long-term projections at the direction
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of the Board (the “Base Case”).71 This project was led
principally by PetSmart CFO Carrie Teffner, Christina Vance,
PetSmart's director of financial planning, and Kim Smith,
PetSmart's director of treasury operations—with input from
Lenhardt and several other executives.72
PetSmart did not prepare long-term projections in the
ordinary course to operate its business.73 Instead, PetSmart's
management would create a one-year budget (or operating
plan) which forecasted PetSmart's quarterly performance
for the upcoming year.74 The budget formulation process
began each summer with a series of meetings over
several days referred to within the Company as “Summer
Strategy.”75 During these meetings, PetSmart's management
discussed financial and strategic priorities for the next
fiscal year.76 Prior to each Summer Strategy, the leaders
of PetSmart's different business segments would identify
potential initiatives for the upcoming fiscal year and, working
with members of PetSmart's finance department, develop
“business cases” around those initiatives.77 Each business
case for a proposed initiative would include certain financial
forecasts.78 The business segment leaders would then present
their proposed business initiatives (and business cases) to the
Company's senior management during the Summer Strategy
meetings.79 Management, in turn, would select (and approve)
specific initiatives for advancement in the upcoming fiscal
year.80
Following Summer Strategy, PetSmart's management would
continue to evaluate the approved initiatives through the
fall and early winter to determine their expected impact on
PetSmart's revenue and expenses.81 Typically, management
would then complete the one-year budget in February of the
following calendar year, present it to the Board in March
of that year and the Board would approve it that same
month.82 Thereafter, before Q2, Q3 and Q4 of the fiscal
year, management would prepare reforecasts of PetSmart's
projected performance for the remaining quarters.83 PetSmart
used the one-year budgets and reforecasts “to run the business
and incentivize management.”84
*9  Over time, Vance had developed a model to extrapolate
the business cases presented at Summer Strategy.85 She
used her model to evaluate whether PetSmart “would stay
within [its] financial framework.”86 The model was not,
however, “presented to the board for approval ... [and was
not] considered a multiyear projection that the business relied
upon.”87 Rather, it “was more of an inherent working tool for
the planning department ....”88
PetSmart management confronted several challenges when
the Board tasked them with developing the long-term
projections to be used by JPM and the Board in their
evaluation of strategic alternatives. First and foremost, they
had never prepared long-term projections and the process
of doing so was vastly different than the process employed
to prepare budgets for Summer Strategy.89 The business
units were unable to provide much input because they had
never prepared and had never been accountable for long-
term projections.90 And then there was the time pressure.
The Board rushed management to prepare the Base Case “in
the span of a few days” after the Board meeting on July 11,
2014, so that the results could be presented at the next Board
meeting in August.91
During PetSmart's 2014 Summer Strategy, management had
“identified a variety of initiatives that [management] thought
would be go-forward initiatives to help drive growth going
forward.”92 Thus, in creating the Base Case, management
first sought “to build a base of what [they] believe[d] the comp
would be for the existing business before layering in [those]
initiatives.”93 The finance team then “layered onto [the
“base” comp projections] what it thought the value of each
of the[ ] initiatives would be.”94 As part of this “layering”
process, the finance team sent its value assumptions to the
relevant business segment leaders “to get an affirmation that
yes, that looks right ....”95 And, as Teffner explained, “that's
essentially what drove the top line.”96
The Base Case forecast estimated revenues using three
primary yardsticks: (1) new store openings; (2) comparable
stores sales growth; and (3) four initiatives selected from the
Summer Strategy.97 The Base Case is summarized below:98
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The comparable store sales forecasts were ambitious and
well above the performance management had projected at
Summer Strategy, including comparable store sales growth.99
Specifically, the Base Case assumed the success of each of
the new revenue initiatives developed at Summer Strategy
and projected comparable store sales growth of 1.3% in 2015,
3.2% in 2016 and 3.3% increases each year thereafter.100
*10  The Base Case was not well received by the Board.
Specifically, “when [management] reviewed the base case
comp assumptions with the ad hoc committee of the board,
[the committee], specifically ... Stemberg, indicated that the
comp assumptions that [management] had put in the plan
were not aggressive enough and [management] needed to
be far more aggressive, recognizing that potential buyers
looking at [PetSmart would] discount [management's] plans
themselves.”101 Accordingly, management went back to the
drawing board and prepared the Base–Plus Case, which is
summarized below:102
The Base–Plus Case “assumed more aggressive delivery
of performance against the exact same initiatives that
[management] had looked at in the Base Case.”103 These
projections also assumed comparable store sales growth that
exceeded similar projections in the Base Case.104 The take
away from the Base–Plus Case was that it depicted an even
sharper turnaround of PetSmart's recent downward-trends
than had been forecast previously.105
As with the Base Case, management prepared the Base–
Plus Case “extremely quickly.”106 During this same time
frame, PetSmart's management also prepared a third set of
projections—the “Growth Case.”107 The Growth Case started
with the Base–Plus Case projections and “assumed yet even
[better] performance of the exact same initiatives.”108 Unlike
the Base Case and Base Plus Case, however, the Growth Case
was not prepared at the request of the Ad Hoc Committee.109
Rather, PetSmart management prepared the Growth Case
on its own initiative because it was not “sure how far the
ad hoc committee wanted [them] to go in terms of comp
assumptions.”110 Management kept the Growth Case in their
“back pocket” in case the Ad Hoc Committee once again was
displeased with their work on the Base Plus Case.111
H. The PetSmart Board Decides to Commence a Public
Sale Process
PetSmart's Board next met on August 13, 2014.112 At this
meeting, JPM presented a preliminary valuation summary
for PetSmart and reviewed several strategic alternatives for
the Company, including (1) continuing on a standalone basis
while engaging in a significant leveraged recapitalization;
(2) exploring a sale of the Company; and (3) exploring
a strategic merger with another industry participant.113 In
connection with the third alternative, the Board focused
on the potential benefits and risks associated with inviting
Petco to participate in an exploratory sales process.114 The
Board identified two “overwhelming, overriding”115 risks
associated with such an overture: (1) that Petco would not
be serious about acquiring PetSmart, but would feign interest
in order to gain access to confidential information about
PetSmart's business model, strengths and weaknesses;116 and
(2) that a Petco–PetSmart merger “would face pretty strong
[antitrust] headwinds ... [so that] approval of th[e] transaction
would be quite difficult.”117 Given these concerns, the Board
“was not very keen on engaging with Petco” at that time.118
*11  During the August 2014 meeting, PetSmart
management and JPM provided the Board with an overview
of management's standalone plan and the Base Case
and Base–Plus Case financial projections.119 The Board
admonished management that that Base Case and the Base–
Plus Case were not aggressive enough because PetSmart
“needed to put [its] best foot forward in terms of the
projections [it was] putting forward to ... potential buyers.”120
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Teffner's “take-away from the [August 2014 Meeting] was
very much one that [management] needed to put [their] best
foot forward because potential buyers were going to discount
[management's] assumptions and assume that [the Company
was] putting more aggressive assumptions forward.”121
At the conclusion of the August meeting, the Board
determined that it would publicly announce that PetSmart was
exploring strategic alternatives including a possible sale of
the Company.122 Accordingly, on August 19, 2014, PetSmart
issued a press release to that effect, announcing that, based
on a thorough, year-long business review, the Board had
determined to explore strategic alternatives for the Company
to maximize value for shareholders, including a possible sale
of the Company.123
Also on August 19, 2014, PetSmart issued a second press
release announcing PetSmart's Q2 2014 results.124 Here,
PetSmart announced that its comparable store sales for Q2
2014 had declined to –0.5%, with comparable transactions
declining to 2.6%.125 This press release also announced that
the Company had entered into a definitive merger agreement
to acquire online retailer Pet360 for $130 million and that the
Company would be launching a broad cost reduction program
and certain other growth initiatives.126
I. PetSmart Management Formulates the Profit
Improvement Plan and Finalizes its Projections
Prior to the August 13, 2014 Board meeting, PetSmart
had engaged two consulting firms to analyze certain
aspects of PetSmart's business and identify cost-savings
opportunities.127 In May 2014, PetSmart engaged The
Hackett Group to identify cost cutting initiatives with respect
to PetSmart's Selling, General, and Administrative expenses
(specifically, a headcount reduction).128 And in May/June
2014, PetSmart engaged A.T. Kearny, Inc. to focus on cost
cutting initiatives with respect to certain of PetSmart's indirect
expenses.129
Shortly after the August 2014 Board meeting, with
the assistance of its consultants, PetSmart's management
undertook to formulate a large-scale cost-savings plan at
the Board's direction.130 This plan came to be known
as the “Profit Improvement Plan” (or “PIP”).131 The PIP
consisted of: (1) implementing a headcount reduction;132
(2) engaging A.T. Kearny to develop a cost-savings plan
with respect to PetSmart's cost of goods sold (“COGS”)
expenses and certain of PetSmart's other indirect expenses
such as spending on transportation, marketing, supplies,
real estate, packaging, and real estate services;133 and (3)
engaging the Peppers & Rogers Group to develop a cost-
savings plan with respect to PetSmart's enterprise costs.134
Two weeks after the August 2014 Board meeting, Teffner
sent an email to the Board stating that management's target
for PIP cost savings was “[approximately] $160M-$200M+
EBITDA improvement.”135 The final PIP savings developed
by the consultants, together with management, and presented
to the Board showed an expected range of $183–$283 million
in EBITDA savings annually.136
*12  While management worked on developing the PIP, they
also worked to prepare an updated set of financial projections
that would integrate the PIP savings.137 Specifically,
between August and October 2014, PetSmart management
prepared what would be their final revised set of financial
projections for presentation to the Board (the “Management
Projections”).138 The Management Projections started with
the Base–Plus Case projections and layered on (1) greater
sales growth assumptions for the same proposed business
initiatives, (2) new sales growth expected from the Pet360
acquisition, and (3) cost savings associated with the PIP.139
The forecasts for comparable store sales growth were
significantly higher than those set forth in both the Base
and Base–Plus Cases. These new projections also included
more aggressive Net Sales, EBITDA, Earnings Per Share
and Capex numbers.140 They estimated that, through the PIP,
PetSmart would achieve cost savings totaling $120 million in
2015 and then $200 million for each of the subsequent years
laid out in the forecast.141 The Management Projections are
summarized below:142
Once again, management designed its latest projections
to be aggressive—“bordering on being too aggressive.”143
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Indeed, Vance went so far as to characterize the Management
Projections as approaching “insan[ity].”144 With that said,
these projections reflected an inexperienced management
team's best effort at estimating how PetSmart would perform
in the future if all of its performance and cost initiatives paid
off.145 And management made a point of “being very clear
with respect to the assumptions that they were making.”146
The record is clear that the Board exerted substantial
pressure upon management to prepare increasingly more
aggressive and ultimately unrealistic long-term projections.
In this regard, Lenhardt and Teffner were told that their
jobs “depended” on it.147 And management heard the
Board “loud and clear.”148 For its part, JPM told PetSmart
management that prospective buyers would likely view the
overly aggressive Management Projections skeptically,149
and that management best be prepared to defend them when
the sales process got underway.150
J. The Auction for PetSmart
While PetSmart management continued the back-and-forth
with the Board over its projections, JPM opened the auction
process for PetSmart in earnest. JPM spoke with 27 potential
bidders following the announcement that PetSmart was
exploring a sale in August through early October.151 As
among the potential bidders, three were potential strategic
partners that had been targeted by JPM and the Board—Wal–
Mart, Target, and Tractor Supply—and the rest were financial
sponsors.152 Ultimately, none of the strategics elected to
participate in the process.153 Of the 24 private equity funds
with whom JPM spoke, 15 signed nondisclosure agreements
and moved forward with the bidding process.154
The Board held additional meetings with JPM on October 2
and 3, 2014, to discuss, among other things, the risks and
benefits of formally inviting Petco to bid for the Company.155
Citing the risks it and JPM had previously identified, the
Board again decided that it was not in the Company's best
interests to pursue a transaction with Petco.156 Of course, the
Board was open to engaging with Petco if Petco expressed a
serious indication of interest.157
*13  During the Board meetings on October 2 and 3,
PetSmart's management updated the Board on their progress
with the PIP, including their expectation that the Company
would achieve cost savings of $120 million in 2015 and
$200 million in 2016.158 Management also presented the
Management Projections to the Board.159 JPM's reaction to
this presentation was to reiterate that buyers would likely
be skeptical of PetSmart's ability to achieve those results as
potential bidders had expressed concerns to JPM that well-
documented trends in PetSmart's performance did not bode
well for the future.160 Even so, the Board decided to use
the Management Projections for the auction process,161 with
the expectation that bidders would give a “haircut” to the
projections in any event.162
PetSmart's electronic data room was opened to bidders
after the October 3 Board meeting. It was well-
stocked with comprehensive, nonpublic information about
PetSmart, including information about PetSmart's financials,
performance and the PIP.163 PetSmart's management also
made presentations to the various potential bidders who had
signed nondisclosure agreements.164 Around this time, JPM
informed potential bidders that Longview would consider
rolling over up to 7.5 million of its approximately 9 million
shares in a sale of the Company.165
PetSmart received five preliminary bids by October 31, 2014:
(1) $80–$85 per share from Clayton, Dubilier & Rice (“CD &
R”); (2) $81–$84 per share from Apollo Global Management
L.P. (“Apollo”); (3) $81–$83 per share from BC Partners;
(4) $70–$75 per share from KKR & Co. L.P. (“KKR”); and
(5) $65 per share from Ares Management, L.P. and Canada
Pension Plan Investment Board.166 The stock price as of
October 31 was $72.35, while the unaffected price, which
JPM set as of July 2, 2014, was $59.81.167 Some members
of the Board were “surprised that the numbers had come in
that high.”168
As the auction progressed, the Board continued to consider
alternatives to a sale.169 In this regard, the Board pressed
management to create a stronger standalone plan for the
Company.170 And the Ad Hoc Committee asked JPM to
report on the financing that would be available for a leveraged
recapitalization of the Company should the Board decide
against a sale.171
The Board next reviewed the progress of the auction for
PetSmart with its advisors at a meeting on November 3.172
JPM reported on the initial indications of interest it had
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received as well as feedback from parties who chose not
bid. This feedback largely reflected a view that PetSmart's
business had “significant execution risk” and that there was
inadequate potential for upside growth.173 The Board decided
to allow the four bidders who bid $80 per share or higher
(CD & R, Apollo, BC Partners and KKR) to continue in the
process.174 These remaining bidders performed further due
diligence, which included access to more detailed information
about PetSmart's financials, the Management Projections and
the PIP, and additional meetings with management.175
*14  PetSmart released its Q3 results on November 18,
2014.176 Comparable store sales growth was stagnant and
comparable transactions were down 2.4%.177 PetSmart also
announced its progress on the PIP and its expectation that the
plan would be fully implemented by the end of fiscal year
2015, and reiterated its expectation that the plan would result
in a pre-tax cost savings of $120 million in 2015 and $200
million per year starting in 2016.178
The Board met again on December 2 and 3 to consider
whether to sell the Company, remain independent or pursue
a leveraged recapitalization.179 The Board also reexamined
the Management Projections, noting that it believed the PIP
savings were achievable but that it was skeptical about
the Company's ability to achieve the projected top-line
revenue and comparable store sales growth.180 The feedback
delivered to management was that the Board had a low level
of confidence in PetSmart's ability to achieve the results
forecasted in the Management Projections.181
The Board's skepticism centered largely around the
projections of comparable stores sales growth; “many in
the board really did not believe” that these projections
were realistic.182 To understand PetSmart's standalone value
better, the Board determined that it needed to “see additional
sensitivity analyses, particularly around top-line and same-
store sales growth.”183 Accordingly, the Board directed JPM
to prepare sensitivities assuming a 2% comparable store
sales growth.184 The requested sensitivities were set at 2%
because the Board had “a great amount of discomfort ...
[about whether the 4% comparable store sales used in the
Management Projections] would be achievable, attainable or
not.”185 Instead, the Board believed that “2 percent looked
more reasonable, and something that the management team
more than likely should be able to get to, if they executed a
plan.”186
In the weeks leading up to the final bids, questions arose about
whether the financial sponsors would be able to obtain deal
financing based on reports that the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (“OCC”) and Federal Reserve would engage
in “increased scrutiny ... over LBO loans.”187 The OCC and
Federal Reserve had implemented restrictions on the amount
of leverage that would be allowed in deal financing and, in
the days leading up to Thanksgiving 2014 (in the midst of the
PetSmart auction), regulators indicated they would begin to
enforce these regulations more strictly than before.188 This
led bidders to perceive that the quantum of debt available to
finance an acquisition of PetSmart had tightened.189 While
there were initial concerns that this increased regulatory
scrutiny may affect the bids for PetSmart, the evidence reveals
that those concerns abated after Thanksgiving when it became
clear that all of the bidders would have no difficulty securing
debt financing at the levels necessary to fund their bids for
PetSmart at the values they deemed appropriate.190
*15  On December 10, PetSmart received new offers from
the remaining bidders.191 BC Partners made a binding offer
of $80.70 per share.192 Apollo made a binding offer of $80.35
per share.193 KKR and CD & R, working together, verbally
indicated they would not offer more than PetSmart's current
stock price, which was approximately $78 per share.194 When
JPM presented these offers to the Ad Hoc Committee, the
committee directed JPM to engage further with Apollo and
BC Partners to see if they would increase their bids.195 The
Ad Hoc Committee also decided on December 12 that it
would allow Longview to join with BC Partners after BC
Partners “indicated that they may be able to offer [ ] a higher
price with Longview.”196
JPM returned to the bidders and directed them to submit their
best and final offers because the Board would soon be meeting
to make a final decision whether to sell the Company or go in
a different direction. Specifically, JPM told bidders “if [they]
had anything more in [their] pocket, now [was] the time to
put it [in].”197 Apollo responded with an offer of $81.50 per
share; BC Partners, with its commitment from Longview in
hand, offered $82.50 per share.198 With some prodding, JPM
was able to get BC Partners to increase its offer to $83 per
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share.199 Both parties made clear that these were their best
and final offers.200
K. The Auction Concludes and the Board Recommends
the BC Partners Offer to Shareholders
The PetSmart Board met on December 13 to discuss the
final offers from BC Partners and Apollo and to consider
strategic alternatives to a sale of the Company.201 JPM made
presentations to the Board on each of these alternatives,
including the possibility that the Board may have to engage
in a proxy contest with JANA.202 JPM also presented
its valuation analysis under various scenarios including a
standalone valuation of PetSmart if the Board determined to
terminate the auction.203 This standalone valuation focused
on a DCF analysis based on the Management Projections that
resulted in a valuation for the Company of $78.25–$106.25
per share.204 Understanding that the Board had little faith in
the Management Projections, JPM also presented the Board
with the results of the sensitivity analyses the Board had
requested which resulted in a valuation range of $65–$95.25
per share.205
As a part of its presentation, JPM delivered its fairness
opinion with respect to the BC Partners offer concluding that,
as of that date, the Merger Price of $83 per share in cash
was fair from a financial point of view to the stockholders of
the Company.206 Petitioners point to several aspects of JPM's
fairness opinion they contend reveal that JPM “manipulated
[its] financial analysis” in order to get to a place where it
could recommend the BC Partners proposal.207 At the core
of the criticism is the contention that JPM “stretched” to
reach a high weighted average cost of capital (“WACC”) for
PetSmart in order to deflate the DCF results.208 In this regard,
Petitioners select certain of JPM's internal communications
they contend demonstrate that Aiyengar pushed her team
to inflate PetSmart's WACC into double digits even though
her team had determined that a much lower WACC was
appropriate.209
*16  To be sure, there were discussions among the JPM
deal team regarding whether a double digit WACC could be
defended.210 But the evidence also demonstrates that JPM
approached its work without preconceptions or designs to
reach a desired result.211 JPM made no secret of its approach
to calculating WACC and walked the Board through that
analysis in detail.212 Petitioners may not agree with that
approach but there is simply no credible evidence that JPM set
out to manipulate its analysis to support a fairness opinion.213
Petitioners also criticize JPM for utilizing the so-called
“Barra beta,” which Petitioners (and others) describe as a “
‘black box’ form of forward-looking beta” that is difficult,
if not impossible, to verify.214 Contrary to Petitioners'
characterization of JPM's process, however, the evidence
reveals that, in addition to considering Barra's forward-
looking beta, JPM considered “Barra predicted, Barra
historical, as well as relevered beta.”215
*17  Petitioners next criticize JPM for “artificially
inflat[ing]” the betas it applied by “arbitrarily” selecting
PetSmart's peer group and then selecting the betas of
companies in the lowest quartile of that group even though
PetSmart had historically traded at a premium to its peers.216
Here again, Petitioners' criticism recounts only a portion of
the evidence. First, the criticism glosses over the fact that
PetSmart was a niche retailer with only one true peer (Petco).
Moreover, the complete evidentiary picture reveals that, after
conducting a “very detailed benchmarking analysis,” JPM
looked to the betas of companies that had “operating and
financial statistics” that it could meaningfully correlate with
PetSmart's operations, “numbers and projections.”217
While one can debate the results JPM reached, and can
speculate whether JPM would have arrived at the same place
had it utilized different inputs in its valuation analysis,218
there is no credible basis to debate whether JPM skewed its
analysis to push the Board to accept the BC Partners offer. The
JPM analysis was thorough and the results were objectively
rendered.219
Aiyengar shared her view during the December 13 Board
meeting that the PetSmart auction had been “a robust auction
process, where anybody who had an interest in this company
had the opportunity to engage with the company and see
whether they wanted to buy the company.”220 The Board then
weighed the $83 per share offered by BC Partners generated
by this process against the Company's prospects if it remained
standalone.221 In its deliberations, the Board considered the
aggressiveness of the Management Projections, which it felt
were heavily dependent on a number of factors breaking
the Company's way all of which were subject to much
speculation and volatility.222 After weighing all options, the
- 376 -
In re PetSmart, Inc., Not Reported in A.3d (2017)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11
Board decided to take the $83 per share offered by BC
Partners, as this was a “certainty,” rather than confront the
“risk of trying to get something more than $83 if [PetSmart]
were a stand-alone.”223 This decision reflected the Board's
pessimism that management would be able to deliver on
their plans and its view that such efforts likely would not
yield more than the $83 per share that had been achieved
through the sales process.224 The Board unanimously voted to
approve and recommend the Merger with BC Partners at the
conclusion of the December 13 meeting.225 It announced the
transaction and signed the Merger Agreement the following
day.226
*18  The $83 per share was $1.50 higher than what the
next highest bidder, Apollo, had offered. Indeed, Apollo told
JPM after the process concluded that it “never would have
paid that price” for PetSmart.227 Several financial analysts
also were surprised and impressed by the price achieved in
the auction.228 While PetSmart was covered by more than
a dozen securities analysts, the consensus price target for
PetSmart in the year preceding the Merger, even after the PIP
was disclosed, never exceeded $75 per share.229
PetSmart's definitive proxy statement, filed with the SEC on
February 2, 2015 (the “Proxy”), disclosed the Management
Projections as well as the JPM sensitivities.230 When
introducing the projections, the Proxy disclosed that the
Company had not historically prepared long-term projections
in the ordinary course of its business and that it was “wary”
of doing so.231 The Board wanted stockholders to have the
Management Projections because they had been utilized by
the Board, JPM, and the bidders.232 But the Proxy made
clear that the Board was cautioning stockholders not to
place undue reliance on the projections.233 With regard to
the JPM sensitivities, the Proxy disclosed that these had
been prepared by JPM “to assist the board in assessing the
potential downside risks that could arise from reasonable
deviations in the assumptions underlying the [Management]
Projections.”234
After the announcement of the transaction, and the disclosure
of the Management Projections in the Proxy, no topping bids
emerged and no further inquiries about PetSmart surfaced
before the Merger closed.235 The stockholder vote on March
6, 2015, overwhelmingly favored the Merger; 99.3% of
voting shares of PetSmart voted in favor of the transaction,
representing 77.4% of the 99,455,151 outstanding common
shares.236 The Merger closed on March 11, 2015.237
L. BC Partners Creates its Plan for PetSmart
*19  As one would expect, BC Partners formulated a plan
to turnaround PetSmart throughout the auction process so it
could hit the ground running should it win the bid. It engaged
Michael Massey, the former CEO of Collective Brands,
former President of Payless, Inc. and current director of Office
Depot, to provide counsel as it pursued its goal (as reported
to investors) of making a significant retail acquisition.238
When looking at PetSmart, Massey believed the Company
lacked a clear strategy or understanding of its customers,
meaning it was ripe for a turnaround.239 BC Partners also
believed that PetSmart had been “undermanaged,” but that
these management problems had been masked historically
by “the strength of underlying market growth” in the pet
specialty industry.240 BC Partners' strategic hypothesis was
that PetSmart's performance slowed when the underlying
growth trends in the pet specialty industry slowed. It posited
that PetSmart could be revived with a new management team,
headed by Massey, who would implement a series of new
revenue and cost initiatives.241
In performing its due diligence, BC Partners engaged Boston
Consulting Group to speak to PetSmart's vendors on its
behalf.242 It also spoke directly to several former PetSmart
executives and consultants.243 With this information in
hand, BC Partners was confident that the Management
Projections were not achievable, at least not with PetSmart's
current management in place.244 Therefore, when evaluating
PetSmart, BC Partners developed its own “BCP Case.”245
The BCP Case projected lower total revenues, year-over-
year total sales growth and fewer new store openings from
2014 to 2019.246 These projections were included in the
equity syndication memo that BC Partners sent to potential
investors.247 BC Partners told its potential investors that its
case was conservative, with room for significant upside.248
Massey also created his own set of projections based
on his plans for running PetSmart (the “Massey Case”),
which included the implementation of his proposed cost
and revenue initiatives which he hoped would help drive
up EBITDA.249 Massey told BC Partners' equity investors
that these projections were conservative and that he was
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very confident they could be achieved.250 The projected cash
flows from the Massey Case were higher than those in the
Management Projections by $192 million.251
BC Partners also prepared the “Bank Case” with the help
of PetSmart's management after the signing of the Merger
Agreement252 in order to solicit debt financing for the
transaction253 and present to ratings agencies so they could
rate the bonds BC Partners would issue in connection with
the transaction.254 The Bank Case was designed to be
conservative; it assumed, for instance, that PetSmart would
have no new store openings in later years.255
M. PetSmart's Performance in the Period Leading Up
To The Stockholder Vote and Post–Closing
Beginning in December of 2014, preliminary estimates
suggested that PetSmart was outperforming the forecasts in
the Management Projections for items such as comparable
store sales, comparable transactions and earnings per
share.256 When PetSmart released its Q4 2014 results on
March 4, 2015—seven days before the close of the transaction
—it revealed that its operating income EBIT beat its
projections by 5.4%.257 PetSmart also adjusted its non-GAAP
adjusted diluted earnings per share estimate up to $1.43,
exceeding its guidance and the $1.28 per share achieved for
the prior year period.258 PetSmart's comparable store sales
grew from –.05% in Q2 2014, to flat in Q3 2014, to +2.6% in
Q4 2014.259 Revenue similarly grew from 1.4% in Q2 2014,
to 2.6% in Q3 2014, to 6% in Q4 2014.260
*20  The Merger Agreement was signed in the middle of
Q4 2014, and Lenhardt, Teffner and Gangwal all testified
that PetSmart's favorable Q4 performance did not change
their views about the long-term prospects of the Company.261
Indeed, in Q1 2015 (the quarter in which the Merger
closed), PetSmart's comparable store sales growth dropped to
1.7%,262 and remained below 2% throughout 2015.263
After the closing of the Merger, Lenhardt resigned and
Massey became PetSmart's new President and CEO.264
Massey quickly installed a new management team, changed
PetSmart's organizational structure and created a new strategy
for PetSmart based on his own revenue and cost initiatives.265
While Massey used the Management Projections solely for
purposes of management compensation,266 his team created
a new set of multi-year projections in July 2015.267
In 2015, PetSmart achieved $7.2 billion in total sales and
$982.1 million in EBITDA.268 PetSmart's comparable store
sales growth, however, came in at 0.9%, missing the projected
1.5% growth forecast in the Management Projections by
40%.269 According to Massey, in 2016 year-to-date, the
comparable store sales growth was –0.2%, in comparison
to the projected growth in the Management Projections.270
The Company's EBITDA, however, exceeded the 2015
Management Projections by $200 million by the end of FY
2015.271 In February 2016, PetSmart was able to issue a
dividend of $800 million which constituted a 38% return on
invested capital.272
N. Procedural Posture
Petitioners seek appraisal for 10,713,225 shares of common
stock of PetSmart, 9,541,372 of which were acquired after
the record date of the Merger.273 Six appraisal petitions were
filed on March 12 and 13, 2015, and all were consolidated
by order dated April 30, 2015.274 A trial was held October
31 to November 3, 2016. I heard post-trial oral argument on
February 28, 2017, following post-trial briefing.
*21  Petitioners and Respondent both presented two experts
at trial: one to address the reliability of the Management
Projections and the other to address the fair value of PetSmart
at the time of the Merger. I summarize their opinions briefly
below.
1. The “Projections” Experts
Mark A. Cohen served as Petitioners' retail expert.275 He
focused on the credibility of the Management Projections
and the outlook of PetSmart's business going forward.276
Based on his analysis of the pet retail industry and PetSmart's
prior performance, Cohen believes that PetSmart hit a “speed
bump” just prior to the initiation of the sales process from
which the Company would have rebounded. According to
Cohen, PetSmart was not facing long-term growth issues.277
He also opined that the Management Projections were created
in line with industry standards and were reliable estimates of
the Company's future cash flows.278
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Mark Weinsten was retained by Respondent to provide an
expert opinion on the Management Projections and related
business plans created by the PetSmart management during
the sales process.279 Weinstein opined that the Management
Projections were overly aggressive, overly optimistic and
wholly unreliable.280 In support of this opinion, he pointed
to the facts that PetSmart's management was newly installed
when they were directed to create the projections, they had
no experience in creating long-term projections of future cash
flows and they could not look to past examples of projections
within PetSmart for guidance since PetSmart historically
did not create long-term projections.281 In those instances
where management attempted to forecast future performance,
even for quarterly forecasts, the Company regularly would
underperform.282
*22  According to Weinsten, the Management Projections
were all the more sketchy given that they were prepared
largely as top down forecasts, an approach not consistent
with industry best practices, and were prepared specifically
for a sales process with Board pressure to be more and
more aggressive.283 He also found specific areas of concern
regarding the achievability of the forecasts, which included
the comparable store sales growth projections and the ability
of management successfully to execute on its overall business
plans.284
2. The Valuation Experts
Petitioners' valuation expert was Kevin Dages.285 Dages
determined that a DCF analysis based on the Management
Projections is the most reliable indicator of the fair value of
the Company. Based on his DCF analysis, Dages concluded
that the fair value of PetSmart's common stock as of
the date of the Merger was $128.78 per share.286 Dages
relied upon the Management Projections in all respects
for his DCF analysis based upon Cohen's opinion that the
projections “were reasonably and reliably prepared in a
manner consistent with industry standards,” as well as his
own opinion that the Management Projections “represent the
most reasonable set of projections [available] as to PetSmart's
future performance.”287 Dages also acknowledged, however,
that “once [he] signed onto the opinion of where the fair
value is ... based on these projections,” he was, “at the end
of the day,” tied to the projections.288 On the other hand,
Dages recognized that if the Court finds that the Management
Projections are not reliable, then it should not rely on his
DCF valuation because that analysis assumed the accuracy
of those projections.289 Stated differently, “[g]arbage in,
garbage out.”290
*23  Dages performed a WACC-based DCF analysis in
which he discounted the Company's free cash flows back to
present value using the Company's weighted average cost of
capital and then subtracted the value of the Company's debt to
determine the value of its equity.291 He also ran the BCP Case,
Massey Case and Bank Case through his DCF model—which,
notably, all produced higher values than the DCF based on
the Management Projections.292 In Petitioners' rebuttal case
at trial, Dages presented a new DCF analysis he ran during
trial based on the JPM sensitivities.293 This exercise yielded
a value ranging from $102.82 to $112.90 per share.294
Dages rejected the $83 per share deal price as a reliable
indicator of fair value for three main reasons.295 First,
he believed the Merger Price was stale due to the three-
month lag between the signing and closing of the deal.296
Second, he believed “the Board did not receive accurate or
reliable valuation advice from J.P. Morgan” because JPM's
DCF analysis was “results-driven” and biased.297 Finally,
he found that the Merger Price was depressed due to the
exclusion of Petco, the most logical strategic buyer, from
the PetSmart auction, resulting in the participation of only
financial bidders.298
Respondent's valuation expert was Andrew Metrick.299
According to Metrick, the Merger Price of $83 per share,
achieved after a well-run active auction, is the most reliable
indicator of PetSmart's fair value at the time of the Merger.300
While he acknowledged that DCF is considered by many
to be the “gold standard” of valuation tools, Metrick found
that DCF was misleading here since the primary data input,
the Management Projections, were entirely unreliable.301 He
explained that, for the purposes of a DCF analysis, “one
must use the ‘expected’ (as opposed to ‘hoped for’) future
cash flows of the business.”302 Based on his review of the
evidence, Metrick opined that the Management Projections
were unreliable because they were prepared specifically for
the sale process (not in the ordinary course of business) by
inexperienced management who were pushed to be overly
optimistic.303
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Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, Metrick did
perform a DCF analysis, but not with the Management
Projections. Instead, he utilized his own adjustments to the
revenue forecasts, starting with the JPM sensitivities.304 He
did not believe that PetSmart could achieve the $200 million
in cost savings from the PIP indefinitely into the future, as
projected by management, so he adjusted the projected PIP
savings to decline linearly beginning three years after the
savings are assumed to be fully realized, with only $59 million
remaining in the terminal period.305
*24  After adjusting the Management Projections, Metrick
created an APV-based DCF model that discounts the
Company's free cash flows by the Company's unlevered cost
of equity, adds the benefits of a tax shield obtained from
the Company's debt, and then subtracts the value of the debt
to determine the Company's equity value.306 Metrick's DCF
analysis resulted in a fair value of $81.44 per share. According
to Metrick, his DCF valuation simply corroborates the most
reliable indicator of PetSmart's fair value—the $83 per share
Merger Price that followed a “deal process where (1) the sale
[was] well publicized, (2) there [were] multiple bidders and
a large number of interested parties, and (3) the incentives of
the Board and management [were] aligned with those of the
stockholders.”307
Metrick asserts that his opinion regarding the fair value of
PetSmart at the Merger Price is bolstered by the following
confirmatory analyses: (1) his DCF analysis resulting in a
value of $81.44 per share; (2) the fact that “[a]t no point
prior to PetSmart's acquisition did its shares trade at or above
$83 per share”; (3) the fact that “[a]t no point prior to the
consummation of the transaction did analysts' average price
target of PetSmart exceed $83 per share”; (4) a “valuation
of PetSmart based on the trading multiples of comparable
companies ranges from $70 to $112, with a value below $91
(the median) [being] more appropriate based on PetSmart's
operating metrics relative to the peers”; (5) a “valuation of
PetSmart based on the recent acquisition of Petco is $69”;
and (6) a “valuation of PetSmart based on prior transactions
involving retailers ranges from $59 to $74.”308
After trial, Metrick submitted a supplemental report to
respond to Dages's DCF analysis based on the JPM
sensitivities.309 He determined that Dages's valuations
corresponding to the sensitivities “are inflated significantly
due to (i) an assumption that PetSmart has no fixed costs,
meaning margins are unchanged as revenue declines in
moving from the [Management Projections] to [the JPM
sensitivities], and (ii) [the] failure to adjust the discount rate
to reflect the lease treatment embedded in the cash flows.”310
Correcting for these errors, Metrick derived valuations from
the JPM sensitivities ranging from $82.79 to $86.96.311
*25  The driving difference in the valuations produced
by Dages and Metrick can be traced most directly to
the different projections of expected cash flows on which
they rely.312 Unlike many appraisal cases litigated in this
court, the inputs utilized by the valuation experts involved
here are relatively close. But there are differences. Metrick
capitalized all of PetSmart's current leases,313 while Dages
maintained the characterization of the leases from PetSmart's
financial statements.314 The experts agreed, however, that
as long as the leases are treated consistently throughout
the valuation analysis, the manner in which the leases are
characterized should not affect the valuation substantially.315
The other large difference between the two models is the
terminal investment required.316 Metrick used a model out
of a McKinsey & Co. textbook to calculate the amount
of investment necessary at the terminal period to support
the projected growth during the terminal period, arriving
at an investment rate of 28.6% in the terminal period.317
This results in a required investment of $222 million.318
Dages adopted the required terminal investment found in the
Management Projections of $47 million.319
II. ANALYSIS
Petitioners and Respondent present two vastly different
valuations of PetSmart as of the date of the Merger based
on two binary views of the most reliable means by which
to determine fair value—deal price versus a discounted cash
flow analysis. The vast delta between the valuations generated
by the parties' proffered methodologies raises red flags and
suggests, perhaps, that neither is truly reflective of PetSmart's
fair value. As the Court undertakes to discharge its duty
(or burden) independently to determine fair value, therefore,
the temptation to strike a balance between the competing
positions is undeniable. The $4.5 billion that separates the
parties certainly leaves much room for compromise. But
the unique structure of the appraisal proceeding should not
obscure the reality that the process is adversarial; the parties
have presented evidence; and the Court's fact-finding and
decision-making must be evidence based. Nor should the
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Court jump to the conclusion that both parties' valuations are
off the mark simply because their positions on fair value are
so incredibly divergent. Rather, the Court's first task, as I see
it, is to drill down on the parties' positions to see if they are
grounded in the evidence and in sound methodology. That
assessment will take the Court a long way down the road of
fulfilling its function to appraise the fair value of the shares of
PetSmart. Only then can the Court discern the extent to which
further valuation analyses may be required.
*26  A proper examination of the parties' competing
positions reduces to the following questions: (1) was the
transactional process leading to the Merger fair, well-
functioning and free of structural impediments to achieving
fair value for the Company; (2) are the requisite foundations
for the proper performance of a DCF analysis sufficiently
reliable to produce a trustworthy indicator of fair value;
and (3) is there an evidentiary basis in the trial record for
the Court to depart from the two proffered methodologies
for determining fair value by constructing its own valuation
structure? I take up these questions below. But first I address
the statutory framework within which the Court must operate.
A. The Legal Standard for Appraisal
This action for appraisal is governed by the Delaware
appraisal statute, which directs that the Court
Appraise the shares, determining their fair value exclusive
of any element of value arising from the accomplishment
or expectation of the merger or consolidation, together
with a fair rate of interest, if any, to be paid upon the
amount determined to be the fair value. In determining such
fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant
factors.320
The purpose of an appraisal action is to “provide equitable
relief for shareholders dissenting from a merger on grounds of
inadequacy of the offering price.”321 The court's prescribed
task is to determine the fair value of the dissenters'
shareholdings as of the date of the merger.322
Appraisal is not subject to “structured and mechanistic
procedure.”323 It is “by design, a flexible process.”324
Accordingly, there are no presumptions in Delaware appraisal
law that favor one valuation approach over another.325
Instead, the fair value determination, by statutory design and
mandate, must take into account “all relevant factors.”326
Every company is different; every merger is different.327
These differences are enriched with “relevant factors” that
must be accounted for in the search for fair value.
In the unique design of statutory appraisal, “[b]oth parties
‘have the burden of proving their respective valuation
positions by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ”328 If neither
party carries this burden, however, “the court must then use
its own independent judgment to determine fair value.”329
B. Did the Auction for PetSmart Yield Fair Value?
*27  “The concept of fair value under Delaware law is not
equivalent to the economic concept of fair market value.”330
It is, rather, “a jurisprudential concept that draws more from
judicial writings than from the appraisal statute itself.”331 The
focus of the fair value calculation is on “the value of the
company as a going concern, rather than its value to a third
party as an acquisition.”332 Even so, in certain cases, based on
the evidence presented, the fair market value for a company
may be the best and most reliable indicator of fair value.333
But this will only be so where the evidence reveals a market
value “forged in the crucible of objective market reality,”334
meaning that it was the “the product of not only a fair sales
process, but also of a well-functioning market.”335
After years of striving for it, Vince Lombardi finally arrived
at the understanding that perfection in human endeavors is not
attainable.336 Even in the best case, a process to facilitate the
sale of a company, constructed as it must be by the humans
that manage the company and their human advisors, will not
be perfect.337 For the reasons I explain below, I am satisfied
that the process employed to facilitate the sale of PetSmart,
while not perfect, came close enough to perfection to produce
a reliable indicator of PetSmart's fair value.338
With guidance from Morgan Stanley, PetSmart's Board began
the process of exploring strategic alternatives because the
Company's “stock had taken [a] very significant decline
from historical levels,” the Company “was unhappy,” and
“[s]hareholders were speaking up....”339 When the Board
ultimately decided to pursue a sale, it engaged another
reputable investment bank, JPM, and created an Ad Hoc
Committee of experienced independent directors to oversee
the process. From the outset, the Board's orientation was to
view a sale of the Company not as an inevitable outcome,
but rather as one of several strategic alternatives that also
included remaining standalone while pursuing new revenue
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and cost saving initiatives or pursuing a significant leveraged
recapitalization.340 If the price achieved in the auction was
unsatisfactory, the Board was prepared to walk away from
that process and pursue other alternatives.341 And if the more
active among the Company's stockholders were unhappy with
the decision the Board ultimately made, the Board was ready
to deal with the consequences of that reaction, including
to take on a proxy fight if necessary.342 It was in this
environment that the auction for PetSmart was conducted.
*28  In August of 2014, PetSmart announced to the world
that it was pursuing strategic alternatives including a sale, so
the whole universe of potential bidders was put on notice.343
The Board did not rush the sale; it did not receive final
bids and make its final decision to sell the Company until
December 2014. By the time the gavel fell, JPM had contacted
27 potential bidders, including the three potential strategic
partners it considered most likely to be interested in acquiring
PetSmart's niche business. In this regard, I note that the Board
considered inviting the most likely strategic partner, Petco,
into the process, but made the reasoned decision that, without
a firm indication of interest from Petco, the risks of providing
PetSmart's most direct competitor with unfettered access to
PetSmart's well-stocked data room outweighed any potential
reward. Nevertheless, the evidence revealed that the Board
held the door open for Petco to join the auction if it expressed
serious interest in making a bid. It never did.
Fifteen parties signed nondisclosure agreements and engaged
in due diligence. PetSmart management made in-person
presentations to thirteen suitors. Thereafter, JPM received
indications of interest from five bid groups. Two of those
bidders joined forces so that three bid groups proceeded
into the next round of bidding. Those three bid groups then
engaged in further due diligence, receiving constant updates
regarding PetSmart's financials and operations (including the
progress of the PIP) and further presentations from PetSmart
management.344 There was no credible evidence presented
that management, the Ad Hoc Committee, the Board or JPM
colluded with or otherwise favored any bidder during the
entirety of the process.345
When JPM directed the final-round bidders to submit “their
best and final” offers, KKR/CD & R advised JPM they could
not offer more than PetSmart's then-current trading price of
approximately $78 per share.346 Apollo then submitted a
final bid of $81.50 per share. BC Partners submitted a bid
of $83 per share, after JPM prodded it to bid against its own
initial final bid of $82.50 per share. BC Partners' offer of $83
per share was higher than PetSmart stock had ever traded
and reflected a premium of 39% over its unaffected stock
price. With this bid in hand, the Board met on December
13, 2014, and carefully considered its strategic options with
the assistance of its financial and legal advisors. Only after
engaging in an analysis of all options did the Board conclude
that accepting the $83 per share offer provided the best
opportunity to maximize value for PetSmart stockholders.347
The Proxy issued by PetSmart in advance of the stockholder
vote on the Merger included the Management Projections.
Even though the Board cautioned stockholders against relying
too heavily upon these projections,348 they were there
nonetheless for any stockholder to run its own DCF analysis,
just as Petitioners have done.349 PetSmart also announced its
Q4 2014 results which revealed at least some positive recent
trends in PetSmart's performance. Despite these disclosures,
between the announcement that BC Partners would acquire
PetSmart and the closing, no topping bidder stepped forward.
When the time came to vote, PetSmart's fully-informed
stockholders overwhelmingly approved the Merger.
*29  In the wake of this well-constructed and fairly
implemented auction process, Petitioners are left to nitpick at
the details and to invent certain prevailing market dynamics
that they now claim acted as impediments to PetSmart
realizing fair value in the Merger. Specifically, Petitioners
point to the following confounders that render deal price
unreliable in this case: (1) restrictions on financing impeded
the ability of bidders to bid as much as they might have
otherwise been willing to pay; (2) the lack of strategic bidders
left PetSmart at the mercy of financial sponsors and their
“LBO models”; (3) PetSmart was forced into the sales process
at a low point in its performance by the agitations of JANA;
(4) the Board was ill-informed, (5) JPM was conflicted; and
(6) the transaction price was stale by the valuation date. I
address each in turn.
First, as for the contention that a seized credit market
restricted the bids, the credible evidence says otherwise.
While JPM had concerns in the late fall of 2014 that the
credit markets may not allow the private equity bidders to
attain the financing necessary to fully fund their bids, these
concerns abated soon after Thanksgiving and prior to the
submission of final bids. The record is devoid of any evidence
that unavailable credit actually affected the amount any bidder
- 382 -
In re PetSmart, Inc., Not Reported in A.3d (2017)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 17
was willing to offer for PetSmart. Both Aiyengar and Svider
confirmed that in their testimony and I believe them.350
Second, while it is true that only financial sponsors submitted
bids for the Company, the evidence is clear that JPM made
every effort to entice potential strategic bidders and none were
interested. Indeed, the Board would have been receptive to
a deal with Petco if only it would have expressed a serious
indication of interest. Importantly, the evidence reveals that
the private equity bidders did not know who they were
bidding against and whether or not they were competing with
strategic bidders.351 They had every incentive to put their best
offer on the table.
Petitioners advance the argument that the “LBO model” will
rarely if ever produce fair value because the model is built
to allow the funds to realize a certain internal rate of return
that will always leave some portion of the company's going
concern value unrealized. Taken to its logical conclusion, of
course, Petitioners' position would suggest that all private
equity bidders employing the same model (assuming they
strive for the same IRR as Petitioners contend they do) should
have bid the same amount for PetSmart. This, of course, did
not happen—as shown by the spread between KKR and CD &
R's final verbal bid at $78 per share and BC Partners' winning
bid at $83 per share. And while it is true that private equity
firms construct their bids with desired returns in mind, it does
not follow that a private equity firm's final offer at the end of
a robust and competitive auction cannot ultimately be the best
indicator of fair value for the company.352
*30  Third, the notion that the Board was forced to sell after
the emergence of an activist shareholder finds no credible
support in the evidence. By the time JANA arrived on the
scene in July 2014, PetSmart's Board had already begun
the process of reviewing strategic alternatives with Morgan
Stanley. Thereafter, PetSmart took its time with the sales
process, not signing the Merger Agreement with BC Partners
until December 2014. Indeed, the evidence reveals that all
strategic alternatives were on the table in December 2014 and
that the Board did not decide to sell until JPM was able to coax
the final offer of $83 per share from BC Partners (actually
causing it to bid against itself). Had the auction not generated
an offer that the Board deemed too good to pass up, I am
satisfied that the Board was ready to pursue other initiatives as
a standalone company and to defend itself in a proxy contest
against JANA and others if necessary.353
Fourth, Petitioners' argument that the Board was ill-informed
is premised largely on the exploitation of director Gangwal's
inability to recall at trial (nearly three years after the fact)
certain details regarding PetSmart's PIP initiative. It is a
stretch to point to a witnesses' lack of recall at trial regarding
the details of a cost-savings initiative as evidence that the
entire PetSmart Board was ill-informed regarding the sales
process. This is especially so given that Gangwal was able
to testify extensively regarding the Board's consideration
of strategic alternatives, the sales process and the Board's
deliberations during this period.354 Petitioners also argue
that the Board was ill-informed because it did not receive
advice regarding the valuation of the Company if it remained
standalone, but this is contradicted by the evidence adduced
at trial, including (but not limited to) JPM's presentation at the
December 13 Board meeting.355
Fifth, as previously noted, the “conflicts” Petitioners rely
upon to impugn the results of the sales process are hardly
striking and, in any event, were fully disclosed to the Board
and the Ad Hoc Committee. For example, Petitioners argue
that JPM did not adequately disclose its previous relationships
with potential private equity bidders. As Gangwal testified,
however, as a large institutional bank, the Board knew and
was not at all surprised that JPM naturally had ties to the large
private equity funds interested in bidding on the Company.356
While Petitioners contend that JPM did not disclose, and was
hindered by, conflicts due to its involvement with the initial
public offering that Petco pursued in the fall of 2015, the
only record evidence on this conflict shows that JPM did
not pitch this project, much less get retained to work on it,
until months after the PetSmart Merger closed.357 Petitioners
also point to JPM's prior relationship with Gangwal due to
its involvement in taking his airline public, but I can discern
no basis to characterize this relationship as a conflict or to
conclude that it would have affected the advice JPM rendered
to the PetSmart Board or its work in running the PetSmart
auction.
*31  Finally, the argument that the Merger Price was stale
by the time of closing is at best speculative. Mergers are
consummated after the consideration is set. That temporal
separation, however, does not in and of itself suggest that
the merger consideration does not accurately reflect the
company's going concern value as of the closing date.358
Here, Petitioners would have me conclude that the Merger
Price was stale because, in the gap between signing and
closing, PetSmart's fortunes took a miraculous turn for the
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better. While the record indicates that the Company did
enjoy some favorable results in Q4 2014, such as an uptick
in comparable store sales growth, I am not convinced that
these short-term improvements were indicative of a long-term
trend. In fact, all testimony at trial was to the contrary—the
Board, as well as Teffner, believed that the Q4 results were
temporary and provided no basis to alter their view of the
Company's long-term prospects.359 These perceptions were
born out in Q1 2015 (when the Merger closed) during which
PetSmart's comparable store sales dropped to 1.7%.360 At
year end, PetSmart reported comparable store sales growth of
0.9%, a 40% miss from the Management Projections in just
the first projection year.361
Respondent has carried its burden of demonstrating that the
Merger Price of $83 per share was the result of a “proper
transactional process”362 comprised of a robust pre-signing
auction in which adequately informed bidders were given
every incentive to make their best offer in the midst of a
“well-functioning market.”363 Under these circumstances, I
am satisfied that the deal price is a reliable indicator of fair
value.364
C. Can a DCF Analysis that Relies Upon the Any of the
Projections In the Record Produce a Reliable Indicator
of Fair Value?
My determination that the $83 per share Merger Price is a
reliable indicator of fair value does not end the inquiry. To
discharge my statutory obligation to consider “all relevant
factors,” it is necessary that I consider the reliability of the
other valuations of PetSmart in the trial record.365
Petitioners peg DCF as the “gold standard” of valuation
tools.366 To be sure, that is precisely how Metrick has
described it.367 This court, likewise, has turned to a DCF
analysis in the appraisal context to determine fair value and,
in certain circumstances, has deemed the results of a DCF
analysis to be the only reliable indicator of fair value.368 Even
though I am confident that the deal price in this case is a
reliable indicator of fair value, I have approached the DCF
valuations performed by the parties' experts with an open
mind.369
*32  A proper DCF analysis follows a well-defined
sequence:
First, one estimates the values of future cash flows
for a discrete period, based, where possible, on
contemporaneous management projections. Then, the
value of the entity attributable to cash flows expected after
the end of the discrete period must be estimated to produce
a so-called terminal value, preferably [by] using a perpetual
growth model. Finally, the value of the cash flows for the
discrete period and the terminal value must be discounted
back using the capital asset pricing model or ‘CAPM.’370
The first key to a reliable DCF analysis is the availability of
reliable projections of future expected cash flows, preferably
derived from contemporaneous management projections
prepared in the ordinary course of business.371 As this court
has determined time and again, if the “data inputs used in
the model are not reliable,” then the results of the analysis
likewise will lack reliability.372 And, as the experts in this
case both agree, to be reliable, management's projections
should reflect the “expected cash flows” of the company, not
merely results that are “hoped for.”373
1. The Projections
Petitioners like the Management Projections and maintain
they are reliable indicators of PetSmart's future performance.
Respondent, on the other hand, finds itself in the presumably
uncomfortable position of having to argue that its own
projections cannot be trusted as a basis for predicting
expected cash flows and, therefore, cannot provide a sound
foundation for a DCF analysis. While I appreciate that the
parties' disagreement with respect to the reliability of the
Management Projections presents a question of fact that must
be answered by the evidence in this case, I take guidance from
other instances where this court has examined the reliability
of projections used for the purposes of appraisal. Specifically,
this court has deemed projections unreliable where “the
company's use of such projections was unprecedented, where
the projections were created in anticipation of litigation,
where the projections were created for the purpose of
obtaining benefits outside the company's ordinary course of
business,”374 where the projections were inconsistent with a
corporation's recent performance,375 or where the company
had a poor history of meeting its projections.376
*33  The Management Projections upon which Petitioners
rely are saddled with nearly all of these telltale indicators of
unreliability: (1) PetSmart management did not have a history
of creating and, therefore, had virtually no experience with,
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long-term projections; (2) even management's short term
projections frequently missed the mark; (3) the Management
Projections were not created in the ordinary course of
business but rather for use in the auction process; and (4)
management engaged in the process of creating all of the
auction-related projections in the midst of intense pressure
from the Board to be aggressive, with the expectation that
the projections would be discounted by potential bidders.
As explained below, each of these factors undermine the
credibility of Dages's DCF results.
First, PetSmart had not historically created five-year
projections prior to the creation of the auction-
related projections (including the Management Projections).
PetSmart's forecasting practice was limited to the creation
of annual budgets in connection with the Summer Strategy
meetings. These budgets were nothing like the five-year
projections management was directed to prepare when the
Board decided to explore a sale of the Company. The Summer
Strategy budgets were one-year forecasts prepared to support
particular proposed initiatives with the anticipation that they
would be revised throughout the year as events unfolded.377
While Vance made her own long-term projections based on
the annual budgets created as a part of Summer Strategy, her
model was never presented to or relied upon by PetSmart's
management or Board.378
The Board's request that management shift from preparing
one-year budgets to five-year cash flow projections was
made all the more difficult by the fact that PetSmart's senior
management were new to their jobs. Teffner, who was leading
the effort, had only been in her job for about a year; Lenhardt
had only taken on the role of CEO in June 2013. And, of
course, the projections were rush jobs; the Board wanted the
work product in a matter of weeks to ready the Company for
the sales process.379
Second, while management had no history of preparing
long-term projections, it did have a history of preparing
short-term forecasts that did not accurately predict Company
performance.380 As demonstrated in the following chart
produced in Metrick's opening expert report, even PetSmart's
reforecasts were often off by large margins:381
*34  Third, the evidence reveals that management did not
believe that the projections they were preparing actually
offered reliable predictions of future performance. They were
told to “put their best foot forward” and that is precisely what
they did.382 This, of course, is no surprise since they were told
by the Board that their jobs depended on it.383
Finally, the evidence makes clear that the Management
Projections were created specifically to aid PetSmart in
its pursuit of strategic alternatives, including a sale of the
Company. To fulfill this purpose, the projections were created
to be aggressive and extra-optimistic about the future of the
Company.384 In fact, the Management Projections projected
a reversal of several downward trends, including with regard
to the important metric of comparable store sales growth
estimates.385 As Teffner, Gangwal and Aiyengar testified at
trial, the projections were designed to be aggressive because
the Board (and JPM) were convinced that potential bidders
would discount whatever projections were put in front of
them. This makes perfect sense when projections are being
prepared not in the ordinary course but to facilitate a sale of
the Company.386
Petitioners argue that management knew where to draw the
line between reliable and unreliable projections as evidenced
by management's decision not to share the super-aggressive
“Growth Case” with the Board. According to Petitioners, the
fact that management was willing to provide the Management
Projections to the Board reveals that management stood
behind them and that they can trusted as a reliable input
for a DCF analysis. I disagree. The Management Projections
were the product of aggressive prodding by the Board for
more optimistic forecasts and everyone involved in their
creation knew that. Indeed, when the time came for the Board
to look to JPM for valuation guidance, the Board directed
JPM to run only downside sensitivities on the Management
Projections.387
Petitioners next argue that the reliability of the Management
Projections is bolstered by the Company's performance after
the Merger Agreement was signed and post-closing. Here
again, I disagree. To hear Petitioners tell it, PetSmart's post-
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signing performance was nothing short of a turnaround
miracle.388 The trial record says otherwise. PetSmart's
success, both post-signing and post-closing was and has
been mixed. It is true that PetSmart's EBITDA exceeded the
Management Projections for 2015 and that PetSmart was able
to issue a $800 million dividend by year end. It is also true,
however, that in both 2015 and 2016 (as of the date of trial),
PetSmart's comparable store sales growth was massively
underperforming the numbers forecast in the Management
Projections.389 Hardly a turnaround miracle.
*35  Petitioners point to the PIP and argue that no matter
the “aggressiveness” of the Management Projections, they
must be considered in the context of the “cushion” provided
by the substantial estimated cost savings PetSmart would
realize from this initiative. In this regard, Petitioners point
out that while PetSmart repeatedly reported that it would
achieve $200 million in cost savings annually from the PIP,
various internal documents set the actual estimates between
$183–$283 million.390 The suggestion is that the extra $83
million was a cushion to offset any undue optimism in
the Management Projections. Petitioners make too much
of the range of PIP savings identified at various times by
management. When the rubber hit the road, and management
was pressed to provide optimistic but arguably achievable
forecasts of PIP savings, management determined that, in
their best estimate, $200 million was what was actually
achievable.391 The PIP was layered into the Management
Projections and I see no basis in the evidence to conclude that
some additional phantom savings were ready to be mined out
of PetSmart beyond those already accounted for.392
For all of these reasons, I find that the Management
Projections are not reliable statements of PetSmart's
expected cash flows. Any DCF analysis that relies upon
the Management Projections, therefore, would produce
“meaningless” results.393
Even though I have determined that the Management
Projections cannot support a meaningful DCF analysis, I must
consider the possibility that a reliable valuation of PetSmart
nevertheless can be constructed from other evidence in the
record. In addition to the Management Projections, Dages
has looked to other projections—namely the BCP Case,
the Massey Case, and the Bank Case—as foundations for
alternative DCF analyses.394 And on the final day of trial,
Dages presented rebuttal testimony regarding a new DCF
analysis he had performed based on the JPM sensitivities.
Metrick initially declined to run of any these projections
through his DCF model. Instead, he created his own forecasts
for PetSmart by adjusting the Management Projections, based
on the 2% comparable store sales growth assumption adopted
in the JPM sensitivities, and then further adjusting to account
for the eventual decline of the PIP savings he believed
would be realized further into the forecast. As the last word
from the valuation experts, however, Metrick responded post-
trial to Dages' last-minute DCF analysis by pointing out its
shortcomings and running his own analysis on the unadjusted
JPM sensitivities. The questions remain whether any of these
projections represent the expected future cash flows of the
Company and whether any DCF based on these projections
can be trusted as a reliable indicator of PetSmart's fair value
at the time of the Merger.
*36  When faced with unreliable contemporaneous
management projections, this court has adopted other
contemporaneous projections as a basis for a DCF analysis
where it is satisfied that those projections provide a reliable
estimate of the company's future cash flows.395 But the
projections must be contemporaneous, meaning they must
reflect the “operative reality” of the Company at the time of
the Merger.396 A DCF analysis does not work in the appraisal
context when the projections reflect the “operative reality” of
the company in the hands of the acquirer.397 With this in mind,
it is easy to see why none of the projections prepared outside
of PetSmart can produce a reliable DCF result. Each reflect
various scenarios of how PetSmart would be run under BC
Partners' management with a variety of different assumptions.
The BCP Case and the Massey Case both were designed
with the idea that PetSmart would be run as a private, rather
than a public company, with new management, new initiatives
and Massey at the helm.398 While BC Partners believed that
Massey might be able to turn PetSmart around, it had no
such confidence in PetSmart's current management.399 Given
BC Partners' plan to overhaul PetSmart management and its
lack of faith in the current management, it strains credulity
to argue that the cases BC Partners created showed expected
cash flows if PetSmart were to continue operating as a going
concern sans Merger.
The Bank Case prepared by BC Partners fares no better.
The assumptions upon which those projections are based
resemble nothing of PetSmart's operative reality. To reiterate,
the Bank Case was created for BC Partners to present to
potential lenders, not in the ordinary course of business, with
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the purpose of showing that “if things get tough ... you can run
the business for cash.”400 It assumed that the Company would
cut capital expenditures in its efforts to preserve cash with the
implicit understanding that this approach would stymie long-
term growth.401 Simply stated, the Bank Case did not reliably
state expected cash flows because that was not its purpose.
*37  Having determined that the Management Projections,
the BCP Case, the Massey Case and the Bank Case are
not reliable statements of PetSmart's expected future cash
flows, it should come as no surprise that I reject outright the
DCF analyses Dages performed using those projections as
foundation.402 They are patently not reliable indicators of fair
value.
That leaves the possibility of undertaking some adjustments
to the Management Projections to bring them in line with
the Company's expected cash flows as a means to supply
reliable data for a DCF analysis. Both parties have submitted
a DCF analysis based on the JPM sensitivities.403 Metrick has
gone a step further by making further adjustments to the JPM
sensitivities to account for his view that the PIP savings will
not be sustainable indefinitely.404 Even though Dages appears
to have referred to the JPM sensitivities as an afterthought,
his DCF based on those projections is in the record and must
be addressed.
The Board requested that JPM run sensitivities based on 2%
comparable store sales growth because it had “a great amount
of discomfort” with the 4% comparable store sales growth
utilized in the Management Projections, and thought that “2
percent looked more achievable.”405 Given the pressure the
Board had placed upon management to prepare increasingly
aggressive projections, it is reasonable that the Board would
seek to gain a more realistic understanding of PetSmart's
expected cash flows and its going concern value as the hour
approached for the Board to make impactful decisions about
PetSmart's future. While the evidence is a bit light with
respect to the bases for the 2% adjustment in comparable store
sales growth selected by the Board, I take comfort that the
adjustment was conceived by an informed, experienced Board
and then analyzed carefully by an informed, experienced
banker. It is also not lost on me that the JPM sensitivities are
the only projections utilized, in some form at least, by both
of the valuation experts engaged by the parties. They bear
sufficient indicia of reliability to justify further consideration
of the valuations based on the data contained therein.
2. The Expert Valuations Based on the JPM Sensitivities
Dages performed his rebuttal DCF on the JPM sensitivities
to respond to testimony from Aiyengar and Gangwal to the
effect that the Board directed JPM to make adjustments to
the Management Projections that would cause them to reflect
more accurately PetSmart's future performance.406 For this
analysis, Dages took the cash flows from the JPM sensitivities
and ran them through a DCF analysis applying the inputs
derived from both his and Metrick's prior DCF analyses—the
discount rate (or WACC), the perpetual growth rate and the
terminal investment.407 First, he applied his perpetual growth
rate of 2.25%, WACC of 7.75% and terminal investment
of $41 million.408 Across the three JPM sensitivities, this
resulted in a value ranging from $102.82 to $112.90 per
share.409
*38  Dages then ran a DCF analysis using the inputs
he attributed to Metrick “based on [the] exhibits” Metrick
utilized during his trial testimony—a perpetual growth rate
of 2.0% and WACC of 6.35%.410 Dages calculated the
terminal investment for each of the sensitivities using the
same formula that Metrick had used for each sensitivity
during his testimony.411 Across the JPM sensitivities, this
resulted in a value ranging from $108.13 to $118.88 per
share.412
Metrick had already seized on the import of the JPM
sensitivities in his initial report.413 He adjusted the
Management Projections to reflect the 2% comparable store
sales growth estimate for years after FY15.414 He further
adjusted the Management Projections, which assumed that
PetSmart would achieve the cost savings envisioned by
the PIP infinitely, to account for his view “that the cost
savings EBITDA improvements will decline beginning in
FY19, three years after the savings are assumed to be fully
realized in FY16.”415 He then incorporated his assumption
that “the annual savings will decline linearly to the Base Case
Amount ($59 million) by the terminal period, which begins
in FY25.”416
The projected decreases in PIP savings represented Metrick's
best attempts to estimate how long and to what extent
PetSmart would retain the projected benefits.417 He based
his opinion that PetSmart would not realize the PIP savings
infinitely on “economic theory, market response to the
PIP, and industry experience related to cost reduction
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programs.”418 Of particular relevance was a McKinsey &
Co. study that found 90% of 230 S & P 500 firms that had
engaged in cost-savings strategies between 1999 and 2003
had failed to sustain the lower cost savings beyond three
years.419 Additionally, Metrick believed that increasingly
strong competition from other pet retailers—i.e., Petco—
would cause the cost savings to erode over time.420
Metrick returned to the JPM sensitivities when he responded
to Dages's rebuttal DCF valuations.421 He ran his own
DCF analysis on the JPM sensitivities (without adjustments)
to reveal the errors in Dages's DCF on those same
projections.422 Metrick found two principal faults with
Dages's rebuttal DCF. First, he took Dages to task for using
the improper discount rates. In this regard, he began with the
premise that “[t]o value the cash flows properly, the discount
rate must reflect the assumed capital structure, which in turn
depends on how leases are treated in the cash flows.”423
According to Metrick, the discount rates Dages utilized
are not consistent with the capital structure assumed in his
analysis. Specifically, Dages treated the leases as operating
leases (as reflected in the JPM sensitivities), which results in a
capital structure with no debt (and 100% equity).424 And yet
the WACC utilized by Dages, pulled from his initial report,
is based on a capital structure of 8% debt and 92% equity.425
Similarly, the WACC Dages attributed to Metrick in his
rebuttal DCF was based on Metrick's assumption of a capital
structure of 31% debt and 69% equity.426 Given the very
different capital structure assumed in the JPM sensitivities,
Metrick opines that Dages should have used a WACC of
8.17% based on his own beta and equity risk premium, not
7.75%.427 The proper WACC based on Metrick's assumptions
should have been 7.7%, not 6.35%.428
*39  Metrick's second criticism of Dages focuses on his use
of income projections that “assume that all of PetSmart's
costs are completely variable, rising or falling in proportion to
sales, so profit margins do not change” even though the JPM
sensitivities (based on the Management Projections) include
specific fixed expense line items that will not vary with
declining sales.429 To adjust for this, Metrick took the fixed
costs he found in the Management Projections and treated “all
other costs as variable in implementing the 2% comparable
store sales growth assumption.”430
Metrick then ran a DCF based upon JPM Sensitivity # 2,
which assumes that PetSmart will open new stores according
to current management plans through 2019 and will have
no new store growth thereafter.431 In this DCF model, he
used his terminal investment formula to calculate the required
investment in the terminal period using a 2.0% perpetual
growth rate.432 Applying his adjusted Dages WACC of 8.17%
(as adjusted to reflect the capital structure assumed by the cash
flows), Metrick then performed a DCF using the cash flows
found in Sensitivity # 2 resulting in a valuation of $82.79 per
share.433 Using his own adjusted WACC of 7.77%, Metrick's
DCF analysis using Sensitivity # 2 results in a valuation of
$86.96 per share.434
As explained above, I have found the JPM sensitivities to be
the most reliable projections in the record before me—the
question now is what to do with the various DCF analyses
constructed by the experts based upon these projections.
While I agree with Metrick's criticism of any projection that
extends the PIP cost savings out indefinitely into the future,
I find no support in the evidence for the specific adjustments
that he makes to the PIP cost savings in his initial report. The
theory is sound, and I agree that it is not reasonable to assume
that the PIP savings will continue at $200 million annually
through the terminal period, but there is insufficient evidence
in the record to allow me to assess when the PIP cost savings
will begin to fade and at what levels. Therefore, I am not
persuaded that Metrick's initial DCF valuation, based on his
adjustments to the Management Projections, offers a reliable
indicator of fair value.435
This leads me to the experts' competing analyses based on
the JPM sensitivities. I agree with Metrick's criticism of the
rebuttal DCF analysis Dages presented at trial—the WACC
must accurately reflect the capital structure indicated by
the cash flows, and the costs should accurately reflect the
fixed costs. I am also convinced that Metrick's formula for
calculating the required amount of investment to support the
terminal growth rate is proper, as it is supported by economic
theory, finance literature and even testimony that Dages
offered to this court in a prior case.436 Metrick's formula
demonstrates that PetSmart's return on invested capital will
converge towards its cost of capital, a theory this court has
repeatedly cited with approval.437 In contrast, and in contrast
to his past practice, Dages merely adopted the terminal
investment from the Management Projections, which would
imply that PetSmart would permanently see returns on capital
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far above its cost of capital.438 That premise is not credible,
at least not to me.
*40  I also find Sensitivity # 2 to be the most reliable
of the three JPM sensitivities, as this reflects the current
management plan for new store sales growth. Accordingly,
I am satisfied that the DCF analysis performed by Metrick
in his supplemental report is the most reliable DCF that can
be performed with the data available. As noted, this analysis
reveals a valuation of PetSmart ranging from $82.79 to $86.96
per share (depending upon whether one applies the adjusted
Dages WACC or the adjusted Metrick WACC). Given my lack
of confidence in the Management Projections underlying the
JPM sensitivities, however, I am not inclined to adjust my
view that the fair value of PetSmart at the time of the Merger
is best reflected in the $83 per share Merger Price. The DCF
analyses performed by Metrick on the JPM Sensitivity # 2 are,
however, confirmatory.
D. Does the Evidence Provide a Basis for Alternative
DCF Analyses?
As a final step in discharging my duty to consider “all relevant
factors,” I have looked to the record to determine if there
is any basis to make further adjustments to the projections
or to alter the inputs used by the experts to arrive at a
more reliable DCF analysis. I am satisfied that no such
basis exists. The JPM sensitivities provided the most reliable
evidence in the record of the actual, expected future cash
flows of the Company. And while they are not perfect, I
find nothing in the evidence that would allow me credibly to
adjust these projections further. Nor do I find a basis to alter
the experts' inputs. The DCF models they constructed were
not that dissimilar. Where they differed, I found Metrick's
explanations for his approach, in this case, to be credible. I
see no reason to alter the work he performed.
I have considered all relevant factors. I state my final decision
below.
III. CONCLUSION
Accepting Petitioners' contention that the fair value of
PetSmart was $128.78 per share would be tantamount to
declaring that a massive market failure occurred here that
caused PetSmart to leave nearly $4.5 billion on the table. In
the wake of a robust pre-signing auction among informed,
motivated bidders, and in the absence of any evidence that
market conditions impeded the auction, I can find no basis to
accept Petitioners' flawed, post-hoc valuation and ignore the
deal price. Nor can I find a path in the evidence to reach a fair
value somewhere between the values proffered by the parties.
And so I “defer” to deal price, not to restore balance after
some perceived disruption in the doctrinal Force, but because
that is what the evidence presented in this case requires.439
*41  For the foregoing reasons, I have found the fair value
of PetSmart shares at the date of the closing of the Merger
to be $83 per share. The legal rate of interest, compounded
quarterly, shall accrue from the date of closing to the
date of payment. The parties should confer and submit an
implementing order within ten days.
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109 See Trial Tr. 237:5–12 (Teffner).
110 Trial Tr. 237:9–12 (Teffner).
111 Id.
112 PTO ¶¶ 198, 204–05.
113 PTO ¶ 206.
114 Trial Tr. 414:12–416:24 (Gangwal).
115 Trial Tr. 415:14 (Gangwal).
116 Trial Tr. 415:9–10 (Gangwal).
117 Trial Tr. 415:15–17, 414:21–23 (Gangwal).
118 Trial Tr. 415:17–18 (Gangwal).
119 Trial Tr. 237:17–238:13 (Teffner). Management did not present the Growth Case at the August 2014 Meeting. See Trial
Tr. 237:5–12 (Teffner).
120 Trial Tr. 241:10–13 (Teffner).
121 Trial Tr. 242:22–243:2 (Teffner).
122 Trial Tr. 418:12–419:8 (Gangwal).
123 PTO ¶ 213.
124 PTO ¶ 211.
125 Id.
126 PTO ¶ 212. The PetSmart–Pet360 merger closed on September 29, 2014, with a purchase price of $131.5 million and
a potential earnout of $30 million. PTO ¶ 221.
127 See PTO ¶¶ 366–70, 378; Trial Tr. 247:22–248:23 (Teffner).
128 PTO ¶ 378; Trial Tr. 247:22–24 (Teffner).
129 Trial Tr. 248:5–7 (Teffner); PTO ¶ 370. PetSmart had previously entered into a Master Provider Agreement with A.T.
Kearney in August 2013. Id.
130 Trial Tr. 247:14–19 (Teffner); see PTO ¶ 366.
131 Trial Tr. 247:14–19 (Teffner); PTO ¶ 366.
132 Trial Tr. 248:14–17 (Teffner).
133 Trial Tr. 248:17–23 (Teffner); PTO ¶¶ 371–73.
134 PTO ¶ 375; Trial Tr. 248:24–249:7 (Teffner) (“We also brought in Peppers & Rogers[,] and their work was [focused]
around a Lean Six Sigma operational efficiency process, ... to see if [PetSmart] had opportunity to reduce labor costs by
operating more efficiently than [it was] currently operating at the time.”). PetSmart engaged Peppers & Rogers to perform
this work on September 12, 2014. PTO ¶ 375.
135 JX 668 at 1.
136 JX 2021 at 375; Trial Tr. 338:22–339:1 (Teffner); PTO ¶ 232.
137 See Trial Tr. 247:22–249:8 (Teffner); PTO ¶¶ 223, 231.
138 PTO ¶¶ 223, 231.
139 PTO ¶ 223; Trial Tr. 254:16–255:6, 259:1–14 (Teffner).
140 Compare JX 807 at PETS_APP00000694 with JX 586 at PETS_ APP00000438–39.
141 JX 1136 at 8; Trial Tr. 339:7–10 (Teffner).
142 PTO ¶ 231.
143 Trial Tr. 258:13–14, 258:18–20 (Teffner).
144 JX 758.
145 Trial Tr. 368:19–369:16 (Teffner). See also JX 1674 (Vance Dep.) 136:25–137:3.
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146 Id.
147 JX 671 at PETS_APP00215455. See also JX 608; JX 668.
148 JX 673.
149 Trial Tr. 256:11–13, 257:10–11 (Teffner).
150 JX 758; JX 753.
151 JX 1336 at 23; Trial Tr. 884:10–885:4, 886:10–18 (Aiyengar).
152 Trial Tr. 919:4–921:21 (Aiyengar).
153 Id.
154 JX 1336 at 23; JX 811 at PETS_APP00000578; Trial Tr. 887:18–888:5 (Aiyengar).
155 JX 803; JX 811.
156 JX 803 at PETS_APP00000557–58.
157 See Trial Tr. 417:13–418:1 (Gangwal); Trial Tr. 923:1–16 (Aiyengar).
158 JX 805 at PETS_APP00000609.
159 Id.
160 JX 803 at PETS_APP00000556.
161 See PTO ¶¶ 315–17.
162 See Trial Tr. 234:23–235:8, 242:22–243:2, 256:11–17, 258:8–14 (Teffner); Trial Tr. 421:4–422:3 (Gangwal); Trial Tr.
892:1–20 (Aiyengar).
163 Trial Tr. 263:3–265:13 (Teffner); JX 811 at PETS_ APP00000580; JX 913 at PETS_APP00000748; JX 1054 at
PETS_APP00000907.
164 JX 913 at PETS_APP00000747; Trial Tr. 262:1–263:2 (Teffner).
165 JX 861.
166 JX 913 at PETS_APP00000749.
167 Id.
168 Trial Tr. 430:3–4 (Gangwal).
169 See JX 666; JX 915; Trial Tr. 427:22–428:15 (Gangwal).
170 JX 666.
171 JX 915 at PETS_APP00000741–42.
172 JX 913.
173 JX 913 at PETS_APP00000752; Trial Tr. 898:11–899:11 (Aiyengar).
174 JX 1336 at 24. The Board later determined to allow CD & R and KKR to work together based on the understanding that
this would allow them to make a stronger bid. Id.; JX 953.




179 JX 1336 at 24; JX 1121; JX 1081 at PETS_APP00000759–61.
180 JX 1081 at PETS_APP00000760.
181 Trial Tr. 440:7–9 (Gangwal). See also Trial Tr. 432:13–433:14, 434:1–8, 436:13–19, 440:2–4 (Gangwal).
182 Trial Tr. 433:9–14 (Gangwal). See also Trial Tr. 433:12–13, 434:3, 436:14 (Gangwal).
183 JX 1081 at PETS_APP00000760.
184 Trial Tr. 434:4–8 (Gangwal); Trial Tr. 910:24–911:8 (Aiyengar). I will hereafter refer to these adjustments to the
Management Projections as the “JPM sensitivities.” This should not be interpreted, however, as a finding that the JPM
sensitivities were undertaken on JPM's own initiative. As noted above, I am satisfied that the Board came up with the
idea of the 2% sensitivities and then directed its financial advisor to run the analysis. The JPM sensitivities began with the
Management Projections and then: (1) for Sensitivity # 1 applied a higher discount rate; (2) for Sensitivity # 2 made no
changes to the new store assumptions through FY19 but eliminated new stores thereafter; (3) for Sensitivity # 3 assumed
half the new stores through FY19 and eliminated new stores thereafter; and (4) for Sensitivity # 4 assumed no new stores
after FY14. See JX 1336 at 35. Sensitivity # 1 was the only sensitivity not to make adjustments based on 2% comparable
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store sales growth. Id. This sensitivity was not featured at trial, not addressed by the experts and will not be included
herein when referencing the JPM sensitivities.
185 Trial Tr. 436:14–19 (Gangwal).
186 Id.
187 JX 2044. See also JX 1414; JX 1618.
188 JX 1414 at 3; JX 2044.
189 See Trial Tr. 859:15–860:24 (Svider); JX 1104; JX 1084 (Svider characterizing the financing restrictions as “[w]orse than
during Lehman in some ways”). See also JX 1103; JX 1109 at 5–6 (discussing BC Partners' issues with debt financing);
Trial Tr. 995:4–6 (Aiyengar) (discussing Apollo's struggles to get its debt financing in order); JX 1296 at 182 (stating that
KKR's financing for the PetSmart deal had “apparently” collapsed).
190 See Trial Tr. 861:18–862:3 (Svider) (testifying that BC Partners was able to get all the financing that it needed); Trial
Tr. 916:16–918:3, 994:13–995:6 (Aiyengar) (testifying that all other bidders were able to secure deal financing and that
none were prevented from reaching the levels needed to bid their desired price). The ability of the bidders to secure
adequate financing in spite of the enhanced regulation appears to be attributable, at least in part, to PetSmart's strong
cash flow profile. See JX 1109 at BC00146204 (noting that BC Partners was able to get seven “viable” financing proposals
notwithstanding the increased regulatory scrutiny due to the “high quality of the credit” of PetSmart); Trial Tr. 917:7–918:10
(Aiyengar) (testifying that she had no reason to believe that any regulation of the U.S. debt market negatively impacted
the bidding for PetSmart, likely because of PetSmart's “pretty strong cash flow profile,” as she saw U.S. regulated banks
participating in diligence calls, whereas U.S. regulated banks typically will not participate in financing when leverage
levels are too high).
191 JX 1336 at 25.
192 JX 1144.
193 JX 1134.
194 JX 1336 at 25.
195 Id.
196 JX 1142 at 1. See also PTO ¶¶ 288–89. Apollo had indicated that it was not interested in partnering with Longview and
that its price would be the same with or without Longview's participation. JX 1142 at 1; JX 1153 at PETS_APP00000944.
197 Trial Tr. 907:5–12 (Aiyengar).
198 JX 1336 at 26.
199 Id.
200 JX 1153 at PETS_APP00000945; Trial Tr. 906:7–908:9 (Aiyengar).
201 JX 1156; JX 1157; JX 1153 at PETS_APP00000944–45. In fact, the night before this meeting, PetSmart management
worked to put together a press release that would announce that the Company had decided to end the sales process.
JX 1138.
202 JX 1149; JX 1153; JX 1155; JX 1158.
203 JX 1158 at PETS_APP00001265–73; JX 1156 at PETS_APP00001129–31.
204 Id.
205 JX 1158 at PETS_APP00001265–68; Trial Tr. 432:13–436:19 (Gangwal); Trial Tr. 908:14–912:20 (Aiyengar).
206 JX 1153 at PETS_APP000945; PTO ¶ 293.
207 Pet'rs' Post–Trial Br. 72.
208 Id. at 73.
209 Id.
210 JX 847.
211 See JX 1680 (Gold Dep.) 47:24–48:2, 49:7–50:11; JX 1679 (Aiyengar Dep. Day 1) 327:16–330:6. I note that Aiyengar's
deposition testimony, proffered by Respondents, along with the deposition testimony of other witnesses who testified at
trial on Respondent's behalf, is admissible over Petitioners' objection under either Court of Chancery Rule 32(a)(4) or
DRE 106. Court of Chancery Rule 32(a)(4) provides that “[i]f only part of a deposition is offered in evidence by a party, an
adverse party may require the offeror to introduce any other part which ought in fairness to be considered with the part
introduced, and any party may introduce any other parts.” Delaware Rule of Evidence 106 provides that where a party
introduces “a writing or recorded statement or part thereof ..., an adverse party may require him at that time to introduce
any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously
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with it.” After an analysis of the deposition testimony proffered by the Respondents in response to Petitioners' Post–
Trial Brief, I find that each instance where Respondent cites to the deposition testimony of Teffner, Svider, Aiyengar and
Weinstein fits under the “completeness” doctrine codified in Court of Chancery Rule 32(a)(3)(B) and DRE 106, and is
therefore admissible.
212 JX 1086 at JPM00000203; JX 1158 at PETS_APP00001282.
213 JX 605; JX 1086; JX 1158.
214 JX 1679 (Aiyengar Dep. Day 1) 253:5–8; JX 79. “Barra is a company owned by MSCI, Inc., that provides investment
decision-making tools, including market indices and a beta service.” In re Appraisal of DFC Global Corp., 2016 WL
3753123, at *8 n.89 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016). See JX 1698 (Dages–Opening) 40–42 (“Barra betas are rarely used by
academics to justify their beta estimates. I am unaware of any academic evidence that Barra beta estimates are superior
predictors of a stock's future beta than are historical estimates such as Bloomberg. Another problem with Barra betas is
that they cannot be unlevered and relevered to reflect the appropriate target capital structure. Therefore, a peer-based
beta derived from Barra betas can potentially reflect the risk of a capital structure that is different than the operative
capital structure of the company being valued.... In addition, a commonly referenced valuation textbook cautions the use
of Barra betas because they are not replicable. I understand that, for those same reasons, Barra betas have yet to be
accepted by the Delaware Chancery Court.”) (citations omitted).
215 See JX 1158 (JPM's slide deck reflecting its WACC analysis relied upon Barra predicted and historical betas); Trial Tr.
947:23–948:1 (Aiyengar).
216 Pet'rs' Post–Trial Br. 72.
217 JX 1682 (Aiyengar Dep. Day 2) at 412:9–413:15. See also JX 1682 (Aiyengar Dep. Day 2) at 122:15–24, 243:8–245:1,
288:7–24, 320:3–10, 341:21–342:21, 673:24–675:10; JX 534; JX 538.
218 Trial Tr. 958:21–959:10 (Aiyengar) (agreeing that had JPM utilized a lower WACC it could not have rendered its fairness
opinion).
219 I also find no basis to accept Petitioners' contention that JPM labored under disabling conflicts. Pet'rs' Post–Trial Br. 74.
JPM's previous work with Petco was disclosed to the PetSmart Board and, if anything, it was deemed as a benefit not
a conflict. Trial Tr. 203:21–204:6 (Teffner). JPM's prior relationships with potential private equity buyers, including those
that actively participated in the process, was correctly deemed by the Board to be a “fact of business life.” See In re Dollar
Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 582 (Del. Ch. 2010) (noting that it is “one of the facts of business life that most of
the top, if not all, banks have relationships with the major private equity firms.”); Trial Tr. 484:22–23 (Gangwal) (testifying
that he “knew that [JPM] would have many, many” relationships with private equity firms). Nor is there a basis in the
evidence to find that JPM misled the Board regarding potential conflicts. See Pet'rs' Post–Trial Br. 75. The evidence to
which Petitioners refer in support of this contention, JX 1251, upon careful reading, says no such thing.
220 Trial Tr. 925:12–15.
221 See JX 1336 at 27; Trial Tr. 439:4–441:9 (Gangwal).
222 JX 1336 at 27 (In considering the achievability of the Management Projections, the Board considered, inter alia, “the
risks associated with executing on [PetSmart's] business plans, including that [PetSmart's] business plans and Profit
Improvement Plan [were] based, in part, on projections ... dependent on a number of variables, including economic
growth, same-store-sales growth, ability to execute on store expansion plans, and overall business performance that are
difficult to project and are subject to a high level of uncertainty and volatility.”).
223 Trial Tr. 440:23–441:2 (Gangwal). See also JX 1336 at 26–27 (proxy statement summarizing the Board's reasons for
recommending the merger to stockholders).
224 Trial Tr. 439:16–441:9 (Gangwal).
225 JX 1336 at 26.
226 Id.
227 Trial Tr. 908:9 (Aiyengar). I have considered this hearsay testimony only as evidence of the state of mind of the declarants,
not for the truth of the matter asserted. DRE 803(3).
228 JX 1188; JX 1187; JX 1185. In addition to DRE 803(3), these analyst reports are admissible under DRE 703 as they
were relied upon by Professor Metrick in formulating his opinion and are “of a type” of information “reasonably relied
upon by experts” in the valuation field. They have “help[ed] the [Court] understand [the] expert's thought process and
determine what weight to give [the] expert's opinion.” Towerview LLC v. Cox Radio, Inc., 2013 WL 3316186, at *2 (Del.
Ch. June 28, 2013) (applying DRE 703).
229 See JX 1703 (Metrick–Rebuttal) at 71. See also JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at Ex. 8 (providing monthly summary of
analyst price targets for PetSmart stock from January 2012 to March 2015).
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230 JX 1336 at 35–36, 38–39.
231 Id. at 37–38.
232 Id. The Proxy “included a summary of [the Management Projections] ... to give stockholders access to certain nonpublic
information provided to [the PetSmart Board] and J.P. Morgan for purposes of considering and evaluating the Company's
strategic and financial alternatives, including the merger.” Id.
233 Id. at 38 (“Readers ... are cautioned not to place undue reliance on the [projections found in the Proxy].”). See also Trial
Tr. 324:7–15 (Teffner) (“The proxy had disclaimer statements in there with respect to projections ... to explain that these
are projections” and therefore speculative.).
234 JX 1336 at 39.
235 See Trial Tr. 926:5–7 (Aiyengar) (“[T]here was nobody who called after the deal was announced really, other than to say
congratulations for getting such a good price.”).
236 PTO ¶¶ 3–4; JX 1496.
237 PTO ¶ 5.
238 See JX 779; JX 931.
239 JX 779; Trial Tr. 1011:6–23 (Massey).
240 JX 1060 at BC00105547.
241 JX 1060 at BC00105547–49, 560, 617–21; Trial Tr. 739:9–742:1 (Svider).
242 Trial. Tr. 833:15–838:16 (Svider).
243 Trial Tr. 827:4–833:4, 838:21–841:2 (Svider).
244 Trial Tr. 746:9–15 (Svider).
245 Id.
246 Compare JX 1060 at BC0010552 with JX 807 at PETS_APP00000692–94.
247 JX 1065 at 80.
248 JX 1065 at 83.
249 JX 1060 at BC00105546; JX 1132; Trial Tr. 739:9–740:11 (Svider).
250 JX 1238 at 29, 48; Trial Tr. 1125:8–1127:23 (Massey).
251 Trial Tr. 526:14–19 (Dages).
252 PTO ¶ 309; Trial Tr. 360:22–361:15 (Teffner).
253 PTO ¶ 311; Trial Tr. 362:9–16 (Teffner).
254 PTO ¶ 309; Trial Tr. 363:17–20 (Teffner). “Bank Case” is a term of art in the LBO industry to describe projections meant
to reflect a company's post-acquisition capacity to service its debt. They are heavy on cash flows and light on growth.
Trial Tr. 692:3–15 (Dages).
255 Trial Tr. 639:2–8 (Dages); Trial Tr. 373:14–18 (Teffner).
256 JX 1280; JX 1411 at 17.
257 JX 1350 at 12.
258 JX 1447; Trial Tr. 1385:21–23 (Metrick).
259 JX 630; JX 983; JX 1476.
260 Id.
261 Trial Tr. 272:18–274:19 (Teffner); Trial Tr. 447:4–11 (Gangwal); JX 1684 (Lenhardt Dep.) 63:10–65:19, 331:21–332:25.
262 JX 1598 at PETS_APP00842050.
263 Id.; JX 1619 at PETS_APP00820988; JX 1656 at PETS_ APP00821452. See also Trial Tr. 1057:6–9 (Massey).
264 JX 1508.
265 Trial Tr. 741:19–742:19 (Svider); Trial Tr. 1051:15–1055:13 (Massey). These new initiatives were informed by updated
reports from PetSmart's consultants who identified for Massey additional savings they believed could be achieved. See
Trial Tr. 348:16–350:6 (Teffner); JX 2022 at 5; JX 1286 at 18; PTO ¶ 388–393. See also JX 1286 at 7; Trial Tr. 342:24–
346:16 (Teffner); JX 1684 (Lenhardt Dep.) 324:14–23.
266 Trial Tr. 750:2–5, 750:14–22 (Svider).
267 JX 1590 at PETS_APP00821375.
268 JX 1656 at PETS_APP00821450–51, 57. I appreciate that PetSmart's post-closing performance is not relevant when
assessing the Company's operational reality at the point of valuation—the date the merger closed. Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d 485, 499 (Del. 2000). Petitioners argue, however, that PetSmart's post-closing performance
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is probative of the reliability of the management projections. I have considered this post-merger evidence for this limited
purpose. See id. (holding that a court may consider post-merger evidence to the extent it relates to the validity of
projections prepared prior to the merger).
269 Id.
270 Trial Tr. 1057:6–9 (Massey).
271 Trial Tr. 1119:16–20 (Massey); JX 1643 at 4; JX 1637 at 2.
272 JX 1637 at 2; PTO ¶ 352; JX 1627 at 6.
273 PTO ¶¶ 15–16, 18, 24–29, 31, 36–43, 45, 51, 53, 60–61, 63, 69–71.
274 PTO ¶¶ 6–7.
275 JX 1692 (Cohen–Opening) at 1–3, App. 8–9.
276 Cohen holds a B.S. in Electrical Engineering as well as a M.B.A. from Columbia University. He has an extensive history
working in the retail industry, having worked for Abraham & Strauss, Gap Stores, Lord & Taylor, Mervyns Stores,
Federated Department Stores, Bradlees Inc. and Sears Roebuck & Co. He served as Chairman and CEO of Sears
Canada Inc. from 2001 to 2004. Since 2005, he has served as the Director of Retail Studies and Adjunct Professor
of Retailing at Columbia University's Business School, maintains an independent consulting practice, and serves as a
contributor for several news outlets. JX 1692 (Cohen–Opening) at 1–3.
277 See JX 1692 (Cohen–Opening) at 28, 30, 33, 35–37.
278 Id. at 38 (“PetSmart's 5–year financial projections were reasonably and reliably prepared in a manner consistent with
industry standards.”).
279 Weinsten holds a B.S. in economics from Carnegie–Mellon University and an M.B.A. from the Wharton School at the
University of Pennsylvania. He is a Managing Director in the Corporate Finance Group at Berkeley Research Group,
a global strategic advisory firm. His practice focuses on turnarounds and restructurings, and he specializes in serving
in interim executive positions during transition phases. Prior to joining Berkeley Research Group, Weinsten served as
Senior Managing Director in the Corporate Finance & Restructuring practice of FTI Consulting, Inc. JX 2307 (Weinsten–
Opening) at 1–6, App. A.
280 See id. at 6–7.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 42 (“Starting in 2013 through first half of 2014, Management had underperformed its quarterly forecasts—even
short-term forecasts). See also id. at 43, Ex. 15.
283 Id. “Top down is driven by management and starts with overarching goals, such as 3% revenue growth and 10% gross
margin expansion, which are then pushed down to targets and quotas that are assigned down to employees. Bottoms up
planning starts with teams of employees who develop plans for initiatives to improve the business, which are then passed
on to management for review and approval and the aggregate result of all initiatives drives the overall company goals
and targets.... [B]ottoms up planning typically yields more realistic and reliable results as it involves detailed planning by
the people who will be responsible for executing on the initiatives.” Id. at 45.
284 Id. at 53 (“[I]t would have been difficult for Management to achieve the turnaround in comparable store sales growth
reflected in the [Management Projections.]”); id. at 84 (“The ability to execute a plan hinges upon three critical components
—people, processes and tools. At the time of development of the [Management Projections], PetSmart faced challenges
with respect to all three components.”).
285 Dages is well-known to this Court. He holds a B.B.A. in accounting from the University of Notre Dame and is a
Certified Public Accountant. He is an Executive Vice President of Compass Lexecon, a consulting firm specializing in the
application of economics to legal and regulatory issues. JX 1698 (Dages–Opening) at 1.
286 In his DCF analysis, Dages used a perpetual growth rate of 2.25%, a WACC of 7.75% and a required investment in the
terminal period of $47 million. JX 1698 (Dages–Opening) at 32–33; JX 1704 (Dages–Rebuttal) at Ex. 6D.
287 JX 1698 (Dages–Opening) at 25–26. Dages noted, however, that “I'm not a retail guy so I didn't start with this is absolutely
the right set of projections to go with, because I—you know, that's not my expertise.” JX 1712 (Dages Dep.) 157:6–11.
288 JX 1712 (Dages Dep.) 155:20–157:22 (Dages further explained that the Management Projections were “the best set of
projections for me to start with and to examine sensitivities, and to then ... reach an opinion about fair value, and since the
opinion on fair value is based on this set of projections, then yes, I believe I'm wed to [the] answer [that the Management
Projections are the best estimate of PetSmart's future performance].... If my opinion was based on the 80 percent PIP
scenario, then I think I would be telling you that the 80 percent PIP scenario is the best estimate of performance.”).
289 Trial T7r. 624:14–19 (Dages).
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290 Trial Tr. 624:6–13 (Dages).
291 JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 107.
292 See Trial Tr. 554:6–556:21 (Dages). Using the BCP Case, Dages came up with a value of $137.00 per share. Pet'rs'
DX1 at 66. With the Massey Case, Dages arrived at a value of $138.87 per share. Id. The Bank Case produced a value
of $138.04 per share. Id.
293 Trial Tr. 1412:9–17 (Dages).
294 Trial Tr. 1413:7–1420:12 (Dages); Pet'rs' DX2 at 1; Pet'rs' DX3 at 1; Pet'rs' DX4 at 1.
295 See JX 1704 (Dages–Rebuttal) at 3.
296 Id. at 6.
297 Id. at 10.
298 Id. at 14–23.
299 Metrick is also no stranger to this Court. He holds a Ph.D. and A.M. from Harvard University and a M.A. and B.A. from
Yale University. He is currently the Michael H. Jordan Professor of Finance and Management at the Yale School of
Management. Prior to that, he was on the faculty at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania and at Harvard
University, and served as Senior Economist and Chief Economist for the Council of Economic Advisers in Washington,
D.C. JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 2.
300 Trial Tr. 1244:14–1245:23 (Metrick).
301 Trial Tr. 1241:3–17, 1244:14–1245:8 (Metrick).
302 JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 60.
303 Id. at 101–02.
304 Id. at 102.
305 Id. at 103.
306 Id. at 107–08. In his DCF analysis, Metrick used a 2% terminal growth rate, a WACC of 6.35% and a required investment
in the terminal period of $222 million. Id. at 117–18, Ex. 21, Ex. 23.
307 Id. at 142.
308 Id.
309 JX 2315 (Metrick–Supplemental).
310 Id. at 2.
311 Id.
312 See Trial Tr. 1272:2–5 (Metrick) (“In this particular case, Mr. Dages and I approached it in a broadly similar way and
ended up with discount rates that were fairly similar.”); JX 1704 (Dages–Rebuttal) at 4 (“Assuming the Court agrees that
PetSmart's Management Projections are the appropriate basis for a fair value calculation, the range of expert opinions
of fair value based on a DCF analysis would be $128.78 to $133.94 per share, with the $133.84 per share DCF value
resulting from Professor Metrick's WACC and terminal period growth assumptions and the lower $128.78 per share DCF
value coming from [Dages's] analysis.”); JX 2028 (Metrick Dep.) 639:11–14 (“Q. But if I put the [Management Projections]
through your model and his model, if we use the same models, we are going to come very, very close; correct? A. That
is correct.”). See also JX 1704 (Dages–Rebuttal) at 23 (“The heart of any free cash flow-based valuation analysis—
either a WACC-based DCF or an APV-based DCF model—is the underlying financial forecast.”). I note that while Dages
uses a WACC-based DCF and Metrick uses an APV-based DCF, if the analyses are performed correctly, both models
should yield substantially the same result. Trial Tr. 1274:9–15 (Metrick); JX 1704 (Dages–Rebuttal) at App. A ¶ 1. The two
experts are also “in general agreement regarding the appropriate levered beta,” though Dages derives his beta estimate
from PetSmart's historical data and peer betas while Metrick combined the historical beta for PetSmart with an industry
average. JX 1703 (Metrick–Rebuttal) at 34.
313 Trial Tr. 1303:8–1304:3 (Metrick); Trial Tr. 636:6–15 (Dages).
314 Trial Tr. 1371:24–1372:5 (Metrick); Trial Tr. 636:6–15 (Dages).
315 See JX 2028 (Metrick Dep.) 639:5–10.
316 See Trial Tr. 1302:16–20 (Metrick) (“But that essentially—this boils down the difference. On the DCF, we have a lot of
things that are the same, but ultimately we disagree about what the right model is for this company in the long-run and
what will happen to their returns.”).
317 Trial Tr. 1305:20–1307:21 (Metrick).
318 Trial Tr. 1367:15–1369:4 (Metrick).
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319 Trial Tr. 572:22–574:10 (Dages); JX 1704 (Dages–Rebuttal) at Ex. 6D.
320 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
321 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 296 (Del. 1996).
322 Id.
323 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983).
324 Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 218 (Del. 2010) (declining to adopt a rule requiring this Court to defer
to the deal price in appraisal proceedings). See also id. (reiterating that appraisal is designed to be a flexible process
and “declin[ing] to adopt a rule that binds public companies to previously prepared company specific data in appraisal
proceedings,” noting that the statute provides this Court with “significant discretion”).
325 See Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Gp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 356–57 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“As I perceive it, I
am free to consider all non-speculative elements of value, provided that I honor the fair value definition articulated by
the Delaware Supreme Court.... I am empowered to come up with a valuation, drawing on what I reasonably conclude
is the most reliable evidence of value in the record.”).
326 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
327 See Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 7324170, at *16 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (recognizing
that “[t]he relevant factors can vary from case to case depending on the nature of the company, the overarching market
dynamics, and the areas on which the parties focus.... An argument may carry the day in a particular case if counsel
advance it skillfully and present persuasive evidence to support it. The same argument may not prevail in another case if
the proponents fail to generate a similarly persuasive level of probative evidence or if the opponents respond effectively.”).
328 Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. Ch. 2007) (quoting M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737
A.2d 513, 520 (Del. 1999)). See also Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *12 (“Each party also bears the burden
of proving the constituent elements of its valuation position by a preponderance of the evidence, including the propriety
of a particular method, modification, discount, or premium. If both parties fail to meet the preponderance standard on the
ultimate question of fair value, the Court is required under the statute to make its own determination.”) (quoting Jesse
A. Finkelstein & John D. Hendershot, Appraisal Rights in Mergers & Consolidations, 38–5th C.P.S. §§ IV(H)(3), at A–
89 to A–90 (BNA)).
329 Taylor v. American Specialty Retailing Gp., Inc., 2003 WL 21753752, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 25, 2003).
330 Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *13 (quoting Finkelstein, 2005 WL 1074364, at *12).
331 Del. Open MRI Radiology Assoc., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 310 (Del. Ch. 2006).
332 M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 795 (Del. 1999).
333 See, e.g., Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *33; Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015 WL 6164771,
at *18 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Intern. Corp., 2015 WL 4540443, at *24 (Del. Ch.
June 30, 2015); Merlin P'rs LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 WL 2069417, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015); Ancestry.com, 2015
WL 399726, at *24; Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 WL 5878807, at *15 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013), aff'd, 2015 WL
631586 (Del. Feb. 12, 2015) (TABLE); Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 364.
334 Unimation, Inc., 1991 WL 29303, at *17.
335 DFC, 2016 WL 3753123, at *21. See also Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *16 (collecting cases).
336 Chuck Carlson, Game of My Life: 25 Stories of Packer Football (Sports Pub. 2004) (quoting Coach Lombardi as opening
his first Packers team meeting in 1959, after twenty years of coaching, by saying: “Gentleman, we are going to relentlessly
chase perfection, knowing full well we will not catch it, because nothing is perfect”).
337 See AutoInfo, 2015 WL 2069417, at *14 (observing that no “real-world sales process” will live up to “a perfect, theoretical
model”).
338 Lender Processing identifies a number of structural factors that may be relevant when determining whether the merger
consideration was a reliable indicator of the company's fair value including “meaningful competition among multiple
bidders during the pre-signing phase,” the availability of “adequate and reliable information” to participants in the auction,
the “absence of any explicit or implicit collusion,” and “the lack of a topping bid.” 2016 WL 7324170, at *16–26. Of course,
the court also recognized that the relevant considerations will be deal and company specific and that the court's focus
will be sharpened by the arguments offered by counsel. Id. at *16. My analysis of the reliability of deal price as a product
of the efficacy of the sales process necessarily has been shaped by the arguments of counsel and the evidence they
chose to present at trial.
339 Trial Tr. 398:22–399:7 (Gangwal).
340 JX 337; JX 339; Trial Tr. 400:7–16 (Gangwal).
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341 Trial Tr. 427:7–430:12, 439:11 (Gangwal).
342 See Trial Tr. 405:8–406:2 (Gangwal).
343 Trial Tr. 418:24–419:8 (Gangwal). See also PTO ¶ 219.
344 JX 984; JX 910 at PETS_APP00177993; JX 936; JX 934; JX 1200.
345 See Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc. (Golden Telecom I ), 993 A.2d 497, 507 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del.
2010) (“an arms-length merger price resulting from an effective market check is entitled to great weight in an appraisal.”).
346 Trial Tr. 907:5–12 (Aiyengar).
347 Trial Tr. 439:11 (Gangwal) (The Board, in determining whether to accept BC Partners' offer of $83 per share “[was]
looking at greater value if [it] could [get it].”). See also Trial Tr. 439:4–441:9 (Gangwal).
348 JX 1336 at 38; Trial Tr. 324:7–15 (Teffner).
349 See Pet'rs' Post–Trial Br. 53–54.
350 Trial Tr. 755:6–757:6 (Svider); Trial Tr. 917:4–918:10 (Aiyengar).
351 Cf. Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *18 (observing that “if bidders perceive a sale process to be relatively open,
then a credible threat of competition can be as effective as actual competition”).
352 See, e.g., Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *26–29 (relying on the merger price in a sale to a private equity
buyer); BMC, 2015 WL 6164771, at *18 (determining that the deal price was the most reliable indicator of fair value in case
involving sale to a group of private equity buyers); AutoInfo, 2015 WL 2069417, at *12 (same); Ancestry.com, 2015 WL
399726, at *23–24 (same); CKx, 2013 WL 5878807, at *13 (same). I note that the LBO model and DCF model both rely
upon the same expected cash flows. The LBO model, however, is risk adjusted to account for post-transaction leverage.
It follows, then, that the higher rate of return sought by bidders employing an LBO model will be offset by the fact that
most of the purchase price is financed with debt which, in turn, creates a higher return on equity. Moreover, companies
with a history of lagging performance may be valued more by financial bidders with a plan to turn around the company
than strategic bidders who might be less inclined to take on that risk. Stated more simply, there are two sides to the “LBO
model” argument. JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 49–56; Trial Tr. 1277:4–1281:22 (Metrick). While there may be some
intuitive appeal to Petitioners' argument that the requisite IRR embedded in the LBO model will drive lower valuations,
the evidence in this trial record did not support that argument or demonstrate that this dynamic was in play during the
auction for PetSmart. Accord Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, Strategic and Financial Bidders in Takeover
Auctions, 69 J. Fin. 2513, 2514–16, 2532 (2014) (conducting an analysis of values paid by strategic and financial bidders
and concluding that both, on average, pay more than the company's value under current management and that, in the
case of 22.4% of the targets within the sample, those targets, all “mature, poorly performing companies,” were “valued
more by an average financial bidder than by an average strategic bidder”).
353 See Trial Tr. 405:8–406:2, 427:7–430:12, 439:11 (Gangwal). Nor does the evidence suggest that PetSmart was sold at a
time of market or internal uncertainty. The market trends confronting PetSmart had been in place for some time and the
Company's struggles were not of recent origin. See, e.g., Resp't's RX–6 (displaying PetSmart's historical comparative
store sales growth beginning Q1 2011, showing that comparable store sales growth declined continually from Q1 2012
through Q1 2014 and then continued to slide in 2015 after a minor uptick Q4 2014). See also JX 2307 (Weinsten–
Opening) at 16–26 (describing the challenges facing PetSmart in the period leading up to the Merger). This is not a case
like DFC, where the company was confronting acute regulatory uncertainty at the time it was sold. 2016 WL 3753123, at
*22. PetSmart's Board was able to weigh the Company's options on a clear day and make the decision it believed was
in the best interest of the Company and its stockholders.
354 See, e.g., Trial Tr. 410:10–20, 418:20–419:8, 437:2–441:9 (Gangwal).
355 See Trial Tr. 908:14–910:23 (Aiyengar) (“[V]aluation was presented to the board at multiple different times here. I don't
remember all the dates. But starting from—from the time the plan was finalized in September, I think most of the other
board presentations ... had some sort of valuation discussion.”). See also JX 1158.
356 See In re Inergy LP, 2010 WL 4273197, at *14 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 2010) (holding that financial advisor's “prior dealings”
with counterparty to the proposed transaction “d[id] not show that [the transaction committee's] decision to retain [that
advisor] ... was unreasonable”); Emerald P'rs v. Berlin, 2001 WL 115340, at *7 n.17 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7) (rejecting argument
that target banker's work for the buyer created a conflict of interest), vacated on other grounds, 787 A.2d 85 (Del.
2001); Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning, Inc., C.A. No. 5402–VCS, at *87–88 (Del. Ch. May 13, 2010)
(TRANSCRIPT) (noting that the presence of a conflict “doesn't mean that [the advisor] can't be the banker.... I'd rather
have some of the best bankers with their conflicts disclosed than some of the worst bankers who don't have any conflicts”);
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Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 582 (noting that a company's investment bankers working with private equity bidders prior to
a sales process was “one of the facts of business life”).
357 JX 1679 (Aiyengar Dep. Day 1) 29:5–9.
358 See Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 358.
359 See, e.g., Trial Tr. 447:4–7 (Gangwal) (Q. “And did [PetSmart's] performance in the fourth quarter [of 2014], did that in any
way affect your view of the long-term value of the company?” A. “No.”); Trial Tr. 273:24–24 (Teffner) (Q. “Did [PetSmart's
Q4 2014] results change your view of the long-term prospects of the company?” A. “No.” Q. “Why not?” A. “Because it was
one quarter.”). Petitioners contend that PetSmart's Q4 2014 results were released too close to the closing of the Merger
for potential bidders to digest them. This ignores the fact that bidders were constantly updated regarding PetSmart's
performance, so they received information about PetSmart's Q4 performance in real time well before the market. See,
e.g., JX 1090; Trial Tr. 263:7–20 (Teffner); Trial Tr. 735:17–737:21 (Svider).
360 JX 1598 at PETS_APP00842050.
361 JX 1656 at PETS_APP00821450–51, 57.
362 Ramtron, 2015 WL 4540443, at *21.
363 DFC, 2016 WL 3753123, at *21.
364 BMC, 2015 WL 6164771, at *11 (observing that the court may rely upon “the merger price itself as evidence of fair value,
so long as the process leading to the transaction is reliable indicator of value and any merger-specific value in that price
is excluded.”). I note that there is no need or basis to adjust the Merger Price in recognition of either positive or negative
synergies associated with the combination of PetSmart and BC Partners since the buyer here “was a financial buyer rather
than a strategic acquirer,” DFC, 2016 WL 3753123, at *20 n.230, and there was no evidence presented that synergies
unique to private equity sponsors were present here. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Rationalizing
Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1021, 1050 (2009) (discussing synergies financial buyers
may have with target firms arising from other companies in their portfolio and reduced agency costs).
365 Gonsalves, 701 A.2d at 362.
366 Pet'rs' Post–Trial Br. at 14.
367 JX 1714 (Metrick Dep.) 245:17–19; Trial Tr. 1317:10–21 (Metrick); JX 63 at 14.
368 See, e.g., Owen v. Cannon, 2015 WL 3819204, at *29 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2015); Golden Telecom I, 993 A.2d at 499.
369 I note that both valuation experts agree that no other valuation methodology (e.g., comparable company or comparable
transaction analyses) would make sense here, particularly given the rather unique nature of PetSmart's retail business.
See JX 1698 (Dages–Opening) at 73; JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 142. I agree and will not discuss these methodologies
further.
370 Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 WL 2045640, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005) (citation omitted).
371 See Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 WL 3793896, at *11 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013); Ramtron, 2015 WL
4540443, at *10. See also JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 106–07; JX 1698 (Dages–Opening) at 23–24.
372 Ramtron, 2015 WL 4540443, at *10. See also id. at *18 (stating that where there are no “reliable five-year projections,
any values generated by a DCF analysis are meaningless”); CKx, 2013 WL 5878807, at *11 (noting that “methods of
valuation, including a discounted cash flow analysis, are only as good as the inputs to the model”); Andaloro, 2005 WL
2045640, at *9 (noting that this court may give a DCF analysis great weight in an appraisal proceeding “when it may be
used responsibly”). Dages agrees. Trial Tr. 624:6–13 (Dages) (“Garbage in; garbage out.”).
373 See Trial Tr. 621:2–8 (Dages); Trial Tr. 1240:18–23 (Metrick).
374 CKx, 2013 WL 5878807, at *9.
375 See In re Nine Sys. Corp. S'holders Litig., 2014 WL 4383127, at *41 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014) (citing Kahn v. Household
Acq. Corp., 591 A.2d 166, 175 (Del. 1991)).
376 Nine Sys., 2014 WL 4383127, at *42.
377 Trial Tr. 208:4–209:3 (Teffner). See also Trial Tr. 34:1–23 (Cohen) (Petitioners' retail expert testifying that retail operates
on a one-year cycle, so that creating detailed projections beyond one-year made little sense).
378 Trial Tr. 213:7–19 (Teffner) (explaining that Vance's model “was not presented to management, was not presented to the
board for approval; [instead it] was more of an inherent working tool for the planning department, but it wasn't considered
a multiyear projection that the business relied upon”).
379 Trial Tr. 219:9–22, 229:2–13, 236:8–16 (Teffner).
380 See Ramtron, 2015 WL 4540443, at *11 (discounting the reliability of management projections since their ability to be
accurate forecasters “more than two quarters out was quite poor” and noting that “management's lack of success in
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accurately projecting future revenue in the past provides another reason to doubt the reliability of the Management
Projections”); AutoInfo, 2015 WL 2069417, at *8 (finding it significant in its assessment of the reliability of management
projections that “[m]anagement itself had no confidence in its ability to forecast”).
381 JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 65, Fig. 11.
382 Trial Tr. 368:14–16 (Teffner) (“[The Management Projections were] our best foot forward to potential buyers around the
performance of the company, given the initiatives.”). See also Trial Tr. 242:10–243:2, 256:7–17, 260:5–261:10, 268:9–
269:5, 270:1–11, 370:19–23 (Teffner).
383 JX 671 at PETS_APP00215455.
384 JX 1674 (Vance Dep.) 135:5–137:3.
385 JX 1684 (Lenhardt Dep.) 275:14–21. See also JX 2307 (Weinsten–Opening) at Ex. 8 n.52.
386 It should also be noted that management's projections were “top down” rather than “bottom up” projections, which is
contrary to best practices. JX 2307 (Weinsten–Opening) at 6–7.
387 Trial Tr. 434:16–436:19 (Gangwal).
388 Specifically, Petitioners contend, “PetSmart outperformed the projections immediately, with that outperformance
accelerating from signing through, and well after, closing.” Pet'rs' Post–Trial Br. 44. See also id. at 47 (“PetSmart's post-
closing performance ... blew the Management Projections out of the water.”).
389 Petitioners argue that Respondent is unduly “fixated” on the comparable store sales growth. See id. at 48–53. However,
the PetSmart financial model was premised largely on this important growth metric. Indeed, management appeased the
PetSmart Board's desire to make the projections for the sale process more aggressive by increasing the comparable
store sales growth from the Base to the Base–Plus Cases to the final Management Projections. See JX 598 at
PETS_APP00611653, 656; JX 798 (Comp_Trend tab). Suffice it to say, I am satisfied that “comp” is an important metric
to measure performance and growth. In any event, whether or not the comparable store sales growth is important for the
long-term prospects of the Company, as the parties dispute, based upon the evidence adduced at trial, this metric was
indisputably central to the creation of the Management Projections and therefore directly indicative of their reliability.
390 Trial Tr. 338:22–339:10 (Teffner).
391 Trial Tr. 339:23–340:11 (Teffner). Petitioners also point to other cost-savings proposals created by consultants estimating
even greater savings, arguing that the consultants found an additional $473–$685 million in cost savings. Pet'rs' Post–
Trial Br. 32. There is no evidence that PetSmart management ever thought these pitches from the paid consultants were
actually achievable. For his part, Massey explicitly rejected the consultants' pitches as providing any meaningful input for
a valuation of PetSmart because they were nothing more than “ideas.” Trial Tr. 1105:1–5, 1106:5–1107:1 (Massey).
392 JX 807 at PETS_APP00000690; JX 728.
393 CKx, 2013 WL 5878807, at *9 (“[W]ithout reliable five-year projections, any values generated by a DCF analysis are
meaningless.”). See also id. at *11 n.113 (“If I were to apply a DCF analysis in this matter, by choosing between speculative
revenue estimates ... I would simply lend a faux-mathematic precision to a patently speculative enterprise: I would
become, to use Twain's memorable locution, no better than a hair-ball oracle.”); Ramtron, 2015 WL 4540443, at *18
(determining that there were no reliable five-year projections in the record, and therefore declining to rely upon a DCF
analysis); Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL 1152338, at *7 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2004) (declining to use a DCF
analysis to value a company where the record did not contain any reasonably reliable contemporaneous projections of
the company's future cash flows, rendering “a DCF analysis of marginal utility as a valuation technique”).
394 To be clear, Dages performed a DCF analysis with Management Projections and the Bank Case in his initial report. JX
1698 (Dages–Opening) at 59, 65. He prepared his DCF on the BCP Case and the Massey Case in advance of his direct
testimony at trial. Trial Tr. 554:7–556:21, 603:1–4 (Dages).
395 See, e.g., AutoInfo, 2015 WL 2069417, at *15.
396 Highfields Capital, 939 A.2d at 42 (“The corporation subject to valuation is viewed as a going concern based upon the
operative reality of the company at the time of the merger. This value must be reached regardless of the synergies
obtained from the consummation of the merger, and cannot include speculative elements of value arising from the
merger's accomplishment or expectation.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
397 Id. See also Cede & Co. v. JRC Acq. Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *7 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (rejecting one party's
valuation expert's attempt to use the debt incurred in the merger as a justification for his debt-to-equity ratio in his DCF
analysis because nothing relating to the merger itself “can be included as an element of value”).
398 Trial Tr. 741:19–742:22 (Svider) (describing the complete management turnover that BC Partners believed was
necessary at PetSmart, as “it was our view that in order to turn this business around, you needed to implement very
profound changes to the management team” so that once the Merger closed, BC Partners “basically changed not
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only the whole top management, but you know, pretty much the whole management of the company”). See also JX
1236 at BC00043779–93 (detailing Massey's loyalty, store associate behavior, product optimization, product expansion,
marketing and merchandising, net price, supply chain and freight, consumable vendors negotiations, Asia sourcing,
field payroll, overhead, occupancy cost and other operating, general and administrative initiatives); Trial Tr. 1027:7–
11; 1030:8–1045:3 (Massey) (describing his proposed initiatives and how they differed from current management's
initiatives); Trial Tr. 1041:23–1042:12 (Massey) (stating that, after a meeting where they discussed current management's
progress on its initiatives, “I had a lot of concern. Many of the initiatives didn't seem to have much backing them up. And
what was really concerning were the—a number of the senior managers really couldn't articulate how they were going to
execute these things. Some could, and some did a very good job. But some of the most important ones in merchandising
and marketing, we had walked away with a lot of concerns”); Trial Tr. 1048:3–22 (Massey) (describing his worries about
the achievability of his plan leading up to the consummation of the Merger because “I had serious doubts about relying on
the people, a number of the people. There were a lot of good people, but there [were] other people I was very concerned
about. And I knew I would have to make a tremendous amount of change”).
399 Id. See also JX 1676 (Svider Dep.) 38:6–9, 145:14–23.
400 Trial Tr. 743:21–746:4 (Svider) (describing the purpose of a bank case).
401 Id.
402 Ramtron, 2015 WL 4540443, at *18 (holding that a DCF analysis built on unreliable projections is “meaningless”).
403 Trial Tr. 1411:23–1429:18 (Dages); JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 108–09; JX 2315 (Metrick–Supplemental) at 1.
404 JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 103.
405 Trial Tr. 436:13–19 (Gangwal).
406 Trial Tr. 1412:9–1414:19 (Dages).
407 Trial Tr. 1415:19–1416:5, 1416:15–21 (Dages).
408 Pet'rs' DX 2 at 2; Pet'rs' DX 3 at 2; Pet'rs' DX 4 at 2.
409 Id.
410 Trial Tr. 1413:19–1414:3 (Dages); Pet'rs' DX 2 at 3; Pet'rs' DX 3 at 3; Pet'rs' DX 4 at 3.
411 Trial Tr. 1417:6–17, 1420:2–12 (Dages); Pet'rs DX 2 at 3; Pet'rs' DX 3 at 3; Pet'rs' DX 4 at 3. Dages used real rates in
this method, whereas Metrick had used nominal rates. Trial Tr. 1413:4–6.
412 Pet'rs' DX 2 at 3; Pet'rs' DX 3 at 3; Pet'rs' DX 4 at 3.
413 JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 102.
414 Id. at 102–03.
415 Id. at 103.
416 Id.
417 Trial Tr. 1403:4–21 (Metrick).
418 JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 103.
419 JX 24 at 108–11. This is also consistent with Weinsten's experiences. Trial Tr. 1206:9–19 (Weinsten).
420 JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 94–95.
421 JX 2315 (Metrick–Supplemental) at 1. I note for clarity that the JPM sensitivities are the cash flows from JPM's valuation
model, and therefore distinct from the adjustments that Metrick made to the Management Projections to reflect his view
of the expected cash flows for the DCF he performed in his initial report. See id. at 3.
422 Id. at 2. Metrick focused on Sensitivity # 2 “for simplicity” because, given the assumptions in Sensitivity # 3 and Sensitivity
# 4 regarding new store growth, his DCF analysis on Sensitivity # 2 would result in a higher valuation for PetSmart. Id.
at 1. Since the differences across the sensitivities are assumptions regarding new store growth, Metrick's criticisms of
Dages' DCF analysis would apply equally to all three sensitivities he analyzed. Id.
423 Id. at 5.
424 Id. at 6.
425 Id.; JX 1698 (Dages–Opening) at 58, Ex. 21. See also id. at 33 (noting that a company's WACC is “based on the company's
expected or target capital structure, that is, the relative proportion of debt and equity ownership”).
426 JX 2315 (Metrick–Supplemental) at 6.
427 Id.
428 Id.
429 Id. at 6–7 (citing JX 1723 at row 128 of ‘Financial Build’ tab; JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 109).
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430 Id. at 7.
431 Id. at 1; JX 1336 at 35.
432 JX 2315 (Metrick–Supplemental) at 7–8, 8 n.18; JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 115–117. Both Dages and Metrick chose
inflation for the perpetual growth rate; they just chose two different rates of inflation. Trial Tr. 537:4–10 (Dages).
433 JX 2315 (Metrick–Supplemental) at 8. See also id. at 6 n.14, Ex. 4.
434 Id. at 8. See also id. at 6 n.15, Ex. 3.
435 To be fair, Metrick performed his DCF as a fallback. His showcase opinion is that the Merger Price of $83 per share
reflects fair value and that DCF is not a reliable indicator of value in this case. Trial Tr. 1268:21–1269:8 (Metrick).
436 JX 2315 (Metrick–Supplemental) at 7–8, 8 n.18; JX 1697 (Metrick–Opening) at 115–117; JX 1233 at 29–31; JX 1691;
Trial Tr. 714:10–21 (Dages).
437 See, e.g., In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL 227634, at *4 n.16 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 2011)
(stating that the convergence model is “a reflection of the widely-accepted assumption that for companies in highly
competitive industries with no competitive advantages, value-creating investment opportunities will be exhausted over
a discrete forecast period, and beyond that point, any additional growth will be value-neutral” leading to the “return on
new investment in perpetuity [converging] to the company's cost of capital”); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1990 WL
161084, at *26 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990), consolidated with Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 1991 WL 111134 (Del. Ch.
June 24, 1991), and aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (discussing that “profits
above the cost of capital in an industry will attract competitors, who will over some time period drive returns down to the
point at which returns equal the cost of capital”).
438 Trial Tr. 572:22–574:10 (Dages); Trial Tr. 1299:3–1302:24 (Metrick); JX 1691.
439 I cannot help but observe, however, that reliance upon the deal price as a reliable indicator of fair value in this case, where
the paid experts have offered such wildly different opinions on the subject, does project a certain elegance that is very
appealing. In an arm's-length transaction like the one here, the buyer and seller are both incented to value the company
as accurately as they can knowing that “they [will be] penalized in the marketplace” for failing to do so. See Daniel R.
Fischel, Market Evidence in Corporate Law, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 941, 943 (2002). “Paid experts in litigation who testify
about values derived from analyzing comparables or discounting future cash flows to present value, [on the other hand],
have very different incentives.” Id. Given this dynamic, Delaware courts must remain mindful that “the DCF method is [ ]
subject to manipulation and guesswork [and that] the valuation results that it generates in the setting of a litigation [can
be] volatile....” William T. Allen, Securities Markets as Social Products: The Pretty Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 28
J. Corp. L. 551, 560 (2003). The Merger Price, negotiated at arm's-length, in real time, after a well-run pre-signing auction
that takes place in the midst of a fully functioning market, is not burdened by such litigation-driven confounding influences.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
LASTER, V.C.
*1  This post-trial decision determines the fair value of the
common stock of Stillwater Mining Company (“Stillwater”
or the “Company”) as of May 4, 2017, which is when Sibanye
Gold Limited completed its acquisition of Stillwater through
a reverse-triangular merger (the “Merger”). Pursuant to an
agreement and plan of merger dated December 9, 2016 (the
“Merger Agreement”), each share of Stillwater common stock
was converted at closing into the right to receive $18.00,
subject to the right of each holder to eschew the merger
consideration and seek appraisal.
The petitioners perfected their appraisal rights and litigated
this appraisal proceeding. They contended that Stillwater's
fair value was $25.91 per share. To justify this outcome, they
relied on an expert who valued Stillwater using a discounted
cash flow (“DCF”) model.
The respondent in an appraisal proceeding is technically the
surviving corporation, but the real party in interest is the
acquirer. The petitioners' true opponent in this proceeding was
Sibanye.
Sibanye contended that Stillwater's fair value was $17.63
per share. To justify this outcome, Sibanye relied on a
combination of metrics, including the deal price, Stillwater's
unaffected trading price with an adjustment for a valuation
increase between the unaffected date and closing, and an
expert valuation based on a DCF model.
Sibanye proved that the sale process was sufficiently reliable
to make the deal price a persuasive indicator of fair value.
Although Sibanye argued for a deduction from the deal price
to account for value arising from the Merger, Sibanye failed
to prove that an adjustment was warranted.
The parties engaged in lengthy debate over whether
Stillwater's adjusted trading price could provide a persuasive
indicator of fair value. The reliability of the adjusted trading
price depended on the reliability of the unaffected trading
price, and both sides engaged experts who conducted analyses
and offered opinions about the attributes of the market for
Stillwater's common stock. The evidence demonstrated that
Stillwater's trading price could provide a persuasive indicator
of value, but that it was a less persuasive indicator than the
deal price. This decision therefore does not use a trading price
metric.
Neither side proved that its DCF valuation provided a
persuasive indicator of fair value. The experts disagreed over
too many inputs, and the resulting valuation swings were too
great, for this decision to rely on a model when a market-
tested indicator is available.
This decision concludes that the deal price is the most
persuasive indicator of fair value. Relying on any of the other
valuation metrics would introduce error. The fair value of
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The parties generated an extensive evidentiary record. They
commendably reached agreement on 283 stipulations of
fact. During four days of trial, they introduced 909 exhibits
and lodged twenty-one depositions in evidence. Three fact
witnesses and seven expert witnesses testified live. What
follows are the court's findings based on a preponderance of
the evidence.1
A. The Company
*2  At the time of the Merger, Stillwater was a Delaware
corporation engaged in the business of extracting, processing,
smelting, and refining minerals from an orebody known as the
J-M Reef. Located in in the western United States, the J-M
Reef contains deposits of palladium, platinum, and rhodium,
which are known in the mining industry as “platinum group
metals” or “PGMs.” These metals are rare, and the J-M Reef
is the only PGM asset in the United States. The other principal
sources of PGMs are located in South Africa, Russia, and
Zimbabwe, which present significantly greater political risk.
Stillwater was headquartered in Littleton, Colorado, and its
common stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange under
the symbol “SWC.” Stillwater's trading price was heavily
influenced by commodity prices for palladium and, to a lesser
degree, platinum.
At the time of the Merger, Stillwater's operations consisted of
two producing mines in south central Montana: the Stillwater
Mine and the East Boulder Mine. Stillwater's other assets
were development projects or exploratory properties that
were not yet generating revenue.
At the time of the Merger, Stillwater's two development
projects were Blitz and Lower East Boulder. Blitz expanded
the Stillwater Mine eastward. Lower East Boulder was a
contemplated expansion of the East Boulder mine. Stillwater's
two exploratory properties in the J-M Reef were Iron
Creek and the Boulder Extension. Outside of the J-M Reef,
Stillwater owned two other exploratory properties: (i) Altar,
a copper-gold-porphyry deposit in the San Juan province
of Argentina, and (ii) Marathon, a copper-PGM deposit in
Ontario, Canada.
At the time of the Merger, Michael “Mick” McMullen served
as Stillwater's President and CEO and as a member of its
board of directors (the “Board”). The other six members of
the Board were independent, outside directors:
• George Bee was a mining engineer who had held senior
management positions or served on the boards of other
mining companies.
• Patrice Merrin had served as an executive or director for
numerous companies and was a director of Glencore plc,
a multi-national mining firm. Merrin chaired the Board's
Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee.
• Peter O'Hagan had worked at Goldman Sachs for nearly
twenty-three years, including as co-head of its global
commodities business.
• Michael Parrett was a Chartered Professional Accountant
who had served in senior management positions and as
a director for other mining companies.
• Brian Schweitzer had served as Governor of Montana. He
was Chairman of the Board.
• Gary Sugar had spent thirty-two years at RBC Capital
Markets, where he specialized in the mining sector. He
served on the boards of other mining companies.
B. McMullen Convinces The Board To Build A Mid-Cap
Mining Company.
McMullen was hired in December 2013 as a “turnaround
CEO.” McMullen Tr. 814–16; see Schweitzer Tr. 170. By
early 2015, McMullen had refocused Stillwater's operations,
cut costs, and generally turned the Company around. At this
point, McMullen believed that market conditions favored
the creation of a mid-cap mining company. He thought
Stillwater could achieve this outcome either by growing
through acquisitions or by combining with another industry
player through a merger of equals.
During a meeting of the Board in June 2015, McMullen gave
a lengthy presentation on Company strategy that devoted
twenty-six slides to various alternatives. See JX 44 at '848 to
'874. McMullen's presentation discussed means of increasing
earnings, increasing the trading multiple, and optimizing the
capital structure, and then turned to the pros and cons of
selling some or all of the business. The presentation was
particularly negative about the prospect of a sale. See id.
at '866 to '868. In another presentation, McMullen devoted
over forty slides to discussing candidates for acquisitions or
mergers of equals. See id. at '929 to '970.
- 407 -
In re Stillwater Mining Company, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3
*3  In addition to his own presentation, McMullen provided
the Board with presentations from three investment banks.
McMullen had a close relationship Dan Vujcic, then an
investment banker with Jefferies Financial Group, Inc.,
and the Jefferies presentation was the most detailed. It
analyzed an acquisition of another base metals company,
focusing on Sandfire Resources NL, Western Areas Ltd.,
and Panoramic Resources Ltd. It also analyzed the possible
acquisition of a downstream company, a possible spinoff of
Stillwater's processing and trading business, and the option
of maintaining the status quo. See id. at '014 to '080. A
presentation from BMO Capital Markets was more of a
high-level pitch book, but it identified selected acquisition
opportunities. See id. at '081 to '183. A presentation from
Nomura Holdings, Inc. discussed alternatives for refinancing
Stillwater's convertible bonds. See JX 44 at '164 to '182.
Sibanye has argued that this meeting marked the start of the
Board's careful and thoughtful consideration of a sale of the
Company, but the purpose of the meeting was not to prepare
the Board for a sale. McMullen hoped to convince the Board
to back him in creating a mid-cap mining company.2 The
Board, however, resisted, recalling unsuccessful acquisitions
that had necessitated hiring a turnaround CEO in the first
place. During the June 2015 meeting, the Board did not
provide McMullen with a mandate to pursue any strategic
options. See JX 43.
After the June 2015 meeting, McMullen kept looking for
opportunities to build a mid-cap mining company. During the
second half of 2015, McMullen worked with Jefferies, BMO,
and Citigroup to identify acquisition targets and merger-of-
equals candidates.3 McMullen was focused on an acquisition,
particularly “something not in the PGM space to diversify
risk.” JX 59.
During a meeting of the Board in October 2015, McMullen
gave another presentation on the Company's strategy. See
JX 61 at '102 to '127. He highlighted the risks Stillwater
faced because of its dependence on palladium, which was
used principally in catalytic converters. His presentation
discussed the disruptive threat posed by electric cars, which
could displace gasoline-powered cars and render catalytic
converters obsolete. See id. at '105 (“Know Your Enemy
—Electric Cars”). He recommended making a diversifying
acquisition from which Stillwater would “emerge as a multi
mine, multi commodity and multi jurisdiction mid cap miner
with a bullet proof balance sheet.” Id. at '127. He then
reviewed six possible candidates: Sandfire, Western Areas,
Panoramic, Northern Star Resources Ltd., Imperial Metals,
and Hecla Mining Co. See id. at '128 to '179. He also
circulated a presentation from Jefferies that discussed an
acquisition of Sandfire. See id. at '249 to '292. During the
weeks after the meeting, Jefferies provided McMullen with
more detailed analyses of a deal with Northern Star, a large
gold producer in Australia. See JX 67; JX 68.
*4  In December 2015, McMullen and a team from Stillwater
visited the mining operations of Northern Star, where
McMullen had a close relationship with senior management.
During the visit, McMullen met with the CEO and CFO of
Northern Star and discussed a potential merger of equals. See
PTO ¶ 145; JX 73 at '867; see also JX 61 at '282 to '286; JX
67. At this point in time, a merger of equals with Northern
Star was McMullen's top choice among Stillwater's strategic
options.
During meeting of the Board in January 2016, McMullen
gave another presentation on the Company's strategy. See
JX 86 at '002 to '040. As with the meetings in June
and October 2015, his goal was to convince the Board
to authorize him to build Stillwater into a mid-cap metals
company. See JX 78 (McMullen discussing his desire to
“come away from [the January] board meeting with a clear
mandate”). McMullen recommended a merger of equals
with Northern Star as the best option, telling the Board
that the transaction “would make a very strong mid cap
precious metals miner.” JX 86 at '038. If Northern Star
would not engage, then he recommended acquiring Sandfire
or Western Areas. See id. at '039. He also identified some
smaller acquisitions that “should be pursued independently”
and “[r]egardless of whether Stillwater completes one of the
larger deals.” Id. at '040. Later in the meeting, he provided
additional information about the proposed M&A strategy and
further detail about Northern Star, Sandfire, Western Areas,
Panoramic, Hecla, and Imperial. See id. at "320 to '367.
McMullen also distributed a presentation from Jefferies that
analyzed mergers with Northern Star and Western Areas. See
id. at '275 to '319
At the conclusion of the January 2016 meeting, the Board
gave management a mandate, but it was broad and vague.
According to the minutes, “[t]he Board provided management
with a sense of the Board for management to continue to
pursue the options as discussed, but to return to the Board for
any final decision.” JX 90. During this litigation, Sibanye has
argued that this mandate authorized management to pursue
a sale of the Company, but that is not accurate.4 McMullen
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put it best when he told a banker at Blackstone that he had
“finally convinced the Stillwater board to go off and buy some
things.” JX 93 at '628; see Schweitzer Tr. 187.
C. The Company's Stock Price
While McMullen was trying to convince the Board to let
him “buy some things,” Stillwater's stock price was falling.
The decline began in June 2016 and continued steadily
through December. Over the course of this six month period,
Stillwater's stock price fell by over 40%, dropping from
$14.46 per share on June 1 to $8.57 per share on December 31.
The market drop did not reflect any problems with Stillwater's
operations. Instead, it reflected a decline in the spot price of
palladium, which fell by 27% from $773.70 per ounce on June
1 to $562.98 per ounce on December 31. PTO Exs. A, B.
During the Board meeting in January 2016, McMullen had
told the Board that “[d]espite our stock being down 40%, we
still have options open to us today.” JX 86 at '012. But during
the weeks following the January 2016 meeting, the stock price
fell further. On January 19, it closed at $5.29 per share, down
38% from its closing price of $8.57 per share on December
31. The drop corresponded with further declines in the spot
price of palladium, which closed on January 19 at $494.83
per ounce, down another 12% from its close of $562.98 per
ounce on December 31.
*5  The Company's dismal stock performance caused
McMullen to conclude that Stillwater did not have a currency
that it could use for either an acquisition or a merger of equals.
JX 93 at '628 (“[U]nfortunately the stock price has collapsed
in the last 2 weeks and I don't think Stillwater has the currency
to do anything anymore. Ce [sic] la vie.”); see McMullen Tr.
826; JX 97 at '308 to '310, '313. He felt Stillwater had missed
its opportunity to expand and was now just an “an option play
on the P[alladium] price.” JX 93 at '628; see JX 97 at '313
At this point, McMullen told a banker at Blackstone that
“[s]itting around for one or two years waiting for the price to
recover” was “not my idea of a job.” McMullen Tr. 828; JX
93 at '628. McMullen did not view himself as an “operational
CEO.” McMullen Tr. 814–16. He thought he “would become
bored.” McMullen Tr. 828. With his contract set to expire at
the end of the year, McMullen began thinking about what he
would do next, including the possibility of building a mining
portfolio company for Blackstone. See McMullen Tr. 828; JX
93 at '627 to '628.
D. Sibanye Contacts McMullen.
On January 30, 2016, Sibanye reached out through BMO
to arrange a meeting between McMullen and Sibanye's
CEO, Neal Froneman. Without telling the Board, McMullen
accepted.
The meeting took place at an industry conference on March
1, 2016. PTO ¶ 161. When Froneman broached the subject
of buying Stillwater, McMullen was receptive. He asked
Froneman to provide “an informal proposal” in writing that
included “an idea of valuation” and “transaction structure.”
JX 109 at '976; see PTO ¶ 164. Froneman had the impression
that a deal “was doable if we got the valuation right.” JX 109
at '976.
After the meeting, Froneman asked McMullen for “specific
guidance” about what would be acceptable. JX 110.
McMullen indicated that Sibanye's offer should include “a
large cash component.” JX 113 at '175. He also told Froneman
during these early discussions that an acceptable transaction
should be priced at a premium of 30% over Stillwater's thirty-
day volume-weighted average price (“VWAP”). Stewart Dep.
39; see also JX 162 at '283. Froneman agreed in principle
to this pricing metric, and he began organizing a team to
visit Stillwater's mines. See JX 113 at '174 to '175. Froneman
asked to enter into a confidentiality agreement to facilitate
diligence, but McMullen rejected the request, commenting
that he wanted “to see some form of indicative, non-binding
and highly confidential terms of a transaction before we go
too far down the path.” Id. at '174.
McMullen took all of these actions without involving the
Board. Indeed, he did not even inform the Board about
Sibanye's approach. See Schweitzer Tr. 189–92; Wadman
Tr. 657. Instead, on March 25, 2016, he agreed to extend
his employment for an additional two years. JX 114 § 4.1.
His original employment agreement had been scheduled to
terminate on December 31, 2016, and the Board had expected
that because McMullen was a short-term, turnaround CEO,
he would not stay beyond that date. Wadman Tr. 670–71;
see Wadman Dep. at 341; Schweitzer Tr. 170, 193. But with
acquisition talks in the offing, McMullen agreed to a new deal.
See JX 114.
The new employment agreement permitted McMullen to
serve concurrently as a director of Nevada Iron Limited and
New Chris Minerals Limited, which later became GT Gold
Corp. See JX 114 § 3.1, Ex. A. During 2016, McMullen
did more than serve on the boards of these companies. He
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became Executive Chairman and CEO of Nevada Iron, and
he served as Non-Executive Chairman and President of New
Chris. See McMullen Tr. 863–64; McMullen Dep. 45, 553;
JX 93 at '628. Both companies were Australian resource firms
whose equity comprised a significant portion of McMullen's
net worth. JX 157 at '315; see McMullen Tr. 709, 863–64.
Over the next year, while McMullen was busy selling the
Company, he also caused Nevada Iron and New Chris to
engage in transformative transactions.5
*6  In May 2016, the Board held its next regular meeting.
In connection with that meeting, McMullen did not inform
the Board about Sibanye's approach or his discussions with
Sibanye.6
E. Sibanye Submits An Indication Of Interest.
During the first week of June 2016, executives from both
Sibanye and Northern Star toured the Company's mines. PTO
¶¶ 171–72. Sibanye toured as part of their exploration of a
potential acquisition of the Company. Northern Star toured
separately, ostensibly as part of a mutual benchmarking
exercise but really in connection with a potential merger
of equals. McMullen and the Company's CFO, Christopher
Bateman, led Sibanye and Northern Star on separate tours
and ensured that neither saw one another. McMullen claimed
that despite keeping the two teams separate, each knew that
the other was on site because McMullen and Bateman would
alternate between the tours and McMullen had them both sign
the visitors log. McMullen said he did this as a clever way
to create competition between the firms. See McMullen Tr.
726–27.
After the visits, McMullen believed that a deal with Sibanye
was more likely than with Northern Star. See JX 140 at
'048; JX 142. Toward the end of June 2016, Northern
Star reported that they were primarily interested in a joint
venture involving Blitz. JX 145 at '845. That possibility did
not interest McMullen. Id. Meanwhile, McMullen pushed
Sibanye to provide an indication of interest in advance of
the Board's next meeting, which was scheduled for July 28,
2016.7
Sibanye began working with Citigroup to develop its bid. Two
of the Citigroup bankers had previously advised McMullen
and Bateman about the Company's alternatives. As part of
its advice, Citigroup had recommended against a sale of the
Company because of the limited universe of potential buyers.
See JX 32 at '829; cf. JX 42 at '422.
On July 21, 2016, Sibanye provided McMullen with a non-
binding indication of interest to acquire Stillwater at $15.75
per share in cash, which valued the Company at $1.9 billion.
PTO ¶ 177; JX 165. The letter described that price as
reflecting “a 30% premium to Stillwater's volume-weighted
average share price [ (VWAP) ] of US$12.12 over the last 20
trading days prior to 20 July 2016.” JX 165 at '880; see PTO
¶ 178.
As suggested by Sibanye's offer, Stillwater's stock price
had mostly recovered, reflecting a recovery in the price of
palladium. At the beginning of July 2016, the stock closed
at $12.25 per share, up 132% from its low of $5.29 in
January. During that same period, the palladium spot price
had increased 22% to $605.63 per ounce. PTO Exs. A, B.
Despite the stock's performance, McMullen did not revisit
potential acquisitions or a merger of equals. He was now
focused on selling the Company. See JX 156 (email from
Vujcic to McMullen stating, “[W]e'll make sure the company
gets sold. Don't worry about that.”).
F. McMullen Presents The Indication Of Interest To The
Board.
*7  On July 27 and 28, 2016, the Board held a regularly
scheduled meeting. At the end of the two-day meeting,
the directors held a forty-five minute “executive session”
with McMullen, who distributed and walked through a
presentation titled “Business Development Update.” JX 151
at '551; see Schweitzer Tr. 193; JX 526 at '377; Wadman
Tr. 657–64. The presentation compared the Company's recent
performance to various potential transaction partners, then
described the pros and cons of transactions with Northern
Star and Sibanye. After summarizing the terms of Sibanye's
expression of interest, the presentation described the premium
as “within the right range for shareholder value” and “broadly
within the range of mining transactions.” JX 151 at '568.
McMullen gave his “strong recommendation ... to engage
with Sibanye and attempt to conclude [due diligence] as
quickly as possible (likely to take 2 months) and achieve
a higher price.” Id. McMullen added that he would “look
to engage with other potential bidders on a low key and
informal basis to determine if there are alternative bidders.”
Id. He warned: “The list of other potential bidders is
short given the commodity, size of transaction and whether
[Stillwater's] shareholders would want their paper. The
process of determining if there are alternatives will not be a
long process.” Id. He also told the directors that “[t]he market
appears to be open for people to carry out M+A, and asset
- 410 -
In re Stillwater Mining Company, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6
values have risen to a level where you want to be a seller rather
than a buyer.” Id.
Brent Wadman, the Company's General Counsel, became
concerned about what took place during the July meeting.
He had not been asked to stay for the executive session and
was not given access to McMullen's presentation. See JX 526
at '377; Wadman Tr. 657–64. He suspected that McMullen
was running a sale process on his own, without Board
oversight, and potentially using it as a means of exiting from
the Company. Wadman believed that as General Counsel,
he should have been involved. After the July meeting,
Wadman asked McMullen to include him in the planning
process. McMullen rebuffed him, saying that Wadman would
be “brought in at a later date” and “offer[ing] no other
information.” JX 526 at '377; Wadman Tr. 658.
After the July meeting, McMullen told Sibanye to submit its
list of due diligence questions so the Company could start
pulling the information together. He told Sibanye to direct all
inquiries to himself or Bateman. See PTO ¶ 181; JX 183.
G. McMullen Remains Committed To Sibanye.
On August 9, 2016, Stillwater and Sibanye entered into a
confidentiality agreement, and Sibanye gained access to the
data room. PTO ¶ 183; JX 525 at 26; see also JX 194. On
August 10, the Board met again. See JX 193. McMullen
testified that at this meeting, the Board instructed him “to go
out and ... to sign the NDAs with the likes of Sibanye, and
then, also, ... to get as much interest as possible.” McMullen
Tr. 835.
Rather than working closely with an investment bank to
develop a process designed to generate “as much interest
as possible,” McMullen pressed forward with Sibanye. He
interacted with some investment banks, but in a haphazard
and unstructured way. For example, back in July 2016, a
Macquarie banker had asked McMullen to meet for a market
update. See JX 167. On August 10, the same day that the
Board met, Macquarie proposed a formal engagement. Five
days later, McMullen told Macquarie that it was “a bit early
for us I think to be signing anyone up.” JX 196.
One week after the Board meeting, on August 18, 2016,
McMullen and Bateman met with Bank of America Merrill
Lynch (“BAML”), who had arranged the meeting to pitch
Stillwater on possible mergers of equals. See JX 199; see
also JX 163; JX 190. The BAML presentation materials did
not discuss a sale of the Company or mention Sibanye, and
McMullen and Bateman did not use the meeting to identify
other possible acquirers. Instead, the BAML bankers got “the
sense ... that a sale was a possibility,” and so they decided on
their own to “pivot[ ] to focus more, as time went on, on that.”
Hunt Dep. 35.
Acting on their own, the BAML bankers developed a
list of fifteen possible acquirers whom they approached
independently, pitching a potential acquisition of Stillwater as
“a banker idea.” JX 206 at '360. The record does not reveal
exactly how many companies BAML contacted, what the
BAML bankers said, or how seriously the companies took
the pitch. Because BAML did not know that Stillwater was
in discussions with Sibanye, they reached out to Sibanye
as part of these efforts, ironically describing that a deal for
Stillwater would be “[a] little pricey.” JX 207 at '093. In
the end, five companies expressed interest: Sibanye; Hecla;
Coeur Mining, Inc.; CITIC Resources Holdings Limited, and
Anemka Resources Ltd. See JX 211; JX 213; JX 214; JX 217
at '588 to '591.
*8  Having made these calls on their own, the BAML bankers
held a follow-up meeting with McMullen and Bateman on
September 7, 2016. The pitch book identified the parties
contacted and expressing interest. It then described three
types of sale processes Stillwater could pursue: a “proprietary
process” with a single bidder, a targeted auction involving
a limited number of likely buyers, or a broad auction
involving outreach to many potentially interested parties. JX
217 at '603. BAML recommended against the proprietary
process because the absence of competition would minimize
Stillwater's negotiating leverage. BAML also recommended
against a broad auction, given the existence of a “narrow list
of most likely buyers.” Id. This left a targeted auction as the
recommended route.
The pitch book described an illustrative timeline for a
sale process. BAML recommended allocating the rest
of September 2016 to contact potential buyers. During
October and early November, the Company would enter into
confidentiality agreements, respond to diligence requests, and
then receive and evaluate initial indications of interest. From
mid-November through early January 2017, the Company
would host site visits, provide additional diligence, and then
solicit and receive final bids. JX 217 at '605.
Nothing formal came out of the September 7 meeting.
McMullen and Bateman did not instruct BAML to proceed,
nor did they take BAML's recommendation to the Board.
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Instead, McMullen and Bateman asked BAML and Vujcic,
the investment banker who had been with Jefferies and
was now working on his own, to arrange meetings with
potential suitors at an industry conference during the week of
September 20, 2016. BAML arranged a meeting with Coeur,
and McMullen arranged a meeting with Hecla. See JX 220 at
'609; JX 222; JX 224; PTO ¶ 190–91. Vujcic set up meetings
with Kinross Gold Corporation and Gold Fields Limited,
neither of whom had expressed interest. During each meeting,
McMullen conducted what he called a “soft sound” regarding
potential interest in buying the Company. PTO ¶ 192; see id.
¶¶ 193–97.
On the last night of the conference, McMullen had dinner
with Froneman. McMullen told him that he “remain[ed]
committed” to a deal with Sibanye and that “no one else is in
the data room,” but cautioned that he was “being flooded by
investment banks” pitching ideas for deals with gold-mining
companies. JX 231 at '711.
After the conference, BAML sent McMullen “a fairly detailed
timeline” for a more compressed sale process. JX 225 at '629.
The new timeline contemplated the process starting during
the last week of September and ending during the first week
of December. See id. at '632. BAML anticipated site visits
taking place during November as part of the due diligence
phase, but McMullen told BAML that the site visits needed to
take place earlier in the process before parties sent their initial
indications of interest: “Unless people get to site, they can't
appreciate the scale of it and will not be putting their best foot
forward in the indicative, non binding offers.” JX 229 at '603.
BAML revised the timeline, noting that they were “putting
[it] together in a vacuum of info on what's taken place.” Id.
At this point, BAML had not been retained and did not yet
know about Sibanye's bid. They only knew about their own,
independent efforts to solicit interest.
H. The Board Decides Not To Form A Special Committee.
In anticipation of a board meeting on October 3, 2016,
Wadman circulated a “list of potential buyers” to the directors.
JX 234. The list identified eighteen companies and the
status of Stillwater's discussions with each. According to
the list, Sibanye had completed its first phase of diligence
and was working with Citigroup to secure financing. Hecla
and Coeur had expressed interest, entered into non-disclosure
agreements (“NDAs”), and scheduled site visits. Northern
Star was listed as “interested but very foucssed [sic] on a
gold deal.” Id. at '630. Six other companies were described
as “[p]otentially interested” or as having “some interest,”
including Anglo American Platinum Limited (“Amplats”). Id.
Six candidates were described as “[u]nlikely” and two as “not
interested.” Id. The list omitted CITIC and Anemka, even
though both had expressed interest when BAML called with
its “banker's idea.”
*9  The list identified a representative who was responsible
for interacting with each company. Evidencing the
uncoordinated, unstructured nature of the Company's process,
the list identified a hodgepodge of names. Vujcic was the
contact for eight companies. BAML was the contact for
four companies. Jefferies was the contact for another three.
Macquarie was the contact for one company. An executive
at New Chris, the company where McMullen served as Non-
Executive Chairman and President, was listed as the contact
for another company. No one had been formally engaged. Two
companies had no contact listed.
During the meeting, McMullen reported on the Company's
outreach to the various parties. After his presentation, the
directors instructed McMullen to obtain formal proposals
from investment banks for a sell-side engagement. The Board
also instructed McMullen to create a cash flow model that
could be used to value the Company. See JX 246 at '308 to
'309.
Ever since the July 2016 meeting, Wadman had been
concerned that McMullen was running a sale process to
facilitate his exit from the Company. After McMullen
rebuffed him, Wadman had shared his concerns privately with
Schweitzer and Merrin. See Wadman Tr. 664–65; Schweitzer
Tr. 157–58, 194. Neither took action.
During the October meeting, Wadman presented his concerns
to the full Board and recommended the formation of a special
committee to oversee the sale process. Lucy Stark of Holland
& Hart LLP, the Company's longstanding outside counsel,
disagreed and advised the Board that she did not believe
any conflict existed that warranted the creation of a special
committee. JX 246 at '309; see Schweitzer Tr. 159.
The directors other than McMullen then met in executive
session. Schweitzer reported to Wadman that the Board had
decided to form a special committee, and Wadman drafted
a set of minutes memorializing the decision. See JX 238 at
'245; Wadman Dep. 134–35; see also Schweitzer Tr. 205–06.
But in the meantime, McMullen learned of the decision from
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two other directors. McMullen Tr. 745–47. The final minutes
described the outcome of the executive session as follows:
- No decision was made to pursue or not pursue a
potential strategic transaction at this time. The Board
further discussed the potential for a committee and agreed
that, should the need arise, the committee would consist
of the entire Board with the exception of the CEO. It
also discussed timing and the potential engagement of an
investment banking firm to assist in the assessment process.
JX 246 at '310.
I. McMullen Continues To Focus on Sibyane.
On October 15, 2016, almost two weeks after the Board
directed McMullen to solicit terms from investment bankers,
McMullen finally drafted and sent out an email asking
bankers to respond “by no later than COB Wednesday
Oct 19 2016.” JX 279 at '867. Other than Macquarie, the
record does not reflect what bankers received the email or
whom McMullen solicited, but Macquarie, BMO, BAML,
and Jefferies submitted proposals.
On October 17, 2016, Froneman told McMullen that
Sibanye's offer of a “30% premium to VWAP remained
unchanged” and that Sibanye's board of directors
unanimously supported the transaction. JX 281 at '425.
McMullen responded that he remained fully supportive of
the deal. He also shared that Stillwater did not yet have a
banker, telling Froneman that he had started reaching out
to investment banks on a no-names basis. Demonstrating
his commitment to the deal, McMullen told Froneman that
he would be happy to have Stillwater's legal advisors start
putting together an initial sales agreement. Id.
The Board met again on October 26 and 27, 2016. After
reviewing the proposals from the investment banks, the Board
narrowed the list to BMO and BAML. JX 295 at '790.
Vujcic, whom McMullen regarded as his “in house banker,”
summarized the state of the Company's outreach. JX 293
at '521. Compare JX 262 at '485, with JX 234 at '630.
He reported that third parties exhibited a general “[l]ack of
knowledge around the significant improvement in operations
and general performance,” and he reported that a number of
parties were either focused on other deals, not considering
M&A because of prior bad acquisitions, or not considering
PGM companies because of negative associations with risky
jurisdictions like South Africa and Russia. JX 293 at '522. For
the first time, the Board authorized management “to engage
in discussions with strategic buyers, financial buyers or any
other party interested in consummating a potential strategic
transaction with the [Company].” JX 296 at '791.
*10  After the meeting, McMullen scheduled a second site
visit for Sibanye and discussed the “timelines to and post
announcement” with Froneman. JX 315 at '291 to '292; see
PTO ¶ 214. Sibanye convinced McMullen that they needed
to announce the deal by mid-December 2016. See JX 281 at
'425; JX 282 at '776; see also PTO ¶ 241.
J. BAML Begins An Abbreviated Pre-Signing Market
Check.
On November 7, 2016, the Board formally retained BAML.
PTO ¶¶ 216–17; see JX 323 at '371. The Board also decided
to hire “additional legal counsel with substantial experience
in advising Delaware publicly traded companies in respect of
potential strategic transactions.” JX 323 at '372. Four days
later, the Board retained Jones Day. PTO ¶ 232.
On November 8, 2016, Bateman sent BAML a package
of information that included Sibanye's indication of interest
from July, the non-disclosure agreements with Hecla and
Coeur, a cash flow model, and instructions for accessing the
data room. See JX 325; JX 326; JX 327; JX 328; JX 329. The
next day, BAML sent management a slide deck titled “M&A
Process Considerations.” JX 331 at '277.
BAML understood from management that Sibanye wanted
to sign up a deal in December 2016, so BAML proposed to
complete its outreach to a list of parties in just two days.
That timeframe was drastically shorter than the four weeks
that BAML had recommended in September 2016. Anyone
who expressed interest would have three weeks to conduct
diligence and submit an indication of interest, just half of
the six weeks that BAML had recommended in September.
At that point, the Board would decide whether to proceed
with Sibanye or engage with the other bidders. PTO ¶ 226;
see JX 331 at '280. Even though McMullen had previously
told BAML that it was critical for potential bidders to visit
the Company's mines before making an initial indication of
interest, BAML's compressed timeline did not contemplate
that step.
BAML's presentation identified twenty-eight third parties
divided into four categories:
• “Interested Parties”—Sibanye, Coeur, and Hecla.
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• “Possibly Interested Parties”—Gold Fields,
Independence Group NL, Kinross, MMG Limited, Rio
Tinto, and South32 Limited.
• “Additional Parties To Contact”—Alamos Gold
Inc., Anemka, CITIC, Fresnillo plc, Goldcorp Inc.,
IAMGOLD Corporation, Impala Platinum Holdings
Limited, New Gold Inc., Northam Platinum Limited,
Pan American Silver Corporation, X2 Resources, and
Yamana Gold Inc.
• “Not Interested”—Northern Star, Amplats, Eldorado
Gold Corporation, Evolution Mining Limited, Newcrest
Mining Limited, Newmont Mining Corporation, and OZ
Minerals.
JX 331 at '279. Anemka and CITIC were listed as “Additional
Parties to Contact,” even though they had expressed interest
during BAML's earlier independent outreach. OceanaGold
Corporation and Boliden AB, whom Vujcic had included in
his review of the Company's outreach, were omitted from
BAML's list.
BAML's presentation included scripts for its bankers to use
when making their calls. For “Possibly Interested Parties,” the
script stated:
• Announce participants and remind parties of
confidentiality;
• BofA Merrill Lynch has been retained by Stillwater
Mining Company to explore strategic alternatives;
• We understand you have had some discussions previously
with our client;
• We would like to further clarify your potential interest in
Stillwater as the process moves forward;
*11  • Do you have any interest to learn more?
• If so, we would suggest you sign an NDA for access to
diligence on the company.
PTO ¶ 225 (formatting added); JX 331 at '281. For
the “Additional Parties To Contact,” the script omitted
Stillwater's name and asked generally about interest in the
PGM sector.
• Announce participants and remind parties of
confidentiality;
• We are calling to gauge your potential interest in a
situation in the PGM sector;
• Our client is a leading player and low cost producer of
PGMs and substantial organic production growth;
• Do you have any interest to learn more?
• If yes, disclose that our client is Stillwater and suggest
they sign an NDA for access to diligence.
PTO ¶ 224 (formatting added); JX 331 at '281. For Hecla and
Coeur, BAML planned to skip the call and send instructions
for submitting an indication of interest by November 23. PTO
¶ 231; JX 336; JX 337.
Because of the expedited timeline, BAML decided not to
contact companies in the “Not Interested” category, even
though many of those companies had said they were not
interested when BAML previously called them with “a banker
idea.” The response could have been different with a formal
mandate. BAML's script for “Additional Parties to Contact”
was not likely to generate interest because it did not say
anything more than “a situation in the PGM sector.” Because
almost every other PGM company was located in a politically
unstable jurisdiction, additional parties were less likely to
have interest without a signal that the company involved was
Stillwater. And because Stillwater had been advertising its
interest in acquisitions, there was no reason for the additional
parties to think that the situation involved Stillwater. See JX
124 at '074.
Using its scripts, BAML contacted five of the six possibly
interested parties, missing Gold Fields. See JX 351. BAML
contacted eight of the twelve additional parties, missing
Alamos, Goldcorp, New Gold, and Yamana Gold. See PTO
¶ 230; JX 338; JX 339; JX 340; JX 341; JX 342. BAML
contacted Northern Star, even though they were listed as not
interested. See JX 351 at '953.
Three of the companies expressed interest: Anemka, Northern
Star, and X2. BAML sent a confidentiality agreement and an
invitation to submit a bid by November 29 to Anemka and
Northern Star. BAML sent only a confidentiality agreement
to X2, which quickly retracted its interest. See JX 395 at '412;
see also JX 359 at '413.
Sibanye learned about BAML's market check from Bateman.
JX 332 at '969. Sibanye perceived that a compressed timeline
was its “only real advantage” in the process. Id.
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K. The Abbreviated Pre-Signing Market Check
Continues.
On November 17, 2016, the Board met again, with Jones Day
attending for the first time. BAML and McMullen updated the
Board on the outreach and “the Board directed management
to continue the strategic assessment process.”8 Sibanye had
already sent a draft merger agreement to Jones Day.
*12  On November 18, 2016, BAML suggested contacting
Norilsk Nickel, a Russian mining company that had owned a
majority stake in the Company between 2003 and 2010. JX
367. McMullen decided against it. See McMullen Dep. 476.
On November 20, 2016, the CFO of Northern Star informed
McMullen that they were not interested in buying Stillwater
but remained interested in a merger of equals. Northern Star
asked McMullen to send a proposal. PTO ¶ 242.
On November 22, 2016, the CEO of Independence informed
McMullen that they were not interested in buying Stillwater
but were interested in a merger of equals. PTO ¶ 246.
Independence asked to sign a confidentiality agreement and
perform diligence, explaining that they had trouble reaching
BAML. Independence did not receive a confidentiality
agreement until November 25. See JX 403; JX 405.
The Board met again on the afternoon of November 23,
2016. McMullen reported that he had told Sibanye that
its July proposal of $15.75 per share was not sufficient.
He also reported that Sibanye needed the transaction to be
“announced by the second week in December”; otherwise,
Sibanye would need to delay the deal until the following
year so that it could obtain stockholder approval to raise
the capital needed to fund the Merger. JX 395 at '411.
McMullen viewed a December signing as “ambitious given
that ... the Company's assessment process with other potential
parties was ongoing and would need to be concluded prior to
proceeding with a transaction with Sibanye.” Id.
By the time of the board meeting, twenty-four parties had
received some type of formal or informal contact from BAML
or Stillwater management. Four parties—Sibanye, Hela,
Coeur, and Anemka—had signed NDAs and accessed the data
room. Four parties—Sibanye, Hela, Coeur, and Northern Star
—had conducted site visits. Two parties—Coeur and Anemka
—had notified BAML that they would not proceed further.
PTO ¶ 235; JX 393 at '868. Two other parties—Northern Star
and Independence—had informed Stillwater that they were
only interested in a merger of equals. Hecla had reported
that it needed to find a partner and had asked Stillwater to
extend its bid deadline from November 23 to November 30.
PTO ¶ 247; JX 383. The Board extended Hecla's deadline to
November 28. JX 395 at '413. By comparison, the Board had
given Sibanye until November 30 to update its expression of
interest from July. See JX 359 at '414.
After receiving these updates, the Board met in executive
session, and the minutes reflected for the first time that
McMullen did not participate. See JX 395 at '413. The Board
instructed BAML to evaluate a merger of equals as a potential
alternative. Id. When McMullen learned of the decision,
he was skeptical, believing that a merger of equals could
not compete with “a circa $18/share [ ]all cash offer from
S[ibanye].” JX 406 at '376. He shared his negative opinion
with one of the directors, who replied that a merger of equals
was actionable and needed to be explored as an alternative to
Sibanye. See JX 401.
McMullen and BAML worked together to update the
presentation that McMullen had given the Board in January
2016 on a potential merger of equals. See JX 384; JX 396.
McMullen ranked the Company's options as follows: 1)
Sibanye's acquisition; 2) a merger of equals with Northern
Star; and 3) do nothing or a merger of equals with
Independence. JX 396 at '707.
*13  After the board meeting on November 23, 2016, BAML
followed up with Hecla to solicit a specific indication of
interest. See JX 394 at '214. Hecla did not respond, and the
Company treated Hecla as having dropped out of the process.
On November 29, 2016, Northam asked to be included in
the process. JX 414. BAML sent Northam a confidentiality
agreement and invited them to submit a bid by December 7.
PTO ¶ 258; see JX 423; JX 424. That same day, Independence
asked for an extension to the bid deadline since they were still
negotiating the confidentiality agreement. JX 411. McMullen
decided that meant that Independence was not interested.
L. Sibanye Revises Its Price.
As of November 20, 2016, Sibanye anticipated borrowing
$2.5 billion to complete the Merger. Of this amount, $1.98
billion would be used to pay for the Company's stock, with the
consideration priced at a 30% premium over the Company's
thirty-day VWAP, just as McMullen and Froneman had
agreed in March. See JX 378 at '979, '009, '016, '017.
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The additional $500 million would be used to pay off
the Company's debt, fund change-of-control payments for
management, and pay transaction fees.
But on November 30, 2016, Sibanye ran into problems. First,
Sibanye realized that the Company's stock price had increased
to a point where the pricing metric would cause the total
purchase price to exceed Sibanye's financing. Using the 30%
premium over the thirty-day VWAP, Sibanye would have to
pay approximately $18.25 per share, an amount that would
require Sibanye to supplement the transaction financing with
cash on hand or from its revolving credit line. See JX 420 at
'876.
Second, Sibanye realized that it had calculated the purchase
price in its indication of interest using a twenty-day VWAP
rather than a thirty-day VWAP. Id. at '874. The Sibanye team
recognized that they had agreed in principle to a thirty-day
VWAP, but when they sent their initial indication of interest,
they used a twenty-day VWAP because the Company's stock
had been in a declining trend, so the shorter period resulted
in a lower price. Id. at '873.
Citigroup recommended pretending that Sibanye had never
agreed to a pricing mechanism and had instead offered a fixed
price. Id. The Sibanye team went along and disavowed all of
the communications in which they had agreed in principle to
a 30% premium over the thirty-day VWAP. See Stewart Dep.
147–48; PTO ¶¶ 243, 245; JX 397 at '448; JX 378 at '009,
'016. Going forward, Sibanye would discuss price based on
an indication of interest of $15.75 per share.
M. Stillwater Negotiates With Sibanye.
On December 1, 2016, the deal teams from the Company and
Sibanye met in New York City. Sibanye proposed to acquire
the Company for between $17.50 and $17.75 per share in
cash. PTO ¶ 261.
On December 2, 2016, the Board met in New York City.
See JX 432; JX 430. McMullen shared Sibanye's revised
offer. The minutes do not reflect any discussion of Sibanye's
departure from the prior agreement in principle on a 30%
premium over the thirty-day VWAP or the fact that the
agreed-upon pricing metric would have supported a price
around $18.25 per share. Even though BAML had worried
about Sibanye using precisely this tactic, and even though
McMullen had assured BAML that Sibanye would stick to the
agreed-upon pricing metric, see JX 343 at '740 to '741, no one
appears to have mentioned the change to the Board. See JX
432 at '414.
*14  During the meeting, BAML presented its preliminary
financial analysis of the Company. Using a discounted cash
flow analysis, BAML valued the Company at between $10.78
and $14.14 per share. Id. at '416. That same day, the
Company's stock closed at $15.17 per share. PTO Ex. A.
BAML also reviewed potential merger of equals transactions
with Northern Star and Independence. JX 432 at '417.
According to the minutes, the Board decided not to pursue
either transaction because: (i) the lack of synergies; (ii) “the
significant disparity in trading multiples”; (iii) “no merger-
of-equals or similar transaction appeared to be available
to the Company at this time”; (iv) “neither Northern
Star nor Independence Mining had signed a confidentiality
agreement”; and (v) “a substantial delay in the process
to pursue such a possible transaction could result in the
loss of a potential transaction with Sibanye.” JX 432 at
'417; see McMullen Tr. 769. At the time, Northern Star
and Independence had both proposed a merger-of-equals
transaction and both had signed confidentiality agreements.
There was also a meaningful probability that the Sibanye
transaction would slip into the following year.
During the meeting, the Board instructed management to
seek a higher price from Sibanye. That evening, McMullen
and Bateman had dinner with Richard Stewart, Sibanye's
Executive Vice President of Business Development. PTO ¶
265. After the dinner, Stewart emailed Froneman that “Mick's
number is 18$+ and that he thinks he can get his board across
the line on that.” JX 434 at '426. Froneman, Stewart, and
Citigroup discussed the limits of Sibanye's financing, which
would support a bid up to $18.20 per share. A 30% premium
on the twenty-day VWAP for the Company's common stock
was $19.20 per share. Id. The group decided to bid $18.00 per
share, observing that “if this is truly not good enough – they
will come back but we need to be firm.” JX 434 at '425.
On December 3, 2016, Stewart called McMullen and offered
$18 per share. PTO ¶ 267. BAML had been expecting $19 per
share. See JX 438.
On the evening of December 3, 2016, Bateman had “a
very open discussion” with one of Sibanye's bankers from
Citigroup, sharing information about the Board's internal
dynamics, the Company's lack of other prospects, and his
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preferences for employment. See JX 444. The Citigroup
banker reported on the conversation as follows:
- 1. Value. Didn't push back, as knows we're at our limits.
Said Mick will recommend our proposal to the Board,
[that two directors] are “very commercial”. [Schweitzer]
is the one most focused on 30% premium to 20D VWAP.
I reiterated that we've truly been talking about 30D
VWAP internally and with [Stillwater], which he seems to
understand.
- ...
- 3. MOE. He seemed quite dismissive of the MOE
candidate, but said certain Board members are keen to not
shut it down completely (I suspect more from a litigation
perspective).
- 4. Chris' Plans. Said he honestly hasn't given a lot of
thought to what's next, and he's generally open minded
about it. ... He could be open to staying with [Sibanye],
but depends on the vision and the role. He would have no
desire to be a divisional CFO, but potentially interested in
an Americas Head position. ...
Id. Bateman participated in this discussion one day after Jones
Day had advised the Board and senior management about the
risk of conflicts during the negotiations. In response, Bateman
and other members of management had represented to the
Board that they had not had any discussions with Sibanye
about their roles. See JX 432 at '418.
*15  On December 4, 2016, Stewart called McMullen and
told him that $18.00 was Sibanye's best and final offer. PTO
¶ 270. After Bateman's dinner with the Citigroup banker,
Sibanye knew it did not have to bid higher.
Later that afternoon, McMullen shared the offer with the
Board. Fearing that the timeline might slip into 2017, the
directors instructed management “to progress discussions
with Sibanye” and to find out whether Northam remained
interested. JX 440 at '742.
On December 5, 2016, BAML reported that it had not heard
anything from Northam. JX 445. That same day, Froneman
called McMullen to reiterate that $18.00 per share was the
best Sibanye could do given their financing constraints. PTO
¶ 272.
N. McMullen Demands His Stock Awards.
On December 7, 2016, McMullen asked Sibanye to “put
something into the merger agreement” about his 2017 stock
awards. JX 451. According to McMullen, Sibanye had
previously agreed to the following terms:
- On Closing of the deal, the value of the awards would be
converted to cash based on the metrics of the deal (share
price etc) and the amount paid out as per the normal vesting
schedule in cash, namely 1/3 of the RSU value at each of
the end of 2017, 2018 and 2019, and all the PSU value is
paid out at the end of 2019. If any employee leaves for
Good Cause (fired or diminution of job role) then the RSU's
accelerate in accordance with our plan docs, but the PSU
amount is still paid out at the end of 2019.
Id. McMullen told Sibanye that the Compensation Committee
had “decided that the 2015 and 2016 PSU's would vest at
150% for each series in the event of an $18 bid.” Id.
O. The Board Approves The Merger.
On December 8, 2016, the Board met to consider the Merger
Agreement and decide whether to proceed with the Merger.
McMullen reported that Northam had withdrawn from the
process. JX 454 at '744; see JX 459. By this point, BAML
had interacted with fourteen parties since being formally
retained. Five had signed NDAs and conducted diligence.
Only Sibanye had made a bid.
BAML rendered its opinion that Sibanye's offer of $18 per
share was fair. The consideration of $18 per share represented
a 21% premium to the Company's then-current stock price, a
21% premium to the 20-day VWAP, and a 25% premium to
the 30-day VWAP. JX 453 at '260. In its presentation, BAML
valued the Company between $10.58 per share and $13.98 per
share using a discounted cash flow analysis. Id. at '279 to '281.
The Merger Agreement contained a no-shop clause with
a fiduciary out that permitted the Company to provide
information to and negotiate with a third-party bidder if the
bidder made an “Acquisition Proposal” that constituted or
was reasonably likely to lead to a “Superior Proposal” and
the Board concluded that its fiduciary duties required it. See
JX 525 Annex A § 6.2.4. The Board had the right to change
its recommendation in favor of the Merger if a competing
bidder made a superior proposal and the Board concluded
that its fiduciary duties required it. The Board did not have
the right to terminate the Merger Agreement to pursue the
superior proposal. The Company had to proceed through the
stockholder meeting and only gained the right to terminate if
the stockholders voted down the deal.
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*16  If the Company exercised its right to terminate after a
negative stockholder vote, then the Company was obligated
to pay Sibanye a termination fee of $16.5 million plus
reimbursement of Sibanye's expenses up to $10 million, for a
total payment of $26.5 million. The total payment represented
approximately 1.2% of equity value, with the termination-fee
portion reflecting 0.76% of equity value. The Company had
approximately $110 million more cash than debt, resulting in
a slightly smaller enterprise value than equity value. The total
payment represented approximately 1.3% of enterprise value.
The Board adopted the Merger Agreement and resolved to
recommend that the Company's stockholders approve it. JX
454 at '746. On December 9, 2016, Sibanye and the Company
announced the Merger. Sibanye's stock price dropped 18%
from $8.20 per share to $6.96 per share.
The last day of unaffected trading in Stillwater's common
stock was December 8, 2016. On that date, the Company's
shares closed at $14.68, equating to a market capitalization
of approximately $1.8 billion. The deal price represented a
22.6% premium over the unaffected trading price and a 24.4%
premium over the 30-day VWAP. During the previous two
years, Stillwater's stock price had never traded above $15.58,
a level it reached on August 1, 2016.
P. Vujcic Gets Paid.
After the Merger was signed, McMullen sent Vujcic a
retroactive consulting agreement to compensate him for
assisting with the Merger. Vujcic had two comments. First,
he wanted confirmation that he would “not be named in the
proxy.” JX 474 at '101. Second, he was disappointed with his
compensation, stating:
- I'm a little perplexed as to why you are being so
aggressive on the comp, especially when you are exposed
to a potentially large claim from Jefferies and when I feel
I have been pretty fair all along in (a) not locking you in
earlier (trusted your guidance on compensation in July) and
(b) in making every effort leading up to the board meetings
in late October to give you the comfort to reiterate that
Sibanye were the only show in town.
Id. at '100.
The petitioners argue that Vujcic's statement that he made
“every effort ... to give you comfort to reiterate that Sibanye
were the only show in town” shows that McMullen and
Vujcic had been trying to eliminate the competition for
Sibanye. That is a conspiratorial reading, rather than a
credible reading. Vujcic was attempting to justify receiving
greater compensation by pointing to his efforts to solicit other
potential bidders. He showed that Sibanye was “the only show
in town” by engaging in outreach and demonstrating that
no one else wanted to bid. The record does not support an
inference that McMullen and Vujcic deceived the Board. See
also McMullen Dep. 442–46.
McMullen and Vujcic agreed on a fixed fee of $20,000 per
month beginning on October 24, 2016, plus a discretionary
bonus of $100,000. JX 477. Vujcic's name and compensation
arrangement did not appear in the proxy statement. See JX
525.
Q. Wadman's Noisy Withdrawal
In February 2017, McMullen and Bateman negotiated the
terms of their post-closing employment with Sibanye. As
part of those discussions, Sibanye agreed to treat the Merger
as triggering McMullen and Bateman's change-of-control
payments, without the need for a second trigger such as
termination or a resignation for “Good Reason.” None of the
Company's other employees received this special treatment.
For the other employees, the Merger was only the first trigger,
and no change-in-control benefits would be paid absent a
second trigger.
When McMullen reported on this agreement to the Board
during a meeting on February 23, 2017, Wadman objected.
He had been concerned since July 2016 that McMullen and
Bateman had pursued a sale of the Company in their own
interest and had used the deal to advantage themselves. He
regarded their special deal on change-in-control benefits as
“clearly self-dealing.” JX 526 at '376. The Board did not
address Wadman's concerns during the meeting.
*17  One month later, Wadman resigned. In his resignation
letter, Wadman restated his concerns about how the deal
process unfolded. He noted that after the board meeting
on February 23, 2017, McMullen and Bateman “removed
[me] from all legal conversations and decision-making” and
“prohibited me from doing my job.” Id. at '377 to '378.
Quoting his employment agreement, Wadman resigned for
“Good Reason” based on a “material diminution” to his
“nature of responsibilities, or authority.” Id.
Over the next several days, the Company's counsel negotiated
a settlement with Wadman. On March 30, 2017, the Company
released a Form 8-K, which stated:
- 418 -
In re Stillwater Mining Company, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2019)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 14
On March 29, 2017, Brent R. Wadman, our Vice
President, Legal Affairs & Corporate Secretary, terminated
employment. In connection therewith, we entered into an
agreement with Mr. Wadman with respect to his separation
pursuant to which we will pay him up to approximately
$1.49 million. This amount includes the settlement of
Mr. Wadman's outstanding equity awards, which will
continue to vest in accordance with their terms, including
in connection with the previously announced merger with
Sibanye Gold Limited.
JX 527. The Form 8-K did not mention Wadman's letter or
the reasons for his resignation.
R. Stockholder Approval And Closing
During Stillwater's annual meeting on April 26, 2017,
the stockholders approved the Merger Agreement. Under
Delaware law, a merger requires the approval of holders of
a majority of the outstanding shares, making a non-vote the
equivalent of a “no” vote. Because stockholders can vote no
by not voting, the percentage of the outstanding shares is
the appropriate metric for evaluating the level of stockholder
support for a merger. The Company had 121,389,213 shares
outstanding. Holders of 91,012,990 shares voted in favor of
the Merger, representing 75% of the issued and outstanding
equity. Holders of 103,088,167 shares were present at the
meeting in person or by proxy, so the same number of
affirmative votes results in a misleadingly higher approval
percentage of 88%. See JX 549 at 1.
The Merger closed on May 4, 2017. Between signing and
closing, the spot price of palladium increased by 9.2%.
The spot price of a weighted basket of Stillwater's products
increased by 5.9%.
S. Post-Closing Developments
On July 1, 2017, Sibanye entered into employment
agreements with Bateman and McMullen. Bateman agreed
to serve as Executive Vice President—US Region, reporting
directly to Froneman. Bateman waived his change-of-control
benefits in return for a higher base salary and additional
incentive compensation. See JX 585.
McMullen agreed to serve as a Technical Advisor to Sibanye.
His employment agreement permitted him “to perform the
functions of that role while residing in the Turks and Caicos.”
JX 586 at '041. Like Bateman, McMullen waived his change-
of-control benefits in return for an annual salary of $712,000
plus incentive compensation. See id.
In November 2017, Sibanye issued a Competent Person's
Report that valued the Company's operating mines at $2.7
billion as of July 31, 2017. This valuation was 23%
greater than the total consideration that Sibanye paid for the
Company at closing, just three months before the valuation
date for the report. PTO ¶ 102; JX 615 at 205.
T. This Appraisal Proceeding
Holders of 5,804,523 shares of the Company eschewed the
consideration offered in the Merger and pursued appraisal.
In August 2018, the holders of 384,000 shares settled
their claims. The remaining petitioners litigated their claims
through trial.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
*18  “An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy
intended to provide shareholders dissenting from a merger on
grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a judicial
determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value) of their
shareholdings.” Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor
I), 542 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Del. 1988). Section 262(h) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law states that
the Court shall determine the fair value of the
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from
the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon
the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining
such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant
factors.
8 Del. C. § 262(h). The statute thus places the obligation to
determine the fair value of the shares squarely on the court.
Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publ'rs, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 361
(Del. 1997).
Because of the statutory mandate, the allocation of the burden
of proof in an appraisal proceeding differs from a traditional
liability proceeding. “In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both
sides have the burden of proving their respective valuation
positions ....” M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513,
520 (Del. 1999). “No presumption, favorable or unfavorable,
attaches to either side's valuation ....” Pinson v. Campbell-
Taggart, Inc., 1989 WL 17438, at *6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1989).
“Each party also bears the burden of proving the constituent
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elements of its valuation position ..., including the propriety
of a particular method, modification, discount, or premium.”
Jesse A. Finkelstein & John D. Hendershot, Appraisal Rights
in Mergers and Consolidations, Corp. Prac. Series (BNA) No.
38-5th, at A-90 (2010 & 2017 Supp.) [hereinafter Appraisal
Rights].
As in other civil cases, the standard of proof in an
appraisal proceeding is a preponderance of the evidence.
M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 520. A party is not required to
prove its valuation conclusion, the related valuation inputs,
or its underlying factual contentions by clear and convincing
evidence or to exacting certainty. See Triton Constr. Co. v. E.
Shore Elec. Servs., Inc., 2009 WL 1387115, at *6 (Del. Ch.
May 18, 2009), aff'd, 2010 WL 376924 (Del. Jan. 14, 2010)
(ORDER). “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means
proof that something is more likely than not. It means that
certain evidence, when compared to the evidence opposed to
it, has the more convincing force and makes you believe that
something is more likely true than not.” Agilent Techs., Inc. v.
Kirkland, 2010 WL 610725, at *13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
“In discharging its statutory mandate, the Court of Chancery
has discretion to select one of the parties' valuation models
as its general framework or to fashion its own.” M.G.
Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 525–26. “[I]t is entirely proper for
the Court of Chancery to adopt any one expert's model,
methodology, and mathematical calculations, in toto, if that
valuation is supported by credible evidence and withstands
a critical judicial analysis on the record.” Id. at 526. Or
the court “may evaluate the valuation opinions submitted
by the parties, select the most representative analysis, and
then make appropriate adjustments to the resulting valuation.”
Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-31 (collecting cases). The court
may also “make its own independent valuation calculation
by ... adapting or blending the factual assumptions of the
parties' experts.” M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 524. “If neither
party satisfies its burden, however, the court must then
use its own independent judgment to determine fair value.”
Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *5 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 24, 2004). But the court must also be cautious
when adopting an approach that deviates from the parties'
positions. Doing so “late in the proceedings” may “inject[ ]
due process and fairness problems” that are “antithetical to
the traditional hallmarks of a Court of Chancery appraisal
proceeding,” because the court's approach will not have
been “subjected to the crucible of pretrial discovery, expert
depositions, cross-expert rebuttal, expert testimony at trial,
and cross examination at trial.” Verition P'rs Master Fund Ltd.
v. Aruba Networks, Inc., 210 A.3d 128, 140-41 (Del. 2019).
*19  In Tri-Continental Corporation v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71
(Del. 1950), the Delaware Supreme Court explained in detail
the concept of value that the appraisal statute employs:
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is
that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has
been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a
going concern. By value of the stockholder's proportionate
interest in the corporate enterprise is meant the true or
intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the
merger. In determining what figure represents the true or
intrinsic value, ... the courts must take into consideration all
factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the
fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset value, dividends,
earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other
facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of
the date of the merger and which throw any light on future
prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent
to an inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholder's
interest, but must be considered ....9
Subsequent Delaware Supreme Court decisions have adhered
consistently to this definition of value.10 Most recently, the
Delaware Supreme Court reiterated that “[f]air value is ...
the value of the company to the stockholder as a going
concern,” i.e., the stockholder's “proportionate interest in a
going concern.” Aruba, 210 A.3d at 132–33.
The trial court's “ultimate goal in an appraisal proceeding is
to determine the ‘fair or intrinsic value’ of each share on the
closing date of the merger.” Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global
Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 20 (Del. 2017)
(quoting Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1142–43). To accomplish
this task, “the court should first envisage the entire pre-
merger company as a ‘going concern,’ as a standalone entity,
and assess its value as such.” Id. (quoting Cavalier Oil,
564 A.2d at 1144). When doing so, the corporation “must
be valued as a going concern based upon the ‘operative
reality’ of the company as of the time of the merger,” taking
into account its particular market position in light of future
prospects. M.G. Bancorp., 737 A.2d at 525 (quoting Cede
& Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor IV), 684 A.2d 289,
298 (Del. 1996)); accord Dell, 177 A.3d at 20. The concept
of the corporation's “operative reality” is important because
“[t]he underlying assumption in an appraisal valuation is
that the dissenting shareholders would be willing to maintain
their investment position had the merger not occurred.”
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Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 298. Consequently, the trial court
must assess “the value of the company ... as a going concern,
rather than its value to a third party as an acquisition.” M.P.M.
Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 795 (Del. 1999).
*20  “The time for determining the value of a dissenter's
shares is the point just before the merger transaction ‘on
the date of the merger.’ ” Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-33
(quoting Technicolor I, 542 A.2d at 1187). Put differently,
the valuation date is the date on which the merger closes.
Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 298; accord M.G. Bancorp., 737
A.2d at 525. If the value of the corporation changes between
the signing of the merger agreement and the closing, then the
fair value determination must be measured by the “operative
reality” of the corporation at the effective time of the merger.
See Technicolor IV, 684 A.2d at 298.
The statutory obligation to make a single determination
of a corporation's value introduces an impression of false
precision into appraisal jurisprudence.
[I]t is one of the conceits of our law that we purport
to declare something as elusive as the fair value of
an entity on a given date .... [V]aluation decisions are
impossible to make with anything approaching complete
confidence. Valuing an entity is a difficult intellectual
exercise, especially when business and financial experts
are able to organize data in support of wildly divergent
valuations for the same entity. For a judge who is not an
expert in corporate finance, one can do little more than
try to detect gross distortions in the experts' opinions. This
effort should, therefore, not be understood, as a matter
of intellectual honesty, as resulting in the fair value of a
corporation on a given date. The value of a corporation
is not a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values,
and the judge's task is to assign one particular value
within this range as the most reasonable value in light of
all the relevant evidence and based on considerations of
fairness.11
As the Delaware Supreme Court recently explained, “fair
value is just that, ‘fair.’ It does not mean the highest possible
price that a company might have sold for had Warren Buffet
negotiated for it on his best day and the Lenape who sold
Manhattan on their worst.” DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield
Value P'rs, 172 A.3d 346, 370 (Del. 2017).
Because the determination of fair value follows a litigated
proceeding, the issues that the court considers and the
outcome it reaches depend in large part on the arguments
advanced and the evidence presented.
An argument may carry the day in a particular case
if counsel advance it skillfully and present persuasive
evidence to support it. The same argument may not prevail
in another case if the proponents fail to generate a similarly
persuasive level of probative evidence or if the opponents
respond effectively.
Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., L.P., 2016
WL 7324170, at *16 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016). Likewise,
the approach that an expert espouses may have met “the
approval of this court on prior occasions,” but may be
rejected in a later case if not presented persuasively or if “the
relevant professional community has mined additional data
and pondered the reliability of past practice and come, by a
healthy weight of reasoned opinion, to believe that a different
practice should become the norm ....” Glob. GT LP v. Golden
Telecom, Inc. (Golden Telecom Trial), 993 A.2d 497, 517
(Del. Ch.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).
A. The Deal Price
*21  Sibanye contends that the deal price of $18.00 per share
is a persuasive indicator of fair value if adjusted downward
to eliminate elements of value arising from the Merger. The
petitioners argue that the deal price should receive no weight.
As the proponent of using the deal price, Sibanye bore the
burden of establishing its persuasiveness. Sibanye also bore
the burden of proving its downward adjustment.
1. The Standard For Evaluating A Sale Process
There is no presumption that the deal price reflects fair value.
Dell, 177 A.3d at 21; DFC, 172 A.3d at 366–67. Relying on
the statutory requirement that the Court of Chancery must
consider “all relevant factors” when determining fair value,
the Delaware Supreme Court has rejected “requests for the
adoption of a presumption that the deal price reflects fair
value if certain preconditions are met, such as when the
merger is the product of arm's-length negotiation and a robust,
non-conflicted market check, and where bidders had full
information and few, if any, barriers to bid for the deal.” Dell,
177 A.3d at 21. Yet the Delaware Supreme Court has also
cautioned that its
refusal to craft a statutory presumption in favor of the deal
price when certain conditions pertain does not in any way
signal our ignorance to the economic reality that the sale
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value resulting from a robust market check will often be
the most reliable evidence of fair value, and that second-
guessing the value arrived upon by the collective views of
many sophisticated parties with a real stake in the matter
is hazardous.
DFC, 172 A.3d at 366. The Delaware Supreme Court has
likewise cautioned that “we have little quibble with the
economic argument that the price of a merger that results
from a robust market check, against the back drop of a rich
information base and a welcoming environment for potential
buyers, is probative of the company's fair value.” Id. Based on
the facts presented in DFC and Dell, the Delaware Supreme
Court endorsed using the deal price as a persuasive indicator
of fair value in those cases. Based on the facts presented in
Aruba, the Delaware Supreme Court used a deal-price-less-
synergies metric to make its own fair value determination.
As a general matter, the persuasiveness of the deal price
depends on the reliability of the sale process that generated it.
When assessing whether a sale process results in fair value,
the issue “is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest
possible bid.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33. “[T]the purpose of an
appraisal is ... to make sure that [the petitioners] receive fair
compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects what
they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to
them in an arm's-length transaction.” DFC, 172 A.3d at 370–
71. “[T]he key inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value
and were not exploited.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33.
Relying on the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in DFC,
the petitioners assert that the deal price “deserves weight only
if the merger is the product of a ‘robust market search’ and
an arm's-length third party transaction with ‘no hint of self-
interest that compromised the market check.’ ” Dkt. 210 at 36
[hereinafter PTOB] (quoting DFC, 172 A.3d at 349). That is
not what DFC held.
The petitioners have accurately quoted phrases from the
decision in DFC, but when the Delaware Supreme Court
made those observations, it was describing the trial court's
findings regarding the sale process that took place in that
case. The Delaware Supreme Court then determined that
given those attributes, “the best evidence of fair value was
the deal price.” DFC, 172 A.3d at 349. The high court's
comments in DFC explained why the particular sale process
in that case was so good as to make the deal price “the
best evidence of fair value.” The decision did not identify
minimum characteristics that a sale process must have before
a trial court can give it weight. The decision also did not
address what makes a sale process sufficiently bad that a
trial court cannot give it weight. Technically, the decision did
not even delineate when a sale process would be sufficiently
good that a trial court should regard it as “the best evidence
of fair value.” The Delaware Supreme Court could have
believed the sale process in DFC warranted that level of
consideration without excluding the possibility that a not-as-
good sale process could warrant the same treatment.
*22  The same is true for the Delaware Supreme Court's
comments about the sale process in Dell. There, the Delaware
Supreme Court described the sale process as having featured
“fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach to all logical
buyers, and the chance for any topping bidder to have the
support of Mr. Dell's own votes ....” Dell, 177 A.3d at
35. Based on its view of the sale process, the Delaware
Supreme Court suggested that “the deal price deserved heavy,
if not dispositive weight.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 23. After
describing the sale process in greater detail, the Delaware
Supreme Court observed, “Overall, the weight of evidence
shows that Dell's deal price has heavy, if not overriding,
probative value.” Id. at 30. As in DFC, the Delaware Supreme
Court was explaining why it regarded a particular sale
process as so good that it deserved “heavy, if not dispositive
weight.” The Delaware Supreme Court was not identifying
the minimum requirements for a sale process to generate
reliable information about fair value, nor was it enumerating
qualities which, if absent, would render the outcome of a sale
process so unreliable as to provide no insight into fair value.
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Aruba likewise
did not address the minimum requirements for a sale process
to generate reliable information about fair value. There, the
trial court found the sale process to be sufficiently reliable
to use the deal price as a valuation indicator, but declined to
give it weight. The Delaware Supreme Court accepted that the
sale process was sufficiently reliable and used the deal price
as the exclusive basis for its own fair value determination.
As with Dell and DFC, the Aruba decision did not have to
address when a sale process was sufficiently bad that a trial
court should decline to rely on the deal price.
The decisions in DFC, Dell, and Aruba are highly informative
because they analyze fact patterns in which the Delaware
Supreme Court viewed the sale processes as sufficiently
reliable to use the deal price as either (i) the exclusive
basis for its own fair value determination (Aruba), (ii) as a
valuation indicator that “deserved heavy, if not dispositive
weight” (Dell), or (iii) as a valuation indicator that provided
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“the best evidence of fair value” (DFC). But Aruba, Dell, and
DFC do not establish legal requirements for a sale process.
Whether a sale process is sufficiently good that the deal price
should be regarded as persuasive evidence of fair value, or
whether a sale process is sufficiently bad that the deal price
should not be regarded as persuasive evidence of fair value
are invariably fact-specific questions, and the answers depend
on the arguments made and the evidence presented in a given
case.
2. Objective Indicia Of Reliability
In the recent appraisal decisions that have examined the
reliability of a sale process, the Delaware Supreme Court has
cited certain “objective indicia” that “suggest[ ] that the deal
price was a fair price.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 28; accord DFC, 172
A.3d at 376. The presence of objective indicia do not establish
a presumption in favor of the deal price. The indicia are a
starting point for analysis, not the end point, and in each of
its recent appraisal decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court
has determined that a combination of the objective indicia
and other evidence outweighed the shortcomings in the sale
processes that the petitioners had identified (Aruba) or which
the trial court had regarded as undermining the persuasiveness
of the deal price (Dell and DFC).
First, the Merger was an arm's-length transaction with a
third party. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (citing fact that “the
company was purchased by a third party in an arm's length
sale” as factor supporting fairness of deal price). It was not
a transaction involving a controlling stockholder. See Dell,
177 A.3d at 30 (citing fact that “this was not a buyout led by
a controlling stockholder” as a factor supporting fairness of
deal price). Sibanye was an unaffiliated acquirer with no prior
ownership interest in Stillwater.
Second, the Board did not labor under any conflicts of
interest. Six of the Board's seven members were disinterested,
outside directors, and they had the statutory authority under
the Delaware General Corporation Law to say “no” to any
merger. See 8 Del. C. § 251(b) (requiring board adoption
and recommendation of a merger agreement); Dell, 177 A.3d
at 28 (citing fact that special committee was “composed
of independent, experienced directors and armed with the
power to say ‘no’ ” as factor supporting fairness of deal
price). Stillwater's stockholders were widely dispersed, and
the petitioners have not identified divergent interests among
them. Cf. id. at 11 (citing the fact that “any outside bidder
who persuaded stockholders that its bid was better would have
access to Mr. Dell's votes” as a factor supporting fairness of
deal price).
*23  Third, Sibanye conducted due diligence and received
confidential information about Stillwater's value. See Aruba,
210 A.3d at 137 (emphasizing that buyer armed with
“material nonpublic information about the seller is in a strong
position (and is uniquely incentivized) to properly value the
seller”). Like the acquirer in Aruba, Sibanye “had signed
a confidentiality agreement, done exclusive due diligence,
gotten access to material nonpublic information,” and had a
“sharp[ ] incentive to engage in price discovery ... because it
was seeking to acquire all shares.” Id. at 140.
Fourth, Stillwater negotiated with Sibanye and extracted
multiple price increases. See id. at 139 (citing “back and forth
over price”); Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (citing fact that special
committee “persuaded Silver Lake to raise its bid six times”).
In July 2016, when Sibanye indicated interest in a transaction
at $15.75 per share, Stillwater did not rush into a deal. In
December 2016, when Sibanye raised its indication of interest
to a range of $17.50 to $17.75 per share, Stillwater again did
not proceed. With the Board's backing, McMullen demanded
a higher price. When Sibanye offered $18.00 per share, the
Board did not immediately accept. Only after Sibanye twice
stated that $18.00 per share was its best and final offer did the
Board accept that price.
Most importantly, no bidders emerged during the post-signing
phase, which is a factor that the Delaware Supreme Court
has stressed when evaluating a sale process.12 The Merger
Agreement did not contain any exceptional deal protection
features, and the total amounts due via the termination fee and
expense reimbursement provision were comparatively low,
representing approximately 1.2% of equity value. Excluding
the expense reimbursement, the termination fee reflected only
0.76% of equity value. The absence of a topping bid was thus
highly significant.
As noted, these are fewer objective indicia of fairness than the
Delaware Supreme Court identified when reviewing the sale
processes in DFC, Dell, or Aruba, and the presence of these
factors does not establish a presumption in favor of the deal
price. Nevertheless, the objective indicia that were present
provide a cogent foundation for relying on the deal price as
a persuasive indicator of fair value, subject to further review
of the evidence.
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3. The Challenges To The Pre-Signing Phase
The petitioners have advanced a multitude of reasons why
they believe the deal price for Stillwater does not provide a
persuasive indicator of fair value. The bulk of their objections
concern the pre-signing phase.
As a threshold matter, the petitioners argue generally that
a reliable sale process requires some degree of pre-signing
outreach, citing a comment from the Union Illinois decision
in which this court used a deal-price-less-synergies metric
to value a privately held company after concluding that the
company was “marketed in an effective manner.” Union
Ill., 847 A.2d at 350. The petitioners also cite a statement
from the AOL decision to the effect that a sale process will
provide persuasive evidence of statutory fair value when
“(i) information was sufficiently disseminated to potential
bidders, so that (ii) an informed sale could take place, (iii)
without undue impediments imposed by the deal structure
itself.” In re Appraisal of AOL Inc., 2018 WL 1037450, *8
(Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018). Neither decision established a rule
that pre-signing outreach is invariably required before the
deal price can serve as persuasive evidence of fair value.
At least for a widely held, publicly traded company, a sale
process could justify both sets of observations through the
public announcement of a transaction and a sufficiently open
post-signing market check.
*24  The petitioners' myriad arguments about the pre-signing
process in this case raise a fundamental question: Would
the deal price provide persuasive evidence of fair value
if Stillwater had pursued a single-bidder strategy in which
it only interacted with Sibanye before signing the Merger
Agreement, recognizing that the Merger Agreement was
sufficiently open to permit a meaningful post-signing market
check? If the deal price would have provided persuasive
evidence of fair value under those circumstances, then the
additional efforts that Stillwater made before signing, even if
disorganized and flawed, should not change the outcome. It is
conceivable that a pre-signing process could involve features
that undermined the effectiveness of a post-signing market
check, such as never-waived standstill agreements containing
don't-ask-don't-waive provisions, but that was not the case
here. At least on the facts presented, Stillwater's efforts were
additive, not subtractive. They might not have added much,
but they did not detract from what Stillwater could have
achieved through a single-bidder process focused on Sibanye
followed by a post-signing market check.
a. The Possibility Of A Single-Bidder Strategy
Although the Delaware Supreme Court has not had the
opportunity to consider a single-bidder strategy for purposes
of determining the persuasiveness of a deal-price metric
in an appraisal proceeding, extant precedent suggests that
if Stillwater had pursued a single-bidder strategy in which
it only interacted with Sibanye before signing the Merger
Agreement, then the deal price would provide persuasive
evidence of fair value because the Merger Agreement was
sufficiently open to permit a meaningful post-signing market
check. The reasoning that leads to this endpoint starts not
with the recent triumvirate of appraisal cases, but rather with
an important Delaware Supreme Court decision that restated
the high court's enhanced scrutiny jurisprudence for purposes
of applying that standard of review in a breach of fiduciary
duty case. C & J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen.
Empls.' & Sanitation Empls.' Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049 (Del.
2014). The Delaware Supreme Court's enhanced scrutiny
jurisprudence becomes pertinent to appraisal proceedings
because, as commentators have perceived, the deal price will
provide persuasive evidence of fair value in an appraisal
proceeding involving a publicly traded firm if the sale process
would satisfy enhanced scrutiny in a breach of fiduciary duty
case.13
In C & J Energy, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that plaintiffs who challenged a transaction involving only
a passive, post-signing market check had not shown a
reasonable likelihood that the director defendants had
breached their fiduciary duties under the enhanced scrutiny
standard of review. The transaction in C & J Energy was
a stock-for-stock merger between C & J Energy Services,
Inc. and a subsidiary of Nabors Industries Ltd. Although C
& J Energy was nominally the acquirer, it would emerge
from the transaction with a controlling stockholder, and the
Delaware Supreme Court therefore examined whether the
directors had fulfilled their situationally specific duty to seek
the best transaction reasonably available. See C & J Energy,
107 A.3d at 1067.
*25  The merger in C & J Energy resulted from a CEO-driven
process. Joshua Comstock, the founder, chairman, and CEO
of C & J Energy, spearheaded the discussions. Talks between
Comstock and the CEO of Nabors started in January 2014,
and although Comstock discussed the deal with some of C &
J Energy's directors, he did not receive formal board approval
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to negotiate until April. Later in the process, he made a revised
offer to Nabors without board approval. The plaintiffs argued
that Comstock acted without authority and misled the board
about key issues. The Delaware Supreme Court found “at
least some support for the plaintiffs' contention that Comstock
at times proceeded on an ‘ask for forgiveness rather than
permission’ basis.” Id. at 1059.
There was evidence in C & J Energy that Comstock had
personal reasons to favor a deal with Nabors. The Nabors
CEO “assured Comstock throughout the process that he
would be aggressive in protecting Comstock's financial
interests if a deal was consummated.” Id. at 1064. After the
key terms of the transaction had been negotiated, but before
it was formally approved, Comstock asked for a side letter
“affirming that C & J's management would run the surviving
entity and endorsing a generous compensation package.” Id.
When the Nabors CEO balked, Comstock threatened to not
sign or announce the deal. The Nabors CEO gave in, and the
deal was announced as planned. Id. at 1064–65. In addition,
there was evidence that C & J Energy's primary financial
advisor was less than optimally effective and seemed to
be advocating for the deal rather than advocating for C &
J Energy. See id. at 1056. The banker also had divergent
interests because of its role as a financing source for the deal.
Id. at 1057. There were thus reasons to think that the two
principal negotiators for C & J—its CEO and its banker—
had personal reasons to favor a transaction with Nabors and
to push for that outcome.
The merger agreement in C & J Energy included a no-shop
clause subject to a fiduciary out and a termination fee equal
to 2.27% of the deal value. Id. at 1063. The period between
the announcement of the deal on June 25, 2014, and the trial
court's issuance of the injunction on November 25, 2014,
lasted 153 days. No competing bidder emerged during that
period.
On these facts, the Delaware Supreme Court found no
grounds for a potential breach of duty, explaining that “[w]hen
a board exercises its judgment in good faith, tests the
transaction through a viable passive market check, and gives
its stockholders a fully informed, uncoerced opportunity to
vote to accept the deal, we cannot conclude that the board
likely violated its Revlon duties.” Id. at 1053. Elaborating,
the senior tribunal explained that a board may pursue a
single transaction partner, “so long as the transaction is
subject to an effective market check under circumstances in
which any bidder interested in paying more has a reasonable
opportunity to do so.” Id. at 1067. The high court emphasized
that “[s]uch a market check does not have to involve an
active solicitation, so long as interested bidders have a fair
opportunity to present a higher-value alternative, and the
board has the flexibility to eschew the original transaction
and accept the higher-value deal.” Id. at 1067–68. The
transaction in C & J Energy satisfied this test. Describing
the suite of deal protections, the Delaware Supreme Court
observed that “a potential competing bidder faced only
modest deal protection barriers.” Id. at 1052. Later, the court
reiterated that “there were no material barriers that would
have prevented a rival bidder from making a superior offer.”
Id. at 1070; accord id. (“But in this case, there was no
barrier to the emergence of another bidder and more than
adequate time for such a bidder to emerge.”). The Delaware
Supreme Court also cited with approval precedents in which
a sell-side board had engaged exclusively with a single
buyer, had not conducted a pre-signing market check, then
agreed to a merger agreement containing a no-shop clause,
a matching right, and a termination fee, and the resulting
combination was found sufficient to permit an effective post-
signing market check that satisfied the directors' duties under
enhanced scrutiny.14
*26  Procedurally, the Delaware Supreme Court's decision
in C & J Energy vacated an injunction that the trial court
had entered in advance of the stockholder vote. In holding
that the trial court had issued the injunction improvidently,
the high court noted that “[t]he ability of the stockholders
themselves to freely accept or reject the board's preferred
course of action is also of great importance in this context.”
Id. at 1068. The role of the vote, however, should not detract
from the high court's observations about the adequacy of the
single-bidder process. Underscoring that point, the Delaware
Supreme Court cited the trial court's apparent belief “that
Revlon required C & J's board to conduct a pre-signing
active solicitation process in order to satisfy its contextual
fiduciary duties,” then explicitly rejected that understanding
of the enhanced scrutiny standard. Id. at 1068. As a result,
the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in C & J Energy has
implications that go beyond the injunction context.
One area where its implications subsequently became
manifest was in a post-closing liability action where plaintiffs
sought to recover from an alleged aider-and-abettor under a
quasi-appraisal theory of damages. See In re PLX Tech. Inc.
S'holders Litig., ––– A.3d ––––, 2019 WL 2144476 (Del.
May 16, 2019) (TABLE). The PLX litigation challenged a
merger agreement in which the acquirer (Avago) purchased
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the target (PLX) for cash. As in C & J Energy, the sale
process was not pristine. The trial court found that a key
director and the company's investment banker had divergent
interests that caused them to favor a sale over having PLX
remain independent, that Avago tipped the director and the
banker about the timing and pricing of a deal, that the director
and the banker failed to disclose the tip to the board while
using the information to help them position PLX to be sold,
and that the proxy statement failed to disclose these issues.
See In re PLX Tech. Inc. S'holders Litig. (PLX Trial), 2018
WL 5018535, at *32–35, *44–47 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2018)
(subsequent history omitted). Based on these findings, the
trial court found a predicate breach of fiduciary duty under
the enhanced scrutiny standard. The trial court also found
that the sole remaining defendant—an activist stockholder
affiliated with the key director—had participated knowingly
in the breach. See id. at *48–50.
The plaintiffs' claim foundered, however, at the damages
stage. The plaintiffs sought to recover compensatory damages
on behalf of a class of stockholders based on the theory that
PLX should have remained independent rather than being
sold. Under this theory, the plaintiffs sought “out-of-pocket
(i.e., compensatory) money damages equal to the ‘fair’ or
‘intrinsic’ value of their stock at the time of the merger, less
the price per share that they actually received,” with “[t]he
‘fair’ or ‘intrinsic’ value of the shares ... determined using
the same methodologies employed in an appraisal.” Id. at
*50 (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases). The
plaintiffs' expert used a DCF methodology to value PLX at
$9.86 per share, well above the deal price of $6.50 per share.
See id. at *51.
Although PLX's pre-signing process was marred by breaches
of fiduciary duty resulting from Avago's tip to the key director
and the company's banker, the trial court found that the
sale process as a whole was sufficiently reliable to warrant
rejecting the plaintiffs' valuation. The trial court explained
that “[m]ore important than the pre-signing process was the
post-signing market check.” Id. at *55. After discussing the
outcome in C & J Energy, the trial court reasoned that “the
structure of the Merger Agreement satisfied the Delaware
Supreme Court's standard for a passive, post-signing market
check.” Id. The merger agreement (i) contained a no-shop
with a fiduciary subject an unlimited match right that gave
Avago four days to match the first superior proposal and two
days to match any subsequent increase, and (ii) required PLX
to pay Avago a termination fee of $10.85 million, representing
3.5% of equity value ($309 million) and 3.7% of enterprise
value ($293 million). See id. at *26, *44. Avago launched its
first step-tender offer on July 8, 2014. No competing bidder
intervened, and the merger closed thirty-five days later on
August 12. Id. at *27. This time period compared favorably
with other passive, post-signing market checks that Delaware
decisions had approved.15
*27  On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment based solely on the trial court's damages ruling and
without reaching or expressing a view on any of the other
issues raised by the case. See PLX, 2019 WL 2144476, at
*1. For present purposes, the damages issue is the important
one, because the trial court had determined that the suite
of defensive measures in the merger agreement, together
with the absence of a topping bid, provided a more reliable
indication of value than the plaintiffs' discounted cash flow
model. See PLX Trial, 2018 WL 5018535, at *44, *54–56.
Notably for present purposes, although the burden of proof
rested solely with the plaintiffs, the trial court in PLX made its
determination using the same valuation standard that would
apply in an appraisal proceeding. Id. at *50.
To reiterate, in its appraisal jurisprudence, the Delaware
Supreme Court has not yet been asked to rule on the reliability
of a sale process involving a single-bidder strategy, no pre-
signing outreach, and a passive post-signing market check.
The closest precedent is Aruba, where the dynamics of the
sale during the pre-closing phase resembled a single-bidder
strategy, although the company's banker did engage in some
minimal outreach.
The pre-signing phase of the sale process in Aruba had two
stages. See Verition P'rs Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks,
Inc. (Aruba Trial), 2018 WL 922139, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. Feb.
15, 2018) (subsequent history omitted). The first stage began
in late August 2014, when HP approached Aruba about a deal.
Aruba hired an investment banker (Qatalyst), who identified
thirteen potential partners and approached five of them. For
reasons having “nothing to do with price,” no one was
interested. Id. at *10. Aruba and HP entered into an NDA that
restricted HP from speaking with Aruba management about
post-transaction employment, and HP began conducting due
diligence. Id. at *11. Despite the restriction in the NDA, HP
asked Aruba's CEO, Dominic Orr, if he would take on a key
role with the combined entity. Orr replied that he had no
objection. Id.
The parties seemed to be making progress towards a deal,
but the HP board of directors balked at making a bid
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without further analysis, recalling the fallout from a disastrous
acquisition in 2011. In November 2014, Aruba terminated
discussions, bringing the first stage of the pre-signing process
to a close. Id. at *12.
For its part, HP continued to evaluate an acquisition of Aruba.
In December 2014, HP tapped Barclays Capital Inc. as its
financial advisor. That firm had worked for Aruba and had
been trying to secure the sell-side mandate. Id. at *13. On
January 21, 2015, HP's CEO met with Orr for dinner. During
the meeting, when HP's CEO proposed resuming merger
talks, Orr responded with enthusiasm and suggested trying
to announce a deal by early March. But HP's CEO also told
Orr that because Qatalyst had represented the seller in HP's
disastrous acquisition from 2011, HP would not proceed if
Aruba used Qatalyst. Id. at *14.
The Aruba board decided to move forward with the deal and
informed Qatalyst about HP's ukase. Aruba was obligated to
pay Qatalyst a fee in the event of a successful transaction, so
it kept Qatalyst on as a behind-the-scenes advisor. From then
on, Qatalyst's primary goal was to repair its relationship with
HP, and Qatalyst regarded a successful sale of Aruba to HP
as a key step in the right direction. Aruba also needed a new
HP-facing banker. It hired Evercore, a firm that was trying to
establish a presence in Silicon Valley. During the sale process,
Evercore likewise sought to please HP, viewing HP as a major
source of future business. See id. at *9, *15–16, *19, *21.
The ensuing negotiations proceeded quickly. HP had
anticipated making an opening bid of $24 per share, but after
Orr's enthusiastic response, HP opened at $23.25 per share. Id.
at *16–17. Qatalyst reached out to a sixth potential strategic
partner, but it was not interested. Id. at *17. The Aruba board
decided to counter at $29 per share. Evercore conveyed the
number to Barclays, but when Barclays dismissed it, Evercore
emphasized Aruba's desire to announce a deal quickly. Id. at
*17–18. On February 10, 2015, twenty days after HP resumed
discussions with Orr, the Aruba board agreed to a price of
$24.67 per share. Id. at *19. The parties negotiated a merger
agreement, and on March 1, 2015, the Aruba board approved
it.
*28  The post-signing phase was uneventful. On March 2,
2015, Aruba and HP announced the merger. The merger
agreement (i) contained a no-shop clause subject to a
fiduciary out, (ii) conditioned the out for an unsolicited
superior proposal on compliance with an unlimited match
right that gave HP five days to match the first superior
proposal and two days to match any subsequent increase,
and (iii) required Aruba to pay HP a termination fee of
$90 million, representing 3% of Aruba's equity value. No
competing bidder emerged, and on May 1, 2015, Aruba's
stockholders approved the merger. Id. at *21–22.
Although the sale process in Aruba had flaws, the trial court
found that it was sufficiently reliable to make the deal price
a persuasive indicator of fair value. Overall, the trial court
viewed the HP-Aruba merger as “a run-of-the-mill, third
party-deal,” where “[n]othing about it appear[ed] exploitive.”
Id. at *38. The petitioners argued that the deal price resulted
from a closed-off sale process in which HP had not faced a
meaningful threat of competition. Id. at *39. The trial court
rejected that contention, noting that the petitioners failed “to
point to a likely bidder and make a persuasive showing that
increased competition would have led to a better result.” Id.
(citing Dell, 177 A.3d at 28–29, 32, 34).
The petitioners also argued that the negotiators' incentives
undermined the pre-signing phase, citing the desire of Aruba's
bankers to cater to HP and the more subtly divergent interests
of Aruba's CEO. The trial court found that although the
petitioners proved that Aruba could have negotiated more
aggressively, they did not prove that “the bankers, [the CEO],
the Aruba Board, and the stockholders who approved the
transaction all accepted a deal price that left a portion of
Aruba's fundamental value on the table.” Id. at *44.
In other portions of the decision, the trial court found that
Aruba's unaffected trading price was a reliable indicator
of fair value and rejected the parties' DCF valuations as
unreliable. These holdings left the trial court with two reliable
valuation indicators: the unaffected trading price and the deal
price. The trial court determined that the unaffected trading
price was the better measure of the fair value of Aruba's
shares. See id. at *53–55.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed. The high
court found that the trial court had incorrectly relied on
the unaffected trading price, but it accepted the trial court's
finding that the deal price was a reliable indicator of fair value.
Aruba, 210 A.3d at 141–42.
Addressing the petitioners' claim that the pre-signing phase
of the sale process was insufficient to establish a competitive
bidding dynamic, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized
that
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when there is an open opportunity for many buyers to buy
and only a few bid (or even just one bids), that does not
necessarily mean that there is a failure of competition; it
may just mean that the target's value is not sufficiently
enticing to buyers to engender a bidding war above the
winning price.
Id. at 136. Applying this principle to the facts in Aruba, the
high court explained:
Aruba approached other logical strategic buyers prior to
signing the deal with HP, and none of those potential buyers
were interested. Then, after signing and the announcement
of the deal, still no other buyer emerged even though the
merger agreement allowed for superior bids. It cannot be
that an open chance for buyers to bid signals a market
failure simply because buyers do not believe the asset on
sale is sufficiently valuable for them to engage in a bidding
contest against each other. If that were the jurisprudential
conclusion, then the judiciary would itself infuse assets
with extra value by virtue of the fact that no actual market
participants saw enough value to pay a higher price. That
sort of alchemy has no rational basis in economics.
*29  Id. On the facts presented, the level of competition in
Aruba was sufficient to support the reliability of the deal
price.
The Delaware Supreme Court also explained that the
negotiations between Aruba and HP over price had important
implications for the reliability of the deal price:
[A] buyer in possession of material nonpublic information
about the seller is in a strong position (and is uniquely
incentivized) to properly value the seller when agreeing to
buy the company at a particular deal price, and that view of
value should be given considerable weight by the Court of
Chancery absent deficiencies in the deal process.
Id. at 137. The high court noted that HP and Aruba went “back
and forth over price” and that HP had “access to nonpublic
information to supplement its consideration of the public
information available to stock market buyers ....” Id. at 139.
The Delaware Supreme Court elsewhere emphasized that “HP
had signed a confidentiality agreement, done exclusive due
diligence, gotten access to material nonpublic information,”
and “had a much sharper incentive to engage in price
discovery than an ordinary trader because it was seeking to
acquire all shares.” Id. at 140. On the facts presented, the
extent of the negotiations in Aruba was sufficient to support
the reliability of the deal price.
The high court ultimately concluded that Aruba's sale process
was sufficiently reliable to render the deal price the best
measure of fair value. The Delaware Supreme Court declined
to use the trial court's estimate of the deal price minus
synergies, instead adopting HP's contemporaneous synergies
estimate and remanding with instructions that “final judgment
be entered for the petitioners in the amount of $19.10 per share
plus any interest to which the petitioners are entitled.” Id. at
142.
The Aruba decision technically did not involve a single-
bidder process, but the dynamics closely resembled one.
Although Qatalyst reached out to five bidders at the beginning
of the first phase of the pre-signing process, none of those
parties had any interest in Aruba. After this development,
both Qatalyst and Aruba's CEO concluded that Aruba's “only
(but strong) weapon is to say we go alone.” Aruba Trial,
2018 WL 922139, at *10. Later, Aruba's CEO had a “pretty
open dialogue” with HP during which he informed HP
that Aruba was “not running a sales process” and did not
attempt to posture about pitting HP against anyone else. Id.
at *40 (internal quotation marks omitted). During the second
phase of the pre-signing process, after HP re-engaged, HP
understood that Aruba was not pursuing other options. Id. at
*41. The negotiations unfolded in a manner consistent with a
single-bidder dynamic. See id.
In concluding that the deal price was a reliable indicator of
fair value, the trial court considered a number of factors,
including that “HP and Aruba agreed to terms for the
merger agreement that the petitioners have not meaningfully
challenged.” Id. at *38. After describing the suite of defensive
measures in the merger agreement, the trial court noted that
“[t]his combination of defensive provisions would not have
supported a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.” Id. The
petitioners had argued about a lack of competition during the
pre-signing phase, and the trial court had discussed that factor
at length, ultimately rejecting the objection. See id. at *39–41.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized that a
failure of competition does not result simply because a limited
number of parties bid, “or even just one bids.” Aruba, 210
A.3d at 136. The Delaware Supreme Court also emphasized
the reliability of the price that resulted from the “back and
forth” between Aruba and HP. Id. at 139.
*30  Given these precedents, I cannot agree that a reliable
sale process must invariably involve some level of active
outreach during the pre-signing phase. By making this
observation, I am not suggesting that the Delaware Supreme
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Court has ever endorsed a single-bidder process for purposes
of appraisal, nor that any of the precedents that this decision
has discussed are squarely on point. Nor am I claiming to
have any privileged insight into how the Delaware Supreme
Court would or should evaluate the persuasiveness of a
single-bidder strategy on the facts of any particular case. It
nevertheless seems to me that if the proponent of a single-
bidder process could show that the merger agreement allowed
for a passive post-signing market check in line with what
decisions have held is sufficient to satisfy enhanced scrutiny,
and if there were no other factors that undermined the
sale process, then the deal price would provide persuasive
evidence of fair value.
This decision has already found that the sale process exhibited
objective indicia of reliability. As noted and as discussed
in greater detail below, the petitioners have not raised a
meaningful challenge to the post-signing market check. The
operative question for purposes of examining the pre-signing
phase is not whether Stillwater's process fell short of what
would have been optimal, but rather whether the pre-signing
process sufficiently impaired the sale process as a whole,
including the post-signing phase, so as to prevent the deal
price from serving as a persuasive indicator of fair value.
b. The Relative Involvement Of McMullen And The
Board In The Pre-Signing Phase
In their initial challenge to the pre-signing phase, the
petitioners attack McMullen's role in the pre-signing process.
They contend that McMullen acted improperly by pursuing
Sibanye's indication of interest without authorization from
the Board and contrary to its direction to pursue acquisitions
or a merger of equals. See PTOB at 37. They also criticize
McMullen for starting to engage with Sibanye in January
2016, but failing to inform the Board until after receiving
an expression of interest from Sibanye in July. During
this period, McMullen met with Sibanye's senior executives
at least twice to discuss a sale of Stillwater, reached an
understanding with Sibanye's CEO on pricing the deal at
a 30% premium over Stillwater's thirty-day VWAP, and
arranged a multi-day site visit for Sibanye personnel.
The petitioners also contend that after the Board learned
of Sibanye's expression of interest in July 2016, the Board
did not exercise meaningful oversight over the sale process.
They accurately observe that the record lacks any evidence
of meaningful engagement by the Board until October 3,
2016, two months before signing, when the Board received
a report on the Company's outreach to various parties,
instructed McMullen to obtain formal proposals for retaining
an investment bank, instructed McMullen to create a cash
flow model that could be used to value the Company, and
decided not to form a special committee. See JX 246.
The petitioners correctly contend that these facts could have
contributed to findings that McMullen and the directors
breached their duty of care under the enhanced scrutiny
standard of review.16 But the enhanced scrutiny analysis
would not have ended there. The C & J Energy decision
likewise involved a CEO that began deal discussions without
formal board authorization, engaged for months without
formally reporting to the board, made a revised offer without
board approval, and generally proceeded by asking for
forgiveness rather than by getting permission. See C & J
Energy, 107 A.3d at 1059. After considering the totality of
the sale process, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that
the facts would not support a fiduciary breach, placing heavy
reliance on the directors' decision to “test[ ] the transaction
through a viable passive market check ....” Id. at 1053.
*31  The outcome in PLX likewise shows that the existence
of problems during the pre-signing process does not
necessarily undermine the reliability of the deal price. The
trial court in PLX found that the directors had breached
their fiduciary duties under the enhanced scrutiny standard
because of an undisclosed tip from the eventual buyer to a
key director and the company's banker. PLX Trial, 2018 WL
5018535, at *15–16, *32–35, *44–47. Despite this defect,
the sale process provided reliable evidence of the company's
value based primarily on the adequacy of the company's post-
signing market check. See id. at *55 (“More important than
the pre-signing process was the post-signing market check.”).
Applying the same damages standard that would govern in an
appraisal proceeding, the trial court found that the sale process
was sufficiently reliable to render the plaintiffs' damages
calculation unpersuasive, resulting in a failure of proof. Id. at
*50–55. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the judgment
based solely on the trial court's damages ruling. See PLX,
2019 WL 2144476, at *1.
McMullen's unsupervised activities and the Board's failure to
engage in meaningful oversight until October 2016 represent
flaws in the pre-signing process. They are factors that must be
taken into account, but they do not inherently disqualify the
sale process from generating reliable evidence of fair value.
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In this case, McMullen's unsupervised activities did not
comprise the entirety of the Company's sale process.
Ultimately, after the Board engaged, Stillwater formally
retained BAML, conducted an expedited pre-signing canvass,
and entered into the Merger Agreement. The terms of the
Merger Agreement facilitated a meaningful post-signing
market check, and no other buyer emerged even though the
merger agreement allowed for superior bids. As in Dell, the
petitioners did not point to any evidence that another party
was interested in proceeding and would have bid if McMullen
and the Board had acted differently. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 29.
c. McMullen's Personal Interest In A Transaction
In their next challenge to the pre-signing process, the
petitioners contend that McMullen undermined the sale
process because he planned to leave Stillwater, and “he
wanted the benefit of a strategic transaction (i) to boost
the Company's stock price prior to his departure and (ii) to
maximize his payout upon stepping down as CEO.” PTOB at
39. The petitioners correctly observe that by leaving after a
transaction, McMullen would be entitled to unvested equity
awards and accelerated retention payments that he could not
obtain if he left without a transaction.
The petitioners also point out that McMullen devoted
considerable time to developing and selling his personal
investments outside of Stillwater. They cite McMullen's
contemporaneous service in 2016 as CEO of Nevada Iron
and as President of New Chris, even though McMullen's
employment agreement with Stillwater limited McMullen's
outside activities to board service and otherwise required him
to devote his full efforts to Stillwater. See JX 114. During
2016, McMullen raised money for the successor company to
New Chris and sold Nevada Iron. See McMullen Tr. 709, 863–
64. The petitioners cite McMullen's activities (i) to show that
McMullen was trying to maximize his personal wealth before
retiring to Turks & Caicos, (ii) to suggest that McMullen
might have done a better job with the sale process if he had
not been pursuing his other investments, and (iii) as further
evidence that the Board failed to provide active oversight.
Sibanye takes the extreme position that “there is no evidence
to suggest that Mr. McMullen was motivated by anything
other than maximizing stockholder value.” Dkt. 211 at 59.
Sibanye points to McMullen's decision in March 2016 to
extend his employment by two years, claiming simplistically
that if “McMullen's intention was truly to do a quick sale and
leave the company, there would have been no need for him to
renew his employment agreement since his prior contract did
not expire until December 31, 2016 and contained essentially
the same termination benefits as the new contract.” Id. at 60.
To the contrary, McMullen understood that completing a sale
to Sibanye or another buyer might extend past December 31.
Extending his employment agreement was the smart play for
McMullen personally. Although Sibanye has not argued this
point, it was also likely good for Stillwater, because it avoided
the prospect of a near-term issue with CEO succession.
*32  Sibanye has no meaningful response to McMullen's
pursuit of his other activities. Sibanye says they were
permitted, but the petitioners have correctly described
McMullen's employment agreement as only authorizing
board service, not his more active roles. Sibanye also
contends that his outside interests were disclosed in public
filings, but that is not the point. The issue is whether the
interests undermined the sale process, not whether they
were disclosed. On this final point, Sibanye asserts that the
petitioners “have pointed to no evidence that these outside
interests presented an actual conflict, that these interests
competed with or were adverse to Stillwater's interests, or that
they otherwise interfered with Mr. McMullen's ability to carry
out his duties as CEO of Stillwater.” Id.
Sibanye has focused on the critical question: whether
McMullen's personal interests undermined the sale process.
Senior executives almost invariably have divergent incentives
during a sale process, often because of change-in-control
agreements, and equally often because the transaction will
have implications for their personal employment situations.
Two Delaware appraisal precedents provide insight into
factual scenarios involving divergent incentives of this type.
The Aruba decision involved a sale process where the
top executive and the company's investment bankers had
conflicting incentives. The CEO wanted to retire, but he
cared deeply about the company and its employees. When
HP proposed to acquire Aruba and keep the CEO on to
integrate the companies, it offered the perfect path “to an
honorable personal and professional exit.” Aruba Trial, 2018
WL 922139, at *5; see id. at *43 (analyzing CEO's conflict).
Aruba's investment bankers both wanted to curry favor
with HP. Qatalyst was desperate to save its Silicon Valley
franchise, and Evercore was auditioning for future business.
Id. at *43. The trial court acknowledged the petitioners'
concerns, but found that the conflicting incentives did not
undermine the deal price as an indicator of fair value:
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The evidence does not convince me that the bankers, Orr,
the Aruba Board, and the stockholders who approved the
transaction all accepted a deal price that left a portion of
Aruba's fundamental value on the table. Perhaps different
negotiators could have extracted a greater share of the
synergies from HP in the form of a higher deal price. Maybe
if Orr had been less eager, or if Qatalyst had not been
relegated to the back room, then HP would have opened
at $24 per share. Perhaps with a brash Qatalyst banker
leading the negotiations, unhampered by the Autonomy
incident, Aruba might have negotiated more effectively and
gotten HP above $25 per share. An outcome along these
lines would have resulted in HP sharing a greater portion
of the anticipated synergies with Aruba's stockholders. It
would not have changed Aruba's standalone value. Hence,
it would not have affected Aruba's fair value for purposes
of an appraisal.
Id. at *44. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court accepted
the reliability of the deal price as a valuation indicator and
used it when making its own fair value determination. Aruba,
210 A.3d at 141–42.
The Dell decision also involved a conflict: Mr. Dell, the
company's founder and top executive, was a buy-side
participant in the management buyout and would emerge from
the transaction with a controlling stake. A special committee
negotiated the terms of the transaction with the financial
sponsor backing the deal, but the trial court regarded Mr.
Dell's involvement on the buy side as a factor cutting against
the reliability of the deal price. For example, the trial court
found that Mr. Dell gave the buyout group a leg-up given his
relationships within the company and his knowledge of its
business, and the trial court accepted the testimony of a sale-
process expert that if bidders competed to pay more than what
Mr. Dell's group would pay, then they risked overpaying and
suffering the winner's curse. In re Appraisal of Dell Inc. (Dell
Trial), 2016 WL 3186538, at *42–43 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016)
(subsequent history omitted). Equally important, Mr. Dell was
a net purchaser of shares in the buyout, so any increase in the
deal price cost him money.
*33  If Mr. Dell kept the size of his investment constant
as the deal value increased, then Silver Lake would have
to pay more and would demand a greater ownership stake
in the post-transaction entity. [The petitioners' sale-process
expert] showed that if Mr. Dell wanted to maintain 75%
ownership of the post-transaction entity, then he would
have to contribute an additional $250 million for each $1
increase in the deal price. If Mr. Dell did not contribute
any additional equity and relied on Silver Lake to fund the
increase, then he would lose control of the post-transaction
entity at a deal price above $15.73 per share. Because Mr.
Dell was a net buyer, any party considering an overbid
would understand that a higher price would not be well
received by the most important person at the Company.
Id. at *43 (footnote omitted). The trial court found that for
purposes of price discovery in an appraisal case, Mr. Dell's
involvement and incentives undermined the reliability of the
sale process and the persuasiveness of the deal price. Id. at
*44.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that Mr. Dell's
involvement in the buyout group had not undermined the sale
process. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 32–33. The high court noted
that “the [trial court] did not identify any possible bidders that
were actually deterred because of Mr. Dell's status.” Id. at
34. The Delaware Supreme Court also emphasized Mr. Dell's
willingness to work with rival bidders during due diligence
and the absence of evidence that Mr. Dell would have left the
company if a rival bidder prevailed. Id. at 32–34. The high
court concluded that the lack of a higher bid did not call into
question the sale process, because “[i]f a deal price is at a
level where the next upward move by a topping bidder has a
material risk of being a self-destructive curse, that suggests
the price is already at a level that is fair.” Id. at 33.
The facts of C & J Energy are also relevant. The merger in
C & J Energy resulted from a CEO-driven process, and there
was evidence that the sell-side CEO had personal reasons to
favor the deal because he would be in charge of the combined
company and receive significantly greater compensation. See
C & J Energy, 107 A.3d at 1064. After the key terms of the
transaction had been negotiated, but before it was formally
approved, the CEO went so far as to demand a side letter
“affirming that C & J's management would run the surviving
entity and endorsing a generous compensation package.” Id.
When the acquirer balked, the CEO threatened to terminate
the discussions. He got his way, and the deal was announced
as planned. Id. at 1065. There was also evidence that C &
J Energy's primary financial advisor acted as a banker for
the deal rather than for C & J Energy, and the banker had
divergent interests as a source of financing for the deal. See id.
at 1056–57. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the facts
could not support a reasonable probability that the defendants
had failed to obtain the best transaction reasonably available,
relying heavily on the post-signing market check. See id. at
1053, 1067–68.
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In this case, McMullen's personal interests are not as serious
as the buy-side conflict that failed to undermine the sale
process in Dell. They more closely resembled the divergent
sell-side interests that affected the negotiators in Aruba
and C & J Energy. Like the CEOs and bankers in those
cases, McMullen's change-of-control benefits gave him a
personal reason to secure a deal under circumstances where
a disinterested participant might prefer a standalone option.
McMullen appears to have been motivated by his desire
to maximize his personal wealth and retire to a greater
degree than the negotiators in Aruba. Stillwater's general
counsel (Wadman) recognized McMullen's conflict, voiced
his concerns to the Board, and ultimately resigned when
McMullen secured more favorable treatment in the Merger
for his own change-in-control benefits and for his CFO. See
JX 526. As a result, McMullen's motivations most closely
resembled the incentives of the CEO in C & J Energy, who
held up the entire transaction until the acquirer agreed to a
side letter “affirming that C & J's management would run
the surviving entity and endorsing a generous compensation
package.” C & J Energy, 107 A.3d at 1064. The Delaware
Supreme Court held that the facts in C & J Energy did not
provide reasonable grounds for a breach of fiduciary duty
under the enhanced scrutiny standard of review.
*34  At the same time, McMullen had ample reason to pursue
the best deal possible for Stillwater. From his testimony
and demeanor, McMullen seems like someone who took
considerable satisfaction in his ability to achieve outcomes.
As a matter of professional pride, he wanted to sell Stillwater
for the best price he could. He also had economic reasons to
extract a higher price. As disclosed in the proxy statement for
the Merger, McMullen held 131,248 common shares, 155,891
restricted stock unit awards, and 222,556 performance based
restricted stock unit awards, for a total of 509,695 common
shares or share equivalents. See JX 525 at 78. At the deal
price, these common shares and share equivalents had a value
of $9,174,510. To state the obvious, every $1 increment in
the deal price generated another half-a-million dollars for
McMullen.
When directors or their affiliates own “material” amounts
of common stock, it aligns their interests with other
stockholders by giving them a “motivation to seek the
highest price” and the “personal incentive as stockholders
to think about the trade off between selling now and the
risks of not doing so.”
Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 670–71 (Del. Ch.
2014) (quoting Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 600); see also
Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *22 (discussing
incentive to maximize deal price where target managers were
net sellers and would not retain jobs post-merger).
Consistent with his personal desire to obtain a good price
for Stillwater, McMullen negotiated with Sibanye to increase
the consideration. When Sibanye indicated interest at $15.75
per share in July 2016, McMullen did not rush to sign up a
deal. When Sibanye raised indication of interest to $17.50
to $17.75 per share in December 2016, McMullen and the
Board demanded a higher price. Even after Sibanye offered
$18.00 per share, McMullen wanted more. Only after Sibanye
twice said that $18.00 per share was its best and final offer
did McMullen and the Board finally agree to transact.
As with McMullen's initiation of the sale process and
the Board's failure to engage in meaningful oversight of
his activities until October 2016, McMullen's personal
motivation to exit from Stillwater and maximize his
personal wealth represents a flaw in the sale process.
Although Wadman's noisy withdrawal highlighted these
issues, McMullen's personal interests as a whole do not
appear materially different from interests that have not been
sufficient in other cases to undermine the reliability of sale
processes. On balance, the evidence does not convince me
that McMullen's divergent interests led either McMullen
or the Board to accept a deal price that left a portion of
Stillwater's fundamental value on the table, particularly in
light of the effective post-signing market check that Stillwater
conducted.
d. The “Soft-Sell”
Turning to the details of the pre-signing phase, the petitioners
contend that Stillwater's pre-signing market check fell short
because until BAML was formally retained, McMullen relied
on a “soft sell” approach that provided potential buyers with
insufficient information to conclude that Stillwater was for
sale and used unauthorized agents who could not formally
engage on Stillwater's behalf. See PTOB at 44–45.
The evidence demonstrates that on the facts of this case, the
“soft sell” strategy was not an effective means of generating
interest in the Company. At the same time, the “soft sell”
effort did not do anything to harm either BAML's abbreviated
pre-signing process or the post-signing market check. The soft
sell strategy was not a positive feature of the sale process, and
it does not help support the persuasiveness of the deal price,
but it does not detract from it either.
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e. BAML's Compressed Pre-Signing Market Check
In a further criticism of the pre-signing phase, the petitioners
contend that after BAML was formally retained, BAML did
not have time to run an organized and meaningful process.
The petitioners complain that BAML hastily called a list
of potentially interested parties, who then were given only
days after signing an NDA to prepare an expression of
interest. Contrary to McMullen's strong recommendation in
September 2016 that any bidder visit the Company's mines
before providing an expression of interest, the November
timeline did not accommodate site visits until after a party
made an expression of interest. See JX 229 at '603. At trial, the
petitioners introduced testimony from a sale process expert
who questioned the effectiveness of BAML's abbreviated pre-
signing process. See Gray Tr. 567–68. Even Sibanye's sale
process expert questioned the effectiveness of the type of
condensed outreach that BAML attempted to conduct. See
Stowell Tr. 947–48.
*35  The petitioners have made a persuasive case that the
BAML's pre-signing process was suboptimal, but they have
not shown that it was worthless, nor that it was harmful. To
the contrary, when evaluated against Delaware precedents, the
pre-signing efforts, while rushed, were a positive factor for
the sale process.
BAML received its formal mandate on November 7, 2016.
The next day, BAML received a package of information from
the Company, including Sibanye's indication of interest from
July, the non-disclosure agreements with Hecla and Coeur,
a cash flow model, and instructions for accessing the data
room. BAML understood that Sibanye was pushing to close
a deal by December and swung into action to do what it
could. By November 9, BAML had generated a plan for an
expedited market check that contemplated reaching out to
twenty parties over the next two days, working with parties
who expressed interest for the rest of the month, and then
receiving expressions of interest at the end of the month. At
that point, the Board would decide how to proceed.
In accordance with its expedited plan, BAML engaged
directly with Sibanye, Coeur, and Hecla. BAML contacted
five of the six parties that BAML regarded as “Possibly
Interested,” missing one. BAML contacted eight of the
twelve additional parties that BAML had identified, missing
four. BAML also contacted Northern Star, even though they
originally had been listed as not interested.
Ten of the fourteen parties had no interest, but four engaged.
One quickly withdrew, two ultimately expressed interest in
a merger of equals, and the fourth dropped out by late
November. Coeur also dropped out, and Hecla indicated that it
needed to find a partner to pursue a transaction. Although the
Board extended Hecla's deadline for submitting an indication
of interest, and BAML followed up with Hecla, Hecla did
not respond. At the end of November, an additional party—
Northam—asked to be included in the Company's process.
During a meeting on December 2, 2016, the Board considered
the status of the Company's process. At that point, the
Board's only definitive expression of interest was a proposal
that Sibanye had submitted on December 1 to acquire the
Company for between $17.50 and $17.75 per share in cash.
The Board decided to focus on Sibanye, which later raised its
offer to $18 per share. Northam decided to withdraw, and on
December 8, the Board approved the Merger Agreement.
Although compressed and expedited, BAML's outreach
resulted in fourteen other parties hearing about Stillwater. In
addition to Sibanye, a total of seven parties engaged to some
degree. Ultimately, no one other than Sibanye submitted an
indication of interest. The plaintiffs have criticized the timing,
pacing, and scope of the pre-signing process, but it resulted
in BAML contacting the “logical strategic buyers” before
Stillwater signed up its deal with Sibanye. Cf. Aruba, 210
A.3d at 136 (observing that “Aruba approached other logical
strategic buyers prior to signing the deal with HP, and none
of those potential buyers were interested.”). The number of
meaningful contacts compares favorably with or is similar
to the facts in the Delaware Supreme Court precedents.17
When considering whether a deal price provides persuasive
evidence of fair value, it is pertinent that the parties contacted
failed to pursue a merger when they had a free chance to do
so. See DFC, 172 A.3d at 376 (citing “failure of other buyers
to pursue the company when they had a free chance to do so”
as factor supporting fairness of deal price).
*36  On balance, BAML's pre-signing efforts were helpful.
At a minimum, the abbreviated process generated incremental
interest in Stillwater and gave those parties who engaged a leg
up for the post-signing market check. Even the parties who
were contacted but did not engage had the benefit of knowing
that a transaction potentially was afoot. As with the “soft
sell” strategy, there is no evidence that BAML's abbreviated
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process did anything to harm the sale process. The bidders
who participated in the abbreviated pre-signing phase were
free to bid during the post-signing phase. There is no evidence
that any were alienated or put off by the Company's pre-
signing efforts.
BAML's abbreviated pre-signing process was not ideal.
Nevertheless, contrary to the petitioners' contentions, it was a
positive factor for the reliability of the sale process.
f. The Negotiations With Sibanye
In their penultimate objection to Stillwater's pre-signing
process, the petitioners contend that Sibanye pressured
Stillwater to sign a merger agreement before the Company's
rising stock price made what Sibanye was willing to pay
look inadequate. The evidence demonstrates that early in
his discussions with Sibanye, McMullen and Froneman
recognized that any transaction would require a premium over
Stillwater's trading price and agreed in principle on a 30%
premium over the thirty-day VWAP. On October 17, 2016,
Froneman told McMullen that Sibanye's offer of a “30%
premium to VWAP remained unchanged” and that Sibanye's
board of directors unanimously supported the transaction. JX
281 at '425. Another Sibanye executive repeated this message
on November 22. PTO ¶ 243.
Sibanye, however, needed to borrow the funds to acquire
Stillwater, and by November 30, 2016, Stillwater's share price
had recovered to a point where a 30% premium over the
thirty-day VWAP equaled $18.25 per share. Sibanye could
not pay more than $18 per share without supplementing the
consideration with cash on hand or a draw from its revolving
credit line, which Sibanye did not want to do. Rather than
sticking with the concept of a 30% premium over a thirty-day
VWAP, Sibanye disavowed that concept, instead treating its
prior indication of interest from July 2016 as a fixed price of
$15.75 per share. On December 1, 2016, Sibanye proposed a
transaction in a range of $17.50 to $17.75 per share, below
what the 30% premium to the thirty-day VWAP would have
contemplated.
The petitioners object that rather than breaking off discussions
or continuing the sale process, the Board negotiated a price
of $18.00 per share, representing the maximum that Sibanye
could pay under its financing arrangements. They argue
that the highest price a bidder is willing to pay is not the
same as fair value. See, e.g., M.P.M. Enters., 731 A.2d at
797 (cautioning that the merger price must be supported
“by evidence tending to show that it represents the going
concern value of the company rather than just the value of the
company to one specific buyer”); In re Appraisal of Orchard
Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 18,
2012) (“[A]lthough I have little reason to doubt Orchard's
assertion that no buyer was willing to pay Dimensional
$25 million for the preferred stock and an attractive price
for Orchard's common stock in 2009, an appraisal must be
focused on Orchard's going concern value.”).
The petitioners' objection resembles similar arguments that
the Delaware Supreme Court rejected in Dell and DFC. In
Dell, the trial court found that the price negotiations during
the pre-signing phase were limited by what the financial
sponsors could pay based on their leverage-buyout pricing
models. The respondent had conceded that the LBO model
was not “oriented toward solving for enterprise value,” and
the special committee's financial advisors had briefed the
committee about the LBO model and how financial sponsors
would use it. Dell Trial, 2016 WL 3186538, at *29 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The committee's financial advisors
used a similar model to calculate the maximum prices that
a financial sponsor could pay. See id. at *30. The evidence
indicated that the financial sponsors bid consistently with
the results of an LBO model, and their negotiations with the
committee proceeded within that framework. See id. at *30–
32. In addition to the record evidence, the trial court relied on
treatises which explained how the price generated by an LBO
model can diverge from fair value.18 Based on this evidence,
the trial court found that the original merger consideration
“was dictated by what a financial sponsor could pay and still
generate outsized returns,” rather than Dell's value as a going
concern. Id. at *32.
*37  Three months later, the trial court in DFC reached a
similar conclusion when evaluating the deal price paid by a
financial sponsor (Lone Star) to acquire the company (DFC)
that was the subject of the appraisal proceeding. Although the
trial court regarded the deal price as sufficiently reliable to use
as a valuation input, the court expressed concern that “Lone
Star's status as a financial sponsor ... focused its attention on
achieving a certain internal rate of return and on reaching
a deal within its financing constraints, rather than on DFC's
fair value.” In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp. (DFC Trial),
2016 WL 3753123, at *22 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016) (subsequent
history omitted).
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The appeal from the trial-level ruling in DFC reached the
Delaware Supreme Court before the appeal in Dell. The
Delaware Supreme Court rejected the trial court's finding that
the buyer's financial constraints limited the price it could pay
and caused the deal price to diverge from fair value, stating:
To be candid, we do not understand the logic of this finding.
Any rational purchaser of a business should have a targeted
rate of return that justifies the substantial risks and costs
of buying a business. That is true for both strategic and
financial buyers. It is, of course, natural for all buyers to
consider how likely a company's cash flows are to deliver
sufficient value to pay back the company's creditors and
provide a return on equity that justifies the high costs and
risks of an acquisition. But, the fact that a financial buyer
may demand a certain rate of return on its investment in
exchange for undertaking the risk of an acquisition does not
mean that the price it is willing to pay is not a meaningful
indication of fair value. That is especially true here, where
the financial buyer was subjected to a competitive process
of bidding, the company tried but was unable to refinance
its public debt in the period leading up to the transaction,
and the company had its existing debt placed on negative
credit watch within one week of the transaction being
announced. The “private equity carve out” that the Court
of Chancery seemed to recognize, in which the deal price
resulting in a transaction won by a private equity buyer is
not a reliable indication of fair value, is not one grounded
in economic literature or this record.
DFC, 172 A.3d at 349–50. When the Delaware Supreme
Court subsequently ruled on the discussion of the LBO model
in the appeal from the trial-level ruling in Dell, the high court
relied on its decision in DFC, explaining:
[W]e rejected this view [in DFC] and do so again here
given we see “no rational connection” between a buyer's
status as a financial sponsor and the question of whether the
deal price is a fair price. After all, “all disciplined buyers,
both strategic and financial, have internal rates of return
that they expect in exchange for taking on the large risk of
a merger, or for that matter, any sizeable investment of its
capital.”
Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (quoting DFC, 172 A.3d at 374–76).
The reasoning that led the Delaware Supreme Court to
reject the implications of the LBO model for deal pricing
indicates that comparable constraints on a prevailing bidder's
ability or willingness to pay—whether resulting from IRR
hurdles, a comparatively higher cost of capital, or limits on
the availability of financing—should not undermine the deal
price as an indicator of fair value if the sale process was
otherwise sufficiently open. Both Dell and DFC suggest that
a post-signing market test can be the predominant source of
price competition. In Dell, the only participants during the
pre-signing phase were the two financial sponsors, whom the
committee permitted to participate at any one time and each of
whom priced their deals using an LBO model. See Dell Trial,
2016 WL 3186538, at *9–10, *30–31, *37. In DFC, although
the company initially engaged in a broad solicitation, the only
bidders who engaged and submitted indications of interest
during the pre-signing phase were two financial sponsors,
one of whom soon dropped out. See DFC Trial, 2016 WL
3753123, at *4.
*38  On the facts of this case, Sibanye had the ability to pay
more. Although it had not secured transactional financing that
would have supported a price greater than $18.00 per share,
Sibanye could have deployed cash on hand or drawn on its
revolving line of credit. As a rational bidder for Stillwater,
Sibanye understandably had a targeted rate of return that it
needed to satisfy to justify the substantial risks and high costs
of the acquisition. That Sibanye did not bid higher does not
mean that the price it agreed to pay did not reflect fair value
when its bid prevailed. See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136; Dell, 177
A.3d at 28; DFC, 172 A.3d at 349–50, 374–76.
The negotiations between Stillwater and Sibanye over price,
together with Sibanye's refusal to pay more, provides strong
evidence of fair value. In Aruba, the Delaware Supreme Court
explained that
a buyer in possession of material nonpublic information
about the seller is in a strong position (and is uniquely
incentivized) to properly value the seller when agreeing to
buy the company at a particular deal price, and that view of
value should be given considerable weight by the Court of
Chancery absent deficiencies in the deal process.
Id. at 137. The high court observed that HP and Aruba went
“back and forth over price” and that HP had “access to
nonpublic information to supplement its consideration of the
public information available to stock market buyers ....” Id.
at 139. The Delaware Supreme Court elsewhere emphasized
that “HP had signed a confidentiality agreement, done
exclusive due diligence, gotten access to material nonpublic
information” and “had a much sharper incentive to engage
in price discovery than an ordinary trader because it was
seeking to acquire all shares.” Id. at 140. Given these facts, the
extent of the negotiations in Aruba supported the reliability
of the deal price. The same observations apply to Sibanye
on the facts of this case. Sibanye entered into an NDA
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with Stillwater, conducted extensive due diligence, obtained
access to material nonpublic information, and was “in a strong
position (and is uniquely incentivized) to properly value the
seller when agreeing to buy the company at a particular deal
price.”
The fact that Stillwater and Sibanye reached agreement at
$18.00 per share is entitled to considerable weight. Although
the petitioners perceive it to be a weakness of the pre-sale
process, the Delaware Supreme Court's precedents indicate
that it was a strength.
4. The Challenges To The Post-Signing Phase
In contrast to their many objections to the pre-signing phase,
the petitioners have relatively few disagreements with the
post-signing phase. They advance perfunctory challenges to
the terms of the Merger Agreement, claiming that it prevented
the stockholders from capturing the value of an increasing
palladium price and foreclosed other bids. They also contend
that the proxy statement contained disclosure violations.
a. The Merger Agreement And The Price Of Palladium
The petitioners observe that the price of palladium increased
between signing and closing. They then object that the
Merger Agreement “provided no practical way for Stillwater's
stockholders to receive that additional value.” PTOB at 51. In
cursory fashion, they criticize the Board for not asserting the
existence of a Company Material Adverse Effect or invoking
the fiduciary-out clause. Id. at 52. This objection is not really
a criticism of the sale process, but so be it.
The petitioners never engage with the terms of the Merger
Agreement and how it uses the concept of a Company
Material Adverse Effect. The definition of a Company
Material Adverse Effect turns on any “facts, circumstance,
condition, event, change, development, occurrence, result,
or effect” that is materially adverse to the Company. JX
575, Annex A, at A-3. The arising of a Company Material
Adverse Effect does not mean that something good has
happened to Stillwater, like an increase in value due to
rising commodity prices. It means something very bad has
happened to Stillwater. In the Merger Agreement, Stillwater
represented that it had not suffered a Company Material
Adverse Effect, and the Merger Agreement made the accuracy
of this representation a condition to Sibanye's obligation to
close. See id. §§ 4.10.2, 7.2.1. The Merger Agreement also
made the absence of a Company Material Adverse Effect a
separate condition to Sibanye's obligation to close. See id. §
7.2.3. Stillwater did not obtain the right to declare something
akin to a Company Material Beneficial Effect and terminate
the Merger Agreement on that basis. The petitioners' criticism
that the Board did not declare a Company Material Adverse
Effect is a turn down a blind alley.
*39  The petitioners likewise never engage with the terms
of the Merger Agreement and the scope of the fiduciary out.
The Board had the right to change its recommendation in
favor of the Merger based on (i) its receipt of a “Superior
Proposal” or (ii) the occurrence of an “Intervening Event.”
See JX 525, Annex A, § 6.2.4. As permitted by Delaware
law, see 8 Del. C. § 146, the Merger Agreement contained
a force-the-vote provision that obligated Stillwater to take
the Merger to a stockholder vote even if the Board changed
its recommendation, but the stockholders would have the
benefit of the Board's negative recommendation when voting.
See id. § 6.17.2 (“Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, the Company shall submit this Agreement for the
adoption by its stockholders ... whether or not a Company
Adverse Recommendation Change shall have occurred or an
Acquisition Proposal shall have been publicly announced or
otherwise made ....”). If the Company's stockholders voted
down the Merger, or under other defined circumstances,
then the Company had the ability to terminate the Merger
Agreement. See id. § 8.1.2(ii). The Board's ability to change
its recommendation for an Intervening Event, however,
did not include changes in commodity prices. The Merger
Agreement defined the concept of an “Intervening Event” as
any material change, event, effect, occurrence,
consequence or development with respect to the Company
or Parent, as applicable, that (i) is unknown and not
reasonably foreseeable as of the date hereof, (ii) does not
relate to any Acquisition Proposals, and (iii) does not
arise out of or result from changes after the date of this
Agreement in respect of prices or demand for products.
Id. at A-6; cf. R. Franklin Balotti & A. Gilchrist Sparks, III,
Deal Protection Measures and the Merger Recommendation,
96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 467, 468 (2002) (explaining the
importance of an intervening event provision for the target
who “discover[s] the world's largest deposit of gold under
its headquarters, causing the value of the target to increase
dramatically”). Post-signing changes “in respect of prices
or demand” for palladium thus would not qualify as an
Intervening Event and would not support a change of
recommendation. The petitioners' criticism that the Board did
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not exercise its fiduciary out based on changes in commodity
prices is another wrong turn.
The record reflects that Stillwater did not want the merger
consideration to float with the price of palladium. McMullen
testified that “we wanted to know with certainty what was
the number that we were taking to shareholders as the value
proposition.” McMullen Tr. 770. That was a legitimate goal.
The petitioners may well take these explanations and run with
them, claiming that the situation was even worse than they
thought because the Board lacked the power to do things
that the petitioners previously believed the Board had merely
failed to consider. Regardless, the petitioners' bottom-line
criticism of the Merger Agreement misses the point of what
the contract was trying to accomplish. The Merger Agreement
was not attempting to give the stockholders the benefit of
a transaction that included the potential upside or downside
that would result from changes in the price of palladium
after signing. The Merger Agreement was trying to provide
stockholders with the ability to opt for the comparative
certainty of deal consideration equal to $18.00 per share.
More broadly, the petitioners are mistaken when they claim
that there was no practical way for Stillwater's stockholders
to receive the additional value that the increased commodity
price could generate. If Stillwater's stockholders had wanted
to capture the increased value of palladium, then they could
have voted down the Merger and kept their shares. The spot
price of palladium was readily available public information
that Stillwater's stockholders could take into account when
deciding how to vote.
b. The Merger Agreement And Competing Bids
In conclusory fashion, the petitioners object that the Merger
Agreement “contained a no solicitation provision and 5-
day matching rights,” which the petitioners characterize as
“more buyer friendly than the protections provided in AOL
that this Court described as creating ‘structural disadvantages
dissuading any prospective bidder.’ ” PTOB at 51–52
(quoting AOL, 2018 WL 1037450, at *9, and noting that
the decision “describe[ed] a no-shop provision with a 3.5%
termination fee and unlimited 3-day matching rights”). The
petitioners argue that Sibanye's matching rights deterred
interested buyers from making a topping bid because Sibanye
could simply match any competing proposal.
*40  The AOL decision was a fact-specific ruling that turned
on the court's view of the sale process in that case, after
hearing the witnesses at trial and considering the evidentiary
record. The Dell and DFC decisions issued while the matter
was pending, and the trial court requested supplemental
briefing on the effect of those decisions. Both sides continued
to argue for determining fair value based on financial metrics
rather than by relying on the deal price. AOL, 2018 WL
1037450, at *1. The court nevertheless examined the sale
process and regarded the persuasiveness of the deal price as “a
close question.” Id. On balance, the court decided not to rely
on the deal price, except as cross check to a DCF valuation.
In reaching this outcome, the court placed heavy weight on
a comment made by AOL's CEO, shortly after the signing of
the deal, in which he said he was “committed to doing the
deal with Verizon” and emphasized that he “gave the team
at Verizon my word that ... this deal is going to happen.” Id.
at *9. The court found that the comment “could reasonably
cause potential bidders to pause when combined with the deal
protections here.” Id. A trial court's job is to make that type
of decision and determine when the evidence warrants a case-
specific departure from a general rule.
The broader Delaware corpus supports the general principle
that the package of defensive measures found in the Merger
Agreement in this case is sufficient to permit an effective
post-signing market check, even when matching rights are
present. As noted, commentators have perceived that under
the Delaware Supreme Court's recent appraisal decisions, a
sale process involving a publicly traded firm will function as a
reliable indicator of fair value as long as it would pass muster
if reviewed under enhanced scrutiny in a breach of fiduciary
duty case. See Hamermesh & Wachter, supra, at 962, 982–
83; Korsmo & Myers, supra, at 269. Based on numerous
trial court precedents, the suite of deal protection measures
in the Merger Agreement would not have supported a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty.19 The suite of deal protections
in the Merger Agreement compared favorably with the deal
protections in C & J Energy and PLX, which this decision has
discussed at length.
*41  The Aruba decision involved a similar suite of deal
protections. The merger agreement in that case “prohibited
Aruba from soliciting competing offers and required the
Aruba Board to continue to support the merger, subject to a
fiduciary out and an out for an unsolicited superior proposal”
and included a termination fee equal to 3% of the merger's
equity value. Aruba Trial, 2018 WL 922139, at *21, *38.
The matching rights were similar too: HP had “an unlimited
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match right, with five days to match the first superior proposal
and two days to match any subsequent increase, and during
the match period Aruba had to negotiate exclusively and in
good faith with HP.” Id. at *38 (footnote omitted). Viewing
the deal protections holistically, the Delaware Supreme Court
found that potential buyers had an open chance to bid, which
supported the high court's use of a deal-price-less-synergies
metric to establish fair value. See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136.
The Delaware Supreme Court has explained that a post-
signing market check is effective as long as “interested
bidders have a fair opportunity to present a higher-value
alternative, and the board has the flexibility to eschew the
original transaction and accept the higher-value deal.” C &
J Energy, 107 A.3d at 1068. This description comports with
guidance from a frequently cited treatise, which identifies
“critical aspects” of a merger agreement that does not
“preclude or impermissibly impede a post-signing market
check.” 1 Lou R. Kling & Eileen T. Nugent, Negotiated
Acquisitions of Companies, Subsidiaries and Divisions §
4.04[6][b], at 4-89 to -90 (1992 & Supp. 2019).
First, the economics of the executed agreement must be
such that it does not unduly impede the ability of third
parties to make competing bids. Types of arrangements
that might raise questions in this regard include asset lock-
ups, stock lock-ups, no-shops, force-the-vote provisions,
and termination fees. The operative word is “unduly;” the
impact will vary depending upon the actual type of device
involved and its specific terms.
* * *
Second, the target should be permitted to disclose
confidential information to any third party who has on
its own (i.e., not been solicited) “shown up” in the sense
that it has submitted a proposal or, at a minimum, an
indication of interest which is, or which the target believes
is, reasonably likely to lead to (and who is capable of
consummating) a higher competing bid. In this regard,
the target should also be able to negotiate with such third
parties. This removes any informational advantage that the
initial (anointed) purchaser may have.
* * *
Finally, the target board of directors should have
the contractual right, without violating the acquisition
agreement, to withdraw or modify its recommendation to
shareholders with respect to the transaction provided for in
the executed acquisition agreement.
Id. at 4-90 to -94.1 (footnotes omitted).
Using this framework, the deal protections did not preclude
or impermissibly impede a post-signing market check.
For starters, any party could submit a bona fide written
Acquisition Proposal. If the Board determined that the
Acquisition Proposal “constitutes, or could reasonably be
expected to result in, a Superior Proposal” and entered
into an “Acceptable Confidentiality Agreement” with the
party making the proposal, then the Board could “engage in
negotiations or discussions with, or furnish any information
to,” the party making the Acquisition Proposal. JX 545,
Annex A, § 6.2.2. Additional requirements included that
the Company notify Sibanye within twenty-four hours of its
determination, furnish Sibanye “substantially concurrently”
with any information provided to the third party, and not share
any of Sibanye's confidential information unless required by
law. Id. The Company also had to notify Sibanye of the terms
of the Acquisition Proposal and the identity of the third party
making it, then keep Sibanye informed of any developments
on a reasonably prompt basis. Id. § 6.2.3.
*42  After that point, if the Board determined that the
Acquisition Proposal constituted a Superior Proposal and
that its fiduciary duties required it, then the Board could
change its recommendation in favor of the Merger, provided
that before doing so, the Board gave Sibanye five days in
which to match the Superior Proposal or otherwise offer
changes to the Merger Agreement to avoid the change
of recommendation. The Board could also withdraw or
modify its recommendation for an Intervening Event, again
conditioned on giving Sibanye five days in which to propose
changes to the Merger Agreement to avoid the change
of recommendation. If the stockholders voted down the
deal, then Stillwater could terminate the Merger Agreement,
subject only to paying a termination fee and expense
reimbursement equal to 1.2% of the Merger's equity value.
The post-signing market check began on December 9, 2016,
when Sibanye and the Company announced the Merger. It
ended on April 26, 2017, when the Company's stockholders
approved the Merger Agreement. The resulting passive
market check lasted 138 days, close to the 153 days in C & J
Energy and far longer than many of the passive, post-signing
market checks that the Delaware courts have approved. See
App.
During the post-singing market check, no one bid. The failure
of any other party to come forward provides significant
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evidence of fairness, because “[f]air value entails at minimum
a price some buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which no
class of buyers in the market would pay.” Dell, 177 A.3d at
29; see id. at 32, 34. The absence of a higher bid indicates
“that the deal market was already robust and that a topping
bid involved a serious risk of overpayment,” which in turn
“suggests the price is already at a level that is fair.” Id. at 33.
As in Aruba, “[i]t cannot be that an open chance for buyers
to bid signals a market failure simply because buyers do not
believe the asset on sale is sufficiently valuable for them to
engage in a bidding contest against each other.” Aruba, 210
A.3d at 136. Instead it suggests that “the target's value is
not sufficiently enticing to buyers to engender a bidding war
above the winning price.” Id.
c. The Stockholder Vote
In their last challenge to the post-signing phase, the petitioners
assert that the stockholders approved the Merger based on
incomplete and misleading information. They devote only
two pages in their opening brief to this argument, the bulk
of which describes the legal principles that apply in fiduciary
duty cases. See PTOB at 53–54 (citing Morrison v. Berry,
191 A.3d 268, 282–83 (Del. 2018); and Corwin v. KKR Fin.
Hldgs., LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312 (Del. 2015)). The factual
description of their disclosure theory appears in just three
sentences:
Stillwater's stockholders were told McMullen led the
sale process, but they were never informed that he was
preparing to leave the Company or the scope of his outside
business ventures. In addition, Stillwater stockholders were
told that Wadman left the Company prior to closing,
but they were never informed of the context of his
departure or his “noisy exit.” Stillwater's stockholders were
also provided no information regarding the Company's
exploration zones.
PTOB at 53–54. They devote the same amount of space to
this theory in their reply brief, although the text extends over
three pages. Dkt. 228 at 26–28. In their reply brief, they
argue that stockholders should have been told that Wadman
raised concerns about McMullen's conflicts of interest and
“his manner of soliciting interest from third parties,” and
that Wadman was “retaliated against for doing so.” Id. at
27. They also argue that stockholders should have been told
that McMullen “was in violation of his 2016 employment
agreement” while running the sale process because of his
roles with Nevada Iron and New Chris. Id.
*43  The petitioners' argument about Stillwater's exploration
zones does not appear to hold up under their own
understanding of the law. The petitioners elsewhere argued
persuasively that under Industry Guide 7, promulgated by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, Stillwater was
not permitted to disclose information about the value of the
Company's exploration zones. See, infra, Pt. II.B.3.a.
The disclosure theories about McMullen and Wadman would
likely have some merit if the petitioners had done more to
articulate them, support them with case law, and explain
their relationship to a determination of fair value. Presumably
the petitioners' believe that if stockholders had been told
that McMullen was pursuing a sale in part because of his
personal interest in exiting the Company and that Wadman
resigned because of disputes over how McMullen handled the
sale process, then some stockholders might have questioned
whether the deal price reflected fair value.
These contentions would have to overcome the doctrine
against self-flagellation. See, e.g., Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 143 (Del. 1997). That said, the
proxy statement should have disclosed McMullen's interest
in retiring, his roles with GT Gold and New Chris, and their
implications for his employment agreement. Stockholders
also should have been told that Wadman resigned because of
disputes with senior management about the conduct of the
sale process.
Although I have tried to give the petitioners the benefit of
the doubt by crediting their conclusory assertions in this
fashion, I am not convinced that their arguments are sufficient
to undermine the stockholder vote as an expression of the
preference of a supermajority of Stillwater's stockholders
for a sale rather than having the Company continue as
a standalone entity. The Delaware Supreme Court has
explained that “[t]he issue in an appraisal is not whether a
negotiator has extracted the highest possible bid. Rather, the
key inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value and were
not exploited.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33. The disclosures that the
petitioners say the Company should have made could have
affected stockholders' views about whether their negotiators
had extracted the highest possible bid. If stockholders had
been provided with information about McMullen's interests
and Wadman's withdrawal, then perhaps some stockholders
would have inferred that a different negotiator might have
pushed for more from Sibanye or worked harder during the
pre-signing phase to find a bidder who could have paid
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a higher price (an inference undercut by the absence of
any topping bid during the post-signing phase). They would
not have had any reason to revise their assessment of the
Company's prospects as a standalone entity or to vote down
the Merger in the belief that the Company was more valuable
as a going concern in its operative reality as a widely held,
publicly traded firm.
Because of the disclosure issues, this decision does not give
heavy weight to the stockholder vote. Nevertheless, the vote
remains a positive factor when evaluating whether the deal
price reflected fair value. If stockholders believed that the
Company was worth more, they could have voted down the
Merger and retained their proportionate share of the Company
as a going concern. By approving the Merger at $18.00 per
share, they evidenced their belief that the deal price provided
fair value and was not exploitive.
5. The Sale Process Was Reliable.
*44  Sibanye proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
the sale process made the deal price a persuasive indicator of
fair value. The sale process was not perfect, and the petitioners
highlighted its flaws, but the facts of this case, when viewed
as a whole, compare favorably or are on par with the facts in
C & J Energy, PLX, DFC, Dell, and Aruba.
The sale process that led to the Merger bore objective
indicia of fairness that rendered the deal price a reliable
indicator of fair value. To reiterate, it was an arm's-length
transaction. It was approved by an unconflicted Board and
by Stillwater's stockholders. And it resulted from adversarial
price negotiations between Stillwater and Sibanye. Most
significantly, no bidders emerged during the post-signing
phase, despite a Merger Agreement that contained a suite
of deal protections that would pass muster under enhanced
scrutiny.
The petitioners pointed to problems during the early phases
of the sale process before the Board began exercising serious
oversight and before BAML was retained. Those flaws are
factors to consider, but they do not undermine the reliability
of the sale price given what happened later. BAML's pre-
signing canvass was a positive factor. The negotiations
with Sibanye were also a positive factor. And the process
culminated in an effective, albeit passive, post-signing market
check. If Stillwater had pursued a single-bidder strategy and
only engaged with Sibanye, then the terms of the Merger
Agreement would have facilitated a sufficiently reliable post-
signing market check to validate the deal price. Stillwater did
more than what would have been sufficient under a single-
bidder scenario.
It is theoretically possible that a more thorough pre-signing
process or more vigorous negotiations might have generated
a higher transaction price for Stillwater's stockholders, but the
issue in an appraisal “is not whether a negotiator has extracted
the highest possible bid.” Dell, 177 A.3d at 33.
Capitalism is rough and ready, and the purpose of an
appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the
highest conceivable value that might have been procedure
had every domino fallen out of the company's way; rather,
it is to make sure that they receive fair compensation for
their shares in the sense that it reflects what they deserve
to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in
an arm's-length transaction.
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370–71. “[T]he key inquiry is whether the
dissenters got fair value and were not exploited.” Dell, 177
A.3d at 33.
The Merger in this case was rough and ready. McMullen and
the Board did not adhere to the best practices and transactional
niceties that an advisor steeped in Delaware decisions would
recommend. Nevertheless, given the arm's-length nature of
the Merger, the premium over market, and the substance of
what took place during the sale process, it is not possible
to say that an award at the deal price would result in the
petitioners being exploited.
6. The Adjustment For Value Arising From The Merger
Section 262 provides that “the Court shall determine the
fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger
or consolidation ....” 8 Del. C. § 262(h). “[I]t is widely
assumed that the sale price in many M&A deals includes a
portion of the buyer's expected synergy gains, which is part
of the premium the winning buyer must pay to prevail and
obtain control.” DFC, 172 A.3d at 371. “In an arm's-length,
synergistic transaction, the deal price generally will exceed
fair value because target fiduciaries bargain for a premium
that includes ... a share of the anticipated synergies ....” Olson
v. ev3, Inc., 2011 WL 704409, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21,
2011). “[S]ection 262(h) requires that the Court of Chancery
discern the going concern value of the company irrespective
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of the synergies involved in a merger.” M.P.M. Enters., 731
A.2d at 797. To derive an estimate of fair value, the court
must exclude “any synergies or other value expected from
the merger giving rise to the appraisal proceeding itself ....”
Golden Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 507. This means the
trial court “must exclude ... the amount of any value that
the selling company's shareholders would receive because a
buyer intends to operate the subject company, not as a stand-
alone going concern, but as part of a larger enterprise, from
which synergistic gains can be extracted.” Aruba, 210 A.3d
at 133 (internal quotation marks omitted).
*45  Sibanye's valuation expert was Mark Zmijewski, an
emeritus professor of finance at the University of Chicago
and a consultant at Charles River Associates. Zmijewski
opined that the evidence he reviewed did “not indicate that
the Transaction resulted in quantifiable synergies.” JX 652
¶ 66 [hereinafter Zmijewski Rep.]; see Zmijewski Tr. 1146.
Sibanye told its stockholders that the price did not reflect
any synergies. JX 421 at '224. McMullen testified at trial that
he did not believe there were any synergies arising from the
Merger. McMullen Tr. 801. There is accordingly no reason to
exclude any value from the deal price based on synergies.
In this proceeding, Sibanye argued that despite the absence
of quantifiable cost synergies or revenue synergies, it
willingly paid more than fair value for Stillwater, resulting
in a portion of the consideration reflecting value “arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation ....” 8 Del. C. § 262(h). In its opening brief,
Sibanye argued that it paid a premium for two strategic
reasons: (i) to facilitate entry into the United States and (ii)
to expand its share of the PGM market. Sibanye also argued
that it could pay a premium in the Merger because after the
Merger, it could obtain a better rating on its debt. See also
Zmijewski Tr. 1120–22; JX 397 at '452; JX 498 at 20; JX
486 at 1; Rosen Tr. 407–08. Each of these reasons identifies a
valuable aspect of Stillwater based on its operative reality as a
going concern. Stillwater was the only PGM producer located
in the United States, and it generated significant cash flow.
None of these features represented a source of value “arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation.”
Sibanye failed to meet its burden of proof to establish a
quantifiable amount that the court should deduct from the deal
price. This decision does not make any downward adjustment
to the deal price to compensate for combinatorial value.
7. The Adjustment For Changes In Value Between Signing
And Closing
Under Section 262, the time for determining the value of a
dissenter's shares is the point just before the merger closes.
See Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-33. The deal price provides
a data point for the value of the company as of the date
of signing, but the valuation date for an appraisal is the
date of closing. Consequently, if the value of the corporation
changes between the signing of the merger and the closing, the
fair value determination must be measured by the “operative
reality” of the corporation at the effective time of the merger.
Technicolor II, 684 A.2d at 298.
In a merger involving a widely held, publicly traded company,
some gap between signing and closing will usually exist.
The customary need to prepare and disseminate disclosure
documents, then complete a first-step tender offer or obtain
a stockholder vote will typically result in several months
elapsing between signing and closing. See Robert T. Miller,
The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC
Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 2007, 2018–19 (2009) (discussing timelines
for various transaction structures). If regulatory approvals are
required, the temporal gap can expand. Id. at 2020–23. During
this period, the value of the company could rise or fall.
Despite the customary existence of a temporal gap between
signing and closing, Delaware appraisal decisions have
typically not made adjustments to the deal price to reflect
a valuation change during the post-signing period. In Union
Illinois, this court relied for the first time on a deal-price-
less-synergies metric when determining the fair value of a
privately held bank (UFG). See Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 343.
Six months elapsed between signing and closing, and the
petitioners objected to using the deal price because of the
temporal gap. The trial court described this argument as a
“quibble” and as “not a forceful objection,” because “[t]he
negotiation of merger terms always and necessarily precedes
consummation.” Id. at 358. Turning to the facts of the case,
the court found that the petitioners were not able “to cite
any rational explanatory factor that indicates why an investor
would perceive UFG's future more optimistically on New
Year's Eve 2001 than they did on the preceding Fourth of
July.” Id. UFG had experienced “a modest upward adjustment
in its [net income margin] in the second half of 2001,” but
the court saw no evidence that the increase was sustainable
or would alleviate UFG's problems complying with capital
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adequacy standards. Id. Although UFG had refinanced its
debt, the loan came from the acquirer, and UFG was not in a
position to either service that debt or refinance it completing
the merger. Id. The court concluded that “[c]onsidered fairly,
the record does not support the idea that UFG was more
valuable at the end of 2001 than it was when the Merger
Agreement was signed.” Id.
*46  In PetSmart, this court awarded fair value based on
the deal price in a case involving a publicly traded firm. See
In re PetSmart, Inc., 2017 WL 2303599, at *2 (Del. Ch.
May 26, 2017). The court regarded the petitioners' argument
that the merger price “was stale by the time of closing” as
“at best speculative.” Id. at *31. Citing Union Illinois, the
court explained that “[m]ergers are consummated after the
consideration is set. That temporal separation, however, does
not in and of itself suggest that the merger consideration does
not accurately reflect the company's going concern value as of
the closing date.” Id. The court then turned to the petitioners'
case-specific arguments:
Petitioners would have me conclude that the Merger Price
was stale because, in the gap between signing and closing,
PetSmart's fortunes took a miraculous turn for the better.
While the record indicates that the Company did enjoy
some favorable results in Q4 2014, such as an uptick in
comparable store sales growth, I am not convinced that
these short-term improvements were indicative of a long-
term trend. In fact, all testimony at trial was to the contrary
—the Board, as well as Teffner, believed that the Q4 results
were temporary and provided no basis to alter their view
of the Company's long-term prospects. These perceptions
were born out in Q1 2015 (when the Merger closed)
during which PetSmart's comparable store sales dropped
to 1.7%. At year end, PetSmart reported comparable store
sales growth of 0.9%, a 40% miss from the Management
Projections in just the first projection year.
Id. (footnotes omitted). The petitioners in PetSmart thus
failed to carry their burden of proving that the value of the
company had changed.
Most recently, in Columbia, this court awarded fair value
based on the deal price in another case involving a publicly
traded firm. See In re Appraisal of Columbia Pipeline Gp.,
Inc., 2019 WL 3778370, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 12, 2019).
The company developed, owned, and operated natural gas
pipelines, storage facilities, and other midstream assets, and
it had a business plan that called for raising large amounts
of equity financing through a master limited partnership
(“MLP”). Before agreeing to be acquired, the company
had been unable to use the MLP structure to raise capital
because of adverse trends in the MLP financing market.
The merger agreement was signed on March 17, 2016,
and the transaction closed on July 1, 2016. The petitioners
argued that in the interim, the market for MLP equity had
improved and prices for energy commodities had increased.
See id. at *45. The court found that the petitioners had not
carried their burden of proving how to quantify the alleged
improvements in the form of a higher deal price. Id. The
court also found that the improvement in two MLP indices
did not persuasively support the claim that the company
would have been able to raise capital efficiently through its
MLP. The court similarly rejected any valuation increase
based on the prices of energy related commodities, because
everyone agreed that the company's value did not depend on
commodities. As a midstream company, it did not own, buy,
or sell the commodities that it transported or stored. Id.
The one arguable exception is Lender Processing, where
this court awarded fair value based on the value of the
deal price at closing, rather than at signing, where the deal
consideration consisted of 50% cash and 50% stock. See
Lender Processing, 2016 WL 7324170, at *1, *8. Because of
the stock component, the value of the merger consideration
increased from $33.25 per share at signing to $37.14 per share
at closing. Id. The petitioners pointed to the existence of the
temporal gap as a reason not to rely on the deal price or
other market-based metrics associated with the signing of the
deal. The respondent pointed to the absence of a topping bid
as validating the deal price. After reviewing the evidence,
the court concluded that the final merger consideration “was
a reliable indicator of fair value as of the closing” and
that “because of synergies and a post-signing decline in the
Company's performance, the fair value of the Company as
of the closing date did not exceed” that amount. Id. at *23.
The acquirer's expert had not tried to quantify the synergies
or the amount of the post-signing valuation decline, and the
court concluded that the respondent had failed to carry its
burden of proof on those issues. Id. at *33. By using the
deal price as measured at closing rather than at signing, the
Lender Processing decision accounted for changes in value
between signing and closing, but without making an explicit
adjustment.
*47  All four precedents considered whether the deal-price
metric needed to be adjusted to reflect changes in value
between signing and closing. The decisions thus indicate that
an adjustment to the deal price can be warranted. But the
decisions also show that the proponent of the adjustment must
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carry its burden by identifying a persuasive reason for the
change and proving the amount.
At a minimum, it would seem to make sense to adjust the
deal price for inflation. When the parties agreed to the deal
price on December 8, 2016, they reached agreement on a price
measured in dollars valued as of that date. Between that date
and the closing on May 4, 2017, the purchasing power of those
dollars declined. If Stillwater had precisely the same value in
the abstract on May 4, 2017, as it did on December 8, 2016, it
would still be necessary to adjust the number of dollars used
to express that value to reflect the intervening decline in what
the value of a dollar represented. Adjusting the deal price for
inflation would achieve this result.20
As their valuation expert, the petitioners relied on Howard
Rosen, a senior managing director at FTI Consulting. When
adjusting the unaffected trading price, Rosen used an inflation
rate of 2% per annum to account for the decrease in the value
of dollars between signing and closing, then made further
adjustments. See JX 728 ¶¶ 5.19, 5.25 to 5.28. A similar
inflation-based adjustment could be made to the deal price,
generating a value on the closing date of $18.14 per share, but
no one argued for it.
The nature of Stillwater's business makes this case a plausible
one for an upward adjustment that goes beyond inflation.
Stillwater was a mining concern that primarily produced
palladium and platinum. Stillwater's cash flows depended on
the prices of those metals, so when the prices of those metals
increased or decreased materially, the value of the Company
increased or decreased materially as well. The Company's
annual report for 2016 explained the relationship as follows:
*48  The Company's earnings and cash flows are sensitive
to changes in PGM prices – based on 2016 revenue and
costs, a 1% (or approximately $7 per ounce) change in the
Company's average combined realized price for palladium
and platinum would result in approximately a $7.1 million
change to before-tax net income and a change to cash flows
from operations of approximately $3.9 million.
JX 728 ¶ 5.21 (quoting Stillwater Mining Company, Annual
Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 16, 2017)). The Merger was
signed on December 9, 2016. The Merger closed on May 4,
2017. Between signing and closing, the prices of palladium
and platinum increased materially, with a direct effect on
Stillwater's value. Id. ¶ 5.20.
Rosen determined that the sales-weighted price of Stillwater's
commodities increased by 5.9% between signing and closing.
Using the formula in Stillwater's annual report, Rosen
calculated the valuation impact of the additional cash flow as
ranging from $248 million (using a 11.2% WACC) to $285
million (using a 10% WACC), which equated to an increase of
between $2.00 to $2.30 per share. Id. He regarded his estimate
as conservative because he kept production constant and did
not account for new sources, such as Blitz, coming on line. Id.
¶¶ 5.23 to 5.25. Rosen used this figure to make adjustments
to the unaffected trading price. In theory, he could have made
similar adjustments to the merger price.
As this discussion indicates, the petitioners never argued for
an adjustment to the deal price based on an increase in value
between signing and closing. As discussed in the next section,
Sibanye argued that the court could make an adjustment to
the unaffected trading price and use the adjusted trading
price as an indicator of fair value. The petitioners countered
that argument by proposing an adjustment of their own that
resulted in the adjusted trading price exceeding the deal
price. Those arguments addressed the trading price, not the
deal price. There could be considerable conceptual overlap
between the approaches, but there could also be significant
differences.
A petitioner seeking to make valuation-based adjustments
to a reliable deal price also would need to confront the
implications of the post-signing market check. As in Lender
Processing, a respondent in an appraisal case could easily
argue that if a company's value increased between signing and
closing, then a competing bidder would have perceived that
value and offered more than the deal price. The respondent
would argue that if no one bid, then that fact would call
for rejecting the petitioners' evidence of a valuation increase.
There are several possible responses to this argument.
One response is a relatively small point from a valuation
perspective: the termination fee. Using this case as an
example, if a topping bidder made a Superior Proposal,
and if the Board changed its recommendation, and if the
stockholders voted down the Merger, then Stillwater would
have to pay Sibanye a termination fee of $16.5 million plus
reimbursement of Sibanye's expenses up to $10 million, for a
total payment of $26.5 million or 21.6 cents per share. Those
amounts would reduce Stillwater's value to the acquirer,
making the acquirer neutral as to any increase in Stillwater's
value that did not clear that level. The point of indifference
is actually higher, because a competing bidder would incur
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expenses of its own to make the competing bid. Ignoring
those incremental expenses and focusing only on the sell-side
fees, Stillwater's value could increase by up to $26.5 million
without a rational acquirer having any reason to bid. The
absence of a topping bid could not rule out a valuation change
of this magnitude, but an award above the deal price that fell
within the range permitted by the termination fee would likely
be cold comfort to the typical appraisal petitioner.
*49  A more significant counterargument would focus on
the timing of the valuation change. A premise that underlies
the effectiveness of the post-signing market check is that
other bidders learn that the target is for sale when the deal is
announced, can examine the target for themselves, and if they
value the target more highly (taking into account synergies
and other sources of bidder-specific value), then they can
intervene. Under this theoretical framework, competing
bidders can begin work shortly after the announcement,
giving them the full timeline between the signing and the
vote in which to intervene. When the potential overbid would
be induced by a change in the value of the target company,
the time for the competing bidder to act does not begin with
the announcement of the deal, but rather when the bidder
learns of the valuation change. The delayed signal shortens
the amount of time for the bidder to intervene. As the date
of the stockholder vote approaches, it becomes less likely (all
else equal) that a bidder will intervene, if only because less
time is available in which to do so. Because of this effect, a
failure to bid during the post-signing phase provides a much
noisier signal about changes in the target's value than it does
about the absence of higher-valuing bidders. In this case, the
increase in value that resulted from changes in the spot price
did not really begin until February 2017, two months after
signing. It dropped in March, then picked up again in April,
when the stockholder vote took place.
A third counterargument would examine the possibility of
changes in value after the stockholder vote but before
closing. As this case illustrates, a competing bidder's
only meaningful opportunity to intervene is before the
stockholders approve the transaction. In a case where closing
is delayed significantly after the stockholder vote because of
issues such as the need for regulatory approvals, the post-vote
temporal gap would matter more.
Perhaps the most significant problem with relying on a post-
signing market check to rule out an increase in the target's
standalone value is that the resulting valuation improvement
would be available to any bidder. The competition for the
incremental value would likely operate as a common value
auction, defined as an auction in which “every bidder has
the same value for the auctioned object.” Peter Cramton &
Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover
Regulation, 75 L. Econ. & Org. 27, 28–29 (1991). In a
competition for that incremental value, the incumbent bidder's
matching right would loom large. To make it worthwhile
to bid, a potential deal jumper would not only have to
perceive that the value of the target had increased above the
level set by the deal price plus the termination fee and fee
reimbursement plus the deal jumper's likely transaction costs,
but also perceive a pathway to success that was sufficiently
realistic to warrant becoming involved, taking into account
the potential reputational damage that could result from being
unsuccessful. Unless the competitor had a unique reason
to value the increased cash flows more highly than the
incumbent, the competitor should expect the incumbent to
match any incremental bid.21 In a case like this one, where the
valuation increment would result from improved commodity
prices that would be available to all bidders, a strong argument
can be made that a competitor would not think that it had the
ability to outbid the incumbent and would not try.
*50  The respondent in an appraisal proceeding could make
similar arguments about the stockholder vote. If the reasons
for the valuation increase were public, and stockholders still
voted for the deal, then their behavior would provide contrary
market evidence undermining the claim of increased value.
In this case, the increase in commodity prices was publicly
available information, and Stillwater's stockholders had the
ability to vote down the deal if they thought the increased
value from improving commodity prices changed matters.
One obvious response to this argument is that to vote down
the deal, stockholders would have had to prefer returning
to Stillwater in its operative reality as a widely traded firm,
where their only the options for liquidity were either to sell
into the market or hold out for a higher-priced takeover down
the road. Given these choices, stockholders might well have
preferred the surer option of the deal price, even if they
believed that the Company's value had increased between
signing and closing such that the deal price no longer reflected
fair value.
As this discussion shows, whether to adjust the deal price
for an increase in value between signing and closing presents
numerous difficult questions. In this case, the petitioners did
not argue for an adjustment to the deal price, and so the parties
did not have the opportunity to address these interesting
issues. The court will not take them up at this late stage in the
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proceeding. The petitioners accordingly failed to prove that
the deal price should be adjusted upward to reflect a change
in value between signing and closing. See Columbia, 2019
WL 3778370, at *45. This decision finds that the deal price
of $18.00 per share provides reliable evidence of fair value.
B. The Adjusted Trading Price
Sibanye contended that Stillwater's adjusted trading price
is a reliable indicator of the fair value of the Company.
Sibanye generates the adjusted trading price by making
adjustments to the unaffected trading price, so the reliability
of the adjusted trading price depends on the reliability of
the unaffected trading price. As the proponent of using this
valuation indicator, Sibanye bore the burden of establishing
its reliability and persuasiveness.
Assessing the reliability of the trading price for Stillwater's
common stock means getting “deep into the weeds of
economics and corporate finance.” In re Appraisal of Jarden
Corp., 2019 WL 3244085, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 19, 2019).
The thicket of market efficiency is one such place where
“law-trained judges should not go without the guidance of
experts trained in these disciplines.” Id. In this case, both
sides retained financial experts who tried to lead the court
through the undergrowth. Zmijewski addressed these issues
for Sibanye. Israel Shaked, a professor of economics and
finance at Boston University, addressed these issues for
petitioners.
1. Informational Efficiency and Fundamental-Value
Efficiency
The experts agreed on the difference between informational
efficiency and fundamental-value efficiency. See Zmijewski
Tr. 1087; JX 651 ¶¶ 13–27, 33–41 [hereinafter Shaked Rep.].
“[I]nformational Efficiency ... is concerned with how rapidly
security prices reflect or impound new information that
arrives to the market.” Shaked Rep. ¶ 33 (quoting Alex Frino
et al., Introduction to Corporate Finance 305 (5th ed. 2013)).
There are three recognized types of informational efficiency:
• Weak: a company's stock price reflects all historical price
information.
• Semi-Strong: a company's stock price reflects all
publicly available information.
• Strong: a company's stock price reflects both publicly
available information and inside information.
No one claimed that the market for Stillwater's common
stock could be informationally efficient in the strong sense.
Everyone focused on whether the market for Stillwater's
common stock was informationally efficient in the semi-
strong sense. All of the references in this decision to
informational efficiency as it relates to Stillwater's common
stock therefore contemplate informational efficiency in the
semi-strong sense.
*51  “While informational efficiency is a function of speed
and how quickly new material information is incorporated
into a stock's price, fundamental value efficiency is
an incremental function of how accurately a market in
which a stock trades discretely incorporates new material
information.” Shaked Rep. ¶ 42. The price of a security in
a market that is fundamental-value efficient should reflect
its intrinsic value, defined as “the present value of all cash
payments to the investor in the stock, including dividends
as well as the proceeds from the ultimate sale of the stock,
discounted at the appropriate risk adjusted rate.” Shaked Rep.
¶ 40. (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, a
stock trading in a market that is fundamental-value efficient
is one in which the trading price “fully reflects all estimates,
guidance and other public, material information that portray
the risks and returns of a stock accurately, including all key
drivers.” Id. ¶ 41.
The experts agreed that it is impossible to observe whether a
stock trades in a market that is fundamental-value efficient.
See Zmijewski Tr. 1088, 1153–54; Shaked Report ¶ 41.
According to the petitioners, this concession means that
Sibanye cannot meet its burden of proof.
While theoretically valid, the petitioners' argument goes too
far. Whether called fundamental value, true value, intrinsic
value, or fair value, the really-real value of something is
always an unobservable concept. No valuation methodology
provides direct access to it. Fundamental value is like a
Platonic form, and the various valuation methodologies only
cutouts casting shadows on the wall of the cave. The real issue
is not whether a particular method generates a shadow (they
all do), but rather whether the shadow is more or less distinct
than what other methods produce.
Reliance on the trading price of a widely held stock is
generally accepted in the financial community, and the trading
price or metrics derived from it are regularly used to estimate
the value of a publicly held firm based on its operative reality
in that configuration. For purposes of determining fair value
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in an appraisal proceeding, therefore, the trading price has a
lot going for it.22 Like democracy, the trading price may be
imperfect, but it often will serve better than the other metrics
that have been tried. Cf. Winston Churchill, Churchill by
Himself 574 (Richard Langworth ed., 2008). The petitioners'
admittedly valid objection that it is impossible to prove that
a trading price reflects fundamental value is thus not one that
automatically disqualifies the use of the trading price as a
valuation indicator in an appraisal.
*52  In this regard, it is important to recognize that
informational efficiency and fundamental-value efficiency
are not all-or-nothing concepts. See Bradford Cornell & John
Haut, How Efficient Is Sufficient: Applying the Concept of
Market Efficiency in Litigation, 74 Bus. Law. 417, 418 (2019).
A stock trading in a national market like the New York
Stock Exchange will have more attributes of informational
efficiency than a stock trading over the counter, but a party
might be able to show that the particular over-the-counter
market had sufficient attributes to regard the trading price
as informationally efficient. The attributes of the over-the-
counter market are likely to be consistent with a greater
degree of informational efficiency than thinner and chunkier
markets, such as markets for houses or entire companies.
Fundamental-value efficiency is likewise a matter of degree.
A market could be precisely fundamental-value efficient in
that it accurately prices the asset at exactly its true value.
Or it might be nearly fundamental-value efficient in that it
accurately prices the asset within some percentage, say plus
or minus 3%, of its true value. Or it might be approximately
fundamental-value efficient in that it accurately prices the
asset within some wider range of its true value, such as a factor
of two. See id. at 422 (“We might define an efficient market as
one in which price is within a factor of 2 of value, i.e., the price
is more than half of value and less than twice value.” (quoting
Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. Fin. 553 (1986))).
Although it is impossible to test for fundamental value,
there are indicators of fundamental-value efficiency. One
indicator is directional consistency, in which the market for
a security reacts positively to new material information that
is positive, and negatively to new material information that
is negative. See Shaked Rep. ¶¶ 43–44. Another indicator
is proportionality, which examines not only whether the
direction of the reaction to new material information is
consistent with its content, but also whether the extent of
the reaction corresponds with the informational content.
See id. ¶ 45. In simplified terms, if a company announces
a positive earnings surprise and its stock price increases,
then that outcome is directionally consistent. If the stock
price increases by an amount generally proportionate to
the present value of the earnings surprise, then that
outcome is proportionally consistent. A market that evidences
directionality and proportionality is more likely to be
fundamental-value efficient. A market that lacks evidence
of directionality and proportionality is less likely to be
fundamental-value efficient. See id. ¶ 46.
The question in this case is thus not whether the market for
Stillwater's common stock was or was not informationally
efficient. Nor is it whether the market for Stillwater's common
stock was or was not fundamental-value efficient. The
question is whether the market for Stillwater's common stock
was informationally efficient enough, and fundamental-value
efficient enough, to warrant considering the trading price
as a valuation indicator when determining fair value. Put
differently, the operative question in this case is whether
Sibanye proved that Stillwater's common stock traded in
a market having attributes that made the trading price a
sufficiently reliable valuation indicator to be taken into
account when determining fair value, either in conjunction
with other metrics, or even as the sole metric, with the
answer turning on both the attributes of the market for
Stillwater's common stock, and also on the relative reliability
of the trading price compared to other metrics like the deal
price and the outputs of DCF models. See, e.g., Jarden,
2019 WL 3244085, at *4, *27–31 (determining fair value
based on the unaffected trading price after concluding that
it was comparatively the most reliable valuation indicator);
Cornell & Haut, supra, at 425 (“What is important in legal
applications is not some abstract notion of market efficiency.
Rather, what is important is whether the market is sufficiently
efficient in any particular situation.”).
2. Evidence Of Market Efficiency
*53  The experts disagreed about the extent to which the
market for Stillwater's shares was efficient. The experts
discussed factors that courts have considered as indicative of
informational efficiency. The experts also conducted event
studies and opined on their implications for informational
efficiency, directionality, and proportionality.
a. The Cammer And Krogman Factors
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Zmijewski examined whether the market for Stillwater's
shares exhibited attributes that courts have associated
with informational efficiency. He relied on an instruction
from Sibanye's counsel that “Delaware Courts cite as
attributes of market efficiency characteristics such as market
capitalization, public float, weekly trading volume, bid-ask
spread, analyst following, and market reaction to breaking
news and information.” Zmijewski Rep. ¶ 49. He also
analyzed the existence of market makers, eligibility to file
SEC Form S-3, institutional ownership, and autocorrelation
of stock returns, noting that these additional factors were
considered in Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J.
1989), and in Krogman v. Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467 (N.D. Tex.
2001). Zmijewski Rep. ¶ 51. For simplicity, and following
the parties' lead, this decision refers to these attributes as the
“Cammer and Krogman factors,” even though not all of them
were considered in those two cases.
Based on his review of the record, Zmijewski reached the
following conclusions about these attributes:
• Market Capitalization: Zmijewski opined that “firms
with a larger market capitalization tend to have larger
institutional ownership,” “tend to be listed on the
New York Stock Exchange,” and are therefore more
likely to have shares that trade in markets that are
informationally efficient. Zmijewski Rep. App. C ¶ 35
(citing Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Measuring
Securities Market Efficiency in the Regulatory Setting,
63 L. & Contemp. Probs. 105, 115 (2000) (JX
896)). The Company's market capitalization averaged
approximately $1.3 billion, exceeding roughly 60% of
the combined equities of companies listed on the New
York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ. Id.
• Public Float: Zmijewski opined that having a large
percentage of shares in the public float is indicative of
a trading market that is informationally efficient. Id. ¶¶
42–43 (noting that the Delaware Supreme Court in Dell
cited a public float of 1.5 billion shares representing
84.29% of the outstanding stock, and in DFC cited a
public float of 37.5 million shares representing 95%
of the outstanding stock). The Company's public float
consisted of 106 million shares representing 87.4% of
the outstanding stock. Id. ¶ 44.
• Weekly Trading Volume: Zmijewski opined that an
average weekly trading volume of at least 2% warrants
a “strong presumption” of informational efficiency. Id. ¶
2 (quoting Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286). The average
weekly turnover for Stillwater was 6.8%. Id. ¶ 3.
• Bid-Ask Spread: Zmijewski opined that a bid-ask spread
of less than 2.5% is indicative of a trading market that
is informationally efficient. Id. ¶¶ 37–38 (citing DFC,
172 A.3d at 352; Dell, 177 A.3d at 1, 5–6, 24–27, 41;
In re Sci.-Atlanta, Inc. Sec. Litig., 571 F. Supp. 2d 1315,
1340 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Cheney v. Cyberguard Corp., 213
F.R.D. 484, 501 (S.D. Fla. 2003); and Krogman, 202
F.R.D. at 478). The Company's average daily bid-ask
spread was 0.10%. Id. ¶ 39.
*54  • Analyst Coverage: Zmijewski opined that the
presence of at least five analysts following a company
is indicative of a trading market that is informationally
efficient. Id. ¶¶ 4–6 (relying on Thomas & Cotter, supra,
at 115). Seven analysts followed the Company. Id. ¶ 7.
• Market Makers: Zmijewski opined that the presence
of at least nineteen market makers is indicative of a
trading market that is informationally efficient and that
the same inference can be drawn when a company's
shares trade on a centralized auction market like the New
York Stock Exchange. Id. ¶¶ 8–9 (citing Cammer, 711
F. Supp. at 1293; Cheney, 213 F.R.D. at 499–500; In
re Dynex Capital, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2011 WL 781215,
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2011); and Zvi Bodie et al.,
Investments 62–70 (12th ed. 2018)). The Company's
stock traded on the New York Stock Exchange and had
eighty-two market makers. Id. ¶ 10.
• SEC Form S-3 Eligibility: Zmijewski opined that a
company's eligibility to register shares using SEC Form
S-3 eligibility is indicative of a trading market that is
informationally efficient. Id. ¶ 11 (citing Cammer, 711
F. Supp. at 1284). A company is eligible for Form S-3 if
it, among other things, has been subject to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 reporting requirements for more
than one year, filed documents in a timely manner, and
shown that it has not failed to pay certain obligations.
Id. The Company filed Forms S-3 in 1996, 1998, 2001,
2009, and 2010. Id. ¶ 12.
• Institutional Ownership: Zmijewski opined that having
a significant percentage of stock owned by institutional
investors is indicative of a trading market that is
informationally efficient. Id. ¶ 46 (citing Thomas &
Cotter, supra, at 106, 119). As of September 30, 2016,
institutions held approximately 90% of the Company's
outstanding stock. Id. ¶ 47.
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• Autocorrelation: Zmijewski opined that a lack of
autocorrelation in a company's stock return is indicative
of a trading market that is informationally efficient.
Id. ¶ 48. Autocorrelation measures the extent to which
the next day's stock price movement can be predicted
based on the current day's stock price. Zmijewski found
no evidence of statistically significant autocorrelation
during the 254 trading days preceding the announcement
of the Merger. Id.
• Cause And Effect: Zmijewski opined that market
reactions to significant events are indicative of
informational efficiency. Id. ¶ 13 (citing Cammer, 711
F. Supp. at 1287). Zmijewski found that after the
Merger announcement, there was a quick and significant
increase in trading volume. Id. ¶ 17. The first news of
the Merger was released at 1:04 a.m on December 9,
2016. Pre-market trading opened at 4:00 a.m. The first
trade occurred at 4:01 a.m. at $17.50. The Company's
stock closed that day at $17.32 per share, with 38 million
shares having traded. The day before, the Company's
stock closed at $14.68 per share, and only 3.2 million
shares were traded. Id. ¶¶ 15–16; see Zmijewski Tr.
1096.
Having considering the Cammer and Krogman factors,
Zmijewski opined that “[t]he evidence indicates that
Stillwater's common stock traded in a semi-strong efficient
market.” Zmijewski Rep. ¶ 49.
In response, Shaked disputed whether the Cammer and
Krogman factors established informational efficiency to a
sufficiently reliable degree. He opined that “the Cammer and
Krogman factors have not been academically tested and are
not truly conclusive in judging a market as semi-strong form
efficient, but merely an indicator that a market is likely semi-
strong form efficient.” Shaked Rep. ¶ 23. The petitioners
did not cite any academic studies or provide other forms of
evidence that would undermine the use of the Cammer and
Krogman factors, at least as a starting point for assessing
informational efficiency. Zmijewski did not engage on this
issue. He analyzed the factors because he understood that
courts considered them.
b. The Event Studies
*55  The experts also conducted event studies. Zmijewski's
event study tested for a cause-and-effect relationship between
new information and a trading price reaction, which would
provide evidence of informational efficiency. He examined
five events—the four quarterly earnings releases leading up
to the announcement of the Merger plus the announcement
itself. Zmijewski characterized the events as positive or
negative, and examined the market evidence to determine if
the observations resulted in statistically significant abnormal
returns. Three of the five did, but one of those was the reaction
to the announcement of the Merger. Shaked persuasively
observed that finding a statistically significant relationship
between the trading price and the announcement of the
Merger was trivial. See Shaked Tr. 468–69.
For the remaining four observations, Zmijewski found that
only two resulted in statistically significant abnormal returns,
and he admitted that he would have expected the rate of
statistically significant results in an informationally efficient
market to be higher. Zmijewski Tr. 1101. The events
themselves do not suggest any reason why the market would
have reacted in one instance and not the other. For example,
for both the fourth quarter of 2015 and the third quarter of
2016, Stillwater announced higher earnings per share, yet
only the former resulted in a statistically significant abnormal
return.
Shaked conducted three event studies, and he analyzed the
results not only for evidence of a cause-and-effect relationship
consistent with informational efficiency, but also for evidence
of directionality and proportionality that would provide
indications of fundamental value efficiency. In his first study,
Shaked looked at eleven quarterly earnings releases during
the three-year period leading up to the announcement of
the Merger and characterized their informational content
as positive or negative. He then examined whether the
announcement resulted in abnormal returns consistent with
the direction of the news. Shaked observed that only six of the
eleven releases resulted in a directionally consistent reaction;
five of the eleven did not.
In his second study, Shaked examined articles, analyst reports
and SEC filings during the same three-year period, yielding
a total of 181 events that he believed contained material new
information. News of the 181 events was published on a total
of fifty-six days, resulting in fifty-six observations. Although
there are reasons to question some of Shaked's events,
on the whole, his identification appears credible. Of these
fifty-six observations, only twelve resulted in statistically
significant abnormal returns that were consistent with the
directional content of the information. Moreover, there were
thirty-eight days in the study period when there was a
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statistically significant abnormal return but no material news
announcement.
In his third study, Shaked tested for proportionality by
examining the reaction of the Company's stock to the
announcement of a significant increase in the expansion of
its mining operations in its earnings announcement for the
third quarter of 2016. In the prior quarterly earnings releases,
the Company forecast that the expansion would produce
between 150,000 and 200,000 PGM ounces per year. JX
134 at 13; JX 187 at 17. In the earnings announcement
for the third quarter of 2016, the Company increased the
projection to between 270,000 and 330,000 PGM ounces per
year. JX 309 at 16; see JX 306. Shaked estimated the pre-
tax net income that would result from the increased output,
taking into account the additional costs. He then prepared a
discounted-cash-flow model that assumed production would
ramp up by 25,000 ounces per year until 2022, continue at
125,000 ounces per year until 2031, then stop with no terminal
value. Based on this model, Shaked calculated a net present
value of $111.6 million for the increased production, which
should have equated to a 7.08% abnormal return. Although
the stock reacted positively, the observed abnormal return was
only 0.39%. Shaked concluded that the Company's stock did
not react in a proportionate manner, further undermining the
claim of informational efficiency.
c. The Assessment Of Market Efficiency
*56  Absent any countervailing evidence, Zmijewski's
analysis of the Cammer and Krogman factors would support a
finding that the trading market for Stillwater's common stock
had sufficient attributes to be regarded as informationally
efficient. Shaked pointed out that the Cammer and Krogman
factors have not been shown to provide a reliable indication
of informational efficiency, but given the weight of authority
on this issue, an absence of evidence on this point is no longer
enough.23
The event studies, however, cut in the opposite direction.
Courts applying the Cammer and Krogman factors have
generally given greater weight to event studies compared
to the other factors.24 Based on his studies, Shaked
opined that Stillwater's stock did not trade in a manner
consistent with informational efficiency, and Zmijewski's
event study generated relatively unconvincing results. Given
this evidence, it is difficult to conclude that Stillwater's stock
was informationally efficient to a degree sufficient to use the
trading price as an indicator of fair value when a superior
market-based metric, like the deal price, is available. That
does not mean that Stillwater's stock was not informationally
efficient, only that the deal price is a superior market-based
metric for purposes of determining fair value.
*57  Shaked's event studies also raised questions about the
degree of directionality and proportionality exhibited by the
market for Stillwater's common stock. This evidence does
not mean that Stillwater's stock price was unreliable, but it
does make it difficult to conclude that Stillwater's stock was
fundamental-value efficient to a degree sufficient to use the
trading price as an indicator of fair value when a superior
market-based metric like the deal price is available.
3. Evidence Of Information Gaps
The petitioners advance two other challenges to the reliability
of Stillwater's trading price. Because everyone agrees that
the market for Stillwater's common stock could only
be informationally efficient in the semi-strong sense, the
trading price could only account for publicly available
information. The petitioners argue that material information
about Stillwater's inferred reserves was not publicly available,
meaning that the trading price could not be a reliable indicator
of fundamental value. They also cite evidence indicating that
the parties themselves did not trust the market's estimation
of the Company's value. The former point is another strike
against the trading price; the latter is not.
a. Industry Guide 7
The petitioners argue that Stillwater's trading price is not a
reliable indicator of value because the market did not have
access to material information related to the Company's value.
On this issue, the petitioners relied on another expert: Thomas
Matthews, a Principal Resource Geologist at Gustavson
Associates. Matthews discussed the constraints imposed by
Industry Guide 7, which specifies what the United States
Securities and Exchange Commission permits a mining
company to disclose. See JX 843 [hereinafter Industry Guide
7]; 17 C.F.R. 229.801(g).
To oversimplify a significantly more complex area, Industry
Guide 7 only permits a mining company to disclose
information about proven reserves or probable reserves. A
proven reserve is a mineral deposit where (i) “quantity is
computed from dimensions revealed in outcrops, trenches,
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workings or drill holes,” (ii) “grade or quality are computed
from the results of detailed sampling,” and (iii) “the sites
for inspection, sampling and measurement are spaced so
closely and the geologic character is so well defined that
size, shape, depth and mineral content of reserves are well-
established.” Industry Guide 7 ¶ (a)(2). A probable reserve is
a mineral deposit where “the sites for inspection, sampling,
and measurement are farther apart or are otherwise less
adequately spaced,” resulting in a “degree of assurance” that
is “lower than that for proven reserves” but still “high enough
to assume continuity between points of observation.” Id. ¶
(a)(3). Industry Guide 7 does not permit a mining company
to disclose information about inferred resources, which are
mineral deposits where the quantity, grade, and quality
“can be estimated” based on “geological evidence,” “limited
sampling,” and “reasonably assumed, but not verified,
geological and grade continuity.” JX 7 at 4; see Industry
Guide 7 ¶ (b)(5), Instruction 3.
Since at least 2012, the Society for Mining, Metallurgy and
Exploration, Inc. has criticized this aspect of Industry Guide
7, complaining that the restrictions on reporting “limits the
completeness and relevance of SEC reports for investors.”
JX 15 at 1. The Society contrasted Industry Guide 7 with
the standards applied in other countries, which permit this
disclosure. Id. at 2. In 2016, the SEC acknowledged the issue
and proposed revisions to Industry Guide 7, but the new
rules did not go into effect until 2018, long after the Merger
closed. See Modernization of Property Disclosures for Mining
Registrants, Exchange Act Release No. 34-84509, 2018 WL
5668900 (Oct. 31, 2018).
*58  Under Industry Guide 7 as it existed during the
period leading up to the Merger, Stillwater could disclose
information about the Stillwater Mine and East Bolder
Mine, but could not disclose information about the inferred
resources at Blitz, Lower East Boulder, Iron Creek, Altar,
and Marathon. See JX 727 ¶ 13 (Matthews Reb. Rep.).
For Blitz, the Company possessed but could not disclose
“a resource estimation, a conceptual mine plan, material
movement schedules, a capital and operating cost review, and
a preliminary economic analysis for the Blitz expansion.” Id.
¶ 12. The Company could only disclose certain drill data and
briefly describe production target ranges, estimated capital
spend, and timeframes. See id. ¶ 14.
The parties disagreed about whether disclosure of this
information would cause investors to place a higher or lower
valuation on the Company, but they agreed that it created
an information gap for purposes of trading in the Company's
stock. See id. ¶ 16; Zmijewski Tr. 1151. Zmijewski argued
that because the effect of the information was unknowable,
the court should assume that the absence of the information
did not bias the trading price up or down. Sibanye also pointed
out that some of the information was available in a filing that
Stillwater made in March 2011 under the laws of Canada. See
JX 9 at '055; cf. JX 501 at '345.
Stillwater's inability to disclose information about inferred
resources under Industry Guide 7, combined with its partial
disclosure of some of this information in a Canadian filing
from 2011, are negative factors for purposes of using the
Company's trading price as a valuation indicator. They are not
dispositive in their own right, but they undermine the relative
persuasiveness of the trading price.
b. Contemporaneous Evidence Of A Valuation Gap
The petitioners also cite contemporaneous evidence in the
record in which knowledgeable insiders affiliated with
Stillwater, its advisors, or Sibanye regarded the trading price
as an unreliable indicator of value. For example:
• In May 2015, Stillwater management told the Board that
“[m]uch of the value from Blitz, Lower East Boulder and
recycle ramp up yet to be recognized by the market and
potential buyers.” JX 41 at '715.
• In January 2016, the Board thought that “the stock had
been forced down significantly and ... didn't feel it really
was reflective of what was going on in the business.”
McMullen Dep. 145.
• In June 2016, Froneman described the markets as “a bit
all over the place lately.” JX 152 at '532.
• In their second and third quarter 2016 reports,
BMO analysts thought the Company's stock price
did not reflect the value of Blitz. See JX 766
(stating in October 2016 that “[e]ven with arguably
conservative assumptions, we maintain our opinion that
the magnitude of the growth potential at Blitz is not
factored into SWC shares”); Shaked Rep. ¶ 124 (quoting
a June 2016 BMO report stating that “Blitz remains an
underappreciated growth opportunity”).
• In October 2016, Vujcic told the Board that the market
perceived PGMs as “exposed to irrational producer
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behaviour in both South Africa and Russia.” JX 293 at
'522.
• During October, November, and December 2016, Stewart
repeatedly stated that “[a]t an offer price of ~US$2bn
(30% premium to 30 day VWAP) we are effectively
paying a full price for the existing operations, 50% of
Blitz and getting the remaining upside optionality for
free.” JX 282 at '775; see JX 410; JX 378 at '009;
JX 447 at '981. He did not believe the market was
“really considering Blitz.” JX 397 at '451; see JX 280
at '279 (describing the Company's underperformance as
“unlikely to remain as market recognises improvements
are sustainable and Blitz comes on line”).
*59  • In late November 2016, two weeks before signing,
Stewart stated that the market was “currently at or near
the bottom of the PGM cycle,” suggesting a depressed
stock price. JX 410 at '099; see PTO ¶ 257; see also JX
280 at '279; JX 399 at '407.
• In early December 2016, days before signing, McMullen
commented on how the price of palladium had been
artificially depressed. See JX 437 at '471 (noting
that palladium was “finally starting to reflect the
fundamentals”)
• After announcing the Merger, Sibanye received two “deal
of the year” awards and commented in both instances
that the Merger was signed “at an opportune time in the
commodity price cycle.” JX 511; JX 641 at 1.
• At trial, Schweitzer testified that “[t]he company's stock
price was all over the place from 2013 to 2016” and that
he and “McMullen both believed there was a disconnect
between the price of metals and the share price for
Stillwater stock.” Schweitzer Tr. 173.
This evidence as a whole is less extensive and persuasive than
what the record demonstrated about the contemporaneous
views of knowledgeable insiders regarding the existence of a
valuation gap in Dell, and the Delaware Supreme Court in that
case found that the trial court erred by giving weight to that
evidence. See Dell, 177 A.3d 25–26; cf. Dell Trial, 2016 WL
3186538, at *33–36. This decision therefore does not give any
weight to the petitioners' weaker showing in this case.
4. The Comparative Reliability Of The Trading Price
Through Zmijewski's analysis of the Cammer and Krogman
factors, Sibanye made an initial showing that would be
sufficient to support the reliability of the trading price as
a valuation indicator absent contrary evidence. The results
of the experts' event studies and the limitations imposed
by Industry Guide 7 provided contrary evidence. Based on
the parties' showings, the trading price is a less persuasive
and less reliable valuation indicator in this case than the
deal price. The lack of a reliable trading price does not
undermine a court's ability to rely on the deal price, where
the persuasiveness of the deal price has been established by
analyzing the sufficiency of the sale process. See Columbia,
2019 WL 3778370, at *49.
This decision does not find that the trading price was so
unreliable that it could not be used as a valuation indicator. If
a market-tested indicator like the deal price was unavailable,
then this decision might well have given weight to the trading
price. Had this decision been forced to take that route, it
would not have relied on the unaffected trading price, because
Sibanye did not argue for its use, but instead would have taken
into account the adjusted trading price.
Based on the record that the parties generated, Sibanye did not
carry its burden to establish that the adjusted trading price was
a sufficiently reliable valuation indicator for the court to use in
determining fair value. The reliability of the adjusted trading
price depended on the reliability of the unaffected trading
price, and the record provides sufficient reason for concern
about incorporating a trading price metric. This decision
therefore does not give any weight to the adjusted trading
price.
C. The Discounted Cash Flow Models
The petitioners and Sibanye each introduced a DCF valuation
prepared by an expert. The petitioners relied on Rosen, whose
DCF model generated a value of $25.91 per share. Sibanye
relied on Zmijewski, whose DCF model generated a value of
$17.03 per share. The difference amounts to approximately
$1 billion in value.
*60  The DCF method is a technique that is generally
accepted in the financial community. “While the particular
assumptions underlying its application may always be
challenged in any particular case, the validity of [the DCF]
technique qua valuation methodology is no longer open
to question.” Pinson, 1989 WL 17438, at *8 n.11. It is a
“standard” method that “gives life to the finance principle that
firms should be valued based on the expected value of their
future cash flows, discounted to present value in a manner that
accounts for risk.” Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005
WL 2045640, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005).
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The DCF model entails three basic components: an
estimation of net cash flows that the firm will generate and
when, over some period; a terminal or residual value equal
to the future value, as of the end of the projection period,
of the firm's cash flows beyond the projection period; and
finally a cost of capital with which to discount to a present
value both the projected net cash flows and the estimated
terminal or residual value.
In re Radiology Assocs., Inc. Litig., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del.
Ch. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Dell and DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court cautioned
against using the DCF methodology when market-based
indicators are available. In Dell, the high court explained
that “[a]lthough widely considered the best tool for valuing
companies when there is no credible market information and
no market check, DCF valuations involve many inputs—
all subject to disagreement by well-compensated and highly
credentialed experts—and even slight differences in these
inputs can produce large valuation gaps.” Dell, 177 A.3d at
37–38. The high court warned that when market evidence
is available, “the Court of Chancery should be chary about
imposing the hazards that always come when a law-trained
judge is forced to make a point estimate of fair value based on
widely divergent partisan expert testimony.” Id. at 35. Making
the same point conversely in DFC, the Delaware Supreme
Court advised that a DCF model should be used in appraisal
proceedings “when the respondent company was not public
or was not sold in an open market check ....” DFC, 172 A.3d
at 369 n.118. The high court commented that “a singular
discounted cash flow model is often most helpful when there
isn't an observable market price.” Id. at 370.
This case illustrates the problems that the Delaware Supreme
Court identified. The experts disagreed over many inputs,
with small changes producing large swings in value. The
briefing focused on eight inputs, with four generating the bulk
of the difference.
First, the experts debated whether to apply a small-company
risk premium, otherwise known as a size premium. Zmijewski
applied a size premium of 1.66%, relying on Duff &
Phelps, 2017 Valuation Handbook – U.S. Guide to Cost of
Capital (2017). Rosen did not apply one, arguing that it
was not warranted. To the extent the court disagreed, he
argued for using a premium of 1.5% drawn from Ibbotson
Associates, SBBI 2013 Valuation Yearbook (2013). The
scholarly literature on whether and how to apply a size
premium is less than enlightening. The same respected
scholars have found different results depending on the data
set,25 and others have engaged in vigorous debate about how
to interpret the data and what inferences to draw.26 This
one dispute results in a valuation swing of $2.13 per share,
accounting for approximately 24% of the difference between
the two models.
*61  Second, the experts debated the size of the equity risk
premium. Zmijewski used a historic supply-side risk premium
of 5.97% published by Duff & Phelps. See JX 837; JX 893.
Duff & Phelps advised practitioners to deduct 1.08% from
this measurement to account for “the WWII Interest Rate
Bias.” JX 893 at 34. Zmijewski did not make the adjustment,
explaining that it would not make sense to exclude the effect
of interest rate controls during World War II, while failing
to account for other periods of government control, such as
the extreme phases of interest rate repression and quantitative
easing that followed the 2008 financial crisis. Zmijewski Tr.
1042–43. Rosen used a forward-looking premium of 5.34%,
derived from a model created by Aswath Damodaran. See JX
678. Zmijewski criticized the model, explaining that a user
could generate approximately seventy different equity risk
premiums by manipulating the inputs and objecting to some
of Rosen's selections. See JX 893 at 47; JX 894; Zmijewski
Tr. 1053–54. This one dispute results in a valuation swing
of $1.33 per share, accounting for approximately 15% of the
difference between the two models.
Third, the experts disputed which set of commodity price
forecasts to use to generate cash flows. Zmijewski relied on
price forecasts prepared by another expert for Sibanye. JX
710 (Burrows Rep.). Rosen relied on price forecasts from
Bloomberg. JX 654 ¶ 8.21 (Rosen Rep.). This one dispute
results in a valuation swing of $0.82 per share, accounting for
approximately 9% of the difference between the two models.
Fourth, the experts diverged in their treatment of Stillwater's
exploration areas. Sibanye argued that any valuation of these
properties would be speculative and instructed Zmijewski
not to try. Zmijewski Tr. 1074–75. Rosen estimated an “in-
ground metal dollar value” for the properties, then relied
on a report that examined PGM transactions in South
Africa to estimate that exploration properties could be worth
“between .5 percent and 2.5 percent of the estimated in
situ dollar value of metal.” Rosen Tr. 277–78; see JX 765.
The respondent's mining expert identified many problems
with Rosen's method. See JX 768. The dispute over the
exploration areas results in a valuation swing of more than
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$2.00, accounting for approximately 23% of the difference
between the two models.
Four other disputes account for the remaining valuation swing
of $3.00 per share. Those disagreements concern how to
account for the resources in mine-adjacent areas, the amount
of excess cash, the value of inventory, and the value of Altar.
As with the four major disputes, both sides have good reasons
for their positions.
The legitimate debates over these inputs and the large swings
in value they create undercut the reliability of the DCF
model as a valuation indicator. If this were a case where
a reliable market-based metric was not available, then the
court might have to parse through the valuation inputs and
hazard semi-informed guesses about which expert's view was
closer to the truth. In this case, there is a persuasive market-
based metric: the deal price that resulted from a reliable sale
process. Dell and DFC teach that a trial court should have
greater confidence in market indicators and less confidence
in divergent expert determinations. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 35–
38; DFC, 172 A.3d at 368–70 & n.118. Compared to the deal-
price metric, the DCF technique “is necessarily a second-best
method to derive value.” Union Illinois, 847 A.2d at 359.
This decision therefore does not use it. See In re Appraisal of
Solera Hldgs., Inc., 2018 WL 3625644, at *32 (Del. Ch. July
30, 2018).
III. CONCLUSION
The fair value of the Company's common stock at the effective
time of the Merger was $18.00 per share. The legal rate of
interest, compounded quarterly, shall accrue on the appraised
value from the effective date until the date of payment. The
parties shall cooperate to prepare a form of final order. If there
are additional issues that need to be resolved, then the parties
shall submit a joint letter within fourteen days that identifies
them and proposes a path to bring this matter to a conclusion
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Footnotes
1 Citations in the form “PTO ¶ ––” refer to stipulated facts in the pre-trial order. Dkt. 209. Citations in the form “[Name]
Tr.” refer to witness testimony from the trial transcript. Citations in the form “[Name] Dep.” refer to witness testimony
from a deposition transcript. Citations in the form “JX –– at ––” refer to a trial exhibit with the page designated by the
last three digits of the control or JX number. If a trial exhibit used paragraph or section numbers, then references are
by paragraph or section.
2 The two slides in the management presentations that addressed a sale contained comments like “[f]inding a willing buyer
with higher priced currency is difficult,” “[m]uch of the value from Blitz, Lower East Boulder and recycle ramp up yet to be
recognized by the market and potential buyers,” and the “[r]ecent downward trend in PGM prices not the right environment
in which to be a seller.” Id. at '866 to '867. Out of the nearly 190 slides in the banker presentations, only one discussed
a possible sale. There, BMO opined that selling was “unlikely to be a value maximizing strategy until value has been
extracted from all the other alternatives” available to the Company. Id. at '108.
3 See, e.g., JX 50 at '586 to '594; JX 52; JX 53; JX 55; JX 57; JX 58; JX 67; JX 68; PTO ¶¶ 138–39. Although principally
focused on acquisitions, McMullen asked BMO in an October 2015 email for its views about “who would potentially be
a buyer of Stillwater in an M+A deal?” JX 57 at '920. BMO sent back a list of twenty-one candidates, but warned that
“[g]enerally as a whole we would say that we do not believe there is a high level of current interest and capability for
an acquisition of Stillwater.” Id. at '919.
4 Only one slide in McMullen's presentation referenced a sale of the Company, and it advised that there was a “[v]ery
limited number of potential buyers” and that because “commodity prices and sentiment are low,” the Company “would
not realize full value potentially.” JX 86 at '025. By contrast, he presented multiple slides discussing positively how the
Company could deploy its “capital and currency” (its stock) to make an acquisition. See id. at '026 to '035.
5 See JX 138; JX 139 at '831; JX 154 at '087; JX 155; JX 157 at '315; McMullen Tr. 709–10; see also JX 349.
6 See Schweitzer Tr. 189–90. McMullen testified that he told Schweitzer and Merrin about Sibanye's approach after his
initial meeting with Froneman. He also claimed that he kept the Board informed as discussions progressed. McMullen's
self-interested testimony conflicted with Schweitzer's more credible testimony and other record evidence.
7 See JX 152 at '532 '533. At trial, McMullen testified that after Sibanye conducted its site visit, the Board told him that they
wanted “some sort of written expression of interest” before starting “a data room process.” McMullen Tr. 728–29. That
testimony was not credible. The evidence indicates that McMullen did not brief the Board about a potential transaction
with Sibanye until the July 2015 board meeting. See Schweitzer Tr. 189–90.
8 JX 364 at '374. At trial, Schweitzer testified that this was the meeting at which the Board finally decided it did not need a
special committee. See Schweitzer Tr. 157–58, 194. The minutes omit any discussion of the matter.
9 Id. at 72. Although Battye is the seminal Delaware Supreme Court case on point, Chancellor Josiah Wolcott initially
established the meaning of “value” under the appraisal statute in Chicago Corporation v. Munds, 172 A. 452 (Del. Ch.
1934). Citing the “material variance” between the Delaware appraisal statute, which used “value,” and the comparable
New Jersey statute that served as a model for the Delaware statute, which used “full market value,” Chancellor Wolcott
held that the plain language of the statute required “value” to be determined on a “going concern” basis. Id. at 453–55.
But see Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. Union Fin. Gp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 355–56 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“This requirement
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that the valuation inquiry focus on valuing the entity as a going concern has sometimes been confused as a requirement
of § 262's literal terms. It is not.”).
10 See, e.g., Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 222 (Del. 2005); Paskill Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747
A.2d 549, 553 (Del. 2000); Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802 (Del. 1992); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564
A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989); Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 141 (Del. 1980); Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Francis I. duPont & Co., 334 A.2d 216, 218 (Del. 1975).
11 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003, revised July 9, 2004), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part on other grounds, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005); accord Finkelstein v. Liberty Dig., Inc., 2005 WL 1074364, at *12 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 25, 2005) (“The judges of this court are unremittingly mindful of the fact that a judicially selected determination
of fair value is just that, a law-trained judge's estimate that bears little resemblance to a scientific measurement of a
physical reality. Cloaking such estimates in grand terms like ‘intrinsic value’ does not obscure this hard truth from any
informed commentator.”).
12 See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136 (“It cannot be that an open chance for buyers to bid signals a market failure simply because
buyers do not believe the asset on sale is sufficiently valuable for them to engage in a bidding contest against each
other.”); Dell, 177 A.3d at 29 (“Fair value entails at a minimum a price some buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which
no class of buyers in the market would pay.”); id. at 33 (finding that absence of higher bid meant “that the deal market
was already robust and that a topping bid involved a serious risk of overpayment,” which “suggests the price is already
at a level that is fair”).
13 See Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Finding the Right Balance in Appraisal Litigation: Deal Price, Deal
Process, and Synergies, 73 Bus. Law. 961, 962 (2018) (commending outcomes in Dell and DFC and arguing that “the
Delaware courts' treatment of the use of the deal price to determine fair value does and should mirror the treatment of
shareholder class action fiduciary duty litigation”); id. at 982–83 (citing Dell and DFC in observing, “What we discern
from the case law, however, is a tendency to rely on deal price to measure fair value where the transaction would
survive enhanced judicial scrutiny .... Thus, in order to determine whether to use the deal price to establish fair value,
the Delaware courts are engaging in the same sort of scrutiny they would have applied under Revlon if the case were
one challenging the merger as in breach of the directors' fiduciary duties.” (footnote omitted)); Charles Korsmo & Minor
Myers, The Flawed Corporate Finance of Dell and DFC Global, 68 Emory L.J. 221, 269 (2018) (explaining that Dell and
DFC “conflate questions of fiduciary duty liability with the valuation questions central to appraisal disputes”).
14 See id. at 1068 n.87 (citing cases including In re Dollar Thrifty S'holders Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 612–13, 615 (Del. Ch. 2010)
(finding that the target board's use of no-shop, matching rights, and termination fee provisions were reasonable even
though the company had agreed to deal exclusively with the buyer without conducting a pre-signing market check); and
In re MONY Gp. Inc. S'holders Litig., 852 A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. 2004) (finding that the board acted reasonably even though
it did not actively shop the company because the board was financially sophisticated, had knowledge of the relevant
industry, and there was a “substantial opportunity for an effective market check” after the agreement was announced));
id. at 1069 (citing Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009)).
15 See id. at *44. The PLX Trial decision included an appendix that collected decisions approving a passive market check.
The table somehow swapped the details of the passive market check in Braunschweiger v. American Home Shield
Corporation, 1989 WL 128571 (Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1989), with the details from In re Formica Corporation Shareholders
Litigation, 1989 WL 25812 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1989). A corrected version is attached to this decision as an appendix.
16 See Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instr. Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 66 (Del. 1989) (“[I]n change of control situations, sole reliance
on hired experts and management can taint[ ] the design and execution of the transaction. Thus, we look particularly
for evidence of a board's active and direct role in the sale process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mills Acq. Co.
v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1281 (Del. 1989) (“[A] board of directors ... may not avoid its active and direct duty
of oversight in a matter as significant as the sale of corporate control.”); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor
II), 634 A.2d 345, 368 (Del. 1993) (explaining that directors must maintain “an active and direct role in the context of
a sale of a company from beginning to end”); In re Rural Metro Corp. S'holders Litig., 88 A.3d 54, 91 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(“As a threshold matter, the decision to initiate a sale process falls short under enhanced scrutiny because it was not
made by an authorized corporate decisionmaker. The Board did not make the decision to launch a sale process, nor did
it authorize the Special Committee to start one.”), aff'd sub nom. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del.
2015); id. (“One of the Delaware Supreme Court's clearest teachings is that ‘directors cannot be passive instrumentalities
during merger proceedings.’ ” (quoting Technicolor II, 634 A.2d at 368)).
17 See Aruba, 210 A.3d at 136–39, 142 (adopting deal price less synergies as fair value where company's banker contacted
five potential buyers after HP's initial outreach, none were interested, sale process terminated, and sale process later
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resumed as single-bidder engagement with HP, with only one quick contact to a sixth party); Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (finding
competitive pre-signing process where Silver Lake competed one-at-a-time with interested parties); DFC, 172 A.3d at
350, 355, 376 (finding “competitive process of bidding” where company's banker contacted “every logical buyer,” three
expressed interest, and two named a preliminary price with one dropping out before serious negotiations commenced).
18 See Dell Trial, 2016 WL 3186538, at *29 & n.24 (citing Joshua Rosenbaum & Joshua Pearl, Investment Banking:
Valuation, Leveraged Buyouts, and Mergers & Acquisitions 195–96 (2009) (“[An LBO model] is used ... to determine an
implied valuation range for a given target in a potential LBO sale based on achieving acceptable returns....”); and Donald
M. DePamphilis, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Other Restructuring Activities 506 (7th ed. 2014) (“[T]he DCF analysis solves
for the present value of the firm, while the LBO model solves for the internal rate of return.”)); id. at *29 nn. 25, 26 (citing
Rosenbaum & Pearl, supra, at 195–96 (“In an M&A sell-side advisory context, the banker conducts LBO analysis to
assess valuation from the perspective of a financial sponsor. This provides the ability to set sale price expectations for the
seller and guide negotiations with buyers accordingly ....” (emphasis added)); id. at 235–36 (“Traditionally, the valuation
implied by LBO analysis is toward the lower end of a comprehensive analysis when compared to other methodologies,
particularly precedent transactions and DCF analysis. This is largely due to the constraints imposed by an LBO, including
leverage capacity, credit market conditions, and the sponsor's own IRR hurdles.”)).
19 See, e.g., Dent v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2014 WL 2931180, at *8–10 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014) (rejecting fiduciary challenge
to “(1) a no-solicitation provision; (2) a standstill provision; (3) a change in recommendation provision; (4) information
rights for [the acquirer]; and (5) a $5 million termination fee” where termination fee represented 4.5% of equity value
and change-of-recommendation provision included unlimited matching right); In re BJ's Wholesale Club, Inc. S'holders
Litig., 2013 WL 396202, at *13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013) (rejecting fiduciary challenge to a merger agreement with a
no-shop provision, matching and information rights, a termination fee representing 3.1% of deal value, and a force-the-
vote provision; observing that “under Delaware law, these deal protection measures, individually or cumulatively, have
routinely been upheld as reasonable”); In re Novell, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2013 WL 322560, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2013)
(describing “the no solicitation provision, the matching rights provision, and the termination fee” as “customary and well
within the range permitted under Delaware law” and observing that “[t]he mere inclusion of such routine terms does not
amount to a breach of fiduciary duty”); In re Synthes, Inc. S'holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1049 (Del. Ch. 2012) (finding that
a termination fee of 3.05% of equity value, a no-solicitation provision with a fiduciary out and matching rights, a force-the-
vote provision, and a voting agreement that locked up at least 33% of the company shares in favor of the merger were
not unreasonable deal protection devices); In re Answers Corp. S'holders Litig., 2011 WL 1366780, at *4 & n.47 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 11, 2011) (describing “a termination fee plus expense reimbursement of 4.4% of the Proposed Transaction's equity
value, a no solicitation clause, a ‘no-talk’ provision limiting the Board's ability to discuss an alternative transaction with
an unsolicited bidder, a matching rights provision, and a force-the-vote requirement” as “standard merger terms” that “do
not alone constitute breaches of fiduciary duty” (quoting In re 3Com S'holders Litig., 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 18, 2009))); In re Atheros Commc'ns, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL 864928, at *7 n.61 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011) (same
analysis for no-solicitation provision, matching right, and termination fee); In re 3Com, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 & n.37
(rejecting challenge to merger agreement with a no-solicitation provision, matching rights, and a termination fee in excess
of 4% of equity value; describing provisions as having been “repeatedly” upheld by this court and collecting authorities).
20 The pop-culture illustration of this principle is J. Wellington Wimpy's offer to “gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger
today.” See J. Wellington Wimpy, Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._Wellington_Wimpy (last visited Aug. 20,
2019). Setting aside credit risk, dollars paid next Tuesday are worth less than dollars paid today, so the same price paid
next Tuesday is a pleasant deal for Wimpy. The same is true for Sibanye in an appraisal. Valuing Stillwater at $18.00
per share based on an agreement reached on December 8, 2016, then using that figure to determine value as of May 4,
2017, lets Sibanye use December's dollars for a valuation in May. The statutory interest award is measured from closing,
so that aspect of the appraisal remedy does not pick up the decline in the purchasing power of dollars used to measure
the deal-price metric. In this respect, the petitioners are differently situated than stockholders who did not pursue their
appraisal rights. They accepted the $18.00 per share and received it, without interest, shortly after May 4, 2017, once
the merger consideration payouts were processed through the clearing system. The appraisal petitioners did not accept
that outcome. They opted for appraisal and sought a determination of Stillwater's fair value as of May 4, 2017. Sibanye
can argue legitimately that the deal price of $18.00 per share provides the best evidence of fair value, but that is a price
calculated in December 2016 dollars, not May 2017 dollars.
21 See Fernán Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, The New Look of Deal Protection, 69 Stan. L. Rev. 1013, 1058–63 (2017)
(analyzing implications of matching rights); Brian JM Quinn, Bulletproof: Mandatory Rules for Deal Protection, 32 J. Corp.
L. 865, 870 (2007) (analyzing matching rights as the functional equivalent of a right of first refusal and explaining that “[t]he
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presence of rights of first refusal can be a strong deterrent against subsequent bids” because “[s]uccess under these
circumstances may involve paying too much and suffering the ‘winner's curse’ ”); see also Marcel Kahan & Rangarajan
K. Sundaram, First-Purchase Rights: Rights of First Refusal and Rights of First Offer, 12 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 331, 331
(2012) (finding “that a right of first refusal transfers value from other buyers to the right-holder, but may also force the
seller to make suboptimal offers”); Frank Aquila & Melissa Sawyer, Diary of a Wary Market: 2010 in Review and What
to Expect in 2011, 12 M & A Law. Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 1 (“Match rights can result in the first bidder 'nickel bidding' to
match an interloper's offer, with repetitive rounds of incremental increases in the offer price.... [M]atch rights are just
one more factor that may dissuade a potential competing bidder from stepping in the middle of an already-announced
transaction.”); David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 20–21 (1999) (discussing
how a right of first refusal affects bidders).
22 See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal Proceedings, 57 Bus. Law. 127,
151 n.130 (2001) (“[M]arket price should ordinarily equal going concern value if the market is efficient.”); William J.
Carney & Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the Nonexistent: The Delaware Court's Struggle with Control Premiums, 152
U. Pa. L. Rev. 845, 847–48, 857–58 (2003) (“The basic conclusion of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH)
is that market values of companies' shares traded in competitive and open markets are unbiased estimates of the value
of the equity of such firms.”); id. at 879 (noting that the appraisal statute requires consideration of all relevant factors
and stating that “in an efficient market, absent information about some market failure, market price is the only relevant
factor”); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of the “Implicit Minority Discount”
in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 52 (2007) (“Take the case of a publicly traded company that has no
controller. Efficient market theory states that the shares of this company trade at the pro rata value of the corporation as
a going concern.”); id. at 60 (“As a matter of generally accepted financial theory ..., share prices in liquid and informed
markets do generally represent th[e] going concern value ....”); see also Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter,
Rationalizing Appraisal Standards in Compulsory Buyouts, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1021, 1033–34 (2009) (positing trading prices
should not be used to determine fair value if there is either no public market price at all, if the shares are illiquid or thinly
traded, or if there is a controlling stockholder, implying that outside of these scenarios, “because financial markets are
efficient, one can simply use the market value of the shares”).
23 The experts' exploration of the Cammer and Krogman factors has left me with significantly less confidence in them than
I had before this litigation. There appears to be substantial overlap among the factors, such that a single attribute, like
a New York Stock Exchange listing, would correlate with and lead to the satisfaction of multiple factors. For an issuer to
satisfy multiple Cammer and Krogman factors is thus likely less significant than it might seem. It is also striking how many
of the Cammer and Krogman, at least based on Zmijewski's report, stem from judicial opinions or law review articles,
rather than from financial or economic papers. I am left with the concern that the Cammer and Krogman factors may be
a convenient heuristic that law-trained judges deploy as a matter of routine, rather than because they have support in
reliable research. That said, the absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence, and the record in this case
does not provide grounds to call the Cammer and Krogman factors into doubt.
24 See, e.g., In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 634 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[B]ecause an efficient market is one in which
information important to reasonable investors ... is immediately incorporated into stock prices, the cause-and-effect
relationship between a company's material disclosures and the security price is normally the most important factor in an
efficiency analysis.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &
Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013); In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 512 (1st Cir. 2005) (describing the cause and
effect prong of Cammer as “in many ways the most important” and explaining that “[i]n the absence of such a relationship,
there is little assurance that information is being absorbed into the market and reflected in its price”); Cammer, 711 F.
Supp. at 1287 (“[S]howing a cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate events or financial releases
and an immediate response in the stock price” is “the essence of an efficient market and the foundation for the fraud on
the market theory.”); see also Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension, Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 207
(2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Xcelera.com for the import of the cause and effect prong of Cammer). That said, the cause-and-
effect factor is not dispositive. Beaver Cty. Empls.' Ret. Fund v. Tile Shop Hldgs., Inc., 2016 WL 4098741, at *10–11
(D. Minn. July 28, 2016) (collecting cases and explaining that “[t]he weight of authority on this issue favors” a finding of
market efficiency without a favorable resolution of the cause and effect factor).
25 Compare Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, A Five-Factor Asset Pricing Model, 116 J. Fin. Econ. 1 (2015) (JX
681) (finding evidence of size premium in asset pricing models), and Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Common
Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and Bonds, 33 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1993) (JX 680) (finding evidence that stocks with
smaller market capitalizations tended to have higher average returns), with Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Size,
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Value, and Momentum in International Stock Returns, 105 J. Fin. Econ. 457 (2012) (JX 679) (finding no evidence of a
size premium in any region based on analyses of international stock returns from November 1989 to March 2011).
26 Compare, e.g., Cliff Asness et al., Size Matters, If You Control Your Junk, 129 J. Fin. Econ. 479, 479 (2018) (finding “[a]
significant size premium ..., which is stable through time, robust to the specification, more consistent across seasons and
markets, not concentrated in microcaps, robust to non-price based measures of size, and not captured by an illiquidity
premium” and arguing that challenges to the existence of the size premium “are dismantled when controlling for the
quality, or the inverse ‘junk’, of a firm”), and Roger Grabowski, The Size Effect Continues To Be Relevant when Estimating
the Cost of Capital, 37 Bus. Valuation Rev. 93 (2018) (responding to criticisms of Ang, infra), with Aswath Damodaran,
The Small Cap Premium: Where is the Beef?, Musings on Markets (Apr. 11, 2015) (JX 682 at 1) (commenting that “the
historical data, which has been used as the basis of the argument [for size premia], is yielding more ambiguous results and
leading us to question the original judgment that there is a small cap premium” and that “forward-looking risk premiums,
where we look at the market pricing of stocks to get a measure of what investors are demanding as expected returns,
are yielding no premium for small cap stocks”), http://aswathdamodaran.blogspot.com/2015/04/the-small-cap-premium-
fact-fiction-and.html, and Clifford Ang, The Absence of a Size Effect Relevant to the Cost of Equity, 37 Bus. Valuation
Rev. 87 (2018) (JX 732 at 3–4) (concluding from survey of empirical literature that either “(1) investors ... do not believe
a size effect exists and, therefore, do not demand compensation for it, or (2) investors ... believe a size effect exists, but
believe the adjustment for the size effect is not made in the cost of equity”). Zmijewski has acknowledged that “there is
much weaker evidence of a size effect since the original [article finding the effect] was published.” JX 836 at 322.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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*1  In this appraisal action, the petitioner asks the Court to
determine the fair value of its shares in the respondent. On
November 10, 2012, a third party acquired the respondent in a
hostile cash merger for $3.10 per share. The deal had an equity
value of approximately $110 million and paid a 71% premium
over the respondent's unaffected stock price of $1.81.
The petitioner acquired its shares after the announcement of
the merger and demanded appraisal pursuant to 8 Del. C. §
262. The respondent contends the merger price less synergies
offers the most reliable measure of the fair value of its shares.
That methodology, as applied by the respondent's expert,
yields a value of $2.76 per share. The petitioner's expert,
relying on a combination of a discounted cash flow (“DCF”)
analysis and a comparable transactions analysis, contends that
the fair value is $4.96 per share.
For the reasons that follow, I conclude that a DCF analysis
is not an appropriate method of determining fair value in
this instance. The utility of a DCF ceases when its inputs
are unreliable; and, in this instance, I conclude that the
management projections that provide the key inputs to the
petitioner's DCF analysis are not reliable. The parties agree
that there are no comparable companies. The petitioner relies,
in part, upon a comparable transactions approach, but I
conclude that his two-observation data set does not provide
a reasonable basis to determine fair value. Although the
petitioner thoroughly disputes this point, I conclude that the
sales process in this instance was thorough and that the
transaction price less synergies provides the most reliable
method of determining the fair value of the petitioner's shares.
The respondent, however, has not shown that the synergies
in fact amounted to $0.34 per share, as it claims. Instead, I
adopt the petitioner's estimate of $0.03 per share in synergies,
resulting in a fair value of $3.07 per share.
I. BACKGROUND
I begin by providing a brief overview of the parties, the
respondent and its business, and the process leading up to the
merger.1 I delve more deeply into several of these and related
topics in subsequent Sections.
A. The Parties
Petitioner, LongPath Capital, LLC (“LongPath”), is an
investment vehicle that began acquiring shares of the
respondent in mid-October 2012, about a month after the
announcement of the merger.2 Overall, LongPath timely
demanded and perfected its appraisal rights as to 484,700
shares of common stock in the respondent.3
Respondent, Ramtron International Corporation (“Ramtron”
or the “Company”), is a fabless semiconductor company that
produces F–RAM. A “fabless” semiconductor company is
one that does not manufacture the silicon wafers used in
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its products, but instead, outsources that task to a separate
company known as a “fab” or a “foundry.”4 RAM stands
for random access memory, a ubiquitous component of
computers. F–RAM is ferroelectric RAM.5 The benefits of
F–RAM are that it has fast read and write speeds, can be
written to a high number of times, and consumes low power.6
Importantly, F-RAM will retain memory when power is lost.7
*2  Nonparty Cypress Semiconductor Corporation
(“Cypress”) issued a bear hug letter to Ramtron on June
12, 2012, offering to buy all of its shares for $2.48 per
share.8 After Ramtron's board rejected the offer as inadequate,
Cypress initiated a hostile tender offer on June 21, 2012, at
$2.68 per share.9 Ramtron and Cypress eventually reached an
agreement on a transaction price of $3.10 per share and signed
a merger agreement on September 18, 2012.10 Following a
subsequent tender offer—apparently in an unsuccessful effort
to acquire 90% or more of the outstanding stock or at least
solidify Cypress' stock holdings—and a stockholder vote,
the long-form merger closed on November 20, 2012 (the
“Merger”).11
B. Ramtron's Operative Reality
Throughout this litigation, Respondent has portrayed
Ramtron as a struggling company unlikely to be able to
continue as a business had the transaction with Cypress
not concluded successfully. Petitioner, by contrast, describes
Ramtron as a company with strong patent and intellectual
property protection of its core products, a successful
new management team, and excellent business prospects.
Indeed, in relying on the management projections, Petitioner
characterizes Ramtron as a company on the verge of taking
off like a rocket. Perhaps unsurprisingly, I find that Ramtron's
operative reality at the time of the Merger was somewhere in
between these practically polar opposite characterizations.
1. Ramtron's foundry situation
As a fabless semiconductor company, Ramtron's relationships
with its foundries were vitally important. Indeed, Ramtron
depended on its foundry to manufacture its products. At the
time of the Merger, Ramtron's primary foundry was Texas
Instruments (“TI”).12 Ramtron's contract with TI provided
that, if TI decided to terminate the contract, it would have
to provide three additional years of products to Ramtron. By
contrast, in the event of a change-in-control transaction at
Ramtron, TI could stop providing foundry services after only
ninety days.13
Semiconductor foundries were the subject of a substantial
amount of testimony at trial. As will be seen, the subject of
foundries relates to both the reliability of the management
predictions and the disputed cause of Ramtron's poor
performance in 2012. Gery Richards, Ramtron's CFO at
the time of the Merger,14 testified that Fujitsu previously
served as the Company's primary foundry. In 2009, Fujitsu
gave Ramtron a “last-time buy” notice under the relevant
contract, indicating that Fujitsu intended to terminate its
foundry relationship with Ramtron in two years.15
The testimony at trial made clear that transitioning foundries
is not a simple process. Semiconductors are complex
products. In fact, even the silicon wafers from which the
semiconductors are created are not commodities but instead
vary by company.16 Additionally, each foundry's technology
differs and F–RAM, being a relatively unique product,
complicates the process further. Thus, transitioning to a new
foundry requires understanding the foundry's manufacturing
technology and how it interacts with the semiconductors as
designed, then modifying the product design to eliminate any
resulting errors, then completing several rounds of product
testing followed by further design modifications to eliminate
any previously undiscovered errors, and then allowing the
customers to evaluate the product before finally moving to
full-scale production.17 Unlike, for example, consumer RAM
that one could purchase at an electronics store for a PC
and then, depending on the model, simply “plug and play,”
Ramtron's F–RAM often was designed into the product being
created by another manufacturer, thus inhibiting Ramtron's
ability to unilaterally change its products in any significant
way. According to T.J. Rodgers, the CEO of Cypress, even
for a noncontroversial shift of “going to a different foundry,
to change one of your products, you're looking at two years
plus.”18
*3  In fact, Ramtron's own track record of foundry
transitions suggests that two years probably is a significant
underestimate. When Fujitsu gave Ramtron a last-time buy
notice in 2009, Ramtron already had been attempting to
develop a second foundry relationship with TI. The effort of
transitioning to TI had begun in 2004 and took seven years
to complete.19 That transition was not smooth, resulting in
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product shortages that caused Ramtron to place its customers
on allocation.20 Despite the difficulty of transitioning from
Fujitsu to TI, Ramtron succeeded, eventually, in obtaining a
reliable new foundry.
To increase its flexibility and reduce its dependence on TI,
Ramtron sought to develop a second foundry relationship
with IBM. That effort, however, never succeeded. Thomas
Davenport, Ramtron's Vice President of Technology at the
time of the Merger,21 described the Company's attempt to
work with IBM. Davenport headed up a team of six people
that worked from 2009 until spring 2012, attempting to get
IBM up and running as a second Ramtron foundry. They
incurred $17 million in direct costs in addition to $16 million
in capital equipment purchased by Ramtron and provided
to IBM to enable it to produce F–RAM.22 But, in what
Davenport considered a “huge personal disappointment,”23
the integration project failed and Ramtron never achieved a
single milestone. To put the IBM investment in context, in
2011 Ramtron had approximately $66 million in revenue.24
The witnesses at trial uniformly attested to the difficulty
of transitioning foundries.25 Ramtron's own experience with
transitioning to TI and its failed attempt to develop IBM
as a foundry confirm this fact. Nevertheless, on July 20,
2012, about a month after Cypress launched its hostile bid for
Ramtron, Ramtron entered into a manufacturing agreement
with ROHM Co., Ltd. (“ROHM”), a Japanese company, to
act as Ramtron's second fab.26 Ramtron's management's five-
year forecasts incorporate the purported cost savings that
would derive from having ROHM operate as a second, or even
the primary, foundry for Ramtron.
2. Ramtron's business and finances
Ramtron's board of directors installed Eric Balzer as the
Company's new CEO in January 2011.27 He hired Pete
Zimmer to lead the Company's sales department. At Zimmer's
recommendation, Scott Emley was hired to lead Ramtron's
marketing department. Both Zimmer and Emley had worked
at TI and joined Ramtron sometime in 2011.28 Richards
officially became CFO in late 2011 or 2012.29 Thus, as of the
time of the Merger, most of Ramtron's executives had been
in their positions for less than two years and, in the case of
Emley and Zimmer, about a year.
The difficult transition from Fujitsu to TI caused problems
for Ramtron's day-today business throughout 2011 and into
2012. A brief overview of Ramtron's sales process is required
in order to understand that effect. Ramtron sold some of its
product directly to customers, but the majority was sold to
distributors who in turn sold the products to the end users.30
Ramtron also recognized revenue on a point-of-purchase
basis instead of a point-of-sale basis. Under the point-of-
purchase system, revenue is recognized when the product is
shipped to a distributor. By contrast, under the point-of-sale
method, revenue is only recognized when the product is sold
to the end user, whether directly by the Company or indirectly
by the distributor.31
*4  Theoretically, the two systems should arrive at the same
results. Unless the distributors are buying exactly the same
amount of inventory as they are selling during each financial
reporting period, however, the systems will result in revenue
being recognized at different times. To take a simplistic
example, suppose a company sells 100% of its products
through distributors and that the company develops a new
product in the first quarter. The following chart provides an
example of how the company would recognize revenue under
the two different regimes assuming the company sold 100
units of the product to the distributors at $1 each over the
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This comparison deliberately highlights an important dispute
between the parties in this case: the point-of-purchase method
makes it difficult to forecast actual demand because the
distributors provide a buffer. Indeed, in this example, under
the point-of-purchase method, demand appears to be falling,
while under the point-of-sale method, it appears to be rising.
Several of the witnesses testified that they believed Ramtron's
point-of-purchase revenue system made it more difficult
accurately to forecast future sales.32 The revenue recognition
system matters for two reasons. First, as already mentioned,
distributor activity can mask actual demand. The difficult
transition from Fujitsu to TI forced Ramtron to place
its customers on allocation in or around 2011. Because
Ramtron's F–RAM already was designed into many of their
customers' products, those customers needed to ensure that
they would have a sufficient supply of F–RAM. After
they were placed on allocation, many customers apparently
increased their orders accordingly.33 For example, a customer
that was allocated 80% of its ordered amount potentially
would order five units for every four that it actually
needed. This increase in orders led Ramtron to increase
the number of wafers it was ordering from TI. The upshot
of this chain of events was a massive inventory bubble,
over-recognition of revenue, and a resulting cash crunch
for Ramtron because it then had to pay for the extra
inventory it ordered.34 Because of its point-of-purchase
revenue recognition, Ramtron recognized these additional
distributor orders as revenue, even though the over-ordering
was not reflective of “real” underlying demand, but instead,
at least in part, was an effort of the customers to game the
allocation system.
The second reason that Ramtron's point-of-purchase revenue
recognition system is relevant is because it allows
management to alter the Company's revenue by forcing more
inventory into the distribution channels. This practice is
known as “channel stuffing.” As discussed in more detail in
Section III.A infra, I find that Ramtron's management did
stuff the channel in the first quarter of 2012, thereby distorting
the company's revenue.
The combination of over-orders from customers that were
placed on allocation and Ramtron's stuffing of the channel
led to a massive build-up of inventory. The chart below35
shows the amount of inventory Ramtron had accumulated as
of the time of the Merger. Because of its point-of-purchase
accounting system, Ramtron already had recognized this
inventory as revenue. As this chart shows, in the first quarter




This inventory needed to be financed, which took a serious
toll on Ramtron's cash position. Ramtron's primary lender was
Silicon Valley Bank (“SVB”). Throughout 2011 and 2012,
the years affected by the inventory bubble, Ramtron either
missed or needed to renegotiate its loan covenants repeatedly.
For example, the Company missed its April 2011 liquidity
covenant and received a forbearance for May of that year.36
A July 7, 2011 Form 8–K filing states that on June 30, 2011,
Ramtron entered into a Default Waiver and Fifth Amendment
to its loan agreement with SVB, an amendment that cost the
Company $20,000.37
Around this time, Cypress began expressing an interest in
Ramtron. On March 8, 2011, Cypress made a non-public
written offer to Ramtron for $3.01 a share.38 Ramtron rejected
the offer as inadequate later that month. The offer represented
a 37% premium over the March 8 closing price of Ramtron's
stock.39 Rodgers described the offer as including “a high
market premium to say we were serious and not to try to
squeeze on them.”40
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After rebuffing Cypress and renegotiating its bank covenants,
Ramtron still needed capital. SVB apparently had shifted to
lending to Ramtron on an asset-backed basis, meaning that
its loans were collateralized by the Company's receivables
instead of being unsecured. Ramtron considered borrowing
from other lenders, but concluded that the cost was too high.41
So, in July 2011, Ramtron launched a secondary public
offering of 4,750,000 shares, which was roughly 20% of its
outstanding shares.42 The secondary offering occurred at $2
per share, with a net to Ramtron of $1.79 after underwriting
commissions and other charges.43 The Company used the
proceeds of this equity raise largely for working capital to pay
off its excess inventory.44
As the above chart shows, Ramtron's inventory continued
to increase throughout 2011. Despite the recent equity raise,
Ramtron soon fell short on cash again. At least one internal
Company email from January 2012 suggests that the first
quarter covenants would be tight.45 And, by spring 2012, the
Company was in a cash crunch of sorts. Richards emailed
Davenport on March 3, 2012, that “we are basically running
on fumes in regards to cash management and related bank
covenants, which we just announced new ones yesterday.”46
These cash management problems continued after Cypress
announced its hostile bid for Ramtron on June 12, 2012.
Shortly after the merger agreement was signed, Richards
provided Brad Buss, Cypress' then-CFO, with cash forecasts
that showed the Company would go cash negative on October
26, 2012.47 In response, Cypress promptly began funding
Ramtron.48
*6  Overall, the evidence shows that Ramtron continually
had difficulty meeting its bank covenants, but that SVB
seemed willing to renegotiate those covenants. There is no
evidence that SVB ever sought to call its loans or that
the Company actually faced a serious risk of foreclosure.
Richards concisely summed up Ramtron's relationship with
SVB as “rocky in regards to the covenants” but that he “had
a good relationship with the bankers.”49 From the evidence
of record, therefore, I conclude that the Company was cash-
strapped and struggling from a liquidity standpoint at the time
of the Merger, but that Ramtron was not, as Cypress suggests,
a bankruptcy waiting to happen.
C. The Merger
On June 12, 2012, Ramtron issued a public letter declaring its
intent to acquire Ramtron for $2.48 a share.50 Interestingly,
the $2.48 offer reflected the same 37% premium to
market as Cypress' March 2011 offer; the decrease in
price corresponded to the fall in Ramtron's stock price.51
Ramtron rejected that offer as inadequate in a June 18 press
release and announced that it had begun exploring strategic
alternatives.52
Only two days after Cypress announced its public bid, Balzer,
Ramtron's CEO, ordered the creation of new long-term
management projections (the “Management Projections”).
While, as discussed infra, the parties vigorously dispute
the accuracy of Ramtron's prior forecasts, there seems to
be no dispute that the Company's management had not
previously created multi-year forecasts and instead generally
only created five-quarter forecasts.53 Balzer oversaw the team
in charge of creating the new management projections, which
consisted of Richards, Brian Yates, who worked for Richards,
Zimmer, and Emley.54
A June 14, 2010 email chain among those five individuals
shows a team undertaking a new and unfamiliar project.
As if emphasizing that the projections were not being
prepared in the ordinary course of Ramtron's business,
Balzer wrote that he wanted a “product by product build
up, with assumptions, for it to hold water in the event of
a subsequent dispute.”55 Indeed, Richards testified that he
understood the purpose of the projections to be twofold:
marketing the company to a white knight and creating inputs
for a DCF analysis.56 The Ramtron management team had
never done long-term projections before.57 Zimmer, the
head of sales, wrote that not even the automotive industry,
which he apparently considered more predictable than the
semiconductor industry, “can do a line item 4 year forecast.”58
He also suggested that for “[o]ut years I would simply plug
in 30% CAGR,”59 a comment that reinforces the inference
that these projections were not produced in the ordinary
course of business based on reliable data. Additionally,
Balzer wanted the projections done using a point-of-
sale approach, as opposed to Ramtron's standard point-
of-purchase methodology. Ramtron's management team
had never done point-of-sale projections.60 I describe the
resulting projections in significantly more detail in Section
III.A infra.
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*7  Meanwhile, Cypress' hostile offer continued. On June
21, 2012, Cypress commenced a hostile tender offer for
Ramtron at $2.68 per share.61 Ramtron's Board rejected
the $2.68 price as inadequate and not in the best interests
of the Company's stockholders. Accordingly, the Board
recommended that the stockholders not tender their shares.62
Shortly thereafter, Ramtron issued its second quarter 2012
earnings, which were significantly below expectations. In the
first quarter of 2012, Ramtron had reported $15 million in
revenue and reaffirmed its public guidance for entire-year
2012 revenue of “approximately $70 million.”63 On July
24, 2012, Ramtron reported $14.2 million in revenue for
the second quarter and projected revenue of $14 to $14.5
million for the third quarter.64 These results and projections
placed the Company on track to undershoot its full-year 2012
estimate by at least $10 million. On July 26, 2012, shortly
after Ramtron's announcement, Merriman Capital, the only
analyst covering Ramtron, downgraded the Company from
“buy” to “neutral.”65 Merriman also suspended its target price
and observed that “were Cypress to pull its offer for Ramtron,
these shares might very well return to the $2.00 range or
perhaps lower.”66
The witnesses at trial agreed that Ramtron's second
quarter performance was disappointing.67 The parties,
however, vigorously dispute the reasons for that. Petitioner
assigns basically all of the blame for the poor second
quarter to Cypress and denies that it resulted from any
inherent weakness in Ramtron. According to Petitioner, the
distributors pulled back their orders dramatically in light of
Cypress' hostile bid, because they feared being terminated
after the merger. For this proposition, LongPath relies mostly
on Balzer's deposition testimony.68 Respondent argues that
Ramtron's second quarter results reflected Ramtron's own
operational failures.
It is conceivable that Cypress' offer may have had some
negative effect on second quarter sales, but the weight of the
evidence shows that operational shortcomings of Ramtron
were the primary cause of the decline in sales. Ramtron
appears to run on a calendar fiscal year. As such, less than
three weeks remained in June (and the second quarter) when
Cypress issued its bear hug letter on June 12 and at most ten
days remained after Cypress initiated its hostile tender offer.
The most probable explanation for the poor second quarter
is that Ramtron's management had stuffed the Company's
distribution channel with inventory in the first quarter of
2012, and that caused the Company's distributors to order less
product in quarter two. I discuss channel stuffing in Section
III. A infra. Here, it suffices to note that, as of the first quarter
of 2012, Ramtron had $25.5 million in inventory, a 264%
increase over the previous year. Even assuming Ramtron's
optimistic 2012 projection of $70 million in revenue, Ramtron
had roughly nineteen weeks worth of inventory, for which
it already had recognized revenue, at the beginning of the
second quarter of 2012.69 A fiscal quarter contains only
thirteen weeks.
Other factors support the conclusion that Cypress' hostile bid
did not drive Ramtron's poor second quarter performance.
First, Davenport disagreed with the allegation that the
distributors were pulling back because of Cypress. Davenport
viewed Zimmer's comments to that effect as excuses for not
hitting his sales targets.70 Considering that Balzer admittedly
based his assertion that the distributors were withholding
orders on out-of-court statements made by Zimmer, who did
not testify at trial, I accord it little weight. Second, it appears
from the record that a significant number of Ramtron's
products are “designed into” the final products, meaning that
the end users would need the semiconductors to complete
their own products and thus would have relatively stable,
long-term demand. This makes it unlikely that demand dipped
sharply at the end of Q2 because of Cypress' bid.71 For all
of these reasons, I find that, although Cypress' bid may have
contributed slightly to Ramtron's poor performance in the
second quarter of 2012, the main cause of that performance
was Ramtron's own business reality.
*8  Notwithstanding the poor second quarter, Cypress
increased its offer price to $2.88 per share on August 27, 2012,
and extended the term of the tender offer.72 On September
10, 2012, Ramtron's Board again concluded that the offer
was inadequate and recommended that the stockholders not
tender their shares.73 During the time Cypress was pursuing
its hostile tender offer, Ramtron actively canvassed the market
looking for other buyers. In fact, Ramtron contacted over
twenty potential suitors, a process I discuss in more detail in
Section III.C infra. None of those other companies, however,
ever made a firm offer, even though the most serious of them
had access to Ramtron's internal management projections.
Beginning on September 12, 2012, representatives of Cypress
and Ramtron engaged in active negotiations. Cypress
increased its offer to $3.01 per share on September 16 and
then again to $3.08 on September 17. Later that same day,
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Ramtron and Cypress agreed on the final transaction price of
$3.10 per share.74 The parties signed the merger agreement
on September 18,75 and the Merger was approved by a
stockholder vote on November 20, 2012.76
D. Procedural History
LongPath filed this appraisal action on December 11, 2012.
After the parties engaged in discovery, the Court presided
over a three-day trial from October 7 to 9, 2014. Eight
witnesses testified, including the parties' experts. After
extensive post-trial briefing, I heard final argument on March
3, 2015.
I also note, for completeness, that a stockholder class action
challenging the Merger was filed on October 15, 2012. Those
plaintiffs moved to preliminarily enjoin the Merger, but that
motion was denied. Thereafter, the defendants in the class
action moved to dismiss. On June 30, 2014, I issued a
memorandum opinion granting those motions and dismissing
the stockholder class action with prejudice.77
E. Parties' Contentions
Both parties base their positions on expert testimony.
Petitioner called David Clarke as its expert; Respondent relied
upon Gregg Jarrell. Not surprisingly, the experts arrived at
widely disparate conclusions. Clarke contends that the fair
value of Ramtron's stock as of the Merger was $4.96 a share.
Jarrell opines that the stock was worth only $2.76. Petitioner's
fair value of $4.96 a share is more than 274% of Ramtron's
unaffected stock price of $1.81.
Clarke bases his conclusion of $4.96 per share on a
combination of a DCF analysis and a comparable transactions
analysis, which he weighted at 80% and 20%, respectively.
Clarke relied on Ramtron's management projections and a
three-stage DCF analysis to arrive at a value of $5.20 per
share. He based his comparable transactions analysis on a
dataset consisting of only two transactions and obtained a
fair value of $3.99 per share. Because Clarke found no
comparable companies, he did not rely on that valuation
method.
Jarrell rather unusually began his analysis with two premises:
(1) that the Merger price was the result of a fair and
competitive auction; and (2) that the management projections
were overly optimistic. Based on these predicates, Jarrell
opted to examine the transaction price and back out any
synergies in order to determine fair value. This approach
resulted in a fair value of $2.76 per share. In addition, Jarrell
conducted a DCF analysis, in which he relied upon the
management projections he earlier concluded were overly
optimistic. Based on that analysis, Jarrell opined, apparently
in the alternative, that the fair value of the Company's shares
was $3.08 each, a number coincidentally only two pennies
from the Merger price. As a result of his analysis, Jarrell
also concluded that there were no comparable companies or
comparable transactions.
*9  Much has been said of litigation-driven valuations,
none of it favorable.78 Here, the parties have proffered
widely disparate valuation numbers which differ, at the
extremes, by $2.44 as compared to an unaffected stock
price of $1.81 and a deal price of $3.10. LongPath asks
this Court to adopt its $4.96 figure and conclude that the
market left an amount on the table exceeding Ramtron's
unaffected market capitalization. This would be a significant
market failure, especially in the context of a well-publicized
hostile bid and a target actively seeking a white knight. But,
LongPath itself is a market participant. It bought its shares
after the announcement of the Merger, thereby effectively
purchasing an appraisal lawsuit. Although such arbitrage can
be profitable on the merits when flawed deals undervalue
companies, LongPath invested an amount so small that, even
if I accepted its position and concluded that Ramtron's true
value at the time of the Merger was somewhere in the range
of $4.96 per share, this lawsuit is likely a less-than-break-
even proposition for LongPath after considering its litigation
expenses. Respondent, on the other hand, has submitted an
eyebrow-raising DCF that, based on projections its expert
presumed were overly optimistic, still returns a “fair” value
two cents below the Merger price.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In a statutory appraisal action brought pursuant to 8 Del.
C. § 262, the Court is tasked with “determin[ing] the fair
value of the shares exclusive of any element of value arising
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon
the amount determined to be the fair value.”79 The Delaware
Supreme Court has held that “fair value” is “the value to
a stockholder of the firm as a going concern, as opposed
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to the firm's value in the context of an acquisition or other
transaction.”80 “Accordingly, the corporation must be valued
as a going concern based upon the ‘operative reality’ of
the company as of the time of the merger.”81 Section 262
directs that, in making this determination, “the Court shall
take into account all relevant factors.”82 Our case law has
made clear that “[a]ny ‘techniques or methods which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community
and otherwise admissible in court’ may be used.”83
As is well-known, the Delaware appraisal statute places the
burden of proof on both parties.84 “If neither party satisfies its
burden, however, the court must then use its own independent
business judgment to determine fair value.”85
III. ANALYSIS
A survey of the case law reveals that there are four main, or
at least recurring, valuation techniques generally presented in
an appraisal action: a discounted cash flow or DCF analysis, a
comparable companies approach, a comparable transactions
approach, and an examination of the merger price itself, less
synergies. Like all tools, each has its own strengths and
weaknesses. The parties agree that there are no comparable
companies. Jarrell and Clarke disagree about whether there
are comparable transactions, but the universe of potential
comparables, even according to Clarke, is limited to two.
Both sides conducted a DCF analysis, but disagree about
certain issues in addition to the reliability of the Management
Projections, such as the proper size premium, the appropriate
method of modeling future capital expenditures, and whether
a two-step or three-step DCF is more appropriate, as well
as several more minor issues. The parties strongly disagree
about the appropriate weight, if any, to give the Merger price,
which Respondent weighs at 100%. Petitioner places the most
weight on its DCF analysis. Accordingly, I begin there and
then address the utility of a comparable transactions approach
before turning to the transaction price.
A. A Discounted Cash Flow Analysis Is Inappropriate
Because the Management Projections Are Unreliable
*10  A discounted cash flow analysis “involves projecting
operating cash flows for a determined period, setting a
terminal value at the end of the projected period, and then
discounting those values at a set rate to determine the net
present value of a company's shares.”86 “Typically, Delaware
courts tend to favor a DCF model over other available
methodologies in an appraisal proceeding. However, that
metric has much less utility in cases where the transaction
giving rise to appraisal was an arm's-length merger, [or] where
the data inputs used in the model are not reliable....”87 The
foundational inputs of a DCF are the company's cash flows.88
In determining those inputs, this Court has placed substantial
weight on the projections of the incumbent management.
Indeed, “this Court prefers valuations based on management
projections available as of the date of the merger and
holds a healthy skepticism for post-merger adjustments to
management projections or the creation of new projections
entirely.”89
The reason that “Delaware law clearly prefers valuations
based on contemporaneously prepared management
projections” is “because management ordinarily has the
best first-hand knowledge of a company's operations.”90
These projections are useful in appraisals, because they “by
definition, are not tainted by post-merger hindsight and are
usually created by an impartial body.... When management
projections are made in the ordinary course of business, they
are generally deemed reliable.”91 By corollary, projections
prepared outside of the ordinary course do not enjoy the same
deference. In fact, management projections can be, and have
been, rejected entirely when they lack sufficient indicia of
reliability, such as when they were prepared: (1) outside of
the ordinary course of business; (2) by a management team
that never before had created long-term projections; (3) by
a management team with a motive to alter the projections,
such as to protect their jobs; and (4) when the possibility
of litigation, including an appraisal action, was likely and
probably affected the neutrality of the projections.92 These
factors go to the reliability of the projections. In this case,
the Ramtron management projections suffer from all of these
problems.
1. A new Ramtron management team prepared
projections not in the ordinary course using a
methodology they never had employed before
*11  The team in charge of creating the new Management
Projections consisted of Richards and one of his employees,
Zimmer, and Emley, with oversight by Balzer.93 According to
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Richards, the projections started with the numbers provided
by the sales department, because most of the Company's costs
either were fixed or a percentage of revenue, so the revenue
numbers were the most important inputs.94 Zimmer and
Emley were the lead individuals responsible for developing
the sales (and, hence, revenue) numbers. Both had been with
the Company at most a year when they began creating the new
projections.95
Aside from having relatively new employees tasked with
creating the inputs, the team that developed the Management
Projections utilized: (1) a new product-by-product build-
up method; (2) a point-of-sale instead of the usual point-
of-purchase methodology; and (3) a multi-year projection
period.96 The Ramtron management team previously had not
created projections using any of these methods, much less all
three.
Additionally, the projections were not prepared in the
ordinary course of business. There is no evidence Ramtron
ever had prepared forecasts for more than five quarters, with
the exception of Richards's deferred tax asset projections.97
Balzer ordered the projections created immediately after
Cypress issued its bear hug letter. Thus, these projections
were prepared in anticipation of potential litigation, or, at
least, a hostile takeover bid. Balzer explicitly wrote that he
wanted a “product by product build up, with assumptions,
for it to hold water in the event of a subsequent dispute.”98
Furthermore, at least Richards understood one of the purposes
of the projections was to serve as a marketing tool in
Needham's hunt for a white knight.99 This knowledge gave
the management team an incentive to err on the optimistic
side.
In sum, Ramtron's new management team employed a new
methodology to create long-term projections, which they
were not accustomed to doing, out of the ordinary course
of business, with knowledge that the projections could
or would be used: (1) in a subsequent dispute; (2) in
marketing the Company; (3) as the inputs for Needham's
DCF analysis;100 or (4) any combination of those three
possibilities. These projections, therefore, facially lack the
indicia of reliability that generally have led Delaware courts to
defer to management projections. I now turn to more specific
problems with the Management Projections that reinforce the
conclusion that the Projections are unreliable.
2. Management's forecasting capabilities
The parties vigorously dispute Ramtron management's
forecasting accuracy. One dispute, for example, involves
Respondent's contention that Ramtron often missed its
publicly issued guidance for annual revenue going back to
2007, four years before Zimmer and Emley even joined the
Company. This line of attack is something of a red herring.
The proper focus should be on the forecasting accuracy of
the management team that actually made the projections.
Whether other, prior executives had or lacked the gift of
seeing into the Company's future and predicting the success
of its business is less relevant and barely probative of the
forecasting capabilities of the pre-Merger management team.
Accordingly, I would assign little weight to Ramtron's alleged
historic forecasting prowess, even assuming it was proven.
The record is surprisingly unclear on exactly what projections
were made by the then-current Ramtron management team,
aside from the occasional public guidance.101 The parties'
main disagreement over management's forecasting abilities
concerns a waterfall chart. The chart shows forecasts
by quarter. Respondent contends that the chart represents
management's ongoing internal forecasts. Petitioner argues
that it depicts nothing but “stretch goals.” The answer is
somewhat important. If the waterfall chart in fact represents
actual forecasts, then Ramtron's ability to forecast its own
business more than two quarters out was quite poor. On the
other hand, if the chart merely reflects stretch goals, then
it loses much of its impact. The weight of the evidence
convinces me that the waterfall chart represented actual
forecasts, but I still accord that chart only moderate weight
in my evaluation of the Management Projections. Before
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Respondent's argument is straightforward: the waterfall chart
appears in a presentation to the Board,103 and there is no
indication that the numbers are anything other than ordinary-
course forecasts. LongPath relies on a pair of “Sales Update”
presentations that refer to the numbers in the waterfall chart
as “stretch goals.”104 Respondent advances the theory (and
urges the Court to infer) that Zimmer, as the Vice President
of Sales, referred to the forecasts as stretch goals because,
as the head of sales, he primarily was responsible for failing
to meet revenue targets. At trial, Ramtron's Vice President
of Technology, Davenport, similarly suggested that Zimmer
blamed Ramtron's poor second quarter on Cypress as an
excuse to cover up his own poor performance.105
More practical reasons lead me to the conclusion that
the waterfall chart likely represented management's actual
forecasts. First, contemporaneous emails suggest that the
management team saw these numbers as goals they should hit.
In a late January 2012 email chain, Balzer writes to Zimmer,
Richards, and Yates that the Company “really need[s] to find
a way to hit $14.5. That is what we said we would do.”106 The
first quarter 2012 forecast for that quarter was $14 million,
as the chart above shows. Second, the very idea of “stretch”
or “reach” goals requires targets that are, as the names imply,
actually within reach.107 Many of these forecasts were wildly
incorrect. In December 2010, for example, the Company
forecasted $21 million for the first quarter of 2011 (the
very next quarter), a quarter in which actual revenue was
$10.4 million, less than half of the forecast. Relatedly, as the
actual quarter drew closer, management generally reduced
its forecasts to better approximate the actual revenue. As the
quote from Balzer suggests, the management team treated
these numbers as real targets, not lofty stretch goals.108
Third, if these are not actual forecasts, then the record
lacks evidence of regularly created and updated management
forecasts, i.e., if the waterfall chart only contains stretch goals,
then management's publicly issued guidance would be the
only basis for assessing its forecasting.
*13  I find it most likely that management began with
high aspirations for future quarters and reduced those
expectations toward the actual expected results as the quarter
drew nearer. This suggests that management's near-term
forecasting abilities were mediocre at best. Even so, the
waterfall forecasts and the public guidance forecasts were
done with a different methodology than the Management
Projections. Accordingly, I conclude that management, even
under its traditional forecasting system, was of middling
quality when it came to forecasting Ramtron's future business.
Several witnesses at trial testified that, in general, the
semiconductor business is difficult to forecast.109 Indeed,
after Ramtron issued its weak second quarter 2012 earnings,
Merriman Capital issued a report that suspended its target
price for the Company and stated: “We simply can't figure
out how to model this company consistently at the current
time.”110 Ramtron's management also recognized its own
limited success in forecasting.111 In sum, management's lack
of success in accurately projecting future revenue in the
past provides another reason to doubt the reliability of the
Management Projections.
3. The projections incorporate unrealistic assumptions
regarding ROHM
I also note that the Management Projections assume cost
reductions, over time, associated with the transition to
ROHM's foundry. The projections reflect an assumption that
production of F–RAM at ROHM would to begin in January
2013 at 150,000 units a month and increase by 50,000
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units per month thereafter.112 These assumptions are too
speculative to merit any deference.113
Ramtron entered into a manufacturing agreement with
ROHM in late July 2012 pursuant to which ROHM would
serve as a second foundry for Ramtron.114 According to a July
23, 2012 press release, “Initial low-density F–RAM products
have already been qualified for commercial production and
Ramtron expects to receive and begin selling the first
devices produced on ROHM's manufacturing line within
approximately 60 days.”115 As already described, it took
Ramtron seven years to transition entirely from Fujitsu to TI.
That process went so poorly that it forced Ramtron to place
its customers on allocation in 2011. Ramtron's earlier efforts
to develop IBM as a second foundry took place over three
years and caused it to incur more than $30 million in direct
costs and equipment expenses. That endeavor failed entirely.
Additionally, the evidence shows that, in July 2012, Ramtron
was not flush with cash. The IBM venture suggests that
establishing a new foundry requires a substantial monetary
investment, and Ramtron's liquidity situation in the summer
of 2012 makes it doubtful that Ramtron would have been
able to finance the continued development of ROHM as a
foundry.116 In light of this evidence, as well as the uniform
testimony on the difficulty of transitioning foundries, I do not
find credible the proposition that Ramtron reasonably could
expect to begin commercial production at ROHM in sixty
days and start enjoying cost savings within six months.117
*14  Additionally, evidence presented at trial buttresses
this conclusion. Consistent with the other testimony on the
lead time for getting a product from concept to full-fledged
commercial sale,118 Davenport testified the term “initial low-
density F–RAM products” referred to sample quantities that
Ramtron was “going to take over ROHM's design and try to
commercialize them as samples. They weren't cost-effective
but they would seed the market.”119 In fact, Ramtron never
got further than this initial sample stage. Davenport further
testified that Ramtron “never got so far as transfer[ing] our
designs to the ROHM foundry” before the Merger closed.120
It also appears that ROHM technologically lagged behind
both TI and IBM as a foundry.121 I do not question the
strategic judgment of Ramtron's management in seeking to
implement the Company's manufacturing agreement with
ROHM, but the record as a whole leads me to find that the
ROHM assumptions built into the Management Projections
were speculative and further undermine the reliability of those
projections.
4. The Management Projections rely on 2011 and 2012
revenue figures that were distorted because of customer
allocation issues and channel stuffing
As discussed in the next Subsection, the Management
Projections for revenue assume a constant growth rate of 24%
for 2014, 2015, and 2016.122 This is an arbitrary method
of predicting revenue growth if not supported by reasonable
assumptions. Such simple modeling makes the reliability of
the base year numbers crucially important—i.e., if a set of
projections assumes constant growth from a starting number,
the inaccuracy of that foundational input affects the reliability
of the entire enterprise. Substantial evidence in the record
supports the conclusion that Ramtron's revenue in 2011, the
last full year before Cypress' offer, is an unreliable figure.
In Section I.B.2 supra, I discussed the massive inventory
build-up that Ramtron experienced beginning in 2011. During
no quarter in 2010 did Ramtron have more than $7 million
in inventory. Over the course of 2011, however, Ramtron
shipped a huge amount of inventory into its distribution
channels until, in the first quarter of 2012, Ramtron had $25.5
million in inventory. Even under favorable assumptions for
Ramtron, that amounts to about nineteen weeks of inventory
in the channel and it consists of product for which Ramtron
already had recognized revenue.123 In describing Ramtron's
background, I found that this inventory build-up resulted
at least in part from the supply shortages the Company
faced as a result of its foundry transition. Those shortages
forced the Company to place customers on allocation; the
customers responded by over ordering. Because Ramtron
recognized revenue when it shipped to distributors, it is
reasonable to infer that an unknown, but not insignificant
amount of Ramtron's revenue in 2011 actually reflected this
over-ordering by customers, as opposed to a genuine surge
in demand. In addition, because of the backlog of inventory
that existed in the first quarter of 2012, it is logical that less
revenue would be recognized later in 2012 as the inventory
bubble was burned off, unless there was a significant uptick
in demand.
*15  Ramtron's management, however, expected to hit their
reduced forecasts for the first quarter of 2012. Although
I already have discussed the difficulties with the point-of-
purchase revenue recognition system, there is another pitfall
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not yet discussed: channel stuffing. Channel stuffing is the
practice of stuffing inventory into the channel in order to
recognize the attendant revenue sooner, notwithstanding the
fact that the revenue does not correspond to underlying
increases in demand. Hence, it is a form of revenue
manipulation.
I find that Ramtron's management pushed excess inventory
into the Company's distribution channels in the first quarter
of 2012. In an already referenced email chain from
late January 2012, Balzer remarked that the Company
“really need[ed] to find a way to hit $14.5” million.124
Zimmer responded: “I'll die trying. We'll for sure stuff
channel. Next Qtr will suffer.”125 There is no persuasive
evidence that Balzer disagreed. Although Petitioner fights the
channel-stuffing conclusion,126 the combination of Zimmer's
contemporaneous comments and the massive inventory
buildup strongly support the conclusion that Ramtron stuffed
the channel in order to make its first quarter revenue forecast.
All of this matters for two reasons. First, forcing excess
inventory into the channel in early 2012 meant that there
would be a corresponding fall off in revenue at some point in
the future absent a demand spike.127 As Zimmer predicted,
the next quarter, Q2 2012, did suffer. Petitioner's efforts to
attribute those disappointing results to Cypress' hostile offer,
rather than weaknesses in Ramtron's own business practices,
are unavailing.128 Second, Ramtron's revenue figures for
2011 and the first half of 2012 do not accurately map to actual
demand for the Company's products. LongPath argues that the
quantification of the point-of-purchase versus point-of-sale
issue reveals that, at most, Ramtron over-recognized 3.7%
of its total revenue from 2010 through 2012.129 Assuming
Petitioner's math is correct, that is an over-recognition, in
three years, of $6.6 million for a company that only once in its
history had had more than $70 million in revenue in a single
year.
The problem, however, goes beyond just the amount of
improperly recognized revenue. The timing of the revenue
also is affected significantly. If 2011 and 2012 are used as
base years in forecasting, but those years include inflated
revenue because of either over-ordering by customers placed
on allocation or channel stuffing, then the reliability of the
projections is affected. Thus, customer allocation issues in
2011 and channel stuffing in the first quarter of 2012 throw
significant doubt on the accuracy of the underlying revenue
figures for those periods. In that regard, I do not consider
it productive (even assuming it is feasible) to attempt to
quantify how much in extra revenue Ramtron recognized in
2011 or 2012 based on these factors.130
5. The projections defy historical trends
*16  Historical performance does not control a company's
future performance. It is, however, a red flag when projections
suggest a dramatic turnaround in a company despite no
underlying changes that would justify such an improvement
of business. This is the classic “hockey stick” problem.
The Management Projections, prepared days after Cypress
made its bid and with knowledge that Needham would
use the Projections to market the Company, fall into this
category. Both revenue growth and gross margins are shown
as undergoing dramatic improvements. The following chart
shows Ramtron's historical revenue (for the ten years before
the projection period) versus its projected revenue.131 As the
graphs make clear, the projection period suggests a period
of previously unknown prosperity for Ramtron. Not only is
the Company's historically volatile growth rate transformed
into a consistently high growth rate, but the downward trend
in revenue is replaced by a sharp, unprecedented increase
in absolute revenue.132 This sharp uptick in revenue is in
contrast to the fact that, at least dating back to 1994, the
Company never has experienced four consecutive years of
growth.
Presented in another perspective, the following chart shows
the Company's compound annual growth rate (“CAGR”)
over various periods.133 Only under the arbitrary 2005–
2008 timeframe, which appears to be the Company's best-
ever growth period, does historic growth approach projected
growth. When comparing the five or ten years preceding
the projections period, it is clear that the Management
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Projections forecast incredible growth. Indeed, the five-year
projection period implies a CAGR of 22.73%, which is
roughly 3.36 times higher than the CAGR for the five years
immediately preceding the projection period (2007–2011)
and approximately 2.46 times greater than the ten-year period











































Petitioner attempts to justify the Management Projections as
reasonable by comparing the projections to a set of internal
Cypress projections. In what was called the President's
Strategic Plan (the “PSP”), Cypress forecasted the potential
F–RAM market in terms of total available market, service
available market (which was Cypress' term for a product's
core market) and predicted share of the market.134 Petitioner
argues that, if Ramtron simply maintained the market share
of the core F–RAM market that it had at the time of
the Merger, then the Management Projections would be
accurate. There are numerous problems with this argument:
(1) Ramtron's management did not have the PSP when they
were creating the Management Projections, so this thesis is
an entirely post hoc justification for the Projections; (2) for
the Management Projections to be accurate, Ramtron would
have had to increase its market share significantly, not just
maintain it; (3) to the extent that Cypress' predictions are
relevant, the Management Projections would require Ramtron
to capture a substantially larger portion of the market than
Cypress predicted it would; and (4) perhaps most damaging to
Petitioner's theory, Cypress predicted that Ramtron, operating
as an improved division of Cypress, would lose market share.
*17  The chart below compares Cypress' predictions for
Ramtron, as a division of Cypress, against the Ramtron













































































LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron International Corporation, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr....





Petitioner's argument is unpersuasive. The PSP forecasts
Ramtron as a division of Cypress—i.e., after a possible
merger. That alone makes the comparison of market share
unavailing. More importantly, Cypress predicted a moderate,
but falling market share for Ramtron or, at best, that Ramtron
would maintain its market share.135 The Management
Projections predict an entirely different trend under which
Ramtron's market share would increase by nearly 25%, i.e.,
Ramtron would capture another nine percent of the core
F–RAM market. By the year 2016, for the Management
Projections to be accurate, Ramtron would need to hold
twice as much of the core market as Cypress predicted it
would. Considering all the evidence of record regarding
projections, I find it unlikely that Cypress substantially
would underestimate the potential of the very company it
was about to purchase. Thus, Petitioner's attempts to show
the “reasonableness” of the Management Projections by
comparing them to the Cypress PSP are unconvincing. Rather,
the Projections defy historical trends.
6. Management utilized other projections for ordinary
business purposes
The fact which I find to be the final nail in the coffin for
the Management Projections is that Ramtron did not rely on
them in the ordinary course of its business. Although Balzer
suggested that the Management Projections were used for
other purposes, such as cash management,136 the significance
of those alleged uses is dubious. Richards, the CFO, credibly
testified that he used other sets of projections for managing
the Company's finances, such as providing estimated revenue
and cash flow numbers to SVB, the Company's bank.
The final version of the Management Projections utilized by
Needham in preparing its fairness opinion is from September
18, 2012.137 The Needham presentation listed $58.2 million
for estimated 2012 revenue, a slight discrepancy from the
native excel spreadsheet of the Projections, dated August
28, 2012, which listed $58 million for 2012.138 On July 17,
2012, however, Richards sent an email to SVB projecting
$56.5 million for 2012 (the “July SVB Projections”).139
On September 10, 2012, Richards sent another update to
SVB that reduced that projection to slightly less than $54
million (the “September SVB Projections”).140 Both the
July and September SVB Projections pre-date the Needham
presentation. The September SVB Projections are nearly
6.9% lower than the Management Projections. If the revenue
growth assumptions from the Management Projections were
applied to the September SVB Projections, the Management
Projections would overstate five-year revenue by $31 million,
even ignoring all of the other problems with the Management
Projections I have discussed. Richards testified that he
believed that the September SVB Projections “were more
accurate” and that he provided those projections to SVB
because it was the Company's “sole source of borrowing” and
he wanted to keep the bank “apprised of the situation.”141
7. There are insufficient reliable inputs to produce a
reliable DCF analysis
*18  In summary, the Management Projections suffer from
numerous flaws. Specifically, they: (1) were prepared by a
new management team, (2) in anticipation of future disputes
and of shopping the Company to potential white knights, (3)
using a new methodology, and (4) were for a significantly
longer period of time than previous forecasts. In addition, I
note the following problems: (5) management's track record
at forecasting was questionable even under their standard
method of forecasting; (6) the final projections incorporate
speculative elements relating to ROHM, (7) rely on distorted
base year figures that resulted from customer allocation
issues and channel stuffing, and (8) predict growth out of
line with historical trends; and, finally, (9) management
itself was providing other, “more accurate” projections to
the Company's bank. None of the indicia that often justify
deferring to management projections are present in this
case. Thus, Petitioner has not proven that the Management
Projections are reliable, and I conclude that they are too
questionable to form the basis of a reliable DCF valuation.142
“[W]ithout reliable five-year projections, any values
generated by a DCF analysis are meaningless.”143 Having
found that the Management Projections are unreliable and
there are no other viable projections in the record,144 I
therefore conclude that it would be inappropriate to determine
fair value based on a DCF analysis in this instance.
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B. The Comparable Transactions Method Does Not
Produce a Reliable Value
The parties' experts agree that there are no comparable
companies to Ramtron.145 Using another approach, Clarke,
petitioner's expert, opined that there were two comparable
transactions from which Ramtron's value could be derived.146
This analysis resulted in an implied value for Ramtron of
$3.99 per share, and Clarke accorded it a 20% weight in his
ultimate fair value determination.147 Jarrell concluded that
there were no comparable transactions.148 For the following
reasons, I conclude that Petitioner has not proven that the
comparable transactions method is an appropriate valuation
technique in this case.
A comparable transactions approach requires “identifying
similar transactions, quantifying those transactions through
financial metrics, and then applying the metrics to the
company at issue to ascertain a value. The utility of a
comparable transactions methodology is directly linked to
the ‘similarity between the company the court is valuing and
the companies used for comparison.’ ”149 “Reliance on a
comparable companies or comparable transactions approach
is improper where the purported ‘comparables’ involve
significantly different products or services than the company
whose appraisal is at issue, or vastly different multiples.”150
*19  The purportedly comparable transactions are the
acquisitions of Actel Corporation (“Actel”) and Virage Logic
Corporation (“Virage”), both of which Clarke concluded were
companies that produced memory products but, like Ramtron,
operated without their own foundry.151 Clarke computed
multiples for the two firms based on the transactions
involving them for the following financial metrics: (1) equity
value (“EV”)/last twelve months' revenue (“LTM”); (2) EV/
next twelve months' forecasted revenue (“NTM”); and (3)
EV/NTM + 1.152 Clarke then averaged the Virage and Actel
multiples and derived an implied value for Ramtron from
them.
Jarrell contests Clarke's choice of comparable transactions.
He notes that the proxy statement in the Virage transaction
included a list of comparable companies from two industries
similar to Virage's and that Ramtron was not listed in either
group.153 It is unclear whether Jarrell believes that Actel
is not comparable in and of itself, but he did observe that
the multiples for that company support the Merger price as
evidence of fair value. More importantly, Jarrell opines that
the dispersion of the multiples for Actel and Virage is too great
to be reliable and violates the “law of one price.”154 I agree
with this criticism.
In the past, “[t]his Court has found comparable transactions
analyses that used as few as five transactions and two
transactions to be unreliable.”155 This “dearth of data
points ... undermines the reliability” of the methodology.156



























































Clarke then went on to: (1) subtract a 13% synergy discount
from each of the implied equity values; and (2) average the
three figures to arrive at a comparable-transactions-based
equity value for Ramtron of $141.9 million.
- 474 -
LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron International Corporation, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr....
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 16
Even assuming these two transactions qualitatively are
comparable transactions, in that the acquired companies
operated similar businesses to Ramtron, the meager number
of data points and the range of multiples indicate that
this valuation approach is of questionable reliability in this
instance. The EV/LTM multiple, for example, yields synergy-
adjusted per share values of $2.74 to $6.13, a range of $3.39,
which exceeds the Merger price of $3.10.159 The EV/NTM
multiple suggests equity values of $2.72 to $4.55, a spread
of $1.83.160 By contrast, the EV/NTM+1 multiple produces
a tighter range of $3.27 to $4.53.
*20  I see little justification for Clarke's simple averaging
method, particularly with only two data points. His
comparable transactions approach implies per share values
ranging anywhere from $2.72 to $6.13. Two of the multiples
have high-low ranges exceeding Ramtron's unaffected stock
price. I am not convinced it is productive to utilize a method
that implies Ramtron's fair value is somewhere between 88%
and 198% of the deal price.161 Also, the EV/NTM and
EV/NTM+1 multiples rely on the Management Projections,
which I already have concluded are unreliable. Finally, Clarke
himself attributed minimal weight to this approach—only
one-fifth of his conclusion. For all of these reasons, I conclude
that Petitioner has not satisfied its burden of proving that
the comparable transactions approach provides a reliable
indication of Ramtron's fair value.
C. The Transaction Price Provides the Best Evidence of
Fair Value
A DCF analysis attempts to value a company by looking
within the company, extrapolating its financials into the
future, and then discounting these cash flows to present value.
A comparables approach instead looks outside the company
and attempts to value it by market analogy. The former
method is only useful to the extent its inputs are reliable; the
latter is helpful only to the extent actual comparables exist.
Neither approach yields a reliable measure of fair value in this
case. Instead, I conclude that the Merger price offers the best
indication of fair value.
A merger price does not necessarily represent the fair value of
a company, as the term “fair value” is interpreted under 8 Del.
C. § 262. For example, in a short-form merger under Section
253, the merger price is set unilaterally by the controlling
stockholder; the minority stockholders are forced out of the
company and left with appraisal as their sole remedy. To
presume that the merger price represented fair value in such
a situation would leave the minority stockholders effectively
without the remedy offered by Section 262 of an independent
analysis of a company's fair value. In 2010, the Delaware
Supreme Court in Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP162
explicitly rejected the argument that this Court should “defer”
to the merger price. Indeed, the Supreme Court concluded that
such deference would be contrary to the statutory language
of Section 262, which requires consideration of “all relevant
factors” in determining a company's fair value.163
Nevertheless, in the situation of a proper transactional process
likely to have resulted in an accurate valuation of an acquired
corporation, this Court has looked to the merger price as
evidence of fair value and, on occasion, given that metric one-
hundred percent weight.164 In an oft-quoted passage, then-
Vice Chancellor Jacobs wrote: “The fact that a transaction
price was forged in the crucible of objective market reality
(as distinguished from the unavoidably subjective thought
process of a valuation expert) is viewed as strong evidence
that the price is fair.”165 Similarly, Chief Justice Strine,
then writing as a Vice Chancellor, noted: “[O]ur case law
recognizes that when there is an open opportunity to buy a
company, the resulting market price is reliable evidence of
fair value.”166 The inquiry here is whether the Merger process
resulted in a price indicative of Ramtron's fair value or, as the
parties have framed it, whether there was a “competitive and
fair auction”167 for Ramtron.
*21  At the outset, I note that I am not aware of any
case holding that a multi-bidder auction of a company is
a prerequisite to finding that the merger price is a reliable
indicator of fair value. Here, unlike in Union Illinois or
Huff Fund, only one company, Cypress, made a bid. This
case also differs in that the Merger was a hostile deal. As
detailed below, however, I conclude that “the process by
which [the Company] was marketed to potential buyers was
thorough, effective, and free from any spectre of self-interest
or disloyalty,”168 and that the resulting price accordingly
provides a reliable indication of Ramtron's fair value.
Ramtron could, and repeatedly did, reject Cypress' overtures.
Simultaneously, Ramtron actively solicited every buyer it
believed could be interested in a transaction. The Company
provided several of those potential buyers with the much-
vaunted Management Projections. No one bid. LongPath
contends that the lack of other bidders indicates a flawed
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process. I disagree. Any impediments to a higher bid resulted
from Ramtron's operative reality, not shortcomings of the
Merger process.
1. TI and Ramtron's operative reality
Much already has been said about Ramtron's operative reality
as of the Merger. Petitioner focuses on one particular factor
that it contends irredeemably corrupted the sales process:
Ramtron's foundry relationship with TI. Under Ramtron's
manufacturing agreement with TI, Ramtron was guaranteed
three additional years of production if TI terminated the
agreement.169 But, in the event Ramtron experienced a
change in control, TI had the right to terminate the agreement
upon ninety days notice.170 LongPath argues that this change-
in-control provision deterred prospective bidders. I reject this
contention as contrary to the evidence.
The parties do not dispute that Cypress began preparing for
its hostile bid well in advance. Part of that diligence involved
predicting potential interlopers. Another aspect of Cypress'
preparation involved essentially seeking TI's blessing for its
potential bid. Because of the change-in-control provisions,
Cypress sought to get some form of assurance from TI in
advance of issuing its bear hug letter that TI would not
exercise that right in relation to an acquisition by Cypress.
Rodgers testified that he called TI's president to discuss a
potential acquisition of Ramtron. In that regard, Cypress
offered to avoid competing with one of TI's F–RAM products
if TI agreed not to terminate the foundry relationship with
Ramtron. Cypress never received a contract or other written
agreement from TI—in fact, it appears that TI never explicitly
agreed to support Cypress' bid. Cypress did receive, however,
enough of an informal assurance that it deemed the risk of
proceeding with the acquisition acceptable.171
As Petitioner emphasizes, Rodgers began discussing this
issue with TI in March 2011, over a year before Cypress'
bid for Ramtron.172 Even so, the record is clear that
Cypress never obtained a contractual commitment from TI.
In an undated internal Cypress presentation analyzing the
potential bid for Ramtron, the possibility of TI dishonoring its
commitment is listed as a low risk, but Cypress (twice) listed
the lack of TI support as a major risk to any potential deal.173
*22  LongPath argues that Cypress had an unfair tactical
advantage and that other bidders were unlikely to get
TI's support. This appears to be nothing but speculation.
Ramtron's relationship with TI was part of its operative
reality. A Cypress planning document, titled “Potential
Interlopers,” listed five such plausible interlopers. For three
of them, Cypress predicted that TI would not extend foundry
support because those companies directly competed with
TI.174 A different document predicted the same as to a sixth
possible interloper.175
I find these predictions and Petitioner's reliance upon them
somewhat puzzling. Even though Cypress offered not to
encroach on one specific TI product line, “low power
microcontrollers,”176 in order to get an informal assurance
that the manufacturing agreement would continue, the
uncontradicted evidence shows that TI and Cypress directly
competed in several markets and that the two companies
had significant bad blood between them as a result of two
previous intellectual property lawsuits.177 Thus, applying
the reasoning underlying Cypress' advisor's predictions, TI
likely would not have extended foundry services to Cypress
either. But, TI did make at least a nonbinding commitment to
continue foundry services for Cypress.
Petitioner has not shown that any other company that wanted
to acquire Ramtron was in a worse position than Cypress in
terms of getting TI's assent. Indeed, some may have been
better positioned than Cypress. Construed most favorably to
LongPath, all bidders were in the same boat as Cypress vis-
à-vis TI. Ramtron's manufacturing agreement with TI simply
was part of the Company's operative reality at the time of the
Merger.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the change-in-control
provisions in the TI manufacturing agreement actually
deterred any of the potential bidders.178 Ramtron apparently
proceeded the furthest in discussing alternative transactions
with three companies: Atmel Corp., SMART Modular, and
ROHM. Nothing suggests that the TI agreement caused any
of those companies to back out. Davenport testified that
SMART Modular was “very hesitant due to our supply-
side cost structure and the tenuousness of our supply”
and also did not like the Company's “sole sourcing.”179
Atmel similarly declined because of Ramtron's “cost structure
[and] in particular our wafer supply, [which] they were
very, very concerned about.”180 ROHM seems to have been
contemplating a minority investment, discussed in the next
Subsection, which would not have implicated the TI concerns.
In short, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the change-
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in-control provisions in the manufacturing agreement with
TI materially impaired Ramtron's sales process. Instead,
Ramtron's sole or primary reliance on TI as its foundry was
part of the Company's operative reality.
2. Ramtron tries to sell itself to anyone but Cypress
*23  Ramtron authorized Needham, its financial advisor,
to market the Company to other potential acquirers and
explore strategic alternatives. According to an August 30,
2012 Needham presentation, Needham had: (1) contacted
twenty-four third parties, including Cypress; (2) sent non-
disclosure agreements (“NDAs”) to twelve of those entities,
again including Cypress; (3) received executed NDAs from
six interested parties, which did not include Cypress; and
(4) remained in discussions with two companies other than
Cypress.181 This market canvass reveals that six companies
were intrigued enough to enter into NDAs. It appears that
those companies received or at least had access to Ramtron's
Management Projections.182 In addition, by August, Ramtron
had announced its new manufacturing agreement with
ROHM. Yet, despite this sales effort, not one company
besides Cypress ever made a firm bid for Ramtron.
SMART Modular and Atmel were two of the companies with
which talks proceeded the furthest. As noted, both companies
declined to pursue a transaction because of what they viewed
as problems with Ramtron's cost structure. The evidence does
not reveal why each and every other company declined to
bid for Ramtron. At least one that executed an NDA saw
no synergies in the transaction.183 A second did not see
the acquisition fitting with the potential bidder's strategic
priorities.184 Another that apparently did have familiarity
with Ramtron's technology was advised by its engineers not
to move forward.185 That company was sent, but did not sign,
an NDA.
Not one of the specific explanations in the record relates to
TI. Instead, what evidence there is suggests that these other
companies did not see value in Ramtron exceeding Cypress'
bid. The importance of this point is amplified by the fact
that Needham's call log indicates that the NDAs all were
executed in late June,186 when Cypress' bid was only $2.68
a share. According to Petitioner's position in this litigation,
at that point in time, the Company was being undervalued
by $2.28. Ramtron's hostile bid caused a significant spike
in trading volume, as revealed by Needham's stock price
analyses.187 Aside from the prospective purchasers that
Needham contacted, therefore, the fact that Ramtron was in
play was known in the market. Purely financial purchasers
theoretically could have stepped in and made unsolicited
bids and, according to LongPath's position in this litigation,
snatched up Ramtron at a fire sale price. None did. Indeed, no
one even bid, including those with inside information, even
when Cypress' offer was $0.42 below the final Merger price.
Petitioner focuses at length on Ramtron's discussions with
ROHM. On July 17, 2012, Ramtron's management proposed
two alternative transactions to ROHM: (1) a purchase of
seven million shares of Ramtron common stock at $3.50
per share together with a board seat; or (2) seven million
shares of Ramtron convertible preferred stock at $4.00 per
share and a board seat.188 Three days later, on July 20,
Ramtron and ROHM announced their new manufacturing
agreement.189 ROHM apparently also was interested in the
potential purchase of Ramtron's common stock and, on
August 11, 2012, communicated to the Company that any
such purchase would be at $3.00 per share.190
According to Petitioner, ROHM's interest in a minority
investment at a price slightly below the deal price indicates
that the Merger price undervalued Ramtron. If ROHM in fact
had made such an investment, I might be inclined to agree.191
But, even in its email countering at $3.00, ROHM explicitly
stated the following:
*24  Actually, one of our concerns at this time is the
legal and financial risk for purchasing stocks of a public
company with a price above the market price. Since
we have to justify the purchasing price to achieve the
accountability to our shareholders, we have to seek profit
that can make up for the paid premium. And we have to
be careful to decide the purchase price in order to avoid
impairment loss of assets.192
ROHM itself, it seems, was concerned with justifying
the above-market premium. Perhaps, because of the
manufacturing agreement between it and Ramtron, ROHM
might have been able to exploit synergies between the
two companies or otherwise unlock value in Ramtron not
available to other bidders. Ultimately, however, ROHM
backed away from pursuing a deal for Ramtron at the end
of August. Citing “growing apprehension in ROHM's own
business environment,” ROHM determined that it was “not
in a position to make an investment under present business
outlook.”193
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3. Ramtron extracts a substantial premium from Cypress
Finally, LongPath criticizes Cypress' hostile approach,
arguing that Cypress pounded Ramtron into submission at
a below-market rate. I already have found that, to the
extent Cypress' hostile bid negatively altered Ramtron's
performance, such effects were dwarfed by Ramtron's own
business problems, which included channel stuffing earlier
in the year. Those flaws are part of Ramtron's operative
reality. On the other hand, there is support in the case
law for disregarding temporary distortions in determining a
company's fair value.194 In theory, then, it could be acceptable
to back out any negative effects caused by Cypress' hostile
offer. The parties, however, have offered no practical way to
quantify those effects, particularly as against the larger effects
from Ramtron's own business problems.
In that regard, there is no evidence that Cypress' hostile
approach hampered the ability of other companies to bid for
Ramtron or otherwise affected the Merger process. Only one
company contacted by Needham stated that it did not wish to
bid against Cypress.195 By contrast, six other companies went
so far as to execute NDAs. Even if Cypress was attempting
to wear Ramtron down,196 Cypress had every right to do
so and there is no evidence that it acted improperly in this
regard. Furthermore, the history of the Merger runs contrary
to LongPath's argument. Ramtron's Board had the ability to
say no to Cypress and repeatedly did so. The Board advised
Ramtron's stockholders on several occasions not to tender into
Cypress' bid and, over the same time period, Cypress raised
its bid five separate times. The price Cypress ultimately paid
—which was negotiated by the Ramtron Board and Cypress
—was 25% higher than Cypress' starting offer.
4. Conclusion
The Merger resulted from Cypress' hostile bid. Cypress
spent three months attempting to acquire Ramtron, during
which time the Company actively shopped itself to other
conceivable buyers, several of which indicated serious
interest. None of those potential alternative buyers made a
firm offer. Cypress, however, repeatedly raised its price until
it and Ramtron's Board agreed on final Merger price of $3.10
per share. This lengthy, publicized process was thorough and
gives me confidence that, if Ramtron could have commanded
a higher value, it would have. “For me (as a law-trained judge)
to second-guess the price that resulted from that process
involves an exercise in hubris and, at best, reasoned guess
work.”197 As such, I conclude that the Merger price is a
reliable indication of Ramtron's fair value.
D. Transaction Price Less Synergies
*25  Thus far, I have concluded that the Management
Projections are unreliable, making the use of a DCF
inappropriate. Additionally, the parties agree that there are no
comparable companies and I concur with Respondent that the
comparable transactions approach does not provide a reliable
indication of fair value here. By contrast, the Merger process
was thorough and supports my reliance on the Merger price
as an indication of Ramtron's fair value. In the absence of
alternative methodologies, I weigh the Merger price at 100%
in determining the fair value of Petitioner's shares.
In an appraisal action, however, it is inappropriate to include
merger-specific value. Accordingly, I must exclude from the
$3.10 Merger price any portion of that amount attributable
to Cypress-specific synergies, as opposed to Ramtron's value
as a going concern.198 Respondent argues that the synergies
amount to $0.34 per share. Petitioner contends that the net
synergies are only $0.03.
Preliminarily, I reject LongPath's contention that synergies
should be subtracted not from the Merger price, but instead
from the value that Cypress attributed to Ramtron, which,
according to Petitioner, is between $3.90 and $5.44. Those
valuations estimated Ramtron's worth as a division of
Cypress. Petitioner's requested approach is contrary to the
language of Section 262, which commands that I “determine
the fair value of the shares exclusive of any element of value
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger
or consolidation.”199 There is no basis to deduct synergies
from the idiosyncratic value attributed to a company by its
purchaser, because it is not clear that value would provide
insight into the fair value of the target company as a going
concern. Instead, the proper way of applying a merger-price-
less-synergies approach is to determine the value paid for a
company and then subtract that portion of the purchase price
representing synergies.200
As to the synergies in this transaction, I find Respondent's
argument that over 10% of the transaction price represented
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synergies to be without merit. Jarrell first provided a market-
wide analysis of the premia paid by financial versus strategic
buyers and from this approach concluded that average
synergies could be removed from the purchase price by
applying the ratio of the average financial buyers' premium
to the average strategic buyers' premium, i.e., effectively
multiplying the Merger price by 0.73, which results in a fair
value of $2.75.201
This general data, however, does not tell me anything about
this specific transaction, which must be the focus in a Section
262 action. With respect to Cypress-specific synergies, Jarrell
compared the Management Projections to a set of Cypress
projections202 and quantified the cost savings, which Jarrell
determined to be $0.69 per share. He then assumed that
Ramtron's stockholders captured between 25% and 75% of
these synergies and took the midpoint of those calculations,
resulting in a fair value of $2.76.203 In addition to its
back-of-the-envelope feel, this approach focuses solely on
cost savings, which are positive synergies, and neglects the
possibility of negative synergies, which Clarke asserts would
exist here.204
*26  Although Clarke rejected the transaction-price-less-
synergies approach, he opined that negative revenue synergies
and transaction costs would have to be added back to any
value based on Jarrell's estimate of synergies. I find this
approach to be reasonable and supported by the record. The
testimony at trial indicates that Cypress expected significant
negative synergies from the Ramtron acquisition.205 While
Petitioner's approach may understate the net synergies, I
find that it better conforms to the evidence adduced at trial
than Ramtron's position. Accordingly, I adopt LongPath's
approach to synergies and exclude $0.03 from the Merger
price. This results in a fair value determination of $3.07 per
share.
E. Reality Checks
As a final step, I consider it appropriate to touch briefly on
some of the “real world” evidence that Petitioner contends
undermines the Merger price as a reliable indicator of fair
value. Some of these items are entitled to zero weight. Balzer,
for example, testified at his deposition that he told Cypress
at the time of its nonpublic offer in 2011 that he believed
Ramtron's stock would be worth $6 to $8 “several years
out.”206 This speculation, of course, is not informative as to
what Ramtron was worth at the time of the Merger. Similarly,
Ramtron's Chairman of the Board testified that he “personally
would have paid more than $3.10.”207 The usefulness of a
transaction price, however, is that “buyers with a profit motive
[are] able to assess [company-specific] factors for themselves
and to use those assessments to make bids with actual money
behind them.”208 By contrast, hypothetical statements about
how much money someone allegedly would have paid, if they
actually had the money to do so, which they apparently did
not, are significantly less probative.
Similarly, I give no weight to the $4 target trading price
Merriman Capital announced in January 2012,209 and
reiterated in April 2012.210 By late July, Merriman Capital
had pulled its target price and admitted it could not model
Ramtron accurately.211 And, as already discussed, I do not
find informative the fact that Cypress' internal documents
suggest a value for Ramtron above the deal price; those
documents model Ramtron as a division of Cypress and are
not indicative of the fair value of Ramtron as a stand-alone
company.
The one factor that does cause me some pause, however, is the
ROHM potential investment. The fact that ROHM apparently
was seriously considering a minority equity investment at
$3.00 per share casts some doubt on the Merger price of $3.10.
Ultimately, however, ROHM did not make this investment
and, in fact, expressed serious concern about paying an
above-market price for Ramtron stock. Because ROHM
had extensive information about Ramtron and ultimately
decided not to pursue the minority investment, I discount its
importance. ROHM made exactly as many actual bids as the
rest of the market: zero. In that regard, the ROHM equity
“investment” is simply another non-event.
Indeed, I suspect that, rather than the Merger price being low,
it was more likely that the ROHM proposal was inexplicably
high. Recall, for example, that, in 2011, long before Cypress
made its public offer, Ramtron executed a secondary public
offering in which it diluted its equity holders and sold about
20% of its shares for $2.00 each, with a net to itself of $1.79.
By July 2012, based on the findings in this Memorandum
Opinion, Ramtron's financial condition was no better than it
was when it made the secondary public offering. For these
reasons, I conclude that the ROHM investment, which never
actually occurred, does not cast doubt on the Merger price as
a reliable indicator of fair value.
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IV. CONCLUSION
*27  For the foregoing reasons, I determine the fair value of
Ramtron as of the Merger date to be $3.07 per share. Counsel
for Petitioner shall submit, on notice, an appropriate final
order to that effect, including provisions for pre- and post-
judgment interest.
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Not Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2015 WL 4540443
Footnotes
1 The factual record is drawn, in part, from the testimony presented at trial. Citations to such testimony are in the form “Tr.
# (X)” with “X” representing the surname of the speaker, if not clear from the text. Exhibits will be cited as “JX # ” and
facts drawn from the parties' pre-trial Joint Stipulation are cited as “JS ¶ # .”
2 Tr. 10 (Davidian).
3 JS ¶ 1.
4 Id. ¶ 4.
5 Tr. 184 (Davenport).
6 JS ¶ 2.
7 Tr. 281 (Rodgers).
8 JS ¶ 11.
9 Id. ¶ 13.
10 Id. ¶ 18.
11 Id. ¶ 23.
12 Id. ¶ 5.
13 JX 322, JX 324.
14 Before assuming the CFO position, Richards previously had served as the Company's controller. He appears to have
started working at Ramtron in 2004. Tr. 49. After the Merger, he worked for Cypress for five months until March 2013.
Id at 22–23.
15 Id. at 48–49. Apparently Fujitsu did not definitively terminate the foundry relationship, but instead, was moving its plant
to a new location and Ramtron determined that the expense of transitioning to the new location outweighed the benefits.
16 Id. at 291 (Rodgers).
17 Id. at 291–92 (describing the process of transitioning foundries). The Company's products primarily, if not entirely, were
for commercial customers. The F–RAM often was “designed into” the customer's end product.
18 Id. at 292. Rodgers also suggested that Ramtron's products had design flaws that increased the difficulty of transitioning.
19 Tr. 49 (Richards).
20 Id. at 50-52 (Richards); id. at 187-88 (Davenport).
21 Davenport began working for Ramtron in 1986. He started as an equipment engineer and worked his way up to the Vice
President position. He currently is employed by Cypress as the Vice President of Technical Staff. Tr. 183.
22 Id. at 198-99; JX 128.
23 Tr. 198.
24 JX 215 [hereinafter “Jarrell Rpt.”] Ex. 8.
25 Tr. 49-50 (Richards); id. at 198 (Davenport) (noting that the difficulty and risk of transitioning foundries is “substantially
higher” in the case of transferring a specialty process like F-RAM if the new foundry has no experience with F-RAM); id.
at 291 (Rodgers) (stating that “in general, switching foundries is a big deal” and that the process requires a company
to “in effect, change the product”).
26 JS ¶ 5.
27 Id. ¶ 6.
28 Tr. 63-64 (Richards).
29 Id. at 22.
30 Id. at 158 (Richards).
31 Id. at 30-31 (Richards).
- 480 -
LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron International Corporation, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr....
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 22
32 Id. at 30 (Richards); id. at 192 (Davenport); id. at 299-302 (Rodgers); id. at 396-97 (Buss).
33 Id. at 50-51 (Richards); id. at 187-88 (Davenport).
34 Id. at 52 (Richards) (describing the resulting difficulty when TI would not extend credit for the over-order of wafers).
35 The data in this chart is drawn from Exhibit 5 to the Jarrell Report.
36 JX 22; Tr. 25 (Richards).
37 JX 24.
38 JS ¶ 8.
39 JX 14.
40 Tr. 285.
41 Id. at 54-55 (Richards).
42 Id. at 54 (Richards).
43 JS ¶ 9.
44 Tr. 55 (Richards).
45 JX 35.
46 JX 43; Tr. 28 (Richards: explaining that this reference to the new bank covenants related to the fact that Ramtron recently
had renegotiated its covenants yet again).
47 JX 151.
48 Tr. 410 (Buss).
49 Id. at 30.
50 JS ¶ 11.
51 Tr. 294 (Rodgers).
52 JS ¶ 12.
53 The sole exception appears to be a set of projections created by Richards in February 2012 and sent to the Company's
auditors in an effort to corroborate the extent of Ramtron's net operating loss tax assets. JX 40. Interestingly, the 2013
forecasts included a confidence factor of 80% and the 2014 forecasts had a confidence factor of only 50%. Richards did
not even bother providing a confidence factor for the 2015 forecasts. Id. (native file).
54 Tr. 59 (Richards).
55 JX 60.
56 Tr. 59 (“Needham was going to market our company.... [O]ne of their tactics was to put us out to bid so hopefully maybe
a white knight would come in. And, two, I think they used [the projections] for a discounted cash flow to come up with
a basis to value the company, if you will.”).
57 Id. at 63.
58 JX 60.
59 Id. By recommending use of a 30% CAGR, which generally stands for compound annual growth rate, Richards understood
Zimmer to be advocating multiplying a base value by 1.3 for each year of the projection period.
60 Tr. 63 (Richards).
61 JS ¶ 13.





67 Tr. 73 (Richards); id. at 302 (Rodgers); id. at 397 (Buss).
68 JX 245 [hereinafter “Balzer Dep.”] at 106 (“Part of the reason that sales fell off as soon as Cypress announced the
acquisition is distributors that we had.... If these distributors were not distributors of Cypress product, it was their belief—
and I heard this from Pete [Zimmer]—their belief then that Cypress would probably not protect them if they consummated
the deal and they could be stuck with a whole bunch of product and, hence, they just stopped buying.”). There is a
potential hearsay problem with this testimony, but Respondent did not press any such objection in its briefing.
69 A $70 million year would equate to weekly sales of, on average, $1.347 million.
70 Tr. 209.
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71 Id. at 402-04 (Buss).
72 JS ¶ 15.
73 Id. ¶ 16.
74 Id. ¶ 17.
75 Id. ¶ 18.
76 Id. ¶ 23.
77 Dent v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2014 WL 2931180 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014).
78 E.g., In re Dole Food Co., 2014 WL 6906134, at *11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 9, 2014) (“In appraisal proceedings, the battling experts
tend to generate widely divergent valuations as they strive to bracket the outer limits of plausibility.”); Finkelstein v. Liberty
Digital, Inc., 2005 WL 1074364, at *13 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005) (“Men and women who purport to be applying sound,
academically-validated valuation techniques come to this court and, through the neutral application of their expertise to
the facts, come to widely disparate results, even when applying the same methodology.”).
79 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
80 Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 218 (Del. 2010).
81 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 525 (Del. 1999) (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d
289, 298 (Del. 1996)).
82 8 Del. C. § 262(h).
83 Gholl v. eMachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004) (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 713 (Del. 1983)).
84 M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., 737 A.2d at 520 (“In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both sides have the burden of proving
their respective valuation positions by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
85 Gholl, 2004 WL 2847865, at *5.
86 Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL 1152338, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2004).
87 Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 52-53 (Del. Ch. 2007).
88 Cf. Laidler v. Hesco Bastion Envt'l, Inc., 2014 WL 1877536, at * 8 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2014) (“Though DCF is more
prominently employed in Delaware appraisal litigation, both parties' experts opine that employing a DCF is not feasible
here because [the company's] management never made cash flow projections in the ordinary course of its business.”).
89 Cede & Co. v. JRC Acq. Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004).
90 Doft & Co., 2004 WL 1152338, at *5.
91 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003), revised (July 9, 2004), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005).
92 Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 WL 1569818, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012) (listing these four factors as reasons not to
afford deference to the projections); see also Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 WL 5878807, at *9-11 (Del. Ch. Nov.
1, 2013) (rejecting management projections prepared out of the ordinary course that included substantial speculative
elements), holding left unmodified, 2014 WL 2042797 (Del. Ch. May 19, 2014), both aff'd, 2015 WL 631586 (Del. Feb.
12, 2015) (TABLE); Doft & Co., 2004 WL 1152338, at *5-6 (finding management projections unreliable because: (1)
management themselves did not regard them as reliable; and (2) the company, and seemingly the industry, was deemed
nearly impossible to forecast in the short term, much less the long-term).
Recent cases continue to evaluate the reliability of management projections on similar grounds. See, e.g., Merlin P'rs LP
v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 WL 2069417, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015) (refusing to rely on management projections where:
(1) management never before had prepared similar projections; (2) the projections were so “indisputably optimistic”
that the petitioner's own expert testified that a discount would have been appropriate; and (3) management “itself had
no confidence in its ability to forecast”); Owen v. Cannon, 2015 WL 3189204, at *19-21 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2015)
(rejecting an attack on the management projections when those projections did not include speculative business items,
were not inconsistent with historical performance, were not “created by novices,” and instead generally resulted from
a “deliberate, iterative process over a period of three years to create, update and revise multi-year projections for the
Company”).
93 Tr. 59 (Richards).
94 Id. at 60.
95 Id. at 64.
96 Id. at 63 (Richards); see also JX 60.
97 See supra note 53.
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101 E.g., JX 47 (forecasting, on April 19, 2012, $70 million in total 2012 revenue). On February 22, 2011, Ramtron forecasted
between $65 and $70 million in total 2011 revenue. JX 294. Actual revenues for 2011 were $66.4 million. JX 215 Ex. 3. The
2011 forecast likely was not made by exactly the same management team and neither the 2011 nor the 2012 forecasts
utilized a point-of-sale or a bottoms-up line-item methodology. Thus, the relevance of the 2011 and 2012 forecasts, as
predictors of the accuracy of the Management Projections, is marginal, at best.
102 JX 39. This chart was included in a presentation to the Ramtron Board and is dated February 9, 2012. The first two
columns indicate the month and the quarter when each particular forecast was made. The remaining columns are the
quarters being forecasted. For unknown reasons, there are two sets of forecasts in the first quarter of 2011. The bolded
number represents the actual results in thousands of dollars for each quarter. For example, the cell Q2 2010 by Q1 2011
represents management's forecast, as of the second quarter of 2010, for revenue in the first quarter of 2011. I have
added the actual results for Q1 and Q2 2012, which were not yet known as of February 9, 2012.
103 Indeed, an earlier version of the same chart appeared in an October 18, 2011 board presentation entitled “Financial
Outlook.” JX 31. That chart similarly was entitled “Sales Forecast Waterfall Chart,” as in JX 39, and it contained no
indication that the figures presented were “stretch” goals.
104 JX 313 (Oct. 18, 2011); JX 314 (Feb. 13-14, 2012).
105 Tr. 209, 232.
106 JX 36.
107 See Gholl, 2004 WL 2847865, at *9 (rejecting contention that management projections were unrealistic reach goals and
noting: “If the 2002 budget represented management's wildest dreams come true, it would be illogical and callous to key
the Bonus Plan to even higher targets that were not achievable”).
108 The February 2012 projections cumulatively estimate $67 million in revenue for 2012. This is the same number used by
Richards in a set of projections prepared to justify the Company's deferred tax assets to its auditors. JX 40. Richards's
use of the waterfall chart forecast numbers for projections provided to the Company's auditors further supports my finding
that these were not “stretch” goals.
109 Tr. 31-32 (Richards); id. at 320-21 (Rodgers: explaining that rigorous competition, technological change, and
macroeconomic factors make the industry difficult to forecast); id. at 378-80 (Buss).
110 JX 97.
111 Balzer candidly conceded the Company was mediocre at forecasting:
Q: What was the quality of those forward-looking projections when you took over as CEO?
A: Probably mediocre.
Q: Did you attempt to make improvements in the quality of the projections?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you succeed?
A: I'd say no.
Q: Why not?
A: ... [Y]ou need to understand the market.... And while we were working very hard on that, we weren't there.
Balzer Dep. 50. These comments temper the reliability of Balzer's position that the Management Projections “were the
most likely of what would happen if Cypress walked away.” Id. at 83.
112 JX 170 native file.
113 See Gearreald, 2012 WL 1569818, at *5-6 (concluding that the requirement that a company be valued as a going concern
based on its operative reality at the time of the merger required the exclusion of “speculative costs or revenues”); see
also Huff Fund Inv. P'ship, 2013 WL 5878807, at *11 (finding the inclusion or exclusion of significant contract revenues
so speculative as to render the management projections unreliable).
114 JX 95.
115 Id.
116 E.g., Tr. 410 (Buss: commenting that, upon acquiring Ramtron, Cypress discovered that the Company still had unpaid
legal bills from the beginning of 2012). Indeed, Ramtron was on pace to go cash negative before the end of October
2012. JX 151.
117 JX 170 native file (assumption of per part cost reductions).
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118 See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
119 Tr. 225.
120 Id. at 205.
121 Id. at 207-08 (Davenport: discussing ROHM's wafer yield of 20% to 60%, as against a “good” yield of 97%, which
TI could achieve, all of which bears on supply costs); id. at 348-51 (Rodgers: testifying that ROHM lagged behind TI
technologically, was not competitive in the marketplace against TI's products, and had a very different technology than TI
that would make the foundry transition difficult, all of which raised questions about the economic viability of manufacturing
microchips there); id. at 395 (Buss: stating that TI and IBM “are probably two of the best, well-run, capable fabs in the
world,” and that successfully introducing ROHM as a second foundry “was definitely a long shot”). The testimony of
Cypress' officers and employees is obviously self-serving, but their remarks on the technological status of ROHM versus
TI or IBM is not contradicted by any other evidence and comports with Ramtron's own difficult history in transferring
foundries.
122 JX 170 native file (year-over-year growth rates of -12%, 19%, 24%, 24%, and 24%, for 2012 through 2016, respectively).
123 E.g. Tr. 415 (Buss: describing Ramtron's inventory problem).
124 JX 36.
125 Id.
126 LongPath cites to statements by Balzer regarding other time periods that the Company should avoid stuffing the channel.
JX 10; JX 242.
127 The evidence suggests that many or most of Ramtron's products were “designed into” its customers' products. This long-
term supply nature of Ramtron's business reduces the likelihood of dramatic short-term demand fluctuations.
128 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
129 Pet'r's Post-Trial Br. 34. My rather simplistic comparison of point-of-purchase versus point-of-sale revenue recognition
supra suggested that the use of one system over the other affects only the timing of the revenue, not the amount. There are
various reasons why using the point-of-purchase approach also may lead to over-recognition of revenue. The distributors
may return inventory because, for example, they ordered too much or the products are obsolete. Distributors also may
sell to the end-user for less than the list price, leading to a reduction in the actual revenue received. See Tr. 299-302
(Rodgers: comparing the two revenue recognition systems).
130 Moreover, because Ramtron's management moved to a new revenue-recognition approach for the Management
Projections, it is not clear what steps the Company took to avoid double counting revenue. As of the end of January
2012, Ramtron had about $21 million in inventory in its distribution channels. JX 34 (Zimmer email). That is more than
a quarter's worth of revenue. But, the Company apparently did track to some extent the differences between point-of-
sale and point-of-purchase revenues. JX 174.
131 The historical figures are drawn from Exhibit 8 of Jarrell's Report. These figures are for the years 2002 through 2011 and
are in blue. The projected revenues are drawn from the native excel spreadsheet of JX 170, which is the final iteration of
the Management Projections. The projection period is 2012 through 2016 and those numbers are displayed in red.
132 By 2012, the Company had experienced two consecutive years of revenue decreases. In fact, 2012 revenue was
forecasted as less than 2008 revenue. 2016 forecasted revenue, by contrast, nearly would exceed Ramtron's 2010 and
2011 actual revenues combined.
133 The inputs are the same as the previous graph. CAGR provides the rate at which an initial value would need to grow each
year in order to achieve a final amount. It is a measurement that smoothes out swings in growth over time. For CAGR, I
use the formula: CAGR = ((End Value / Start Value)^(1 / Number of Years)) – 1. Note that, while, for example, 2002-2011
is a period of ten years, the input for the CAGR formula would be nine, because there are only nine periods of growth
between year-end 2002 and year-end 2011. CAGR can be a misleading measurement tool, as the selection of years can
dramatically affect the implied annual return. This is why multiple historical CAGR measurements are provided.
134 JX 199; Tr. 426-32 (Buss: explaining the various portions of JX 199, which is the PSP).
135 In 2017, for example, Cypress predicted a 22% market share.
136 Balzer Dep. 80–81.
137 JX 170.
138 Id. & native file.
139 JX 93 & native file.
140 JX 136 & native file.
141 Tr. 81.
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142 My conclusion that the Management Projections are unreliable prevents me from using those inputs. It is equally dubious
to use either set of the SVB Projections, because they extend only for the 2012 calendar year and one of the main
problems with the Management Projections is that they forecast an unrealistic rate of growth. Thus, even if the SVB
Projections provided a reliable 2012 input, it still would not be clear what rate of growth to apply for future years. The
parties, perhaps, could have advised on this issue. Instead of arguing that the Management Projections should be
discounted a certain percentage, however, the parties took the opposite tactic of wholesale adoption or rejection of the
Management Projections. This has forced the Court to choose one of those routes. Adopting instead some sort of middle
ground would require me to engage in impermissible and unreliable speculation.
143 Huff Fund Inv. P'ship, 2013 WL 5878807, at *9.
144 Cypress prepared its own projections for Ramtron. JX 174. Those projections, however, predict Ramtron's performance
as a division of Cypress. Tr. 321–23 (Rodgers). Accordingly, they are not useful as a predictor of Ramtron's stand-
alone operating potential. Furthermore, Cypress predicted substantially more conservative figures than Ramtron's
management, even after accounting for improvements that Cypress anticipated making to Ramtron.
145 JX 214 [hereinafter “Clarke Rpt.”] at 47; Jarrell Rpt. 84.
146 Clarke Rpt. 51.
147 Id. at 58.
148 Jarrell Rpt. 87, 91.
149 Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 54 (Del. Ch. 2007) (quoting In re U.S. Cellular Operating Co., 2005
WL 43994, at *17 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2005)).
150 In re Orchard Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *9 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012).
151 Clarke Rpt. 50-51.
152 This is “forecasted revenue for the one-year period after the next 12 months.” Id. at 53.
153 JX 216 [hereinafter “Jarrell Rebuttal Rpt.”] at 38.
154 Id.
155 Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 WL 3793896, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013) (citing In re John Q. Hammons
Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., 2011 WL 227634, at *5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 2011) and In re U.S. Cellular Operating Co., 2005
WL 43994, at *18).
156 Id.
157 Clarke Rpt. 54.
158 The implied equity value is not an exact multiple, because Ramtron's debt of $8.8 million is subtracted out and the
Company's cash of $1.3 million is added into the calculation. This results in netting out $7.5 million to obtain the implied
equity value that is shown.
159 This calculation is derived by applying the comparable transaction multiples to Ramtron's financials, subtracting $7.5
million, discounting by 13%, and then dividing by the number of shares, which I assume to be Clarke's figure of 35,528,425.
Jarrell contends that the latter figure understates the number of shares by about four million units because of restricted
stock and stock options.
160 These numbers are inconsequentially different from Jarrell's calculations. The deviation seemingly results from his
rounding of Clarke's determination of shares outstanding to 35,500,000.
161 Jarrell presents a colorable argument that Virage is not, in fact, a comparable transaction. If correct, that provides yet
another reason that the comparable transaction methodology is not reliable here, but I need not decide that issue. If
Virage is not comparable, the Court would be left attempting to value Ramtron on the highly questionable basis of a
single allegedly comparable transaction.
162 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010).
163 Id. at 217-18.
164 In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 WL 399726 (holding that the merger price was the most reliable indication of
fair value and performing confirmatory DCF analysis); Huff Fund Inv. P'ship, 2013 WL 5878807 (finding the merger price
to be the best indication of fair value in light of the lack of other reliable methods); The Union Illinois 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship
v. Union Fin. Gp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2004) (concluding that the merger price offered the best indication
of fair value and also performing a confirmatory DCF analysis).
165 Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., 1991 WL 29303, at *17 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 1991).
166 Union Illinois, 847 A.2d at 357.
167 Id. at 358.
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168 Huff Fund Inv. P'ship, 2013 WL 5878807, at *13.
169 JX 322 (TI Mfg. Agreement); JX 324 (TI Mfg. Agreement Amendment No. 2) § 13.1.
170 JX 322 § 14.8(b).
171 Tr. 287–90; id. at 289 (Rodgers: “They explicitly refused to say ‘we will support you’ to the point that I didn't even try to
get them to sign a document, but my inference was that they wouldn't harm us if we didn't attack them.”).
172 JX 320.
173 JX 236 at 7. Because the presentation includes actual numbers for 2011, I infer that it must be from sometime in 2012.
174 JX 67.
175 JX 65.
176 Tr. 287 (Rodgers).
177 Id. at 286 (Rodgers: “They're a company with many divisions, like us, and they compete broadly in the market.”); id. at
287 (“TI and Cypress have a history of conflict, and they sued us twice about 15 years ago. We won both trials, but
there's not good blood.”); id. at 237 (Kaszubinski: testifying that TI and Cypress competed); id. at 389-90 (Buss: “So the
challenge for us is that TI does not like Cypress. TI and T.J. [Rodgers] do not get along.... I believe he had been in two
prior lawsuits with them prior to my tenure, and I think he beat them both times. So there is a lot of animosity between
the two companies, and it was the number one issue we wrestled with.”).
178 Id. at 65 (Richards); id. at 202 (Davenport).
179 Id. at 201.
180 Id.
181 JX 125 at 8.
182 The Management Projections were in the Company's data room. E.g., JX 84. Needham's call log shows that five
companies who had signed NDAs accessed the data room, though one company that executed an NDA is missing from







189 JS ¶ 5.
190 JX 109.
191 Clarke's report, for example, suggested that the average acquisition premium in the semiconductor industry is about 30%,
with roughly half of that amount attributable to a control premium and the remainder attributable to synergies. Clarke Rpt.
56. An additional 15% on top of $3.00 would imply a minimum acquisition price of $3.45, exclusive of synergies.
192 JX 109.
193 JX 126.
194 See Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001).
195 JX 88.
196 See JX 89 (“Wear them down and wait is working.”).
197 Union Illinois, 847 A.2d at 359.
198 Huff Fund, 2014 WL 2042797, at *2.
199 8 Del. C. § 262(h) (emphasis added).
200 Cf. Huff Fund, 2014 WL 2042797, at *5 (providing the example of the urban cornfield auction and the eccentric farmer,
and noting that, “In an auction setting, it makes little sense to determine whether a bid incorporates information about the
value of certain opportunities by considering only the idiosyncratic weight attached to that information by any particular
bidder, even the winning bidder”).
201 Jarrell Rpt. 43-44.
202 JX 174.
203 Jarrell Rpt. 46.
204 JX 217 (Clarke Rebuttal Rpt.) at 26-27.
205 JX 217 (Clarke Rebuttal Rpt.) at 26-27.
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206 Balzer Dep. 19.
207 JX 246 at 76.
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*1  Plaintiff, a businessman, aspired to create an innovative
scenting business. He teamed with a perfumer and a financier
in a limited liability company (“LLC”), which collaborated
with an established company interested in integrating
scenting technology into its commercial air handling systems.
Developing a functioning product proved difficult, however,
and interpersonal conflict further plagued the LLC. At
some point, the perfumer and the financier began to seek
support from an employee of the air handling company.
The employee, who believed that the perfumer's skills were
more valuable to the air handling company, participated in
communication and meetings that excluded the businessman.
Shortly after the perfumer and the financier voted to dissolve
the LLC, they formed a new, similar company and ultimately
contemplated working with the employee and the air handling
company in a similar capacity. The businessman responded
with this action asserting direct and indirect claims relating to
the failed business. The Court sets forth its findings of fact and
conclusions of law in this post-trial memorandum opinion.
For the reasons below, the Court finds that the perfumer is
liable for his conduct, the air handling company lacked the
requisite scienter to participate in the wrongful conduct or
cause independent injury and thus has no liability, and an
award of $491,839.79 from the perfumer and the entity he




Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant Stewart Matthew
(“Matthew”) was a manager of Aeosphere LLC (“Aeosphere”
or the “Company”) and held 35% of its membership units.1
He maintains this action against Defendant and Counterclaim
Plaintiff Christophe Laudamiel (“Laudamiel”), as well as
Defendants DreamAir LLC (“DreamAir”),2 Fläkt Woods
Group SA (“FWGSA”), and Fläkt Woods Limited (“FWL”)
to vindicate his rights following Aeosphere's dissolution. The
liability of Roberto Capua (“Capua”), Capua's investment
vehicle Action 1 SRL (“Action 1”), and SEMCO LLC
(“SEMCO”), named in Matthew's original complaint, is no
longer at issue.
Matthew, Laudamiel and Action 1 were Aeosphere's
members, and Matthew, Laudamiel and Capua were
Aeosphere's managers.3 Laudamiel, like Matthew, held 350
common units of Aeosphere (35% of the fully diluted total),
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and Capua held 300 preferred units of Aeosphere (30%
of the fully diluted total).4 Laudamiel and Capua formed
DreamAir on May 7, 2010, shortly before Matthew filed
Aeosphere's certificate of cancellation.5 FWGSA “provides
management services and contracts for management services
for the Fläkt Woods family of companies,”6 including FWL,
a United Kingdom entity. For convenience, the Court does
not distinguish between FWGSA and FWL. A critical part of
FWGSA's business is the manufacture and sale of air handling
units.7
B. The Creation of Aeosphere
*2  Aeosphere originated as an entertainment company
founded by Matthew to develop a project called the Scent
Opera.8 The Scent Opera involved presenting a story through
scents and sounds and would eventually yield performances at
prominent museums.9 Although Laudamiel initially was not
interested in forming a business with Matthew, he agreed to
create the fragrances for the Scent Opera.10 To obtain funding
for his project, Matthew made a number of “cold call[s],” one
of which was to FWGSA.11 As the discussions progressed,
Matthew worked primarily with Neil Yule (“Yule”), then
responsible for various business development projects at
FWGSA.12 Yule saw an opportunity for FWGSA to use
scenting technology with its air handling units to offer
an “aroma-control and fragrancing” system.13 This Scent
Project intrigued Yule because it would allow FWGSA to
differentiate its business in a “mature industry with a lot of
competition.”14
The discussions culminated in the formation of Aeosphere,
with Matthew and Laudamiel as co-CEOs, and the
execution of the Operating Agreement of Aeosphere
LLC dated June 20, 2008.15 Aeosphere entered into a
Collaboration Agreement with FWGSA on July 2, 2008.16
The Collaboration Agreement broadly anticipated Aeosphere
developing proprietary scent formulas, another company
providing the scented oils, and FWGSA marketing and
supplying the “integrated package ... for incorporation into
new or existing air handling equipment designed to ensure the
controlled diffusion of the selected scent into selected areas
of space.”17
The parties disagree about whether they based their agreement
on the use of electric field effect technology (“EFET”),
developed by Battelle Memorial Institute (“Battelle”), to
transform scent oils into particles that could be dispersed by
the air handling units. It is clear, however, that the parties
saw EFET as the best option in terms of both function and
profitability.18 While a device developed by Prolitec, Inc.
(“Prolitec”) existed as a prospective alternative to EFET, the
Prolitec device did not perform as well as claimed19 and use
of such device would mean collaborating with an FWGSA
competitor.20
Yule presented the Scent Project to FWGSA, but FWGSA
did not adopt the project because of the costs associated
with developing the technology, among other reasons.21
Aeosphere eventually found a source of funding in Capua,
who provided 1.55 million through Action l.22 In return,
Action 1 received a 30% membership interest in Aeosphere23
and Capua became a manager.24 Part of the effort to attract
Capua's investment involved Matthew's preparation of pro
forma financials projecting that FWGSA would sell 15,100
scenting devices by the end of 2013 (and 2,200 by the end of
2010).25
*3  Under Aeosphere's LLC Agreement, certain actions,
such as terminating Matthew and winding up Aeosphere,
required a unanimous vote of the co-CEOs, though Capua
negotiated other meaningful voting rights.26 Generally
speaking, Capua's investment came with a “preferred
return” of 7% (compounded annually) on “outstanding
and unreturned ... Capital Contributions” and priority in
distributions of available cash and liquidation proceeds.27
The new arrangement was reflected in the LLC Agreement,
dated as of May 11, 2009. Matthew and Laudamiel's
employment agreements appeared as attachments to the LLC
Agreement.28 Each had a term of five years, with a base salary
equivalent to $300,000 in the first year and $350,000 per year
thereafter.
Around March 2009, with news of Capua's investment,
Yule updated projections and pitched the Scent Project once
more.29 At about the same time, FWGSA contracted with
Battelle for an option to license the Battelle technology,30
and the Collaboration Agreement was amended to increase
royalties on sales “[i]n return for [Aeosphere's] co-investment
with FWG[SA]” in the technology contemplated by the
License and Development Agreement with Battelle.31 The
assumption of using EFET was “significan[t]” to Yule's
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projections that 2010 sales would reach around 2.6 million.32
Yule claims that his projection would have been at best
one-fifth to one-tenth of that had the Prolitec technology
been used.33 Jean Philippe Margrita, who became FWGSA's
senior vice president of marketing and product development
in late 2008,34 was somewhat skeptical of Yule's numbers;
he believed that it would take over a year to begin selling
units using EFET.35 FWGSA adopted the Scent Project as one
of its initiatives but used a more conservative projection of
500,000 in 2010 sales (later updated to 200,000 in forecasted
sales) in seeking shareholder approval of the November
2009 budget.36 The presentation noted that the FWGSA
“device [was] not yet completed” but anticipated using
Prolitec technology in the meantime.37 Unfortunately, even
the updated numbers proved too optimistic.
C. The Conflict and Yule's Involvement
*4  As Aeosphere struggled, conflict arose within the
Company's management, including Laudamiel's desire to
bring his husband, perfumer Christophe Hornetz (“Hornetz”),
into the business as an employee,38 and certain conduct
during the Scent Opera engagements.39 As to be expected
with disagreements and secret negotiations, the record does
not paint a clear picture of who was planning to do what,
and when. A few records and acts, however, are particularly
noteworthy and illustrate the timeline of the managers'
negotiations and the ultimate dissolution.
Around September 2009, Matthew, Laudamiel, and Capua
began to discuss restructuring their roles within Aeosphere.40
Records from October confirm preexisting strife and a
desire to exclude certain members from communication.
In one email chain, Laudamiel expressed concern about
Matthew holding up a project, and Yule suggested fabricating
a scheduling conflict as a ruse to keep Matthew out of
a meeting they felt unnecessary.41 In a follow-up email,
Yule asked Laudamiel about the “possibility that [Matthew]
could gain access to [Laudamiel's] mails through the
Aeosphere server.”42 Laudamiel and Yule discussed business
opportunities without informing Matthew into November.43
Matthew, too, solicited Capua's help to prevent Laudamiel
from “hav[ing] his own way all the time.”44
Laudamiel and Capua then held a secret meeting with Yule in
Paris. During that January 2010 meeting, the three discussed
the conflict within Aeosphere and Capua's desire “to place
the business into ... different business streams to ... allow
[Matthew] and [Laudamiel] to operate in their preferred areas
and ... avoid some of the conflict.”45 Yule claims that he
did not know that Laudamiel and Capua wanted to discuss
a potential division; he had believed the meeting was to
visit a site for a Scent Opera performance and a center
for perfumery.46 He admits, however, that he had known
as early as fall 2009 that the managers were considering
“some sort of reorganization.”47 Yule agreed to keep the
meeting confidential48 Laudamiel and Capua likely did not
inform Matthew of the meeting,49 although Capua did inform
Matthew that he had discussed the management problems
with Yule at some point.50 The evidence suggests that
Matthew did not authorize his co-members to discuss the
internal separation discussions with Yule and attempted to
keep them confidential himself.51
*5  Adding to the tension was a string of disappointing test
results. Matthew highlights a failed round of testing, of which
Yule notified Laudamiel and Capua on January 21, 2010.52 In
his email, Yule suggested,
One option is for you guys to use the EF[E]T option as
a bargaining chip in your negotiations with [Matthew], If
we agree that it is not a suitable technology for HVAC
applications, then perhaps you should offer the license to
[Matthew] as his share of Aeosphere, allowing him to leave
without the need for an additional financial pay-off?53
The next day, in response to emails from Capua about conflict
with Matthew, Yule expressed his “100% commit[ment]”
to Laudamiel and Capua.54 He not only agreed to conceal
his knowledge of “how serious matters had become”55 but
also represented that “[a]ny contact [he may] have with
[Matthew] during this time will purely be on the basis
that it may help [Laudamiel and Capua].”56 Yule admits
that he favored Laudamiel (and Capua), as Laudamiel's
skills were more valuable to the business arrangement (at
least going forward).57 At the same time, he intended to
“remain[ ] entirely impartial with regard to Aeosphere's
internal structural review.”58 In Yule's words, “the ideal
scenario” for FWGSA would have been for Aeosphere
to have two divisions, one with Matthew developing new
media projects and one with Laudamiel working on ambient
scenting.59
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By February 2010, if not earlier, the managers had retained
counsel and were discussing a separation of business
activities.60 On February 3, Capua asked Matthew to “discuss
our members['] current situation during our meeting,” adding
that “[b]asically we are in agreement almost in everything[,
though] we must deal with your proposal of split job and
exclusivity.”61 In that email chain, Capua refers to “the
split of the company we are evaluating,” explaining that he
“do[es] not trust [Matthew] anymore,” and ends that he will
“see if [he] can r[e]cover some money from this terrible
investment.”62 Thereafter, the managers had a board meeting,
which ended in frustration, “bang[ ]ing doors” and a hasty
exit by Matthew.63 They were unable to agree on a budget.64
A follow-up email from Matthew to Capua states, “I cannot
agree to a discussion of budget limited to a two to three
months time horizon. Our company could face financial ruin
in the meantime unless we set a responsible budget.”65
*6  In contrast, discussions among Laudamiel, Capua, and
Yule continued. Matthew focuses on a number of exchanges
over the next few months. For example, Yule, Laudamiel,
and Capua held a February 24 conference call to discuss
EFET and Prolitec.66 At that point, Laudamiel believed that
EFET was still a viable option.67 Emails from March 8
through 9 discuss pursuit of EFET and working without
interference from Matthew.68 Capua explained that they
“finally reached a preliminary agreement [to] have [Matthew]
out of the company at least for management and decision
making” but retaining a “20% share.”69 At the end of March,
Yule told a third party (then in negotiations with FWGSA
and Aeosphere) about the management dispute and that
Laudamiel and Capua “are close to concluding a deal that will
result in [Matthew] leaving the firm in the next few weeks.”70
Though his testimony was not completely consistent, Yule
stated in his deposition that he understood the negotiations to
be confidential.71 He told the third party contact, “[Matthew]
is not aware that you and 1 have already spoken and 1 would
prefer to maintain that impression during our call.”72
Regardless whether the conflict was a result of mutual
negotiation (as alleged by Defendants) or a conspiracy to oust
him (as alleged by Plaintiff), April emails reflect growing
pressure on Matthew to resolve the conflict. On one hand, the
correspondence appears to show some movement toward an
arrangement where the co-CEOs could avoid deadlock, such
as by making Capua the new CEO and allowing Matthew
and Laudamiel to pursue their respective fields.73 In one
chain dated April 13, Capua explained that he was “done on
financing [A]eosphere unless thing[s] change[d]” but that he
was “trying the impossible to fix th[e] company.”74 Around
one week later, Capua told Matthew that “[i]f everything
is ok we can meet to finalize and sign [documents]” after
discussing a “few little points.”75
On the other hand, there is ample evidence that Matthew
saw only part of the picture. Notably, Laudamiel suggested
on April 22 that Yule send an email, during the period of
negotiations, to help his ability to work free from Matthew's
“manipulations and ... arrogance.”76 Laudamiel's suggestion
resulted in an email (also dated April 22) in which Yule stated,
“I am fearful that unless matters are quickly resolved, then I
will be told to wind up [FWGSA's] involvement in the scent
project.”77 Matthew promptly followed up with a private
phone call to Yule78 and an email request that Yule “consider
sending a follow up message” that properly reflects his value
to Aeosphere.79 The next day, Matthew emailed Capua to
“terminate discussions of an alternative arrangement, unless
it were to buy you and Christophe out of the company.”80
At this point (or shortly thereafter), Defendants say, the
communication broke down.81
*7  Capua and Matthew exchanged a few emails after April
23, in which Matthew reminded Capua that they “have
responsibility to act according to [their] company's amended
operating agreement.”82 Laudamiel forwarded Yule certain
April 23 emails sent by Matthew rejecting Capua's suggestion
to become CEO—apparently at Yule's request83 and against
Matthew's instructions about confidentiality.84 On April 27,
Yule sent an email to Matthew making clear that FWGSA
considered Laudamiel the critical business partner and that
he needed to inform his board of the conflict.85 That email
expressed a hope that “peace” would be achieved but also
“implore[d] [Matthew] to quickly identify a way in which
the business can be divisionalised or if necessary separated,
in order for all parties to move forward.”86 Yule hoped the
email would be helpful to Laudamiel and Capua,87 but did
not discuss his concerns with Margrita.88 In an April 29 reply,
Matthew explained to Yule that Aeosphere, as a team, was
committed to working with FWGSA.89
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Capua claims that he consulted counsel and decided, around
May 3, to hold an emergency meeting on May 4 to wind
up the company.90 Yet on April 28 and 29, Laudamiel wrote
emails to Yule discussing a “Commando Operation” and
“DDay.”91 It is equally clear that Laudamiel was anticipating
an important event (at a minimum, withdrawing money from
Aeosphere's bank accounts92) and that Yule had no idea what
Laudamiel meant.93 On April 29 and 30, Laudamiel took over
$145,000 from Aeosphere's account, of which $70,000 was
distributed to Action 1.94 Matthew was only given a day's
notice of the emergency meeting.95 Attached to the email
notice was an agenda setting forth dissolution and winding-
up as the top item on the list.96
Matthew did not attend the May 4 meeting.97 Regardless,
Laudamiel and Capua took a vote “to cease operations,
wind up the affairs of the Company and dissolve as soon
as is practical in order to preserve important Company
rights and avoid further Company liabilities.”98 Votes were
taken to terminate Matthew's employment, and Laudamiel
was placed in charge of overseeing Aeosphere's winding
up and liquidation.99 Capua understood that he was putting
himself at risk of a lawsuit for breach of the LLC
Agreement.100 Laudamiel also understood that Matthew had
some rights under the LLC Agreement.101 In letters of that
same date, Laudamiel assigned himself equipment in the
Berlin office and “scents, scent formulas, scent conventions
and annotations and test designs” and assigned Matthew
equipment in the London office and “rights to the libretto of
the ScentOpera ‘Green Aria.’ ”102
*8  Laudamiel emailed Yule that same day, informing him
that it was “GAME OVER” and that he and Capua would
soon “be back up and running, AND FREE.”103 The next
day, Yule emailed Battelle to assure it of FWGSA's continued
“commitment to the development of scenting solutions for
HVAC applications.”104 By that time, FWGSA and other
entities with business ties had received notice that Aeosphere
was in the process of winding up.105 Yule explained at
trial that he sent this email because he was interested in “a
license that [he] may be able to sell to somebody else.”106
However, Matthew observes that there were contractual
barriers, including Battelle's consent and potential rights of
Aeosphere.107 Laudamiel formed DreamAir on May 7, but
must have planned for this entity in advance, judging from the
documents filed that day.108 On May 10, Matthew emailed
Yule to inform him that “[Matthew's] partners in Aeosphere
LLC[ ] have taken steps to dissolve the company” unlawfully
and that he intended “to protect [his] rights and interest.”109
Laudamiel caused the filing of Aeosphere's certificate of
cancellation on May 12, 2010110 and forwarded a copy to
Yule.111 At the time of dissolution and winding up, Aeosphere
had $21,000 in its bank account.112
D. Post–Winding Up Events
One day after receiving the certificate, Yule informed Battelle
that he invited Laudamiel (who “remain[ed] a passionate
supporter of EF[E]T”) and Capua to join their conference
call regarding EFET.113 The email expressed a willingness of
Capua and Laudamiel to fund further testing efforts, including
by sending a Battelle engineer to FWGSA's testing facility in
Sweden.114
The next set of communication Matthew highlights involves
a July 28 email from Capua seeking clarification on the
business relationship between DreamAir and FWGSA: “[W]e
really need to understand how our relationship is going to
start.”115 He continued, “I know that you are very busy in
more important issue[s] that involve your company but please
do not forget about us.”116 Yule replied that his “assumption
has been that DreamAir will simply inherit the terms of the
agreement previously in place with Aeosphere” but that “[a]s
[they] will initially be primarily working with the Prolitec
equipment, [FWGSA's] margins will be far smaller.”117 Yule
sent DreamAir a draft Collaboration Agreement in October
2010118 and encouraged Laudamiel to sign.119 Changes
included provisions allowing them “to revisit all of the
substantive clauses at a later date.”120 They never formalized
the contract.121 Ultimately, DreamAir sold Prolitec units and
Prolitec scents.122
E. Procedural Posture
This litigation has a long history. Matthew filed his original
claim in November 2010 against Laudamiel, Capua, Action
1, FWGSA, and SEMCO.123 In February 2012, the Court
dismissed claims against SEMCO and FWGSA for lack
of personal jurisdiction and certain counterclaims filed by
Laudamiel, Capua, and Action l.124 The Supreme Court later
reversed that decision in part, finding that the Court had
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personal jurisdiction over FWGSA based on the conspiracy
theory of personal jurisdiction.125 Matthew added DreamAir
and FWL in later amended complaints. He moved for
partial summary judgment on claims for breach of the
LLC Agreement and conversion, which led to a June 2012
opinion generally denying the motion.126 However, the Court
explained that, “unless the Manager Defendants prevail on
one of their affirmative defenses or Matthew is unable to
prove that he suffered any damages, [Laudamiel and Capua]
will be liable for a breach of § 5.2.6(b)(iii) of the LLC
Agreement” by winding up Aeosphere without Matthew's
approval.127
*9  Capua and Action 1 reached a settlement with Matthew,
and all relevant claims against them were dismissed with
prejudice in April 2014.128 One condition of the settlement
was Capua's agreement to cease funding Laudamiel and
DreamAir's legal representation.129 Counsel for Laudamiel
withdrew as of April 10, 2014,130 and Laudamiel proceeded
as a self-represented litigant. One month later, the Court
granted default judgment against DreamAir.131 Before trial,
the Court granted summary judgment on one of Laudamiel's
counterclaims, finding that Matthew had not materially
breached the LLC Agreement.132 The Court granted
FWGSA's motion for summary judgment on Matthew's unjust
enrichment claims but denied the attempt to dismiss the other
claims against FWGSA.133
II. CONTENTIONS
By the time of trial, Matthew maintained breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and unjust enrichment
claims against Laudamiel; aiding and abetting and tortious
interference with contract claims against FWGSA; and
civil conspiracy claims against Laudamiel, FWGSA, and
DreamAir.134 Laudamiel's counterclaims for non-material
breach of contract135 and for breach of fiduciary duty
remained as well. Laudamiel did not participate in post-
trial briefing, but he did appear for trial and post-trial
argument. Waiver generally operates to bar issues not
briefed. Nonetheless, the Court is aware of the difficulties
of proceeding as a self-represented litigant and will consider
FWGSA's arguments in determining whether Matthew has
met his burdens to establish his claims and right to recovery.
Matthew's claims against Laudamiel, while differing
in technical elements, largely seek to hold Laudamiel
accountable for winding up Aeosphere and pursuing its
business without him. Matthew points to earlier opinions
effectively finding Laudamiel liable for breach of contract
with respect to winding up and employment termination.
Matthew also alleges that Laudamiel contravened the LLC
Agreement's confidentiality provision. The conversion claim,
too, is based on violation of the LLC Agreement (in winding
up), although this contractual violation is argued to have
breached Delaware's LLC Act. The fiduciary duty claims
point to a self-interested effort to misappropriate the benefits
of Aeosphere resulting in violations and injury broader
than that addressed by the LLC Agreement. Matthew's
unjust enrichment claim is similarly based on a scheme
to “usurp[ ] Aeosphere's assets and opportunities for
[Laudamiel's] personal benefit.”136 The conspiracy claims
against Laudamiel (and DreamAir and FWGSA) are said to
have foundation in the above theories.137 Matthew attacks
Laudamiel's counterclaims by claiming a lack of breach,
simple disagreement, and lack of demonstrable, material
harm.
*10  FWGSA attempts to frame the dispute such that the
LLC Agreement governs all potential recovery. Laudamiel's
argument perhaps is best described as an effort to clarify and
explain his conduct. He did not analyze the legal elements
of Matthew's claims or his own counterclaims. Matthew's
arguments in reply emphasize waiver.
The theories of liability remaining against FWGSA are aiding
and abetting, tortious interference, and civil conspiracy. With
respect to the aiding and abetting claims, Matthew argues
that Laudamiel breached his duty of loyalty by favoring
personal interests, failing to deal candidly with Matthew,
sharing confidential information with business partners,
improperly winding up Aeosphere, terminating Matthew, and
generally engaging in a scheme to remove Matthew and take
Aeosphere's “most valuable assets” for his own business.138
According to Matthew, there is enough evidence (direct
and circumstantial) to find that FWGSA (through Yule)
“knowingly facilitated Mr. Laudamiel's breach of trust,”139 or
engaged in a scheme to push Matthew out of Aeosphere and
misappropriate the Company's assets. Matthew further draws
on a number of emails to illustrate the breadth of Defendants'
actions and the harm he suffered. FWGSA attacks the
aiding and abetting claims by arguing that Laudamiel acted
in the best interests of Aeosphere,140 that contract claims
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supersede the fiduciary duty claims, that FWGSA did not
knowingly act to facilitate a breach by Laudamiel, and that no
damages resulted from any breach. While directly attacking
the elements of the claims, FWGSA also explains Yule's
actions in the overall business context.
Matthew's tortious interference claims similarly draw on
direct and circumstantial evidence. The focus here, though,
is on Yule's knowledge of Matthew's employment agreement
and the LLC Agreement and his actions encouraging violation
of those contracts. Matthew alleges that FWGSA is liable
in tort because Yule encouraged Capua and Laudamiel's
breaches, knowing that Matthew was a co-CEO of Aeosphere
and having notice of the LLC Agreement (the latter, two
days before the certificate of cancellation was filed). On the
other hand, FWGSA asserts that Matthew's claims must fail
because FWGSA did not know of “both the [LLC Agreement
and the employment] contract[s] and the specific provision[s]
allegedly interfered with,”141 no act of FWGSA caused a
breach, the Collaboration Agreement justified FWGSA's acts,
and Matthew suffered no damages.
Finally, on the civil conspiracy claims, Matthew describes
a conspiracy “for the ultimate purpose of misappropriating
Aeosphere's assets to Mr. Matthew's exclusion, actions
which were not limited to (but pre-dated and post-dated)
the Company's winding up.”142 He bases the claims on
Laudamiel's breach of fiduciary duty, conversion (as a
statutory violation), and unjust enrichment and adds that
the direct and circumstantial evidence presented at trial
is sufficient to establish the conspiracy. FWGSA responds
that the claims against it must fail because, similar to the
aiding and abetting claims, it did not knowingly participate.
It disputes the showing of any tort and explains that the
members of Aeosphere made the consequential decisions,
including the one to wind up Aeosphere.
*11  Matthew's claims for damages rest on the value of
his interest in Aeosphere and the value of his employment
agreement. With respect to Aeosphere, the parties primarily
debate whether a discounted cash flow or liquidation
approach better accounts for its value and, if using
the former, whether Aeosphere was a start-up or early
development stage company. Matthew highlights factors
such as Capua's financing commitment and Aeosphere's
low capital requirements, valuable contracts with established
companies like FWGSA, and ability to proceed whether or
not EFET materialized. In response, FWGSA emphasizes
Aeosphere's cash shortage, Capua's refusal to contribute
additional funds, the management conflict, and EFET's poor
prospects. Related debates include the reliability of the
valuation inputs, the effect of Capua's preferred units on
the calculations, and the extent to which the Court may
consider facts that post-date Aeosphere's dissolution. These
issues account for the difference between Matthew's measure
($3,184,000) and FWGSA's measure ($0) of Matthew's
ownership interest.
Additionally, Matthew contends that he should recover the
expected value of his (five-year) employment agreement
($1.4 million) because of Defendants' tortious conduct.
FWGSA counters that Matthew has not shown that the
alleged wrongful conduct caused the loss in payment. Rather,
Aeosphere had insufficient funds to continue its operations
and neither Laudamiel nor Capua was willing to act to fund
Matthew's salary. The damages dispute ends with Matthew
requesting pre-judgment interest for his opportunity costs,




For Matthew to recover, he must prove his case by a
preponderance of the evidence.144 He bears the burden
of proving that “certain evidence, when compared to the
evidence opposed to it, has the more convincing force.”145
Laudamiel's status as a self-represented litigant is afforded
some consideration, but Laudamiel chose not to submit post-
trial briefing despite inclusion in the scheduling process.146
Issues not briefed are “generally” considered waived.147
Thus, the Court deals with the claims against Laudamiel for
completeness and largely to determine FWGSA's liability.
Because Matthew needs to support his claims for damages,
FWGSA's counter-presentation will be considered broadly.
B. The Direct Claims
1. Contract Claims
Earlier opinions largely dictate the result on Matthew's
contract claims, and the Court need not belabor the point
here. In June 2012, the Court held that section 5.2.6(b)
(iii) of the LLC Agreement required a unanimous vote to
wind up Aeosphere.148 Although not specifically the subject
of that opinion, sections 5.2.6(b)(i) and (ii) fall under the
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same umbrella: a unanimous vote was required to terminate
Matthew's employment agreement and dispose Aeosphere's
assets.149 Matthew did not vote to terminate his employment
agreement, wind up Aeosphere, or divide the assets. There is
also an allegation that Laudamiel breached Section 10.10 of
the LLC Agreement, which prohibited use and disclosure of
“financial or business data, ... contracts or agreements entered
into by or on behalf of [Aeosphere,] or other proprietary
information.”150 Laudamiel undoubtedly shared information
about separation discussions with FWGSA. He sought Yule's
help to push along confidential separation negotiations. The
question then, foreshadowed in the Court's June 2012 opinion,
is whether Laudamiel “prevail[s] on one of [his] affirmative
defenses or Matthew is unable to prove that he suffered any
damages.”151
*12  The Court provided a partial answer in an October 2014
opinion, in which it found that Matthew had not committed
any material breach to excuse Laudamiel's.152 Laudamiel
maintained two counterclaims leading into trial: nonmaterial
breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.153 These
claims generally involve “(1) acting unilaterally without
approval; (2) failing to agree on or approve various contracts
or courses of action for Aeosphere; and (3) failing to
attend important meetings and events.”154 Laudamiel did not
participate in post-trial briefing, but at post-trial oral argument
he noted Matthew's failure to bring in clients as promised,
a neglect of responsibility to prepare a business plan,
and a general sentiment that Matthew “killed” projects.155
The Court acknowledges the difficulty of proceeding as a
self-represented litigant (and in a foreign language), but,
as Matthew observes, Laudamiel has neither substantiated
that the “harm” was more than legitimate disagreement
between business partners nor proved losses from Matthew's
conduct.156
The Court discusses damages below. For present purposes,
the Court observes that Matthew has only supported claims
for his ownership interest in Aeosphere and compensation
under his employment agreement.157 In his Opening Post–
Trial Brief, Matthew does mention that he “should be granted
equitable restitution for Mr. Laudamiel's unjust enrichment
(or, alternatively, the imposition of a constructive trust
over any future income Mr. Laudamiel and DreamAir will
receive by reason of their wrongful conduct).”158 His focus,
however, is on the value of his units and his employment
agreement, and he has not demonstrated enrichment beyond
the value captured by his share of Aeosphere.159 This point
is significant because Matthew cannot recover multiple times
on his various theories. The Court is satisfied that Matthew's
showing on the breach of contract claims supports any
damages that he can prove from the unlawful winding up of
Aeosphere and termination of his employment agreement.160
2. Non–Contract Claims
The Court analyzes Matthew's non-contract claims against
Laudamiel (breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and
unjust enrichment161) because of their potential impact on
FWGSA's liability. Matthew's fiduciary duty claims look to
Laudamiel's conduct over the entirety of the Aeosphere–
FWGSA relationship, with the winding up just one (though a
“critical”162) step along the way. In addition, Matthew alleges
a breach of loyalty by the very acts of improperly winding up
Aeosphere163 and failing in his “obligation to deal candidly”
with Matthew.164 FWGSA frames the dispute as one about
discrete acts associated with violations of Sections 5.2.6(b)
(i)-(iii), 9.3, and 10.10 of the LLC Agreement—namely
firing Matthew, distributing Aeosphere's assets, winding up
Aeosphere, and disclosing confidential information.165
*13  Laudamiel breached his fiduciary duties if he acted
for a purpose other than to promote the best interests of
Aeosphere.166 Except for general arguments that the scent-
related intellectual property rights he took were worthless to
Matthew167 and that it was impossible to conduct business
with Matthew, Laudamiel has not defended against Matthew's
claim of disloyalty in the winding up process, distributing
Aeosphere's assets in a way that would facilitate future
scenting work, creating DreamAir, and filing the termination
paperwork on May 12. Although the DreamAir–FWGSA
partnership did not prove profitable, the Court cannot find
that Laudamiel did not act in anticipation that it would.
Laudamiel shared confidential information and, though often
for the benefit of Aeosphere's business, some of that sharing
went toward asking for help in manipulating the negotiation
process. Matthew has met the prima facie requirements for
fiduciary duty claims. These claims remain to the extent that
they might facilitate recovery against FWGSA.168 Matthew
has not shown injury independent of that subsumed by the
contract or the fiduciary duty claims (and their indirect causes
of action discussed below), and the Court need not address
the conversion claims and the unjust enrichment claims in
detail.169
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C. The Indirect Claims
1. The Aiding and Abetting Claims
As relevant in light of the above, Matthew argues that the
evidence shows conduct “so suspect” that the Court can
find that FWGSA knowingly participated in Laudamiel's
breach of fiduciary duty.170 The elements of an aiding
and abetting claim are “(1) the existence of a fiduciary
relationship, (2) the fiduciary breached its duty, (3) a
nonfiduciary defendant knowingly participated in a breach,
and (4) damages to the plaintiff resulted from the concerted
action of the fiduciary and nonfiduciary.”171 The Court does
not require a figurative smoking gun, and knowledge can be
inferred under circumstances where conduct is particularly
suspect.172 Knowing participation requires a showing “that
the nonfiduciary act[ed] with the knowledge that the conduct
advocated or assisted constitutes such a breach.”173
*14  Matthew characterizes Yule's wrongdoing as “an
executive at ... a contractual partner of Aeosphere[ ]
interject[ing] himself into an internal dispute within the
company.”174 Matthew's analysis of Yule's knowledge,
accordingly, looks to the “overall course of conduct with
the motive and objective of removing Mr. Matthew from
Aeosphere.”175 Although parts of the story remain unclear,
the Court can find with confidence that Yule did not know
until after the May 4 vote that Capua's and Laudamiel's
actions would be improper and that early May is a proper focal
point for determining FWGSA's liability. Further discussion
of the facts is warranted, especially to explain why the Court
does not find a broad and longstanding scheme to wind up
Aeosphere.
Matthew begins his Opening Post–Trial Brief by discussing
the events of October 2009. By then, Aeosphere's members
were considering separate divisions of, and roles within,
Aeosphere. Over the following months, Matthew was
excluded from meetings and communication. By February,
Capua and Matthew were discussing a split of the company
and had retained counsel, signifying the seriousness of their
attempt to resolve the problems. An email from April 7
suggests that Matthew had decided to walk away from
negotiations, but the negotiations continued. Capua has
asserted that Matthew's April 23 email was the final straw.176
Capua claims to have consulted his counsel at that point and
to have decided to dissolve Aeosphere.
Yule, of course, played some role in the managers' dispute,
as the email record proves. Matthew did not authorize
discussions of internal affairs, but both sides asked Yule for
help to a certain degree. Yule was not opposed to working
with Matthew, although Yule stated that Laudamiel provided
more value to the collaboration. Yule also told at least one
business partner about Aeosphere's management difficulties.
On April 28, Laudamiel informed Yule about the “Commando
Operation” through an email asking for more time to review
certain terms with Prolitec and mentioning unexpectedly
“find[ing] the jungle in New York.”177 It was not until
May 10, however, only two days before the certificate of
cancellation was filed, that Yule received from Matthew
actual notice that Capua and Laudamiel possibly violated the
LLC Agreement.178
One could argue that the negotiations for a mutual
agreement on splitting Aeosphere were pretextual and
part of a bigger secret plan, of which Yule knew early
on. Nonetheless, evidence of continued business through
months of negotiations and the eventual involvement of
counsel makes Defendants' position the more probable.179 A
longstanding scheme to push someone out and steal assets
is not consistent with spending months in negotiations with
that person and notifying him of a meeting at which he
could vote in opposition.180 The July 28 email from Capua
pleading that Yule “not forget about [DreamAir]” and the
Collaboration Agreement markup offer further support. If
Capua, Laudamiel, and Yule contrived to take the Scent
Project for themselves, Capua should not have had to
implore Yule to move forward with the DreamAir–FWGSA
relationship. The agreement Yule proposed would likely not
have avoided concrete terms.
*15  At most, the Court can find that Laudamiel and
Capua formed a plan, by late April, to engage in
a “Commando Operation” of withdrawing cash181 and
calling an emergency meeting to pursue, among other
items, dissolution.182 Yule's (literally fitting) response to
the “Commando Operation” email, imagining Laudamiel
“crawling through the undergrowth in ... camo-paint,”183
suggests that he was clueless about Laudamiel's intentions
(but was trying to be socially responsive).184 That Yule was
involved in confidential communications and clearly favored
Laudamiel does not lead to a natural or probable conclusion
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that he knew about the emergency meeting and that Capua
and Laudamiel would engage in wrongful conduct.
By May 10, Yule knew that Matthew thought the winding up
had been conducted unlawfully. That said, there is no direct
evidence that Yule knew he was advocating wrongdoing by
pushing the parties to resolve their differences,185 and his
actions between May 4 and 12186 are not so suspect that the
Court can infer knowing participation in the illicit winding
up effort.187 At most, Yule emailed business partners (who
had previously received notice of the winding up on May
5), asked for documentation that Aeosphere was no longer in
business,188 and invited Laudamiel to join a conference call
(sometime between May 12 and 13).189 Yule walked the line
by expressing his opinions throughout the entire Aeosphere-
FWGSA relationship, but the evidence does not show that he
knowingly participated in a breach of fiduciary duties relating
to the winding up effort.
Admittedly, there is ample evidence that Yule conveyed
information about management conflict to a third party
and participated in discussions about management issues
to an extent unknown by (and actively concealed from)
Matthew. However, Aeosphere and its members suffered
no harm from these acts. It is likely that Yule had a
sense of the disagreement from Matthew and Laudamiel's
attempts to communicate with him on an individual basis.
Despite Matthew's attempts to keep negotiations confidential,
Matthew's yelling at Laudamiel at a Scent Opera venue was
no secret. Yule's statement to a potential third-party partner
that Matthew was soon to leave did not cause that partner
to terminate relations with either FWGSA or Aeosphere.190
If anything, the negotiations with business partners enhanced
Aeosphere's profitability. Yule explained that Laudamiel was
the more valuable co-CEO to FWGSA—a scenting project
needs a skilled perfumer—and that appears to have been true
despite Matthew's contrary personal beliefs. The Court fails
to see how Yule's repeating true information is actionable
misconduct. The emails do not say that Matthew must quit
or be fired. Yule stated that he was willing to work with both
co-CEOs. Reminding the managers that their squabbles were
hurting business is generally not objectionable. Instructing
the managers to end their relationship lawfully, in the right
context, is not necessarily wrongful.
*16  Matthew's argument that Capua and Laudamiel would
not have dissolved Aeosphere without assurance of Yule's
support, raised in the context of the tortious interference
claims, is also relevant on the point of resulting damages.191
Capua and Laudamiel clearly valued FWGSA's support, but
the inferences that can be drawn from Yule's “poor set of
words”192 do not outweigh the testimony and emails showing
independent disagreement among Aeosphere's members and
the escalation of the negotiations. Yule had expressed
support for Laudamiel since at least October and sent
his 100% commitment email in January.193 The managers
subsequently engaged in months of negotiations. Yule's
belated involvement at most accelerated the already inevitable
deterioration in Aeosphere's management relationships—it
did not cause independent harm.194 In sum, the aiding and
abetting claims fail for lack of knowing participation and
harm.
2. The Tortious Interference Claims
FWGSA's opposition to the tortious interference claims
centers around whether Yule had the requisite knowledge of
the LLC Agreement (and its particular provisions), the causal
chain, and justification. A claim for tortious interference
requires that “(1) there was a contract, (2) about which the
particular defendant knew, (3) an intentional act that was a
significant factor in causing the breach of contract, (4) the
act was without justification, and (5) it caused injury.”195
Tortious interference involves not only knowledge that a
contract exists but also intent to interfere with that contract.196
The justification element depends on factors such as:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct
interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action
of the actor and the contractual interests of the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the
interference and
(g) the relations between the parties.197
The Court evaluates tortious interference claims, including
possible justification, mindful that “some types of intentional
interference with contractual relations are a legitimate part of
doing business.”198
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Again, the Court starts with the premise that the potential
violations are disclosure of confidential information and
unlawful acts associated with winding-up, not a broad
scheme. The tortious interference analysis focuses on Yule's
knowledge of the LLC Agreement and attached employment
contract, but the relevant facts are similar to those above.
Yule had not known about the LLC Agreement (much less
that Capua and Laudamiel were violating any provision of
it) until May 10. As between the time of notice and the time
that Laudamiel filed the certificate of cancellation (two days
later), Matthew points to no act that significantly affected the
filing of the certificate of cancellation or resulted in loss to
Aeosphere, as discussed above.
*17  As previously mentioned, Matthew argues that Capua
would not have wound up Aeosphere if he did not have
Yule's commitment to work with a new business.199 For
support, Matthew quotes a deposition passage in which
Capua addressed the topic of asking Yule whether he would
be willing to work with successors to Aeosphere, where
Aeosphere would be divided into two companies led by
Matthew and Laudamiel separately. Capua also recalled
a concern that “without Flakt Woods Aeosphere would
collapse.”200 At most, such facts could support an inference
that Yule's support was significant in Capua's decision to
wind up Aeosphere. However, Capua's conduct is not at
issue, and expressing a willingness to work with two different
businesses does not show that Yule knew about the LLC
Agreement, intended a breach of that agreement, or acted
between May 10 and 12 to effectuate such a breach. If Yule's
support caused the harm of winding up Aeosphere, it would
mean that Capua and Laudamiel wasted months of their time
and legal fees in negotiations and in operating Aeosphere—
the more likely scenario is that Capua and Laudamiel grew
tired of dealing with Matthew.
With respect to the employment agreement (which was
part of the LLC Agreement), Matthew alleges that there
is enough evidence to find that Yule knew about it early
on and intentionally interfered. He cites Yule's testimony
and the Collaboration Agreement (with its amendments)
that Matthew signed as co-CEO. On the other hand, Yule
testified that he did not “know if [Matthew and Laudamiel]
were working for Aeosphere with a salary or if they were
simply shareholders and drawing dividends.”201 As FWGSA
observes, the mere existence of an employment agreement
does not permit a finding that an employee has a right to a term
of continued employment—a number of cases addressing the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing recognize a
presumption under Delaware law that employment contracts
are “at-will in nature with duration indefinite.”202 That one
can interfere without understanding the legal effect of a
contract does not negate the requirement of intending to
interfere with something in the first place. There is also no
reason to doubt Yule's position that FWGSA would have
been amenable to working with Aeosphere as two separate
companies or that he hoped that “peace” would ensue. Even
if there were some knowledge of a contract, Matthew has
failed to establish the critical element of intent to interfere
with Matthew's employment.
Additionally, FWGSA prevails on the justification element.
Yule expressed that Laudamiel's skill was more valuable to
FWGSA, a true statement, and did not make overt threats.203
He did, however, exert pressure (at times prompted by
Laudamiel), and there was some disingenuousness in his
representation that FWGSA's board would get involved. More
importantly, though, FWGSA was invested in a Collaboration
Agreement that it hoped would differentiate itself from the
competition in the air-handling market, and therefore had
a proper motive204 (and interest205) in urging its business
partner206 to resolve its management disputes. FWGSA
concedes that Yule's conduct interfered with valid contracts,
but justification does not require all factors to be met. Finally,
as noted above, the weight of the evidence is that Yule was
not the deciding factor in the winding up (although Yule
did cause some disclosure of confidential information for
which the Court has found no independent injury). The Court
cannot ignore the progression of the separation negotiations
and the value of the Scent Project to FWGSA and Aeosphere.
Therefore, for reasons of justification and lack of knowledge,
intent, and injury, the tortious interference claims fail.
3. The Conspiracy Claims
*18  FWGSA argues that the conspiracy claim must fail for
the reasons the aiding and abetting claims do: namely the
lack of a wrongful act, knowing participation, and harm.207
A claim for conspiracy requires “(1) [a] confederation or
combination of two or more persons; (2) [a]n unlawful
act done in furtherance of the conspiracy; and (3) [a]ctual
damage.”208 Because “a plaintiff often cannot produce direct
evidence of a conspiracy,” circumstantial evidence can be
offered as “ ‘proof that it occurred.’ ”209 Without rehashing
the arguments above, the claims of FWGSA's involvement
in a “conspiracy” of breaching confidentiality or excluding
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Matthew fail as against FWGSA because either (1) no act
of Yule was in furtherance of winding up Aeosphere or
(2) no actual losses resulted. There was no “confederation”
involving FWGSA regarding dissolution, winding up, and
terminating Matthew's employment agreement—Yule did not
know about Capua and Laudamiel's plans until after their acts
had occurred (and he did not cause any harm once he had
notice of potential wrongdoing). The exchange of confidential
information did not produce any quantifiable harm to
Aeosphere or Matthew. In contrast, Matthew succeeds on his
claim against DreamAir. Laudamiel acted to form DreamAir
before Aeosphere's certificate of cancellation was filed,
and (anyway) default judgment has been entered against
DreamAir. The breaches of fiduciary duty by Laudamiel (at
a minimum) support holding DreamAir responsible for the
damages, discussed below, on equal footing with Laudamiel.
Thus, Matthew's conspiracy claims succeed to the extent that
he can recover (once) for his injury.
D. Damages
Based on the above, Matthew maintains claims for damages
against Laudamiel and DreamAir but not FWGSA. Matthew
seeks compensation for the value of his ownership interest
in Aeosphere (the “remedy for conversion of ... Matthew's
Aeosphere membership units”210) and his employment
agreement (the remedy for “a breach that was tortiously
encouraged ... by FWGSA”211). According to Matthew, these
damages total $4,584,000 plus interest. Matthew must prove
that he is entitled to this amount to attain his full recovery,
although the Court views its task as analogous to an appraisal
and will exercise discretion in determining the appropriate
valuation.212
A few preliminary issues should be addressed. First, the
Court declines to balance the qualifications of the expert
witnesses, Kevin Vannucci (“Vannucci”) for Matthew and
G. Matt Barberich, Jr. (“Barberich”) for FWGSA, other than
to note that they were sufficient to present opinions at trial.
Second, the parties do not argue that the LLC Agreement
offers a standard for determining damages for a breach,
although Section 9.3 governs how payments are to be made
after dissolution. Third, consistent with an appraisal, the
Court does not factor in events or facts unknowable as of the
relevant date for valuation purposes, here May 12, 2010.213
Finally, the Court has not sought out the details of Matthew's
settlement with Capua, but Matthew cannot recover twice for
the same harm.
Amidst the debate over whether Aeosphere should be
considered a going concern or should be treated as if it
had been liquidated,214 the Court is convinced that neither
side's account presents the entire story. If Aeosphere were
worthless, it does not make sense that Laudamiel would
specifically assign himself intellectual property and continue
to work on a modified version of the Scent Project. On the
other hand, the EFET system was not marketable by May
2010, reducing Aeosphere's potential for profitability.
*19  The entirety of the financial and other evidence
demonstrates that Aeosphere was in dire financial straits.
The Company could not even afford to pay Matthew and
Laudamiel, its own co-CEOs, given its inadequate cash flow.
The business continued to suffer as the co-CEOs failed to
cooperate. Further, Aeosphere had considerable debt and at
best a suboptimal product to sell. No evidence existed of
any potential investor other than Capua, and by all accounts
Capua refused to commit additional capital.215 Finally, if
one makes the generous assumption that Aeosphere's cash
bum rate was $30,000 per month (based in part on the co-
CEOs foregoing salaries),216 its bank account would have
sustained operations for only another five to six months.
There was some subjective optimism about EFET, though
successful adaption of the technology to the commercial
context was far from certain and never in fact materialized. As
mentioned, Vannucci's cash flow projections assumed a viable
EFET product, and were prepared by individuals motivated
to promote Aeosphere. For these reasons, the Court cannot
adopt Vannucci's valuation wholesale.
The liquidation approach is also imperfect because it does
not address the Court's concerns about the distribution
of Aeosphere's assets—particularly its intangible assets.
Barberich's analysis worked off of the closing balance sheet
in Vannucci's report,217 and the value of the Scent Project was
not included in the balance sheet.218
As noted above, Aeosphere was running on fumes, and
hindsight proves that the Scent Project (never able to use
EFET) was not profitable. At the time of the winding up,
however, Aeosphere, despite its troubles, was a going concern
with value in its intellectual property and potentially lucrative
contracts with well-established entities such as FWGSA.
Recognizing that Aeosphere had some value as a going
concern, but mindful of the speculative nature of Aeosphere's
product and future cash flows, the Court adopts Vannucci's
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discounted cash flow model with a reduced enterprise value
and allocates a 35% interest to Matthew.
Vannucci, in his valuation, utilized venture capital rates of
return for purposes of selecting a discount rate.219 In making
this selection, Vannucci's first task was to classify Aeosphere
into one of five stages of development, each of which is
designated a distinct range of potential discount rates220
The first stage, a start-up stage investment, is one in which
“[t]he venture funding is to be used substantially for product
development, prototype testing, and test marketing.”221 The
second stage, an early development stage investment, is one
“made in companies that have developed prototypes that
appear viable and for which further technical risk is deemed
minimal.”222
In classifying Aeosphere, the Court considers the following
facts: First, Aeosphere had been in business for over a
year, had contracts of value, and held some expectation that
the Prolitec technology would suffice until EFET became
marketable. Second, the parties were clearly interested in
EFET, and Laudamiel and Capua did not just walk away
from Aeosphere. Third, while Vannucci's valuation utilized
projected cash flows assuming a viable EFET technology, the
Court's calculation considers EFET a mere expectancy and
assumes use of the then-viable Prolitec technology.223 Given
these facts, Aeosphere can reasonably be considered an early
development stage company. The Court, therefore, adopts
Vannucci's discount rates—40% for the FWGSA projections
and 50% for the Aeosphere projections—both of which fall
within the range of acceptable rates for an early development
stage company.224
*20  Vannucci's free cash flow inputs, however, assumed
a viable EFET technology, and were therefore inflated.225
To compensate, the Court, in its independent valuation,
reduced the free cash flows to one-fifth of their projected
value.226 This reduction is consistent with Yule's testimony
regarding the value of the scenting project absent viable
EFET technology.227 Yule, however, further stated that if
the Prolitec relationship was not exclusive (which it was
not228), the projections “would drop again by a factor of
about ten.”229 In hindsight, therefore, the adjusted projections
could reasonably be reduced to as little as two percent of the
originals.230
The Court's decision to reduce the projected free cash flows to
one-fifth, as opposed to some lesser value between one-fifth
and one-fiftieth, is deliberate. At the time of the valuation,
the EFET technology lingered as a possibility. Therefore, the
projected free cash flow, while assuming the use of Prolitec
technology, must also incorporate the expected value of the
EFET technology as of the time of the valuation. The Court
incorporates such value by reducing the projected free cash
flows by the minimum factor suggested by Yule, as opposed
to reducing them further given the lack of an exclusive
agreement with Prolitec.231 The possibility that EFET-based
products could be ready to sell within a year of a successful
test is further counterbalanced by the improbability that the
co-managers would have outlasted the testing.
Applying the 40% and 50% discount rates respectively
to FWGSA's and Aeosphere's adjusted free cash flow
projections results in a weighted232 value of $1,908,066.56
for the Scent Project233 Accounting for cash and cash
equivalents, working capital, and non-operating assets234
brings Aeosphere's enterprise value to $1,405,256.56. The
total value of Matthew's 35% share, treating all units equally,
is therefore $491,839.79. Capua's preferred units had a
liquidation preference and a preferred return, but the Court
cannot find with confidence that those rights should be
afforded any material value: the winding up was wrongful and
the prospect of repayment in the face of Aeosphere's many
struggles is too speculative. Matthew had a 35% interest in
Aeosphere and the right not to have it wound up without his
approval. Although it is difficult to discern the value of an
idea, and reasonable minds could disagree, the Court reaches
this result with some level of comfort.
*21  Matthew appears to base his claim for damages from his
employment contract on tortious interference. He has failed
to prove that claim against FWGSA, but the question of
Laudamiel's and DreamAir's liability lingers. Matthew argues
that he should receive the remainder of his pay under his
five-year contract because the remedy for a tort is what he
expected, not simply what Aeosphere would have paid. The
Court rejects this argument because Matthew's compensation
was not reduced by any wrongful act; Matthew's employment
contract had a five-year term, but Matthew and Laudamiel
had been deferring salaries since at least May 2009.235 Capua
and Laudamiel likely would not have authorized additional
payments, and Matthew has not provided a basis for the
Court to find that Aeosphere's cash flow would improve.
Importantly, the Court's willingness to accept a discounted
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cash flow valuation in the first place rests in part on the co-
CEOs' willingness to forgo compensation so that Aeosphere
could remain a going concern236 Thus, Matthew has not
demonstrated that he is separately entitled to damages for the
termination of his employment contract.
E. Other Matters
If the implementing order establishes that DreamAir owes any
amount to Matthew, it shall respond to the motion to compel.
Matthew has not provided a basis for shifting attorneys' fees
to overcome the American Rule. Pre-judgment interest and
post-judgment interest compounded quarterly at the statutory
rate fairly compensate Matthew.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court awards Matthew
$491,839.79 from Laudamiel and DreamAir for the unlawful
winding up of Aeosphere, subject to a determination of the
effect of the Capua and Action 1 settlement reached by
Matthew.237 The interested parties shall address this issue.
Judgment will be entered in favor of FWGSA and FWL and
against Matthew.238
Entry of an implementing order will await, in the absence of
a request from any party, a conclusion regarding the effect of
the earlier settlement.
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to have some clarity. The clock is ticking and 1 am fearful that unless matters are quickly resolved, then I will be told
to wind up our involvement in the scent project. So if you could provide me with a little information, I would be grateful.
It is also clear that the internal issues are becoming increasingly apparent to our other partners. The guys at Battelle
have made several informal comments to me, such as “the guys at Aeosphere seem to have lost interest” and
“Christophe's lost his fire[.]”[ ] Christophe—they have always placed great store on your reputation and expertise....
Id. Laudamiel's suggestion was,
Without of course interfering in internal Aeosphere matters[ ], you will understand that the special position of [FWGSA]
makes me nervous not to hear a new plan when the clock is ticking, so if you could provide me with a little information,
I would be very grateful. Know also no matter how hard you try to conceal it, people such as Battelle did feel something
was not going round in the past phone conferences, for instance that Christophe is losing his usual passion and flame,
and that worries people because this is key for Aeosphere.
JX 122 at FWGSA 009916.
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Matthew points out that the Collaboration Agreement did not allow FWGSA to terminate for ten years—although winding
up Aeosphere presented another way out. Pl.'s Opening Post–Trial Br. 14 n.7.
78 Trial Tr. vol. II, 488–89 (Yule).
79 JX 38.
80 JX 42 at SM031529.
81 Capua Dep. 154–55 (“[A]fter [Matthew] ... closed down the negotiations with no reason to me.... I decided this was the
only solution.”); see also Trial Tr. vol. IV, 836–37 (Laudamiel) (describing the period around April 22 and explaining that
he and Capua “were running out of solutions, suggestions, to Mr. Matthew”); Oral Arg. Tr. 67–69, 76–77.
82 JX 42 at SM031528.
83 JX 123 at FWGSA 009985. Yule did not “recall having any concern about confidentiality at the time.” Trial Tr. vol. III,
619–20 (Yule).
84 JX 123 at FWGSA 009986.
85 JX 44 at FWGSA 066884.
86 JX 124 at FWGSA 010053.
87 Id.
88 Trial Tr. vol. IV, 932–33 (Margrita).
89 JX 125.
90 See Capua Dep. 150–51 (explaining that he spoke with counsel before making his “decision to call th[e] meeting” and
that he “probably” did not know about calling the meeting until May 3).
91 JX 158 at FWGSA 010215.
92 Laudamiel admitted that he knew of the emergency meeting and dissolution vote by (at least) late April or early May.
See Trial Tr. vol. III, 721–24 (Laudamiel). The Court notes that Laudamiel and Capua could, in theory, vote on the matter
without violating the LLC Agreement; it was the subsequent action in accordance with the non-unanimous vote that
breached the LLC Agreement.
93 See Trial Tr. vol. II, 505–06 (Yule); Trial Tr. vol. III, 707, 756–57 (Laudamiel).
94 JX 111; Trial Tr. vol. III, 707, 709–11, 715–20 (Laudamiel).
95 JX 109 (email about the emergency meeting); JX 110 (noting that Matthew had “acknowledged receipt of” the information).
96 JX 109.
97 JX 110 at LCA 001576.
98 Id.
99 Id. at LCA 001576–77.
100 Capua Dep. 166–68.
101 See Trial Tr. vol. III, 704–05 (Laudamiel).
102 JX 110 at LCA 001580–81.
103 82 JX 126.
104 JX 159 at FWGSA 010272 (“Please be aware that this has no impact on Fläkt Woods' commitment to the development
of scenting solutions.... I do not expect it will be long before Christophe is once again in a position to lend his technical
and creative support to this process.”).
105 See id. at FWGSA 010272–73.
106 Trial Tr. vol. III, 626 (Yule).
107 Pl.'s Opening Post-Trial Br. 22 (citing JX 5 at FWGSA_000007, FWGSA_000009; JX 6 § 4).
108 JX 240; Trial Tr. vol. III, 737–45 (Laudamiel) (questioning Laudamiel about the events surrounding the filing).
109 JX 48 at FWGSA 096730.
110 JX 405.
111 JX 129 (informing Yule that “[t]he Dissolution documents were signed yesterday and filed today with the State of
Delaware”).
112 See JX 434 at Schedule 7 (closing balance sheet).
113 JX 161 at FWGSA 010391.
114 Id.; Trial Tr. vol. III, 747 (Laudamiel).
115 JX 162 at FWGSA 010618.
116 Id.
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117 Id. at FWGSA 010617.
118 See JX 163 (draft agreement).
119 JX 168 at FWGSA 007007; Trial Tr. vol. III, 642 (Yule).
120 Trial Tr. vol. III, 679–81 (Yule); see also JX 163 at FWGSA 003692–93.
121 Trial Tr. vol. II, at 529–31 (Yule).
122 See JX 199 (sales summary); Trial Tr. vol. III, 758 (Laudamiel) (“We were nowhere near, and I want to say one or two
years away from actually having a [custom] scent sold in a Prolitec device.”).
123 Verified Compl. ¶¶ 7–11.
124 Matthew v. Laudamiel, 2012 WL 605589 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2012); see also Matthew v. Laudamiel, 2012 WL 983142
(Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 2012), rev'd sub nom. Matthew v. Fläkt Woods Gp. SA, 56 A.3d 1023 (Del.2012).
125 Matthew v. Fläkt Woods Gp. SA, 56 A.3d 1023 (Del.2012).
126 Matthew v. Laudamiel, 2012 WL 2580572 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012).
127 Id. at *8.
128 Stipulation and [Proposed] Order of Partial Dismissal, Apr. 10, 2014.
129 See Mot. of Defs. Christophe Laudamiel, Roberto Capua, Action 1 SRL, and DreamAir LLC to Withdraw Appearances
of Their Att'ys of Record and for Stay of Case Management Schedule ¶ 3, Mar. 21, 2014.
130 Order Granting Mot. to Withdraw Appearances of Gregory V. Varallo and Kevin M. Gallagher of Richards, Layton &
Finger, and Roger E. Barton and Randall L. Rasey of Barton LLP, Apr. 10, 2014.
131 Matthew v. Laudamiel, 2014 WL 2152353 (Del. Ch. May 22, 2014).
132 Matthew v. Laudamiel, 2014 WL 5499989 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2014).
133 Matthew v. Laudamiel, 2014 WL 5904716, at *4 (Del. Ch. Nov. 12, 2014).
134 Pl.’s Opening Post-Trial Br. 2.
135 While the Court in Matthew v. Laudamiel, 2014 WL 5499989 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2014) dismissed Laudamiel's material
breach counterclaims, id. at *2, it “[did] not dismiss claims for non-material breach which, perhaps, could justify minimal
or nominal damages.” Id. at *2 n.11. Laudamiel only sought to allege claims of material breach, but those claims fell short
of material breach, arguably remaining after summary judgment as claims for non-material breach.
136 Pl.'s Opening Post–Trial Br. 35.
137 Pl.'s Post–Trial Reply Br. 27 (identifying breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and unjust enrichment in support of the
conspiracy claims).
138 Pl.'s Opening Post–Trial Br. 31–32.
139 Id. at 37.
140 At oral argument, FWGSA offered that Laudamiel's conduct before winding up Aeosphere (such as engaging in
communications without Matthew) should not be evaluated as interested transactions because there was no associated
financial benefit. Oral Arg. Tr. 82–83.
141 Defs.' Post–Trial Answering Br. 39.
142 Pl.'s Opening Post–Trial Br. 43.
143 Counsel for FWGSA suggested some distinction between a traditional liquidation methodology and its expert's approach.
Oral Arg. Tr. 101 (“I don't think [the expert] was really performing a liquidation analysis. What he did was to say, ‘I don't
think this is a going concern.’ ”). Because the expert's approach assumed Aeosphere was not a going concern and for
simplicity and convenience, the Court nonetheless refers to this approach as the liquidation approach.
144 See Estate of Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 2009 WL 2586783, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 20, 2009) (“Typically, in a post-
trial opinion, the court evaluates the parties' claims using a preponderance of the evidence standard.”), aff'd, 991 A.2d
1153 (Del.2010).
145 In re Mobilactive Media, LLC, 2013 WL 297950, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
146 See Oral Arg. Tr. 3–5.
147 See Del. Transit Corp. v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 842, 34 A.3d 1064, 1068 n.4 (Del.2011).
148 Matthew v. Laudamiel, 2012 WL 2580572, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012).
149 Id. (“The only reasonable interpretation of § 5.2.6(b) is that it required the approval of all three Managers to approve
the enumerated actions.”).
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150 LLC Agreement § 10.10. In the Pretrial Stipulation and Order, Matthew raised the question of whether the emergency
meeting was properly called. Stip. § III.A ¶ 4. This issue was not developed in the post-trial briefing, and any violation
would not materially affect Matthew's recovery.
151 Matthew v. Laudamiel, 2012 WL 2580572, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 29, 2012). The Court declined to grant Matthew's motion
for summary judgment on his conversion claim (based on breach of the LLC Agreement) for the same reasons. Id. at *11.
152 Matthew v. Laudamiel, 2014 WL 5499989 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2014).
153 Def. Christophe Laudamiel's Verified Answer to Fourth Am. Verified Compl. and Countercls. ¶¶ 111–18.
154 Matthew v. Laudamiel, 2014 WL 5499989, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2014).
155 Oral Arg. Tr. 108–09. He also briefly mentioned that Matthew would discuss projects with Yule alone, but he “had no
problem with [that].” Id. at 107.
156 See Pl.'s Opening Post–Trial Br. 56–57 (incorporating Pl.'s Opening Pre–Trial Br. 28–33, 56–59).
157 The Joint Pre–Trial Stipulation and Order asks for an injunction against use of Aeosphere's assets, an order for an
accounting, a constructive trust, and attorneys' fees and costs. Matthew does not seriously develop these claims in his
post-trial briefing. Furthermore, Matthew has not convinced the Court to award attorneys' fees against Laudamiel, a self-
represented litigant.
158 Pl.'s Opening Post–Trial Br. 35.
159 Cf. Pl.'s Opening Pre–Trial Br. 52 (“To the extent the Court may find after trial that Mr. Matthew cannot adequately be
compensated by an award of damages, equitable restitution for unjust enrichment is appropriate.” (emphasis added)). An
award of damages accounting for the value of the intellectual property taken should adequately compensate Matthew.
160 The argument for different remedies for tort and contract is discussed in the context of damages, infra.
161 The conspiracy claims are said to rest on these three underlying claims and are addressed in more detail in connection
with the claims against FWGSA.
162 Pl.'s Post–Trial Reply Br. 1.
163 Id. at 25 n.6.
164 Pl.'s Opening Post-Trial Br. 31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
165 See, e.g., Defs.' Post–Trial Answering Br. 35–36 (arguing that the contract claims bar the fiduciary duty claims); id. at
44 n.7 (noting “the primacy of contract theory”).
166 “The duty of loyalty mandates that the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes precedence over any
interest possessed by a director, officer or controlling shareholder and not shared by the stockholders generally.” In re
Orchard Enters., Inc. S'holder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch.2014) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Although Laudamiel was a director of an LLC, no one disputes that he owed fiduciary duties to Aeosphere.
167 Oral Arg. Tr. 111-12.
168 The Court is not deciding that every breach of contract that involves some planning or discussion supports a fiduciary
duty claim. The facts here show months of discussions, combined with potential pecuniary interests. These claims might
have been dismissed if Laudamiel had retained an attorney, but the Court will not act on such speculation.
169 The conversion claim involves unlawfully depriving Matthew of his units, covered by damages the Court will award for the
violation of LLC Agreement § 5.2.6(b)(iii). The Court notes, without deciding, that it seems circular to find an independent
statutory claim for violating a contract, based on the LLC Act's facilitation of private ordering. See Pl.'s Opening Post–
Trial Br. 34 (invoking 6 Del. C. § 18–801(a)(1)-(2)).
The unjust enrichment claims were based on “the unlawful winding up of Aeosphere, which represented the culmination
of ... [the] scheme ... to remove Mr. Matthew ..., for the purpose of usurping Aeosphere's assets and opportunities for
[Laudamiel's] benefit,” rather than an injury independent of that already discussed. Id. at 35. See also supra note 159.
170 Pl.'s Opening Post–Trial Br. 37.
171 Triton Constr. Co. v. E. Shore Elec. Servs., Inc., 2009 WL 1387115, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 18, 2009), aff'd, 988 A.2d 938
(Del.2010) (TABLE).
172 Id.
173 Id. As the Court explains in a footnote in Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp., the requirement to show
knowledge in an aiding and abetting claim is important to “facilitate[ ] the commercial interaction of corporate entities.” 965
A.2d 715, 747 n.88 (Del. Ch.2008). The alternative would produce an undesirable result: “whether a particular act by a
board constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty is highly context specific, such third-parties would have to undertake extensive
due diligence in order to assure themselves that the board had not breached a duty in authorizing the transaction.” Id.
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174 Oral Arg. Tr. 16. Matthew also specifies that Yule went too far by “assisting one side in that dispute, ... facilitating their
knowledge, [and] creating an imbalance in the knowledge between Mr. Matthew and the adverse parties.” Id. at 23.
175 Id. at 20.
176 Id. at 76–77; JX 39.
177 JX 158 at FWGSA 010215. Laudamiel contends that the dissolution decision came in May, Oral Arg. Tr. 106, but a
privilege log entry discussed at trial suggests that Laudamiel was aware of a preliminary agenda for the emergency
meeting by April 29. Trial Tr. vol. III, 712–14 (Laudamiel).
178 Oral Arg. Tr. 87–88; JX 48 at FWGSA 096730.
179 Matthew argues that the Court can infer knowledge or rely on circumstantial evidence in support of his various claims.
Circumstantial evidence can prove a fact if the fact “follows as a natural or very probable conclusion from the facts actually
proven.” In re Purported Last Will & Testament of Langmeier, 466 A.2d 386, 402 (Del. Ch.1983). The Court reaches its
factual conclusions with this authority in mind.




183 JX 158 at FWGSA 010215.
184 Yule's email said, “Good luck with the raid!” Id. Yet it does not make sense that Yule would send Laudamiel a “rush”
request to read and comment on “Flaktwoods—Prolitec business terms” if he knew that Laudamiel was occupied with a
crucial part of their alleged scheme. See id. at FWGSA 010215–16.
185 Yule testified that he had never received a copy of the LLC Agreement. Trial Tr. vol. II, 479, 501 (Yule). On cross
examination, he was questioned about the extent of his knowledge of Laudamiel’s employment rights, but not his lack
of receipt. See Trial Tr. vol. III, 653-56 (Yule). The Court does not seek to create an insurmountable burden of due
diligence in commercial transactions with third parties by requiring in depth knowledge of all governing documents to
avoid contributing to a potential breach.
186 Once the certificate of cancellation was filed on May 12, Capua and Laudamiel no longer owed fiduciary duties to
Aeosphere. See Comerica Bank v. Global Payments Direct, Inc., 2014 WL 3779025, at *14 n.120 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 2014)
(citing cases to distinguish between duties owed before and after termination of a joint venture).
187 See Pl.'s Opening Post–Trial Br. 16–23 (reciting facts).
188 Trial Tr. vol. II, 510–11 (Yule); see also JX 129 (May 12 email from Laudamiel attaching minutes from May 4).
189 See JX 161 at FWGSA 010391. In a May 13 email, Yule indicates that he has invited Capua and Laudamiel to join the
call. That email followed an email from May 12 in which Yule mentioned looking forward to the call.
190 See JX 157 at FWGSA 009532.
191 E.g., Pl.'s Post–Trial Reply Br. 27.
192 Trial Tr. vol. II, 469 (Yule).
193 See Pl.'s Opening Post–Trial Br. 4–5 (citing the October 23 email to create a scheduling conflict).
194 The Court finds that while Yule was aware that Laudamiel and Capua were taking a hard line with Mathew, there is
no indication that Yule knew prior to the dissolution meeting that unanimous approval was required to oust Matthew
or that doing so without unanimous approval would violate the LLC agreement. Yule was on notice of the dissolution's
impropriety only after Matthew so informed him in a post-meeting email, JX 48 at FWGSA 096730, which Yule may or
may not have believed.
195 WaveDivision Hldgs., LLC v. Highland Capital Mgmt., L.P. (“WaveDivision II”), 49 A.3d 1168, 1174 (Del. 2012) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
196 NAMA Hldgs., LLC v. Related WMC LLC, 2014 WL 6436647, at *28 (Del. Ch. Nov. 17, 2014).
197 WaveDivision II, 49 A.3d at 1174 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 (1979)).
198 NAMA Hldgs., LLC, 2014 WL 6436647, at *26.
199 Pl.'s Opening Post–Trial Br. 42 (citing Capua Dep. 115); Pl.'s Post–Trial Reply Br. 26–27.
200 Capua Dep. 115.
201 Trial Tr. vol. II, 502 (Yule).
202 Defs.' Post–Trial Answering Br. 40–41 (quoting Bailey v. City of Wilm., 766 A.2d 477, 480 (Del.2001)).
203 See generally Def. Fläkt Woods Group SA's Mem. of Law in Supp. of Its Mot. for Summ. J. 25–32. Matthew also
incorporates earlier filings on the justification issue. See Pl.'s Opening Pre–Trial Br. 45–49.
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204 See WaveDivision II, 49 A.3d at 1174 (“Only if the defendant’s sole motive was to interfere with the contract will this
factor support a finding of improper interference.”).
205 See WaveDivision Hldgs., LLC v. Highland Capital Mgmt. L.P. (“WaveDivision I ”), 2012 WL 3224310, at *12 (Del.Super.
Aug. 7, 2012) (“It was not improper for the defendants to interfere with the Wave Agreements in order to protect their own
financial interest in Millennium.”). However, both FWGSA's interest in protecting its investment in the Scent Project and
Matthew's interest in his contract rights without interference by third parties were important. See id. at *13 (discussing
“[t]he societal interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the contractual interests of the other.” (emphasis
removed)).
206 The parties' economic relationship weighs in favor of justifying FWGSA's involvement. Id.
207 Defs.' Post–Trial Answering Br. 43.
208 Nicolet, Inc. v. Nutt, 525 A.2d 146, 149–50 (Del.1987).
209 Reid v. Siniscalchi, 2014 WL 6589342, at *6 (Del. Ch. Nov. 20, 2014).
210 Pl.'s Opening Post–Trial Br. 44.
211 Id. at 55. In the reply brief, Matthew frames the issue as a remedy for tortious interference, which the Court has already
rejected. The Court will, however, consider the value of the employment contract for thoroughness and to address any
lingering concern about Laudamiel's liability.
212 See Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 221 (Del.2005) (“In a statutory appraisal proceeding, each
side has the burden of proving its respective valuation positions by a preponderance of the evidence. Even if one side
fails to satisfy its burden, the Court ... must use its own independent judgment to determine fair value.” (footnote omitted)).
Again, the Court will consider FWGSA's damages arguments broadly.
213 See, e.g., Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 WL 1569818, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012) (“The Court should consider all
factors known or knowable as of the Merger Date that relate to the future prospects of the Companies, but should avoid
including speculative costs or revenues.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
214 FWGSA argues that a discounted cash flow method does not produce a useable result in Aeosphere's case because it
is not a going concern, it lacks a history of revenues, and lacks reliable inputs. See, e.g., Defs. Fläkt Woods Group SA
and Flakt Woods Limited's Mem. in Further Supp. of Their Mot. In Limine to Preclude Testimony of Kevin Vannucci 4–6.
Another problem is that it is difficult to place a value on specific Aeosphere assets, such as the Scent Opera, but that does
not appear to have inflated Vannucci's calculations. Matthew contends that “this Court has not applied a liquidation-based
valuation ... to appraise equity shares.” Pl.'s Post–Trial Reply Br. 31. He also raises concerns that using liquidation value
“incentivize[s] fiduciaries to simply pursue dissolution of an entity and transfer its liquidated assets to a new business
rather than through a merger that might trigger appraisal rights.” Oral Arg. Tr. 44–45.
215 Aeosphere might have had a breach of contract claim, but that would not be a source of immediate and reliable funding
to continue its operations.
216 The Court adopts this number for hypothetical purposes only. This figure is part of what Vannucci considered when
determining that Aeosphere could be valued as a going concern. See Trial Tr. vol. IV, 990–91, 994–96 (Vannucci).
217 JX 287 at 4 (explaining that Barberich would temper Vannucci's “aggressive” calculations but emphasizing that even
Vannucci's balance sheet shows that Aeosphere “had no value”).
218 See JX 434 at Schedule 1 & n.4.
219 Trial Tr. vol. IV, 1003 (Vannucci) (reasoning that Aeosphere's youth renders the CAPM less reliable than the established
“VC rates of return”); JX 434 at Schedule 4.
220 Trial Tr. vol. IV, 1005–06 (Vannucci).
221 JX 287 at 32. Potentially acceptable discount rates for a start-up stage investment range from 50% to 125%. JX 434
at Schedule 4.
222 JX 287 at 33. Potentially acceptable discount rates for an early development stage investment range from 40% to 70%.
JX 434 at Schedule 4.
223 This fact is relevant because Prolitec was an existing technology that “appear[ed] viable”—even though its use would
presumably reduce margins relative to the yet unperfected EFET technology—further justifying Aeosphere's “early
development” classification.
224 JX 434 at Schedule 4.
225 While the Court adopts Vannucci's valuation model and discount rates, the Court finds credible Yule's testimony regarding
the appropriate cash flow reduction to compensate for the uncertainty surrounding EFET.
226 By simply reducing Aeosphere's free cash flows, as opposed to adjusting its revenue and expenses independently, the
Court assumes that Aeosphere's cost of goods sold and operating expenses vary proportionately to sales. Such an
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assumption is not unreasonable in light of the fact that “Aeosphere, on its own, was not a capital-intensive company,”
and therefore incurred relatively few fixed costs, resulting in an unlevered cost structure. Trial Tr. vol. IV, 995 (Vannucci).
227 Trial Tr. vol. II, 428 (Yule) (stating that projections assuming Prolitec technology would be one-fifth to one-tenth of those
assuming EFET).
228 Id. at 428, 524 (Yule).
229 Id. at 428 (Yule).
230 The Court reaches this figure by reducing the above one-fifth by the additional ninety percent suggested by Yule given
the lack of an exclusive agreement with Prolitec. The Court notes, however, that a reasonable interpretation of Yule's
testimony could result in a finding of one percent of the original projections. Id. (Yule stating that projections assuming
Prolitec could be as low as ten percent of those assuming EFET; reducing that amount by a “factor of ... ten” results in
projections at one percent of the originals).
231 The Court notes, however, that without additional data, equating the expected value of the EFET technology at the time
of the valuation to the value added by reducing cash flows by a mere 80% is somewhat of a rough estimate.
232 The Court adopts Vannucci's weights of 60% for the FWGSA projections and 40% for the Aeosphere projections. JX 434
at Schedule 1 n.1 (Valuation Synthesis and Conclusion).
233 While Vannucci's calculations primarily consider the Scent Project, Dep. Trs. of Kevin Vannucci (“Vannucci Dep.”) 66–
68, Aeosphere's portfolio of business opportunities contained sundry additional projects. JX 285 at 3. Vannucci, however,
stated that any projected cash flows for such additional projects would be “too speculative” to include in the valuation
model. Vannucci Dep. 67. Thus, the value of Aeosphere represented by Vannucci's and the Court's calculations stems
primarily from the Scent Project.
234 JX 434 at Schedule 1.
235 Trial Tr. vol. I, 88 (Matthew).
236 Matthew supports his expert's valuation by observing Capua's commitment to fund salaries. Pl.'s Opening Post–Trial Br.
48–49. Capua would not have done so. If the Court accepts that Aeosphere was a going concern despite its inability to
make payroll, it is fair to assume that Matthew would not have continued to work without compensation.
237 The Court has chosen to reach this decision without being aware of the amount for which Capua and Action 1 settled.
238 The pre-trial order does not squarely address FWGSA's cross-claims. Nonetheless, with this conclusion, the cross-claims
of FWGSA are moot and, thus, are dismissed.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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*1  This is the post-trial decision in an appraisal brought
pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 262 and arising out of a merger in
which a global technology conglomerate and its acquisition
subsidiary acquired a biometrics technology company at a
price of $10.50 per share. Relying upon a discounted cash
flow (“DCF”) analysis, the petitioners claim that each share of
the biometrics company's common shares was worth $16.26
as of the merger date. By contrast, the respondent contends
that the biometrics company's common shares were worth
only $10.12 apiece as of the merger date. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court concludes that, as of the merger date,
the fair value of the biometrics company was approximately
$963.4 million or $10.87 per share.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Parties
Respondent, 3M Cogent, Inc. (“3M Cogent”), formerly
known as Cogent, Inc. (“Cogent” or the “Company”),
is a Delaware corporation that provides biometric1
technology. Specifically, Cogent offers automated fingerprint
identification systems (“AFIS”) technology and other
fingerprint biometrics solutions to government, immigration,
and law enforcement agencies.
Petitioners are Merion Capital, L.P., Magnetar Capital Master
Fund Ltd., Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund
Ltd., Magnetar SC Fund Ltd., Hipparchus Master Fund Ltd.,
Compass Offshore HTV PCC Limited, Compass HTV LLC,
and Blackwell Partners LLC (collectively, the “Petitioners”).
At the time of the merger, Petitioners beneficially owned
5,835,109 shares of Cogent common stock (the “Shares”).2
Petitioners dissented from the merger and perfected their
appraisal rights.
Nonparty 3M Company (“3M”) is a diversified technology
conglomerate with a global presence in the following
businesses: industrial and transportation; health care;
consumer and office; safety, security, and protection services;
display and graphics; and electro and communications.3 3M
acquired Cogent (or the “Company”) through its acquisition
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Cogent was founded by Ming Hsieh in 1990. From 1990
until 2004, Cogent operated as a private company and was
profitable during that entire period.4 Ultimately, Cogent went
public on September 23, 2004, and thereafter was publicly
traded on the NASDAQ Global Select Market under the
symbol “COGT.”5 At all relevant times, Hsieh was the
President, Chairman, and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”)
of Cogent, and Paul Kim was the Chief Financial Officer.
Before the merger, Cogent's Board of Directors (the “Board”)
consisted of four members: Hsieh, John Bolger, John Stenbit,
and Kenneth Thornton.
2. The transaction
*2  In or around 2008, Cogent retained Credit Suisse
to assist in the investigation and evaluation of potential
strategic alternatives, including a sale of the Company.
As part of that engagement, Credit Suisse contacted over
twenty-five potential strategic and financial partners about the
prospect of acquiring Cogent.6 Cogent also retained Goldman
Sachs to pursue potential strategic alternatives with NEC, a
competitor of Cogent. As a result of efforts by Cogent and
its advisers, in 2010, 3M, Danaher Corporation (“Danaher”),
Roper Industries (“Roper”), and NEC Corporation (“NEC”)
expressed interest in acquiring the Company.7
Around that time, Cogent had direct meetings with executives
of 3M in which Cogent and its advisors informed 3M that
other potential suitors were in discussions with Cogent.8 In
May 2010, 3M expressed interest in pursuing a strategic
transaction with Cogent at a price range of $9.25 to $10.25
per share.9
Shortly after 3M's verbal offer, Kim prepared financial
projections for 2010–2015 (the “Five–Year Projections”).10
Up until that time, Cogent had not prepared projections
beyond one year.11 Credit Suisse compiled the projections,
but relied on information supplied by Kim, Hsieh, and
Mary Jane Abalos, Cogent's vice president of finance.12
According to Kim, the Five–Year Projections were “bottom-
up” projections that did not rely on industry analysts or
reports.13
On July 2, 2010, after further discussions and due diligence
with potential acquirers, Cogent received two nonbinding
indications of interest: one from 3M to acquire Cogent for
$10.50 per share and the other from Danaher to acquire
Cogent at a range of $10.00 to $10.50.14 Although Roper and
Danaher eventually dropped out of the process, NEC and 3M
remained interested in pursuing a strategic transaction with
Cogent.15
In August 2010, 3M submitted a nonbinding written proposal
to acquire Cogent for $10.50 per share.16 The Board met
on August 15, 2010, and instructed their advisor, Credit
Suisse, to inform 3M that its proposal was not acceptable
and to negotiate with 3M on price and terms.17 Cogent also
leveraged the offer from 3M to pressure NEC to speed up
its bid.18 Ultimately, NEC submitted a nonbinding indication
of interest to acquire Cogent within the range of $11.00 to
$12.00 per share.19 In a letter dated August 19, 2010, 3M
advised Cogent that its bid would expire on August 20.20
That day, the Board met to determine how to proceed. After
considering updates on the ongoing discussions with NEC,
the Board approved the negotiation of a definitive merger with
3M, rejected the condition of exclusivity requested in 3M's
letter, and instructed Credit Suisse to continue discussions
with NEC.21
Finally, on August 29, 2010, the Board held another special
meeting at which it considered further updates on the
discussions with NEC.22 Based on NEC's need to complete its
due diligence, the existence of antitrust and regulatory issues
with NEC, and Credit Suisse's opinion that the proposed
merger with 3M was fair, the Board unanimously determined
that it was in the best interest of Cogent to enter into
the proposed merger agreement with 3M, and resolved to
recommend that the shareholders approve the merger.23
*3  The next day, Cogent and 3M publicly announced the
merger. On September 10, 2010, 3M commenced a tender
offer to acquire all of the issued and outstanding common
stock of Cogent for $10.50 per share. The initial tender offer
closed on October 7, 2010, after which 3M controlled a
majority of Cogent's outstanding shares. Because Cogent did
not have enough shares to complete a short-form merger,
on October 8, 2010, 3M commenced a subsequent tender
offering at the same price, $10.50 per share. On October 26,
2010, the subsequent offering closed, and 3M controlled 73%
of Cogent's outstanding common shares or approximately
64.9 million common shares. On December 1, 2010 (the
“Merger Date”), the stockholders of Cogent approved the
merger pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 251 (the “Merger”). As a
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result, Cogent became a wholly owned subsidiary of 3M and
thereafter was renamed 3M Cogent, Inc.
C. Procedural History
Following the Merger, Petitioners filed their Verified Petition
for Appraisal on March 4, 2011. From November 28 through
November 30, 2012, I presided over a three-day trial
in this action. After extensive post-trial briefing, counsel
presented their final arguments on March 19, 2013. This
Memorandum Opinion constitutes my post-trial findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
D. Parties' Contentions
Petitioners contend that the fair value of Cogent was $16.26
per share. In support of this valuation, Petitioners rely on
their expert, Dr. Bernard C. Bailey, a Ph.D. in management
and Chairman and CEO of Authentix Inc., a Carlyle
Group portfolio company and global leader in authentication
technology.24 In valuing the Company, Bailey performed
a DCF analysis, a comparable companies analysis, and a
comparable transactions analysis. Bailey relied, however,
only on his DCF analysis in reaching his valuation opinion
because (1) Bailey believed there were no truly comparable
companies or transactions to compare to Cogent and (2), to
the extent there were any potentially comparable companies
and transactions, he lacked sufficient data from which to draw
comparisons.
3M Cogent claims that Cogent's fair value was $10.12 per
share. In support of its valuation contentions, Respondent
relies on the expert testimony and reports of Henry F.
Owsley and Stephen M. Schiller (collectively, the “Gordian
Experts”), a partner and managing director of Gordian Group,
LLC (“Gordian Group”), respectively.25 The Gordian Experts
valued the Company using a DCF analysis, a comparable
companies analysis, and a comparable transactions analysis,
giving each analysis equal, i.e., one-third, weight.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard
Under Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
stockholders who meet certain requirements are entitled to an
appraisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of their
shares of stock.26 During such an appraisal proceeding, the
Court of Chancery
shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to
be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court
shall take into account all relevant factors.27
The Court's task is to perform an independent evaluation
of “fair value.”28 “It is within the Court of Chancery's
discretion to select one of the parties' valuation models as
its general framework, or fashion its own, to determine fair
value in the appraisal proceeding.”29 Fair value in the context
of an appraisal proceeding is the “value to a stockholder
of the firm as a going concern, as opposed to the firm's
value in the context of an acquisition or other transaction.”30
“Only the speculative elements of value that may arise from
the ‘accomplishment or expectation’ of the merger,” that
is, any synergistic value, should be excluded from a fair
value calculation on the date of the merger.31 “One of the
most important factors to consider is the very ‘nature of the
enterprise’ subject to the appraisal proceeding.”32
*4  In an appraisal proceeding, both sides have the burden of
proving their respective valuations by a preponderance of the
evidence.33 If neither party satisfies its burden, however, the
Court must use its own independent judgment to determine
the fair value of the shares.34 The Court may consider
“proof of value by any techniques or methods which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community
and otherwise admissible in court.”35 Among the techniques
that Delaware courts have relied on to determine the fair value
of shares are the DCF approach, the comparable transactions
approach, and comparable companies analyses.36
B. Merger Price as Indication of “Fair Value”
Respondent seeks to have this Court rely on the merger price
as evidence of the fair value of Petitioners' shares. But, the
cases that Respondent cites in support of that proposition37
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pre-date the Supreme Court's statements on this issue in
Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP.38
In Golden Telecom, the Supreme Court stated:
Section 262(h) unambiguously calls upon the Court of
Chancery to perform an independent evaluation of “fair
value” at the time of a transaction. It vests the Chancellor
and Vice Chancellors with significant discretion to consider
“all relevant factors” and determine the going concern
value of the underlying company. Requiring the Court
of Chancery to defer—conclusively or presumptively—
to the merger price, even in the face of a pristine,
unchallenged transactional process, would contravene the
unambiguous language of the statute and the reasoned
holdings of our precedent. It would inappropriately shift
the responsibility to determine “fair value” from the
court to the private parties. Also, while it is difficult
for the Chancellor and Vice Chancellors to assess wildly
divergent expert opinions regarding value, inflexible rules
governing appraisal provide little additional benefit in
determining “fair value” because of the already high costs
of appraisal actions. Appraisal is, by design, a flexible
process. Therefore, we reject [respondent's] contention that
the Vice Chancellor erred by insufficiently deferring to
the merger price, and we reject its call to establish a rule
requiring the Court of Chancery to defer to the merger price
in any appraisal proceeding.39
*5  More recently, Chancellor Strine refused to give any
weight to merger price, stating:
[Respondent] makes some rhetorical hay out of its search
for other buyers. But this is an appraisal action, not a
fiduciary duty case, and although I have little reason to
doubt [respondent's] assertion that no buyer was willing
to pay Dimensional $25 million for the preferred stock
and an attractive price for [respondent's] common stock in
2009, an appraisal must be focused on [respondent's] going
concern value. Given the relevant legal standard, the trial
record did not focus extensively on the quality of marketing
[respondent] by Dimensional or the utility of the “go shop”
provision contained in the merger agreement....
Instead, the testimony at trial focused mostly on the
question that is relevant under Cavalier Oil and its progeny,
which is the going concern value of [respondent] as of
the date of the [m]erger. In this opinion, I concentrate
on answering the key questions raised by the parties
relevant to determining that value, which are: (i) whether
the preferred stock should be valued at the $25 million
liquidation preference value or on an as-converted basis
in determining the value to subtract from [respondent's]
equity value to derive a value for its common stock; and
(ii) the enterprise value of [respondent] as a going concern
on the Merger date.40
Here, both sides have presented expert testimony as to the
going concern value of Cogent on the Merger Date. Indeed,
Respondent did not seek to use the merger price of $10.50
per share, but instead relies on the Gordian Experts' analyses
to arrive at a lower price of $10.12.41 Respondent and its
experts also did not attempt to adjust the merger price to
remove the “speculative elements of value that may arise
from the ‘accomplishment or expectation’ of the merger.”42
In other words, Respondent asks this Court to rely on a
merger price that it has not relied on itself and that is not
adjusted to produce the going concern value of Cogent. Those
deficiencies render the merger price largely irrelevant to this
case. Accordingly, I focus primarily on the evidence presented
by the experts as to the going concern value of Cogent on the
Merger Date, i.e., the experts' technical analyses presented in
their expert reports and in their testimony at trial.
C. Which Valuation Method?
As previously indicated, Petitioners relied solely on a DCF
analysis to support their argument that the fair value of a
Cogent common share on the date of the Merger was $16.26.
By contrast, 3M Cogent's experts gave nearly equal weight
to their DCF analysis, comparable companies analysis, and
comparable transactions analysis in coming to a per common
share value for Cogent of $10.12.
Generally speaking, “it is preferable to take a more
robust approach involving multiple techniques—such as a
DCF analysis, a comparable transactions analysis (looking
at precedent transaction comparables), and a comparable
companies analysis (looking at trading comparables/
multiples)—to triangulate a value range, as all three
methodologies individually have their own limitations.”43
A comparable or market-based approach endeavors to
draw inferences about a company's future expected cash
flows from the market's expectations about comparable
companies.44 “[T]he utility of a market-based method
depends on actually having companies that are sufficiently
comparable that their trading multiples provide a relevant
insight into the subject company's own growth prospects.”45
When there are a number of corporations competing
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in a similar industry, these methods are most reliable.
On the other hand, when the “comparables” involve
companies that offer different products or services, are
at a different stage in their growth cycle, or have vastly
different multiples, a comparable companies or comparable
transactions analysis is inappropriate.46 Therefore, I must
examine the experts' respective selections of comparable
companies and transactions to evaluate their reliability.
1. Comparable companies analysis
*6  The comparable companies method of valuing a
company's equity involves several steps including: (1) finding
comparable, publicly traded companies that have reviewable
financial information; (2) calculating the ratio between the
trading price of the stocks of each of those companies and
some recognized measure reflecting their income such as
revenue, EBIT, or EBITDA; (3) correcting these derived
ratios to account for differences, such as in capital structure,
between the public companies and the target company being
valued; and, finally, (4) applying the average multiple of the
comparable companies to the relevant income measurement
of the target company, here Cogent.47
The Gordian Experts conducted a comparable companies
analysis that began with the selection of ten companies.48
The Gordian Experts then determined multiples by dividing
the enterprise value for each company by: (i) last twelve
months (“LTM”) revenue and EBITDA; and (ii) estimated
forward revenue and EBITDA, as determined by public
filings and other publicly available information. Next, the
Gordian Experts applied a range of multiples to Cogent's LTM
and estimated forward revenue and EBITDA to determine
an estimated enterprise value for Cogent. Ultimately, the
Gordian Experts' analysis yielded an estimated enterprise
value of Cogent of $296.3 million.
Here, Petitioners attack Respondent's first expert, Owsley,
and his comparable companies analysis, claiming the analysis
is “unreliable, unsupported and flawed.”49 Specifically,
Petitioners note that the Gordian Experts' comparable
companies analysis suffers from: (1) a paucity of data; (2)
a selection of companies with either no profits, a different
risk profile, no government-focused customer base, or no
business in the biometrics industry; and (3) a generalized lack
of consistent methodology.
“The burden of proof on the question [of] whether the
comparables are truly comparable lies with the party making
that assertion,” here the Respondent.50 I find that Respondent
and its Gordian Experts have not satisfied that burden.
As an initial matter, six of the ten comparable companies
the Gordian Experts identified were significantly smaller
than Cogent. Those companies each had enterprise values
of less than $50 million,51 while Cogent's enterprise value
was $398.5 million.52 This Court has rejected the use of
companies as comparables where those companies were
significantly different in size than the appraised company.53
That is because, as further discussed in Section II.D.2.d infra
concerning the equity size premium, greater risk is typically
associated with equity in a small company.54 In that regard,
it would be inappropriate to compare a company with an
enterprise value of $14.7 million, as was the case with BIO–
Key International, Inc., to a company, such as Cogent, with
an enterprise value more than 25 times higher.
*7  Moreover, not one of those same six “comparable”
companies had generated a profit.55 At trial, Schiller, who
replaced Owsley as Respondent's expert, acknowledged that
the type of companies that have revenue multiples but not
EBITDA multiples tend to be “companies in the early stage of
their growth and maturity” and “companies that are growing
rapidly.”56 In contrast, Cogent had been profitable from
1990 until 2005.57 In that regard, Schiller acknowledged
that companies that had never turned a profit “are not close
comparables” to Cogent.58
The Gordian Experts also failed to select comparable
companies from the same business or industry as Cogent. For
example, five of the companies selected by Owsley had no
biometrics business at all.59 Bailey, Petitioners' expert, also
notes that of the ten comparable companies selected by the
Gordian Experts, only one—BIO-Key International—listed
Cogent as a competitor in its annual report.60
Finally, the Gordian Experts' failure to identify L–1 as
a comparable company to Cogent before trial causes me
some concern. L–1 competed directly against Cogent in
a number of markets, including the LiveScan market.61
Indeed, Schiller admitted that L–1 “was one of the closer
comparables to Cogent.”62 Nonetheless, the Gordian Experts
excluded L–1 based on their mistaken belief that a roughly
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contemporaneous L–1 transaction had closed before the
Merger.63 Importantly, L–1 had very positive financials that
probably would have increased the values generated by
the Gordian Experts' comparable companies analysis.64 In
that sense, therefore, the Gordian Experts' analysis likely
underestimates the value of Cogent.
Based on the problems identified in this subsection, I find
the Gordian Experts' comparable companies analysis to be
unreliable. Furthermore, because Respondent has not met its
burden of proof to show that the selected companies are truly
comparable, I accord no weight to that analysis.
2. Comparable transactions analysis
A comparable transactions analysis “involves identifying
similar transactions, quantifying those transactions through
financial metrics, and then applying the metrics to the
company at issue to ascertain a value.”65 As with
the comparable companies analysis, “[t]he utility of the
comparable transactions methodology is directly linked to the
‘similarity between the company the court is valuing and the
companies used for comparison.’ ”66
Here, the Gordian Experts began their analysis with the
selection of eighteen transactions.67 They then calculated
multiples by dividing the enterprise value (as determined
by the terms of the relevant transactions) for each company
involved by: (i) LTM revenue and EBITDA; and (ii) estimated
forward revenue and EBITDA.68 Next, the Gordian Experts
arrived at multiple ranges by eliminating the top and bottom
quartile.69 Finally, they applied a 20% discount to the
multiples they obtained to take into account the need to
eliminate any control or synergy premiums.70
*8  Petitioners' expert Bailey criticized the Gordian Experts
for using revenue multiples on the ground that they are less
reliable than EBITDA multiples. At trial, Bailey explained
that “it's inappropriate to use a revenue multiple as a
multiple for trying to value [Cogent], because it was a very
profitable cash-flow-positive company operating in a robust
industry.”71
In an expert report he submitted in another case, Owsley
similarly criticized the use of revenue multiples, stating that
“[w]hile it is true that many analysts regularly examine
revenue multiples[,] I believe that such multiples are
inherently more suspect due to their relatively higher level
of variance (once low and negative earners are eliminated)
than EBITDA multiples.”72 Owsley's inconsistent and
contradictory positions undermine the Gordian Experts'
credibility on this point, which they admitted was a “judgment
call.”73 Based on these facts and Bailey's reasoning, I find
that Respondent has not met its burden of showing that
the Gordian Experts' use of a revenue multiples approach
is reliable. Therefore, I accord no weight to that part of
Respondent's analysis.
Petitioners contend that the remainder of the Gordian Experts'
comparable transactions analysis, i.e., the LTM and forward
EBITDA multiples, is flawed because there are insufficient
data points to support any meaningful conclusions. For
the thirty-six potential EBITDA multiples identified, the
Gordian Experts were able to provide only eight meaningful
multiples. That number is even smaller after one eliminates
the first and fourth quartiles. This Court has found comparable
transactions analyses that used as few as five transactions
and two transactions to be unreliable.74 Indeed, “[i]f it turns
out that very few data points are available for a particular
valuation multiple, that problem may lead to abandon[ing]
that multiple or [ ] put[ting] relatively little weight on it.”75
The dearth of data points here undermines the reliability of
the EBITDA multiples.
This conclusion is buttressed by the high dispersion of the
data points the Gordian Experts did obtain. “The extent
to which the valuation multiples are tightly clustered or
widely dispersed tends to indicate the extent to which the
market focuses on that particular valuation multiple in pricing
companies in the particular industry.”76 Here, the dispersion
was “extremely large.”77 For example, while the mean of the
forward EBITDA multiple was 25.4x, the standard deviation
was 25.1x.78 Thus, because there are so few data points and
the results are so widely dispersed, Respondent has failed to
show that its EBITDA multiples analysis is reliable.
*9  For all of these reasons, I accord no weight to
Respondent's comparable transactions analysis.
3. Delaware Rules of Evidence 702 and 705
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Petitioners also raised an evidentiary challenge to Schiller's
testimony and rebuttal report. According to Petitioners,
Schiller's testimony lacks a factual basis and should be
excluded under D.R.E. 702(1) and 705(b).79 Petitioners also
seek to exclude Schiller's testimony because an expert cannot
act as
a mere conduit or transmitter of the content of an
extrajudicial source. An ‘expert’ should not be permitted
simply to repeat another's opinion or data without bringing
to bear on it his own expertise and judgment. Obviously
in such a situation, the non-testifying expert is not on
the witness stand and truly is unavailable for cross-
examination.80
Finally, Petitioners note that an expert cannot materially
change his opinions after the expert discovery cutoff.81
To put Petitioners' objections in context, I review briefly the
background of Schiller's participation in this case. In late
July 2012, Owsley unexpectedly became ill and went on
medical leave.82 In October 2012, Respondent asked Schiller
to assume Owsley's role in this case by taking over the
partially prepared rebuttal report and preparing himself to
testify.83 As part of that preparation, Schiller read Owsley's
expert report, spoke with members of the Gordian team, and
ultimately adopted Owsley's conclusions.84 Schiller testified
that he “independently assessed the validity of the judgments
and conclusions of Mr. Owsley's report.”85
On October 22, 2012, Schiller submitted a rebuttal report
that reflected his conclusions and judgments.86 Two weeks
later, on November 5, Schiller sat for a deposition. At
that deposition, Schiller admitted that he did not “know
all the things that the team looked at as they evaluated
these comparables.”87 Schiller was unable to say, among
other things, whether in selecting comparable companies the
Gordian team had considered whether those companies were
government contractors.88 Nor was Schiller able to identify
the portion of each comparable company's business that was
involved in the biometrics business.89
*10  At trial, Schiller admitted that he had no role in
preparing Owsley's initial report, never spoke to Owsley
regarding his opening report, and had not reviewed all of the
materials in Appendix C of Owsley's report.90 Schiller also
changed some of his deposition answers to reflect work he
had done after the deposition.91
Generally speaking, an expert can replace another expert who
must drop out as a result of illness. Here, Schiller was a logical
choice based on his understanding of the techniques that the
Gordian Group regularly applies in its valuations. Moreover,
Schiller apparently examined and relied on the judgments
Owsley and his team made. Given these circumstances, I do
not find Schiller's testimony inadmissible.
On the other hand, Schiller's deposition testimony
demonstrated that, as to some topics, Schiller barely
performed sufficient research to express an informed opinion,
and instead relied heavily on the opinions and data of Owsley.
Because Schiller's statements regarding the comparability
of certain companies changed between his deposition and
trial and Respondent provided no prior notice of that change
to Petitioners, I have given no weight to Schiller's later
testimony.
These problems with the evidence adduced from Schiller
also undermine his reliability and credibility as a witness
and create an independent basis for according Schiller's
comparables analyses only minimal weight.
D. DCF Analysis of Cogent
The basic premise underlying the DCF methodology is
that the value of a company is equal to the value of its
projected future cash flows, discounted to the present value
at the opportunity cost of capital.92 Calculating a DCF
involves three steps: (1) one estimates the values of future
cash flows for a discrete period, where possible, based on
contemporaneous management projections; (2) the value of
the entity attributable to cash flows expected after the end of
the discrete period must be estimated to produce a so-called
terminal value, preferably using a perpetual growth model;
and (3) the value of the cash flows for the discrete period and
the terminal value must be discounted back using the capital
asset pricing model or “CAPM.”93 In simpler terms, the
DCF method involves three basic components: (1) cash flow
projections; (2) a discount rate; and (3) a terminal value.94
The experts in this case relied on conflicting inputs and
assumptions as to all three elements of their respective DCF
analyses. I now turn to those disputed inputs and assumptions.
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1. Cash flow projections
*11  A primary dispute between the parties is whether
the Court should rely on the Five–Year Projections
prepared by Kim and Credit Suisse. Petitioners would reject
management's projections and adopt two key scenarios: (1)
Bailey's “Industry Growth Scenario” that assumes an industry
growth rate through 2015 of 17%; and (2) Bailey's “Cash
Deployment Scenario” that assumes Cogent would spend
$396 million of its cash on acquisitions.95 In contrast,
Respondent urges this Court to rely on management's
projections with only a few minor adjustments.
Generally, this Court “prefers valuations based on
contemporaneously prepared management projections
because management ordinarily has the best first-hand
knowledge of a company's operations.”96 In Gearreald
v. Just Care, Inc.,97 however, I held that projections
prepared by management “are not entitled to the same
deference usually afforded to contemporaneously prepared
management projections” where “management had never
prepared projections beyond the current fiscal year,” “the
possibility of litigation, such as an appraisal proceeding,
was likely,” and the projections “were made outside of the
ordinary course of business.”98 I also considered it relevant
in Gearreald that the projections at issue there were prepared
by directors and officers of the target company who “risked
losing their positions if the ... bid succeeded and were
involved in trying to convince the Board to pursue a different
strategic alternative in which [they] were involved.”99
A number of the circumstances in Gearreald also are present
here: (1) Cogent had never prepared projections beyond the
current fiscal year;100 (2) the management projections were
prepared after 3M communicated a verbal offer to Cogent,
and Hsieh communicated to 3M the price at which he was
willing to recommend selling;101 and (3) the projections
were prepared with significant input from Credit Suisse.102
On the other hand, Kim had no reason to believe his job
was in jeopardy, nor was he involved in any alternate bid.
This last factor is significant because neither this Court nor
the Delaware Supreme Court ever has adopted a bright-line
test under which management projections that were created
during the merger process are deemed inherently unreliable.
To the contrary, in a number of cases Delaware Courts have
relied on projections that were prepared by management
outside of the ordinary course of business and with the
possibility of litigation.103 On the other hand, this Court has
expressed skepticism with respect to projections prepared
with the benefit of hindsight by testifying experts.104
*12  Moreover, Bailey's “Cash Deployment Scenario,”
which assumes that Cogent would have spent $396 million
on potential targets and realized positive returns as a result of
those acquisitions, is too speculative. The record shows that
even though Cogent was open to acquiring companies and had
examined more than twenty companies, “none of them fit into
[Cogent's] acquisition target.”105 Furthermore, even if I were
to assume that Cogent would have made an acquisition, which
I am not inclined to do, I would not be willing to speculate as
to the rate of return on that hypothetical acquisition, because
it would amount to nothing more than mere conjecture and
supposition.
Similarly, the record does not support adopting Bailey's
“Industry Growth Scenario,” as opposed to management's
projections.106 In his scenario, Bailey used industry growth
rates to assume a compound annual growth rate (“CAGR”)
through 2015 of 17%, while the CAGR implicit in
management's projections over the same period was only
12.1%. Notably, from 2006 to 2009, Cogent fell far short of
industry growth rates in the biometrics industry.107 Similarly,
in 2010, management projected Cogent's revenues to grow by
8% (from $129.6 million in 2009 to $140 million in 2010).108
In the first three quarters of 2010, however, Cogent had earned
only $78.2 million in revenues.109 If Cogent had maintained
that pace for the final quarter of 2010, Cogent's 2010 revenues
would have been just $104.3 million,110 resulting in negative
year-on-year revenue growth between 2009 and 2010.
Based on the evidence adduced at trial, Delaware's long-
standing preference for management projections, and the
absence of any persuasive evidence that Kim was at risk
of losing his job, involved in another bid, or entangled in
other extraordinary circumstances, I accept management's
projections here as a reliable starting point for the DCF
analysis in this case.
a. Free cash flow adjustments
In their respective DCF analyses, both Bailey and Owsley
made adjustments to the free cash flows. First, Owsley
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deducted share based compensation (“SBC”) from Cogent's
projected cash flows, whereas Bailey did not. And second,
Owsley increased working capital based on an assumption
that Cogent would have working capital equal to 32.2% of
revenues. Bailey, on the other hand, assumed that Cogent
would need to retain only 22.9% of its incremental revenues
as working capital. I examine each of those proposed
adjustments next.
i. Treatment of SBC
Questions about the treatment of SBC often arise in this
Court when fairness opinions fail to disclose whether the
individual or entity rendering the opinion treated SBC as a
non-cash expense in its DCF analysis. In those cases, the
Court's standard practice has been to treat SBC as a non-cash
expense.111 Valuation literature also supports the view that a
non-qualified stock option plan112 is cash neutral or cash flow
positive.113
*13  Respondent's authority to the contrary is inapposite.
3M Cogent relies on a blog post by Damodaran that states,
“It is absurd to add back stock-based compensation (it is an
operating expense ...).”114 That blog post, however, deals
with the reporting of operating income, not the appropriate
treatment of SBC for cash flow purposes.115 I agree with
Damodaran that it makes sense to adjust earnings to take
into account the dilutive effect of SBC. Respondent has made
no showing in this case, however, that SBC will have any
effect on the actual cash flows of the Company. Therefore, I
conclude that SBC should not be treated as a cash expense
here.116
ii. Working capital adjustment
“Working capital is derived by subtracting current liabilities
from current assets and represents the capital the business
has at its disposal to fund operations.”117 Both Petitioners
and Respondent included in their revenue categories
—i.e., current assets—“billed accounts receivable,” “unbilled
accounts receivable,” and “inventory and contracted related
costs.” They both also included in their liabilities category
—i.e., current liabilities—“accounts payable.” The parties
disagreed, however, as to the proper treatment of the
following asset and liability categories for purposes of their
working capital adjustment: “prepaid expenses,” “long-term
inventory and contracted related costs,” “accrued expenses,”
and “other liabilities.”
The Gordian Experts criticized Bailey for including those
accounts in his computation of working capital, describing
them as “long-term” accounts and “subject to random
movement.”118 At least one treatise, however, supports
Bailey's view that working capital should include the disputed
categories. That treatise states:
Operating working capital equals operating current assets
minus operating current liabilities. Operating current assets
comprise all current assets necessary for the operation
of the business, including working cash balances, trade
accounts receivable, inventory, and prepaid expenses.
Specifically excluded are excess cash and marketable
securities—that is cash greater than the operating needs of
the business. Excess cash represents temporary imbalances
in the company's cash position....
Operating current liabilities include those liabilities that
are related to ongoing operations of the firm. The
most common operating liabilities are those related to
suppliers (accounts payable), employees (accrued salaries),
customers (deferred revenue), and the government (income
taxes payable).119
Rather than relying on any professional or academic valuation
literature, the Gordian Experts characterize their position as
a “judgment” based on their “experience in looking at many
companies and many projections.”120
*14  Bailey's approach appears to be well supported and
generally accepted by the financial community.121 The
explanation proffered by the Gordian Experts for their
approach, on the other hand, was essentially conclusory.
Based on the strong support for his view, I adopt Bailey's
approach and assume that Cogent will need working capital
equal to 22.9% of incremental revenues.
b. Unlevered free cash flows
The following table reflects the projections of unlevered free
cash flows that the Court intends to use in conducting a DCF
analysis here. These projections incorporate the SBC and
working capital adjustments discussed above.
Tabular or Graphical Material not displayable at this time
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The preceding image contains the reference for footnote122.
2. Cogent's cost of capital
To discount the cash flow projections for the Company to
present value, the experts for both sides computed their
respective weighted average costs of capital (“WACC”). The
formula used to derive WACC is:
WACC = [K D × W D × (1 - t) ] + (KE × WE )123
Where KD = Cost of debt capital
WD = Average weight of debt in capital structure
t = Effective tax rate for the company
KE = Cost of equity capital
WE = Average weight of equity capital in capital structure
Where the capital structure is 100% equity and 0% debt, as
is the case here, WACC is equal to the cost of equity.124
To calculate the cost of equity capital, the experts for both
Petitioners and Respondent used the Capital Asset Pricing
Model, or CAPM, which can be expressed as:
KE = R F + (β × R ERP ) + R ESP125
Where KE = Cost of equity
R F = Risk-free rate
β = Beta
R ERP = Equity risk premium
R ESP = Equity size premium
In simpler terms, the cost of equity equals the risk-free rate
plus an equity size premium plus the company's beta times
the market risk premium.
*15  The following table summarizes the parties' respective
inputs for WACC or cost of equity:
Tabular or Graphical Material not displayable at this time
In the sections that follow, I discuss, in turn, the disputes
between the parties as to each of the listed variables.
a. Risk-free rate
Petitioners determined Cogent's risk-free rate using the 20–
year Treasury bond yield, which was 3.80% on November
30, 2010, whereas 3M Cogent used the 10–year Treasury
bond yield, which was approximately 2.96% on December 1,
2010.126 Both sides acknowledged that either the 10–year or
20–year Treasury bond yields would be appropriate metrics
for the risk-free rate.127
In the appraisal context, this Court has used the 20–year
Treasury bond yield on numerous occasions in its calculation
of the risk-free rate.128 It does not appear from these cases,
however, that the issue of a 10–year versus a 20–year bond
was disputed or that the Court based its use of a twenty-
year rate on professional or academic valuation literature. To
the contrary, the literature suggests that the 10–year Treasury
bond yield is the appropriate metric for the risk-free rate in
this case. For example, Damodaran states, “we believe that
using the 10–year bond as the risk-free rate on all cash flows
is a good practice in valuation, at least in mature markets.”129
Another well-known treatise on valuation also suggests a 10–
year time horizon.130 And, yet another source states: “[m]any
analysts use the yield on a 10–year [Treasury bond] as a proxy
for the risk-free rate, although the yields on a 20–year or 30–
year [Treasury bond] are also reasonable proxies.”131 Based
on the referenced literature and the fact that Cogent is a mature
firm—as evidenced by its history of positive cash flows—I
conclude that the 10–year Treasury bond yield, i.e., 2.96%,
espoused by Respondent is the appropriate metric for the risk-
free rate in this case.
b. Beta
*16  As a matter of valuation theory, “companies that are
more unstable and leveraged, less established and financially
and competitively secure, and in colloquial terms ‘riskier,’
should have higher betas.”132 Betas also can take into account
considerations like political risk to the extent such risks are
priced by the market.133 The experts' calculations of beta
diverge in significant respects and are the largest driver of
the price difference in their respective DCF calculations.
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Petitioners advocate for a beta of 0.87, while Respondent
espouses a much higher beta of 1.52.134 In this regard, the
parties clash over three main topics: (1) whether to use a
1–year Bloomberg weekly raw beta or a 2–year Bloomberg
weekly adjusted beta; (2) the order of operations; and (3)
whether to adjust for all cash or only excess cash.
The first issue is whether the Court should start with Bailey's
1–year Bloomberg weekly raw beta of 0.708 or the Gordian
Experts' 2–year Bloomberg weekly adjusted beta of 0.67.135
At this point, the experts agree that the Court should use an
observation period of one week. They differ, however, as to
the sample period and whether the beta should be adjusted or
raw.136 Bailey explained that he chose a 1–year sample period
to avoid the “significant noise associated with movements in
the market due to the impact of the Global Financial Crisis
through the period late 2007 through early 2009.”137 Owsley,
on the other hand, provided no explanation of the reasons for
his selection of a 2–year sample period. Accordingly, I adopt
Bailey's selection of a 1–year sample period for this case.
Turning to what I have referred to as the “order of operations”
issue, both Petitioners and Respondent agree that it is
necessary to adjust the beta of Cogent to reflect Cogent's large
cash position. To do that, Bailey cash adjusted the Bloomberg
raw beta. In contrast, the Gordian Experts cash adjusted the
Bloomberg adjusted beta, which is equal to (Raw Beta x 0.67)
+ [1.00 × (0.33) ]. In this context, it strikes me as inappropriate
to cash adjust a market-adjusted beta because it effectively
cash adjusts the market. Accordingly, I conclude that the
appropriate number to begin the development of beta with is
the 1–year Bloomberg weekly raw beta, i.e., 0.708.
The process for adjusting asset beta estimates for excess cash
and investments is outlined by Pratt and Grabowski:
The assets of the guideline public companies used in
estimating beta often include excess cash and marketable
securities. If you do not take into account the excess cash
and marketable securities, you can arrive at an incorrect
estimate of the asset beta for the operating business. This
will lead to an incorrect estimate of the beta for the subject
company. After unlevering the beta for the guideline public
companies, you adjust the unlevered beta estimates for any
excess cash or marketable securities held by each guideline
public company. This adjustment is based on the principle
that the beta of the overall company is the market-value
weighted average of the businesses or assets (including
excess cash) comprising the overall firm.138
The formula for that adjustment is as follows:
*17  βU or overall company unlevered or asset beta
= [Asset beta for operations × (Operating Assets/Total Assets
) ]
+ [Asset beta for surplus assets × (Surplus Assets/Total Assets
) ]
If we assume that cash has a beta of zero,139 the equation is
simply:
βU = Asset beta for operations × (Operating Assets/Total Assets
)
That equation can be restated as:
Asset beta for operations = βU × (Total Assets/ Operating Assets
)
Here, Cogent's total assets were approximately $868.7
million.140 Operating assets are calculated using the
following formula:
Operating assets = total assets - surplus assets
Predictably, the parties disagree as to what proportion of
Cogent's large cash reserves should be considered “surplus.”
Bailey treats approximately $100 million as surplus, whereas
the Gordian Experts consider all of Cogent's cash, i.e., $533.2
million, to be excess. At the very least, the parties agree
that the $100 million the Cogent board announced it would
use to execute a share buyback is excess cash. As for the
remaining $433.2 million in cash, Bailey asserts that it
should be treated as an operational asset because Cogent's
executives signaled “to the market that Cogent intended to
utilize their cash balance to support the operations of the
business in order to take advantage of the significant growth
opportunities in the marketplace.”141 Yet, that view of surplus
cash contradicts the Pratt and Grabowski treatise upon which
Bailey explicitly relied. Pratt and Grabowski define surplus
assets as “[a]ssets that could be sold or distributed without
impairing company operations.”142 Using that broader view
and a simplifying assumption that Cogent would need $50
million in maintenance cash for operations,143 its excess cash
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would be $483.2 million.144 The operational assets of Cogent
then would be just $385.5 million.145 Thus, the ratio of
total assets to operating assets would be 2.253.146 Applying
previously mentioned formula, the asset beta for operations
equals the overall company unlevered or asset beta (0.708)
times the ratio of total assets to operating assets (2.253) or
1.595.
*18  Empirical studies have shown that measures of risk,
including beta, “tend to revert towards the mean over
time.”147 Where a good set of comparables for industry betas
do not exist, one can “smooth” beta by adjusting historical
beta by a market beta of 1, using a 1/3 weighting factor for the
market and a 2/3 weighting for the subject company's beta,
in this case Cogent.148 Here, that would result in a forward
estimated beta of approximately 1.397.149
The Respondent also calculated beta using a peer group
method, i.e., a comparable companies analysis. For the
reasons stated in subsection C above, I do not find the
Gordian Experts' comparable companies analysis reliable.
Accordingly, I rely solely on my calculation of a Cogent
forward beta of 1.397 for purposes of determining the
appropriate WACC here.
c. Equity risk premium
There is very little difference between the parties as to the
appropriate equity risk premium. Bailey supports the use of a
supply-side equity risk premium of 5.0% as published in the
2010 Ibbotson yearbook.150 The Gordian Experts relied on a
5.2% equity risk premium, which they derived from multiple
sources, including Damodaran and Ibbotson.151
Bailey cited a number of treatises and articles in support of
his view that the Court should apply a supply-side equity
risk premium.152 Owsley's report, on the other hand, did
not explain how he calculated equity risk premium (beyond
identifying sources).153 In addition, Schiller testified that he
was unfamiliar with the distinction between a supply-side
equity risk premium and a historic equity risk premium.154
Because Bailey demonstrated a stronger understanding of this
subject and explained his methodology more convincingly, I
conclude that the 5.20% equity risk premium used by Bailey
is the appropriate value to use in this case.155
d. Equity size premium
*19  “In addition to the equity risk premium, an equity size
premium generally is added to the company's cost of equity in
the valuation of smaller companies to account for the higher
rate of return demanded by investors to compensate for the
greater risk associated with small company equity.”156 “A
size premium is an accepted part of CAPM because there
is evidence in empirical returns that investors demand a
premium for the extra risk of smaller companies.”157 The
opposing experts came to similar values in their determination
of an equity size premium: 1.73% for Petitioners and 2.0%
for Respondent.158
Bailey selected his equity size premium of 1.73% based on
decile 7 of Ibbotson Associates' (“Ibbotson”) 2010 yearbook,
which encompasses companies with a market capitalization
between $685,129,000 and $1,063,308,000.159 The Gordian
Experts, on the other hand, used Ibbotson's 2009 yearbook
and adjusted Cogent's market capitalization to exclude its
large cash reserves.
The Ibbotson table headings clearly state “market
capitalization.”160 In addition, the relevant treatises focus
on the market value of common equity and do not suggest
making an adjustment to exclude cash reserves.161 Consistent
with Ibbotson's headings and the treatises, the Court of
Chancery consistently has used market capitalization as the
benchmark for selecting the equity size premium.162
Despite those authorities and Schiller's awareness that
“the definition [for equity size premium] says market
capitalization,” the Gordian Experts chose a size premium
by “look[ing] at the size of the market value less cash of
Cogent.”163 That adjustment was based on Schiller's view
that
*20  we're valuing ... Cogent absent its cash. We're not
valuing Cogent in the DCF. Because the way the DCF
works is, we value the cash streams the company throws
off and then we add the cash on top of it. So we split the
baby in two parts and look at the values of each.164
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I am not persuaded, however, that Schiller's approach is
consistent with the proper use of the Ibbotson tables. The
Ibbotson tables were based on important research in 1981
by Rolf Banz, who found an empirical relationship between
the market value of stocks and higher rates of return.165
Put differently, the Ibbotson tables look at the statistical
relationship between market capitalization and equity size
premium. The Gordian Experts failed to present a convincing
explanation as to why their use of a different metric—
enterprise value—more accurately reflects the correlation that
the equity size premium attempts to reflect.
While some studies—notably the Duff & Phelps Risk
Premium Report166—use a metric other than the market
value of equity, Respondent's expert chose to use Ibbotson's
Valuation Yearbook. In doing so, they effectively embraced
the view that there is a relationship between market
capitalization and rate of return.
Finally, the Gordian Experts' exclusion of cash is
counterintuitive. The Ibbotson tables are based on the insight
that smaller companies are more risky than larger companies.
The Gordian Experts' exclusion of cash decreases the “size”
of the company involved, thereby increasing its equity size
premium. Here, that would mean that Cogent would be more
risky as a result of its cash reserves. Intuitively, however, one
would expect that, all other things being equal, having cash
reserves, as opposed to debt, would decrease the riskiness of
a company.
For all of these reasons, I adopt Bailey's selection of an equity
size premium of 1.73%.
e. Calculating Cogent's WACC
As previously discussed, the equation for CAPM is:
KE = RF + (β × RERP ) + RESP
Inputting my conclusions as to the risk-free rate, beta, equity
risk premium, and equity size premium into that equation
yields:
KE = 2.96 + (1.397 × 5.2) + 1.73 = 11.954%
Based on Cogent's capital structure of 100% equity, Cogent's
WACC would equal its cost of equity, or 11.954%.
f. The present value of Cogent's unlevered free cash flows
Using the WACC of 11.954%, the following table represents
the present value (“PV”), as of the Merger date, of Cogent's
five-year projected unlevered free cash flows:
*21  Tabular or Graphical Material not displayable at this
time
The sum of the present value of the cash flows for 2010–2015
is $42 million.
3. Terminal value
“In a DCF analysis, future cash flows are projected for each
year during a set period, typically five years. After that time,
a terminal value is calculated to predict the company's cash
flow into perpetuity.”167 “The two established methods for
computing terminal value are the exit multiples model (a
market approach) and the growth in perpetuity model [i.e.,
the Gordon Growth Model].”168 “Both approaches have been
accepted by this court in the past.”169
Both Bailey and the Gordian Experts estimated the terminal
value of Cogent based on the perpetuity growth model or the
Gordon Growth Model. The Gordian Experts also used an exit
multiples approach that estimated a terminal value based on
the multiples of enterprise value to estimated forward 2011
EBITDA for the set of comparable companies.170
a. The Gordon Growth Model
The Gordon Growth Model can be expressed as follows171:
TV = FCFt+1/WACC - g
TV = Terminal value
FCFt+1 = Free cash flow in the first year after the explicit
forecast period
WACC = Weighted average cost of capital
g = Expected growth rate of free cash flow into perpetuity
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To calculate terminal value using the Gordon Growth Model,
the Court must select a long-term growth rate, i.e., the
expected growth rate of free cash flows into perpetuity. “A
viable company should grow at least at the rate of inflation
and ... the rate of inflation is the floor for a terminal value
estimate for a solidly profitable company that does not have
an identifiable risk of insolvency.”172 But, a terminal growth
rate should not be greater than the nominal growth rate for the
United States economy, because “[i]f a company is assumed
to grow at a higher rate indefinitely, its cash flow would
eventually exceed America's [gross national product].”173
Relying on historical GDP and inflation data, economic
analysts projections, and the growth prospects of the
biometrics industry, Bailey selected a perpetuity growth rate
of 4.5%.174 The Gordian Experts, on the other hand, used
a range of growth rates between 2% and 5%, and implicitly
selected the midpoint of 3.5%.175 The Gordian Experts,
however, provided no analysis or explanation in support
of the number they chose for the terminal growth rate.176
Because Bailey was the only expert who sought to justify
his conclusion, and his conclusion is within the range of
rates identified by Respondent's expert and appears to be
reasonable based on the evidence, I adopt Bailey's estimate of
a 4.5% perpetuity growth rate.
*22  The parties also disagree as to whether the Court should
use a two-stage or a three-stage DCF model. The Gordian
Experts used a two-stage model whereby, at the end of the
management projections in 2015, they estimated a single
percentage figure that they would use as a proxy for Cogent's
perpetual rate of growth beyond that period. Bailey, on the
other hand, “gradually step[ped] down Cogent's growth rate
using a linear progression over the period from 2016 through
the terminal year, 2021,” before applying his terminal growth
percentage.177
“As a general matter, neither approach is inherently
preferable.”178 Damodaran notes, however, that the two-stage
model “is best suited for firms that are in high growth and
expect to maintain that growth rate for a specific time period,
after which the sources of the high growth are expected to
disappear.”179 Damodaran provides two examples where this
might apply:
One scenario ... is when a company has patent rights to
a very profitable product for the next few years and is
expected to enjoy supernormal growth during this period.
Once the patent expires, it is expected to settle back into
stable growth. Another scenario where it may be reasonable
to make this assumption about growth is when a firm is in
an industry that is enjoying super-normal growth, because
there are significant barriers to entry (either legal or as a
consequence of infrastructure requirements), which can be
expected to keep new entrants out for several years.180
The three-stage model, on the other hand, “is the most general
of the models because it does not impose any restrictions on
the payout ratio. This model assumes an initial period of stable
high growth, a second period of declining growth, and a third
period of stable low growth that lasts forever.”181 Damodaran
notes that the three-stage model is best suited “for a firm
whose earnings are growing at very high rates, are expected
to continue growing at those rates for an initial period, but
are expected to start declining gradually toward a stable
rate as the firm become[s] large and loses its competitive
advantages.”182
Based on my assumptions, Cogent's earnings are expected to
grow at a high rate of 11.45% for the initial period before
moving to a stable growth rate of 4.5%.183 I expect that
decline will occur gradually as Cogent loses its competitive
advantages in the field. Cogent is not in an industry where
there are significant barriers that will disappear after 2015.
Nor does Respondent identify any other reason to assume
a precipitous drop-off. Accordingly, I believe that Bailey's
three-stage model best reflects Cogent's expected growth over
time and adopt that approach.
The following table represents my calculation of Cogent's
unlevered free cash flow for the years 2016 through 2021,
using a linear progression to step Cogent's growth rate down
to 4.5% in 2021:
Tabular or Graphical Material not displayable at this time
Discounting those values back to the Merger Date using the
WACC of 11.954% yields the following values:
Tabular or Graphical Material not displayable at this time
Thus, the sum of the present values of the cash flows for
2016–2020 is $111.5 million.
*23  Finally, using in the Gordon Growth Model equation
for the third and final period, a WACC of 11.954%, a
perpetuity growth rate of 4.5%, and free cash flows in 2021
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of $64.4 million, I calculated Cogent's terminal value to be
approximately $864 million.184 Discounting that value using
a WACC of 11.954% leads to a present value of the terminal
value of $276.7 million.
b. EBITDA multiples
“Multiples approaches assume that a company will be worth
some multiple of future earnings or book value in the
continuing period.”185 “[A] good industry comparison is
crucial if a multiplier methodology is employed.”186 Here,
the Gordian Experts selected a terminal EBITDA multiple
range of 6.5x to 8.5x using the companies in their comparable
companies analysis. Petitioners seek to exclude Respondent's
terminal multiples approach for many of the same reasons
they asserted in opposition to Respondent's other market
approaches. I agree with Petitioners' objections.
As discussed in Part II.C.1 supra, the comparable companies
selected by the Gordian Experts are not sufficiently
comparable to Cogent to support a reliable analysis and do not
provide a good industry comparison. There are also serious
evidentiary problems with Schiller's trial testimony on this
subject.187 As with the EBITDA multiples analysis of the
comparable companies, here only four of the purportedly
comparable companies have data from which to calculate an
equity value to estimated forward EBITDA ratio.188
Furthermore, Owsley's report on this issue is internally
inconsistent. At one point, the report states that its range
of 6.5x to 8.5x is “based on ... 1st and 3rd quartile 2011
EBITDA multiples.”189 Elsewhere, the report indicates that
the 1st and 3rd quartile 2011 EBITDA multiples were actually
7.5x to 9.8x.190 At trial, Schiller defended the selection of
multiples reflected in Owsley's report and described them as
a “judgment call” or an “educated estimate based on what
historical multiples have been adjusted for the sense that
growth will have slowed to something much closer to GDP
growth by that time.”191 Beyond that, however, the Gordian
Experts did not provide any authorities or analysis to justify
their use of an EBITDA multiples approach to determine
terminal value.
For these reasons, I reject Respondent's use of terminal
EBITDA multiples and instead rely solely on the Gordon
Growth Model for my determination of terminal value.
4. DCF Valuation
The following table represents the Court's calculation of the
valuation of Cogent using essentially Bailey's model, the
aforementioned assumptions, and Cogent's cash balance of
$533.2 million as of September 30, 2010192:
($ millions)
 
























In sum, the equity value of Cogent as of the Merger Date was
approximately $963.4 million. Assuming shares outstanding
of approximately 88.6 million,193 the price per share would
be $10.87.194
E. Are Petitioners Entitled to Statutory Interest at the
Legal Rate?
*24  Section 262(h) of the Delaware appraisal statute
provides:
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Unless the Court in its discretion determines otherwise for
good cause shown, interest from the effective date of the
merger through the date of payment of the judgment shall
be compounded quarterly and shall accrue at 5% over the
Federal Reserve discount rate (including any surcharge) as
established from time to time during the period between the
effective date of the merger and the date of payment of the
judgment.195
Nevertheless, “[a]dopting a different rate may be justified
where it is necessary to avoid an inequitable result, such as
where there has been improper delay or a bad faith assertion
of valuation claims.”196
Here, Respondent argues that this Court should not apply the
statutory rate of interest because: (1) awarding prejudgment
interest to shareholders who acquired shares after the
announcement of the acquisition would be an inequitable
result; and (2) Petitioners improperly delayed the resolution
of this action.
1. Petitioners' post-merger acquisition of shares
3M Cogent emphasizes that Petitioners acquired shares
after the Merger was announced. In such circumstances,
Respondent contends, it would be inequitable to award
interest at the legal rate because Delaware law disfavors the
purchase of a lawsuit and statutory interest is not intended to
benefit purchasers of after-acquired shares.
In Salomon Brothers Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp.,197 this
Court addressed whether one who purchases stock after notice
of a transaction is entitled to seek appraisal pursuant to 8 Del.
C. § 262. The Court stated:
I find nothing in the purpose or language of § 262 that
would defeat [petitioner's] entitlement to an appraisal and
I find nothing inequitable about an investor purchasing
stock in a company after a merger has been announced
with the thought that, if the merger is consummated on the
announced terms, the investor may seek appraisal.198
In other words, Delaware law does not disfavor the purchase
of shares after the announcement of a merger. Indeed, after
the trial in Salomon Brothers, the Court awarded an 11%
rate of interest to the petitioner.199 As 3M Cogent correctly
notes, however, the Court in Salomon Brothers did not address
whether any reduction or elimination of prejudgment interest
might be appropriate.
In support of denying Petitioners an award of statutory
interest, Respondent avers that statutory interest was not
intended to compensate shareholders who acquired their
shares after the merger was announced. In Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc.,200 for example, the Delaware Supreme
Court stated that “[t]he underlying assumption in an appraisal
valuation is that the dissenting shareholders would be willing
to maintain their investment position had the merger not
occurred.”201 In the same vein, Respondent relies on cases
that have recognized that the appraisal right was intended to
protect “stockholders—who by reason of the statute lost their
common law right to prevent a merger—by providing for the
appraisement of their stock and the payment to them of the
full value thereof in money.”202
*25  I am mindful, however, that statutory interest also
serves to avoid an undeserved windfall to the respondent
in an appraisal action, who “would otherwise have had free
use of money rightfully belonging to” the petitioners.203
Even though a respondent may have been cash-rich, “the
[respondent] derived a benefit from having the use of the
[petitioners'] funds at no cost.”204
In sum, the plain language of the appraisal statute calls for
the payment of statutory interest unless the Court determines
otherwise for good cause shown. Respondent, 3M Cogent,
has not shown that it would be inequitable for Petitioners to
receive the legal rate of interest for shares acquired after the
merger.205
2. Petitioners' purported “delay”
Respondent next argues that the Court should refuse to
award any interest for the period from April 28, 2011 to
February 2, 2012 because Petitioners unreasonably delayed
in prosecuting their case. Specifically, Respondent complains
that Petitioners failed to respond in a timely manner to certain
discovery requests, as well as to an inquiry by Respondent as
to whether Petitioners intended to proceed with this case.
Petitioners counter that Respondent cannot complain about
Petitioners' purported delay because Respondent itself failed
to move with alacrity. On November 11, 2011, Petitioners
proposed a schedule that called for a trial in April 2012.
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Notably, Respondent counter-offered, seeking a much later,
October 2012 trial date. In January 2012, after extensive
back-and-forth, I entered a stipulated scheduling order setting
the trial for September 5 through 7, 2012. As a result of
Owsley's unforeseen unavailability for medical reasons, I
later postponed the trial until late November 2012.
For a case of this size and complexity, the trial was
completed within a reasonable time period.206 Even with
some excusable delay, the trial was conducted within 20
months of the initial petition. Accordingly, I find that
Respondent has not shown any unreasonable or improper
delay and, therefore, deny Respondent's request to limit the
award of interest on that basis.
III. CONCLUSION
*26  For the reasons discussed in this Memorandum Opinion,
I find that the fair value of Cogent as of December 1, 2010
was $963.4 million or $10.87 per share.
The parties should confer to verify that the Court accurately
has calculated Cogent's value based on the rulings herein and,
assuming that it has, present a final judgment using an amount
of $10.87 per share of Cogent, plus interest from December
1, 2010 to the date of the judgment at the statutory rate,
compounded quarterly. Petitioners shall submit, on notice,
a proposed form of final judgment within ten (10) business
days.
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109 JX 153 at 2. Revenues for the first three quarters of 2009 had been $91.7 million. Id.
110 $78.2 × 4/3 = $104.3
111 See, e.g.,In re Celera Corp. S'holder Litig., 2012 WL 1020471, at *19 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23, 2012) (describing the assumption
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5173804, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009) (“[I]t is plainly disclosed that Goldman treated stock-based compensation as a
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1752847, at *30 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004).
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125 SeeCede & Co. v. JRC Acq. Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (“Under CAPM the cost of equity is
equal to the risk-free rate (the yield on 20 year Treasury bonds) plus a large company equity risk premium multiplied by
the specific company adjusted beta.... Added to this figure is an equity size premium.”).
126 See JX 1 app. I n.4; JX 2 at 47–48; United States Department of the Treasury, Daily Treasury
Yield Curve Rates, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/TextView.aspx?
data=yieldYear&year=2010 (last visited May 16, 2013).
127 See JX 2 at 48 (Bailey's Rep.: “[T]he 10–year or 20–year Treasury bond yield is used as the risk-free rate of return.”); Tr.
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year Treasury bonds)....”).
129 See Aswath Damodaran, The Dark Side of Valuation 149 (2d ed. 2010); Aswath Damodaran, What Is the Riskfree Rate? A
Search for the Basic Building Blocks, at 10 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://people.stern.nyu.edu/
adamodar/pdfiles/papers/riskfreerate.pdf (“[T]his would lead to use [of] the 10–year treasury bond rate as the riskfree
rate on all cash flows for most mature firms.”). But cf. id. at 9–10 (“The duration of equity will rise for higher growth firms
and could be as high as 20–25 years for young firms with negative cash flows in the initial years. In valuing these firms,
an argument can be made that we should be using a 30–year treasury bond rate as the riskfree rate.”).
130 Koller et al., Valuation, supra note 119, at 236–38 (“For U.S.-based corporate valuation, the most common proxy is 10–
year government STRIPS.”). But see Shannon Pratt & Alina Niculita, The Lawyer's Business Valuation Handbook 24–25
(2d ed. 2010) (“As noted earlier, the risk-free rate usually is a yield-to-maturity rate available on U.S. Treasury securities
as of the effective valuation date. Analysts usually use one of three maturities: 30–day, five-year, or 20–year. These
maturities are used because they are the maturities for which [Ibbotson] has developed matching general equity risk
premium series.... Analysts generally prefer the 20–year maturity. They recognize that it has an element of risk called
horizon risk, or interest rate risk, meaning that the value of the principal will fluctuate with changing levels of interest
rates, but investors generally accept this risk. The longer rates are preferable partly because they are more stable over
time and less subject to short-term influences. Also, the longer maturity more closely matches the assumed long life of
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131 Eugene Brigham & Michael Ehrhardt, Financial Management 347 (12th ed. 2008).
132 Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 521 (Del. Ch. 2010).
133 Id.
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137 JX 2 at 51.
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million being in either short term or long term investments in marketable securities. See JX 3 at 43; JX 153 at 3, 9.
144 $533.2 million - $50 million = $483.2 million.
145 $868.7 million - 483.2 million = $385.5 million.
146 ($868.7 million / $385.5 million) = 2.253.
147 Marshall E. Blume, On the Assessment of Risk, 26 J. Fin. 1, 10 (1971); see also Pratt & Grabowski, supra note 138, at 167.
148 See Pratt & Grabowski, supra note 138, at 203 (“An alternative adjustment that is used by Bloomberg and Value Line
adjusts the historical beta to a “forward” estimated beta by averaging the historical beta estimate by two-thirds and the
market beta of 1.0 by one-third.”); Koller et al., Valuation, supra note 119, at 253 (“For well-defined industries, an industry
beta will suffice. But if few direct comparables exist, an alternative is beta smoothing.”).
149 #COGT = (# x 1) + (2/3 x 1.595) = 1.397.
150 JX 2 at 55–56.
151 JX 1 app. I.
152 JX 2 at 55–56.
153 JX 1 app. I.
154 Tr. 630 (Schiller) (“Q. Your equity risk premium used a rate of 5 percent; right? A. Yes. Q. Your report doesn't explain
how ... that [equity risk premium] was calculated, does it? A. No, it does not. Q. It doesn't explain whether it's a historic
equity risk premium or a supply-side equity risk premium, does it? A. No. Q. Do you know which one it is? A. I'm not
familiar with those analyses. The stuff I've seen does not draw a distinction between those two.”).
155 Selection of a supply-side equity risk premium is consistent with prior decisions by this Court. See, e.g., In re Orchard
Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *19 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (“I therefore find that the Ibbotson Yearbook's supply-
side equity risk premium of 5.2% is an appropriate metric to be applied in valuing Orchard under the CAPM.”); Gearreald
v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 WL 1569818, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012) (“[A]lthough experts and this Court traditionally
have applied the historical equity risk premium, the academic community in recent years has gravitated toward greater
support for utilizing the supply side equity risk premium.”); Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 517 (Del.
Ch. 2010) (referring to the Court's adoption of a supply-side equity risk premium, the Court stated “when the relevant
professional community has mined additional data and pondered the reliability of past practice and come, by a healthy
weight of reasoned opinion, to believe that a different practice should become the norm, this court's duty is to recognize
that practice if, in the court's lay estimate, the practice is the most reliable available for use in an appraisal”).
156 Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 2012 WL 1569818, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012).
157 In re Orchard Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *21.
158 JX 1 at 29; JX 2 at 57, 84 n.6.
159 JX 2 at 57; Ibbotson SBBI, 2010 Valuation Yearbook, Market Results for Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation 1926–2009.
Cogent's market capitalization at the time of the Merger was approximately $931 million.
160 Ibbotson SBBI, 2010 Valuation Yearbook, Market Results for Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation 1926–2009.
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161 See, e.g., Pratt & Grabowski, supra note 138, at 233 (“Morningstar, Inc. [the parent of Ibbotson], segregates New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) stock returns into deciles by size, as measured by the aggregate market value of common
equity.” (emphasis added)); id. at 240 (“Traditionally, researchers have used market value of equity as a measure of
size in conducting historical rates of return research. For instance, this is the basis of the small-company return series
published in the SBBI Yearbooks.” (emphasis added)); James R. Hitchner, Financial Valuation: Applications and Models
247 (3d ed. 2011) (noting that in the Valuation Yearbook “Ibbotson presents index-based returns weighted on the market
capitalization of each stock”).
162 See, e.g.,In re Orchard Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *21 (“The Ibbotson Yearbook divides the stock returns of public
companies into deciles by size, measured by the aggregate market value of the companies' common equity.” (emphasis
added)); Cede & Co. v. JRC Acq. Corp.,2004 WL 286963, at *8 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (selecting “market capitalization”
as the benchmark over “fair value implied market capitalization”); In re Sunbelt Beverage Corp. S'holder Litig., 2010 WL
26539, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2010) (“The Ibbotson table assumes one already knows or has an estimate of a company's
market capitalization. Based on that knowledge or estimate, one can determine which decile the company falls into and
then select the corresponding premium from the Ibbotson table.”).
163 Tr. 565 (Schiller). Schiller also admitted that he was “not aware of any authority” that says that when looking at a company's
market capitalization, it's appropriate to adjust it based on its cash. Id. at 631.
164 Id. at 566.
165 See Tr. 201 (Bailey) (“Those tables were developed all from seminal work that was done by Professor Rolf Banz back in
1981, in which Professor Banz did a seminal paper on adjusting the risk value of a company based upon the market value
of the company.”); Rolf Banz, The Relationship Between Returns and Market Value of Common Stock, 9 J. Fin. Econ. 3
(1981) (“The results show that, in the 1936–1975 period, the common stock of small firms had, on average, higher risk-
adjusted returns than the common stock of large firms.”).
166 See Duff & Phelps, Risk Premium Report 2013 (18th ed. 2013).
167 Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 511 (Del. Ch. 2010).
168 Gholl v. Emachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004).
169 Id.
170 JX 1 at 32.
171 Pratt & Grabowski, supra note 138, at 30–34.
172 SeeGolden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d at 511; see alsoLane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2004 WL 1752847, at
*31 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004) (“I find [the] assumption that no growth would occur beyond the projected five-year period
unreasonable; it must be assumed that [the company] would continue to grow at least at the rate of inflation.”).
173 Bradford Cornell, Corporate Valuation: Tools for Effective Appraisal and Decision Making 146–47 (1993).
174 JX 2 at 58–60 (citing Ian Wyatt & Kathryn Byun, The U.S. Economy to 2018: From Recession to Recovery, Monthly Labor
Review (Nov. 2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2009/11/art2full.pdf; Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia,
The Livingston Survey (2010), available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/livingston-
survey/2010/livdec10.pdf).
175 JX 1 at 31–33, 50, 86.
176 Tr. 635–36 (Schiller) (“Q. And you don't have any specific explanation as to why the growth rate drops from 9.2 percent to
2 to 5 percent, do you? A. No.... Q. ... [Y]ou don't provide any analysis in connection with the opinion that you're offering
to the Court as to what GDP would be in the future, do you? A. No, we don't. Q. And you didn't consult any authorities
as to what terminal growth rate should be in 2015 or beyond, do you? A. No. We see these numbers often, but we didn't
consult any authorities, no.”).
177 JX 2 at 20.
178 Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 WL 2045640, at *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005).
179 Aswath Damodaran, Investment Valuation: Tools and Techniques for Determining the Value of Any Asset 329 (3d ed.
2012).
180 Id. at 331.
181 Id. at 340.
182 Id. at 342.
183 Using management's projections, Bailey calculated a CAGR of 11.45% for the period 2009 through 2015. JX 2 at 21.
184 $64.4/11.954% - 4.5 % = ~$864
185 Koller et al., Valuation, supra note 119, at 227.
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186 Crescent/Mach I P'ship, L.P. v. Turner, 2007 WL 2801387, at *14 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2007).
187 See supra Part II.C.3.
188 JX 1 at 44, 74.
189 Id. at 86 n.1.
190 Id. at 44.
191 Tr. 580, 636–37.
192 See JX 3 at 43; JX 153 at 3, 9.
193 There were 88.616 million shares issued and outstanding as of November 2, 2012. See JX 157 at 2.
194 $963.4/88.6 = $10.87
195 8 Del. C. § 262(h); see alsoid. § 262(i) (“The Court shall direct the payment of the fair value of the shares, together with
interest, if any.”).
196 In re Appraisal of Metromedia Int'l Gp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 907 (Del. Ch. 2009).
197 576 A.2d 650 (Del. Ch. 1989), appeal refused,571 A.2d 787, 1990 WL 18152 (Del. 1990) (ORDER).
198 Id. at 654.
199 Solomon Bros. Inc. v. Interstate Bakeries Corp., 1992 WL 94367, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 4, 1992).
200 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996).
201 Id. at 298 (citing Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1145 (Del. 1989)).
202 Schenley Indus., Inc. v. Curtis, 152 A.2d 300, 301 (Del.1959) (citing Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del.
Ch.1934)).
203 Lane v. Cancer Treatment Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2004 WL 1752847, at *36 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2004); see alsoGholl v.
Emachines, Inc., 2004 WL 2847865, at *18 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2004) (“An award of interest serves two purposes. It
compensates the petitioner for the loss of use of its capital during the pendency of the appraisal process and causes the
disgorgement of the benefit respondent has enjoyed during the same period.” (emphasis added)).
204 Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 705 (Del. Ch. 1996), aff'd,693 A.2d 1082, 1997 WL 188351 (Del. 1997)
(ORDER).
205 In a footnote, Respondent argues that in the current interest rate environment—where the statutory rate of interest is
more than seven times the federal discount rate—Petitioners have distorted incentives to seek appraisal. There are risks
to both sides in an appraisal proceeding, however, and the applicable interest rate is only one of them. Moreover, “[i]t
is beyond the province of courts to question the policy or wisdom of an otherwise valid law. Rather, [I] must take and
apply the law as [I] find it, leaving any desirable changes to the General Assembly.” Sheehan v. Oblates of St. Francis
de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247, 1259 (Del. 2011).
206 SeeIn re Appraisal of Metromedia Int'l Gp., Inc., 971 A.2d 893, 907 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“For example, petitioners cannot
point to unreasonable or improper delay, as this matter was tried before the Court roughly one year after the first
appraisal petition was filed, a remarkably short period of time by appraisal litigation standards.”). Although the Court
is working to reduce the average time to trial in the future, recent appraisal actions have taken longer than this case.
See, e.g.,Towerview LLC v. Cox Radio, Inc., 2013 WL 3316186 (Del. Ch. June 28, 2013) (39 months to trial); Highfields
Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34 (Del. Ch. 2007) (30 months to trial).
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
GLASSCOCK, Vice Chancellor
*1  This case presents what has become a common scenario
in this Court: a robust marketing effort for a corporate entity
results in an arm's length sale where the stockholders are
cashed out, which sale is recommended by an independent
board of directors and adopted by a substantial majority of the
stockholders themselves. On the heels of the sale, dissenters
(here, actually, arbitrageurs who bought, not into an ongoing
concern, but instead into this lawsuit) seek statutory appraisal
of their shares. A trial follows, at which the dissenters/
petitioners present expert testimony opining that the stock
was wildly undervalued in the merger, while the company/
respondent presents an expert, just as distinguished and
learned, to tell me that the merger price substantially exceeds
fair value. Because of the peculiarities of the allocation of
the burden of proof in appraisal actions—essentially, residing
with the judge—it becomes my task in such a case to consider
“all relevant factors” and determine the fair value of the
petitioners' shares.
Here, my focus is the fair value of shares of common
stock in BMC Software, Inc. (“BMC” or the “Company”)
circa September 2013, when BMC was taken private by a
consortium of investment firms (the “Merger”), including
Bain Capital, LLC, Golden Gate Private Equity, Inc., and
Insight Venture Management, LLC (together, the “Buyer
Group”). Our Supreme Court has clarified that, in appraisal
actions, this Court must not begin its analysis with a
presumption that a particular valuation method is appropriate,
but must instead examine all relevant methodologies and
factors, consistent with the appraisal statute.1 Relevant to my
analysis here are the sales price generated by the market, and
the (dismayingly divergent) discounted cash flow valuations
presented by the parties' experts (only Respondent's expert
conducted an analysis based on comparable companies, and
only as a “check” on his DCF valuation). Upon consideration
of these factors in light of a record generated at trial, I find
it appropriate to look to the price generated by the market
through a thorough and vigorous sales process as the best





BMC is a software company—one of the largest in
the world at the time of the Merger—specializing in
software for information technology (“IT”) management.3
Specifically, BMC sells and services a broad portfolio of
software products designed to “simplif[y] and automate[ ]
the management of IT processes, mainframe, distributed,
virtualized and cloud computing environments, as well as
applications and databases.”4 In addition, the Company
provides professional consulting services related to its
products, including “implementation, integration, IT process,
organizational design, process re-engineering and education
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services.”5 From fiscal years 2011 to 2013,6 BMC's software
sales, which it offers through either perpetual or term licenses,
accounted for approximately 40% of total revenues, which
share was steadily decreasing leading up to the Merger;
BMC's maintenance and support services, which it offers
through term contracts, accounted for approximately 50% of
total revenues, which share was steadily increasing leading up
to the Merger; and BMC's consultation services accounted for
approximately 10% of total revenues, which share was also
steadily increasing leading up to the Merger.7
*2  The Company is organized into two primary business
units: Mainframe Service Management (“MSM”) and
Enterprise Service Management (“ESM”).8 As explained
by BMC's CEO and Chairman Robert Beauchamp, MSM
consists primarily of two product categories: mainframe
products, which are designed to maintain and improve the
efficiency and performance of IBM mainframe computers;
and workload automation products, which are designed
to orchestrate the multitude of back-end “jobs”—each a
series of executions of specific computer programs—that
a computer system must perform to carry out a complex
computing process, such as a large corporation running its bi-
weekly payroll.9 ESM, on the other hand, is concerned more
with providing targeted software solutions to a business's
needs, and consists primarily of the Company's consulting
division as well as three product categories: performance
and availability products, which are designed to alert BMC's
customers in real time as to delays and outages among their
non-mainframe computer systems, and to diagnose and fix
the underlying problems; data center automation products,
which are designed to automate BMC customers' routine tasks
concerning the design, construction, and maintenance of data
centers, both in local data centers and cloud data centers;
and IT service management products, which are designed to
assist BMC's customers troubleshoot their own customers' IT
problems.10 In each of fiscal years 2011, 2012, and 2013,
MSM and ESM accounted for approximately 38% and 62%
of BMC's total revenues, respectively.11
2. Stunted but Stable Performance
Beauchamp and BMC's CFO Stephen Solcher both testified
that, at the time of the Merger, BMC's business faced
significant challenges to growth due to shifting technologies.
Foremost, MSM was in a state of stagnation, as hardly any
businesses were buying into the outdated, so-called “legacy”
technology at the heart of MSM products and services
—the IBM mainframe computer—and indeed some of
BMC's MSM customers were moving away from mainframe
technology altogether.12 Even though the market's migration
away from the heavily entrenched mainframe computer was
expected to continue at only a crawl—in the words of
Beauchamp, a “very slow, inexorable decline”—the steadily
falling price of new mainframe computers meant that BMC
still faced shrinking margins in renewing MSM product
licenses with customers that stayed with the technology.13
BMC had managed to ease the downward pressure on its
MSM business by increasing the number of products it sold
to each customer that remained with MSM,14 but this side of
the business remained flat, at best, in the years leading up to
the Merger.15
As a result of the decline in mainframe computing, BMC had
become entirely dependent on its ESM business for growth.16
Specifically, Solcher identified ESM license bookings as
the primary driver of growth for the Company.17 However,
the ESM side of BMC's business faced its own challenges,
principally high levels of competition—from a handful of the
most established software companies in the world to a sea
of startups—brought on by the constant innovation of ESM
technologies, which competition in turn created significantly
lower margins on the ESM side of the business.18
Notwithstanding these challenges to its growth, BMC's
business remained relatively stable leading up to the Merger,
aided in part by BMC's role as an industry leader in
several categories of products, in part by the overall
diversity and “stickiness” of its products, and in part by its
multiyear, subscription-based business model, which spreads
its customer-retention risk over several years.19 In fiscal years
2011, 2012, and 2013, BMC generated total revenues of $2.07
billion, $2.17 billion, and $2.20 billion, respectively, and net
earnings of $456.20 million, $401.00 million, and $331.00
million, respectively.20 During this period, total bookings
remained essentially flat, while ESM license bookings fell
11.3% from fiscal years 2011 to 2012 and another 1.2% from
fiscal years 2012 to 2013.21
3. M & A Activity
*3  The primary way that BMC has historically dealt
with the high rate of innovation and competition in the IT
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management software industry is to lean heavily on mergers
and acquisitions (“M & A”) to grow and compete.22 Along
with a corporate department devoted solely to M & A, the
Company maintained a standing M & A committee among
its board of directors that met quarterly to oversee the
Company's M & A activity (the “M & A Committee”), which
Beauchamp explained was designed to spur the Company's
management to continuously and rapidly seek out and execute
favorable transactions.23 Management played an active role
in all M & A activity, but formal decision-making authority
was stratified across the board, the M & A Committee, and
management based on the size of potential transactions (as
estimated by management): deals over $50 million were
evaluated and recommended by the M & A Committee and
had to be approved by the board as a whole; deals between
$20 million and $50 million were evaluated by the M & A
Committee and could be approved by that Committee without
prior approval or consideration by the board; and transactions
under $20 million could be evaluated and approved by
management, without prior approval or consideration of the
M & A Committee or the board.24
At trial, Beauchamp and Solcher both conceptually clustered
the Company's M & A activity into two general categories,
what they referred to as “strategic” transactions and “tuck-in”
transactions.25 As they described it, strategic transactions are
large “move-the-needle type transactions,”26 ones that would
change the Company in a fundamental way, such as acquiring
a new business unit.27 These types of transactions were
relatively rare for the Company, it having only engaged in one
such acquisition in the five years leading up to the Merger
—the approximately $800 million acquisition of a company
called “BladeLogic” in fiscal year 2009, through which BMC
acquired its current data center automation business.28 Tuck-
in transactions, on the other hand, are everything else—
smaller transactions by which the Company would buy an
individual product or technology that it could “tuck in” or
“bolt on” to an existing business unit.29
As explained by Beauchamp and Solcher, it was these latter,
smaller acquisitions that formed the basis of BMC's inorganic
growth strategy.30 The Company carried out over a dozen
tuck-in transactions in the years leading up to the Merger:
three deals totaling $117 million in fiscal year 2008; one deal
totaling $6 million in fiscal year 2009, the same year of the
$800 million acquisition of BladeLogic; three deals totaling
$97 million in fiscal year 2010; two deals totaling $54 million
in fiscal year 2011; six deals totaling $477 million in fiscal
year 2012; and one deal totaling $7 million in fiscal year
2013, the year in which BMC began and ran much of the sales
process for the Merger.31 Beauchamp and Solcher explained
that, had the Company remained public, it had every intention
of continuing its tuck-in M & A activity into the future,32
and indeed the M & A Committee's presentation materials
throughout fiscal year 2013 and into fiscal year 2014, after
BMC had agreed to the Merger, identified dozens of tuck-in
merger targets of varying sizes and stages of development in
the Company's M & A pipeline.33
4. Stock–Based Compensation
*4  Like many technology companies, in order to attract and
maintain talented employees, BMC compensated a significant
portion of their employees using stock-based compensation
(“SBC”).34 The Company had two forms of SBC: (1) time-
based stock options that vested over a specific period of
time, which the Company valued using the price of BMC's
stock on the date of the grant;35 and (2) performance-based
stock options, reserved for select executives, that vested based
on the performance of BMC's stock compared to a broad
index and were valued using a Monte Carlo simulation which
accounted for the likelihood that the performance targets
would be met.36 The Company expensed the fair value of
the stock options, less expected amount of forfeitures, on a
straight-line basis over the vesting period.37 SBC expense
grew substantially each year and in 2013 was approximately
seven percent as a percentage of revenue.38
Because the Company believed SBC was vital to maintaining
the strength of its employee base, management had no plans
to stop issuing SBC had it remained a public company.39
5. Financial Statements
a. Regular Management Projections
BMC in the ordinary course of business created financial
projections—which it called its “annual plan”40—for the
upcoming fiscal year.41 Under the oversight of Solcher,42
management began formulating its annual plan in October
using a bottom-up approach that involved multiple layers of
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management representing each business unit.43 Preliminary
projections were presented to the board in the fourth quarter,44
who then used a top-down approach to provide input before
the annual plan was finalized.45
The annual plan was limited to internal use and represented
optimistic goals that set a high bar for future performance.46
Although management intended the projections to be a
“stretch” and the Company often did, in fact, fail to meet its
goals, management maintained that meeting the projections
included in its annual plan was always attainable.47
Also in October of each year, BMC would begin to prepare
high-level three-year projections that were not as detailed as
the one-year annual plan.48 Additionally, as part of a separate
process, the finance group prepared detailed three-year
projections that Solcher presented to ratings agencies, usually
on an annual basis.49 Although the projections presented to
the ratings agencies were prepared in the ordinary course of
business, they were prepared under the direction of Solcher
and were not subject to the same top-down scrutiny as the
high-level three-year projections.50
b. Reliability of Projected Revenue from Multiyear Contracts
*5  Although management's projections required many
forecasts and assumptions, BMC benefited from the
predictability of their subscription-based business model.
A significant amount of the Company's revenue derived
from multiyear contracts that typically spanned a period
of five to seven years.51 Depending on the nature of
the contract, the Company did not immediately recognize
revenue for the entire contract price in the year of sale.52
Instead, general accounting principles dictated that the sales
price be proportionately recognized over the life of the
contract.53 Therefore, upon the signing of certain multiyear
contracts—such as an ESM or MSM software license54—
the Company recorded deferred revenue as an asset on the
balance sheet and then, in each year for the life of the contract,
recognized revenue for a portion of the contract.55 As a result,
management was able to reliably predict a significant portion
of revenue from multiyear contracts many years into the
future.
c. Management Projections Leading Up to the Merger
BMC created multiple sets of financial projections leading up
to the Merger. In July 2012, BMC began preparing detailed
multiyear projections as the Company began exploring
various strategic alternatives, including a potential sale of
the Company.56 Building off of the 2013 annual plan,
management created three-year financial projections using
a similar top-down and bottom-up approach that was
historically employed to create the Company's internal
annual plan.57 Consistent with their regular approach,
management used optimistic forecasts in their detailed
multiyear projections.58 In October 2012, management
finalized their first set of projections (the “October
Projections”) that were included in a data pack used by the
financial advisors to shop the Company.59
As discussed in more detail below, the Company quickly
abandoned their initial efforts to sell the company. In January
2013, however, following poor financial results in the third
quarter, BMC again decided to explore strategic alternatives,
requiring management to update the October Projections.60 In
February, using the same approach, the Company revised the
multiyear projections (the “February Projections”), resulting
in lower projected results that were provided to the financial
advisors to create a second data pack.61 Finally, in April,
management provided the financial advisors a slight update
to their projections (the “April Projections”), on which the
financial advisors ultimately based their fairness opinion and
used to create a final data pack.62 The financial advisors
also extrapolated the April Projections to extend the forecast
period an additional two years, creating a total of five years
of projections that were provided to potential buyers.63
d. SBC in Management Projections
As I have described above, SBC was an integral part of BMC's
business before the Merger and management had no reason
to believe that SBC would decrease if the Company had
remained public. Additionally, because BMC had a regular
practice of buying shares to offset dilution, management
believed SBC was a true cost and, therefore, included SBC
expense in their detailed projections.64 With the help of
human resources and third-party compensation consultants,
management projected SBC expenses of $162 million for
- 538 -
Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2015)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5
both fiscal years 2014 and 2015, and $156 million for fiscal
year 2016.65
e. M & A in Management Projections
*6  Management believed tuck-in M & A was integral to
the Company's revenue growth and, therefore, its projected
revenues took into account continued growth from tuck-in M
& A transactions.66 Furthermore, management believed that
BMC would continue investing in tuck-in M & A if it had
remained a public company.67 Since growth from tuck-in M
& A was built into their revenue projections, management
also included projected tuck-in M & A expenditures.68 Larger
strategic deals, however, were too difficult to predict and
were, therefore, excluded from management's projections.69
Based on the first three quarters of M & A activity in
fiscal year 2014, management projected $200 million in total
tuck-in M & A expense for fiscal year 2014 and, based on
the Company's historical average tuck-in M & A activity,
management projected $150 million in M & A expenditures
for both fiscal years 2015 and 2016.70
B. The Sales Process
1. Pressure from Activist Stockholder
In May 2012, in response to “sluggish growth” and
“underperformance,” activist investors Elliott Associates,
L.P. and Elliott International, L.P. (together, “Elliot”)
disclosed that Elliot had increased its equity stake in BMC
to 5.5% with the intent to urge the Company to pursue
a sale.71 To accelerate a sales process, Elliott commenced
a proxy contest and proposed a slate of four directors to
be elected to BMC's board.72 According to Beauchamp,
BMC's CEO, Elliot's engagement had a negative impact on
the Company's business operations: BMC's competitors used
customer concerns as a tool to steal business; it hurt BMC's
ability to recruit and retain sales employees; and it generally
damaged BMC's reputation in the marketplace.73
On July 2, 2012, after discussions with other large
stockholders, BMC agreed to a settlement with Elliott that
ended its proxy contest.74 Under the settlement, the Company
agreed to increase the size of the board from ten to twelve
directors and to nominate John Dillion and Jim Schaper
—two members of Elliott's proposed slate—as directors at
the upcoming annual meeting.75 In return, Elliott agreed
to immediately terminate its proxy contest and agreed to
a standstill agreement that restricted Elliott's ability to
initiate similar significant stockholder engagement moving
forward.76
2. The Company on the Market
a. The First Auction
In July 2012, in conjunction with its settlement with Elliott,
BMC's board formed a committee (the “Strategic Review
Committee”) to explore all potential strategic options that
could create shareholder value, including a sale.77 BMC
retained Bank of America Merrill Lynch to help explore
strategic options and to alleviate any concerns that Morgan
Stanley, the Company's longstanding financial advisor, was
too close to management.78
*7  On August 28, 2012, the board instructed Beauchamp
to begin contacting potential strategic buyers and instructed
the team of financial advisors to begin contacting potential
financial buyers to gage their interest in an acquisition.79
Even though all potential strategic buyers ultimately declined
to submit an initial indication of interest, BMC received two
non-binding indications of interest from potential financial
buyers: one from Bain Capital, LLC (“Bain”) for $45–47 per
share and one for $48 per share from a team of financial
sponsors (the “Alternate Sponsor Group”).80
The Strategic Review Committee evaluated the indications of
interest and, encouraged by BMC's improved financial results
in the second quarter of fiscal year 2013,81 unanimously
recommended that the board reject the offers.82 On October
29, 2012, the board unanimously rejected a sale of the
Company and, instead, approved a $1 billion accelerated
share repurchase plan that was publicly announced two days
later.83
b. The Second Auction
Despite the Company's renewed confidence following
improved quarterly results, in December 2012 Elliott sent
- 539 -
Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2015)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6
a letter to the board that expressed continued skepticism of
management's plans and reiterated its belief that additional
drastic measures, like a sale, were required to maximize
stockholder value.84 Shortly thereafter, BMC reported
sluggish third quarter financial results which revealed that
management's previous financial projections—specifically
ESM license bookings—had been overly optimistic.85
The board called a special meeting on January 14, 2013
to reevaluate their options, which included three strategic
opportunities: (1) a strategic acquisition of Company A,
another large software company; (2) a modified execution
plan that included less implied growth and deep budget
cuts; and (3) a renewed sales process targeted at the
previously interested financial buyers.86 The board decided
to pursue all three strategies. In late January, building on
previous consulting work provided by BMC's management
consultants, the Company began implementing Project
Stanley Cup, which mainly focused on reducing costs to
increase BMC's margins and earnings per share.87 In addition,
the Company reached out to Company A regarding a potential
acquisition of Company A by BMC. Although their initial
meetings led to preliminary interest, the diligence efforts
moved slowly and finally, following Company A's poor
financial performance, BMC abandoned their pursuit of an
acquisition.88
In March 2013, after contacting potential financial buyers,89
the Company received expressions of interest from three
buyers: one from a new financial sponsor (“Financial Sponsor
A”) for $42–44 per share, one from the Alternate Sponsor
Group for $48 per share, and one from Bain, who had received
permission to partner with Golden Gate to form the Buyer
Group, for $46–47 per share.90 Despite encouragement from
BMC's financial advisors, Financial Sponsor A declined to
increase its bid and was, therefore, not invited to proceed
with due diligence.91 In early April, the Alternate Sponsor
Group told the Company's financial advisors that it could not
make the April 22 deadline the Company had established and
needed more time to complete due diligence.92 The board
decided that it was important to keep the Alternate Sponsor
Group engaged and thus continue negotiations.93 On April
18, one of the financial sponsors dropped out of the process
leaving its former partner to consider proceeding with a
valuation that was closer to the then current trading price of
$43.75 and requesting an extension of one month to submit
a bid.94
*8  On April 24, 2013, the Buyer Group submitted a bid of
$45.25.95 Over the next two days, the board met with the
financial advisors to consider the developments and voted to
create an ad hoc planning committee to review alternative
options in the event a transaction was not approved or failed
to close.96 On April 26, the financial advisors requested that
the Buyer Group increase their price to at least $48 and that
their bid also include a 30–day go-shop period.97 On that
same day, the Buyer Group responded with a counteroffer of
$45.75 that included a 30–day go-shop period.98 Following
further pushback from BMC's financial advisors, on April 27,
the Buyer Group responded with their final offer of $46.25.99
3. The Company Accepts the Buyer Group's Offer
Starting on April 27, 2013 and continuing over the next
few days, the board met with the financial advisors to
discuss the details of the Buyer Group's final offer, which
included: a 30–day go-shop period that started upon signing
the Merger agreement; a two-tiered termination fee of a 2%
and 3%; and a 6% reverse termination fee.100 On May 3,
the financial advisors presented their fairness opinion to the
board, opining that the transaction was fair from a financial
standpoint.101 On that same day, the board approved the
signing of the Merger agreement and recommended that
BMC's stockholders approve the Merger, which was formerly
announced on May 6.102
The go-shop period lasted from May 6, 2013 through June 5,
2013.103 During this period, the financial advisors contacted
both financial and strategic entities—many of whom were
contacted during the first and second sales processes104—
and, in addition, the board waived any provisions pursuant to
standstill agreements that would have prohibited a potential
bidder from reengaging with the Company.105 Despite
these efforts, only two parties entered into confidentiality
agreements and, ultimately, no alternative proposals were
submitted.106
On May 10, 2013, a group of stockholders brought a breach
of fiduciary duty action to challenge the sales process.107
On June 25, BMC filed its definitive proxy statement that
urged stockholders to vote in favor of the Merger.108 The
stockholders approved the transaction on July 24 with 67%
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of the outstanding shares voting in favor.109 On September
10, the Merger closed. On April 28, 2014 this Court approved
a settlement between stockholders and the Company and
described the sales process as fair and the Revlon claims as
weak.110
C. The Expert Opinions
The Petitioners' expert witness, Borris J. Steffen, exclusively
relied on the discounted cash flow (DCF?) method and
determined that the fair value of BMC was $67.08 per
share;111 that is, 145% of the Merger price and 148% of
the pre-announcement market price.112 Steffen considered
using other methodologies, such as the comparable company
method and the comparable transaction method, but
ultimately decided that those methodologies were not
appropriate given the specific facts in this case.113
*9  The Respondent's expert witness, Richard S. Ruback,
similarly relied on the DCF method to conclude that the
fair value of BMC was $37.88 per share,114 16% below
the pre-announcement market price and little more than half
the fair value as determined by Steffen. In addition, Ruback
performed two “reality checks” to test his DCF valuation
for reasonableness: first, he performed a DCF analysis using
projections derived from a collection of Wall Street analysts
that regularly followed the Company, which he called the
“street case”; second, he performed a comparable companies
analysis using trading multiples from selected publicly-traded
software companies.115
Although the difference between the experts' estimates is
large, the contrasting prices are the result of a few different
assumptions, which I now describe below.116
1. Financial Projections
Steffen based his calculation of free cash flow on
management's projections for 2014 through 2018 that BMC
reported in its proxy statement dated June 25, 2013.117
He concluded the use of management's projections was
reasonable based on his analysis of other contemporaneous
projections prepared by management; BMC's historical
operating results; and the economic outlook for the software
industry.118
Ruback, however, concluded that management's projections
were biased by “overoptimism” and, therefore, reduced
management's revenue projections used in his calculation
of free cash flow by 5%.119 He believed this reduction
was appropriate because, although management thought
their projections were “reasonable,” a DCF model requires
projections that are expected.120 Ruback's adjustment
decreased his valuation by approximately $2.82 per share.121
2. Discount Rate
Steffen used a discount rate of 10.5% while Ruback used a
discount rate of 11.1%. The difference in discount rates is
almost entirely explained by the experts' contrasting views
of the equity risk premium (“ERP”). Steffen calculated his
discount rate using a supply-side ERP of 6.11%, which
he believed was preferable since valuation calculations are
forward-looking.122 Ruback calculated his discount rate
using the long-run historical ERP of 6.7%.123 Ruback used
the long-run historical ERP because he believed it is the most
generally accepted ERP and that any model that attempts
to estimate future ERP is subject to intolerable estimation
errors.124
3. Terminal Growth Rate
*10  Steffen selected a long-term growth rate of 3.75%.125
To determine this number, Steffen first created a range of rates
between expected long-run inflation of 2% and nominal GDP
rate of 4.5%.126 Steffen ultimately concluded that BMC's
long-term growth rate would be 50 basis points greater than
the midpoint between this range.127 Ruback used a rate
of inflation of 2.3% as his long-term growth rate because
he believed that the real cash flows of the business would
stay constant in the long run;128 he viewed BMC as a
“mature software business” in a “mature part of the software
industry.”129
4. Excess Cash
Steffen used an excess cash value of $1.42 billion, which
he calculated by reducing cash and cash equivalents as of
September 10, 2013 by the minimum cash required for BMC
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to operate of $350 million.130 Steffen did not account for
repatriation of foreign cash because he believed that it was the
Company's policy—as publicly disclosed in its 10–K filings
—to maintain its cash balance overseas indefinitely.131
Ruback started with cash and cash equivalents as of June 30,
2013132 and, in addition to the same $350 million deduction
for required operating expenses, further reduced excess cash
by $213 million to account for the tax consequences of
repatriating the cash held in foreign jurisdictions that the
Company would be forced to pay tax in order to access it in
the United States.133
5. Stock–Based Compensation
Steffen's analysis did not account for SBC in his free
cash flow projections.134 Instead, Steffen calculated shares
outstanding using the treasury stock method, which increases
the number of shares outstanding to account for the dilutive
economic effect of share-based compensation that has already
been awarded.135
Conversely, Ruback included SBC as a cash expense that
directly reduced his free cash flow projections.136 Ruback
used management's estimates of future SBC expense—an
accounting value—to directly reduce free cash flow.137 The
difference between the two approaches is that Steffen's
analysis accounts for SBC that had been awarded as of the
date of his report, whereas Ruback's analysis also accounts
for SBC that is expected to be issued in the future.
6. M & A Expenses
*11  Steffen did not deduct M & A expenditures from
free cash flow. He believed that management's projections
were not dependent on M & A activity since he did not
find that management deducted M & A expenditures in
their own analysis.138 Ruback, on the other hand, did
include management's projections of M & A expenditures in
his valuation. Ruback believed that management's revenue
projections included the impact of tuck-in M & A and
that the Company planned to continue tuck-in M & A
activity if it remained a public company.139 Moreover,
although the financial advisors did not include M & A
expenditures for years 2017 and 2018—these being the
years the financial advisors extrapolated from management's
projections—Ruback used the same $150 million in M & A
expenditures projected for 2016 in his projections for year
2017, 2018, and the terminal period.140
D. Procedural History
On September 13, 2013, Petitioners Merion Capital LP and
Merion Capital II LP commenced this action by filing a
Verified Petition for Appraisal of Stock pursuant to 8 Del. C.
§ 262. Immediately prior to the Merger, Petitioners owned
7,629,100 shares of BMC common stock. On July 28 2014,
Respondent BMC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment,
arguing that Petitioners lacked standing to pursue appraisal
because they could not show that each of their shares was
not voted in favor of the Merger. I denied the Motion in a
Memorandum Opinion dated January 5, 2015.141
I presided over a four-day trial in this matter from March 16
to March 19, 2015. The parties submitted post-trial briefing
and I heard post-trial oral argument on June 23, 2015. Finally,
in July the parties submitted supplemental post-trial briefing
regarding the treatment of synergies. This is my Post–Trial
Opinion.
II. ANALYSIS
The appraisal statute, 8 Del. C. § 262, is deceptively simple; it
provides stockholders who choose not to participate in certain
merger transactions an opportunity to seek appraisal in this
Court. When a stockholder has chosen to pursue its appraisal
rights, Section 262 provides that:
[T]he Court shall determine the fair value of the
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from
the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon
the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining
such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant
factors.142
Section 262 vests the Court with significant discretion to
consider the data and use the valuation methodologies it
deems appropriate. For example, this Court has the latitude
to select one of the parties' valuation models as its general
framework, or fashion its own, to determine fair value. The
principal constraint on my analysis is that I must limit my
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valuation to the firm's value as a going concern and exclude
“the speculative elements of value that may arise from the
accomplishment or expectation of the merger.”143
Ultimately, both parties bear the burden of establishing fair
value by a preponderance of the evidence. In assessing
the evidence presented at trial, I may consider proof of
value by any techniques or methods which are generally
considered acceptable in the financial community and
otherwise admissible in court. Among the techniques that
Delaware courts have relied on to determine the fair value of
shares are the discounted cash flow approach, the comparable
transactions approach, and comparable companies approach.
This Court has also relied on the merger price itself as
evidence of fair value, so long as the process leading to the
transaction is a reliable indicator of value and any merger-
specific value in that price is excluded.
*12  Here, the experts offered by both parties agreed that
the DCF approach, and not the comparable transactions or
comparable companies approach, is the appropriate method
by which to determine the fair value of BMC. Thus, I will
start my analysis there.
A. DCF Analysis
In post-trial briefing and at closing argument, the parties
helpfully laid out the limited areas of disagreement between
their two experts as to DCF inputs. I will briefly explain
my findings with respect to those areas in contention, but
I note at the outset that, while I have some disagreements
with the Respondent's expert, Ruback, I generally found him
better able to explain—and defend—his positions than the
Petitioners' expert, Steffen. Since I generally find Ruback
more credible, I start with his analysis as a framework,
departing from it as noted below.
1. Financial Projections
The parties' experts both relied on the same management
projections. Ruback, however, made a 5% reduction to
projected revenue based on his analysis that the Company had
historically fallen short of its projected revenues. Although
it is apparent to me that the management projections, while
reasonable, harbored something of a bias towards optimism,
I ultimately find Ruback's approach too speculative to
accurately account for that bias. Thus, in conducting my
own DCF valuation of the Company, I use the management
projections as is, without a 5% deduction.
2. Discount Rate
The parties contend that the key difference in their experts'
respective discount rates is that the Petitioners' expert used
a supply side ERP, while the Respondent's expert used a
historical ERP. This calculation is forward-looking, and this
Court has recently tended to employ the supply side ERP
approach. In then-Chancellor Strine's decision in Global GT
LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc.,144 this Court noted that using the
supply side ERP as opposed to the historical ERP is a decision
“not free from doubt,” but it nevertheless adopted it over a
historical ERP as a more sound approach.145 The Chancellor
followed that approach again in In re Orchard Enterprises,146
where he noted that the respondent there had “not provided
[him] with a persuasive reason to revisit” the debate.147 In
other cases, this Court has explicitly adopted a supply side
ERP.
While it may well be the case that there is an argument in favor
of using the historical ERP, nothing in Ruback's testimony
convinces me to depart from this Court's practice of the recent
past. I note, however, that the testimony at trial showed this
to be a vigorously debated topic, not just between these two
experts, but in the financial community at large; scholarship
may dictate other approaches in the future. Here, though, I
ultimately find the most appropriate discount rate, using the
supply side ERP, to be 10.5%.148
3. Terminal Growth Rate
*13  The Respondent's expert adopted the inflation rate as the
Company's growth rate, but I did not find sufficient evidence
in the record to support the application of a growth rate limited
to inflation. In Golden Telecom, and again in Towerview
LLC v. Cox Radio, Inc.,149 this Court noted that inflation is
generally the “floor” for a terminal value.150 Testimony and
documentary evidence are inconclusive on the Company's
prospects for growth as of the time of the Merger. Ultimately,
I find it most appropriate to follow this Court's approach in
Golden Telecom and apply a terminal growth rate that is at the
midpoint of inflation and GDP.
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The Petitioners' expert purported to use this methodology, but
arbitrarily opted to add 50 basis points to the midpoint of
inflation and GDP, an approach I do not find supported in the
record. Therefore, though I find the midpoint approach to be
sound, I reject Steffen's addition of 50 basis points and use
3.25% as my growth rate.
I note that the Respondent's expert did an analysis of
implied EBITDA growth rates for comparable companies,
which he found to be an average of –1.7%. I do not find
there to be sufficient evidence of the true comparability of
those companies such that the approach I am adopting, just
discussed, is unreasonable.
4. Excess Cash
The Petitioners' expert used an excess cash figure as of the
Merger date, while the Respondent's expert used a figure from
the last quarterly report prior to the Merger. I found credible
the testimony at trial that the Company was preserving its cash
balance in contemplation of closing the Merger and that, but
for the transaction, the Company would not have conserved
an extra $127 million in cash.151
The Respondent's expert also made an adjustment to excess
cash for the expense associated with repatriating cash held
abroad. The Petitioners argued that this was inappropriate
because the Company's 10–K stated its intent to maintain
cash balances overseas indefinitely. These funds, however,
represent opportunity for the Company either in terms of
investment or in repatriating those funds for use in the
United States, which would likely trigger a taxable event.
Accordingly, I find it appropriate to include a reasonable
offset for the tax associated with repatriating those funds.
5. Stock–Based Compensation
It is abundantly clear to me that, as a technology company,
BMC's practice of paying stock-based compensation is
an important consideration in this DCF valuation. Both
experts accounted for stock-based compensation, but only the
Respondent's expert did so in a way that accounted for future
stock-based compensation, which I find to be the reasonable
approach. His approach was to treat estimated stock-based
compensation as an expense, which I find reasonable in light
of the Company's history of buying back stock awarded to
employees to prevent dilution; in that sense, it is clearly
in line with a cash expense. The Petitioners have argued
strenuously that this overstates the cost, but they presented
only the methodology of Steffen—which fails to account for
future SBC—as an alternative. Accordingly, I adopt Ruback's
calculation as it relates to stock-based compensation.
6. M & A Expense
*14  The parties also disagreed as to whether so-called
“tuck-in” M & A expenses should be deducted in calculating
free cash flows. I find that the projections prepared by
management and used throughout the sales process, including
those projections that formed the basis for the fairness
opinion, incorporated the Company's reliance on tuck-in M &
A activity in their estimation of future growth and revenues.
Those projections expressly provided a line-item explaining
the Company's expected tuck-in M & A expenses in each
year of the projections, and the Company's CFO, Solcher,
credibly testified that, because the Company planned to
continue with its inorganic growth strategy had it remained
a public company, he prepared the management projections
with growth from tuck-in M & A in mind.152 Thus, those
projections are inflated if M & A, and its accompanying
expense, is not taken into account in the valuation. Although
it is not determinative of my analysis, I also note that the
multiple potential buyers through the course of the Company's
sales process must have similarly determined that tuck-in M
& A was embedded in the Company's growth projections,
or else those buyers would have been forgoing up to $1.89
billion in value by not topping the Buyer Group's winning bid.
In any event, because I find that management's projections
incorporated M & A in their forecast of future performance,
the expenses of that M & A must be deducted from income
to calculate free cash flow.
7. Conclusion
Taking all of these inputs and assumptions together, I
conducted a DCF analysis that resulted in a per share price
for BMC of $48.00.153
B. The Merger Price
Having found a DCF valuation of $48.00, I turn to other
“relevant factors” I must consider in determining the value of
BMC. Neither expert presents a value based on comparables,
although Ruback did such an analysis as a check on his DCF.
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Thus, I turn to consideration of the merger price as indication
of fair value. As our Supreme Court recently affirmed in Huff
Fund Investment Partnership v. CKx, Inc.,154 where the sales
process is thorough, effective, and free from any spectre of
self-interest or disloyalty, the deal price is a relevant measure
of fair value. Even where such a pristine sales process was
present, however, the appraisal statute requires that the Court
exclude any synergies present in the deal price—that is, value
arising solely from the deal.
1. The Sales Process Supports the Merger Price as Fair Value
The record here demonstrates that the Company conducted a
robust, arm's-length sales process, during which the Company
conducted two auctions over a period of several months. In
the first sales process, the Company engaged at least five
financial sponsors and eight strategic entities in discussing
a transaction from late August 2012 through October 2012.
As a result, the Company received non-binding indications
of interest from two groups of financial sponsors: one for
$48 per share and another, from a group led by Bain, for
$45–$47 per share. Ultimately the Company decided at
the end of October to discontinue the sales process based
on management's confidence in the Company's stand-alone
business plan, which was temporarily bolstered by positive
second quarter financial results.
However, when the Company returned to underperforming in
the third quarter, it decided to reinitiate the sales process. In
the second sales process, which was covered in the media, the
Company reengaged potential suitors that had shown interest
in acquiring the Company in the previous sales process,
from late January 2013 through March 2013. As a result, the
Company received nonbinding indications of interest from
three different groups of financial sponsors in mid-March,
one for $42–$44 per share, one from the Buyer Group, led
by Bain, for $46–47 per share, and one from the Alternate
Sponsor Group for $48 per share. Negotiations with the low
bidder quickly ended after it refused to raise its bid. The
Company, therefore, proceeded with due diligence with the
two high bidders through April 2013, distributing a draft
merger agreement to them, and setting the deadline for the
auction process at April 22, 2013.
*15  On April 18, 2013, just days before the impending
deadline, one of the sponsors in the Alternate Sponsor Group
backed out of the auction and the remaining financial sponsor
explained that it could no longer support its prior indication
of interest but was considering how to proceed in the auction
at a valuation closer to the stock's then-current trading
price of $43.75. The Company agreed to extend the auction
deadline at the request of the Alternate Sponsor Group in an
attempt to maintain multiple bidders. On April 24, the Buyer
Group submitted an offer of $45.25 per share. The remaining
financial sponsor told the Company that it was still interested
in the auction, but that it would need an additional month to
finalize a bid and reiterated that if it did ultimately make a
bid, it would be below the initial indication of interest from
the Alternative Sponsor Group. On April 26, the Company
successfully negotiated with the Buyer Group to raise its offer
to $45.75 per share, and then to raise its offer again, on April
27, to $46.25 per share.
On May 6, 2013 the Company announced the Merger
agreement, which included a bargained-for 30–day market
check or “Go Shop,” running through June 5. As part of the
Go Shop process, the Company contacted sixteen potential
bidders—seven financial sponsors and nine strategic entities
—but received no alternative offers.
The sales process was subsequently challenged, reviewed,
and found free of fiduciary and process irregularities in a class
action litigation for breach of fiduciary duty. At the settlement
hearing, plaintiffs' counsel noted that the activist investor,
Elliot, had pressured the Company for a sale, but agreed that
the auction itself was “a fair process.”
I note that the Petitioners, in their post-trial briefing, attempt
to impugn the effectiveness of the Company's sales process
on three grounds. First, the Petitioners argue that Elliot
pressured the Company into a rushed and ineffective sales
process that ultimately undervalued the Company. However,
the record reflects that, while Elliot was clearly agitating for
a sale, that agitation did not compromise the effectiveness
of the sales process. The Company conducted two auctions
over roughly the course of a year, actively marketed itself
for several months in each, as well as vigorously marketed
itself in the 30–day Go Shop period. The record does
not show that the pre-agreement marketing period or the
Go Shop period, if these time periods can be said to
be abbreviated, had any adverse effect on the number or
substance of offers received by the Company. In fact, the
record demonstrates that the Company was able to and did
engage multiple potential buyers during these periods and
pursue all indications of interest to a reasonable conclusion.
The Petitioners' argument that Elliot could force the Company
to carry out an undervalued sale is further undermined by
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the fact that the Company chose not to pursue the offers it
received in the first sales process, despite similar agitations
from Elliot, because management was then confident in
the Company's recovery. In sum, no credible evidence in
the record refutes the testimony offered by the Company's
chairman and CEO, which testimony I find to be credible,
that the Company ultimately sold itself because it was
underperforming, not because of pressure from Elliot. The
pressure from Elliot, while real, does not make the sales price
unreliable as an indication of value.
Second, the Petitioners argue that the Company's financial
advisors were leaking confidential information about the sales
process to the Buyer Group, allowing it to minimize its offer
price. For this contention the Petitioners rely solely on a series
of emails and handwritten notes prepared by individuals
within the Buyer Group, which purport to show that the Buyer
Group was getting information about the Alternate Sponsor
Group from a source inside Bank of America, one of the
Company's financial advisors.155 As a preliminary matter, I
don't find sufficient evidence to conclude that the Company's
financial advisors were actually leaking material information
to the Buyer Group. But even if that could be sustained by
the emails and handwritten notes presented by the Petitioners,
nothing in those documents or elsewhere in the record shows
that the Buyer Group had any knowledge as to the Alternate
Sponsor Group's effective withdrawal from the sales process
leading up to the bid deadline. To the contrary, the argument
that the Buyer Group did have such information is directly
contradicted by the actual actions of the Buyer Group, which
increased its bid for the Company twice after its initial
submission despite being (unbeknownst to the Buyer Group)
the lone bidder in the auction. At trial, Abrahamson, the Bain
principal leading the BMC deal, credibly testified that the
Buyer Group raised its bid multiple times because it believed
the auction was still competitive and that the Buyer Group did
not learn it was the only party to submit a final bid until it
viewed the draft proxy after executing the Merger agreement.
And in fact, the emails and notes relied upon by the Petitioners
actually indicate that at the time the Buyer Group submitted its
bid, it had no idea where the Alternate Sponsor Group stood
and was seeking out that information.156 Even as far along
as April 29, 2013, two days after the Buyer Group had raised
its bid for the second and final time, emails within the Buyer
Group show that it believed the Alternate Sponsor Group was
still vying for the Company.157 Therefore, I do not find that
the sales process was compromised by any type of “insider
back-channeling.”
*16  Finally, the Petitioners argue that the same set of
emails and notes from within the Buyer Group show
that the Company made a secret “handshake agreement”
or “gentleman's agreement” with the Buyer Group after
receiving its final offer of $46.25 per share that the Company
would not pursue any other potential bidders, including the
Alternate Sponsor Group. The Petitioners allege that this
handshake agreement prevented the Company from further
extending the auction deadline to accommodate the additional
month requested by the Alternate Sponsor Group and thus
precluded a second bidder that would have maximized value
in the sales process. Again, I note as a preliminary matter that
I do not find that the Petitioners have sufficiently proven the
existence of such a so-called handshake agreement. But in any
case, even if the Company had made such an agreement, the
record shows that by the time such an agreement would have
been made the Alternate Sponsor Group had already notified
the Company that one of its members had dropped out, that
it could no longer support the figure in its prior indication of
interest, and that if it was going to make a bid, that bid would
come in closer to $43.75. I also note that by this time the
Company had already extended its initial auction deadline by
several days to accommodate the Alternate Sponsor Group.
Finally, the Alternate Sponsor Group could have pursued a
bid during the ensuing go-shop period, but did not do so. In
light of these facts, the Company's decision not to wait the
additional month requested by the Alternate Sponsor Group
before moving forward with the only binding offer it had
received was reasonable and does not to me indicate a flawed
sales process.
For the reasons stated above, I find that the sales process was
sufficiently structured to develop fair value of the Company,
and thus, under Huff, the Merger price is a relevant factor I
may consider in appraising the Company.
2. The Record Does Not Demonstrate that the Merger Price
Must be Reduced to Account for Synergies in Calculating Fair
Value
The appraisal statute specifically directs me to determine
fair value “exclusive of any element of value arising from
the accomplishment or expectation of the merger....”158
The Court in Union Illinois 1995 Investment LP v. Union
Financial Group, Ltd.159 thoughtfully observed that this
statutory language does not itself require deduction of
synergies resulting from the transaction at issue, where the
synergies are simply those that typically accrue to a seller,
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because “such an approach would not award the petitioners
value from the particular merger giving rise to the appraisal”
but instead would “simply give weight to the actual price at
which the subject company could have been sold, including
therein the portion of synergies that a synergistic buyer
would leave with the subject company shareholders as a
price for winning the deal.”160 Instead, the mandate to
remove all such synergies arises not from the statute, but
from the common-law interpretation of the statute to value
the company as a “going concern.”161 Mindful that this
interpretation is binding on me here, to the extent I rely
on the merger price for fair value, I must deduct from
the merger price any amount which cannot be attributed to
the corporation as an independent going concern,162 albeit
one which employs its assets at their highest value in that
structure.163 Understanding that such synergies may have
been captured by the sellers in the case of a strategic acquirer
is easily comprehended: if company B, holding a patent
on the bow, finds it advantageous to acquire company A,
a manufacturer of arrows, synergies could result from the
combination that would not have composed a part of the
going-concern or the market value of company A, pre-merger
(and excluding merger-specific synergies). In other words,
company B's patent on the bow might make it value company
A more highly than the market at large, but that patent forms
no part of the property held by the stockholders of company
A, pre-merger. Assuming that the record showed that the
acquisition price paid by company B included a portion of
this synergistic value, this Court, if relying on deal price to
establish statutory fair value, would be required to deduct that
portion from the appraisal award.
*17  Here, the acquisition of BMC by the Buyer Group is not
strategic, but financial. Nonetheless, the Respondent alleges
that synergistic value resulted from the acquisition, and that
if the Court relies on the purchase price to determine fair
value, those synergies must be deducted. They point to tax
savings and other cost savings that the acquirer professed
it would realize once BMC is a private entity. If I assume
that inherent in a public company is value, achievable via tax
savings or otherwise, that can be realized by an acquirer—
any acquirer—taking the company private, such a savings is
logically a component of the intrinsic value owned by the
stockholder that exists regardless of the merger. Therefore, to
the extent some portion of that value flows to the sellers, it is
not value “arising from ... the merger,” and thus excludable
under the explicit terms of the statute; but is likely properly
excluded from the going-concern value, which our case law
has explained is part of the definition of fair value as I must
apply it here.164 However, as discussed below, to the extent
value has been generated here by taking BMC private, the
record is insufficient to show what, if any, portion of that value
was included in the price-per-share the Buyer Group paid for
BMC.
During trial and in post-trial briefing, Respondent offered the
testimony of a Bain principal to show that the Buyer Group
would have been unwilling to pay the Merger price had they
not intended to receive the tax benefits and cost reductions
associated with taking the Company private. In fact, had these
savings not existed, the Buyer Group would have been willing
to pay only $36 per share, an amount that resembles the going-
concern value posited by Respondent's expert. However,
demonstrating the acquirer's internal valuation is insufficient
to demonstrate that such savings formed a part of the purchase
price. Here, the Respondent's expert did not opine on the
fair value of the Company using a deal-price-less-synergies
approach. Instead, the Respondent offered only the testimony
of the buyer and its internal documents to show that the
purported synergies were included in their analysis. While it
may be true that the Buyer Group considered the synergies
in determining their offer price, it is also true that they
required a 23% internal rate of return in their business model
to justify the acquisition,165 raising the question of whether
the synergies present in a going-private sale represent a true
premium to the alternatives of selling to a public company or
remaining independent. In other words, it is unclear whether
the purported going-private savings outweighed the Buyer
Group's rate of return that was required to justify the leverage
presumably used to generate those savings.
When considering deal price as a factor—in part or in toto—
for computing fair value, this Court must determine that the
price was generated by a process that likely provided market
value, and thus is a useful factor to consider in arriving at
fair value. Once the Court has made such a determination, the
burden is on any party suggesting a deviation from that price
to point to evidence in the record showing that the price must
be adjusted from market value to “fair” value.166 A two-step
analysis is required: first, were synergies167 realized from the
deal; and if so, were they captured by sellers in the deal price?
Neither party has pointed to evidence, nor can I locate any in
the record, sufficient to show what quantum of value should
be ascribed to the acquisition, in addition to going-concern
value; and if such value was available to the Buyer Group,
what portion, if any, was shared with the stockholders. I find,
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therefore, that the Merger price does not require reduction for
synergies to represent fair value.
C. Fair Value of the Company
*18  I undertook my own DCF analysis that resulted in a
valuation of BMC at $48.00 per share. This is compared
to, on the one end, a value of $37.88 per share offered
by the Respondent, and on the other, a value of $67.08
per share offered by the Petitioners. Although I believe
my DCF analysis to rely on the most appropriate inputs,
and thus to provide the best DCF valuation based on the
information available to me, I nevertheless am reluctant to
defer to that valuation in this appraisal. My DCF valuation
is a product of a set of management projections, projections
that in one sense may be particularly reliable due to BMC's
subscription-based business. Nevertheless, the Respondent's
expert, pertinently, demonstrated that the projections were
historically problematic, in a way that could distort value.
The record does not suggest a reliable method to adjust these
projections. I am also concerned about the discount rate in
light of a meaningful debate on the issue of using a supply
side versus historical equity risk premium.168 Further, I do
not have complete confidence in the reliability of taking
the midpoint between inflation and GDP as the Company's
expected growth rate.
Taking these uncertainties in the DCF analysis—in light of
the wildly-divergent DCF valuation of the experts—together
with my review of the record as it pertains to the sales process
that generated the Merger, I find the Merger price of $46.25
per share to be the best indicator of fair value of BMC as of
the Merger date.
III. CONCLUSION
As is the case in any appraisal action, I am charged with
considering all relevant factors bearing on fair value. A
merger price that is the result of an arm's-length transaction
negotiated over multiple rounds of bidding among interested
buyers is one such factor. A DCF valuation model built
upon management's projections and expert analysis is another
such factor. In this case, for the reasons above, I find the
merger price to be the most persuasive indication of fair value
available. The parties should confer and submit an appropriate
form of order consistent with this opinion.
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consistent with case law interpreting appraisal statute).
164 See In re Sunbelt Beverage S'holder Litig., 2010 WL 26539 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2010) (holding increased value inherent in
taking company from a C corp. to an S corp. not recoverable as “fair value”). It is interesting to compare Sunbelt with ONTI,
750 A.2d at 910–11, and to note that non-speculative increases in value that could be realized by a company as a going
concern—even though management may have eschewed them—are part of fair value; but non-speculative increases in
value requiring a change in corporate form are excluded from fair value: this is an artifact of the policy decision to engraft
“going concern” valuation onto the explicit language of the appraisal statute itself. See Union Illinois, 847 A.2d at 356.
165 Trial Tr. 719:4–720:5 (Abrahamson).
166 Merlin P'ship v. AutoInfo, Inc. 2015 WL 2069417 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30 2015).
167 Of course, the Petitioner may point to market distortions imposed on the sellers as well.
168 Had I used a discount rate equal to the median of the rates suggested by the parties' experts, but kept my other inputs
the same, my DCF value would be remarkably close to the deal price. See supra note 148.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
LASTER, Vice Chancellor.
*1  Petitioners Merion Capital L.P. and Merion Capital II
L.P. (together, “Merion”) brought this statutory appraisal
proceeding to determine the fair value of their shares
of stock in Lender Processing Services, Inc. (“LPS” or
the “Company”). The valuation date is January 2, 2014,
when Fidelity National Financial, Inc. (“Fidelity” or “FNF”)
completed the merger by which it acquired the Company (the
“Merger”). This post-trial decision determines that the fair
value of the Company's common stock at the effective time
of the Merger is $37.14.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Trial took place over four days. The parties submitted 357
exhibits and lodged eight depositions. Four fact witnesses and
two experts testified live. The following facts were proven by
a preponderance of the evidence.
A. The Company
At the time of the Merger, the Company provided integrated
technology products, data, and services to the mortgage
lending industry, and it had a market leading position
in mortgage processing in the United States. Its business
operated through two principal divisions: Transaction
Services (“Services” or “TS”) and Technology, Data &
Analytics division (“Analytics” or “TD & A”).
The primary segment within the Services division focused
on loan originations. It supported lenders by facilitating
many of the steps necessary to originate a loan. Most of the
originations, however, were not new loans, but refinancings
of existing loans. The Services division also had a segment
that supported lenders, servicers, and investors by facilitating
many of the steps necessary to foreclose on a property.
The Analytics division focused on providing ongoing support
to lenders and loan servicers. Its “MSP platform” automated
many of the loan servicing functions performed during the life
of a loan. A smaller business segment specialized in troubled
loans.
B. The Company's Origins
The Company started as the financial and mortgage services
division of Alltel Information Services. PTO ¶ 11. In 2003,
Alltel sold that division to Fidelity, which is a leading provider
of (i) title insurance, escrow, and other title-related services,
and (ii) technology and transactional services for the real
estate and mortgage industries. Id. ¶¶ 6, 11. Thomas H. Lee
Partners (“THL”) is a private equity firm that worked with
Fidelity on the acquisition but did not co-invest at the time of
the deal.
Fidelity reorganized the former Alltel division as part of a
subsidiary called FNF National Information Services, Inc.
(“FNF Services”). PTO ¶ 11. In 2005, THL invested in FNF
Services. In 2006, Fidelity spun off FNF Services. Id.
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In 2008, FNF Services spun off the Company. Its shares
traded on the New York Stock Exchange until the Merger
closed. Id. Because of the Company's historic ties to Fidelity,
the Company continued to share an office campus with its
former parent (although occupying separate buildings). The
two companies also shared private jets, hangar facilities, and
server space.
C. The Effect Of The Great Recession On The Company's
Business
*2  The Company's spinoff coincided with the Great
Recession of 2008. Although devastating to many
households, the financial crisis was a boon to the Company,
because loan defaults drove key segments of its business.
Revenue grew by approximately 80% from pre-recession
levels to peak in 2010. JX 111 at 21.
But the Company also was involved in some of the
problematic loan protocols that led to the Great Recession,
colloquially known as “robo-signing.” In 2010, the United
States Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and attorneys general from all fifty states
commenced civil and criminal investigations into the
Company's practices. Stockholders also filed lawsuits. PTO
¶ 12.
D. Fidelity's Early Overtures
In April 2010, amidst the negative publicity from the
robo-signing allegations, Fidelity, THL, and the Blackstone
Group made an unsolicited offer to buy the Company. The
Company's board of directors (the “Board”) retained the
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (“Goldman”) as its financial
advisor. The discussions did not go far. PTO ¶ 13.
In early 2011, THL and Blackstone approached the Company
again. Goldman continued in its advisory role. Again, no deal
was reached. PTO ¶ 14.
In late 2011, the Company's CEO retired due to medical
issues. In October, the Board hired Hugh Harris to serve as
President and CEO. He also became a director.
Harris had ties to Fidelity. In 2003, he worked for Fidelity and
THL as a consultant on the Alltel deal. Afterwards, Fidelity
hired Harris to run one of the new business units. Harris
continued to work for FNF Services after its spinoff. He
retired in 2007, before the Company's spinoff in 2008.
Harris also had ties to THL. In addition to consulting on the
Alltel deal, he worked with THL for several years in the mid–
1990s. Tr. 9 (Harris). He also was a friend of and owned
hunting land with one of THL's principals. Tr. 12 (Harris).
Given these relationships, the Board excluded Harris from its
deliberations about any potential transaction with THL and
Fidelity, and Harris recused himself from voting as a director.
The Board determined that Harris could, however, “do all the
normal things that the CEO would do as far as presenting the
company, the business, what was going on with the company,
our projections, our results, et cetera.” Tr. 25 (Harris); see
PTO ¶ 7.
In late November 2011, THL reached out to Harris. He
referred the call to Lee Kennedy, the Company's Chairman.
This time, the discussions progressed further. In December,
the Company and THL signed a confidentiality agreement. In
February 2012, after conducting due diligence, THL offered
to buy the Company for $26.50 per share. THL's offer noted
that Blackstone and Fidelity would participate in the deal,
and THL later explained that Fidelity would contribute its
ServiceLink business to the surviving entity. The ServiceLink
business competed with LPS and was a source of synergies.
On February 28, 2012, the Board met to discuss the
offer. Goldman continued in its advisory role. The Board
determined that a transaction was potentially attractive, but
not at that price. PTO ¶ 19. The Board decided to explore
whether someone might pay more by reaching out to other
financial sponsors and strategic buyers. Tr. 27 (Harris).
In March 2012, Goldman reviewed the Company's financial
performance with the Board. After analyzing several market-
based metrics, Goldman opined that “the Company was fully
valued at current trading prices.” JX 33 at 2. Goldman's
illustrative discounted cash flow analysis, which used LPS's
historical discount rate and assumed a 1% perpetuity growth
rate, produced a valuation of $25.91 per share. Id. at 17. The
Company's stock closed at $24.66 that day. Id. at 13.
*3  In April 2012, after additional due diligence, THL,
Blackstone, and Fidelity increased their offer to $28.00 per
share, comprising $26.00 in cash and $2.00 in Fidelity stock.
The Board rejected that price as inadequate. PTO ¶¶ 22–23.
In May 2012, THL, Blackstone, and Fidelity increased
their offer to $29 per share, payable entirely in cash or
in a combination of $27.00 in cash and $2.00 in Fidelity
stock. JX 38 at 2. The bidding group explained that the
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premium depended in part on anticipated synergies with the
ServiceLink business. JX 260 at 53.
By this point, with the country emerging from the Great
Recession, management was concerned that the Company's
performance would deteriorate. During a series of meetings
in May 2012, management provided the Board with updated
financial forecasts that contemplated revenue declining
approximately 25% by 2017. JX 44 at 927. The forecasts
projected that EBITDA would decrease by 7.2% through
2017 before increasing by 7.5% through 2022. Id. Despite
the weaker forecasts, the Board told THL that the proposed
consideration “was inadequate and should be raised to a price
in the $30s.” JX 44 at 3.
During the last week of May 2012, Goldman contacted
three financial sponsors: Texas Pacific Group Capital
(“TPG”), Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. (“KKR”),
and Advent International. Goldman also contacted seven
potential strategic buyers: Accenture, Berkshire Hathaway,
IBM, Infosys, Oracle, Tata Consultancy Services, and
Total Systems Services. Several of the parties entered into
confidentiality agreements, conducted due diligence, and
received management presentations. None made an offer.
Five of the strategic buyers had no interest. Two said they
needed more time to evaluate the opportunity. KKR and
Advent said they could not pay a premium and meet their
internal hurdle rates. TPG was only interested if it could be
part of the THL/Blackstone/Fidelity consortium.
On June 8, 2012, THL told the Company that the consortium
would not offer more than $29.00 per share. PTO ¶ 25. The
directors felt that was a good price but remained committed
to $30.00 per share. They rejected THL's offer, but decided to
negotiate the terms of the transaction documents in case the
consortium changed its collective mind.
In June 2012, two strategic bidders—Total Systems Services
and Infosys—expressed interest in buying the Company, only
to promptly change their minds. Total Systems wanted to
team up with a financial sponsor but said it could not find
one. Infosys cited LPS's size, lack of strategic fit, and legacy
issues.
The Board and the consortium negotiated a draft merger
agreement that included a go-shop, but neither would budge
on price. One critical issue dividing the parties was the extent
of the Company's legal risk due to the pending investigations
and lawsuits. In August 2012, discussions terminated. PTO ¶
27.
E. The Board Hires BCG.
In October 2012, the Board hired the Boston Consulting
Group (“BCG”) to evaluate the Company's core businesses,
research market trends, assess the legal and regulatory
environment, and test the reliability of management's
projections. The Board also asked BCG to evaluate the
Company's strategic alternatives with a focus on two
particular opportunities: (i) continuing to operate the
Company in its existing configuration, or (ii) splitting up the
Company's two businesses.
*4  BCG would spend the next six months conducting an
in-depth review of the Company's business that included
over 120 interviews with LPS employees, customers, and
investors. Based on its work, BCG generated a report
that spanned more than 200 pages. See JX 111. Through
this process, BCG “pressure tested” each element of the
Company's five-year projections based on macroeconomic
factors, industry trends, and the Company's specific product
lines. See Tr. 226 (Schilling); Tr. 19 (Harris).
F. The Company Addresses Its Legal Problems.
On January 31, 2013, the Company announced that it had
entered into a settlement agreement with the attorneys general
from forty-six states and the District of Columbia. PTO
¶ 31. As part of the settlement, the Company agreed to
make a settlement payment of $127 million. The Company
also entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the
Department of Justice that contemplated a payment of $35
million. The Company settled the outstanding stockholder
litigation for a payment of $14 million. Although the
regulators charged some of the Company's employees with
criminal activity, they did not charge the Company. The
settlement was profoundly good news, and the Company's
shares rose 7.5% to $24.08 on the announcement. JX 71 at 1.
Part of the settlement with the Department of Justice required
the Company to operate under the terms of a consent
order. Ironically, the consent order gave the Company “a
competitive advantage” because many loan servicers were
still trying to adjust to the new post-financial crisis regulatory
regime. Tr. 61 (Harris). The Company's settlement signaled
that the Company had achieved compliance. Management
believed this would result in a “flight to quality” as customers
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chose the Company over competitors whose systems had not
yet been validated. See Tr. 61 (Harris).
Around this time, Harris told the Board he planned to retire
at the end of 2013.
G. Offers From Fidelity And Altisource
After the Company announced the settlements, two of the
Company's competitors expressed interest in buying the
Company. Fidelity was first out of the gate. On January 31,
2013, Fidelity and THL made a joint proposal to acquire
the Company for $30.00 per share, consisting of $13.20 in
cash and $16.80 in Fidelity common stock. PTO ¶ 32. The
proposal represented a premium of approximately 32% over
the Company's average closing stock price during the five
previous trading days. JX 72 at 3.
Four days later, Altisource Portfolio Solutions S.A.
(“Altisource”) proposed to acquire the Company in a
transaction valued at $31.00 per share, consisting of $21.50 in
cash and $9.50 in Altisource common stock. PTO ¶ 33. The
offer represented a 28% premium over the Company's closing
price on February 1 and a 32% premium over its trailing 30–
day weighted average. JX 74 at 2. Altisource competed with
the Company's Analytics business. Tr. 30 (Harris).
During a meeting on February 6, 2013, the Board received a
presentation from the Company's finance team. They advised
the Board that 2013 would “continue to be a challenging
year for the mortgage industry and for LPS.” JX 75 at 464.
They noted that “new entrants will emerge” and that the
Company would face continuing competition from entities
like Ocwen and NationStar. Id. They projected that the
Company's revenue for 2013 would be “down about 4%
compared to 2012, with a 4% increase in [Analytics] revenue
being offset by a 9% decline in [Services] revenue.” Id. They
expected EBITDA to be flat, EBITDA margin to increase
from 26.7% to 27.5%, and earnings per share to decline from
$2.80 to $2.74 due to increased shares outstanding. Id.
*5  The Board also heard from the Company's investor
relations team. Although the Company's stock had risen by
63% in 2012 versus only a 12% increase for the S & P
500, the investor relations team believed that the market
did not appreciate the Company's strong fundamentals. To
address this, the team had launched a strategy to explain
to the market that “LPS is a stronger company today”
with “[s]ustainable competitive advantages” and “[l]ong-term
growth opportunities.” JX 76 at 497. The goal for 2013 was
to “Achieve Fair Value of LPS Securities.” Id. at 509; see
Schilling Dep. 151; see also Tr. 358 (Schilling).
Against this backdrop, the directors considered the offers
from Fidelity and Altisource. In light of Harris' prior ties to
Fidelity and THL, the Board limited his role to responding
to the overtures in his capacity as CEO. Lee Kennedy
was the Company's Chairman, had previously served as a
director of a THL portfolio company, and had served as CEO
of Information Services from 2006 until 2009. The Board
determined that he did not have a conflict. James Hunt was
a non-management director who had served as an officer of
one of THL's portfolio companies. The Board determined that
he should not be involved in any discussions about a sale.
The Board decided to tell Fidelity and Altisource that their
offers undervalued the Company and that the Company was
not interested. PTO ¶¶ 7, 34, 35.
H. More Expressions Of Interest
Over the ensuing weeks, four more unsolicited expressions of
interest arrived. One was an increased bid from Fidelity and
THL. By letter dated February 26, 2013, they increased their
proposal by 7% to $32.00 per share, with $14.72 paid in cash
and $17.28 in Fidelity common stock. PTO ¶ 36. Their letter
stated that $32.00 was the highest price they would offer. JX
89 at 99.
In March 2013, First American National Financial
Corporation expressed interest in a joint venture between
its mortgage servicing arm and the Services business. First
American's proposal valued the Services business at $450–
$600 million. First American said it could complete diligence
in four to six weeks. Also in March, two private equity firms
expressed interest in the Services business. Flexpoint Ford
LLC proposed to buy the business on a cash-free, debt-free
basis for 5.0x–5.5x normalized EBITDA. PTO ¶¶ 41–42.
Golden Gate Capital also proposed to buy the business but did
not suggest a price. PTO ¶¶ 37, 41–42.
Having received a flurry of proposals, the Board engaged
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC (“Credit Suisse”) as
a second financial advisor. The Board decided to defer
considering the offers until after BCG completed its strategic
review.
I. The March 2013 Board Meeting
On March 21, 2013, the Board met to consider the Company's
alternatives. The meeting began with a presentation from
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BCG. Based on its six months of work, BCG projected that
without any new business initiatives, “[m]arket headwinds”
would cause the Company's revenue to decline by $470
to $510 million by 2015 and $580 to $680 million by
2017. JX 111 at 37. BCG attributed the declines to a 75–
80% drop in refinancings and a 60–70% drop in defaults.
Id. at 31. The declines would affect the Services business
disproportionately, which would suffer 95% of the net impact.
Id. at 70. The Analytics business would experience slow and
steady growth, but not enough to offset the decline in the
Services business.
BCG next presented three sets of five-year projections created
in collaboration with management: (i) a Reduced Base Case,
(ii) a Base Case, and (iii) an Optimistic Case. BCG regarded
its Base Case as “the most likely scenario.” Id. at 27. The
Base Case started with the macro-economic trend line then
added “additional initiatives and opportunities” to increase
revenue. Id. at 28. BCG identified ten initiatives, almost
all involving the Analytics business, that could generate
roughly $350 million in revenue. To succeed, the Company
would have to devote resources to all ten and capture market
share with new products. Because the Analytics division's
two biggest products already had captured 56% and 80% of
their respective markets, the bulk of the Company's growth
would come from new initiatives. See Tr. 20 (Harris); Tr. 511
(Geller); JX 111 at 51, 65. Even then, under the Base Case,
2017 revenue still would be less than 2012 revenue: Projected
6% compound annual growth rate for the Analytics business
and -11% compound annual growth rate for the Services
business, resulting in combined compound annual growth for
the Company of -3%. JX 111 at 66.
*6  The Reduced Base Case contemplated a forecast between
doing nothing and the Base Case in which the initiatives did
not fully succeed and revenue decreased by $485 million by
2017. JX 196 ¶ 89. The Optimistic Case contemplated that
the initiatives would succeed to a greater degree than the Base
Case and generate between $651 million to $1 billion in new
revenue. JX 111 at 66. BCG believed the Optimistic Case
was “achievable” but “not the most likely outcome.” Id. at
66–67. Ultimately, “everyone got comfortable with the [B]ase
[C]ase.” Tr. 20 (Harris).
During the same meeting, Credit Suisse and Goldman
made a joint presentation. Their view of industry trends
matched BCG's. See JX 114 at 4; JX 113 at 19. They also
examined stock market trends and concluded that analysts
appeared to understand the Company well because there
was little difference between their consensus forecasts and
the Company's actual performance. See JX 113 at 11. The
bankers observed that since March 2012, most analysts had
maintained a “hold” rating on the Company. The median price
target was $25.00 with a high price target of $31.00.
Using the three cases from the BCG Report, the bankers
prepared valuation models and analyzed alternatives,
including an expanded share repurchase plan, a leveraged
recapitalization, a spinoff of the Analytics business, a joint
venture involving the Services business, a sale of the Services
business, a sale of the entire Company, and a leveraged
buy-out. One analysis estimated the present value of the
Company's future stock price. Using an EBITDA multiple
of 6.0x, the bankers estimated that if LPS achieved the Base
Case, its stock would trade at $29.43 in 2015 and $41.35 in
2017. Discounted at 11%, those figures equated to present
values of $23.88 and $28.70 respectively, with the former
representing a 3% discount to the Company's current market
price and the latter a 10% premium over market. JX 113 at
23. Using an EBITDA multiple of 7.0x, the Company's stock
would trade at $35.07 in 2015 and $47.76 in 2017. Discounted
at 11%, those figures equated to present values of $28.46 and
$31.45 respectively, implying a 15% or 28% premium over
market. Id.
Another analysis used a discounted cash flow methodology to
value the Company using the Base Case. Id. at 25. It generated
the following range of values:
Discount Rate
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The bankers separately analyzed the ability of strategic
bidders and financial sponsors to finance a transaction. For
strategic bidders, the bankers examined the level of accretion
or dilution that a transaction would involve and the acquirer's
post-transaction debt-to-equity levels, without accounting
for synergies, and assuming either an all-cash deal or a
transaction involving 50% cash and 50% stock at prices
ranging from $30 to $34 per share. Id. at 42. For financial
sponsors, the bankers calculated the internal rates of return
that a sponsor could expect at prices of $28 to $33 per share,
assuming total leverage of 5.0x and a January 1, 2018 exit.
They following chart summarizes the results:
Illustrative Purchase Price Per Share
Exit Multiple $28.00 $29.00 $30.00 $31.00 $32.00 $33.00
6.0x 20.3% 18.1% 16.2% 14.4% 12.8% 11.3%
6.5x 23.3% 21.0% 19.0% 17.2% 15.5% 14.0%
7.0x 26.0% 23.7% 21.6% 19.8% 18.0% 16.5%
7.5x 28.4% 26.1% 24.0% 22.1% 20.4% 18.8%
8.0x 30.7% 28.4% 26.2% 24.3% 22.5% 20.9%
Id. at 43. A financial sponsor thus could not pay $33 or more
per share and still clear a hurdle rate of 20% unless it projected
an exit at 8.0x EBITDA.
*7  At the conclusion of the Board meeting, Credit Suisse
and Goldman recommended “in light of the strategic plan
review, the indications of interest that the Company had
received and the Company's prior negotiating history with
certain of the interested parties, that the Company would be
best off if it could proceed with soliciting and evaluating
offers for the sale of the Company (or its Transaction Services
business).” JX 114 at 5. BCG “concurred that in their view,
the best alternative for the Company would be to pursue
a potential sale of the Company at an attractive price.” Id.
Management agreed, citing the “unfavorable macroeconomic
trends and the market and execution risks inherent in the
strategic initiatives.” Id.
The directors decided to task Credit Suisse with contacting
parties about a sale of the Company or the Services business.
They asked the bankers to develop a recommendation for a
sale process that the Board could evaluate and approve. PTO
¶ 43.
J. The Recommended Sale Process
To implement the Board's directive, Company management
and the financial advisors developed a list of the most likely
bidders. It included six strategic buyers (Fidelity, Altisource,
First American, Nationstar, CoreLogix, and IBM) and one
financial sponsor (Golden Gate). All had expressed interest
earlier in 2013; most had also expressed interest in 2012.
The financial advisors recommended a three-step sale
process. They proposed that “given the history of discussions
with [Fidelity],” the Company should first reach out to First
American, Altisource, Nationstar, and Golden Gate “to create
credible competitive tension in the process.” JX 115 at 1.
After getting “feedback” from those firms, the bankers would
contact Fidelity. Then, after receiving a first round of bids, the
bankers would contact CoreLogix and IBM. The bankers also
contemplated approaching other parties that were less likely
to be interested in or capable of completing a transaction,
such as Infosys. Tr. 515 (Geller). The bankers envisioned
announcing a deal on June 11, 2013.
On March 25, 2013, the Board approved the process. PTO ¶
44.
K. The Actual Sale Process
The Company and its bankers did not follow the
recommended process. Rather than delaying the approach to
Fidelity, management met with Fidelity on April 1, 2013. JX
121 at 3. During the same period, the bankers reached out to
the other parties. Everyone but Altisource expressed interest.
Altisource said it would not participate, citing the Company's
exposure to declining refinancings and defaults. PTO ¶ 46.
The Company entered into confidentiality agreements with
Fidelity, THL, Nationstar, Golden Gate, and First American.
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Management made presentations to Fidelity and Golden
Gate. Management was scheduled to make a presentation to
Nationstar, but they dropped out on April 9, 2013. PTO ¶ 51.
Fidelity and THL took less than two weeks to update their
analysis of the Company and make a revised offer. By letter
dated April 18, 2013, they offered to acquire LPS for $32.00
per share, consisting of $16.00 in cash and $16.00 in Fidelity
common stock. PTO ¶ 53. It was the same price they offered
in late February, but with more cash. Fidelity and THL
made their offer more than a month-and-a-half faster than the
timeline that the bankers had recommended.
On April 25, 2013, the Company announced results for the
first quarter. Compared to the prior quarter, revenue decreased
by 6% and EBITDA decreased by 7%. JX 133 at 3. Year
over year, revenue decreased by 3% and EBITDA increased
by 7%. As expected, the bulk of the decline came from
the Services business. The numbers matched management's
guidance and the analysts' consensus.
Management updated the Base Case in light of the Company's
first quarter (the “Updated Base Case”). The new projections






















































































“[T]he modifications did not result in any significant impact”
on the bankers' valuations of the Company. JX 149 at 2. The
Company provided the Updated Base Case to Fidelity, First
American, and Golden Gate. PTO ¶ 45; JX 189.
L. The Board Decides To Sell The Company.
On May 1 and 2, 2013, First American and Golden
Gate submitted their indications of interest. First American
proposed to buy the Services business for $450–550 million in
cash. PTO ¶ 55; JX 145. First American said that it preferred
a joint venture and would increase its valuation of Services
by 15–20% as part of that structure. Golden Gate proposed
to have the Company contribute the Services business to a
Golden Gate controlled entity in which LPS would retain a
“substantial interest.” JX 146 at 2. Golden Gate valued its
proposal at $800 million. PTO ¶ 54.
On May 3, 2013, the Board met with its financial advisors
to discuss the proposals. The bankers generated a range of
values, including:
• Comparable companies: $21.46 to $30.35 per share.
• Precedent transactions: $28.09 to $34.00 per share.
• DCF analysis: $27.95 to $40.11 per share.
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JX 147 at 16. At the time, LPS's stock was trading around
$27.28. The Company's 52–week low was $21.14 and its 52–
week high was $30.88.
To enable the Board to compare a sale of the Company with
a transaction involving the Services business, the bankers
analyzed the EBITDA trading multiples that the latter implied
for the Analytics business, which ranged from 8.0x to 9.1x.
The Fidelity offer implied a range of EBITDA trading
multiples for Analytics of 9.3x to 10.4x. The Board concluded
that selling the Company as a whole was the better course.
In their original plan for the sale process, the bankers
envisioned using a bid from Altisource to create competition
for Fidelity. Without Altisource, the Board decided to counter
at $34.50 per share and ask Fidelity for a collar to support the
stock component. PTO ¶ 56; JX 150. After the Board meeting
on May 3, 2013, Credit Suisse conveyed this proposal to
Fidelity's banker.
Instead of having its banker respond, Fidelity's Chairman
called the Company's Chairman directly. Fidelity's Chairman
was Foley, who previously had served as the Chairman
of FNF Services. The Company's Chairman was Kennedy,
who had served as Chairman, President, and CEO of a
company that Fidelity acquired in 2006 in connection with
the spinoff of FNF Services. Kennedy then served as CEO
of FNF Services under Foley from 2006 through 2009.
The petitioners perceive Foley's call as a way for Fidelity
to capitalize on Foley's history with Kennedy and to take
advantage more generally of the relationships among Fidelity,
THL, and the members of the LPS Board.
The call took place on Sunday, May 5, 2013. Foley proposed
to split the difference between Fidelity's offer and the
Company's counter by increasing the proposed consideration
to $33.25 per share. PTO ¶ 57. The composition would remain
50% cash and 50% stock, but with a one-way collar that would
provide protection against a decline in Fidelity's stock price of
more than 7.5%. He conveyed that Fidelity wanted the right
to increase the cash component to offset the dilutive effect of
issuing additional shares.
*9  The next day, after a meeting of the Board, Credit Suisse
contacted Fidelity's banker to ask for a price increase and a
reduction in the percentage decline necessary to trigger the
collar. Fidelity refused to increase its price but offered to
improve the collar. Fidelity also agreed that if the average
price of its stock increased by more than 6% and Fidelity
substituted cash for shares, then the cash would reflect the
upside that the Company's stockholders would have enjoyed
if they received shares.
On May 14, 2013, the Board held a telephonic meeting. Credit
Suisse reported on the negotiations, and the Board instructed
management and the deal team to begin due diligence on
Fidelity and negotiate a merger agreement. The parties used
the merger agreement they had negotiated in 2012 as a
template, which included a go-shop. The parties kept the
go-shop largely because of legal advice the Board received
regarding its ability to mitigate potential legal risk. See
Carpenter Dep. 124. The concept of a go-shop was not part of
the bankers' design for the sale process.
On May 22, 2013, the Wall Street Journal reported that
Fidelity and the Company were in merger talks. JX 171 at
1. In response, Macquarie Capital (USA) Inc. issued a report
titled, “Best Outcome for LPS is to be Acquired.” JX 173 at 1.
Macquarie argued that “the [loan] cycle has peaked” and the
deal would “rescue[ ] shareholders from pending fundamental
slowdown.” Id. At the time, Macquarie valued LPS at $22 per
share. Id.
M. The Board Approves The Merger Agreement.
On May 27, 2013, the Board met to consider the
agreement and plan of merger (the “Merger Agreement”). It
contemplated consideration of $33.25 per share, paid 50%
in cash and 50% in Fidelity stock (the “Original Merger
Consideration”). The formula for the stock component built in
a one-way collar that protected against a decline of more than
5% in the value of Fidelity's common stock and established
a floor for the stock component at $15.794 per share. The
Merger Agreement gave Fidelity the right to increase the cash
portion and contained a formula that specified how much gain
from an increase in Fidelity's stock price would flow through
to the Company's stockholders.
The Merger Agreement provided for (i) a 40–day go-shop that
would expire on July 7, 2013, (ii) a five-day initial match right
that fell back to a two-day unlimited match right, and (iii) a
$37 million termination fee for a deal generated during the
go-shop. Otherwise the termination fee was $74 million. The
lower fee represented 1.27% of the equity value of the deal
($2.9 billion); the higher fee represented 2.5% of equity value.
Once the go-shop ended, LPS could continue negotiating with
any party that had achieved excluded party status or if a party
made a bid that met the terms of the fiduciary out.
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Credit Suisse and Goldman opined that the transaction
consideration was fair. The bankers' valuations had not
changed materially since their earlier assessments. Credit
Suisse's ranges included:
• Comparable companies: $21.25 to $32.93 per share.
• Precedent transactions: $27.81 to $33.67 per share.
• DCF analysis: $27.67 to $39.76 per share.
JX 175 at 12. Goldman's ranges included:
• Comparable companies: $20.35 to $31.74 per share.
• Precedent transactions: $25.42 to $34.41 per share.
• DCF analysis: $26.50 to $37.25 per share.
• Present value of future share price: $21.32 to $32.97 per
share.
JX 177 at 17.
The Board unanimously adopted and approved the Merger
Agreement and recommended that the LPS stockholders vote
in favor of the transaction.
N. The Go–Shop
*10  On May 28, 2013, the bankers started the go-shop
process. They contacted twenty-five potential strategic buyers
and seventeen potential financial buyers. JX 213 at 5. Only
Altisource and two financial sponsors expressed interest and
executed confidentiality agreements. PTO ¶ 61.
The discussions with the financial sponsors never gained
traction. Altisource, however, brought in a large team and
conducted a “very rigorous level of diligence.” Tr. 277
(Schilling). Altisource accessed the data room, received a
management presentation, and was given the Company's
projections. JX 194; JX 202; Tr. 123 (Harris). Altisource
appeared serious and said they would make an offer that
included an equity component. In response, the Company
began conducting reverse due diligence on Altisource. Tr.
279 (Schilling); JX 199. Management generally preferred
Altisource over Fidelity because they thought they would
keep their jobs after a deal with Altisource. Tr. 419
(Carpenter).
On June 21, 2013, Altisource withdrew without explaining
why. JX 206; Tr. 42 (Harris). There were rumors that several
LPS clients did not want a competitor to acquire LPS. See
JX 357 at 1; Tr. 189 (Harris). Credit Suisse had previously
estimated that Altisource would face “a net revenue dis-
synergy” from acquiring the Company because many of LPS's
clients would have concerns if it were owned by a competitor,
and “any theoretical cost synergy” available to Altisource
“would likely be more than offset by the revenue dis-synergy
with customers.” JX 103.
On July 7, 2013, the go-shop ended. No one had submitted an
indication of interest, much less a topping bid.
O. The Period Leading Up To The Stockholder Vote
In July 2013, management reported on the Company's second
quarter results. Revenues decreased by 1% and EBITDA
remained flat. Year over year, revenue decreased by 9%
and EBITDA by 13%. These results were consistent with
management guidance and the consensus forecast.
On August 29, 2013, Fidelity filed a Form S–4 in connection
with the transaction. The filing included the Updated Base
Case, marking the first time it was publicly disclosed.
In October 2013, management reported on the Company's
third quarter results. Revenue declined by 10.6% and
EBITDA by 18.4%. Year over year, revenue declined
by 15.8% and EBITDA by 25%. The results fell within
management's guidance but at the lower end of the range.
They came in below analysts' consensus estimates.
On October 31, 2013, LPS filed its definitive proxy statement
relating to the Merger. The proxy statement included the
Updated Base Case.
Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis & Co.
recommended that stockholders vote in favor of the Merger.
At a meeting of stockholders held on December 19, 2013,
holders of 78.6% of the outstanding shares voted in favor of
the deal. Of the shares that voted, 98.4% voted in favor.
Goldman received $22.8 million for its work on the
transaction. The proxy statement revealed that Goldman had
a lucrative relationship with THL that generated $97 million
during the previous two years. Goldman had not previously
disclosed these amounts to the Board or LPS management.
They learned about the figures when they saw the proxy
statement. Tr. 171 (Harris).
Credit Suisse received $21.8 million for its work on the deal.
The proxy statement revealed that Credit Suisse had received
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$26 million from THL during the previous two years. Credit
Suisse had not previously disclosed these amounts to the
Board or LPS management. The directors learned about the
figures when they saw the proxy statement.
P. The Merger Closes.
*11  On January 2, 2014, the Merger closed. Fidelity's stock
price had increased in the interim, resulting in an increase in
the merger consideration. Fidelity elected twice to increase
the cash component, which ended up at $28.10 per share.
The collar yielded a stock component valued at $9.04 per
share. The aggregate merger consideration received by the
Company's stockholders at closing was $37.14 per share (the
“Final Merger Consideration”). The equity value of the final
deal was $3.4 billion, an increase of approximately $500
million over the value at signing. Net of $287 million in cash
and $1.1 billion in debt, the enterprise value of the deal was
$4.2 billion.
The Initial Merger Consideration of $33.25 per share and the
Final Merger Consideration of $37.14 per share represented
premiums of 14% and 28% respectively over the Company's
unaffected market price on May 22, 2013, the last trading
day before the Wall Street Journal reported on the merger
discussions. The Final Merger Consideration provided a
premium of approximately 20% over Altisource's expression
of interest in February 2013.
Evidence in the record indicates that the Initial Merger
Consideration and the Final Merger Consideration included
a portion of the value that Fidelity and THL expected to
generate from synergies.
• In May 2012, when THL, Blackstone, and Fidelity made
an offer of $29 per share to acquire the Company,
they explained that the offer price depended in part
on anticipated synergies with Fidelity's ServiceLink
business. JX 260 at 53.
• In March 2013, Credit Suisse made a preliminary
estimate that a transaction with Fidelity could generate
annual synergies of $50 to $65 million, with $40 to
$50 million coming from the combination of Services
and ServiceLink and another $10 to $15 million from
reduced corporate overhead. JX 103.
• In May 2013, in its presentation to the Board, Credit
Suisse estimated “Potential Synergies—$50mm in cost
synergies in 2013E, $100mm in 2014E and $100mm
thereafter. JX 180 at 45. Goldman estimated that “net
synergies include $100mm in run-rate cost savings.” JX
178 at 34.
• In May 2013, Fidelity made a presentation to the rating
agencies that forecasted “$75 million of [annual] cost
synergies” from the transaction. JX 164 at 4. Fidelity
cited its “strong history of overachieving forecasted
synergies.” Id. at 8.
• The press release announcing the deal attributed the
following quote to Foley, Fidelity's Chairman: “We
believe there are meaningful synergies that can be
generated through the similar businesses in centralized
refinance and default related products, elimination of
some corporate and public company costs and the shared
corporate campus. We have set a target of $100 million
for cost synergies and are confident that we can meet or
exceed that goal.” JX 186, Ex. 99.1 at 2.
• Merion internally modeled $100 million in synergies as
part of its investment analysis. JX 310.
• The respondent's expert cited an analyst report
which described the synergy estimate as “conservative,
considering business overlap between [Services] and
ServiceLink (~$2B in combined revenue) and the
potential elimination of corporate and management cost
redundancies.” JX 296 ¶ 126.
The prospect of $100 million in synergies was a significant
source of value. Using a higher discount rate than this decision
adopts, the Company's expert calculated that the $100 million
target would translate into approximately $660.4 million of
present value, or $7.50 per share. Id. ¶ 128.
Q. The Company's Post–Closing Performance
Post-closing, Fidelity divided the Company's operations into
two separate subsidiaries, combined the Services business
with its ServiceLink business, and issued a 35% interest in
each subsidiary to THL. On March 31, 2014, KPMG LLP
issued a final financial report for the combined entity. Across
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R. This Litigation
Merion purchased 5,682,276 shares after the announcement
of the Merger and before the stockholder vote. Merion
demanded appraisal, did not withdraw its demand or vote
in favor of the Merger, and eschewed the Final Merger
Consideration. Merion pursued this appraisal action to obtain
a judicial determination of the fair value of its shares.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
“An appraisal proceeding is a limited legislative remedy
intended to provide shareholders dissenting from a merger on
grounds of inadequacy of the offering price with a judicial
determination of the intrinsic worth (fair value) of their
shareholdings.” Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor
I), 542 A.2d 1182, 1186 (Del. 1988). Section 262(h) of the
Delaware General Corporation Law (the “DGCL”) states that
the Court shall determine the fair value of the
shares exclusive of any element of value arising from
the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or
consolidation, together with interest, if any, to be paid upon
the amount determined to be the fair value. In determining
such fair value, the Court shall take into account all relevant
factors.
8 Del. C. § 262(h).
Because of the statutory mandate, the allocation of the
burden of proof in an appraisal proceeding differs from a
liability proceeding. “In a statutory appraisal proceeding,
both sides have the burden of proving their respective
valuation positions by a preponderance of evidence.” M.G.
Bancorporation, Inc. v. Le Beau, 737 A.2d 513, 520 (Del.
1999).
Each party also bears the burden of proving the constituent
elements of its valuation position by a preponderance of the
evidence, including the propriety of a particular method,
modification, discount, or premium. If both parties fail to
meet the preponderance standard on the ultimate question
of fair value, the Court is required under the statute to make
its own determination.
Jesse A. Finkelstein & John D. Hendershot, Appraisal Rights
in Mergers & Consolidations, 38–5th C.P.S. §§ IV(H)(3),
at A–89 to A–90 (BNA) (collecting cases) [hereinafter
Appraisal Rights]. “Proof by a preponderance of the evidence
means proof that something is more likely than not. It
means that certain evidence, when compared to the evidence
opposed to it, has the more convincing force and makes
you believe that something is more likely true than not.”
Agilent Techs., Inc. v. Kirkland, 2010 WL 610725, at *13
(Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2010) (Strine, V.C.) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Under this standard, [a party] is not required
to prove its claims by clear and convincing evidence or to
exacting certainty. Rather, [a party] must prove only that it is
more likely than not that it is entitled to relief.” Triton Constr.
Co. v. E. Shore Elec. Servs., Inc., 2009 WL 1387115, at *6
(Del. Ch. May 18, 2009), aff'd, 988 A.2d 938 (Del. 2010)
(TABLE).
*13  The standard of “fair value” is “a jurisprudential
concept that draws more from judicial writings than from the
appraisal statue itself.” Del.  Open MRI Radiology Assocs.,
P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 310 (Del. Ch. 2006) (Strine,
V.C.). “The concept of fair value under Delaware law is not
equivalent to the economic concept of fair market value.
Rather, the concept of fair value for purposes of Delaware's
appraisal statute is a largely judge-made creation, freighted
with policy considerations.” Finkelstein v. Liberty Dig., Inc.,
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2005 WL 1074364, at *12 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2005) (Strine,
V.C.).
In Tri–Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71 (Del. 1950),
the Delaware Supreme Court explained in detail the concept
of value that the appraisal statute employs:
The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is
that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that which has
been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a
going concern. By value of the stockholder's proportionate
interest in the corporate enterprise is meant the true or
intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the
merger. In determining what figure represents the true or
intrinsic value, ... the courts must take into consideration all
factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the
fixing of value. Thus, market value, asset value, dividends,
earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other
facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of
the date of the merger and which throw any light on future
prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent
to an inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholder's
interest, but must be considered ....1
When applying this standard, the corporation “must be valued
as a going concern based upon the operative reality' of the
company as of the time of the merger, taking into account
its particular market position in light of future prospects.”
M.G. Bancorporation, 737 A.2d at 525. A determination
of fair value assesses “the value of the company ... as a
going concern, rather than its value to a third party as an
acquisition.” M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790,
795 (Del. 1999).
“The statutory obligation to make a single determination
of a corporation's value introduces an impression of false
precision into appraisal jurisprudence.” In re Appraisal of
Dell Inc. (Dell Fair Value), 2016 WL 3186538, at *22 (Del.
Ch. May 31, 2016). “The value of a corporation is not a point
on a line, but a range of reasonable values, and the judge's task
is to assign one particular value within this range as the most
reasonable value in light of all the relevant evidence and based
on considerations of fairness.” Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 2003 WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2004), aff'd
in part, rev'd on other grounds, 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005).
A. The Deal Price As Evidence Of Fair Value
The Company contends that the Final Merger Consideration
establishes a ceiling for the fair value of the Company. As
the proponent of this valuation methodology, the Company
bears the burden of establishing its reliability. In this case,
the Initial Merger Consideration provides reliable evidence
of the Company's fair value at the time of signing, and the
Final Merger Consideration provides reliable evidence of the
Company's fair value at the effective time.
1. Deal Price As One Form Of Market Evidence
*14  “The consideration that the buyer agrees to provide
in the deal and that the seller agrees to accept is one form
of market price data, which Delaware courts have long
considered in appraisal proceedings.” Dell Fair Value, 2016
WL 3186548, at *22. See generally Appraisal Rights, supra,
at A–57 to A–59. Chancellor Allen summarized the law on
the use of market price data as follows:
It is, of course, axiomatic that if there is an established
market for shares of a corporation the market value of such
shares must be taken into consideration in an appraisal of
their intrinsic value. ... It is, of course, equally axiomatic
that market value, either actual or constructed, is not the
sole element to be taken into consideration in the appraisal
of stock.2
Numerous cases support Chancellor Allen's observations that
(i) pricing data from a thick and efficient market should be
considered3 and (ii) market price alone is not dispositive.4
The trial court “need not accord any weight to [values derived
from the market] when unsupported by evidence that they
represent the going concern value of the company at the
effective date of the merger.” M.P.M., 731 A.2d at 796.
“Recent jurisprudence has emphasized Delaware courts'
willingness to consider market price data generated not only
by the market for individual shares but also by the market
for the company as a whole.” Dell Fair Value, 2016 WL
3186548, at *23. If the merger giving rise to appraisal
rights “resulted from an arm's-length process between two
independent parties, and if no structural impediments existed
that might materially distort the ‘crucible of objective market
reality,’ ” then “a reviewing court should give substantial
evidentiary weight to the merger price as an indicator of fair
value.”5
*15  “Here too, however, the Delaware Supreme Court
has eschewed market fundamentalism by making clear that
market price data is neither conclusively determinative of nor
presumptively equivalent to fair value.” Dell Fair Value, 2016
WL 3186548, at *23.
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Section 262(h) neither dictates nor even contemplates that
the Court of Chancery should consider the transactional
market price of the underlying company. Rather, in
determining “fair value,” the statute instructs that the court
“shall take into account all relevant factors.” Importantly,
this Court has defined “fair value” as the value to a
stockholder of the firm as a going concern, as opposed to
the firm's value in the context of an acquisition or other
transaction. Determining “fair value” through “all relevant
factors” may be an imperfect process, but the General
Assembly has determined it to be an appropriately fair
process. ...
Section 262(h) unambiguously calls upon the Court of
Chancery to perform an independent evaluation of “fair
value” at the time of a transaction. It vests the Chancellor
and Vice Chancellors with significant discretion to consider
“all relevant favors” and determine the going concern
value of the underlying company. Requiring the Court
of Chancery to defer—conclusively or presumptively—
to the merger price, even in the face of a pristine,
unchallenged transactional process, would contravene the
unambiguous language of the statute and the reasoned
holdings of our precedent. It would inappropriately shift
the responsibility to determine “fair value” from the court
to the private parties. Also, while it is difficult for the
Chancellor and Vice Chancellors to assess wildly divergent
expert opinions regarding value, inflexible rules governing
appraisal provide little additional benefit in determining
“fair value” because of the already high costs of appraisal
actions. ... Therefore, we reject ... [the] call to establish a
rule requiring the Court of Chancery to defer to the merger
price in any appraisal proceeding.
Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP (Golden Telecom II), 11
A.3d 214, 217–18 (Del. 2010) (footnotes omitted).
Since Golden Telecom II, the Court of Chancery has
regularly considered the deal price as a relevant factor when
determining fair value, but it has not deferred automatically or
presumptively to the deal price. The court also has not equated
satisfying the standards of review that govern fiduciary duty
claims with carrying the burden of proof in an appraisal
proceeding. Because the two inquiries are different, a sale
process might pass muster for purposes of a breach of
fiduciary claim and yet still constitute a sub-optimal process
of an appraisal.6
*16  In evaluating the persuasiveness of the deal price, this
court has cautioned that “[t]he dependability of a transaction
price is only as strong as the process by which it was
negotiated.” Merlin P'rs LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 WL
2069417, at *11 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015). What is required
is “a proper transactional process likely to have resulted in an
accurate valuation of [the] acquired corporation.” LongPath
Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2015 WL 4540443, at
*21 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015). Under this standard, the court
will rely “on the merger price itself as evidence of fair value,
so long as the process leading to the transaction is a reliable
indicator of value and any merger-specific value in that price
is excluded.” Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015
WL 6164771, at *11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015). “[T]he Court
will give little weight to a merger price unless the record
supports its reliability.” AutoInfo, 2015 WL 2069417, at *11.
The deal price “is informative of fair value only when it is
the product of not only a fair sale process, but also of a well
functioning market.” In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp.,
2016 WL 3753123, at *21 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016).
Evaluating the reliability and persuasiveness of the deal
price for purposes of establishing fair value in an appraisal
proceeding is a multifaceted, fact-specific inquiry. The
relevant factors can vary from case to case depending
on the nature of the company, the overarching market
dynamics, and the areas on which the parties focus. The
last is perhaps an underappreciated aspect of appraisal
jurisprudence. Because an appraisal decision results from
litigation in which adversarial parties advance arguments
and present evidence, the issues that the court considers
and the outcome that it reaches depend in large part on
the arguments that the advocates make and the evidence
they present. An argument may carry the day in a particular
case if counsel advance it skillfully and present persuasive
evidence to support it. The same argument may not prevail
in another case if the proponents fail to generate a similarly
persuasive level of probative evidence or if the opponents
respond effectively.
2. The Persuasiveness Of The Initial Merger
Consideration
The Company demonstrated at trial that the Initial Merger
Consideration provides a reliable indicator of the Company's
fair value at the time of the signing of the Merger Agreement.
Multiple factors contribute to this court's determination that
the sale process that the Board conducted provided an
effective means of price discovery.
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a. Meaningful Competition During The Pre–Signing
Phase
The first factor supporting the persuasiveness of the
Company's sale process is the existence of meaningful
competition among multiple bidders during the pre-signing
phase.7 Scholars who study auction design agree on the
importance of creating competition among multiple bidders.8
Renowned M & A practitioner Marty Lipton has contrasted
the effects of adding another interested party at the front
end of a negotiation with the effect of bargaining more
vigorously with a single counterparty at the back end. Lipton
even roughly quantified the added value of adding another
interested party: “The ability to bring somebody into a
situation is far more important than the extra dollar a share at
the back end. At the front end, you're probably talking about
50%. At the back end, you're talking about 1 or 2 percent.”9
*17  Equally important, the Company's process involved
different types of bidders, which is critical for promoting
competition.10 “[T]he most important driver of market
efficiency for [change of control] transactions [is]
heterogeneous buyers.” Subramanian, supra, at 713. Among
homogenous bidders, a sale process functions as a common-
value auction, but with heterogeneous bidders, the sale
process functions as a private-value auction.11 The latter
is better for the seller because in a private-value auction,
“honest reporting of values is a dominant strategy for
bidders.”12 Finding heterogeneous bidders generally means
involving strategic buyers.13 Financial sponsors, by contrast,
predominantly use the same pricing models, the same inputs,
and the same value-creating techniques.14 Absent distorted
market conditions, “strategic bidders are systematically
willing to pay more than financial bidders,”15 and the fact
that “average returns to [strategic] acquirers are close to zero
or even negative” suggests that acquirers pay full value for
targets, inclusive of the benefits of control and synergies. See
Gorbenko & Malenko, supra, at 2537. Financial buyers, by
contrast, generally pay lower premiums16 and are hampered
by limitations on leverage and the need to achieve their
internal hurdle rates.17
*18  In this case, the Board conducted a sale process that
involved a reasonable number of participants and created
credible competition among heterogeneous bidders during the
pre-signing phase. The process began after the Board received
five unsolicited indications of interest, with three from
strategic buyers (Fidelity, Altisource, and First American)
and two from financial sponsors (Flexpoint and Golden
Gate). The Board did not immediately enter into negotiations
or launch a sale process. Instead it awaited the results
of BCG's analysis and obtained input from management
and its financial advisors about strategic alternatives. With
the benefit of that information, including estimates of the
Company's standalone value based on BCG's scenarios, the
Board was well-positioned to solicit bids for the Company
and its Services business and to evaluate those bids against
other possibilities, including remaining a standalone entity.
Having decided to solicit bids, the Board went beyond the
parties who had submitted unsolicited expressions of interest
by identifying three additional strategic buyers. The Board's
financial advisors approached all of the potential bidders on
equal terms, and all knew that the Board was conducting a
sale process and so faced the prospect of competition when
formulating their offers.
The petitioners have argued that although the Board may
have set out to generate competition, its efforts failed because
Altisource decided not to bid. They say that this left Fidelity
without any competition as the only strategic bidder for the
whole Company. It is possible that a single-bidder process,
even one that would be defensible from a fiduciary duty
standpoint, could be unpersuasive for purposes of price
discovery for an appraisal. In CKx, for example, the court
relied exclusively on the market price, but stressed that the
case involved meaningful pre-signing competition and was
not one in which “the only evidence that a merger price
was the result of ‘market’ forces was a post-signing go-
shop period (which failed to produce competing bids) ....”
2013 WL 5878807, at *13. Likewise in Orchard Enterprises,
the court declined to give weight to the merger price in an
appraisal action where “the trial did not focus extensively
on the quality of marketing ... or the utility of the ‘go shop’
provision in the merger agreement, which could obviously
have been affected by [a large stockholder's] voting power and
expressed interest to acquire all of [the company] for itself.”
2012 WL 2923305, at *5.
Importantly, however, if bidders perceive a sale process to be
relatively open, then a credible threat of competition can be
as effective as actual competition:
Even when there is only one buyer, that buyer could feel
compelled to act as if there were more. In a perfectly
contestable market, competitive pressures exerted by the
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perpetual threat of entry (as well as by the presence
of actual rivals) induce competitive behavior. Free entry
is a sufficient condition for a market to be perfectly
contestable. ...
Aktas et al., supra, at 242–43. Consequently, “competition
need not be observed ex post for the M & A market
to be efficient.” Id. at 242. “Competition, or the threat
of competition, is a strong incentive for buyers to make
higher bids for sellers.” Bulletproof, supra, at 884 (emphasis
added); see also id at 879–80 (surveying literature on auction
theory and concluding that “[t]he two key insights are that
competition, or the threat of competition, will lead to a price
closer to the buyer's reservation price and that the price effect
of one additional competitor is greater than the price effects
attributable to bargaining”).
During the pre-signing phase, Fidelity and THL did not know
that Altisource had dropped out. They instead knew that the
Company was conducting a sale process involving multiple
parties, and they also knew that the merger agreement that
they had negotiated with the Company in 2012 and planned to
use as the framework for their 2013 deal included a go-shop,
which could create a path for post-signing competition by a
strategic competitor.18 In this case, the Company established
the presence of a competitive dynamic during the pre-signing
phase that that generated meaningful price discovery.
*19  Reinforcing the threat of competition from other parties
was the realistic possibility that the Company would reject the
Fidelity/THL bid and pursue a different alternative. Fidelity
and THL had approached the Company previously in 2010,
2011, and 2012. Each time, the Board had declined to pursue
a transaction. In 2012, the Board had rejected premium
bids of $26.50, $28.00, and $29.00 per share, choosing
instead to continue operating the Company on a stand-alone
basis. In early 2013, the Board also rejected Fidelity/THL's
preliminary indication of interest of $30.00 per share. The
Board's track record of saying “no” gave Fidelity/THL a
credible reason to believe that the Board would not sell below
its internal reserve price. See Tr. 483 (Carpenter) (“And I
might add that [Fidelity] had learned in prior times that we
would walk away when they didn't raise their bid.”).
By citing the involvement of multiple, heterogeneous bidders
during the pre-signing phase, this decision is not suggesting
any legal requirement to engage with multiple bidders.
There may be sound business reasons for not doing so,
and “[n]othing in our jurisprudence suggests that an auction
process need conform to any theoretical standard.” CKx, 2013
WL 5878807, at *14. As this court has observed, “a multi-
bidder auction of a company” is not a “prerequisite to finding
that the merger price is a reliable indicator of fair value.”
Ramtron, 2015 WL 4540443, at *21. The point of citing
the involvement of multiple bidders in this case is more
limited. It is simply that because the Company contacted a
reasonable number of heterogeneous bidders during the pre-
signing phase, its argument for reliance on the deal price (all
else equal) is more persuasive.19
b. Adequate And Reliable Information During The Pre–
Signing Phase
Another factor supporting the effectiveness of the sale process
in this case was that adequate and reliable information
about the Company was available to all participants, which
contributed to the existence of meaningful competition.
Delaware cases have questioned the validity of a sale
process when reliable information is unavailable for reasons
that have included regulatory uncertainty20 and persistent
misperceptions about the corporation's value.21 A company
also can create informational inadequacies by providing
disparate information to bidders. See Goeree & Offerman,
supra, at 600. If a seller only makes information available to
one bidder, then the seller has given that bidder a subsidy.
See id. The effect of disparate information is greater in a
common value auction than in a private value auction.22
Strategic buyers, who have their own private sources of value
and trade-based informational advantages, are less affected by
information disparities than financial buyers, who are more
susceptible to the winner's curse. See Dell Fair Value, 2016
WL 3186538, at *42; Denton, supra, at 1546.
*20  In this case, all bidders received equal access to
information about the Company. All had the opportunity
to conduct due diligence before submitting their bids, and
several did so. There is no evidence in the record suggesting
that the Company or its advisors provided any particular
bidder with informational advantages. This is also not a case
where the size of the Company or the nature of its business
made it difficult to understand and assess. Cf.  Dell Fair
Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *40–41. Every bidder who
submitted an indication of interest, including Altisource in
early 2013, identified a limited amount of time for conducting
due diligence, typically four weeks.
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The record in this case lacked persuasive evidence of
factors that would undermine the reliability of information
that bidders received, such as a regulatory overhang or a
significant disconnect between the Company's unaffected
market price and informed assessments of fair value by
insiders. Compare DFC Glob., 2016 WL 3753123, at
*21; Dell Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *32–36.
The petitioners have pointed to the legal uncertainty that
surrounded the Company and the proximity of the sale
process to the settlements that the Company announced
in January 2013. They argue that stockholders did not
sufficiently understand the Company's significant value
once its legal risk had been addressed. It is true that
there was a regulatory overhang from the investigations
in the Company's involvement in robo-signing and related
stockholder litigation, but the settlements cleared up those
issues. The weight of the evidence at trial indicated that the
settlements made the Company easier to understand, and the
Company's stock price increased substantially following the
announcement of the settlements.
The record in this case lacked persuasive indications of
irrational or exaggerated pessimism, whether driven by short-
termism or otherwise, that could have anchored the price
negotiations at levels below fair value.23 A variety of factors
indicated that the market price was providing a reliable
valuation indicator. Management believed that its efforts
to educate the market had succeeded, that the Company's
stockholders understood its business, and that they were
focused on its long-term prospects. Since 2011, analysts had
established a pattern of accurately predicting the Company's
performance. The valuation ranges that the Company's
advisors generated in 2012 and 2013 using DCF analyses
were also generally consistent with market indicators. See JX
33 at 17.
c. Lack Of Collusion Or Unjustified Favoritism Towards
Particular Bidders
*21  A third factor supporting the effectiveness of the sale
process in this case was the absence of any explicit or implicit
collusion, whether among bidders or between the seller and
a particular bidder or subset of bidders.24 Under Delaware
law, only an “arms-length merger price resulting from an
effective market check” is “entitled to great weight in an
appraisal.” Glob. GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc. (Golden
Telecom I), 993 A.2d 497, 508–09 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Strine,
V.C.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010). A common risk in
corporate sale processes is the possibility that management
will favor a particular bidder for self-interested reasons, even
if the favoritism does not rise to the level of an actionable
breach of duty; a reliable sales process avoids that taint.25
*22  The Merger was not an MBO. To the contrary, the
Company's management team believed that Fidelity would
not retain them if it acquired the Company. This gave the
management team a powerful personal incentive not to favor
Fidelity and not to seek (consciously or otherwise) to deliver
the Company to Fidelity at an advantageous price. Instead it
gave the management team an additional incentive to seek out
other bidders and create competition for Fidelity.
The petitioners have pointed to ties among Fidelity, THL, and
members of the Board which they say undermined the sale
process in general and the price negotiation in particular. It is
true that there were relationships among Fidelity, THL, and
members of the Board, in large part because of the Company's
history. Recall that Fidelity purchased the Alltel financial
division that eventually became the Company in 2003,
reorganized it as part of FNF Services, then spunoff FNF
Services in 2006. FNF Services in turn spun off the Company
in 2008. The Company's CEO, Harris, had consulted for
Fidelity and THL on the Alltel acquisition and managed FNF
Services from 2002 through 2006. Kennedy, the Company's
Chairman, had served as CEO of FNF Services from 2006
through 2009, and during that time Foley, the Chairman of
Fidelity, was Executive Chairman of FNF Services. Hunt,
another outside director, served as an officer of one of THL's
portfolio companies. The Company and Fidelity also shared a
common business campus in Jacksonville, Florida (although
they occupied separate office buildings).
These relationships warranted close examination, but they
did not compromise the sale process. Harris interacted with
Fidelity and other bidders in his capacity as CEO, but he
recused himself from deliberating as a director during the
2013 sale process. Hunt also recused himself. Kennedy
participated only after the Board determined that he did
not have a conflict. All of the members of the Board and
management were net sellers in the deal, and they collectively
expected to receive approximately $100 million from the
Merger in stock-based compensation. See JX 260 at 91–99;
Tr. 784 (Hausman). Harris in particular had an incentive to
maximize the value of his shares, because he planned to retire.
As noted, the management team as a whole believed that if
Fidelity acquired the Company, they would not retain their
positions, meaning that maximizing the value of the merger
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consideration was the best way for them to obtain value from
the deal. There also was a history of competition between
Fidelity's ServiceLink business and the Company, and during
the sale process management resisted providing sensitive
information to what it regarded as its closest competitor. See
JX 46.
The petitioners complain the loudest about the call that
Foley made to Kennedy, where Foley proposed consideration
of $33.25 per share, essentially splitting the difference
between Fidelity's offer of $32 per share and the Company's
counteroffer of $34.50 per share. Although the Company's
bankers made one more try to get more consideration, the
headline price term was effectively set during that telephone
call, and negotiations from that point on revolved around the
collar and other aspects of the deal. The petitioners seem to
believe that during that call, Kennedy committed to $33.25
per share, ending the negotiations at a point below where they
would have ended up otherwise. But Kennedy did not have
authority to lock the Board in to $33.25 per share, and the
Board in fact had its bankers push back once more. Nor is
it clear that the negotiations would have ended in a different
place if Fidelity's banker had responded to Credit Suisse, as
the petitioners would have preferred.
*23  More importantly, the record indicates that even at
$33.25 per share, the deal price included a portion of the
synergies that Fidelity and THL hoped to achieve from
the transaction, including revenue synergies from combining
the Company's Services business with Fidelity's ServiceLink
unit. Assuming for the sake of argument that a negotiator
without a historical relationship with Foley might have
extracted more than $33.25 per share, the record indicates that
the additional amount would have represented a portion of the
combinatorial value of the Company to Fidelity, not increased
going concern value to which the petitioners would be entitled
in an appraisal. “A merger price resulting from arms-length
negotiations ... is a very strong indication of fair value,” but
it “must be accompanied by evidence tending to show that
it represents the going concern value of the company rather
than just the value of the company to one specific buyer.”
M.P.M., 731 A.2d at 797. “The fact that a board has extracted
the most that a particular buyer (or type of buyer) will pay
does not mean that the result constitutes fair value.” Dell Fair
Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *29. Likewise, the fact that a
negotiator has failed to extract the most a particular buyer (or
type of buyer) will pay does not mean that what the negotiator
obtained did not already exceed fair value. In Dell, the former
was true. In this case, the latter was true.
d. Conclusion Regarding The Initial Merger
Consideration
The evidence at trial established that the Initial Merger
Consideration is a reliable indicator of fair value as of the
signing of the Merger Agreement. The evidence indicating
that the transaction price included synergies suggests that the
fair value of the Company as of the signing of the Merger
Agreement would not have exceeded the value of the Initial
Merger Consideration. The valuation date for purposes of
an appraisal, however, is not the date on which the Merger
Agreement was signed, but rather the date on which the
merger closes.
3. Evidence From The Post–Signing Period
Over seven months elapsed between the signing of the
Merger Agreement on May 27, 2013, and the closing of the
merger on January 2, 2014. The parties have to address this
temporal gap, because “[t]he time for determining the value
of a dissenter's shares is the point just before the merger
transaction ‘on the date of the merger.’ ” Appraisal Rights A–
33 (quoting Technicolor I, 542 A.2d at 1187). Consequently,
if the value of the corporation changes between the signing of
the merger and the closing, the fair value determination must
be measured by the “operative reality” of the corporation at
the effective time of the merger. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc. (Technicolor II), 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996).
Neither side presented analyses of the potential for valuation
change between signing and closing. Neither analyzed
changes in value of market indices or (arguable) peer
companies. Neither attempted to use these metrics to bring
the Company's market price forward, as parties sometimes
historically did under the Delaware Block Method. See
Appraisal Rights, supra, at A–58 (collecting cases). The
petitioners pointed to the existence of the temporal gap as a
reason not to rely on either the deal price or market-based
metrics associated with the signing of the deal. They argued
that in light of the temporal gap, the court should construct its
own valuation as of the closing date.
The respondent approached the temporal gap differently.
They argued that (i) the failure of a topping bid to emerge
between announcement of the deal and the stockholder vote
validated the deal price, (ii) the Company's performance
declined during the gap period, and (iii) Fidelity's stock traded
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up, resulting in the Company's stockholders receiving the
higher Final Merger Consideration. The respondent argued
that the Final Merger Consideration therefore exceeded fair
value, particularly because of evidence that the deal included
combinatorial synergies.
Taken as a whole, the evidence at trial established that the
Final Merger Consideration was a reliable indicator of fair
value as of the closing of the Merger and that, because
of synergies and a post-signing decline in the Company's
performance, the fair value of the Company as of the closing
date did not exceed the Final Merger Consideration.
a. The Absence Of A Topping Bid
*24  During the seven-month period between signing and
closing, no other bidder submitted an indication of interest
or made a competing proposal. During the first forty days of
the post-signing period, the Company conducted a go-shop.
After that, until the meeting of stockholders on December 19,
2014, the Company was free to respond to a topping bid that
constituted a Superior Proposal. The time leading up to the
meeting of stockholders amounted to a five-month window-
shop.
A go-shop period is less common in deals involving strategic
buyers like Fidelity than in MBOs involving private equity
sponsors.26 MBOs in which a management team has affiliated
with an incumbent financial sponsor rarely generate topping
bids, particularly from other financial sponsors.27 It is not
clear how a go-shop in a deal with a strategic acquirer would
affect the behavior of other strategic bidders. It seems logical
that relative to a deal without a go-shop, a strategic buyer
would be more likely to compete when a deal involved a go-
shop.
In this case, however, several factors undermined the efficacy
of the go-shop. First, it was not part of the bankers' plan
for the sale process. The parties appear to have kept the go-
shop because of legal advice indicating that it would help
mitigate litigation risk in the event a stockholder sued the
board for breach of fiduciary duty. The bankers gave no
advice regarding the timing or structure of the go-shop, and
the respondent's counsel invoked the attorney-client privilege
to block discovery into discussions regarding the go-shop.
The go-shop appears to have been a lawyer-driven add-on.
Second, the quality of the contacts during the go-
shop is suspect. It is true that the Company's financial
advisors contacted twenty-five potential strategic buyers and
seventeen potential financial buyers, which are impressive
headline numbers. The bulk of those companies, however,
already had demonstrated that they were not interested in
acquiring the Company, had been ruled out by the Board and
its bankers as unlikely transaction partners, or were “the usual
opportunities.” Carpenter Dep. 129–30.
Only Altisource and two financial buyers expressed interest
during the go-shop period. Neither bid. One could view the
lack of interest and absence of bidding during the go-shop
phase as providing support for the proposition that the Initial
Merger Consideration equaled or exceeded fair value. See
Highfields Capital, Inc. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 62
(Del. Ch. 2007) (“The more logical explanation for why no
bidder ever emerged is self-evident: MONY was not worth
more than $31 per share.”). The more logical explanation
on the facts of this case is that potential overbidders did
not see a realistic path to success. To make it worthwhile to
bid, a potential deal jumper must not only value the target
company above the deal price, but also perceive a pathway
to success that is “sufficiently realistic to warrant incurring
the time and expense to become involved in a contested
situation, as well as the potential damage to professional
relationships and reputation from intervening and possibly
being unsuccessful.” Dell Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at
*39. The lack of a realistic path to success explains why a
bidder “would choose not to intervene in a go-shop, even if
it meant theoretically leaving money on the table by allowing
the initial bidder to secure an asset at a beneficial price.” Id.
*25  In this case, the most persuasive explanation is that
the existence of an incumbent trade bidder holding an
unlimited match right was a sufficient deterrent to prevent
other parties from perceiving a realistic path to success.28
Put differently, for another bidder to warrant intervening,
the bidder would have had to both (i) value the Company
more highly than $33.25 per share and (ii) believe that it
could outbid Fidelity, recognizing that Fidelity could achieve
synergies from acquiring the Company and therefore would
be likely to be able to outbid any competitor that lacked
similar access to synergies or a comparable source of private
value. Without the second half of the equation, an overbidder
could force Fidelity to pay more, but it could not ultimately
prevail. Without a realistic path to success, it made no sense
to get involved.
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At first blush, Altisource's decision not to bid during the
go-shop phase appears to suggest that the Initial Merger
Consideration exceeded fair value. Altisource was a trade
bidder and therefore might have been expected to generate
synergies from a transaction with the Company. If so, and
if the Initial Merger Consideration was equivalent to or less
than fair value, than Altisource could have contested Fidelity's
position. But there is also evidence in this case that because
Altisource competed with some of the Company's clients,
Altisource actually faced revenue dis-synergies as part of a
potential deal, and that those dis-synergies would outweigh
any cost savings that Altisource might achieve.
On the facts presented, the probative value of the go-shop
is inconclusive. The same is true for the post-signing period
between the end of the go-shop and the stockholder vote.
During that nearly six-month period, the Company could no
longer solicit additional bids, and the termination fee doubled
from $37 million to $74 million, but otherwise the Company
could entertain a bid that qualified as a Superior Proposal.
Just as during the go-shop period, however, a topping bidder
needed a realistic path to success to make it rational to
intervene. The marginally greater impediments to a topping
bid made that path less realistic, rather than more realistic,
than during the post-go-shop phase.
b. Post–Closing Performance And The Operation Of The
Collar
*26  Immediately after the announcement of the Merger,
Fidelity's stock price rose. It continued to rise during the post-
signing period. Due to the collar, these increases caused the
value of the merger consideration to increase. Fidelity twice
exercised its right to increase the cash component, resulting
in the Final Merger Consideration of $37.04 per share.
During the same time period that Fidelity's stock price was
going up, the Company's financial performance was going
down. In October 2013, the Company announced that quarter
over quarter, revenue had declined by 10.6% and EBITDA by
18.4%. Compared to the Updated Base Case's projections for
FY 2013, actual revenues were down 7.8% and EBITDA was
down 16.2%.
The petitioners might have sought to address these issues.
They might have attempted to show by reference to other
companies or indices that but for the Merger, the Company's
stock price would have risen as well, perhaps even more than
Fidelity's. Or they might have sought to show that the declines
in the Company's performance resulted from the Merger itself
and therefore should be excluded as a valuation consideration,
perhaps because the sale process diverted management's
attention and harmed employee morale. They petitioners did
not advance these or other arguments, which they would have
had to support with persuasive evidence. The record rather
indicates that Fidelity's performance improved, causing an
increase in the value of the merger consideration, while the
Company's performance declined.
Instead, the petitioners argued the declines in the Company's
performance post-closing did not require any adjustments
to the Updated Base Case and that management reaffirmed
the Company's belief in the reliability of its projections.
Accepting that as true, it suggests that the going concern value
of the Company did not change such that the Initial Merger
Consideration remained a reliable indicator of fair value and
the Final Merger Consideration established a ceiling for fair
value. See Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 343 (relying on merger price
in appraisal case despite six-month lag between signing and
closing because “nothing occurred between the signing of the
Merger Agreement and the effective date of the Merger that
resulted in an increase in the value of UFG”).
A final factor pertinent to the Company's post-signing, pre-
closing performance is the extensive evidence indicating
that the Initial Merger Consideration included a portion
of the value that Fidelity and THL expected to generate
from synergies. The Final Merger Consideration logically
incorporated an additional portion of this value because
of the component consisting of Fidelity stock, which drew
some (admittedly unquantified) portion of its value from the
synergies that Fidelity and its stockholders would enjoy. The
existence of combinatorial synergies provides an additional
reason to think that the Final Merger Consideration exceeded
the fair value of the Company.
B. The DCF Analysis As Evidence Of Fair Value
Both the petitioners and the Company submitted valuation
opinions from distinguished experts. The petitioners' expert,
Professor Jerry A. Hausman, used a DCF analysis to opine
that the Company's fair value at closing was $50.46 per share.
The respondent's expert, Daniel Fischel, used a DCF analysis
to opine that the Company's fair value at closing was $33.57
per share. The Final Merger Consideration was $37.14 per
share.
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*27  “[T]he DCF ... methodology has featured prominently
in this Court because it is the approach that merits the
greatest confidence within the financial community.” Owen v.
Cannon, 2015 WL 3819204, at *16 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2015)
(quotation marks omitted).
Put in very simple terms, the basic DCF method involves
several discrete steps. First, one estimates the values of
future cash flows for a discrete period .... Then, the value of
the entity attributable to cash flows expected after the end
of the discrete period must be estimated to produce a so-
called terminal value, preferably using a perpetual growth
model. Finally, the value of the cash flows for the discrete
period and the terminal value must be discounted back ....
Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 WL 2045640,
at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005) (Strine, V.C.) (footnote
omitted). This decision does not exhaustively describe the
DCF methodology; it only addresses the areas of substantial
disagreement between the experts.
1. The Projection Period
The first issue for any DCF analysis is to determine the
appropriate forecasts to use for the projection period. Both
experts used the Updated Base Case with minor adjustments.
Hausman added back deferred income taxes and subtracted
accounts payable, accrued liabilities, and other liabilities for
2014. JX 297 ¶ 67. Fischel added back deferred tax income
and other investments. JX 296, Ex. 23. Neither provided
a detailed explanation for their adjustments. This decision
adopts the Updated Base Case and averages the adjustments
that the experts made.
2. The Terminal Period
The next challenge for a DCF analysis is to extend the
forecasts beyond the projection period to derive an estimate of
cash flows during the terminal period. The experts disagreed
on two aspects of the calculation.
The experts disagreed initially over the level of
capital expenditures needed to sustain the Company's
business during the terminal period. Over the long run,
capital expenditures should equal depreciation. Robert W.
Holthausen & Mark E. Zmijewski, Corporation Valuation
Theory, Evidence & Practice 232 (2014). In the last year
of the projection period, however, the Updated Base Case
contemplated an amount for depreciation that exceeded
capital expenditures. To bring the two into harmony,
Hausman assumed that capital expenditures would exceed
depreciation over time by an amount sufficient to cause
net amortizable assets to grow at the Company's long-term
growth rate. Fischel chose to increase capital expenditures
to equal depreciation. The record shows that the Company
historically had high levels of depreciation relative to capital
expenditures, so it is more reasonable to assume depreciation
would decrease during the terminal period to match capital
expenditures. This decision adopts that approach.
The experts also disagreed over the perpetuity growth rate.
Hausman used 3.4%, which he derived from the projected rate
of loan originations. Fischel used 2.2%, equal to the long-term
rate of inflation.
“This Court often selects a perpetuity growth rate based
on a reasonable premium to inflation.” DFC Glob., 2016
WL 3753123, at *17. This is because “[i]n a steady state,
it is typically assumed that future business growth will
approximate that of the overall economy.” In re Trados
S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 73 (Del. Ch. 2013). “[O]nce an
industry has matured, a company will grow at a steady rate
that is roughly equal to the rate of nominal GDP growth.”
Golden Telecom I, 993 A.2d at 511. The risk-free rate is a
viable proxy for expected nominal GDP growth. See DFC
Glob., 2016 WL 3753123, at *17.
*28  The Company was a mature firm, so ordinarily it would
grow at a rate approximating GDP growth. The Company's
operative reality on the closing date, however, included the
Services business, which had declining prospects, and a
smaller Analytics business, which was growing. Given this
business mix, the Company should grow over the long-term at
a rate between inflation and nominal GDP that is closer to the
latter. Hausman's rate of 3.4% better fits the operative reality
of the Company, so this decision adopts his figure.
3. The Discount Rate
The final issue is the appropriate discount rate, which
the experts derived by calculating the Company's weighted
average cost of capital (“WACC”). They disagreed on
virtually every input except the appropriate tax rate, where
they both used 37%.
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Hausman used a capital structure consisting of 81.1% equity,
relying on the Company's financial statements from 2013
and the equity value implied by his DCF analysis. Fischel
used a capital structure consisting of 70% equity, relying on
the Company's pre-announcement debt-to-equity ratio. This
decision adopts Fischel's approach, which is consistent with
precedent and avoids the circularity in Hausman's method.
Hausman opined that the Company's cost of debt was 5.0%
without citing any support. Fischel used a cost of debt of
5.02%, explaining that the Company's was rated BB+ from
2008 through 2014 and that the yield to maturity of a BB-
rated bond index as of January 2, 2014 was 5.02%. Fischel
provided a better justification for his number, so this decision
uses it.
The experts disagreed about the risk-free rate. Hausman used
3.63%, which was the return on a 20–year U.S. Treasury bond
as of December 2013. Fischel used 3.68%, which was the
return on a 20–year U.S. Treasury bond as of January 2, 2014.
Fischel's measurement was closer to the closing date, so this
decision adopts it.
Both experts used the supply-side equity risk premium.
Hausman used 6.11%, which he obtained from Ibbotson's
2013 Valuation Yearbook. Fischel used 6.18%, which he
obtained from the 2014 Duff & Phelps Valuation Handbook.
Fischel's figure better captures the Company's operative
reality on the closing date. See Ancestry.com, 2015 WL
399726, at *21 (rejecting argument that court should have
used 2012 Ibbotson Yearbook instead of 2013 Yearbook for
merger that closed on December 28, 2012, because the 2013
Yearbook would not have been available to investors yet when
the merger closed).
The experts chiefly disagreed over beta. Hausman derived a
beta of 0.845 from five years of daily observations. Fischel
used a beta of 1.395, which represented the average of (i)
a beta derived from five years of monthly observations and
(ii) a beta derived from two years of weekly observations.
The beta drives the bulk of the valuation difference between
the experts. Inserting Hausman's beta into Fischel's model
generates a value of $51.18 per share.
“Beta, like cost of capital itself, is a forward-looking concept.
It is intended to be a measure of the expected future
relationship between the return on an individual security
(or portfolio of securities) and the overall market.” Duff
& Phelps, 2015 Valuation Handbook: Guide to Costs of
Capital 5–3 (2015). The Company's performance during
the measuring period therefore should match, to the extent
possible, the anticipated performance of the Company going
forward. The financial literature indicates that using a five-
year measurement period is both acceptable and common,
but that a shorter period should be used if a five-year look
back encompasses significant changes in the macroeconomic
environment29 or the company's business.30 In this case, five
years covers the Great Recession and attendant housing crisis,
which benefitted the Company and caused it to outperform the
S & P 500. Company management and BCG anticipated that
the Company would perform going forward at substantially
lower levels. Looking back five years also covers a period
when the Company was more dependent on Services, while
going forward the Company will rely more on Analytics.
These factors counsel in favor of using a two-year period as a
better predictor of the Company's operative reality at the time
of the Merger.
*29  Discarding the five-year betas leaves Fischel's
measurement of 1.503, which relied on weekly observations.
The financial literature supports using a two-year beta
with weekly observations, so this decision could adopt this
estimate.31 Fischel, however, used a lower beta of 1.395. By
doing so, Fischel favored the petitioners. That fact enhances
the credibility of his selection, so this decision uses his figure.
The last input is the size premium. Hausman added a size
premium of 0.92%. Fischel did not add a size premium,
arguing that there “is no consensus in the academic literature
as to whether such a premium still exists.” JX 296 ¶ 113
n.163. Adding a size premium increases the discount rate and
lowers the value of the Company. As with his estimate of beta,
Fischel's judgment favored the petitioners, so this decision
uses it.
These inputs result in a WACC of 9.56%, which this decision
adopts. Adding a size premium of 0.92% to the cost of equity
would increase the WACC to 10.2%.
4. The DCF Valuation
A DCF valuation using the foregoing inputs produces a value
of $38.67 per share, which is 4% higher than the Final Merger
Consideration of $37.14 per share. Using a WACC of 10.02%
would produce a value of $34.50 per share, or 8% less than
the Final Merger Consideration. These figures bracket what
the stockholders received. Nevertheless, the figure of $38.67
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per share is my best estimate of the fair value of the Company
based on the DCF method.
B. The Weight Given To The Methodologies
When presented with multiple indicators of fair value, the
court must determine how to weigh them. “In discharging
its statutory mandate, the Court of Chancery has discretion
to select one of the parties' valuation models as its general
framework or to fashion its own.” M.G. Bancorporation,
737 A.2d at 525–26. “The Court may evaluate the
valuation opinions submitted by the parties, select the
most representative analysis, and then make appropriate
adjustments to the resulting valuation.”32 The court also may
“make its own independent valuation calculation by either
adapting or blending the factual assumptions of the parties'
experts.” M.G. Bancorporation, 737 A.2d at 524. “When ...
none of the parties establishes a valuation that is persuasive,
the Court must make a determination based on its own
analysis.”33
*30  Delaware law does not have a rigid hierarchy of
valuation methodologies, nor does it have a settled formula
for weighting them. “Appraisal is, by design, a flexible
process.” Golden Telecom II, 11 A.3d at 218. The statute
“vests the Chancellor and Vice Chancellors with significant
discretion to consider ‘all relevant factors’ and determine the
going concern value of the underlying company.” Id. (quoting
8 Del. C. § 262(h)).
In a series of decisions since Golden Telecom II, this court has
considered how much weight to give the deal price relative to
other indications of fair value. In five decisions since Golden
Telecom II, the Court of Chancery has given exclusive weight
to the deal price, particularly where other evidence of fair
value was unreliable or weak. In five other decisions since
Golden Telecom II, the court has declined to give exclusive
weight to the deal price in situations where the respondent
failed to overcome the petitioner's attacks on the sale process
and thus did not prove that it was a reliable indicator of fair
value.
CKx was the first post-Golden Telecom II decision to rely
exclusively on the merger price. The court found that “[t]he
company was sold after a full market canvass and auction,”
the process was “free of fiduciary and process irregularities,”
and “the sales price [was] a reliable indicator of value.” 2013
WL 5878807 at *1. By contrast, the parties' experts in CKx did
not establish the reliability of their methods. The court found
that (i) the company lacked sufficiently comparable peers
and (ii) that “the evidence [was] overwhelming” that a key
element of management's projections “was not prepared in the
ordinary course of business” and “was otherwise unreliable.”
Id. at *10. “In the absence of comparable companies or
transactions to guide a comparable companies analysis or
a comparable transactions analysis, and without reliable
projections to discount in a DCF analysis,” the court relied
“on the merger price as the best and most reliable indication
of [the company's] value.” Id. at *11. The court stressed that
the “conclusion that merger price must be the primary factor
in determining fair value is justified in light of the absence of
any other reliable valuation analysis.” Id. at *13.
In Ancestry.com, the court again relied exclusively on the
merger price. The court found that the company was sold
after an “auction process” which involved “a market canvass
and uncovered a motivated buyer. 2015 WL 399726, at *1.
The court concluded that the sale process “represent[ed] an
auction of the Company that is unlikely to have left significant
stockholder value unaccounted for.” Id. at *16. As in CKx,
there were “no comparable companies to use for purposes of
valuation.” Id. at *18. The court also had “reason to question
management['s] projections, which were done in light of the
transaction and in the context of obtaining a fairness opinion,”
and where “management did not create projections in the
normal course of business.” Id. at *18. The court prepared its
own DCF analysis, which it regarded as a reliable indicator of
value, but the answer was reasonably close to the deal price.
That outcome gave the court “comfort that no undetected
factor skewed the sales process.” Id. at *23. The court found
that “fair value in these circumstances [was] best represented
by the market price.” Id.
In AutoInfo, the court again relied exclusively on the merger
price. The company conducted an extensive sale process in
which its financial advisor contacted 165 potential strategic
and financial acquirers, seventy signed NDAs, ten submitted
indications of interest after conducting due diligence, nine
received management presentations, five submitted verbal
valuations or written letters of intent, and the company
ultimately negotiated exclusively with the highest bidder.
2015 WL 2069417, at *3–6. The court concluded that
“evidence regarding AutoInfo's sales process substantiates
the reliability of the Merger price.” Id. at *11. The court later
reiterated that “the sales process was generally strong and
can be expected to have led to a Merger price indicative of
fair value.” Id. at *14. The expert's valuation methodologies
lacked similar persuasiveness. Management had prepared
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projections as part of the sale process, but management had
never prepared projections before, and the court found them
unreliable. Id. at *8. The court also found that there were
no comparable companies that could be used for valuation
purposes. Id. The court rejected both sides' valuation analyses
as unreliable, but as in Ancestry, prepared its own DCF
analysis. Id. at *16. Despite noting that the “[u]nder Delaware
law, it would be appropriate to provide weight to the value
as implied by the Court's DCF analysis,” the decision elected
to put “full weight” on the deal price as “the best estimate of
value.” Id.
*31  In Ramtron, the court once again relied exclusively
on the merger price. The company conducted a “thorough”
sale process in response to an unsolicited tender offer. 2015
WL 4540443, at *1. The company rejected the hostile bid
on multiple occasions and “actively solicited every buyer it
believed could be interested in a transaction.” Id. at *21.
The company ultimately agreed to a transaction with the
unsolicited bidder only after extracting five separate price
increases. Id. at *24. As in CKx, management's projections
were “not reliable,” and the parties' experts agreed that there
were “no comparable companies.” Id. at *1, *18.
In BMC, the court relied exclusively on the merger price yet
again. The company engaged in “a thorough and vigorous
sales process” that involved outreach to financial and strategic
buyers. 2015 WL 6164771, at *1. The court found that
the merger price was “sufficiently structured to develop
fair value” and hence a reliable indicator of value. Id. at
*16. The court also constructed a DCF analysis based on
a set of management projections, which the court believed
represented “the best DCF valuation based on the information
available to me.” Id. at *18. The court nevertheless declined
to give weight to the DCF valuation, reasoning as follows:
My DCF valuation is a product of a set of
management projections, projections that in one sense
may be particularly reliable due to BMC's subscription-
based business. Nevertheless, the Respondent's expert,
pertinently, demonstrated that the projections were
historically problematic, in a way that could distort value.
The record does not suggest a reliable method to adjust
these projections. I am also concerned about the discount
rate in light of a meaningful debate on the issue of using a
supply side versus historical equity risk premium. Further, I
do not have complete confidence in the reliability of taking
the midpoint between inflation and GDP as the Company's
expected growth rate.
Taking these uncertainties in the DCF analysis—in light
of the wildly-divergent DCF valuation of the experts—
together with my review of the record as it pertains to the
sales process that generated the Merger, I find the merger
price ... to be the best indicator of fair value. ...
Id. at *18.
In five other decisions since Golden Telecom II, the Court
of Chancery has considered the deal price, but has either not
relied on it or given it limited weight. In Orchard Enterprises,
the court declined to give weight to the merger price in
an appraisal proceeding that followed a merger between a
corporation and an affiliate of a large stockholder, observing
that “the trial did not focus extensively on the quality of
marketing ... or the utility of the ‘go shop’ provision in the
merger agreement, which could obviously have been affected
by [a large stockholder's] voting power and expressed interest
to acquire all of [the company] for itself.” 2012 WL 2923305,
at *5. Similarly in 3M Cogent, the court gave no weight
to a deal price of $10.50 per share where the respondent
corporation did not seek to have the court award that amount
as fair value and relied instead on its experts' opinions that
proposed a fair value award of $10.12 per share. Merion
Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 WL 3793896, at
*5 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013). The court also noted that the
respondent corporation and its experts had not made any
attempt to adjust the merger price for synergies or similar
elements of value that arose from the merger.34
*32  In Dell, I gave limited weight to the deal price, finding
that the respondent corporation “did not establish that the
outcome of the sale process offer[ed] the most reliable
evidence of the Company's value as a going concern.” Dell
Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *44. I nevertheless found
that the market data was sufficient
to exclude the possibility, advocated by the petitioners'
expert, that the Merger undervalued the Company by $23
billion. Had a value disparity of that magnitude existed,
then [a strategic bidder] would have emerged to acquire
the Company on the cheap. What the market data [did] not
exclude is an underpricing of a smaller magnitude.
Id. A confluence of multiple factors caused me not to give
greater weight to the deal price, including (i) the transaction
was an MBO, (ii) the bidders used an LBO pricing model to
determine the original merger consideration, (iii) there was
compelling evidence of a significant valuation gap driven by
the market's short-term focus, and (iv) the transaction was
not subjected to meaningful pre-signing competition. See id.
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at *29–37. Although the deal price increased as a result of
post-signing developments, the pattern of bidding by financial
sponsors during the go-shop reinforced the conclusion that the
consideration did not represent fair value, and the petitioners
proved that there were structural impediments to a topping bid
on the facts of the case, particularly in light of the size and
complexity of the company and the sell-side involvement of
the company's founder. See id. at *37–44. I relied instead on
a DCF analysis to determine fair value. Id. at *51.
More recently, in DFC Global, the court gave equal weight
to the deal price, the court's DCF valuation, and one
of the expert's comparable companies analysis. 2016 WL
3753123, at *23. The court found that the merger giving
rise to the appraisal proceeding had been “negotiated and
consummated during a period of significant company turmoil
and regulatory uncertainty, calling into question the reliability
of the transaction price as well as management's financial
projections.” Id. at *1. The company's competitors faced
similar challenges, and the resulting uncertainty undermined
the projections. Id. at *22. It also meant that the company
was sold during a valuation trough, which suggested that
“the transaction price would not necessarily be a reliable
indicator.” Id. The court also noted that the financial sponsor
who acquired the company had focused “on achieving a
certain internal rate of return and on reaching a deal within
its financing constraints,” which could generate an outcome
different from fair value. Id. To a lesser degree, the uncertainly
also undermined the multiples-based valuation, because that
valuation relied on two years of management projections. The
court concluded that “all three metrics suffer from various
limitations but ... each of them still provides meaningful
insight into [the company's] value.” Id. at *23. The court
also observed that “all three of them fall within a reasonable
range.” Id. The court therefore elected to weight them equally.
Most recently, in Dunmire v. Farmers & Merchants Bancorp
of Western Pennsylvania, Inc., 2016 WL 6651411 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 10, 2016), the court declined to rely on the deal price
where a controlling stockholder set the exchange ratio for a
stock-for-stock transaction between the company and another
entity controlled by the same family. The decision noted that
(i) “the Merger was not the product of an auction,” (ii) no third
parties were solicited, (iii) a controlling stockholder stood
on both sides of the deal, (iv) although a special committee
negotiated with the controller, the record did “not inspire
confidence that the negotiations were truly arms-length,” and
(v) the transaction was not conditioned on a majority-of-
the minority vote. Id. at *7–8. The only surprising aspect of
Dunmire is the respondent argued in favor of deference to the
deal price.
*33  This case is most similar to AutoInfo and BMC. The
Company ran a sale process that generated reliable evidence
of fair value. The Company also created a reliable set of
projections that support a meaningful DCF analysis. Small
changes in the assumptions that drive the DCF analysis,
however, generate a range of prices that starts below the
merger price and extends far above it. My best effort to
resolve the differences between the experts resulted in a DCF
valuation that is within 3% of the Final Merger Consideration.
The proximity between that outcome and the result of the sale
process is comforting. See S. Muoio & Co. LLC v. Hallmark
Entm't Invs. Co., 2011 WL 863007, at *19 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9,
2011) (“[W]hat you actually like to see when you're doing
a valuation is some type of overlap between the various
methodologies.” (quotation marks omitted)), aff'd, 35 A.3d
419 (Del. 2011) (TABLE).
As noted, a DCF analysis depends heavily on assumptions.
Under the circumstances, as in AutoInfo and BMC, I give
100% weight to the transaction price.
C. Whether To Make An Adjustment For Combinatorial
Synergies
The Company argued belatedly that the court should make
a finding regarding the value of the combinatorial synergies
and deduct some portion of that value from the deal price to
generate fair value. That is a viable method. See, e.g., Union
Ill., 847 A.2d at 353 n.26; Highfields, 939 A.2d at 61. In this
case, however, the Company litigated on the theory that the
Final Merger Consideration represented the “maximum fair
value” of the shares. JX 296 ¶ 128. In his expert report, Fischel
declined to offer any opinion on the quantum of synergies
or to propose an adjustment to the merger price. Id. At trial,
Fischel affirmed that he did not have any basis to opine
regarding a specific quantum of synergies. Tr. 982 (Fischel).
Having taken these positions, it was too late for the Company
to argue in its post-trial briefs that the court should deduct
synergies.
III. CONCLUSION
The fair value of the Company on the closing date was $37.14
per share. The legal rate of interest, compounded quarterly,
shall accrue on this amount from the date of closing until
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the date of payment. The parties shall cooperate on preparing
a final order. If there are additional issues that need to be
resolved before a final order can be entered, the parties shall
submit a joint letter within two weeks that identifies them
and recommends a schedule for bringing this matter to a
conclusion, at least at the trial court level.
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get the best possible price in these acquisitions.”); id. at 135–36 (“[P]ost–1980s public-to-private transactions experience
only modest increases in firm operating performance, but still generate large financial returns to private equity funds. This
finding suggests that private equity firms are able to buy low and sell high.”).
17 See DFC Glob., 2016 WL 3753123, at *22; Dell Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *29; see also Joshua Rosenbaum &
Joshua Pearl, Investment Banking: Valuation, Leveraged Buyouts, and Mergers & Acquisitions 235–36 (2009) (explaining
that a sponsor's ability to pay in a leveraged buy-out is constrained by “leverage capacity, credit market conditions, and
the sponsor's own IRR hurdles”).
18 See Dell Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *36 (“[T]he prospect of post-signing competition can help raise the price
offered during the pre-signing phase.”); Brian JM Quinn, Omnicare: Coercion and the New Unocal Standard, 38 J. Corp.
L. 835, 844 (2013) (“[K]nowing that a transaction will include a go-shop, wherein the seller will treat the initial bidder as
a stalking horse to generate an active post-signing auction, may incent initial bidders to offer a preemptive bid to deter
subsequent bids. In that view, the prospect of competition, even if no competition subsequently emerges, should be
sufficient incentive for a bidder to shift transaction surplus to the seller.”).
19 The focus is on a reasonable number of bidders, rather than all potential bidders, because as the number of bidders
increases, the marginal value of each additional bidder declines. “At about 10 bidders, you'll get 85% of the revenue that
you could expect to get from an auction with 50 bidders.” Guhan Subramanian, Negotiation? Auction? A Deal Maker's
Guide, Harv. Bus. Rev. (Dec. 2009), https://hbr.org/2009/12/negotiation-auction-a-deal-makers-guide.
20 See DFC Glob., 2016 WL 3753123, at *21.
21 See Dell Fair Value, *32 (“A second factor that undermined the persuasiveness of the Original Merger Consideration as
evidence of fair value was the widespread and compelling evidence of a valuation gap between the market's perception
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and the Company's operative reality.”). In the Dell Fair Value decision, the misperception resulted from “(i) analysts' focus
on short-term, quarter-by-quarter results and (ii) the Company's nearly $14 billion investment in its transformation, which
had not yet begun to generate the anticipated results.” Id.
22 J. Russel Denton, Note, Stacked Deck: Go–Shops & Auction Theory, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1529, 1536 (2008) (citing Jeremy
Bulow, Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, Toeholds and Takeovers, 107 J. Pol. Econ. 427, 430 (1999)). In an ascending
private value auction, the winning bidder is more likely to have prevailed because it has a greater private value than the
next highest bidder. See Denton, supra, at 1536. In common value auctions, the prospect of information asymmetries
drives the winner's curse. See Dell, 2016 WL 3186538, at *42; Paul Povel & Rajdeep Singh, Takeover Contests with
Asymmetric Bidders, 19 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1399–1400 (2006).
23 See Dell Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186538, at *33–36 (explaining why record supported existence of significant valuation
gap, driven by short-term pessimism, that depressed the market price and anchored price negotiations below fair value);
Malcom Baker, Xin Pan, & Jeffery Wurgler, The Effect of Reference Point Prices on Mergers and Acquisitions, 106 J. Fin.
Econ. 49, 50 (2012) (finding the “26–week high price [of a particular stock] has a statistically and economically significant
effect on offer prices [in mergers and acquisitions], and the 39–, 52–, and 65–week high prices also have independent
explanatory power” and speculating as to the causes of this reference point effect); id. at 64–65 (finding that deals with
higher premiums tend to close more often, which is “consistent with reference point behavior.”); Inga Chira & Jeff Madura,
Reference Point Theory and Pursuit of Deals, 50 Fin. Rev. 275, 277, 299 (2015) (“Our analysis reveals that a higher
target 52–week reference point, relative to the target's current stock price, ... increases the likelihood of a management
buyout (MBO).... Overall, the results from our analyses offer strong evidence that target and bidder reference points
serve as potent anchors that shape the outcomes and structures of mergers.”); Sangwon Lee & Vijay Yerramilli, Relative
Values, Announcement Timing, and Shareholder Returns in Mergers and Acquisitions 2 (January 2016) (unpublished
manuscript) (adopting finding of Baker, Pan, & Wurger, supra, that “key decision makers in the bidding and target firms
and investors are likely to use recent prices as reference points”). See generally Guhan Subramanian, Negotiauctions:
New Dealmaking Strategies for a Competitive Marketplace, 16–18 (2010) (explaining that anchoring “works by influencing
your perceptions of where the [zone of possible agreement] lies”).
24 See M.P.M., 731 A.2d at 796 (“A merger price resulting from arms-length negotiations where there are no claims of
collusion is a very strong indication of fair value.”); Paul Klemperer, What Really Matters in Auction Design, 16 J. Econ.
Persp. 169, 170 (2002) (citing “the risk that participants may explicitly or tacitly collude to avoid bidding up prices”).
25 See DFC Glob., 2016 WL 3753123, at *21 (giving weight to deal price where “[t]he deal did not involve the potential
conflicts of interest inherent in a management buyout or negotiation to retain existing management”); CKx, 2013 WL
5878807, at *13 (giving exclusive weight to sales process where “[t]he record and the trial testimony supports a conclusion
that the process by which [the company] was marketed to potential buyers was thorough, effective, and free from any
spectre of self-interest or disloyalty.”). For these and other reasons, “the weight of authority suggests that a claim that
the bargained-for price in an MBO represents fair value should be evaluated with greater thoroughness and care than,
at the other end of the spectrum, a transaction with a strategic buyer in which management will not be retained.” Dell
Fair Value, 2016 WL 3186548, at *28. See Iman Anabtawi, Predatory Management Buyouts, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
1285, 1320 (2016) (discussing factors that undermine pricing efficiency in the market for corporate control when the
transaction is an MBO); Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Form Over Substance? The Value of Corporate Process
and Management BuyOuts, 36 Del. J. Corp. L. 849, 862 (2011) (“There is a more concrete argument against MBOs on
fairness grounds. It is the prospect that management is utilizing inside information when it arranges an MBO. Management
by its inherent position has in its possession non-public knowledge of the corporation, and management can use this
informational asymmetry between itself and public shareholders to time the buy-out process. MBOs can thus be arranged
at advantageous times in the business cycle or history of the corporation.” (footnotes omitted)); Marcel Canoy, Yohanes
E. Riyanto & Patrick van Cayseele, Corporate Takeovers, Bargaining and Managers' Incentives to Invest, 21 Managerial
& Decision Econs. 1, 2, 14 (2000) (“Long-term investments, such as R & D investments, are slow yielding and more
difficult to be evaluated by the market, despite the fact that they could generate higher profits. Consequently, firms
investing heavily in long-term projects may be more susceptible to a takeover attempt. ... If being taken over is better than
taking over [for target management] ... then obviously, [management] would like to overinvest to facilitate a takeover ....”);
Deborah A. DeMott, Directors' Duties in Management Buyouts and Leveraged Recapitalizations, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 517,
536 (1988) (explaining that overhang from past acquisitions may artificially depress a company's stock market price and
make the buyout price appear generous); James R. Repetti, Management Buyouts, Efficient Markets, Fair Value, and
Soft Information, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 121, 125 (1988) (“Other methods for management to realize large gains in management
buyouts are not as innocuous as the use of leverage or as apparently innocuous as increasing cash flow. Management
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may actively depress the price of the shares prior to the management buyout in order to reduce the price they have to
pay. Management may accomplish this by ... channeling investments into long-term projects which will not provide short-
term returns.”); James Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1189,
1202–03 (1964) (“Far more difficult is ensuring to departing stockholders the benefit of improved prospects, where, at
the time of appraisal, the evidence of improvement is more intuitive than tangible. ... The appraisal process will tend
to produce conservative results where the values are speculative, and the majority's power to pick the time at which to
trigger appraisal may encourage them to move when full values may be temporarily obscured.” (footnote omitted)); see
also Benjamin Hermalin & Alan Schwartz, Buyouts in Large Companies, 25 J. Legal Stud. 351, 356 (1996) (“With respect
to timing, the firm could initiate a freeze-out (i) before it invests effort, (ii) after it invests effort but before the value of the
firm conditional on effort is revealed, or (iii) after the value of the firm is revealed but before earnings are realized. We
generally assume that the firm would wait until point iii because waiting in the model is costless but produces gains: were
the firm to initiate a freeze-out before it learns its value, it might have to pay too much.”).
26 See JX 296 ¶ 79 (finding that a merger agreement contained a go-shop in only 4% of sample of transactions that involved
a strategic entity buying a publicly traded U.S. target for a deal price above $100 million); id. ¶ 80 (finding that only 1%
of transactions had an auction and a go-shop where strategic buyers acquired a U.S. publicly traded target for a deal
price above $100 million).
27 See Denton, supra, at 1547 (“In the sixty-three deals that utilized go-shop provisions, there have been nine deals with
jump bids. Furthermore, there were jump bids in none of the MBOs containing go-shops .... Of the nine jump bids that
were made, strategic buyers made seven.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 1549 (“[G]o-shops have structures that discourage
bidding wars between financial buyers. Management involvement with the initial private equity bidder only increases the
advantages that are given to the initial bidder, since it gives the initial bidder better information about the value of the
target. Despite appearing to encourage additional bidders and a post-signing auction, go-shop provisions are structured
in a way that discourages financial buyers from bidding for the company.”).
28 A matching right is the functional equivalent of a right of first refusal and can foreclose a topping bidder from having a
realistic path to success. See Bulletproof, supra, at 870 (“The presence of rights of first refusal can be a strong deterrent
against subsequent bids. ... Success under these circumstances may involve paying too much and suffering the ‘winner’s
curse.’ ”); see also Frank Aquila & Melissa Sawyer, Diary Of A Wary Market: 2010 In Review And What To Expect In 2011,
14 M & A Law. Nov.–Dec. 2010, at 1 (“Match rights can result in the first bidder ‘nickel bidding’ to match an interloper's
offer, with repetitive rounds of incremental increases in the offer price. ... Few go-shops are successful as it is ... and match
rights are just one more factor that may dissuade a potential competing bidder from stepping in the middle of an already-
announced transaction.”); Marcel Kahan & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, First–Purchase Rights: Rights of First Refusal and
Rights of First Offer, 14 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 331, 331 (2012) (finding “that a right of first refusal transfers value from other
buyers to the right-holder, but may also force the seller to make suboptimal offers”); David I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of
First Refusal, 5 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 20–21 (1999) (discussing how a right of first refusal affects bidders); cf. Steven
J. Brams & Joshua R. Mitts, Mechanism Design in M & A Auctions, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 873, 879 (2014) (“The potential
for a bidding war remains unless interlopers are restricted-say, to one topping bid, which then can be matched.”).
29 Duff & Phelps, 2015 Valuation Handbook, supra, at 5–7 (“If a fundamental change in the business environment in which an
individual company (or even an industry) operates occurs, the valuation analyst should consider whether using historical
data from before the change should be included in the overall [beta] analysis.”). As an example, the Duff and Phelps 2015
Valuation Handbook cites the effect of the Great Recession on the financial sector, suggesting it would not be appropriate
for an analyst to include pre-crisis data. Id.
30 Holthausen & Zmijewski, supra, at 300 (“Using more recent data might better reflect a company's current (and more
forward-looking) systematic risk. Betas can shift because of changes in capital structure or because of changes in the
underlying business risk of the company, or because of fundamental changes in the market. ...”); Tim Koller, Marc
Goedhart & David Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of Companies 247 (5th ed. 2010) (advocating
for five-year monthly but noting that “changes in corporate strategy or capital structure often lead to changes in risk for
stockholders. In this case, a long estimation period would place too much weight on irrelevant data”); Shannon P. Pratt
& Roger J. Grabowski, Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples 208 (5th ed. 2014) (“Most services that calculate
beta use a two- or five-year sample measurement or look-back period. Five years is the most common ... But if the
business characteristics change during the sampling period ..., it may be more appropriate to use a shorter sampling
period. However, as the sampling period used is reduced, the accuracy of the estimate is generally reduced.”); see DFC
Glob., 2016 WL 3753123, at *10 n.124 (“[L]ong estimation period may be inappropriate when analysis of the five-year
historical chart shows changes in corporate strategy or capital structure that could render prior data irrelevant.” (citing
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Koller, Goedhart & Wessels, supra, at 247)); see also James R. Hitchner, Financial Valuation: Applications and Models
256 (3d ed. 2011) (noting that in measuring closely-held companies, sources “use anywhere from a two- to five-year
period to measure beta, with the five-year period being the most common”).
31 John Y. Campbell, Andrew W. Lo & A. Craig Mackinlay, The Econometrics of Financial Markets 184 (1997); Holthausen
& Zmijewski, supra, at 301 (noting that Bloomberg's default is to use “104 weeks of weekly observations or two years of
data”); id. at 300 (“The most commonly used intervals for estimating betas are monthly, weekly, and, to a lesser extent,
daily returns. The precision of regression parameters tends to increase with more observations; hence, all else equal, we
prefer to use more observations.”); id. at 302 (“When using daily beta, a common rule of thumb is to use one to two years
of data .... When using weekly data, it is a fairly common practice to use two years of data ....); see also Hitchner, supra,
at 256 (noting that in valuing closely-held companies, “the frequency of the data measurements varies, with monthly data
being the most common, although some sources use weekly data”).
32 Appraisal Rights, supra, at A–31 (citing ONTI, 751 A.2d at 907) (basing fair value calculation on one expert's valuation,
“modifying it where appropriate by the primary adjustment claims asserted by [the company]”); Kleinwort Benson Ltd.
v. Silgan Corp., 1995 WL 376911, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 15, 1995) (“I will not construct my own DCF model. From the
evidence presented by [the] experts, I will choose the DCF analysis that best represents Silgan's value. Next, ... I will
scrutinize that DCF analysis to remove the adversarial hyperbole that inevitably influences an expert's opinion in valuation
proceedings.” (citation omitted))).
33 Pabst Brewing Co., 1993 WL 208763, at *8; accord Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., 898 A.2d at 310–11 (“I cannot
shirk my duty to arrive at my own independent determination of value, regardless of whether the competing experts have
provided widely divergent estimates of value, while supposedly using the same well-established principles of corporate
finance.”).
34 Id. If the respondent corporation had relied affirmatively on the deal price and made some attempt to deal with synergies,
it seems likely that the court would have given the deal price at least some weight. The transaction resulted from a process
that involved a pre-signing outreach to twenty-five potential strategic and financial partners, followed by competition
among four strategic bidders to acquire the company. See id. at *2–3. Using a DCF analysis, the court ultimately
determined that the fair value of the company as $10.87 per share, just above the deal price. Id. at *26. If the respondent
had made a different tactical decision, the 3M Cogent court could well have relied on the deal price.
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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*1  Petitioners Merlin Partners LP and AAMAF, LP are
former common stockholders of Respondent AutoInfo, Inc.
(“AutoInfo” or the “Company”). Pursuant to 8 Del. C. §
262, they demanded appraisal of their shares in connection
with a merger (the “Merger”) whereby AutoInfo's common
stockholders were cashed out at a price of $1.05 per share.
This memorandum opinion sets forth the Court's post-trial
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I. BACKGROUND
A. AutoInfo's Business
At the time of the Merger, AutoInfo was a public non-asset
based transportation services company operating through two
wholly-owned subsidiaries.1 It did not own any equipment
and provided brokerage and contract carrier services through
a network of independent sales agents in the United States
and Canada. AutoInfo and its agents split fees generated
by freight transportation transactions.2 The agents developed
and maintained all important client relationships.3
The Company also provided support services to its agents.
Its assistance was primarily financial, such as making long-
term loans and short-term advances. AutoInfo also supplied
non-financial services, such as training, marketing assistance,
market segment data, and business analysis tools.4
The Company's 100% agent-based model distinguished it
from many others in the transportation logistics industry that
rely on a “company store” model. While AutoInfo's brokers
were independent contractors, “[b]rokers [in a company store
model] are direct employees of the company.”5
B. AutoInfo's Board and Management
AutoInfo's management (the “Management”) consisted of
Harry Wachtel (“Wachtel”), the Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer (“CEO”); Michael Williams (“Williams”),
the President, Chief Operating Officer, and General Counsel;
William I. Wunderlich (“Wunderlich”), an Executive Vice
President and the Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”); Mark
Weiss (“Weiss”), an Executive Vice President; and David
Less, the Chief Information Officer and Vice President.
Throughout the sales process, and at the time of the Merger,
AutoInfo's board (the “Board”) consisted of five directors.
Two, Wachtel and Weiss, were inside directors. The others,
Peter Einselen, Thomas C. Robertson, and Mark K. Patterson
(“Patterson”), were outside directors. Wachtel served as the
Board's chairman.6
C. The Merger
1. AutoInfo Considers Strategic Alternatives
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During a regularly scheduled meeting in the first
quarter of 2011, the Board discussed AutoInfo's financial
results, budget, business, and financial prospects. It was
concerned that the market undervalued AutoInfo relative
to comparable agent-based, non-asset based transportation
services companies. Part of the problem was that the
Company was small, thinly traded on the Nasdaq Over–the–
Counter Bulletin Board, and did not receive much analyst
coverage. The Board decided that exploring strategic options,
including a potential sale, was in the best interests of
AutoInfo's stockholders.7
*2  The Board was not the only AutoInfo constituent
disappointed with the Company's stock price. Around
this time, Patterson (a Board member) was contacted by
Kinderhook, LP (“Kinderhook”), a stockholder with which
he had a relationship.8 Kinderhook believed that AutoInfo's
stock price failed to reflect its financial performance.
Although it did not push for a sale of the Company, it
encouraged the Board to develop a strategy to increase the
stagnant stock price, which was then trading in the $0.50–0.60
per share range.9
2. AutoInfo Retains Stephens
In summer 2011, Patterson contacted Stephens Inc.
(“Stephens”), an investment bank with experience in the
transportation industry, to explore AutoInfo's strategic
options. Stephens prepared and presented on July 29,
2011, a Strategic Initiatives Overview, outlining avenues
for enhancing stockholder value.10 While AutoInfo had
“built a solid legacy within the transportation and logistics
industry,” it “consistently traded at valuation multiples well
below its peer group due to the Company's relatively small
scale and corresponding lack of interest from the investment
community.”11 Stephens believed that if the Company
could grow its market capitalization from $20 million to
approximately $400–500 million, then it would gain greater
Wall Street attention and access capital at a lower cost.12 The
investment bank concluded that AutoInfo might need to alter
its strategy to achieve the necessary growth.13
Stephens thus proposed strategic alternatives, including
organic projects, shareholder distributions, and
acquisitions.14 It identified pros and cons for each option.
For example, it suggested that “[e]xecution risk,” related to
Management's ability to execute, would be a concern should
the Company decide to pursue an organic project.15 Stephens
also preliminarily valued the Company within a range of
$0.59 to $1.76 per share.16 The average of its valuations
was $0.98 per share, above the Company's then-current $0.60
price.17
In August 2011, after considering its various options, the
Board began reaching out to potential purchasers.18 Patterson
contacted parties that were active in mergers and acquisitions
in the transportation industry. While there was some interest,
AutoInfo could not reach a satisfactory agreement.19
Several months later, in November 2011, activist hedge funds
Baker Street Capital L.P. and Khrom Capital Management,
through affiliated entities (“Baker Street”), acquired a 13%
equity interest in AutoInfo.20 Baker Street began expressing
its desire that AutoInfo be sold. According to Patterson, those
demands did not impact the Board's sales process, which was
already underway.21
In early 2012, after interviewing several investment banks,
AutoInfo formally retained Stephens to run a sales process.22
The parties agreed to an incentive-based fee structure
whereby Stephens would be paid 2% on the first $54 million
of a transaction price and 5% on any additional value23
Stephens had extensive industry experience; Michael Miller
(“Miller”), who worked on AutoInfo's engagement, had
focused on the transportation logistics space since 2002.24
3. Management's Financial Projections
*3  To implement the sales process, Stephens asked
Management to prepare a bottoms-up five-year financial
forecast (the “Management Projections”).25 Stephens
specified that because they would be used to market
the Company, the projections should be optimistic.26
Management had never prepared multi-year projections
before and its first attempt fell largely on Wunderlich's (its
CFO) shoulders.27 Internally, Management doubted its ability
to forecast the Company's future performance accurately and
perceived its attempt as “a bit of a chuckle and a joke.”28
It questioned how to go about a process it had never before
attempted.29
Recognizing that the Management Projections would be
used to shop the Company, Wunderlich focused on painting
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an “aggressively optimistic” picture.30 Williams, AutoInfo's
President, helped develop the forecast by projecting agent
revenue.31 He started with each agent's historical revenue and
“took the most optimistic view of [the] agents' performance
in the marketplace....”32 He categorized agents by size and
assumed that larger agents would grow at a lower percentage
than smaller agents.”33 Williams testified that there “was no
science” behind those assumptions.34 He also looked at agent-
by-agent historical results and predicted, based on knowledge
of the individual agents, how much the agent's business could
grow during 2012–2013.35 Those growth assumptions were
extrapolated to later years.36 The Management Projections
also included estimates of how successfully the Company
would recruit new agents.37
4. Comvest Emerges as the Highest Bidder
In the spring of 2012, Stephens contacted 164 potential
strategic and financial acquirers, focusing on those most
interested in the transportation space.38 Approximately
seventy bidders signed non-disclosure agreements (“NDAs”)
and received a Confidential Information Memorandum
(“CIM”).39 Those interested were provided several weeks
for due diligence before a deadline to submit an indication
of interest (“IOI”).40 By the end of May, ten bidders had
presented IOIs, with bids ranging from $0.90–$1.36 per
share.41 Nine moved on to a second round of the sales process,
at which point they attended Management presentations and
received access to an electronic data room.42
*4  On June 28, 2012, the Board formed a special committee
(the “Special Committee”) to evaluate the competing offers.
The Special Committee consisted of the three outside
directors, with Patterson serving as chair.43 It proceeded, with
the assistance of a legal advisor and a financial advisor, to
review the bids.44
By July, three would-be acquirers had submitted written
letters of intent (“LOI”) and two others had presented verbal
valuation ranges.45 After receiving legal advice regarding
its fiduciary duties, the Special Committee weighed the
proposals as against each other and the alternative option of
foregoing a sale at that time.46 It decided to continue with the
sales process and instructed Stephens to negotiate with the
bidders over price.47
Later that month, Stephens updated the Special Committee
with final terms for the written bids. HIG Capital (“HIG”)
had made the highest offer at $1.30 per share.48 The Special
Committee determined that the highest offer was also the best
and recommended that the Board pursue a transaction with
HIG. The Board accepted this determination and on August
14, 2012, executed an LOI at the $1.30 per share price, which
provided for a forty-five day exclusivity period to negotiate
and perform further due diligence49
HIG conducted due diligence for the next thirty days but
by mid-September, it decided not to proceed with the
purchase.50 HIG's lead partner on the deal had left the
firm, apparently due to various disagreements with his
colleagues, including whether HIG should decrease its offer
for AutoInfo.51 After that partner's departure, HIG opted
against pursuing AutoInfo.52 The parties terminated their
LOI, and AutoInfo decided to continue with the sales process.
Stephens contacted previously interested parties, as well as
others it recommended to AutoInfo.53
By October 2012, two interested parties had submitted written
LOIs and two others had indicated interest verbally. The
highest offer came from Comvest Partners (“Comvest”) and
valued the Company at $1.26 per share.54 The others were
substantially lower, ranging from $1.00–$1.07 per share.55
After determining that Comvest's offer was the best, the
Special Committee recommended that the Board pursue that
transaction. The Board unanimously agreed and on November
12, 2012, AutoInfo executed an LOI with Comvest at $1.26
per share with a thirty day exclusivity period.56 Comvest
then hired accounting, legal, industry, and other advisors to
conduct due diligence.57
5. Comvest's Due Diligence Process
Comvest hired L.E.K. Consulting (“LEK”), a strategy
consultant, to assess AutoInfo's competitive positioning in the
trucking freight brokerage market.58 LEK evaluated growth
trends and dynamics in the brokerage market generally, as
well as concerns associated with AutoInfo's agent-based
business.59 Comvest considered LEK's findings as very
positive.60
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*5  LEK's analysis came relatively early in the due diligence
process, and as that process evolved, Comvest learned
of potential issues associated with AutoInfo's business.61
For example, AutoInfo's infrastructure for recruiting new
agents, which represented the lifeblood of the Company, was
lacking.62 Comvest determined that it would need to address
that deficiency, and others, before it could effectively recruit
agents and grow AutoInfo's business.63 Its biggest concerns,
however, arose during its accounting due diligence.
Comvest retained McGladrey LLP (“McGladrey”) to perform
financial due diligence; its work included conducting a
quality of earnings analysis to test the accuracy of the
Company's stated historical earnings and its ability to achieve
projections.64 McGladrey began its review in November
2012, with Wunderlich, AutoInfo's CFO, serving as its
primary Company contact. McGladrey was immediately
taken aback by the poor quality of AutoInfo's financial
records, which were unusually bad for a publicly traded
company.65 The state of the financials caused the due
diligence process to be more difficult than McGladrey had
anticipated.66
McGladrey was surprised that AutoInfo used QuickBooks,
accounting software popular among small businesses, but
rarely employed by public companies.67 Also troubling
to McGladrey was the fact that a Florida-based public
company would engage a one-office, Connecticut-based
accounting firm as its outside auditor.68 More importantly,
McGladrey believed that some of AutoInfo's accounting
practices violated generally accepted accounting principles.69
McGladrey raised these concerns with an increasingly
troubled Comvest.70
In December 2012, McGladrey reported its findings
to Comvest (the “McGladrey Report”).71 AutoInfo's
Management had estimated the Company's 2012 adjusted
EBITDA as $10 million.72 McGladrey concluded that $7.7
million was an appropriate estimate, representing a 23%
reduction.73 Comvest considered the McGladrey Report a
“huge problem” with the potential to “blow[ ] up” the
deal.74 Not only was AutoInfo's EBITDA apparently much
lower than initially assumed, but there was “a whole
series of weaknesses in the company's financial reporting
practices....”75
AutoInfo responded to the McGladrey Report through
a memorandum prepared by Wunderlich.76 McGladrey
considered the rebuttal unconvincing.77 At the beginning
of January, Wunderlich, Wachtel, and a representative from
Stephens met with a Comvest representative to discuss
the McGladrey Report and AutoInfo's response.78 While
Comvest listened to AutoInfo's arguments, it remained
convinced that the McGladrey Report raised valid issues and
McGladrey did not change its conclusions.
After that meeting, Comvest lowered its offer to $0.96 per
share and AutoInfo countered at $1.15.79 During ensuing
negotiations, Comvest learned that AutoInfo had guaranteed
some loans, the existence of which had been undisclosed
and unreported. Some of the borrower's creditors had filed
an involuntary bankruptcy petition and AutoInfo was facing
the possibility of having to satisfy the guarantees.80 Comvest
was concerned not only by AutoInfo's increased liabilities,
but more importantly, it was troubled by the fact that the
guarantees had not been properly identified in the first
place.81 Its confidence in the quality of AutoInfo's financial
information and controls further deteriorated.82
*6  On January 18, 2013, the Special Committee and
Comvest agreed to a new price of $1.06 per share.83 Comvest
had successfully negotiated for Wachtel (AutoInfo's CEO)
to roll over $500,000 and for Weiss (another executive) to
roll over 25% of his deal proceeds.84 The deal process then
resumed, until discovery of another accounting deficiency.
AutoInfo had improperly booked a transaction, worth
approximately $1,000,000 in EBITDA, in the third quarter
of 2012 before the deal had closed.85 Comvest was shocked
at this revelation and was worried that AutoInfo would
need to restate its financials. Characterizing his reaction,
John Caple, Comvest's lead partner on the AutoInfo deal,
testified, “As much as I had seen financial weaknesses in
the business, the fact that the company could book a million
dollar transaction that hadn't actually happened, I've just never
seen that before in any business I've worked with, public
or private.”86 AutoInfo determined, after an approximately
two week review, that its financials would not need to be
restated.87 Nonetheless, Comvest was “disturb[ed that the
error] could have happened at all, particularly given the size
and the impact of the transaction.”88 Comvest's already low
confidence in AutoInfo's Management and internal controls
eroded further and it revised its offer to $1.00 per share.89
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On February 28, 2013, after additional negotiations, the
parties ultimately reached an agreement at $1.05 per share,
with Wachtel entering into an indemnification agreement
for potential breaches of AutoInfo's representations and
warranties, whereby $500,000 of his proceeds would be held
in escrow.90 The Board approved the Merger pursuant to the
Special Committee's unanimous recommendation. Stephens
had provided a fairness opinion and presentation to the
Special Committee. AutoInfo announced the Merger on
March 1, 2013.91
On April 25, 2013, AutoInfo's stockholders approved the deal
and the transaction closed later that day. No topping bids had
emerged between the deal's announcement and closing.92
II. THE PARTIES' COMPETING VALUATIONS
Both parties retained well-qualified experts to opine on the
fair value of Petitioners' stock as of the date of the Merger.
Petitioners' expert, Donald Puglisi (“Puglisi”), suggests that
AutoInfo's fair value was $2.60 per share. He places equal
weight on three valuation calculations: a discounted cash flow
(“DCF”) analysis, and two comparable companies analyses,
one using a historical based multiple and the other a forward
looking multiple.93
AutoInfo's expert, Mark Zmijewski (“Zmijewski”), submits
that AutoInfo's fair value on the date of the Merger was $0,967
per share. Unlike Puglisi, Zmijewski does not believe that
a DCF or comparable companies analysis can be reliably
performed with available data. Instead, he analyzed the
Merger price and the market evidence regarding the strength
of AutoInfo's sales process. He concluded that the Merger
price, minus cost savings arising from the Merger, is the best
available evidence of the Company's fair value on the Merger
date.94
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Appraisal Statute
Under 8 Del. C. § 262, stockholders who elect against
participating in certain merger transactions may petition the
Court to determine the fair value of their stock.95 Assuming
all procedural requirements are satisfied, the Court
*7  determine[s] the fair value of the shares exclusive of
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to be
the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court ...
take[s] into account all relevant factors.96
“Fair value” represents “the value to a stockholder of the
firm as a going concern, as opposed to the firm's value
in the context of an acquisition or other transaction.”97 To
discharge its statutory responsibility, the Court independently
evaluates the evidence concerning fair value and does not
presumptively defer to any particular valuation metric.98 The
Court may consider “any techniques or methods which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community
and otherwise admissible in court....”99 Depending on the
case, a DCF analysis, a comparable transactions analysis, a
comparable companies analysis, or the merger price itself
may inform the Court's determination.100 “[A]n arms-length
merger price resulting from an effective market check” is a
strong indicator of actual value.101
In a Section 262 appraisal proceeding, “both sides have the
burden of proving their respective valuation positions by a
preponderance of the evidence.”102 The Court may select
one of the parties' valuation models, make adjustments to a
proffered model, or fashion its own framework.103
B. Puglisi's DCF Analysis
Puglisi bases his valuation of AutoInfo in part on a DCF
analysis. “DCF, in theory, is not a difficult calculation to make
—five-year cash flow projections combined with a terminal
value are discounted to their present value to produce an
overall enterprise value.”104 However, when reliable inputs
are unavailable, “any values generated by a DCF analysis are
meaningless.”105 Puglisi used the Management Projections
in his DCF calculation. The first question is: are those
projections reliable?106
The Court will often give weight to management projections
made in the regular course of business because “management
ordinarily has the best first-hand knowledge of a company's
operations.”107 Nonetheless, “management projections [may
be disregarded] where the company's use of such projections
was unprecedented, where the projections were created in
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anticipation of litigation, or where the projections were
created for the purpose of obtaining benefits outside the
company's ordinary course of business.”108 If management
had never prepared projections beyond the current fiscal year,
the Court may be skeptical of its first attempt.109
*8  Here, Petitioners have failed to establish that the
Management Projections can be relied upon.110 Management
prepared them at Stephens's request and with the guidance
that they “need[ed] to be optimistic” to maximize the effort
to market the Company.111 Management had never prepared
anything resembling the Management Projections before and
“hadn't analyzed the business historically in a way that would
allow [it] to predict the future.”112 Stephens had advised,
“You're trying to sell the business. You need to paint the
most optimistic and bright current and future condition of the
company that you can. All positive. Let's get the most interest
by painting the most positive picture of this business.”113
As discussed in Section I.C.3 above, the Management
Projections were indisputably optimistic.114 Puglisi,
Petitioners' own expert, testified that he would have implied
a discount factor to back out the optimism if the record had
provided a basis for calculating one.115 Even if Management
had not been motivated to paint a bright picture, its projections
would have been unreliable. Again, Management itself had no
confidence in its ability to forecast.116 If Management could
not have been trusted to produce credible projections in the
ordinary course of business, the projections it created during
the sales process deserve little deference. Because Petitioners
have failed to establish the credibility of a key component in
their expert's DCF analysis, the Court gives that analysis no
weight.117
C. Puglisi's Comparable Companies Analyses
Puglisi performed two comparable companies analyses, one
using a 2012 EBITDA figure derived from AutoInfo's 2012
10–K, and the other using an estimated 2013 EBITDA created
by modifying the Management Projections. To perform a
comparable companies analysis, one must first identify a set
of actively traded public companies sharing similar business
characteristics with the subject company. Using available
information, one then derives a valuation multiple that, when
multiplied by a relevant financial performance metric, such
as EBITDA, provides an estimate of the value of a company
as a whole.
The Court may credit a comparable companies analysis
in an appraisal proceeding; however, “[t]he utility of the
comparable company approach depends on the similarity
between the company the court is valuing and the companies
used for comparison.”118 Petitioners bear the burden of
proving that Puglisi's “comparables are truly comparable.”119
Because they fail to meet their burden, the Court gives no
weight to Puglisi's comparable companies analyses.120
1. AutoInfo is Significantly Smaller than Puglisi's Supposed
Comparables
*9  The Court may reject comparable companies analyses
based on purported comparables that differ significantly in
size from the company being appraised.121 It is undisputed
that Puglisi's comparables are all significantly larger than
AutoInfo. As of the Merger date, their market capitalizations
ranged from more than twice, to more than 300 times,
AutoInfo's size.122 All but two of Puglisi's comparables
had a market capitalization more than ten times AutoInfo's.
While recognizing this fact, Petitioners argue that size, while
relevant in other contexts, is not a determining factor here.
Puglisi testified that he did not observe a meaningful
relationship between a company's size and its multiple among
his comparables. He could not recall “ever discriminating
inclusion in comparable companies based on company size ...
[because] size itself should not have an impact on the ultimate
valuation.”123 Although there may be little theoretical basis
for discriminating comparables based on size, doing so has
empirical support and is common both in practice and in this
Court.124 Zmijewski suggests that it would be inappropriate
to select comparables without regard to relative market
capitalization without otherwise controlling for risk and other
differences.125
All else equal, smaller firms are riskier and thus face higher
costs of equity capital. This higher cost of capital leads to
lower market multiples.126 Miller, Stephens's representative,
suggests
Typically in this sector, small cap companies tend to
be valued at lower multiples. That's generally been the
case in the ... dozen years that I've spent covering this
sector. The market tends to ascribe premium multiples to
companies that are larger ... [and] are considered more
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stable businesses. And therefore, investors are willing to ...
afford those companies ... a higher trading multiple.127
*10  Before delivering its fairness opinion, Stephens
performed a comparable companies analysis. Based on its
experience in the transportation services industry, Stephens,
unlike Puglisi, did not rely on the median multiple of its
comparables. It selected a lower multiple range, based on
differences between AutoInfo and the comparables, including
size, business model, and the quality of management.128
Stephens grouped its comparable companies by size, which
showed a relationship between size and multiples.129
While Petitioners criticize Stephens's size grouping as
arbitrary and self-serving, in its initial July 29, 2011, Strategic
Initiatives Overview presentation to AutoInfo, Stephens
highlighted the fact that AutoInfo had “consistently traded
at valuation multiples well below its peer group due to
the Company's relatively small scale....”130 Petitioners have
failed to show that the size difference between AutoInfo and
Puglisi's supposedly comparable companies is immaterial.131
2. AutoInfo's 100% Agent–Based Model
Puglisi did not consider the differences between freight
brokerage businesses that use the company store model and
those that employ an agent-based model as important for
valuation purposes.132 As described in Section I.A above, in
a company store model, “[b]rokers are direct employees of
the company,” while in an agent-based model, the brokers
are independent contractors.133 According to Miller, who has
years of experience in the transportation sector, “agent-based
models ... are generally less desirable. They're perceived as
riskier. The company does not have control over the customer
relationship. The agent does. And so the agent-based models
are generally ... less desirable and generally they tend to trade
at lower multiples than the company store models.”134
That the market perceives the agent-based model as
inferior was corroborated by the reaction that one AutoInfo
stockholder received while soliciting topping bids for the
Company. That stockholder learned that “the agent-based
model with no company-owned locations, especially in
important shipping hubs, was a bigger deal to potential
acquirers than ... [initially] realized.”135 AutoInfo's 100%
agent-based model was a “problem” for potential buyers.136
*11  At trial, Puglisi, who lacks Miller's experience in
the freight brokerage sector, could not identify which of
his comparable companies used which type of business
model, but suspected that the majority were agent-based.137
Miller testified specifically regarding the business models
of Stephens's comparables and explained that they mostly
use company store models.138 In its fairness opinion,
Stephens had taken advantage of its industry experience
and its knowledge of AutoInfo's business to select a below-
median multiple for its comparable companies analysis.139
Petitioners have not established that the differences between
AutoInfo's business model and those of Puglisi's comparable
companies are unimportant.
3. Summary of Puglisi's Comparable Companies Analyses
Because the weight of the evidence suggests that size and
business model affect the multiples at which companies
trade in the freight brokerage industry, Puglisi's comparable
companies analyses are not reliable indicators of value. The
Court's confidence in this conclusion is bolstered by the facts
that (i) all of the bids received by AutoInfo during the sales
process implied market multiples well below Puglisi's, and (ii)
AutoInfo ultimately sold, through a thorough sales process,
at a price less than half of Puglisi's comparable companies
valuations.140 The Court was unable independently to derive
in any reasoned manner a valuation multiple from the
purported comparables. Accordingly, the Court gives no
weight to any comparable companies analysis.
D. Merger Price
Zmijewski, AutoInfo's expert, relies on the Merger price as
a reliable indication of AutoInfo's fair value at the time of
the Merger. “[W]here no comparable companies, comparable
transactions, or reliable cash flow projections exist, ... the
merger price [may be] the most reliable indicator of value.”141
Nonetheless, the Court will give little weight to a merger price
unless the record supports its reliability.
The dependability of a transaction price is only as strong
as the process by which it was negotiated.142 For example,
a transaction that implicates self-interested parties or an
inadequate market check may generate a price divergent from
fair value. Conversely, where a company “was marketed to
potential buyers ... [through a process that was] thorough,
effective, and free from any spectre of self-interest or
disloyalty,” the outcome of that process is significant.143
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Petitioners argue that the Merger price deserves no weight
because (i) the Merger price is not a business valuation
methodology, (ii) the Court cannot rely on the price if no
business valuation methodology, e.g., a DCF analysis, was
performed to corroborate the price, and (iii) even if the
Merger price could be considered, AutoInfo's sales process
was deficient.
Petitioners' first two contentions are easily dismissed. As
discussed, this Court can, and has, relied on a merger price
when appraising a company. When it is the best indicator of
value, the Court may assign 100% weight to the negotiated
price.144 Although the Court may not presumptively defer
to price, no particular valuation methodology must provide
corroboration. Rather, the Court may, in its discretion, look
to any “evidence tending to show that [the merger price]
represents the going concern value of the company rather than
just the value of the company to one specific buyer.”145 Here,
evidence regarding AutoInfo's sales process substantiates the
reliability of the Merger price.
*12  The manner by which AutoInfo was sold is described
in Section I.C. above. This case does not involve self-interest
or disloyalty; nothing like a controlling stockholder's freezing
out the minority is at issue. The Merger was negotiated
at arm's length, without compulsion, and with adequate
information. It was the result of competition among many
potential acquirers. However, Petitioners argue that the sales
process was flawed and cannot be expected to have produced
a price representative of value. Based on the evidence, the
Court concludes that Petitioners' objections, discussed next,
are either unwarranted or overblown.
1. Lack of Analyst Coverage
AutoInfo was thinly traded and lacked financial analyst
coverage. Petitioners contend that the market underpriced
the Company because it was ignorant of its potential. While
“[t]he court cannot defer to market price as a measure of
fair value if the stock has not been traded actively in a
liquid market,”146 the Merger price does not reflect the value
that a potentially uninformed market attributed to AutoInfo.
The Merger price represented a 22% premium to AutoInfo's
average stock price during the six months before February 28,
2013, the last trading day before public announcement of the
Merger.147 At no time in the two years before the Merger's
announcement had the market price for the Company's stock
reached $1.00.148 Further, the Merger price exceeded the
highest price that AutoInfo stock had reached during the
previous five years.149
To shop the Company, AutoInfo retained an experienced
investment bank with knowledge of the transportation
industry. Stephens's fee had an incentive-based component,
which allowed the bank to earn a higher percentage fee the
larger the deal.150 Stephens reached out to and provided
information on AutoInfo to many potential bidders. Part of
the reason for hiring the bank would have been to educate
the market and assure the Company that it was not leaving
value on the table.151 The Board formed a Special Committee
to pursue the sales process. Ultimately, AutoInfo was sold at
a premium to market. Despite attempts by a stockholder to
solicit interest, no topping bid emerged during the time frame
between announcement and closing of the Merger.152 While
the market may have been uninformed about AutoInfo before
the sales process, it subsequently gained ample information.
2. Alleged Pressure from Large Stockholders
Petitioners contend that large stockholders pressured the
Board to sell quickly. Approximately 31.4% of AutoInfo's
voting power was held by Baker Street and Kinderhook.153
According to Petitioners, those hedge funds sent a clear
message that if a liquidity event were not achieved, then they
would get active and Management would potentially face a
control contest.
*13  Baker Street purchased its stake in the Company
in November 2011. By that time, AutoInfo had already
begun to consider strategic alternatives, including a potential
sale. The Board had reached out informally to potential
purchasers months before Baker Street became a stockholder.
Stephens's July 29, 2011, presentation to AutoInfo had
indicated “that now is an opportune time to explore initiatives
to maximize shareholder value, including ... [a c]hange of
control transaction.”154 By the time Baker Street arrived on
the scene, AutoInfo was already contemplating the selection
of a bank to lead the formal sales process.155
Unlike Baker Street, Kinderhook was not adamant that
AutoInfo be sold. Rather, like the Board, Kinderhook desired
change to address AutoInfo's low stock price.156 Patterson,
the Special Committee's chair, testified that neither Baker
Street nor Kinderhook impacted the sales process. Before
- 591 -
Merlin Partners LP v. AutoInfo, Inc., Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2015)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 9
retaining Stephens, the Board had received early indications
of interest and “absolutely” could have sold quickly if the
terms had been right.157 Instead, the Board retained Stephens
and embarked on a sales process lasting over a year. Near
the end of that process, Patterson told the rest of the Special
Committee “I plan to tell [Comvest] to pay $1.06 or walk
away.”158 If necessary, the Special Committee was prepared
to “regroup, push some changes through and clean up” for
a future sale.159 Based on the evidence, neither Baker Street
nor Kinderhook appear to have materially impacted the sales
process.
3. Negotiations with Comvest
Petitioners next argue that Comvest completely overwhelmed
AutoInfo's Management and Board during negotiations. More
specifically, they contend that Comvest commissioned the
McGladrey Report as a tool to drive down the Merger
price. According to Petitioners, AutoInfo was incapable of
adequately responding to that report.
Hiring an accounting firm to conduct due diligence is standard
practice for Comvest.160 While due diligence sometimes
flags issues, in other cases, the process is positive and the
accounting firm concludes that the target company is actually
a better deal than Comvest initially believed.161 McGladrey
was not the only outside firm hired to conduct due diligence.
For example, Comvest engaged a strategy consultant, whose
review of AutoInfo's business was very positive.162
It is mostly undisputed that AutoInfo's CFO was below-
average, the Company used relatively unsophisticated
accounting software, and its accounting records contained
errors discovered throughout negotiations. There is room to
debate whether all of McGladrey's adjustments to AutoInfo's
financials were necessary. However, the record does not
support the notion that McGladrey's auditors would have
sacrificed their professional independence to benefit Comvest
on this one particular transaction. AutoInfo did attempt
to rebut the McGladrey Report, but many of McGladrey's
findings “were valid issues.”163 Because AutoInfo had
sub-par accounting and financial controls, McGladrey was
understandably alert to potential problems, and Comvest
was understandably concerned by the issues raised. Comvest
viewed the agreement it eventually reached with AutoInfo as
inferior to the deal it had initially anticipated.164 The record
does not support the allegation that McGladrey was a hired
gun employed to overwhelm AutoInfo.165
4. Stephens's Process
*14  Petitioners suggest that (i) Stephens's market canvas
was unfocused, (ii) Stephens improperly suggested a
valuation of AutoInfo to some bidders, (iii) Stephens did not
provide a formal valuation of the Company until the Merger
was negotiated, and (iv) the Board did not adequately oversee
the sales process.
The sales process is described supra Section I.C. The weight
of the evidence discredits Petitioners' stated concerns. The
Court concludes that the sales process was generally strong
and can be expected to have led to a Merger price indicative
of fair value. Accordingly, it deserves weight in the Court's
valuation.
E. The Court's Determination
Any real-world sales process may be criticized for
not adhering completely to a perfect, theoretical model.
Nonetheless, AutoInfo's process was comprehensive and
nothing in the record suggests that the outcome would
have been a merger price drastically below fair value, as
Petitioners' expert suggests. Placing heavy weight on the
Merger price “is justified in light of the absence of any other
reliable valuation analysis.”166 Not only are other credible
valuations unavailable, but the record also contains evidence
corroborating the Merger price's reliability. Even Petitioners'
expert agrees that AutoInfo was “shopped quite a bit” and that
the sales process was arm's length.167 The Merger was the
result of “an adequate process.”168 The Merger price is thus
a strong indicator of value.169
Before placing full weight on the Merger price, the Court
performed its own DCF analysis. Having rejected the
Management Projections, the Court relied on financial
projections that Comvest had prepared for internal use in
evaluating the AutoInfo deal.170 In a February 25, 2013,
Investment Committee Memo, Comvest projected five-year
financials for AutoInfo based on both a base case (the
“Base Case Projections”) and a downside case scenario.
Comvest's projections were prepared during due diligence
to provide more detail than the Management Projections.
They represented Comvest's then-current belief regarding
AutoInfo's likely future performance.171 After Comvest's
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investment committee requested “a number of alternative
scenarios below the down side case,” a revised downside case
and a “shock case” were also produced.172
When preparing his expert report, Zmijewski considered
using the Base Case Projections in a DCF valuation. While
he concluded that those projections would not yield a reliable
indication of fair value, he did use them to conduct a
DCF analysis included in his rebuttal report. AutoInfo has
argued that Comvest's projections are a better forecast of the
Company's future performance as of the date of the Merger
than are the Management Projections.
In his rebuttal expert report, Puglisi analyzed the Comvest
Base Case Projections. He considered them reasonably
reliable, observing that
after months of due diligence and hundreds of thousands
of dollars spent, up until days prior to the stockholder
vote on the transaction, Comvest continued to focus its
internal investment committee presentations on its Base
case projections, including in its closing memo, noting
the Company's strong 2013 first quarter results, and
highlighting that the Company had outperformed revenue
and gross margins stated in its Base case projections.173
*15  Because the Base Case Projections are the most reliable
forecast in the record, the Court employed them in its DCF
analysis. The Court generally adopted the DCF framework
used by Zmijewski in his rebuttal expert report.174 However,
as explained in Section 3.F below, the record does not support
Zmijewski's decision to remove $1,449,000 per year (before
tax) in purported merger cost savings. The Court added back
that value to arrive at a corrected estimate of AutoInfo's
forecasted free cash flows. The Court otherwise credited the
uncontroversial assumptions underlying Zmijewski's model,
as well as his use of 17.57% as AutoInfo's weighted average
cost of capital (“WACC”).
The parties disagree on AutoInfo's WACC, which is used
in a DCF analysis to discount cash flow projections and a
terminal value to estimate the Company's enterprise value
as of the Merger. Zmijewski used a WACC of 17.57%,
while Puglisi used 11.30%. The difference stems entirely
from debate regarding the appropriate equity size premium
to be added to AutoInfo's cost of equity.175 The most
common method for estimating a company's cost of equity,
and the method employed by both experts, is application
of the capital asset pricing model (the “CAPM”). Because
empirical evidence suggests that the CAPM understates small
companies' costs of equity, valuation professionals often add
a size premium, based on historically observed data, to a
CAPM-derived cost of equity.176 Zmijewski and Puglisi each
added a size premium to AutoInfo's CAPM-based cost of
equity; Zmijewski used 11.65%, and Puglisi selected 3.81%.
Following standard practice, both experts derived the size
premium using data from Ibbotson Associates (“Ibbotson”).
The 2013 edition of Ibbotson breaks down publicly traded
stocks into deciles based on market capitalization.177 It
further breaks down the 10th decile, which includes the
smallest companies, into four subdeciles. Subdecile 10z
subsumes the smallest companies in Ibbotson's data set.
Puglisi chose the size premium for Ibbotson's micro-cap
category, which includes the 9th and 10th deciles, i.e.,
companies with market capitalizations ranging from $1.139
million to $514.209 million. Zmijewski looked to the
10z subdecile, which consists of companies with market
capitalizations from $1,139 million to $96.164 million. At the
time of the Merger, AutoInfo had a market capitalization of
approximately $30 million. AutoInfo thus fell comfortably
within subdecile 10z based on its market capitalization. For
several reasons, the Court relied on the 10z size premium.
First, Puglisi testified that he “would have used [a size
premium] close to the 10z category, if not 10z itself,” had he
not believed it necessary to strip out a marketability factor.178
Puglisi's adjustment to the size premium runs counter to
Delaware law.179 In Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., this Court
“decline[d] to reduce the Company's size premium to less
than what is implied by its actual size.”180 In that case,
as here, the parties agreed as to which Ibbotson subdecile
applied based on size alone, yet petitioners' expert used a
lesser size premium to “eliminate[e] the ‘well-documented
liquidity effect’ contained within the size premium.”181 The
Court rejected the adjustment “because the liquidity effect
at issue relate[d] to the Company's ability to obtain capital
at a certain cost, ... [and was therefore] related to the
Company's intrinsic value as a going concern and should be
included when calculating its cost of capital.”182 Petitioners
attempt to distinguish between a marketability discount
and an illiquidity discount, which may represent distinct
concepts in a separate context. However, AutoInfo's cost of
capital directly affects transactions between the Company
and providers of capital, and is thus part of its value as a
going concern. Because in these circumstances there is an
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insufficient factual basis for doing so, the Court declines to
depart from the size premium implied by AutoInfo's actual
size.183
*16  The Court also considered the fact that Stephens, when
valuing AutoInfo, used a size premium and WACC even
higher than what Zmijewski recommends. Stephens believed
that AutoInfo would need to significantly increase its market
capitalization to benefit from a lower WACC.184 Perhaps
most importantly, relying on Puglisi's WACC produces an
estimate of fair value completely divorced from the negotiated
Merger price (and the other bids offered for the Company).
The discrepancy between Puglisi's estimates and the market's
valuation of AutoInfo cannot be explained by anything in the
record.185
Using a WACC of 17.57% and the Base Case Projections, the
Court performed a DCF analysis that resulted in a fair value
determination of approximately $0.93 per share on the date of
the Merger.186 Under Delaware law, it would be appropriate
to provide weight to the value as implied by the Court's DCF
analysis.187 Nonetheless, because the Merger price appears to
be the best estimate of value, the Court will put full weight
on that price.188
F. Must the Merger Price Be Adjusted for Cost Savings?
While the Merger price was the baseline for Zmijewski's fair
value opinion, he adjusted that amount downward to account
for the portion of the price that he deemed attributable to
the consummation or prospect of the Merger.189 In this, as
in any appraisal action, the Court must value Petitioners'
shares “exclusive of any element of value arising from the
accomplishment or expectation of the merger....”190 AutoInfo
argues that two categories of cost savings, which increased
the price that Comvest was willing to pay for it, must be
backed out of the Merger price to arrive at AutoInfo's fair
value as a going-concern as of the Merger date. Those
categories are (i) public company costs that Comvest could
eliminate once AutoInfo ceased trading as a public company,
and (ii) executive compensation costs that Comvest planned
to eliminate. AutoInfo bears the burden of showing that
adjustments should be made to the Merger price.191
Zmijewski suggests backing out these cost savings because
AutoInfo's stockholders likely captured 100% of the value
created by those savings and, thus, the value is embedded
in the Merger price.192 He cites academic literature that
concludes that target firms capture virtually all of the value
created by corporate combinations through the price paid by
the acquirer.193 Because the $1.05 price would be expected
to reflect anticipated cost savings, Zmijewski adjusted the
Merger price downwards to account for Merger-related
effects on the stock's value.
This Court only excludes from an appraisal award value that is
merger-specific.194 An appraisal award does not include “the
amount of any value that the selling company's shareholders
would receive because a buyer intends to operate the subject
company, not as a stand-alone going concern, but as a part
of a larger enterprise, from which synergistic gains can be
extracted.”195
*17  Zmijewski based his calculation of cost savings on
adjustments that Comvest made to AutoInfo's earnings when
preparing the Base Case Projections. Comvest apparently
anticipated savings related to public company costs and
executive compensation. It assumed that the savings would
not grow over time and would persist into perpetuity.196
In Huff Fund, the respondent company urged the Court to
subtract $0.29 from the merger price to arrive at fair value.197
Its rationale was that prior to the merger, the acquirer had
identified $4.6 million in annual cost savings that it hoped
to realize by converting the target from a publicly held
corporation to a privately held firm.198 The evidence for those
anticipated cost savings was an investment memorandum
that the acquirer had prepared. The Court did not need to
“reach[ ] the theoretical question of under what circumstances
cost-savings may constitute synergies excludable from going-
concern value under Section 262(h)” because the record did
not establish that the acquirer had based its bid on cost savings
that the target could not have itself realized had it continued
as a going concern.199
Accepting Zmijewski's adjustments would appear to require
the Court to reduce for cost savings the fair value established
in an appraisal proceeding through reliance on the transaction
price. Allowing a near automatic reduction in price would
reverse the burden that is on the party arguing that adjustments
are warranted. Zmijewski derived his cost savings figures
from three lines of data included in Comvest's development
of its Base Case Projections.200 The Court does not know
how Comvest arrived at its numbers or even what it included
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as “public company costs.” Unlike the Merger price, which
was corroborated by a thorough and public sales process, the
reliability of the purported cost savings has not been tested.201
AutoInfo has thus failed to establish that any downward
adjustment to the Merger price is warranted.202
IV. CONCLUSION
Where, as here, the market prices a company as the result of a
competitive and fair auction, “the use of alternative valuation
techniques like a DCF analysis is necessarily a second-best
method to derive value.”203 The result of a DCF analysis
depends critically on its inputs. For example, small changes to
the assumed cost of capital can dramatically impact the result.
*18  AutoInfo's expert, a tenured professor at the University
of Chicago Booth School of Business, concluded that there is
no reliable data to input into a DCF or comparable companies
model. He determined that the process by which AutoInfo was
marketed and sold would be expected to have led to a price
indicative of the fair value of the Company's stock. The Court
has independently reached these same conclusions.
For the reasons set forth above, the fair value of one share of
AutoInfo at the time of the Merger was $1.05. Petitioners are
entitled to interest at the legal rate. Counsel are requested to
confer and to submit an implementing form of order.
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*1  In this joint fiduciary duty and appraisal action, Nathan
Owen (“Nate”), formerly the largest stockholder of Energy
Services Group, Inc. (“ESG” or the “Company”), challenges a
conflicted merger (the “Merger”) in which he was cashed-out
of ESG in May 2013, for the right to receive $19.95 per share,
or $26.334 million in total. The Merger was orchestrated by
the Company's two other largest stockholders: Lynn Cannon,
who replaced Nate as President in August 2009, and Bryn
Owen (“Bryn”), Nate's brother. The Merger price was derived
from a valuation that ESG's financial advisor performed based
on five-year projections (the “2013 Projections”) prepared
under Cannon's direction, which projections the Company
submitted to a nationally reputable lender in order to obtain a
$25 million credit facility to buy out Nate.
Nate and his financial expert accept the 2013 Projections that
formed the basis for the Merger price, but they argue that
the $19.95 per share price is unfair because ESG's financial
advisor applied certain incorrect assumptions in its valuation,
the most significant of which is the tax rate applicable to ESG
as a Subchapter S corporation. Applying what he submits
are the correct assumptions to the 2013 Projections, Nate
contends that the fair value of his stock was $53.46 million.
Although defendants were content to use the 2013 Projections
at the time of the Merger, they now insist that those
projections are not sufficiently reliable to value Nate's stock.
Instead, they rely on a valuation based on a set of ten-
year projections their financial expert created in the midst
of this litigation. Based on their expert's valuation, which
applies a corporate tax rate for ESG that disregards its status
as a Subchapter S corporation at the time of the Merger,
defendants contend that the fair value of Nate's stock was no
more than $21.502 million.
The two primary areas of disagreement between the parties
concern which projections to use for a discounted cash flow
(DCF) analysis to value Nate's stock as of the Merger, and
whether to tax affect the earnings in that analysis to account
for ESG's status as a Subchapter S corporation. In this post-
trial opinion, I conclude that it is appropriate to use the
2013 Projections because they reflected management's best
estimate of what was known or knowable about ESG's future
performance as of the Merger. I also conclude, consistent
with this Court's precedents, that it is appropriate to tax affect
the earnings in the DCF analysis given ESG's status as a
Subchapter S corporation. Based on these two conclusions,
and certain other determinations discussed below, I find that
the fair value of Nate's shares was $42,165,920 as of the
Merger.
II. BACKGROUND
These are the facts as I find them based on the documentary
evidence and testimony of record.1 I accord the evidence and
testimony the weight and credibility that I find it deserves.
A. The Parties
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*2  Plaintiff and Petitioner Nathan Owen was the President
of ESG until his removal in August 2009, and a director of
the Company until the Merger. Before the Merger, Nate held
1,320,000 shares of ESG stock, which were cancelled in the
Merger in exchange for the right to receive $19.95 per share
in cash, or $26.334 million in total. Nate currently resides in
Maine.
Defendant Lynn Cannon served as a director of the ESG and
as President “pro tem” after Nate's removal as President.2
Before the Merger, Cannon held 1,218,750 shares of ESG
stock. In connection with the Merger, Cannon became
President of ESG.
Defendant Bryn Owen, Nate's brother, is a Vice President
and director of ESG. Before the Merger, Bryn held 1,098,750
shares of ESG stock.
Non-party Felimon Gurule is the Vice President of
Information Technology at ESG. Before the Merger, Gurule
held 112,500 shares of ESG stock.
Respondent Energy Services Group, Inc., a Delaware
corporation based in Norwell, Massachusetts, provided
services to the retail energy industry. At all relevant times
before the Merger, Nate, Cannon, and Bryn were the three
members of the Company's board of directors, and Nate,
Cannon, Bryn, and Gurule were stockholders of the Company.
In connection with the Merger, Cannon, Bryn, and Gurule
transferred their ESG stock to Defendant ESG Acquisition
Corp. (“Acquisition Corp.”), a Delaware corporation, in
exchange for an equal amount of Acquisition Corp. stock. In
the Merger, ESG merged with and into Acquisition Corp.,
which is now known as Energy Services Group, Inc.3 Unless
noted otherwise, I refer to Energy Services Group, Inc.
and Acquisition Corp. interchangeably as “ESG” or the
“Company,” and I refer to Cannon, Bryn, and Acquisition
Corp. as “Defendants.”
B. The Formation of ESG
In the mid–1990s, Nate started a website- and intranet-
development company called IC Solutions, which was the
predecessor to ESG.4 Bryn joined IC Solutions and reported
to Nate.5 In the late 1990s, one of the country's first retail
energy providers, which are known as “REPs,” engaged
IC Solutions to create a software solution to manage its
electronic data interchange, or EDI, in order to participate in
the retail electricity market. Other REPs also approached IC
Solutions for a similar service.6
EDI is the data interchange system that REPs use to
schedule and deliver electricity.7 REPs operate in states that
have deregulated retail electricity that permit competition
with the incumbent utility. REPs arbitrage what they term
“headroom”: the difference in price between the electricity
that they can buy at wholesale prices through short-term
contracts and the electricity bought by incumbent utilities
through long-term contracts.8 Historically, the price of natural
gas, a primary source to generate electricity, has been
highly volatile, which creates opportunities for headroom.9
For example, when natural gas prices drop, REPs can buy
electricity at lower wholesale prices than incumbent utilities
that are locked into long-term contracts and thereby sell
electricity at lower retail prices than incumbent utilities.10
*3  Lynn Cannon was introduced to Nate through his wife,
Leslie Cannon, who had been doing marketing and business
planning work for Nate to explore business opportunities
for IC Solutions.11 Nate and Lynn Cannon began discussing
working together to create EDI solutions for the then-nascent
retail electricity industry.12
Nate, Cannon, and Bryn agreed to work together at what
became ESG. Each would receive stock in exchange for
their contributions to the Company. In general terms, Cannon
would invest capital; Bryn would work in client services; and
Nate would lead the company.13 They also decided to hire
Gurule, a software developer at IC Solutions.14
On September 20, 2000, Nate, Cannon, Bryn, and Gurule
entered into a Stockholders' Agreement, which specified their
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As required by Section 9 of the Stockholders' Agreement,
ESG made the appropriate elections to be taxed as a
Subchapter S corporation.16 Thus, ESG does not pay federal
tax on its income. Rather, the stockholders of ESG pay federal
income tax on their respective shares of the Company's
profits.
C. ESG's Lines of Business and Growth
Before the Merger, ESG offered three services: (i) Transaction
Management Services (TMS), which is an EDI solution;
(ii) Prospect–to–Cash (P2C), which is largely a billing
management service; and (iii) Wholesale Energy Services
(WES), which is a data management and reporting service.
TMS has accounted for the majority of the Company's
revenue, as demonstrated by ESG's revenues in 2012, the
last full year before the Merger: approximately $18.8 million
from TMS, approximately $10.8 million from P2C, and
approximately $1.8 million from WES.17 Given its recurring
revenue business model, an average contract length of
around three years, and high customer retention rates,18
ESG's revenues have generally been “predictable,” as Cannon
acknowledged at trial.19
Much of the Company's success can be traced to several
apparent advantages it holds over its competitors. As touted
on the Company's website, ESG's three products offer an
“end-to-end business process solution” for REPs,20 which can
reduce their costs and the risk of data translation errors.21
Cannon and ESG's senior management testified uniformly
that they believe ESG's products and services are higher
quality than those of its competitors.22
*4  Consistent with its strong position in the market, the
Company experienced significant revenue and cash flow
growth in the years leading up to the Merger despite facing
competition since its founding.23 In the five-year period
before the Merger, ESG's revenues and earnings before
interest and taxes (EBIT) demonstrated strong growth, which




































According to Nate's expert, Yvette Austin Smith, over the
seven years from 2005 to 2012, ESG's revenue grew at a
compound annual rate of 23.4%.25
ESG made pro-rata distributions of a majority, but not all,
of its income to its stockholders. Historically, Nate, Bryn,
Cannon, and Gurule received a combination of (i) below-
market salaries (i.e., $80,000 per year for Nate, Bryn and
Cannon and more for Gurule); (ii) monthly “draws” that were
in effect interest-free loans against their distributions; and (iii)
distributions, a portion of which covered the stockholders'
tax liabilities for their pro rata shares of the Company's
profits.26 Because the amounts paid to Nate, Bryn, Cannon,
and Gurule as salary were below-market, the distributions
they received did not accurately reflect the return on their
equity investments in the Company. To accurately reflect
their equity returns, the distributions must be “normalized” to
account for the difference between market-rate salaries and
the salary payments they actually received.27 Table 1 below
reflects the normalized distributions from ESG to Nate, Bryn,
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Using the normalized distributions in Table 1, Jacobs
calculated the median percentage of pre-tax income that
ESG distributed for the years 2007–2012 as 76.7%.29 The
Company retained most of its undistributed income as cash on
its balance sheet. At the time of the Merger, ESG had $17.4
million in cash and equivalents on its balance sheet.30
D. Nate's Removal as President of ESG
During the late 2000s, a significant disagreement arose among
Nate, Cannon, and Bryn concerning what to do with the
Company's growing pile of cash. Nate wanted to reinvest
in the business. Cannon and Bryn were more interested in
“being paid” through profit distributions.31 There also was
day-to-day friction in managing the Company. In July 2009,
for example, Cannon postponed a new WES project after
repeated operational delays.32 Nate responded by directing
ESG's controller to not “pay any bonuses without my explicit
approval.”33 A colorful email exchange ensued, with Nate
and Cannon each stating that the other would have been fired
if he was not a stockholder of ESG.34
*5  Nate, Cannon, and Bryn sought to work out their
differences. On August 11, 2009, they engaged in mediation
conducted by Bryn's father-in-law.35 They left the one-day
mediation with “assignments” to work on in anticipation of a
second meeting.36
Rather than continue with the mediation, Cannon decided
that it was time to end Nate's employment relationship with
ESG. On August 11, the same day of the mediation, Cannon
drafted a notice for a special meeting of the ESG board of
directors to remove Nate as President. Cannon understood
that he could not eliminate Nate's ownership interest “without
going through some type of negotiated purchase,” but that,
with Bryn's cooperation, there would be sufficient votes on
the three-person board to end Nate's day-to-day relationship
with the Company.37
On Thursday, August 13, 2009 at 1:49 p.m., Cannon and
Bryn sent Nate a notice of a special board meeting to
occur on Friday, August 14 at 11:00 a.m., in Boston.38 This
was the first formal board meeting in the history of the
Company.39 The notice identified the purpose of the meeting
as “considering, and upon such a determination by the Board
of Directors, approving the immediate termination [of] the
employment of Nate Owen as President of the [Company],
and the election of Lynn Cannon as President pro tem.”
Further, the board would “consider the employment of Nate
Owen as Vice President, Special Projects, pursuant to terms
and conditions attached” to the notice.40 Those terms and
conditions contemplated a six-month leave of absence and a
demotion for Nate, who would report to Cannon if he returned
after six months.41 Cannon knew that Nate would find this
condition unacceptable.42
Nate, who was in Pennsylvania attending to a medical
issue for his wife, was “shocked” by the proposal and felt
“incredibly betrayed” by his brother.43 He called the lawyer
whose name appeared in the special meeting notice (Barry
C. Klickstein, Esquire at Duane Morris LLP)44 and asked for
a delay of the meeting to make it easier for him to travel to
Boston and attend the meeting in person. Cannon and Bryn
refused.45
After making arrangements for his family, Nate traveled
overnight to attend the meeting. Once there, he was not
allowed to say anything. Cannon and Bryn promptly voted,
over Nate's objection, to remove him as President. After the
meeting, Nate's keycard access was deactivated, his email
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access was terminated, and all of his work and personal
emails were deleted from the system. That same day, $35,000
was removed from his personal bank account, likely because
Cannon and/or Bryn cancelled a recent direct deposit from the
Company.46
After the six-month leave of absence, Nate did not return to
ESG, nor did he contact Cannon or Bryn about returning to
work.47 Under the terms imposed by Cannon, Nate continued
to receive a base salary and benefits as well as stockholder
distributions.48
*6  According to Nate, the Company became “extremely
obstinate” in providing Nate access to information about ESG
once he was terminated.49 In October 2009, Nate made a
formal demand under 8 Del. C. § 220 to obtain books and
records from the Company.50 ESG thereafter provided certain
financial information, including its 1999–2008 tax returns,
its 2007–2008 audited financial statements, and a copy of its
QuickBooks files.51
E. Cannon Prepares Multi–Year Projections and Offers
to Buy Out Nate
Before 2010, ESG had not prepared multi-year projections for
the Company or its individual lines of business.52 Instead, at
the beginning of each calendar year, Cannon would prepare
an annual budget. ESG management participated in Cannon's
budgeting process “in terms of providing the inputs for what
[the Company] can expect for the upcoming year.”53 Bryn
also typically reviewed the budget with Cannon.54
Cannon's understanding of ESG's future prospects stems
in large part from weekly, two-hour meetings held on
Monday mornings, during which he and the department heads
discuss sale opportunities and operations.55 Drew Fenton,
Vice President of Business Development at ESG, described
the two-hour meetings as “exhausting.”56 Once a month,
ESG management also compares realized revenue to the
annual budget.57 Based on these meetings with management,
Cannon admitted that he knows what the department heads
know, meaning that he is “very familiar” with the Company's
business and has a “good handle” on specific customer
relationships.58
In February 2010, Cannon extrapolated the Company's 2010
annual budget into a set of multi-year projections for years
2010–2015 to see what ESG's future performance might “look
like from a P & L perspective.”59 I refer to these projections
as the “2010 Projections.”60 To create the 2010 Projections,
Cannon took the Company's 2010 annual budget and then
applied an assumed growth rate to each line of the budget for
each year. Some line items had higher growth rates in later
years, and others had lower growth rates. Cannon projected
revenue growing from approximately $15.27 million in 2009
to $39.5 million in 2015.61
Cannon claims he created the 2010 Projections, and every
future set of multi-year projections for ESG, without seeking
input from anyone else at the Company. Although ESG's
employees confirmed that Cannon did not seek their input
into the preparation of projections per se,62 the weight of the
evidence reflects that, even if Cannon did not explicitly ask
for their input, he obtained functionally equivalent knowledge
based on the extensive discussions of ESG's future prospects
he had with members of management on a regular basis.63
Indeed, Cannon's familiarity with the Company's business
prospects grew over time after he had arranged to remove
Nate from management and assumed firm control over the
day-to-day operations of ESG.
*7  According to Nate, Cannon and Bryn (through ESG)
offered to repurchase his stock for $8 million in 2010.
Nate rejected this offer, which Cannon denied making,64
as “ridiculously low.”65 Although no documentary evidence
supports the existence of this offer, I find Nate's testimony to
be credible on this point.66 The making of such an offer also
is consistent with the fact that Cannon contemporaneously
created a set of multi-year projections for the first time in the
Company's history in 2010; and that the parties had retained,
at ESG's expense, valuation experts during this period.67
In 2011, Cannon engaged Duff & Phelps to provide a
valuation of the Company for the purpose of repurchasing
Nate's shares.68 Duff & Phelps performed a discounted
cash flow analysis based on projections extrapolated from
Cannon's 2011 annual budget, as well as an analysis of
five, comparable publicly traded companies.69 On May 12,
2011, Duff & Phelps provided a midpoint valuation of ESG
(including cash and equivalents) of approximately $64.8
million, or approximately $17 per share.70 At that price,
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Nate's 1,320,000 shares would have been worth $22.44
million.71
According to Nate, ESG made a second offer to repurchase
his shares in mid–2011, this time for $12 million. He rejected
the offer as “entirely insufficient.”72 No documents in the
record reflect such an offer and Cannon again disclaimed
ever making such an offer, but I find Nate's testimony more
credible.73
In early 2012, Cannon prepared a revised version of the 2010
Projections, which I refer to as the “2012 Projections.”74
The 2012 Projections use the same growth assumptions as
the 2010 Projections but project higher future revenues.
This is because the 2012 Projections were derived from the
Company's actual results for 2010, which were higher than
the 2010 annual budget used to create the 2010 Projections.75
For example, projected revenue of $39.5 million for the year
2015 in the 2010 Projections increased to projected revenue
of $44.34 million in the 2012 Projections.76
In an April 2012 planning conference, Cannon presented
the 2012 Projections to senior management as a “bogie”
for ESG's potential future performance.77 The presentation
described the projections for the years 2013–2015 as
“Revenue Targets.”78 The same presentation noted that while
falling natural gas prices were good for ESG customers, there
was a market expectation that natural gas prices would level
off eventually.79
*8  F. ESG Engages Grant Thornton to Perform a Series
of Valuations
In June 2012, Cannon engaged Grant Thornton to assist ESG
in obtaining financing to buy back Nate's shares.80 Cannon
directed the Company's controller, Lisa Swift, to send the
2012 Projections to Grant Thornton.81 When ESG shared the
2012 Projections with Grant Thornton in June 2012, it had
exceeded the monthly projections in them.82
ESG's main contact at Grant Thornton was Len Batsevitsky,
although a colleague, Peter Resnick, would perform the
indication of value of the Company in connection with the
Merger.83 In June 2012, Grant Thornton used the 2012
Projections to analyze a proposed financing structure from
Wells Fargo.84
In early July 2012, Cannon spoke with Batsevitsky about
making certain adjustments to the 2012 Projections, including
decreasing revenue growth and increasing operating costs.85
In an email, Cannon stated that these revisions were necessary
due to “future competitive forces in the market.” Batsevitsky
responded that the revisions would “make the projections
more conservative which may be better as Wells [Fargo] will
most[ ] likely use them to set covenant levels.”86 All else
being equal, the changes Cannon proposed would make ESG
less valuable.87
Cannon testified that, at this time, Batsevitsky “had taken
over custody of the financial modeling,” implying that the
assumptions in the revised projections were those of Grant
Thornton's creation.88 I do not accept Cannon's attempt to
distance himself from the revisions to the 2012 Projections.
Based on the documentary evidence and the testimony of
Resnick, who was a credible third-party witness, I find
that Cannon caused Grant Thornton to revise the 2012
Projections into a new set of multi-year projections for
the years 2012–2017,89 which I refer to as the “Revised
2012 Projections.”90 The changes Cannon requested with
respect to the overlapping years in the 2012 Projections and
the Revised 2012 Projections were relatively modest. For
example, projected revenue for 2015 decreased from $44.34
million to $43.93 million.91
The Revised 2012 Projections were created by taking the base
year of 2012 (which was a combination of actual results plus
projected results drawn from the 2012 annual budget) and
then applying an assumed growth rate. The Revised 2012
Projections include quarterly line item projections for the
years 2012–2015 and annual bottom line revenue growth
assumptions for the years 2016–2017.92 Projected year-over-
year revenue growth was 20.2% in 2012; 11.9% in 2013;
10.0% in 2014; and 8.5% in 20152017, with projected
revenue for 2017 of $51.73 million. The projected EBIT
margin was 57.4% in 2012; 56.5% in 2013–2015; and 56.6%
in 2016–2017, with projected EBIT for 2017 of $29.28
million.93
*9  In July 2012, at the same time Cannon was discussing
these assumptions with Grant Thornton, ESG employees
were voicing their concerns with Cannon “about possible
attrition” in their customer base, including the threat of losing
customers to a key competitor, EC Infosystems.94 Thus, the
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record shows that Cannon was well aware of pricing pressures
and “future competitive forces in the market” when he was
discussing ESG's prospects with Batsevitsky.95
Cannon authorized Grant Thornton to provide the Revised
2012 Projections to several financing sources for a
prospective buyout of Nate's interest in the Company,
including Citizens Bank, UBS, and Wells Fargo.96 Cannon
admitted he would not have authorized Grant Thornton to
share the Revised 2012 Projections with these potential
lenders if he thought they were unrealistic.97
In September 2012, ESG's counsel proposed to Nate's counsel
that the parties engage in mediation to facilitate a purchase
of Nate's shares in the Company.98 On September 12, 2012,
ESG's counsel formally engaged Grant Thornton to perform a
valuation of the Company.99 Given the sequencing of events,
I find that Cannon and Bryn sought an updated valuation
of the Company based on the Revised 2012 Projections for
purposes of the mediation.100
In October 2012, Grant Thornton performed a discounted
cash flow analysis of ESG based on the Revised 2012
Projections. Assuming a discount rate of 15.1%, a tax rate of
40%, and a perpetuity growth rate of 2.5%, and excluding the
cash on the Company's balance sheet, Grant Thornton came to
an enterprise value for ESG of approximately $118.5 million.
Further assuming that Nate owned 33.3% of ESG on a fully
diluted basis, Grant Thornton indicated that the enterprise
value of Nate's interest was approximately $39.5 million on a
going-concern basis, excluding his pro rata share of any cash
on hand.101
Before the mediation, Nate sought and obtained certain
information from the Company. In October 2012, Nate
received ESG's 2011 audited financial statements.102 In
November 2012, Nate's financial advisor, Floyd Advisory,
obtained access to the financial information contained in
the Company's QuickBooks file.103 Nate also received
certain personal tax information from Cannon and Bryn, and
representatives of Floyd Advisory met with Cannon and ESG
senior management.104
In November 2012, the parties engaged in mediation. It was
unsuccessful. Cannon and Bryn offered to buy out Nate for
$18 million.105 This offer was based on the “May 2011
valuation report prepared by Duff & Phelps.”106 In other
words, the offer was not based on the more recent Grant
Thornton discounted cash flow analysis of the Revised 2012
Projections. Nate rejected the $18 million offer as too low.
He thought that ESG was “exploding in growth.”107 On
January 16, 2013, Nate countered with a proposal that did not
involve selling his shares but would have led to his resigning
from the board of ESG.108 Cannon and Bryn rejected this
proposal, which ESG's lawyer, Klickstein, characterized as
“absurd.”109
G. ESG's Business Shortly before the Merger
*10  By December 2012, ESG learned that Viridian,
the Company's largest customer, expected to end its
relationship with ESG in early 2013.110 Viridian accounted
for approximately $2.5 million, or 7.9%, of ESG's 2012
revenue.111 Bob Potter, ESG's Vice President of Sales and
Marketing, tried to retain Viridian by offering lower prices
and emphasizing ESG's greater functionality and value, but
he was unsuccessful.112
By April 2013, Viridian had left ESG to become a customer
of EC Infosystems, one of ESG's main competitors.113 EC
Infosystems had been a consistent competitor of ESG's, likely
for over a decade.114 Potter testified that the Company's
competitors were “commoditizing” its products.115 In a July
2012 email chain and at other times, ESG employees were
complaining to Cannon that EC Infosystems was stealing
their business by offering lower prices, even though they
believed that ESG offered “superior client support.”116 Into
early 2013, ESG employees were still “worried about the
bleeding” of losing their customers.117
In addition to facing competition from other service
providers, ESG's business faced the risk of losing customers
that might choose to in-source some or all of the services
ESG provided. As competition in the retail energy market
matures and consolidates, REPs can be forced to cut costs,
particularly for the type of back-office functions that ESG
offers.118 For example, in mid–2012, ESG lost two of its
top five P2C customers, NAPG and AEP, to in-sourcing.119
AEP in-sourced the TMS services it received from ESG as
well.120 ESG also lost several WES customers that year for a
similar reason,121 although the WES losses represented only
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a fraction of ESG's revenue.122 These and related competitive
threats often forced ESG to renegotiate expiring contracts
with customers at lower prices. In 2012 and 2013, ESG
renegotiated certain contracts for prices that would yield 30%
or lower revenue.123
*11  ESG employees were disappointed by the loss of
Viridian, but Cannon viewed this as a “one-time event”
and not as a “defect in the business model.”124 Consistent
with this testimony, in a January 2013 sales and marketing
overview presentation, ESG touted a “[v]ery full sales
pipeline” and an expectation that the Company “[w]ill close
6 to 10 deals in 2013.”125
H. Cannon Decides to Cash Out Nate
In January 2013, Cannon decided that it was time to eliminate
Nate's ownership interest in the Company.126 According to
Cannon, “the relationship had to come to a head” after the
latest failed mediation, and he and Bryn “chose to do a cash-
out merger because it was clear that [he, Bryn, and Nate]
couldn't come to a resolution any other way.”127
In March 2013, Cannon updated the Company's valuation
materials. He revised his 2013 annual budget to reflect
the loss of Viridian, and made line-by-line changes to
accurately reflect the developments he saw in the Company's
business.128 Although Cannon testified that, in revising the
2013 annual budget, he did not undertake a “deep dive” of the
Company's or the industry's future prospects beyond 2013,129
the record shows that he was well versed in the Company's
future prospects from, among other things, the comprehensive
weekly and other meetings he held with members of the
Company's senior management.
On March 13, 2013, Cannon sought to schedule a meeting the
following day with Grant Thornton's Batsevitsky to review
the Company's projections. Cannon explained to Batsevitsky,
who Cannon knew was on “personal time” that day, that
“[t]iming has become a significant issue.”130 When I asked
Cannon at trial to explain why he thought it was necessary
to buy out Nate in the March–April 2013 time frame, he
was unable to offer any credible business explanation for
why timing had become such an “issue.”131 I credit Cannon's
deposition testimony and find that he and Bryn wanted to
effectuate a cash-out transaction quickly in order “to stop
the hemorrhage” of paying profit distributions to Nate.132 As
noted in Table 1 above, Nate had received over $14 million
in distributions during 2007–2012, with the majority of those
distributions being made after Nate was removed as President
in August 2009.
In March 2013, Cannon directed ESG's controller to provide
the Company's 2013 annual budget to Grant Thornton.133
As occurred in 2012 with respect to the Revised 2012
Projections, Grant Thornton and Cannon discussed the
appropriate growth rate assumptions to apply with respect
to the 2013 annual budget.134 At Cannon's direction, Grant
Thornton applied the assumptions they discussed to the 2013
annual budget to produce a set of projections for the years
2013–2017, dated as of March 15, 2013.135 Resnick testified
that these projections came from ESG management,136 and
internal Grant Thornton documents characterized them as
“management's financial forecast.”137
*12  Grant Thornton did not come up with any of its
own financial forecast assumptions.138 Rather, as Resnick
testified, which I find to be a credible account, ESG provided
the underlying assumptions, and Grant Thornton tested
the reasonableness of those assumptions in the March 15
projections through conversations with Cannon, including
discussions about the Company's position in the industry,
pricing pressure from competitors, and industry trends.139
To note one example, I find that it is more likely than not
that Cannon told Batsevitsky to decrease the 8.5% revenue
growth assumption for years 2016–2017 in the Revised 2012
Projections to the 6.0% revenue growth assumptions for years
2016–2017 in the March 15 projections.140
In delivering the March 15 projections, Batsevitsky noted
that he and Cannon should discuss further the 6.0% revenue
growth assumptions for the years 2016–2017.141 Cannon
testified that he thought those assumptions were “overly
optimistic given the headwinds that [the Company was]
seeing.”142 Although Cannon did not specifically solicit input
from ESG management for this purpose, he likely discussed
the growth assumptions at some point in time with Bryn,
who also testified that he thought the assumptions “were quite
optimistic.”143
Based on Batsevitsky's conversations with Cannon, and, to
a lesser extent, with ESG's controller,144 Grant Thornton
produced another set of projections for the years 2013–
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2017 dated March 28, 2013, which I refer to as the “2013
Projections.”145 There are certain differences between the
March 15 projections and the 2013 Projections. For example,
projected revenue growth of 7.4% for 2014 and 6.1% for
2015 in the March 15 projections were revised to 7.5%
for 2014 and 5.8% for 2015 in the 2013 Projections.
However, the 6.0% projected revenue growth for 2016–2017
—what Cannon claimed at trial was “overly optimistic”—
went unchanged.146 According to Resnick, there was no
disagreement between Grant Thornton and ESG on any of the
forecast assumptions.147
The 2013 Projections include quarterly line item projections
for the years 2013–2015 and annual bottom line revenue
growth assumptions for the years 2016–2017. Overall, the
most significant changes in the 2013 Projections from the
Revised 2012 Projections were reducing revenue forecasts to
reflect the loss of Viridian as a customer and reducing ESG's
operating margin to reflect increased competition, which
resulted in lower projected EBIT for 2013 and, in turn, lower
projected EBIT for 2014–2017.148 Cannon testified that he
“[a]bsolutely” used the best information he had available
in creating the 2013 Projections.149 Resnick understood the
2013 Projections to reflect ESG management's best estimates
of the Company's expected future performance.150 I credit
this testimony.151
*13  Although the record is not entirely clear on this point,
my understanding is that the parties do not dispute that the
2013 Projections reflect “normalized” salary expenses for
Cannon, Bryn, and Gurule similar to those built into the model
that Defendant's expert, Jacobs, created for his discounted
cash flow analysis.152 As explained above, normalization
of the salary expenses for these employees is necessary to
perform a discounted cash flow analysis of ESG because
they historically had been compensated with below-market
salaries. The following tables compare certain key metrics
across the 2012 Projections, the Revised 2012 Projections,
and the 2013 Projections.
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Grant Thornton performed a discounted cash flow valuation
of ESG based on the 2013 Projections (the Grant Thornton
Valuation?).153 Assuming a discount rate of 16.0%, a tax rate
of 40%, and a perpetuity growth rate of 2.5%, and excluding
the $13.6 million in cash on ESG's balance sheet, the Grant
Thornton Valuation reflected an enterprise value for ESG of
approximately $67 million. Assuming that Nate owned 33.3%
of ESG on a fully diluted basis, Grant Thornton indicated that
the enterprise value of Nate's interest (excluding cash) was
approximately $22.331 million.154
On March 28, 2013, ESG provided the 2013 Projections and
the Grant Thornton Valuation to Nate.155 In the disclaimer
to its valuation materials, Grant Thornton stated that the
included information “does not constitute an independent
valuation or fairness opinion” and that the information
“includes certain statements, estimates and projections
provided by the Company with respect to its anticipated future
performance.”156 Also in March 2013, ESG provided its then-
current financial statements and QuickBooks file to Nate's
counsel.157
In a cover letter, ESG's counsel proposed that the Company
repurchase Nate's interest in ESG for $26.331 million, which
is the sum of $22.331 million (based on the Grant Thornton
Valuation) plus $4 million as a proportionate distribution of
ESG's cash on hand. The offer was to expire on April 5,
2013.158 Nate did not respond to the offer.159 He “didn't think
that anything would be gained from having the discussion”
with Cannon and Bryn.160
*14  On April 4, 2013, with Cannon's authorization,
Batsevitsky sent the 2013 Projections to Citizens Bank for the
purpose of obtaining financing to buy out Nate.161 According
to Resnick, Grant Thornton would not have sent the 2013
Projections to Citizens Bank without ESG's consent.162 ESG
thereafter obtained a $25 million credit facility from Citizens
Bank to cash out Nate's interest pending resolution of this
action.163
I. The Merger
On Friday, May 3, 2013, a county sheriff served Nate at his
Maine residence (when Nate was out of town) with a notice
of a special meeting of the ESG board to be held on at 8:30
a.m. on Monday, May 6, 2013, to consider and vote upon a
proposed merger between ESG and Acquisition Corp.164 This
was only the second formal board meeting in the Company's
history.165 The Merger Agreement, attached to the notice,
contemplated that Nate would be cashed out of ESG at $19.95
per share,166 or $26.334 million in total—$3,000 more than
the Cannon and Bryn's March 2013 offer.
Also attached to the notice was the Grant Thornton Valuation
based on the 2013 Projections that had been provided to
Nate previously.167 Earlier on May 3, 2013, Batsevitsky had
informed ESG's counsel that Grant Thornton had “spoke[n]
with ESG's Management and confirmed that as of today's
date there have been no material changes to the business
operations or forecast assumptions since completion of
the analysis back in March.”168 In other words, when
given one last chance to propose further revisions to the
2013 Projections before the Merger, Cannon reaffirmed the
accuracy of the 2013 Projections. ESG also told Grant
Thornton on May 3, that “the actual financial performance
of the Company (from January 1, 2013 through April 30,
2013) is tracking in a manner that is materially in-line with the
Company's forecast used in the analysis.”169 At trial, Cannon
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confirmed that both of these statements were accurate.170
Pressed on the subject at trial, Cannon further admitted that
he stands by the 2013 Projections, testifying, “I—I signed off
on the Grant Thornton projections [i.e., the 2013 Projections],
and I'll—I'll live with them.”171
Nate learned about the special board meeting scheduled for
May 6 when he was in New York. He immediately asked
for a one-day delay so that he could travel back to Maine
and study the documents served at his residence. Cannon
and Bryn refused.172 Tellingly, Cannon testified he “wasn't
interested in extending [the board meeting] any further”
because he believed that Nate only wanted a delay “to get
to the Court to try and get an injunction.”173 In Cannon's
mind, Nate, who had received the 2013 Projections back in
March, “absolutely” had enough time to review the Merger
materials.174
*15  On May 6, 2013, the board of ESG, consisting of
Nate, Bryn, and Cannon, held a special meeting to vote on
the Merger. Nate recalled that this meeting was “extremely
tense,” in part because ESG “had hired an armed guard” who
stood “at the door with a gun at his hip.”175 At the meeting,
Cannon and Bryn voted in favor of the Merger; Nate voted
against it.176
In connection with the Merger, Cannon, Bryn, and Gurule
transferred their ESG stock to Acquisition Corp. in exchange
for Acquisition Corp. stock. After this transfer, Nate owned
1,320,000 shares, or 35.2%, of the outstanding shares
of ESG and ESG Acquisition Corp. owned 2,430,000
of the outstanding shares, or 64.8%.177 The Merger
Agreement contemplated that ESG would merge with and into
Acquisition Corp., with (i) Nate receiving $19.95 per share in
cash for his ESG stock; (ii) the ESG stock held by Acquisition
Corp. being cancelled for no consideration; and (iii) the stock
of Acquisition Corp. remaining outstanding. On May 6, 2013,
Cannon executed a stockholder written consent as President
of Acquisition Corp. in favor of the Merger.
At 9:07 a.m. on May 6, 2013, a Certificate of Merger was filed
with the Delaware Secretary of State.178 Nate described the
Merger as “boom, done, Blitzkrieg style.”179
On May 13, 2013, a notice of the Merger was sent to Nate.180
On May 21, 2013, Nate delivered a written demand to ESG
for appraisal of his shares pursuant to 8 Del. C. § 262.181
J. Procedural History
On September 3, 2013, Nate initiated this action. On October
9, 2013, Nate filed the Verified Amended Complaint asserting
four claims: breach of fiduciary duty against Cannon and
Bryn as directors of ESG (Count I); breach of fiduciary duty
against Cannon, Bryn, and Acquisition Corp. as controlling
stockholders of ESG (Count II); aiding and abetting against
Acquisition Corp. (Count III); and appraisal under 8 Del.
C. § 262 against ESG (Count IV). In his prayer for relief,
Nate sought, among other relief, rescissory damages.182 On
November 20, 2013, Defendants filed an Answer to the
Amended Complaint. Discovery ensued. On September 29,
2014, Nate withdrew his request for rescissory damages. In
November 2014, a four-and-a-half day trial was held. On
March 17, 2015, I heard post-trial oral argument.
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Because this combined appraisal and fiduciary duty action
ultimately turns on the fair value of Nate's shares in ESG as
of the Merger, I analyze Nate's statutory appraisal claim first
before addressing his fiduciary duty claims. For the reasons
explained below, I conclude based on a discounted cash flow
analysis that the fair value of Nate's stock as of the Merger
was $42,165,920. It follows that the Merger was not entirely
fair, primarily because it was not effectuated at a fair price. I
further find that damages for Nate's breach of fiduciary duty
claims are equivalent to the appraised value of his stock.
A. Count IV: Appraisal
*16  In Count IV of the Amended Complaint, Nate petitions
the Court under 8 Del. C. § 262 to determine the fair value of
his stock as of the Merger. Nate demanded the appraisal of his
shares on May 21, 2013, and filed a claim for appraisal in this
Court on September 3, 2013, both of which occurred within
the time periods required under the statute.183
“An action seeking appraisal is intended to provide
shareholders who dissent from a merger, on the basis of the
inadequacy of the offering price, with a judicial determination
of the fair value of their shares.”184 Under 8 Del. C. § 262(h),
I must “determine the fair value of the shares” by “tak[ing]
into account all relevant factors.” Both the petitioner seeking
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appraisal and the surviving corporation bear the burden of
proof, and I am obligated to use my independent judgment to
determine fair value,185 meaning “the value to a stockholder
of the firm as a going concern.”186 As the Delaware Supreme
Court explained over sixty years ago in Tri–Continental Corp.
v. Battye,187 the concept of “fair value” includes “market
value, asset value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of
the enterprise and any other facts which were known or which
could be ascertained as of the date of merger and which throw
any light on future prospects of the merged corporation.”188
More recent decisions reiterate that “elements of future value,
including the nature of the enterprise, which are known or
susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger and not the
product of speculation, may be considered.”189
“[I]t is within the Court of Chancery's discretion to select
one of the parties' valuation models as its general framework,
or fashion its own, to determine fair value in the appraisal
proceeding.”190 In doing so, I may consider any valuation
methodology that is “generally considered acceptable in the
financial community and otherwise admissible in court.”191
The parties' post-trial briefing focused exclusively on the
use of a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. Thus, this is
methodology I use to determine fair value in this case.
“[T]he DCF valuation methodology has featured prominently
in this Court because it ‘is the approach that merits the greatest
confidence’ within the financial community.”192
Put in very simple terms, the basic DCF method involves
several discrete steps. First, one estimates the values of
future cash flows for a discrete period.... Then, the value
of the entity attributable to cash flows expected after the
end of the discrete period must be estimated to produce
a so-called terminal value, preferably using a perpetual
growth model. Finally, the value of the cash flows for the
discrete period and the terminal value must be discounted
back[.]193
*17  The fact that ESG had no outstanding debt as of the
Merger simplifies my analysis because ESG's enterprise value
is equal to its equity value. Although the parties agree on
the DCF methodology, they disagree on certain key inputs to
the DCF model. I summarize below the experts' competing
valuations and then analyze the five areas of disagreement
between the parties.
Nate's expert, Yvette R. Austin Smith of The Brattle Group,
performed a DCF analysis based on the 2013 Projections,
which projected EBITDA and the other inputs necessary to
calculate the Company's free cash flows for the years 2013–
2017.194 She concluded that it was appropriate to tax affect
ESG's tax rate in her DCF model to reflect the Company's
Subchapter S status, and she used a tax rate of 21.5%.195
Although Austin Smith derived a weighted average cost of
capital (WACC) of 13.28%, Nate has since accepted the
14.13% discount rate proposed by ESG's expert.196 Austin
Smith assumed a terminal growth rate of 5.0%.197 Austin
Smith also calculated Nate's ownership percentage of ESG
as 33.3%, but she acknowledged that Nate's share of ESG's
$17.4 million cash on hand at the Merger may need to
be adjusted to reflect discrete tax liabilities.198 Based on
the foregoing assumptions, Austin Smith concluded in her
report that Nate's stock in ESG was worth $51.7 million
total, or $39.15 per share199 Based on a revised post-trial
calculation of his percentage ownership and adjustments to
the Company's cash on hand, Nate submits that the fair value
of his stock was $52.65 million, or $39.89 per share.200
ESG's expert, E. Allen Jacobs of Berkeley Research Group,
LLC, also performed a DCF analysis of ESG.201 Jacobs did
not base his DCF analysis on the 2013 Projections. Instead,
Jacobs created his own set of ten-year projections for the
years 2013–2023 based on per-unit calculations of revenues
and costs.202 His projections for the years 2013–2017 are
considerably lower than those in the 2013 Projections. Jacobs
asserted that it was not appropriate to tax affect ESG's
earnings and calculated the appropriate tax rate to be 44.8%.
Alternatively, he proposed a 34.1% tax rate if ESG's earnings
are tax affected.203 Jacobs computed a WACC of 14.13%,
which Nate has accepted, and he calculated a terminal
growth rate of 3.0%.204 Based on these assumptions, Jacobs
concluded that the DCF value of the Company's future cash
flows was $53.1 million and that its net cash on hand was
$11.9 million such that ESG was worth $65.0 million at
the Merger.205 Based on its post-trial calculation of Nate's
ownership percentage as 33.08%, ESG contends that the fair
value of Nate's stock in ESG was worth $21.502 million.
*18  The parties disagree in five respects over the proper
inputs for a DCF valuation of ESG: (i) the source of the
projections of the Company's future performance; (ii) whether
ESG's earnings should be tax affected due to its status as a
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Subchapter S corporation; (iii) the terminal growth rate; (iv)
the proper treatment of the cash on ESG's balance sheet as
of the Merger; and (v) Nate's ownership percentage of the
Company. Most of the delta between the parties' competing
valuations ($52.65 million versus $21.502 million) relates to
the first two issues. I address each in turn.
1. The 2013 Projections
Nate contends that the 2013 Projections “were prepared by
ESG management as part of a careful and deliberate process
and reflected management's best estimate at the time of the
Merger of the Company's expected performance.”206 For
support, he cites to contemporaneous documents in the record
reflecting how Cannon prepared and revised the assumptions
in the 2013 Projections in anticipation of cashing Nate out
of ESG, as well as testimony from Grant Thornton's Resnick
about the creation and evolution of the 2013 Projections.
ESG argues that the 2013 Projections “lack appropriate
indicia of reliability for [a] DCF valuation” because they
“were not the product of a robust process that included a broad
management team, were not developed within ESG's ordinary
course of business, did not involve a thorough review of
ESG's or industry drivers, and were accepted by Defendants in
the hope that a high merger price would avoid litigation.”207
ESG asserts that I should appraise the fair value of Nate's
stock as of the Merger by performing a DCF valuation using
Jacobs's cash flow projections.
For the reasons explained below, based on the trial record,
I agree with Nate that the 2013 Projections reflected
management's best estimates of what was known or knowable
about ESG's future performance as of the Merger.
“[M]ethods of valuation, including a discounted cash
flow analysis, are only as good as the inputs to the
model.”208 When performing a DCF analysis to determine
the fair value of stock, Delaware courts tend to place
great weight on contemporaneous management projections
because “management ordinarily has the best first-hand
knowledge of a company's operations.”209 Management
also typically “has the strongest incentives to predict the
company's financial future accurately and reliably.”210 That
said, it may be appropriate to reject a DCF analysis based on
management-created projections “where the company's use
of such projections was unprecedented, where the projections
were created in anticipation of litigation, or where the
projections were created for the purpose of obtaining benefits
outside the company's ordinary course of business.”211
*19  Here, the record reflects that Cannon, ESG's top
executive since Nate's removal in August 2009, engaged in
a deliberate, iterative process over a period of three years
to create, update and revise multi-year projections for the
Company. This process began with the 2010 Projections
Cannon created in February 2010, continued with the 2012
Projections he created in early 2012, which were revised
in mid–2012, and culminated with the 2013 Projections
that Grant Thornton prepared at Cannon's direction and
with his input.212 Resnick's unbiased testimony and Grant
Thornton's internal documents both confirm that ESG (not
Grant Thornton) supplied the growth assumptions in the 2013
Projections, as revised from the Revised 2012 Projections.213
Although Cannon was likely the only ESG employee who had
a direct role in the creation of the 2013 Projections, which
were derived from his 2013 annual budget, that does not
undermine the reliability of the 2013 Projections in my view
because Cannon regularly met with ESG's management to
review the Company's sales and operations, including through
exhaustive two-hour meetings that were held weekly.214 ESG
employees also routinely updated Cannon about customer-
specific challenges and opportunities they observed.215 It
is thus no surprise Cannon admitted that he is “very
familiar” with the Company's lines of business and specific
customers and agreed that “ESG's revenues have generally
been predictable.”216 Given the regular feedback Cannon
received from other members of management, the relatively
small size of the Company ($32.2 million in revenue in
2012) and its limited operations (three closely related lines
of business), I find that Cannon was extremely well informed
about the Company's prospective growth and that he brought
this knowledge to bear on the 2013 Projections.
This is not a case, as in In re John Q. Hammons Hotels
Inc. Shareholder Litigation,217 where projections prepared
by management failed to account for contemporaneous or
anticipated business developments.218 Rather, as Cannon
testified, he updated the 2013 Projections to reflect the
Company's growth prospects as of the Merger. In particular,
in March 2013, Cannon carefully revised his 2013 annual
budget, the base year for the 2013 Projections, on a line-
by-line basis to reflect the recent loss of Viridian as a
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customer and competitive changes in the market.219 Cannon
also directed Grant Thornton to make certain changes to the
2013 Projections to reflect increased costs from the time of the
Revised 2012 Projections.220 Those changes were significant.
They resulted in decreasing ESG's projected EBIT between
29.3% and 41.3% for each of the years from 2013 to 2017,
and in reducing ESG's operating margin in 2017 (the final
year of the discrete period) from 56.6% to 43.9%.221 The
reasonableness of the 2013 Projections was tested, albeit
perhaps not as robustly as one might see in a third-party
transaction, through discussions with Grant Thornton.222 And
ESG management confirmed the 2013 Projections to be
accurate just days before the Merger.223
*20  I also find that Cannon worked with Grant Thornton
to revise the 2013 Projections downward significantly at
a time when he knew he would force Nate out of the
Company, if necessary, based on a valuation derived from
those projections. Cannon testified that he decided to cash
out Nate in January 2013.224 After making up his mind to do
so, Cannon undertook to adjust the assumptions underlying
the 2013 Projections, resulting in material decreases to the
Company's projected future performance justified by the loss
of Viridian and other perceived competitive pressures. Then,
when Nate did not respond to ESG's March 2013 buyout
proposal, which was based on the Grant Thornton Valuation
using the 2013 Projections, the Merger followed as a matter
of course a few weeks later at essentially the same price.
Cannon's motive for deciding to force Nate out of the
Company at this point was obvious and admitted: he and Bryn
wanted “to stop the hemorrhage”225 of paying millions of
dollars in equity distributions to Nate who had not worked
at the Company since August 2009. I reject as an after-the-
fact rationalization ESG's assertion that I should find the 2013
Projections to be overly optimistic because they supposedly
offered Nate a “premium” to “avoid continued litigation.”226
To the contrary, Cannon was motivated in my view to make
the assumptions in the 2013 Projections as conservative (i.e.,
reliable) as possible because he knew full well when they
were created that they could set the price to force Nate out
of the Company involuntarily, which was an invitation to
litigation.
Notably, Cannon authorized Grant Thornton to submit the
2013 Projections to Citizens Bank in connection with
obtaining a $25 million credit facility to finance the purchase
of Nate's shares.227 As then-Vice Chancellor Strine observed
in Delaware Open MRI Radiology Associates, P.A. v.
Kessler,228 because it is a federal felony “to knowingly obtain
any funds from a financial institution by false or fraudulent
pretenses or representations,” projections that are provided
to a financing source are typically given “great weight”
by this Court.229 The undisputed fact that Grant Thornton
submitted the 2013 Projections to a financial institution at
Cannon's direction further supports my conclusion that the
2013 Projections reflected management's best estimate of
ESG's future performance. If the 2013 Projections were a
reliable basis to obtain debt financing, then there is no reason
to conclude that they were an unreliable basis to value the
Company.230
In support of its position that the 2013 Projections are not
reliable, ESG draws heavily on principles discussed in Huff
Fund Investment Partnership v. CKx, Inc.,231 Gearreald v.
Just Care, Inc.,232 and In re Nine Systems Corp. Shareholders
Litigation.233 Each of those cases is distinguishable from the
record here.
In CKx, after reviewing how management created the
company's projections, the Court concluded that the basis
for a projected increase in licensing fees under a material,
to-be-negotiated contract was speculative because “[i]nitial
estimates of those revenues were markedly lower than
projections provided to potential buyers and lenders,” which
rendered the entirety of the company's revenue projections
inherently unreliable.234 Unlike in CKx, ESG has not
identified any particular line item or line of business in the
2013 Projections that is so uncertain as to undermine the
integrity of the overall projections.
*21  In Just Care, the Court declined to defer to
management's projections, which were the first set of multi-
year projections the company had ever prepared and thus
were “made outside of the ordinary course of business.”235
Unlike in Just Care, the 2013 Projections were not Cannon's
first crack at creating and/or revising multi-year projections.
Cannon had done so three times before: the 2010 Projections,
the 2012 Projections, and the Revised 2012 Projections. He
also had felt confident enough in his earlier work product
to share the 2012 Projections with ESG management at a
planning conference to set revenue targets, and to submit
the Revised 2012 Projections to several banks to finance a
potential buyout of Nate and to one bank (Wells Fargo) to
- 614 -
Owen v. Cannon, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2015)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 15
conduct a debt covenant analysis.236 The concerns in Just
Care about projections being created by novices are further
assuaged here because the 2013 Projections were created with
the assistance of a financial advisor, Grant Thornton, with
whom Cannon reviewed the revenue growth assumptions.237
Finally, in Nine Systems, the Court rejected as unreliable a set
of one-year financial projections management had prepared
and presented to the board because the projections were
“inconsistent with the corporation's recent performance.”238
Specifically, the projections were found unreliable because
management had “overestimated the [c]ompany's revenues
even two to three months away ... by more than a factor of
three.”239 Here, by contrast, ESG's performance in March and
April 2013, shortly before the Merger, was in line with the
2013 Projections.240
Separately, I find that the ten-year projections Jacobs prepared
in connection with this litigation are not reflective of
management's best estimate of future performance as of
the Merger. In valuing the Company, Jacobs analyzed the
“fundamentals” of ESG: its lines of business, its sales
opportunities, its sales won and lost, its individual customers,
its market, its competition, and its growth. His process
involved discussions with ESG management in 2014 and
input from ESG's industry expert, Peter Weigand.241 Based
on his analysis, Jacobs projected, on a per unit basis, the
Company's future revenue for the years 2013–2023.242
Compared to the 2013 Projections, Jacobs's projections are
pessimistic, i.e., they project lower revenue, primarily in the
Company's TMS line of business. Over the period from 2009
to 2012, TMS revenue had grown from $12.34 million to
$18.76 million. In the 2013 Projections, Cannon projected
consistent growth for the years 20132017, albeit at a slower
pace than in the years 2009–2012.243 In sharp contrast, Jacobs
projected that, going forward, TMS revenue would decline to
$12.74 million in 2020 and then slowly increase to $13.67
million in 2023.244
Delaware courts are generally skeptical of projections
created by an expert during litigation. “Expert valuations
that disregard contemporaneous management projections are
sometimes completely discounted.”245 In Taylor v. American
Specialty Retailing Group, Inc.,246 for example, an expert
hired by the company (Dunham) “ignored a contemporaneous
set of projections prepared by Dunham's management,” and
instead performed a DCF analysis in that appraisal proceeding
based “on far more pessimistic assumptions of Dunham's
future prospects that he prepared on his own.” The Company's
Chief Financial Officer also refused to endorse the expert's
valuation. For these reasons, the Court concluded that the
expert's calculation “lacks credibility.”247
*22  Then–Vice Chancellor Strine reached a similar
conclusion in Agranoff v. Miller.248 There, the company's
expert concluded that management's projections were an
unreliable basis for a DCF analysis, but the expert nonetheless
performed a DCF calculation based on “a substantial negative
revision to those projections that he came up with after
discussions with ... managers after the valuation date.”249 In
rejecting the expert's analysis, then-Vice Chancellor Strine
concluded that “[t]he possibility of hindsight bias and other
cognitive distortions seems untenably high,” particularly
since the expert had consulted with an individual interested in
the outcome of the case about the negative revisions.250
In my opinion, consistent with Taylor and Agranoff, the
after-the fact projections Jacobs created for purposes of this
litigation are tainted by hindsight bias251 and are not a
reliable source to determine the fair value of Nate's shares
as of the Merger. Jacobs first spoke with ESG management
about valuation issues in the spring of 2014, approximately
one year after the Merger,252 when this litigation was well
underway. The key individual with whom Jacobs discussed
the Company's future prospects—Cannon253—had a strong
financial interest for Jacobs to believe that management did
not think that the 2013 Projections were reliable. As Cannon
acknowledged at trial, every dollar paid to Nate in the Merger
is approximately $0.50 out of his own pocket.254 The rest
of the payment would come out of the pockets of only a
few other senior managers: Bryn, Gurule and Fenton. The
financial incentive for them to steer Jacobs toward a lower
valuation of the Company, even if only subconsciously, is just
too great to overcome in this case.
Indeed, Jacobs testified that, based on conversations he had
with ESG management in 2014, he understood the 2013
Projections to be inconsistent with the contemporaneous
beliefs of management.255 But this understanding is belied by
the trial record in my view, which demonstrates that the 2013
Projections were reflective of management's best estimate of
the Company's future performance as of the Merger. Jacobs's
projections also assume that the Merger occurred at the very
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peak? of ESG's performance, at an “inflection point” when
ESG went from a growing company to a declining company,
which Cannon conceded would have been “pretty stupid” to
do.256
In sum, I see no basis to depart from the reasoned
principle recited in Taylor, Agranoff, and elsewhere to
be chary of relying on an expert's post hoc, litigation-
driven forecasts where, as here, contemporaneous, reliable
projections prepared by management are available.257 I am
persuaded that the 2013 Projections were ESG management's
best estimates of the Company's future performance as of
the Merger, and provide a reliable basis for performing a
DCF valuation. Thus, I use the 2013 Projections in my DCF
analysis and give no weight to Jacobs's projections.
2. The Tax Rate
*23  The DCF model requires a corporate-level tax rate to
calculate the Company's projected free cash flows.258 But, as
a Subchapter S corporation, ESG does not pay any corporate-
level income taxes. Instead, ESG's income is taxed only once
at the investor level at the stockholder's ordinary income rate
(rather than at the lower dividend rate).259 This different
tax treatment means that stockholders in a Subchapter S
corporation such as ESG are able to receive distributions on
a tax-advantaged basis when compared to stockholders in a
Subchapter C corporation, where income is taxed twice: once
at the corporate level, and again at the investor level (at the
lower dividend rate).
As the Supreme Court stated in Tri–Continental Corp., Nate
is “entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from
him.”260 A critical component of what was “taken” from Nate
in the Merger was the tax advantage of being a stockholder
in a Subchapter S corporation. As then-Vice Chancellor
Strine reasoned in Kessler, “[a]n S corporation structure
can produce a material increase in economic value for a
stockholder and should be given weight in a proper valuation
of the stockholder's interest.”261 The Court thus concluded
that “when minority stockholders have been forcibly denied
the future benefits of S corporation status, they should
receive compensation for those expected benefits and not an
artificially discounted value that disregards the favorable tax
treatment available to them.”262
Based on the testimony of Austin Smith, who I found more
persuasive on this issue than Jacobs, I conclude that the
Company's earnings should be tax affected in order to perform
a DCF valuation that adequately compensates Nate for being
deprived of his Subchapter S stockholder status.263 This
conclusion follows Kessler, in which then-Vice Chancellor
Strine thoughtfully surveyed the case law and literature on
this subject,264 and is consistent with another recent decision
of this Court that also followed Kessler.265
Before explaining my calculations, I address ESG's
contention that any Kessler-based valuation must take into
account the Company's policy with respect to distributed
earnings, which Jacobs calculated to be 76.7%—the median
of ESG's distributions for the years 2007–2012.266 According
to ESG, Nate should not receive any special Subchapter S
value for earnings that are retained and reinvested in the
Company. Thus, ESG proposes a tax rate in a Kessler-
based valuation that would permit Nate to receive value
from being a Subchapter S corporation stockholder for some
of ESG's earnings (the 76.7% calculated by Jacobs) but
not from any retained earnings (the 23.3% remainder).267
Jacobs calculated this rate to be 34.1%.268 In my opinion, the
Company's position is based on a false premise.
*24  ESG did not reinvest any appreciable amount of its
undistributed earnings in its business but instead kept those
earnings as cash on its balance sheet. This is the reason
the amount of cash and cash equivalents on ESG's balance
sheet increased from $3.2 million in 2009 to $17.4 million in
May 2013.269 The record also does not contain any evidence
suggesting that, as of the Merger, Cannon or anyone else
at ESG intended to reinvest the cash it had accumulated in
the business.270 Nor was it necessary for ESG to reinvest
earnings to grow. Both Austin Smith and Jacobs testified that
the 2013 Projections included all of the capital expenditures
necessary for ESG to generate the projected future cash
flows.271
In my opinion, the operative metric under the Kessler-based
valuation method is not the actual distributions made by
a Subchapter S corporation, but the amount of funds that
are available for distribution to stockholders. To conclude
otherwise would run afoul of the rationale of Tri–Continental
Corp. because Nate would be deprived of “his proportionate
interest” in ESG as a “going concern,”272 which includes the
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Subchapter S corporation benefits that inure to earnings that
are distributed and retained.
Table 5 below reflects my calculation, under Kessler, of
the hypothetical corporate tax rate for ESG that “treat[s]
the S corporation shareholder [i.e., Nate] as receiving the
full benefit of untaxed dividends, by equating [his] after-
tax return to the after-dividend return to a C corporation
shareholder.”273 For this purpose, I use Jacobs's calculation
of ESG's effective state and federal tax rate to be 43%,
which Nate has accepted.274 Because Nate was the only
stockholder cashed out in the Merger, I also accept Austin
Smith's calculation of Nate's actual tax rates as a Maine
resident rather than Jacobs's calculation of “hypothetical” tax
rates for a Massachusetts stockholder. Thus, I calculate the
tax rate Nate would pay on distributions from a Subchapter C
corporation to be 31.75%, which is the sum of the 20% federal
tax on dividends, the 3.8% Net Income Investment Tax (NIIT)
imposed by the Affordable Care Act,275 and the 7.95% Maine
state tax on dividends.276 I also calculate the tax rate that Nate
would pay on distributions from a Subchapter S corporation
to be 47.25%, which is the sum of Nate's actual 35.5% federal
income tax rate (based on his 2012 tax returns),277 the 3.8%
NIIT, and the 7.95% Maine state tax.
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Thus, I conclude that the appropriate tax rate to apply in my
DCF valuation of Nate's interest in ESG at the time of the
Merger is 22.71%.
3. The Terminal Growth Rate
In a typical DCF valuation, the terminal growth rate
“attempt[s] to capture the future growth prospects of the firm
while recognizing that over time firms cannot continue to
grow at a rate that is materially in excess of the real growth of
the economy.”278 Austin Smith offered a 5% terminal growth
rate, calculated as a modest premium (0.5%) to the midpoint
of three estimates of nominal U.S. GDP growth prepared in
March 2013 for 2017 and onward (4.5%).279 Jacobs proposed
a terminal growth rate of 3%, calculated as a premium (1%) to
the Federal Reserve's projection of inflation as of the Merger
(2%).280
Although calculating the appropriate terminal growth rate
is one of several challenging estimations for a law-trained
judge tasked with determining a corporation's fair value,281
two well-reasoned principles guide my analysis. In Merion
Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc.,282 the Court observed that,
in most cases, “a terminal growth rate should not be greater
than the nominal growth rate for the United States economy,
because ‘[i]f a company is assumed to grow at a higher rate
indefinitely, its cash flow would eventually exceed America's
[gross national product].’ ”283 Under the logic of 3M Cogent,
I find Austin Smith's 5% terminal growth rate too high for a
company like ESG, which, as of the Merger, had matured into
a company that was facing increasing competitive pressures
and flatter growth after several years of relatively rapid
growth in an environment of declining natural gas prices.
Conversely, as the Court noted in Global GT LP v. Golden
Telecom, Inc.,284 “the rate of inflation is the floor for a
terminal value estimate for a solidly profitable company
that does not have an identifiable risk of insolvency.”285
Because the 2013 Projections contemplate that ESG would
remain profitable even after taking into account increasing
competitive pressures as of the Merger, I find that it is
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appropriate under Golden Telecom to calculate the terminal
growth rate as a premium to inflation. In my judgment,
Jacobs's 3% rate strikes the appropriate balance. Indeed, a
3% rate is very close to the 2.5% rate utilized in the Grant
Thornton Valuation contemporaneous with the Merger.286
*26  Courts have acknowledged that a non-trivial spread
in the growth rate for the discrete forecast period and the
terminal growth rate is common.287 Thus, the 3% difference
between the revenue growth rate in the final year of the
2013 Projections (6.0% for 2017) and the terminal growth
rate I adopt (3%) should not be controversial. There also is
considerable precedent in Delaware for adopting a terminal
growth rate that is a premium, such as 100 basis points,
over inflation.288 Additionally, the fact that ESG's own
expert proposed a 3% terminal growth rate in connection
with his projections for the Company, which were unduly
pessimistic in comparison to the 2013 Projections, compels
the conclusion that the terminal growth rate must be at least
3%. I therefore adopt a 3% terminal growth rate.
4. The Cash on ESG's Balance Sheet
ESG had approximately $17.4 million in cash and cash
equivalents on its balance sheet as of the Merger.289 It
is undisputed that Nate is entitled to receive a pro rata
share of the “excess” cash that could have been distributed
to stockholders at that time. At post-trial argument, Nate
conceded that $2.3 million should be deducted to reflect
certain income tax liabilities.290 ESG argues that it is
necessary to further deduct (i) $916,000 as working capital;
and (ii) $2.3 million for a Texas sales and use tax liability.
a. Working Capital
Jacobs opined that $916,000 in cash, roughly 3% of ESG's
2012 revenue, should be set aside as the Company's working
capital. He considered this amount to be an “extremely
conservative estimate.”291 Austin Smith assumed that ESG
did not need a working capital reserve because ESG generated
millions of dollars in cash every month.292 The trial record
supports Jacobs's estimation. Cannon testified that Nate
agreed upon the Company's “long-standing practice” to retain
a percentage of earnings to use for “[c]apital expenditures,
as well as other corporate matters.” According to Cannon,
who described himself as “a very conservative kind of guy,”
having no cash on hand would not be a “prudent thing to
do.”293 In my opinion, although there is no direct evidentiary
support for a working capital reserve of 3% of revenue,
I credit Cannon's testimony on this point and thus accept
Jacobs's estimate that ESG's cash on hand at the Merger
should be decreased by $916,000.
b. Texas Use and Sales Tax
*27  In 2012, ESG discovered that it was subject to a use
and sales tax imposed by Texas on “data processing services”
in the state, which the Company had not paid for over a
decade.294 Assuming that none of the Company's customers
paid this tax on their own, ESG's controller, Swift, estimated
in April 2012 that the Company's potential liability was $2.6
million. In an updated analysis in July 2013, she estimated
that the tax could be as high as $3.136 million.295 In the third
or fourth quarter of 2013, the Company hired a tax consultant,
who subsequently estimated that the tax liability was around
$1.2 million.296 In March 2014, ESG eventually contacted its
clients over the course of a week, learned that several had been
paying the tax, and determined that its liability for the Texas
sales and use tax was $448,389, with the amount attributable
to the period before the Merger being $373,168.297
Based on his conversations with ESG management, Jacobs
calculated that a low estimate of the Texas tax as of the
Merger date was $1.6 million. Jacobs then determined that the
midpoint of Swift's $3.1 million calculation and his own $1.6
million estimate, calculated as $2.3 million, was a reasonable
expectation of ESG's obligation as of the Merger.298 Nate
disagrees. He argues that, under Tri–Continental Corp.,
Jacobs's calculation does not accurately reflect what was
“knowable” about the Texas use tax because determining
the Company's tax liability was an “empirical exercise” that
“could easily have been conducted as of the date of the
Merger.”299 He submits that the correct amount to deduct for
the Texas tax liability was $375,000.
Because ESG's management did not know for over a decade
about the Texas sales and use tax, I do not accept Swift's $3.1
million estimation, or Jacobs's derivative estimation, as fairly
representative as what was “knowable” about this liability at
the Merger. In my view, ESG's tax consultant's estimate of
$1.2 million, despite being calculated several months after the
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Merger, is the best available proxy for what was knowable
about this liability as of the Merger.
* * *
With the foregoing deductions, I conclude that ESG's
“excess” cash on hand as of the Merger totaled $12.984
million ($17.4 million minus $2.3 million, minus $916,000,
minus $1.2 million).
5. Nate's Ownership Percentage
The final area of disagreement between the parties
concerns Nate's ownership percentage of the Company. The
shareholdings of Nate (1,320,000 shares) and Acquisition
Corp. (2,430,000 shares) in ESG at the time of the Merger
are not in dispute. In percentage terms, Nate contends that
he owned 35.2% of the Company, but ESG contends that he
owned only 33.08%. The dispute stems from whether 240,000
“performance units” granted to other ESG employees, which
the board of ESG ratified when approving the Merger,300
should be included in a fully diluted valuation of the
Company.
Drew Fenton has what amounts to a phantom stock agreement
for 150,000 shares of ESG. He regularly receives pro rata
distributions for those phantom shares.301 Bob Potter has
50,000 vested stock options that, according to Cannon, are
exercisable in the event of a change of control, which
does not include the Merger.302 Neither Nate nor ESG
presented any evidence probative of the terms of the other
40,000 performance units referenced in the board resolution
approving the Merger, so I will not include those units in my
calculation of Nate's percentage interest.
When Jacobs performed a normalization of the compensation
Cannon, Bryn, and Gurule received as ESG stockholders
in the manner discussed above, he did not change
Fenton's compensation because Fenton's “total compensation
approximat[ed] a market salary.”303 In other words, Jacobs
determined that Fenton's salary and bonus as an ESG
employee and his distributions as the holder of 150,000
phantom shares historically approximated a market-rate
salary for someone in his position.
*28  Nate contends that, because Fenton's compensation was
not normalized, it would be double-counting to also include
Fenton's 150,000 phantom shares for purposes of determining
the fair value of Nate's interest on a fully diluted basis. I
disagree. The fact that Fenton's total compensation as an
employee and as a holder of phantom shares historically
approximated market-rate compensation does not change
the reality that, in the future, Fenton would still be
entitled to distributions for those 150,000 phantom shares
in the same manner that Cannon or Bryn are entitled to
distributions. In other words, from my perspective, Jacobs
“normalized” Fenton's compensation by not changing it in
his projections.304 Because the parties have assumed that
Grant Thornton normalized the 2013 Projections for purposes
of the Grant Thornton Valuation in a manner equivalent to
Jacobs's own normalization process,305 I find it is more likely
than not that Fenton's phantom stock rights were functionally
normalized in the 2013 Projections. I am thus persuaded that
I should include Fenton's 150,000 phantom stock rights when
calculating the number of outstanding shares of ESG as of the
Merger.
As to Potter's 50,000 units, I exclude them from my
calculation because they are exercisable only in the event
of a change of control. My conclusion follows from then-
Chancellor Strine's decision in In re Appraisal of Orchard
Enterprises, Inc.306 ESG argues that, under Orchard, I
must value the Company on a fully diluted basis, i.e., by
including Potter's 50,000 units.307 In my view, ESG's reading
of Orchard misses the mark. Orchard was an appraisal
action involving a company with a series of preferred
stock that was entitled to participate in any dividends
declared on common stock on an as-converted basis and
that had a liquidation preference of $25 million, which
was triggered in certain situations. In his post-trial decision,
then-Chancellor Strine concluded that the possibility of an
event triggering the liquidation preference was “entirely a
matter of speculation.”308 Thus, when he determined the
company's going concern value, he valued the preferred stock
on an as-converted basis without deducting the liquidation
preference because, “if [the company] remains a going
concern, the preferred stockholders' claim on the cash flows
of the company (if paid out in the form of dividends) is
solely to receive dividends on an as-converted basis.”309
Under the logic of Orchard, Potter's 50,000 units, which
are only exercisable in a change of control, should not be
included in valuing ESG because there is no evidence in the
record suggesting that a change of control as of the Merger
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was anything but entirely speculative, and valuing ESG by
reference to speculative events is inconsistent with Delaware
appraisal law.310
* * *
*29  Therefore, I find that Nate owned 1,320,000 of ESG's
3,900,000 outstanding shares at the time of the Merger,311
which equates to 33.85% of the Company.
6. The Fair Value of Nate's Interest in ESG
Appendix A reflects my DCF valuation of ESG as of
the Merger based on the relevant items in the 2013
Projections, i.e., the projections for EBITDA, depreciation
and amortization, capital expenditures, and additional
working capital for the years 2013–2017. For the terminal
period, I calculated EBITDA based on a 3% growth rate, and I
adopt Austin Smith calculation's for the other items.312 I also
apply a partial period adjustment to the year 2013 to represent
the distributable cash flows between the Merger and the end
of the year. Finally, I use the agreed-upon WACC of 14.13%,
and I adopt Austin Smith's use of the mid-year convention to
calculate present value, “which assumes cash flows will be
received evenly throughout the period rather than at the end
of the period.”313 Based on the foregoing assumptions, I find
that the fair value of Nate's 1,320,000 shares in ESG as of the
Merger date was $42,165,920.
B. Counts I and II: Breach of Fiduciary Duty Against
Cannon, Bryn, and Acquisition Corp.
In Count I of the Amended Complaint, Nate contends that
Cannon and Bryn breached their fiduciary duties as directors
of ESG by approving the Merger as a self-interested and
unfair transaction. In Count II of the Amended Complaint,
Nate contends that Cannon, Bryn, and ESG Acquisition Corp.
breached their fiduciary duties as controlling stockholders of
ESG by approving the unfair Merger. Defendants conceded in
the Pre–Trial Stipulation that they carry the burden to prove
the entire fairness of the Merger under Counts I and II.314
That was a sensible concession. Cannon and Bryn, as the ESG
directors who voted in favor of the Merger, were conflicted
in that they had a material interest in paying Nate as little as
possible by virtue of their substantial holdings in Acquisition
Corp., the surviving corporation in the Merger.315 Acquisition
Corp., as ESG's majority stockholder, also stood on both sides
of the Merger.316 Absent procedural mechanisms not present
here,317 Cannon and Bryn as conflicted directors (under
Count I) and Acquisition Corp. as a controlling stockholder
(under Count II) bear the burden to prove the entire fairness
of the Merger by establishing “to the court's satisfaction
that the transaction was the product of both fair dealing and
fair price.”318 Because Cannon, Bryn, and Acquisition Corp.
presented a single defense of the Merger, the following entire
fairness analysis applies to both claims.
1. The Merger Was Not the Product of Fair Dealing
*30  Fair dealing “embraces questions of when the
transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured,
negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals
of the directors and the stockholders were obtained.”319 Nate
contends that Cannon and Bryn timed the Merger strategically
in two ways: first, to exploit the loss of Viridian as a major
customer of ESG and thereby cash him out at a low valuation;
and second, to deprive Nate of the opportunity to enjoin the
transaction in court before it closed.320
Defendants counter that the timing of the Merger was dictated
by Nate's refusal to negotiate over a cash-out price, and that
the one-day notice of the ESG board meeting to approve
the Merger, which was permitted under ESG's bylaws, was
equitable under the circumstances because Nate already had
the 2013 Projections and the Grant Thornton Valuation for
over a month. Further, Cannon and Bryn submit that their
reliance on a financial expert, Grant Thornton, to determine
the Merger price is evidence of fair dealing under 8 Del. C.
§ 141(e).321
In my opinion, Defendants failed to demonstrate that the
Merger was the product of fair dealing. Instead, I find
that Cannon timed the Merger to take advantage of the
downward revision from the Revised 2012 Projections to
the 2013 Projections, which were primarily brought about
by the loss of Viridian, to cash out Nate and “thereby stop
the hemorrhage”322 of paying millions in profit distributions
to Nate, who had not worked at the Company since August
2009.323 I also find it was inequitable for Cannon and Bryn
to reject Nate's reasonable request for a one-day delay of the
May 6, 2013, ESG board meeting at which the Merger would
be put to a vote.
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*31  Under Section 6–4(b) of the Company's bylaws, ESG's
board had the authority to convene a special meeting on one
day's notice.324 But, “inequitable action does not become
permissible simply because it is legally possible.”325 Nate
may have had the 2013 Projections in hand since the end
of March 2013,326 but there is no evidence in the record
suggesting that Cannon or Bryn had informed Nate before
May 3, 2013, that the 2013 Projections would be the basis
for a cash-out transaction.327 In any event, Nate asked only
for a one-day delay to travel (from New York to Maine) and
to review the deal documents before the board meeting in
Boston. Tellingly, Cannon conceded that he and Bryn refused
this request because they wanted to prevent Nate from having
the opportunity to go to court to enjoin the transaction.328
Because the record does not reveal a legitimate need for such
acute timing pressure, Cannon and Bryn's refusal of Nate's
reasonable request was inequitable.329
In sum, under the totality of the circumstances, Defendants
have not proven that the Merger was the product of fair
dealing.
2. The Merger Was Not at a Fair Price
Fair price “relates to the economic and financial
considerations of the proposed merger, including all relevant
factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and
any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of
a company's stock.”330 “When conducting a fair price inquiry
as part of the entire fairness standard of review, the court
asks whether the transaction was one ‘that a reasonable seller,
under all of the circumstances, would regard as within a range
of fair value; one that such a seller could reasonably accept.’
”331 The fair price inquiry in a fiduciary duty claim is largely
equivalent to the fair value determination in an appraisal
proceeding, although the remedies may be different.332 Under
the DCF valuation set forth above, where I concluded that the
fair value of Nate's interest in ESG was $42,165,920, I find
that Defendants have failed to show that the $19.95 per share
consideration ($26.334 million in total) offered to Nate in the
Merger was within a range of fair value of ESG.333
3. The Merger was not Entirely Fair
*32  Under the entire fairness standard, I must make a
unitary conclusion as to whether the Merger was entirely
fair. “[I]n a non-fraudulent transaction ... price may be the
preponderant consideration outweighing other features of the
merger.”334 After weighing the respective fair dealing and fair
price inquiries, I conclude that the Merger was not entirely
fair. Cannon, Bryn, and Acquisition Corp. thus breached their
fiduciary duties.
“[W]here a merger is found to have been effected at an
unfairly low price, the shareholders are normally entitled
to out-of-pocket (i.e., compensatory) money damages equal
to the ‘fair’ or ‘intrinsic’ value of their stock at the time
of the merger, less the price per share that they actually
received.”335 This principle plainly applies here. Defendants
have not shown that Nate's damages are less than the fair
value of his interest in ESG, nor has Nate shown that his
damages are greater than the fair value of his interest.336
Thus, judgment will be entered in Nate's favor under Counts
I and II, with Cannon, Bryn, and Acquisition Corp. jointly
and severally liable to Nate for damages in the amount of
$42,165,920, representing the fair value of Nate's shares.
C. Count III: Aiding and Abetting Against Acquisition
Corp.
In Count III of the Amended Complaint, Nate asserts that
Acquisition Corp. is liable for aiding and abetting Cannon
and Bryn's breaches of fiduciary duty. Nate waived this
claim because he offered no probative evidence at trial and
presented no argument in support of this claim in his post-trial
briefing.337
D. Interest, Fees, and Costs
Under 8 Del. C. § 262(h), unless I determine otherwise for
good cause shown, Nate is entitled to interest at the statutory
rate (the Federal Reserve discount rate plus 5%, compounded
quarterly) from the effective date of the Merger until the
appraised value of his stock is paid. Neither Nate nor ESG has
offered any good cause to depart from the statute here. Thus, I
award Nate interest at the statutory rate on his appraisal claim,
compounded quarterly.
In his post-trial briefing, Nate seeks to recover his expert fees
and attorneys' fees incurred in this action, contending that
Defendants litigated in bad faith. I disagree that Defendants'
conduct rose to the level of bad faith, and I reject this request.
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Under the American Rule, litigants in this Court generally
pay their own attorneys' fees.338 “The bad faith exception
to the American Rule applies in cases where the court finds
litigation to have been brought in bad faith or finds that
a party conducted the litigation process itself in bad faith,
thereby unjustifiably increasing the costs of litigation.”339
“[T]o constitute bad faith, the [litigant's] action must rise to a
high level of egregiousness.”340 The thrust of Nate's request
is that the Merger price, unilaterally set by Cannon and
Bryn, was unfair on its face and not based on any legitimate
valuation of the Company because Grant Thornton failed to
tax affect its DCF analysis of the 2013 Projections for ESG
as a Subchapter S corporation under Kessler.341
*33  In my opinion, this conduct does not rise to the level
of bad faith to warrant fee shifting because the parties “could
and did reasonably differ on the legal import” of several
critical issues,342 such as whether it was appropriate to tax
affect ESG's earnings under Kessler. For example, the import
and application Kessler is not free from criticism,343 nor
is it a binding decision of the Delaware Supreme Court.
I also rejected several aspects of Austin Smith's valuation,
including her discount rate and terminal growth rate, in favor
of Jacobs's calculations. None of the authorities Nate has
advanced compels me to award expert fees or attorneys' fees.
I thus deny Nate's request for fees. Under 8 Del. C. § 262(j)
and Court of Chancery Rule 54(d), I award Nate his costs.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, judgment will be entered in Nate's
favor under Counts I, II, and IV of the Amended Complaint.
Nate is entitled to: (1) the fair value of his 1,320,000 shares
of ESG as of the Merger on May 6, 2013, which I find to
be $42,165,920; (2) pre-judgment and post-judgment on this
amount at the Delaware legal rate, compounded quarterly;
and (3) costs. Judgment will be entered in Acquisition Corp.'s
favor under Count III.
Counsel shall confer and submit an implementing order of
final judgment within five business days, providing for the
foregoing payments to be made within thirty calendar days of
entry of judgment.
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was Grant Thornton's partner on the ESG account and his explanation of events was logical and consistent with the
documentary record.
140 Id. 508–10 (Resnick), 116 (Cannon).
141 JX 250 (Email from Len Batsevitsky to Lynn Cannon (Mar. 15, 2013)) at ESG00095769.
142 Tr. 111–12 (Cannon).
143 Id. 608 (Bryn), 113 (Cannon), 301 (Purdum), 405 (Potter).
144 Id. 485, 535, 538 (Resnick).
145 JX 264 (2013 Projections) at NO00000046–50.
146 Compare JX 255 at GT017931, with JX 264 (2013 Projections) at NO00000052.
147 Tr. 493, 510 (Resnick).
148 Id. 194–98 (Cannon), 502, 506 (Resnick). Around the same time, Cannon was in the process of negotiating a new
commercial lease that would increase ESG's space from 16,000 to 26,000 square feet and would permit future growth.
Id. 214 (Cannon), 303 (Purdum). Cannon and other ESG employees testified that their then-current facilities were
“inadequate.” Id. 215 (Cannon), 295–96 (Purdum), 346–48 (Gurule).
149 Id. 186 (Cannon).
150 Id. 492 (Resnick).
151 ESG's performance for the rest of 2013 generally tracked the 2013 Projections. Id. 221–22 (Cannon).
152 Pl.'s Op. Br. 23 (citing JX 264 (2013 Projections) at NO00000052); Tr. of Oral Arg. 116–17.
153 JX 264 (Grant Thornton Valuation) at NO00000052–58.
154 Id. at NO00000052–53.
155 JX 264 (Letter from Barry Klickstein to Wayne Dennison (Mar. 28, 2013)) at NO000000042.
156 JX 264 (Grant Thornton Valuation) at NO00000045.
157 JX 349 (Stipulation (Oct. 2, 2014)) at ¶ 14.
158 JX 264 (Letter from Barry Klickstein to Wayne Dennison (Mar. 28, 2013)) at NO00000042; Tr. 709 (Nate).
159 JX 270 (Email from Barry Klickstein to Wayne Dennison (May 3, 2013)) at NO00000018.
160 Tr. 710 (Nate).
161 JX 265 (Email from Len Batsevitsky to Denise McGeough (Apr. 4, 2013)).
162 Tr. 512 (Resnick).
163 Id. 130–31 (Cannon), 651 (Bryn); Cannon Dep. 241–42.
164 JX 269 (Letter from Barry Klickstein to Megan Kelley (May 3, 2013)) at ESG00089409; Pre–Trial Stip. ¶ II.D.27.
Depositions were scheduled to begin the following week in a lawsuit Nate had filed in Massachusetts Superior Court
against Cannon, Bryn, and Gurule related to his removal as President of ESG. Id. ¶ II.D.20; Tr. 711 (Nate). Cannon
testified that the timing of the Merger had nothing to do with the scheduled depositions. Id. 206 (Cannon). On September
11, 2013, the parties to the Massachusetts litigation filed a joint motion to stay the proceedings in that lawsuit pending
the outcome of this action. JX 286 (Joint Mot. for Stay and to Continue Prelim. Inj. (Sept. 11, 2013)).
165 Tr. 153 (Cannon).
166 JX 269 (Merger Agreement) at § 7(b).
167 JX 269 (Email from Len Batsevitsky to Barry Klickstein (May 3, 2013)) at ESG00089429; Pre–Trial Stip. ¶ II.D.28.
168 JX 272 (Email from Len Batsevitsky to Barry Klickstein (May 3, 2013)).
169 Id.
170 Tr. 122 (Cannon).
171 Id. 213, 172 (Cannon).
172 Id. 711–12 (Nate).
173 Id. 121 (Cannon). When Nate later sought injunctive relief in a Massachusetts state court, the court denied his request
because the Merger already had closed. Id. 712 (Nate).
174 Id. 121 (Cannon).
175 Id. 713 (Nate).
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176 JX 278 (Resolutions of the Board of Directors of Energy Services Group, Inc. (May 6, 2013)) at NO00000250, 252; Tr.
713–14 (Nate).
177 Pre–Trial Stip. ¶ II.D.29. The ownership of ESG Acquisition Corp. on an undiluted basis was as follows: Cannons owned
1,218,750 shares (approximately 50.2%); Bryn owned 1,098,750 shares (approximately 45.2%); and Gurule owned
112,500 shares (approximately 4.6%).
178 JX 280 (Certificate of Merger (May 6, 2013)).
179 Tr. 712 (Nate).
180 JX 280 (Letter from Energy Services Group, Inc. to Stockholders of Energy Services Group, Inc. (May 13, 2013)).
181 JX 289 (Am.Compl.) at Ex. D. (Letter from Wayne Dennison to Energy Services Group, Inc. (May 21, 2013)); Pre–Trial
Stip. ¶ II.D.36.
182 JX 289 (Am.Compl.) at Prayer for Relief ¶ B.
183 See 8 Del. C. § 262(d)(2) (requiring, where a merger is approved by stockholder written consent, a stockholder to demand
appraisal within twenty days of the date of mailing of notice); 8 Del. C. § 262(e) (requiring a stockholder to commence
an appraisal proceeding within 120 days after the effective date of a merger).
184 Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1142 (Del.1989).
185 See Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co., Inc. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 221 (Del.2005).
186 Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 217 (Del.2010).
187 74 A.2d 71 (Del.1950).
188 Id. at 72.
189 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del.1983).
190 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684 A.2d 289, 299 (Del.1996).
191 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713.
192 Cede & Co. v. JRC Acq. Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (quoting Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., 709
A.2d 682, 702 (Del. Ch.1996), aff'd, 693 A.2d 1082 (Del.1997) (Table)).
193 Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 WL 2045640, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005).
194 Austin Smith also performed a comparable companies analysis in her report. JX 331 (Austin Smith Report) at ¶¶ 55–63,
Ex. 6. She gave 25% weight to her comparable companies valuation ($45.6 million) and 75% weight to her DCF valuation
($53.7 million). Id. at ¶ 64. Because Nate did not discuss the comparable companies analysis in his post-trial briefing, I
treat that valuation as waived. See Emerald P'rs v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1224 (Del.1999).
195 JX 331 (Austin Smith Report) at ¶¶ 45–46.
196 Pl.'s Op. Br. 29 n. 10.
197 JX 331 (Austin Smith Report) at ¶¶ 52–53, 65.
198 JX 340 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report) at ¶ 5.
199 JX 331 (Austin Smith Report) at ¶¶ 64–65.
200 Tr. of Oral Arg. 80–81.
201 Jacobs concluded that any comparable companies or comparable transaction analysis was not informative of ESG's
value due to insufficient data on comparables companies and transactions. JX 332 (Jacobs Report) at ¶¶ 129–36.
202 Id. at ¶¶ 138–54.
203 JX 339 (Jacobs Rebuttal Report) at ¶¶ 63–78.
204 JX 332 (Jacobs Report) at ¶¶ 166–81.
205 Id. at ¶ 201.
206 Pl.'s Reply Br. 30.
207 Defs.' Ans. Br. 63.
208 Neal v. Ala. By–Products Corp., 1990 WL 109243, at *9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1, 1990), aff'd, 588 A.2d 255 (Del.1991).
209 Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL 1152338, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2004, revised May 21, 2004); see also
In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2004 WL 1305745, at *14 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004, revised June 4, 2004)
(“This Court has consistently expressed a preference for the most recently prepared management projections available
as of the merger date.”).
210 In re Nine Sys. Corp. S'holders Litig., 2014 WL 4383127, at *40 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014).
211 Huff Fund Inv. P'rship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 WL 5878807, at *9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013), aff'd,––– A.3d ––––, 2015 WL
631586 (Del. Feb. 12, 2015) (TABLE).
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212 Tr. 484, 486–87, 490–91, 508–10 (Resnick).
213 Id. 493, 513 (Resnick); JX 255 (Email from Len Batsevitsky to Oksana Westerbeke (Mar. 19, 2013)).
214 Tr. 33–34, 160–61 (Cannon), 305 (Purdum), 357 (Gurule), 583 (Fenton).
215 See, e.g., JX 170 (Email from Carol Purdum to Lynn Cannon (July 5, 2012)) at ESG00100820; JX 236 (Email from Carol
Purdum to Bob Potter (Feb. 26, 2013)) at ESG00085988.
216 Tr. 159–60, 178–79 (Cannon).
217 2011 WL 227634 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 2011).
218 See id. at *4–6 (rejecting an expert's reliance on management projections based on “overly optimistic assumptions” in
part because they “failed to account for the sale of three properties ... after the projections were prepared”).
219 Tr. 193 (Cannon).
220 Id. 111–12, 116, 193–94 (Cannon), 508–10 (Resnick).
221 See supra Tables 3–4.
222 Tr. 484, 486–87 (Resnick).
223 JX 272 (Email from Len Batsevitsky to Barry Klickstein (May 3, 2013)).
224 Tr. 101, 193 (Cannon).
225 Id. 208–09 (Cannon).
226 Defs.' Ans. Br. 72.
227 Tr. 512 (Resnick); JX 265 (Email from Len Batsevitsky to Denise McGeough (Apr. 4, 2013)).
228 898 A.2d 290 (Del. Ch.2006).
229 See id. at 332, 332 n.109 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2006)).
230 See Emerging Commc'n, 2004 WL 1305745, at *13 (“If contemporaneous reliance upon the June projections by [the
corporation's controlling stockholder], his lender and his financial and legal advisors was appropriate, then logic and
common sense dictate that reliance on those same projections by [the plaintiff's expert] in performing his valuation was
no less appropriate.”).
231 2013 WL 5878807 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013), aff'd, ––– A.3d ––––, 2015 WL 631586 (Del. Feb. 12, 2015) (Table).
232 2012 WL 1569818 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012).
233 2014 WL 4383127 (Del. Ch. Sept. 4, 2014), appeal docketed No. 281,2015 (Del. June 5, 2015).
234 See CKx, 2013 WL 5878807, at *9, *11 (“Because I have little confidence in the reliability of using or excluding the
estimated $20 million increase in revenues under the to-be-negotiated American Idol contract, I conclude that a DCF
analysis is not the appropriate method of valuation in this case.”).
235 Just Care, 2012 WL 1569818, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012).
236 Tr. 172, 189 (Cannon); JX 187 (Email from Lynn Cannon to Francois Karl–Henry (Sept. 28, 2012)).
237 Tr. 484, 486–87, 490–91, 493, 510 (Resnick).
238 Nine Sys., 2014 WL 4383127, at *41.
239 Id. at *42.
240 Tr. 221–22 (Cannon).
241 See, e.g., JX 332 (Jacobs Report) at ¶ 108; Tr. 1231–32 (Jacobs).
242 JX 332 (Jacobs Report) at Ex. C1.
243 JX 264 (2013 Projections) at NO00000046, 52.
244 JX 332 (Jacobs Report) at ¶ 145, Ex. C1.
245 JCR Acq. Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *2.
246 2003 WL 21753752 (Del. Ch. July 25, 2003).
247 Id. at *2, *2 n.7.
248 791 A.2d 880 (Del. Ch.2001).
249 Id. at 891.
250 See id. at 892, 892 n.25.
251 See In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 n.50 (Del. Ch.2009) (defining “hindsight bias” as “the
tendency for people with knowledge of an outcome to exaggerate the extent to which they believe that outcome could
have been predicted.” (citation omitted)).
252 Tr. 1237 (Jacobs).
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253 JX 339 (Jacobs Rebuttal Report) at ¶ 84.
254 Tr. 204–05 (Cannon).
255 Id. 1237–38 (Jacobs); see also JX 339 (Jacobs Rebuttal Report) at ¶¶ 84–85.
256 Tr. 212–13 (Cannon).
257 See Gray v. Cytokine Pharmascienes, Inc., 2002 WL 853549, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002) (rejecting an expert's
calculation that disregarded management's revenue projections and that adjusted other projections where there were no
“valid reasons to warrant all of the[ ] adjustments”); see also Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 WL 3793896,
at *11–12 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013) (accepting management's projections, not the expert-created projections, “as a reliable
starting point for the DCF analysis”).
258 JX 331 (Austin Smith Report) at ¶ 45.
259 Tr. 1298 (Jacobs).
260 Tri–Cont'l Corp., 74 A.2d at 72.
261 Kessler, 898 A.2d at 327.
262 Id. at 328.
263 See id. at 330 (calculating a hypothetical S corporation tax rate of 29.4% by assuming a 15% dividend tax rate and a
40% personal income tax rate).
264 See id. at 326 (“This dispute raises an interesting question of valuation, which has elicited a fair amount of attention from
judges, appraisers, and academics.”).
265 See Zutrau v. Jansing, 2014 WL 3772859, at *36 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2014) (accepting a financial advisor's DCF calculation
of a Subchapter S corporation that was based on an estimated “hypothetical ‘pre-dividend S corporation tax rate’ ” of
28.8% (quoting Kessler, 898 A.2d at 330)).
Other jurisdictions also have cited Kessler with approval. See Bernier v. Bernier, 873 N.E.2d 216, 221 (Mass.2007) (“Our
review of the scant case law and the pertinent literature on the issues leads us to adopt generally the metric employed
by the Kessler court[.]”); see also Hamelink v. Hamelink, 2013 WL 6839700, at *5 (Minn.Ct.App. Dec. 30, 2013) (“In light
of Kessler and Bernier, we agree with husband that there is support for [his expert's] decision to tax affect.”).
266 JX 339 (Jacobs Rebuttal Report) at ¶ 70. Kessler itself acknowledges that “[t]he relative value of an S corporation, vis-
à-vis a C corporation, to its shareholders is dependent upon the level of distributions paid.” Kessler, 898 A.2d at 329.
267 Tr. 1301–05 (Jacobs).
268 JX 339 (Jacobs Rebuttal Report) at ¶¶ 70–71.
269 Tr. 1306–08 (Jacobs).
270 It would inappropriate to consider post-Merger changes to the Company's reinvestment practices. See, e.g., Gonsalves
v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 701 A.2d 357, 363 (Del.1997) (concluding in an appraisal proceeding that a petitioner
was not entitled to the pro rata value of “possible changes which may be made by new management” after the effective
date of the transaction).
271 Tr. 888 (Austin Smith), 1309 (Jacobs).
272 Tri–Cont'l Corp., 74 A.2d at 72.
273 Kessler, 898 A.2d at 330.
274 JX 339 (Jacobs Rebuttal Report) at ¶¶ 69–71; Pl.'s Op. Br. 61.
275 See 26 U.S.C. § 1411.
276 I also accept Austin Smith's assumption that Nate's state taxes are effectively not deductible for federal tax purposes.
JX 331 (Austin Smith Report) at ¶ 46.
277 Tr. 873–74, 883–84 (Austin Smith). I credit Austin Smith's testimony that it is appropriate to apply Nate's most recent,
actual tax rate because there is no evidence in the record suggesting a different tax rate during the discrete discount
period. Id. 885 (Austin Smith).
278 Andaloro, 2005 WL 2045640, at *12.
279 JX 331 (Austin Smith Report) at ¶¶ 52–53.
280 JX 339 (Jacobs Rebuttal Report) at ¶¶ 102–08.
281 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Orchard Enters., Inc., 2012 WL 2923305, at *18 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (“As a law-trained
judge who has to come up with a valuation deploying the learning of the field of corporate finance, I choose to deploy
one accepted method as well as I am able, given the record before me and my own abilities.”), aff'd, 2013 WL 1282001
(Del. Mar. 28, 2013) (Table).
282 2013 WL 3793896 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013).
- 629 -
Owen v. Cannon, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2015)
 © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 30
283 Id. at *21 (quoting Bradford Cornell, Corporate Valuation: Tools for Effective Appraisal and Decision Making 146–47
(1993)).
284 993 A.2d 497 (Del. Ch.2010), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del.2010).
285 Id. at 511.
286 JX 264 (Grant Thornton Valuation) at NO00000052.
287 See, e.g., S. Muoio & Co. LLC v. Hallmark Entm't Invs. Co., 2011 WL 863007, at *21 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2011), aff'd, 35
A.3d 419 (Del.2011) (Table).
288 See, e.g., Kessler, 898 A.2d at 334, 337 (adopting a 4% terminal growth rate where inflation was estimated to be 3%);
JRC Acq. Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *6 (adopting a 3.5% terminal growth rate where inflation was estimated to be 2.5%).
289 Tr. 1330 (Jacobs); JX 332 (Jacobs Report) at ¶¶ 195.
290 Tr. of Oral Arg. 61.
291 JX 332 (Jacobs Report) at ¶ 196.
292 JX 340 (Austin Smith Rebuttal Report) at 17.
293 Tr. 38–39 (Cannon).
294 Swift Dep. 135–36, 138.
295 Id. 139–40, 144, 146.
296 Id. 148.
297 Id. 155–56, 164.
298 JX 332 (Jacobs Report) at ¶ 198.
299 Pl.'s Op. Br. 68.
300 JX 278 (Resolutions of the Board of Directors of Energy Services Group, Inc. (May 6, 2013)) at NO00000249–50.
301 Tr. 558–60 (Fenton); Cannon Dep. 18–19.
302 Cannon Dep. 16–17; Tr. 407–08 (Potter).
303 JX 332 (Jacobs Report) at Ex. G.
304 Consider the following example. Assume ESG's historical financials reflect that Cannon, Bryn and Fenton each received
$5 in compensation per year but that their market rates were $10 each. Further assume that Cannon, Bryn, and Fenton
historically received distributions of $100, $90 and $5, respectively. It would be logical to normalize the compensation
expense for each of them by reallocating $5 from their distributions to compensation expense, which would mean that
the amount of distributions attributable to their equity interests would be reduced to $95, $85 and $0, respectively. After
normalizing ESG's historical financials in this manner and projecting future cash flows based on the same assumptions,
which is what Jacobs did as I understand it, Cannon, Bryn, and Fenton would be entitled to share in equity distributions
in the future on a pro rata basis.
305 See, e.g., Tr. 1226–27 (Jacobs).
306 2012 WL 2923305 (Del. Ch. July 18, 2012), aff'd, 2013 WL 1282001 (Del. Mar. 28, 2013 (Table)).
307 Defs.' Reply Br. 39–40.
308 Orchard, 2012 WL 2923305, at *6.
309 Id. at *7.
310 See, e.g., Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713; Orchard, 2012 WL 2923305, at *8 (“[T]he duty of this court in an appraisal is ...
to make a determination of [the company's] value as a going concern, without reference to ... speculative events.”).
311 This amount is the sum of Nate's shares (1,320,000) plus Acquisition Corp.'s shares (2,430,000) plus Fenton's phantom
shares (150,000).
312 JX 331 (Austin Smith Report) at ¶ 47.
313 Id. at Ex. 3.
314 Pre–Trial Stip. ¶ VI.C.3.
315 See In re Digex Inc. S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d 1176, 1207 (Del. Ch.2000) (concluding that a decision by four directors
must be reviewed for entire fairness because those directors “possessed substantial direct, personal financial interests
in the proposed transaction”).
316 See Kahn v. Lynch Commc'ns Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del.1994) (“A controlling or dominating shareholder
standing on both sides of a transaction, as in a parent-subsidiary context, bears the burden of proving its entire fairness.”).
317 See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 645 (Del.2014).
318 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del.1995) (citation omitted).
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319 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
320 Pl.'s Op. Br. 25–27.
Nate also argues that the Merger violated the Stockholders' Agreement. Pl.'s Op. Br. 28. Section 10 of the Stockholders'
Agreement requires that Nate, Cannon and Bryn unanimously approve any “agreements or transactions valued in excess
of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000)” and any “material changes in the business of the Company.” JX 2 (Stockholders'
Agreement) at §§ 10(2)(3), 10(2)(6). Defendants deny that the Stockholders' Agreement barred the Merger and argue,
alternatively, that the contracting parties waived those provisions of Section 10 by not enforcing them in the past. Defs.'
Ans. Br. 79–82; Tr. 27 (Cannon), 652 (Bryn). Nate counters that the Stockholders' Agreement includes a no-waiver
provision. See JX 2 (Stockholders' Agreement) at § 17(3). I decline to resolve these issues because the parties did not
fully or fairly brief the legal effect of Cannon and Bryn transferring their ESG stock to Acquisition Corp. on the contractual
rights and obligations under the Stockholders' Agreement. In any event, the impact of the Stockholders' Agreement would
have no practical effect on the outcome of my fairness analysis given my conclusions above.
321 Defs.' Reply Br. 4–10; Defs.' Ans. Br. 75–79.
322 Tr. 208–09 (Cannon); Cannon Dep. 190.
323 According to Defendants, the fact that Nate withdrew his claim for rescissory damages before trial meant that Nate himself
no longer thought that the Company was worth more after the Merger than on May 6, 2013. Tr. of Oral Arg. 102–03.
Defendants offered no authority for taking an adverse inference from Nate's litigation strategy, and I decline to do so
here. As with the appraisal analysis, fairness logically should focus on what was known and knowable to the parties at
the time of the challenged transaction.
324 JX 3 (Bylaws of Energy Services Group, Inc.) at § 6.
325 Schnell v. Chris–Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del.1971).
326 JX 264 (Letter from Barry Klickstein to Wayne Dennison (Mar. 28, 2013)) at NO00000042.
327 See Pepsi–Cola Bottling Co. v. Woodlawn Canners, Inc., 1983 WL 18017, at *13 (Del. Ch. Mar. 14, 1983) (concluding
after trial that it was not inequitable for a director to call an impromptu special board meeting where the matters discussed
were likely “potential topics for discussion” at a noticed board meeting and the annual shareholders meeting scheduled
for the same day).
328 Tr. 121 (Cannon).
329 Cannon and Bryn's reliance on 8 Del. C. § 141(e) is misplaced in my view. A director's reliance on qualified experts
under 8 Del. C. § 141(e) is “a pertinent factor in evaluating whether corporate directors have met a standard of fairness
in their dealings,” but this factor alone is not dispositive of fair dealing. See Cinerama. Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663
A.2d 1134, 1142 (Del. Ch.1994), aff'd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del.1995). “To hold otherwise would replace this court's role in
determining entire fairness ... with that of various experts hired to give advice to the directors in connection with the
challenged transaction[.]” Valeant Pharm. Int'l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 751 (Del. Ch.2007). Under the circumstances of
this case, where Cannon and Bryn advance the Grant Thornton Valuation based on the 2013 Projections as evidence
of fair dealing but simultaneously insist that the 2013 Projections were not reflective of the Company's fair value, I find
Cannon and Bryn's reliance on Grant Thornton's bottom line to be unpersuasive.
330 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
331 See In re Orchard Enters., Inc. S'holder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 30 (Del. Ch.2014) (quoting Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1143).
332 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713–14 (determining fair price under the entire fairness standard by reference to determining
fair value in an appraisal proceeding).
333 See Emerging Commc'ns, 2004 WL 1305745, at *24 (concluding that the merger consideration of $10.25 per share was
not a fair price under Weinberger where the appraised fair value of the company was $38.05 per share).
334 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711.
335 Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 579 (Del. Ch.2000); see also Orchard Enters., 88 A.3d at 48 (“[T]his court has
conducted consolidated breach of fiduciary duty and appraisal proceedings and awarded the same damages measure
in both cases.”).
336 See, e.g., ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 932 (Del. Ch.1999) (“I find the Counterclaim Defendants dealt
unfairly with the Counterclaimants, and the amount of damages equals the fair value I have determined above less the
$6,040,000 offered.”).
337 See In re El Paso Pipeline P'rs, L.P. Deriv. Litig., 2015 WL 1815846, at *14 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2015).
338 See Goodrich v. E.F. Hutton Gp., Inc., 681 A.2d 1039, 1044 (Del.1996).
339 Beck v. Atl. Coast PLC, 868 A.2d 840, 850–51 (Del. Ch.2005).
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340 Judge v. City of Rehoboth Beach, 1994 WL 198700, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 1994).
341 Pl.'s Op. Br. 73–74.
342 See In re Sunbelt Beverage Corp. S'holder Litig., 2010 WL 26539, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2010, revised Feb. 15,
2010) (declining to award attorneys' fees under the bad faith exception because the defendants' litigation strategy “was
sufficiently reasoned to preclude a finding that there was no legal issue in the case upon which reasonable parties could
differ”).
343 See, e.g., Stephen D. McMorrow, Consider “Tax–Affecting” When Setting the Value of an S Corporation, 10 Bus. Entities
36, 42–43 (Nov.-Dec.2008) (“Vice Chancellor Strine gave an admiring nod to research in this area by noting that useful
models for valuing S corporations were provided by Chris Treharne and others ... as well as by Z. Christopher Mercer....
The problem with the court's model is that it works only when the S corporation is distributing 100% of earnings.”); Bret A.
Tack, At Last, a Valid Way to Value S Corps, WealthManagement.com (Nov. 1, 2006), http://wealthmanagement.com/
valuation/last–valid–way–value–s–corps–0 (“The Delaware Chancery Court's method for capturing the value of the S
corp status using a presumed corporate tax rate does not address how the value of the S corp benefits is reduced when
earnings are retained in the corporation and not distributed.”).
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1 Corporations and Business
Organizations Payment of value of stock
Fair value for stock in appraisal action was
determined by sale price of business assets
less its liabilities. Corporation notified its
shareholders of a meeting that was held for
the purpose of considering and authorizing
corporation to sell substantially all of its assets
pursuant to a written asset purchase agreement
with another company. Shareholders gave notice
of their intention to seek appraisal rights, and
after corporation sold its assets, shareholders
were paid a sum equal to estimated fair value of
each share of the common stock. Shareholders
correctly contended that fair value of stock was
incorrectly calculated. General Statutes § 33–
871; General Statutes §§ 33–855.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Thomas F. McDermott, Jr., Feeley, Nichols, Chase,
McDermott & Pellett, P.C., Litchfield, for Torrington
Research Co.
Gersten Clifford & Rome LLP, Hartford, for Michael D.
Marvin/Lee Newberg/Heidi Newberg/Nancy Lawson.
Opinion
ROCHE, J.
*1  In this appraisal action, the court is asked to determine
the “fair value” of certain shares of common stock pursuant
General Statutes §§ 33–855(4) and 33–871.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 4, 2006, the plaintiff, Torrington Research
Company (hereinafter the company), a closely held
corporation, commenced this appraisal action against the
defendants, Michael D. Marvin, Lee Newberg, Heidi
Newberg and Nancy Lawson, by filing a petition with this
court. In its petition, the company alleges the following. On
April 8, 2006, and at all pertinent times, Heidi Newberg, Lee
Newberg, Michael Marvin and Nancy Lawson owned 51,200,
51,200, 204,167 and 5000 shares of the company's common
stock, respectively. The company notified its shareholders on
April 8, 2006, of a meeting that was to be held on April
19, 2006, “for the purpose of considering and authorizing
the company to sell substantially all” of its assets pursuant
to a written asset purchase agreement with the Bergquist
Torrington Company (hereinafter Bergquist), a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Bergquist Company. In that notice, the
company provided its opinion that the proposed action would
give rise to appraisal rights. As a result, the defendants and at
least two other parties gave notice of their intention to seek
appraisal rights.1 At the special meeting, the shareholders
approved the sale of “substantially all” of the company's
assets to Bergquist, and on April 21, 2006, the sale occurred.
On approximately May 1, 2006, the company served each
defendant with an appraisal notice, and on July 12, 2006,
it paid the defendants a sum equal to its estimate of the
fair value of each share of the common stock. The company
estimated the fair value at one cent, and thus, Heidi Newberg,
Lee Newberg, Michael Marvin and Nancy Lawson were
paid $524 .80, $524.80, $2092.72 and $51.25, respectively.
The company also provided the defendants with financial
information when it paid out its estimation of the fair value
of the common stock.
On July 24, 2006, the defendants gave notice of their
“dissatisfaction with the amount of the payment, rejected
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the offer and demanded payment of their stated estimate of
the fair value of the shares,” which they allege is $1.75 per
share. As of the date of the filing of this petition, the parties
were unable to agree upon the fair value of the company's
common stock.2 Thus, pursuant to General Statutes § 33–871,
the company instituted this action and petitioned the court
to determine the fair value of the shares pursuant to General
Statutes §§ 33–855 through 33–872 and to enter a judgment
for the “amount, if any by which the court finds the fair value
of the defendant shareholders' shares, plus interest, exceed[s]
the amount” already paid to the defendants.
Pursuant to § 33–871(d), this case was tried to the court
without a jury on September 16, September 17, September
18 and October 29, 2009.3 At trial, the parties submitted
numerous exhibits, and the court heard testimony from
Peter Turner, James Plewacki, Roger Dickinson and Heidi
Newberg.4 Neither the company nor the defendants called
expert witnesses to testify as to appropriate valuation
methods. On November 20, 2009, and November 23, 2009,
respectively, the company and the defendants filed proposed
findings of fact and post-trial memoranda. On December
11, 2009, the defendants filed a reply to the company's
proposed findings of fact and supporting memorandum, and




*2  In Welsh v. Independent Bank & Trust Co., 1 Conn.App.
14, 467 A.2d 941 (1983), cert. denied, 192 Conn. 801, 470
A.2d 1218 (1984), the only appellate level case in Connecticut
that discusses the fair value of stock in an appraisal action, the
court noted: “The basic concept of value under the appraisal
statute ... is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for
that which has been taken from him ... his proportionate
interest in a going concern. This is the true or intrinsic
value of this stock which has been taken by the merger ...
In determining fair value, a court may rely on a legally
recognized measure of value which is supported by the
subordinate facts. No single method of valuation will control
in all cases ... It is within the discretion of the trier of fact
to select the most appropriate method of valuation under the
facts properly found by him ... Valuation is a matter of fact
to be determined by the trier's independent judgment of what
is just compensation. Thus, valuation rests largely within the
discretion of the lower court.”5 (Citations omitted; emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 16–17, 467
A.2d 941.
Although the Appellate Court decided Welsh before the
legislature adopted the definition of fair value, in § 33–855(4),
the current statutes provide discretion to the trier of fact as
it determines fair value. Section 33–871 provides in relevant
part: “(a) If a shareholder makes demand for payment under
section 33–868 which remains unsettled, the corporation shall
commence a proceeding within sixty days after receiving the
payment demand and petition the court to determine the fair
value of the shares and accrued interest ... (d) The jurisdiction
of the court in which the proceeding is commenced ... is
plenary and exclusive. The court may appoint one or more
persons as appraisers to receive evidence and recommend a
decision on the question of fair value. The appraisers shall
have the powers described in the order appointing them, or
in any amendment to it ... There shall be no right to a jury
trial. (e) Each shareholder made a party to the proceeding
is entitled to judgment (1) for the amount, if any, by which
the court finds the fair value of the shareholder's shares, plus
interest, exceeds the amount paid by the corporation to the
shareholder for such shares, or (2) for the fair value, plus
interest, of the shareholder's shares for which the corporation
elected to withhold payment under section 33–867.”
The applicable definition of fair value is found in § 33–
855(4) and provides: “Fair value means the value of the
corporation's shares determined: (A) Immediately before the
effectuation of the corporate action to which the shareholder
objects, (B) using customary and current valuation concepts
and techniques generally employed for similar businesses in
the context of the transaction requiring appraisal, and (C)
without discounting for lack of marketability or minority
status except, if appropriate, for amendments to the certificate
of incorporation pursuant to subdivision (5) of subsection (a)
of section 33–856.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
*3  The Supreme Court has identified at least two valuation
methods of closely held businesses in other contexts. “While
there are several different methods by which to determine
the value of a closely-held corporation, these methods, and
their variants, are of two general types: (1) capitalization of
earnings, or the net present value of a future income stream;
and (2) net asset value, or the present sale price of the business
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assets less its liabilities ... While these alternate methods of
valuation frequently yield different results ... they purport
at least in theory to obtain the same object, i.e., the market
value of the business. That different methods of valuation may
yield different results, depending upon what exactly is being
valued, does not mean that the results of the alternate methods
can simply be summed to determine total value. One or the
other, or the combined weighted average of each, will produce
the best approximation of market value.” (Citations omitted.)
West Haven Sound Development Corporation v. West Haven,
201 Conn. 305, 329–30, 514 A.2d 734 (1986).
Connecticut's definition of fair value is derived from the
Model Business Corporation Act's definition of fair value,
which was adopted in Public Acts 2001, No. 01–199, §
15. The act's official comments indicate that its drafters
endorse similar, if not identical, valuation approaches to those
recognized by the Supreme Court. The comments provide in
relevant part: “[F]air value is to be determined immediately
before the effectuation of the corporate action, rather than, as
is the case under most state statutes that address this issue, the
date of the shareholders' vote. This comports with the purpose
of this chapter to preserve the shareholder's prior rights as a
shareholder until the effective date of the corporate action,
rather than leaving the shareholder in an ambiguous state with
neither rights as a shareholder nor [perfected] appraisal rights.
The corporation and, as relevant, its shares are valued as they
exist immediately before the effectuation of the corporate
action requiring appraisal. Accordingly, [the definition of fair
value] permits consideration of changes in the market price
of the corporation's shares in anticipation of the transaction,
to the extent such changes are relevant. Similarly, in a two-
step transaction culminating in a merger, the corporation is
valued immediately before the second step merger, taking into
account any interim changes in value ... The new formulation
in paragraph ii [which corresponds with § 33–855(4)(B)
], which is patterned on section 7.22 of the Principles of
Corporate Governance promulgated by the American Law
Institute, directs courts to keep the methodology chosen
in appraisal proceedings consistent with evolving economic
concepts ...
“Modern valuation methods will normally result in a range
of values [rather than a] particular single value. When a
transaction falls within that range, ‘fair-value’ has been
established. Absent unusual circumstances, it is expected
that the consideration in an arm's length transaction will
fall within the range of ‘fair value ’ ... Section 7.22 of the
ALI Principles of Corporate Governance also provides that
in situations that do not involve certain types of specified
conflicts of interest, the aggregate price accepted by the
board of directors of the subject corporation should be
presumed to represent the fair value of the corporation,
or of the assets sold in the case of an asset sale unless
the plaintiff can prove otherwise by clear and convincing
evidence. That presumption has not been included in the
definition of fair value ... because the framework of defined
types of conflict transactions which is a predicate for the ALI's
presumption is not contained in the Model Act. Nonetheless ...
a court determining fair value should give great deference
to the aggregate consideration accepted or approved by a
disinterested board of directors for an appraisal-triggering
transaction.” (Internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis
added.) Model Business Corporation Act (American Bar
Association) § 13.01(4), official comment (2008).
II
THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
*4  The company argues, inter alia, that the definition
of fair value in § 33–855(4) precludes the court from
considering the value of any appreciation or depreciation
arising out of the transaction to which the dissenting
shareholders object. The company argues that the statute
precludes any adjustment for appreciation or depreciation
because the definition of fair value is based on the time
period “immediately before” the transaction to which the
dissenting or minority shareholders object, which, in this
case, is Bergquist's purchase of substantially all of the
plaintiff's assets. Moreover, the company argues, “value must
be taken to mean what the shares would be worth if the
proposed change in the corporation had not occurred.” Thus,
the dissenting shareholders are entitled to the fair value of
their interest in the specific “going concern” that existed
before the transaction to which they object and no more.
Although the company recognizes that the court has broad
discretion in choosing a valuation method, it notes that
the following factors are generally considered appropriate
when determining the fair value of shares: earnings record,
earnings prospect, capitalization of its earnings, dividend
record, rate of dividends, probability/likelihood of future
earnings and dividends, accumulated surplus earnings, the
“basic condition” of the corporation, the market value of its
stock, reserves for contingencies and requirements for and
availability of working capital, value of assets, book value,
liabilities, net asset value and liquidation value.
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Additionally, the company argues, a threshold issue for the
court is whether it was a “going concern.” Since Connecticut
has adopted the “going concern” standard, the company
argues that “those methods of valuation geared to valuing
a going business rather than those geared to valuing assets
and liabilities in a theoretical liquidation circumstance would
seem most appropriate.” Moreover, the company argues,
it was not a “going concern” as of April 21, 2006, since
evidence and testimony reveal that it was insolvent and
without significant earnings, but for the asset sale with
Bergquist. In fact, the company argues, it would have filed for
bankruptcy if the asset sale had not occurred. Even if there is
evidence to support the fact that the company was a “going
concern,” the company argues that the “generally accepted
factors” used in going concern valuations “negate any claim
that [the company] had a positive value.”6 Thus, if the court
finds that the company was a “going concern,” the company
suggests that a “reliable factor” upon which the court may use
to determine the fair value of the stock is “the price paid by
[Bergquist] for substantially all of the assets of [the company]
plus the value of the assets retained by [the company] less the
total amount of liabilities that [the company] had on April 21,
2006.”
In the defendants' post-trial memorandum, they also note that
the trial court has the discretion to accept certain testimony
and valuation methods. Regarding the company's case, the
defendants note that the company failed to provide any expert
opinion on valuation and instead relied on “self-serving
testimony of ‘insiders' who benefitted from the dilution of
value in the asset sale to justify the penny a share valuation.”
In contrast, the defendants rely on “historical prices” to
estimate the fair value of the stock. The defendants also rely
on General Statutes § 33–900 to argue that the court may
take wrongful conduct into account when determining “fair
value.” The defendants claim that the company cannot refute
the historical trend of the stock prices and suggest that Peter
Turner's testimony that the company would have filed for
bankruptcy in lieu of the asset sale is nothing more than “rank
speculation.” The defendants also claim that the company
chose to ignore over six million dollars in assets allegedly
reported to the Internal Revenue Service in 2006, which it had
before the asset sale. Moreover, the defendants claim that the
one cent valuation is “simply unrealistic” because it suggests
that the company “could be purchased in its entirety for less
money at that value than the price paid for the assets actually
sold.” Additionally, the defendants claim, the company failed
to produce evidence at trial to justify “why Bergquist would
overpay so much for its assets,” and there is “no objective
evidence ... that the company faced bankruptcy in 2006 any
more than it did in 2004, when it sold its shares for [sixty-five
cents per share].”
*5  The defendants also characterize the company's
bankruptcy claim as an “obvious and disingenuous attempt to
distract the court from the fact that [the company] chose to
structure a sales transaction that assured it lacked liquidity to
pay the defendants ‘fair value’ for their shares after the asset
sale, which explains the penny valuation.” The defendants
claim that the company had “no intention of raising sufficient
funds to avoid the asset sale” as of January 2006, the
company did not seek out buyers other than Bergquist, and
the fair value of the stock was “diluted” as a result of
“dealing with an insider like Bergquist beginning in 2005, as
opposed to a neutral buyer in the open market place.” The
defendants argue that the company's officers let Bergquist
control the terms of the asset sale because those officers would
receive substantial benefits as a result of the sale, unlike the
defendants. Although the defendants' assertion that the one
cent valuation is inconsistent with the historical trend of the
share prices, they argue that even if the company's internal
balance sheet is accurate, there is no reasonable basis for the
one cent valuation, which they claim is thirteen cents a share
under the net asset valuation methodology.7 The defendants
also allege that the company's transaction with Bergquist “has
all the indicia of a fraudulent transfer” under General Statutes
§ 52–552e.
In a post-trial rebuttal memorandum dated December 11,
2009, the company argues, inter alia, that there is no evidence
to support claims that any alleged, “self-serving” transactions
impacted the fair value of the stock. On December 15,
2009, the defendants filed a reply memorandum in which
they argue, inter alia, that the company ignores central
concepts of “fairness” and “equity” that are essential to
Connecticut's appraisal right statutes. The defendants urge the
court to reject the company's various accounting principles
because those methods were not explained through expert
witness testimony, which the defendants claim is required.
The defendants note: “In essence, [the company] is asking
this court to do what no court has done in the past
twenty years; find that minority shareholders' stock had
no value immediately before the asset sale where the
majority shareholders reaped valuable hidden benefits in the
transaction.” The defendants urge the court to find that the fair
value of the stock is not less than eight cents per share, before
accounting for the company's alleged wrongful conduct.
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III
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & FINDINGS OF FACT
A
Going Concern
Based on the applicable legal standards, the court agrees with
the company's conclusion that a threshold determination is
whether the company was of a “going concern” immediately
before the effectuation of the corporate action to which
the defendants object. Given that the Supreme Court has
recognized that a “going concern value ... has been sometimes
used to broadly encompass all those factors which contribute
to the value of the enterprise apart from its physical assets”;
Gray Line Bus Co. v. Greater Bridgeport Transit District,
188 Conn. 417, 422, 449 A.2d 1036 (1982); the court
concludes that the company was of a “going concern.”
This conclusion is based on various testimony adduced at
trial. Peter Turner, who was involved in the asset sale,
testified that the company was a “synergistic” counterpart
to Bergquist and that Bergquist saw potential value in the
company's developing technology, which is one of the reasons
Bergquist was interested in acquiring the company's assets.
Specifically, Turner testified that “Bergquist had a strong
interest in our technology ... because of the synergies of
the two products. They had, prior to these discussions,
made an investment in the company, because they liked the
technology substantially.” Additionally, Turner testified that
“Bergquist, just like [the company's] officers and directors
and employees, realized that there was a technology that had
a lot of potential, but we had not been able to capitalize
or commercialize that potential. Bergquist didn't know if
they could capitalize on commercializing that potential, but
they were willing to take that risk.” James Plewacki testified
that Bergquist was “purchasing the business ... with the
assumption that we were going to run it forward as a going
concern.” Plewacki also testified that there may have been
some “nominal value” in the company's patents, and that the
licensing agreement that Bergquist had with the company,
which dated back to August, 2005, “tapped the expertise
of the [company's] employees.” Finally, Plewacki responded
affirmatively when asked whether the primary reason or
asset that Bergquist was interested in was the company's key
employees. All of this testimony collectively establishes that
the company had value apart from its physical assets. As a
result, the company was of a “going concern” immediately
before the asset sale.
B
Fair Value
*6  Since the court has concluded that the company was
of a “going concern,” the next question is the appropriate
valuation method and the fair value of the stock at issue.
Both parties concede that the court has the discretion to
choose the most appropriate valuation based on the facts
found at trial. Although the parties spend a great deal of
time arguing as to whether either side was required to put
on expert testimony at trial, nothing in the applicable statutes
requires either party to put on expert testimony. Moreover,
although the company argues that the defendants have the
burden of proving that the fair value of the stock is contrary
to the company's determination, it does not advance binding
legal authority to support such a conclusion. Furthermore, the
applicable statutes do not support this theory. Accordingly,
the court is left to determine the fair value of the stock based
on the evidence and testimony submitted at trial and the facts
found.8
At the outset, it is noted that regardless of the valuation
method chosen, the court will not take §§ 33–900 and 52–
552e into account in determining the fair value of stock
in this appraisal action, despite the defendants' arguments
otherwise. The defendants rely on these statutes to argue that
the court should take the company's “wrongful conduct” into
account when determining fair value. Appraisal actions are
governed by §§ 33–855 through 33–872. Section 33–900
governs fair value in the context of a dissolution action, not
an appraisal action. Moreover, that section does not include
a definition of fair value, unlike the appraisal section of the
General Statutes. Additionally, § 52–552e, which pertains
to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, is also irrelevant
in the present matter. The defendants presented minimal,
if any, evidence from which the court can conclude that
fraudulent activity was behind or implicated in the valuation
or the asset sale. Aside from Heidi Newberg's testimony,
during which she suggested that the company's valuation was
suspect and questioned the motivations behind the asset sale,
the defendants never presented documentation or any other
evidence from which the court may find that self-dealing or
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fraudulent activity was involved in the company's valuation
of its stock or the asset sale. Instead, the defendants discussed
these concepts in their post-trial memoranda. The court will
not infer fraud or self-dealing in the absence of credible
evidence.
Even if the court refuses to find wrongful conduct in the
company's assessment of fair value, this does not mean that
the court must accept the company's conclusion as to the
stock's fair value. As already noted by the parties, the court
has the discretion to chose the most appropriate valuation
based on the facts found in this case.9 Thus, based on the
following exhibits, as well as supporting Connecticut case
law, the official comments to the Model Business Corporation
Act and the parties' recognition of this valuation method,
the court concludes that the “net asset value” method, or
the sale price of the business assets less its liabilities, is the
most appropriate valuation method in the present matter. In
determining the company's “net asset value,” the court relies
on the following exhibits, which are probative: plaintiff's
exhibit 1 (the February 8, 2006 letter from Bergquist to the
company outlining the terms of the asset sale), plaintiff's
exhibit 4 (the asset purchase agreement between the company
and Bergquist), plaintiff's exhibit 9 (the July 12, 2006 letters
from the company to the defendants), plaintiff's exhibit
20 (the company's income statement for periods ending
December 31, 2004, December 31, 2005 and April 21, 2006;
the company's balance sheets for the same period; and a
statement of changes in the shareholders' equity from January
1, 2005 through April 21, 2006), and the defendant's exhibit Y
(the 2006 corporate tax return). Additionally, the court relies
on I.R.S. form 8594, which is included in defendant's exhibit
Y, in which the plaintiff asserts that the total value of the assets
transferred from the company to Bergquist was $6,881,851.
The court concludes that this sale price includes the value
of the earnout provision in the asset purchase agreement.
Moreover, the court relies on the balance sheet contained
within the plaintiff's exhibit 9 (the July 12, 2006 letters from
the company to the defendants) in which the company's total
liabilities are stated at $6,306,411. It is undisputed that the
number of outstanding shares of stock immediately before the
sale to Bergquist was 6,838,531 shares. Thus, the asset value
coincides with the sale price as indicated in I.R.S. Form 8594.
CONCLUSION
*7  As a result of these probative exhibits, the court
concludes that the sale price ($6,881.851) of the company,
less its liabilities ($6,306,411) before the sale date and divided
by the number of outstanding shares (6,838,531) results in a
per share price of $.084 dollars per share. Thus, the value of
Heidi Newberg's 51,200 shares is $4300.80, the value of Lee
Newberg's 51,200 shares is $4300.80, the value of Michael
Marvin's 204,167 shares is $17,150.028 and the value of
Nancy Lawson's 5000 shares is $420. See addendum. Finally,
the court must include 8% statutory interest for each year, per
General Statute § 37.1. The asset sale occurred on April 21,
2006, almost four years ago. As a result, this adds: $1376.29
in interest to Heidi Newberg's shares, bringing her total stock
value to $5677.80; $1376.29 in interest to Lee Newberg's
shares, bringing his total stock value to $5677.80; $5488.01
in interest to Michael Marvin's shares, bringing his total stock
value to $22,638.04; and $134.40 to Nancy Lawson's shares,
bringing her total stock value to $554.40. See addendum. It
is noted that the company has already paid Heidi Newberg,
Lee Newberg, Michael Marvin and Nancy Lawson, $524.80,
$524.80, $2092.72 and $51.25, respectively. Thus, the fair
value, as found here, must be reduced by these amounts.
As a result, Heidi Newberg, Lee Newberg, Michael Marvin
and Nancy Lawson are entitled to an additional $5152.29,
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Footnotes
1 The other parties were: 1) John Haller; and 2) the estate of Stephen Marks and Abbie Marks. The estate of Stephen
Marks and Abbie Marks filed a timely withdrawal of its intention to exercise its appraisal rights. The company paid John
Haller $358.60 for the fair value of his stock. Haller is not named as a defendant because he “has given no notice of
dissatisfaction with the amount of payment received, not rejected the offer of July 12, 2006, nor demanded payment of
any sum other than that tendered.”
2 Specifically, the company alleges, the parties were unable to agree on the fair value of the stock immediately before “and
independently of the sale of substantially all of its assets to [Bergquist],” thereby suggesting that the court should not take
the Bergquist sale into account, in any way, in determining fair value.
3 Section 33–871(d) provides in relevant part: “There shall be no right to a jury trial.”
4 Turner was called as a witness by both the company and the defendants. Turner testified that, at the time of trial, his
only relationship with the company was as a shareholder. During the asset sale, however, Turner was the company's
president, chief operating officer and chief financial officer. Turner left the company in 2008 and sold his shares for
seventy-five cents per share. The company called Plewacki as a witness, and he testified that he is a senior vice president
and the chief financial officer of Bergquist. The defendants called Dickinson as a witness, and he testified that he was
the chief executive officer, chairman and one of the founding members of the company. The defendants also called Heidi
Newberg, one of the defendants. Newberg testified that she never worked for the company or Bergquist and that she is
employed as a professor of physics and astronomy. Newberg testified that she and the other defendants invested in the
company because her brother, Russell Marvin, was the company's chief technology officer at one point in time.
5 “[G]oing concern value, [is] a term which has sometimes been used broadly to encompass all those factors which
contribute to the value of the enterprise apart from its physical assets.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gray Line Bus
Co. v. Greater Bridgeport Transit District, 188 Conn. 417, 422, 449 A.2d 1036 (1982).
6 Specifically, the company argues: 1) it had no earnings for the years preceding April 21, 2006; 2) there is no evidence
that it ever paid a dividend to its shareholders; 3) since no dividend was paid, there is no evidence of a rate that can be
utilized to establish any value; 4) actual earnings were less than the expenses incurred throughout the five-year period
preceding April 21, 2006; 5) in the first quarter of 2006, the company was without the financial resources to raise capital,
make payroll, pay rent or to fund the performance of its then outstanding contracts; 6) in the absence of actual positive
earnings, there is no capitalization factor that, applied to positive earnings, can produce a positive value; 7) the likelihood
of accumulated surplus earnings as of April 21, 2006, was negative if that likelihood was to be based on actual past
earnings and dividends paid; 8) the accumulated surplus earnings for the company were negative between 2002, and
December 31, 2005; 9) the company's ability to sustain its operation for the five-year period prior to April 21, 2005, was
dependent upon its ability to obtain loans and equity investments, and the company was unable to raise any equity from
its January 6, 2006 stock offering, which also precluded the company from borrowing; 10) the company's current liabilities
exceeded its assets, and the company had no reserves for contingencies; and 11) the “basic condition” of the company
from December 31, 2003 through April 21, 2006, was that it was on the verge of “going under,” which the defendants
allegedly concede.
7 The defendants define the “net asset value” from Black's Law Dictionary, as “the market value of a share in a mutual
fund, computed by deducting any liabilities of the fund from its total assets and dividing the difference by the number of
outstanding fund shares.” Black's Law Dictionary (9th Ed.2009).
8 Although Connecticut courts have not addressed the burden of proof in appraisal actions, one Delaware court has noted
that: “In a statutory appraisal proceeding, both sides have the burden of proving their respective valuation positions
by a preponderance of the evidence ... If neither party satisfies its burden, however, the court must then use its own
independent judgment to determine fair value.” Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Holding Co., Inc., 2004 WL 2271592
(Del.Ch. Sept.30, 2004), aff'd, 880 A.2d 206 (Del.2005).
9 It is interesting to note, however, that in their briefs, both the company and the defendants identify a valuation method
that is akin to the Supreme Court's “net asset value.” The company recognizes that “the market value of its stock ... [the]
value of assets, [the] book value, liabilities, [and the] net asset value” are all factors that the court may consider in valuing
the stock of a closely held business in an appraisal action. Additionally, the company suggests that a “reliable factor”
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upon which the court may use to determine the fair value of the stock is “the price paid by [Bergquist] for substantially all
of the assets of [the company] plus the value of the assets retained by [the company] less the total amount of liabilities
that [the company] had on April 21, 2006.” Likewise, the defendants identify the “net asset value” method, as defined in
Black's Law Dictionary, in their post-trial memorandum.
* The interest owed was calculated by multiplying the total amount of the shares at $.084 by 8% over four years (April
2006–April 2010).
End of Document © 2020 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
PARSONS, Vice Chancellor.
*1  This appraisal proceeding arises from the merger of a
Delaware corporation with and into a subsidiary of its parent
company, which owned 78% of the corporation's outstanding
stock at the time of the merger. Following the announcement
of the proposed merger, certain holders of the corporation's
stock filed a breach of fiduciary duty action against the
corporation, its directors, and its parent in March 2009.
Those parties entered into an agreement of compromise and
settlement to which the petitioners in this action objected.
The merger was consummated on May 29, 2009. This Court
ultimately approved the class action settlement over the
petitioners' objections, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The
petitioners now seek appraisal of their shares pursuant to 8
Del. C. § 262.
The petitioners maintain that the merger consideration of
$4.80 per share substantially underestimated the value of
their shares. They presented evidence from an industry expert
and a valuation expert in support of their position. The
petitioners' valuation expert assessed the fair value of the
petitioners' shares to be between $11.05 and $12.12 per share.
The respondent defended the merger price. It also retained
an industry expert and a valuation expert. The latter expert
opined that the fair value of petitioners' shares was in a range
of $3.40 to $5.29, and suggested that the Court select the
midpoint of that range, $4.28 per share, as the fair value of
the petitioners' shares on the merger date. Having carefully
considered the evidence presented at a four-day trial and the
parties' extensive briefing and post-trial argument, I conclude




Each petitioner was a holder of Cox Radio, Inc.'s (“CXR”
or the “Company”) Class A common stock when, on
May 29, 2009, Cox Enterprises, Inc. (“CEI”), through
its wholly owned subsidiary Cox Media Group (“CMG”),
acquired the publicly held stock in CXR. The petitioners
are Towerview LLC (900,000 shares),1 Hartz Capital
Investments, L.L.C. (125,000 shares), Metropolitan Capital
Advisors, L.P. (100,000 shares), Metropolitan Capital
Advisors International, Ltd. (55,400 share), Jeffrey E.
Schwarz (25,000 shares), and Metropolitan Capital Advisors
Select Fund, L.P. (19,800 shares) (collectively, “Petitioners”).
Respondent is CXR, a Delaware corporation headquartered
in Atlanta, Georgia. CXR engaged in the radio broadcasting
business. It owned, operated, or provided sales and other
services for eighty-six stations clustered in nineteen markets.
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B. Evidentiary Objections
Before reciting the facts of this case, I briefly address several
evidentiary objections raised by Petitioners. Specifically,
Petitioners complain that Respondent impermissibly relied
on post-merger data and hearsay and that Respondent
did not follow the agreed-upon practice for exchanging
demonstratives. For the most part, I overrule Petitioners'
objections. The Court will consider the evidence adduced by
the parties and will attribute to it the weight the Court deems
appropriate based on the credibility of the source and the
relevance and probative value of the evidence.2
*2  I will address, however, a few of Petitioners' specific
complaints. First, Petitioners object to a PowerPoint
presentation apparently created by Petitioners' industry
expert, John Chachas, and two others that is marked joint
exhibit (“JX”) 307. Under Rule 703 of the Delaware Rules of
Evidence (“D.R.E.”):
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or
made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the
opinion or inference to be admitted.3
The fact that an expert may rely on a specific document,
however, “does not mean that it would be admissible; to
the contrary, a reliability analysis under Rule 703 is not a
substitute for a hearsay ruling.”4 Thus, the admissibility of all
documents objected to on hearsay grounds, even those relied
upon by experts, “turns on whether it is admissible as non-
hearsay or, if it is hearsay, if it qualifies for one of the hearsay
exceptions.”5 A document may be considered nonhearsay
if it is admitted as “basis evidence” to “help the factfinder
understand the expert's thought process and determine what
weight to give to the expert's opinion.”6
Petitioners argue that because JX 307 “was not part of the
discovery record or presented in any way at trial,” it should be
excluded as unsponsored hearsay.7 Although JX 307 appears
on the pre-trial exhibit list, Chachas did not refer to the
document in his expert report or testify about it at trial or
in his deposition. Hence, there is no basis for treating the
document as admissible as nonhearsay to support Chachas's
expert opinion under Rule 703. The document, therefore, is
hearsay and Respondent has not argued that it qualifies for
admission under any hearsay exception. Therefore, I sustain
the objection to JX 307 and hold that it is inadmissible to the
extent that Respondent relies on it for its truth.
Petitioners also object to the admissibility of certain analyst
reports. They do not dispute that such reports are the type
of evidence on which the experts in this case may rely.8
Rather, Petitioners contend that Respondent is attempting
to introduce the analyst reports as expert testimony in
their own right. Petitioners also maintain that the reports
are unreliable because the analysts are not independent.
Respondent disagrees, arguing that this Court has admitted
similar reports in past appraisal proceedings and that such
reports are admissible to demonstrate, at least, the state of
mind of analysts at the time of the merger.9 In addition,
Respondent notes that Petitioners relied on similar reports,
including reports from credit rating agencies such as Moody's
and Fitch.10 Petitioners counter that reports from credit
rating agencies are more reliable than analyst reports because
those agencies are the industry's independent arbiters who
reach their conclusions with inside information from CX R's
management. Petitioners also emphasize that the reports they
cite properly were introduced through their experts' reports
and testimony. More importantly, perhaps, Respondent did
not object to Petitioners' use of analyst or credit rating agency
reports.
*3  The Delaware Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he
danger exists ... that Rule 703 can be used as a ‘back door’
hearsay exception—a crafty litigant could give hearsay to
its expert for the purpose of having the expert refer to it
as a basis for the expert's opinion.”11 This danger does not
appear to exist here. Petitioner tacitly has accepted the fact
that analyst reports are proper evidence for the experts to
consider; thus, the experts on both sides have discussed
analysts' observations and quoted from analyst reports at
length in their expert reports.12 Instead, Petitioners appear
to object only to the use of analyst reports not brought into
evidence through an expert report or expert testimony.
As to analyst reports not used in the context of an expert
report or expert testimony, the report would be admissible if
it is “non-hearsay or, if it is hearsay, if it qualifies for one of
the hearsay exceptions.”13 The analyst reports arguably are
nonhearsay to the extent the parties offer them to help the
Court “understand the expert's thought process and determine
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what weight to give to the expert's opinion.”14 To the extent a
party relies on these reports as substantive evidence, they are
hearsay. Thus, the Court's consideration of analyst reports will
be limited (1) to considering the analyst reports identified in
the exhibit list prepared in connection with trial and discussed
by an expert in their expert report or at trial, a use which is
unchallenged here, and (2) to assist the Court in evaluating
the experts' opinions.
Lastly, Petitioners seek to limit use of Respondent's industry
expert Bishop Cheen's testimony and rebuttal report to
rebuttal only and to preclude its use in CX R's case-in-
chief. Petitioners' argument in this regard is unpersuasive.
Petitioners rely on two federal cases for the proposition that
“rebuttal evidence may be used to challenge the evidence or
theory of an opponent [but] not to establish a case-in-chief.”15
But, both those cases are distinguishable.16 Petitioners also
rely on the April 20, 2012 Stipulated Scheduling Order which
states: “The scope of a party's rebuttal expert report shall be
limited to rebutting positions taken in an opposing party's
opening expert report.”17 The Scheduling Order also sets
forth when the parties were to exchange their list of fact
witnesses and states that “[t]hose listings are being provided
to help avoid the need for depositions of fact witnesses after
the close of discovery, and are made without prejudice to later
modification; the definitive list of trial witnesses shall be as
set forth in the Joint Pretrial Order.”18 The November 5, 2012
Joint Pre–Trial Order states that CXR plans to call “valuation
expert Rajiv B. Gokhale and industry expert Bishop Cheen
as live witnesses.” The Order does not distinguish between
witnesses being called in the parties' case-in-chief and being
called as rebuttal witnesses.
*4  Pursuant to the Scheduling Order, Respondent identified
its valuation expert on August 10, 2012 and reserved
“the right to call any additional rebuttal experts necessary
to address any non-valuation subject matters on which
Petitioners intend to call an expert at trial.”19 On September
14, the date on which rebuttal expert reports were due to be
exchanged, Respondent submitted Cheen's rebuttal report and
the materials upon which he relied. Petitioners deposed Cheen
on October 11, 2012.
In the context of this appraisal proceeding, Respondent
reasonably could have expected to call a valuation expert
and to reserve judgment on whether to call an additional
expert until the necessity of rebutting a position advanced
by Petitioners arose. The opening expert reports identified
what would become a main issue: what kind of an economic
rebound would have been expected at the time of the Merger.
Petitioners submitted a report not only of their valuation
expert, but also of an industry expert, John Chachas. The
latter report provided Chachas's opinion on the radio industry
environment and the prospects for a recovery of the industry
in general and for CX R in particular. Although Cheen's
rebuttal report served to rebut Chachas's opinions, it also was
consistent with opinions already presented by Respondent's
valuation expert in his expert report. Thus, Respondent was
not hiding the ball and was not dilatory in presenting its
case. Both parties have the same burden of proof in an
appraisal proceeding. After Petitioners came forward with
both a valuation expert and an industry expert, it was not
surprising that Respondent elected to present an industry
expert as well.
In addition, Petitioners had adequate time to respond to
Cheen's opinions. Petitioners deposed Cheen and cross-
examined him at trial. Thus, I perceive no material prejudice
to Petitioners if, in rebutting Chachas's opinions, Cheen's
opinions also served to support Respondent's case-in-chief.
In these circumstances, Petitioners have presented no good
reason to limit Cheen's testimony as they suggest.20 Thus, I
reject Petitioners' argument that Cheen's trial testimony and
report should be admissible only for the purpose of rebutting
Petitioners' case.
Having resolved the various evidentiary matters presented, I
turn to my findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case.
C. The Facts
1. The Merger
On March 23, 2009, CEI announced a tender offer to acquire
the publicly held stock of CXR for $3.80 per share. At that
time, CEI indirectly owned 78.4% of CXR's outstanding
shares and indirectly controlled 97% of CXR's voting power.
On April 29, 2009, the tender offer price was increased
to $4.80. After satisfaction of a majority of the minority
condition of the tender offer, a short-form merger under 8 Del.
C. § 253 was consummated on May 29, 2009 (“the Merger”).
After the Merger, CX R became fully consolidated with CEI
subsidiary CMG.
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At the time of the tender offer and Merger, CXR's board
consisted of eight directors: six who were affiliated with
CEI or its subsidiaries and two who were not. The
nonaffiliated directors served as a two-member special
committee (the “Special Committee”) that evaluated the
Merger and ultimately concluded that the offer price was fair
to the stockholders and recommended that the stockholders
accept the offer and tender their shares.21 The Special
Committee's financial advisor was Gleacher Partners LLC
(“Gleacher”). CEI's financial advisor was Citigroup Global
Markets, Inc. (“Citi”).
2. Management team
*5  Robert Neil was CXR's chief executive officer (“CEO”)
at all times relevant to this action. Neil Johnston was CXR's
chief financial officer (“CFO”) until the end of 2008 when
he became the CFO of CMG. In January 2009, Charles
Odom replaced Johnston as CXR's CFO. Lauren Tilson, a
CXR accountant and manager of financial reporting, worked
with Odom.22 Eventually, Johnston changed roles at CMG to
become the executive vice president of strategy and digital
innovations and Odom became CMG's CFO.
3. Management's projections: long-range plans and
current year forecasts
Every year, CXR management created bottom up five-
year financial projections with input from regional
managers. Management called these five-year projections
the Company's long range plan, or “LRP.” The LRPs were
carefully prepared and thorough. They were submitted to
and approved by the board of directors at the end of each
year. Of the five years projected in the LRP, management
considered the first year's forecast a “budget.” That forecast
includes monthly numbers. The four years that follow are
the “out-years” and are considered at a higher level.23
When examined retroactively, the LRPs consistently were
overoptimistic, especially as to the out-years.24 In addition
to creating the LRPs annually, management routinely created
monthly forecasts for the current year.25 These monthly
forecasts typically would provide new estimates for the next
several months of the current year.
In December 2008, CXR's board of directors approved
management's long range plan for the years 2009–2013
(“2009 LRP”). In somewhat of a departure from the
Company's general practice, management also created a
current year forecast in January 2009. This forecast received
particular emphasis because, in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis, the Company had experienced a dramatic decrease in
revenues since the 2009 LRP was approved in December
2008. Therefore, rather than forecast only the next few
months, as was management's normal practice, management
forecasted the entire year.26 Management updated the current
year forecasts again in February, March, April, and May.
The most recent forecast before the Merger was the forecast
created on May 20, 2009 (“the May Forecast”).27 The
monthly forecasts were not vetted and approved by the board.
These forecasts, however, were prepared in the normal course
of business and there is no evidence that they were not as
thoughtfully prepared or as reliable as the board-approved
LRPs.
4. Economic environment at the time of the Merger
*6  At the time of the Merger, the United States was
experiencing the worst recession since World War II (“the
2008/2009 Recession”).28 By May 2009, it had become the
longest recession since World War II. The radio industry, like
all U.S. industries, was experiencing a deep contraction.29
“[T]he downturn that gripped all ad-driven media beginning
in 2008 was among the worst in 50 years.”30 On average,
U.S. advertising revenues in the radio industry had declined
by 29% between 2005 and 2009.31 The 10–year compound
annual growth rate (“CAGR”) for the industry was –2.0%.32
a. Prospects for economic recovery
In March 2009, Ben Bernanke and the Federal Reserve
announced that they would begin quantitative easing.33
The Federal Reserve's injection of $1.75 trillion into the
financial system helped to spur the beginning of an economic
recovery.34 By March 2009, the economy and the radio
industry were experiencing some recovery.35
b. Expected robustness of the radio industry's recovery
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The parties advanced widely divergent views on the prospects
for recovery in the radio industry, generally, and at CXR, in
particular, as of May 2009. The differences between those
two views present the main issues in this appraisal case.
In the years leading up to the 2008/2009 Recession, the
radio industry had been experiencing fragmentation with
increased competition from new media such as MP3 players,
satellite radio, general digital media such as iPods, and
internet radio.36 The industry had lost pricing power. To
maintain their sell-through rates for advertising, radio stations
reportedly had lowered prices.37 Analysts worried that these
rates “would not recover due to the intense pressure on public
radio companies to discount rates in order to get business.”38
Even in early 2009, however, CXR's management touted
the Company's future prospects to shareholders and industry
analysts.39 Management observed that radio audiences were
growing40 and that CXR had the best management in the
radio industry.41 At a March 4, 2009 earnings call, CXR
CEO Neil stated that although “the near-term outlook on the
economy remains very difficult, we continue to be optimistic
about both the prospects of [CXR] and the radio industry in
general.”42 Regarding media fragmentation, Neil remarked:
“Actually, I'm pretty optimistic on the listener's side. For all
of the baloney that we heard about satellite radio five, six,
seven years ago, it certainly is dubious at best as to whether
that really is a business.”43
*7  In addition to CXR's management's views, rating
agencies such as Moody's and Fitch considered the downturn
in the radio industry to be cyclical and expected CXR
to “improve to levels consistent with an investment-grade
rating.”44 Analysts covering the radio industry and other radio
station companies, however, expressed concerns about the
increased pressure on advertising.45 They recognized that
the industry was in a cyclical downturn but also mentioned
that secular trends presented challenges to the industry's
recovery.46
CXR had cut its expenses slightly in response to the
2008/2009 Recession; its expenses were down by 1%
in 2008.47 But, the Company refused to make any
drastic across-the-board cuts. CXR was unique in its peer
group in publicly rejecting major cost reductions such as
reducing its workforce.48 After CXR management made
this pronouncement in the March 2009 earnings call, the
Company's stock price dropped sharply from the $5–$6 range
to a low around $3 per share.49 Other causes of the drop in
CXR's stock price in March 2009 included a Goldman report
that put a sell on the stock at a $3 target and the fact that CXR
stock was being shorted.50 Notably, however, radio insiders
and owners, in addition to CEI, were making investments in
radio industry businesses in early 2009.51
5. Management projections: May Forecast
*8  As noted, by early 2009, CXR's management's
expectations for 2009 had plummeted compared to the 2009
LRP. The January reforecast showed projected revenues
and operating cash flow (“OCF”) down by 14.7% and
37.6%, respectively, compared to the 2009 LRP.52 By
May, management's projections for 2009 departed negatively
from the 2009 LRP by 16.8% in revenue and 40.1 % for
OCF.53 Although the 2009 numbers diverged dramatically
from the 2009 LRP forecasts, management continued to
look to the 2009 LRP to some extent. For example, Bond
& Pecaro54 made use of the 2009 LRP in its Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 (“FAS 142”)
valuation report as of December 31, 200855 and in its
ongoing appraisal process for 2008.56 Bond & Pecaro did
not simply incorporate management's projections into its
valuation models, but apparently considered the 2009 LRP
as one of many documents it referred to in creating its own
projections.57
CXR management also continued to circulate the 2009 LRP in
early 2009, sending it to at least three people. First, Odom sent
the 2009 LRP as background information to Grace Huang, the
new senior director of corporate strategy at CMG, on January
8, 2009.58 Odom's email responded to a request from Huang,
which stated that she was “trying to get up to speed on the
businesses and [was] looking for overall financials; budget/
board presentations that can help provide a quick snapshot
of the Radio business.”59 Odom attached “a couple of files
that should be helpful,” including a PowerPoint presentation
created in 2008 regarding CXR's “2009 Budget Meeting”
and two additional documents entitled “November Financial
Package” and “November One Sheet.”60 The 2009 Budget
Meeting PowerPoint contained sixty slides, several of which
summarized or discussed the 2009 LRP.61 Odom informed
Huang that “the 2009 budget presentation ... gives a good
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strategic overview of the company and lays out our strategy
for 2009.”62 One slide entitled “Radio Strategic Review”
set forth CXR's strengths. They included that radio usage
was growing, that radio was attractive to advertisers because
the medium is personal and targeted, and that radio was
resilient.63 After briefly describing the other two documents
he attached, Odom told Huang that “the combination of these
items should give you a good overview of the company.”64
Second, on March 26, 2009, Odom sent nine documents,
including the 2009 LRP, to Harry Bond at Gleacher.
According to Odom's transmittal email, he simply was
attaching information Gleacher had requested.65
Third, in an email dated April 28, 2009, CXR accountant
Tilson sent the 100–page version of the 2009 LRP to
Kimberly Smith, a junior auditor at Deloitte and one of the
people that Odom and Tilson regularly dealt with regarding
FAS 142 issues.66 Tilson's email, however, did not contain
any subject reference or any text.
6. The Tilson Memo
*9  Tilson sent another email that has become a central point
of dispute in this action. On May 15, 2009, Tilson sent an
email, with a copy to Odom, regarding “FAS 142” to Deloitte
auditors Barry McLaurin and Charles Crawford. The email
included an attached memo, the “Tilson Memo,” dated May
11, 2009. Earlier, on May 1, Odom had sent Tilson a request:
Please draft a short memo that discusses why we didn't
do a FAS 142 analysis at the end of Q1 ... in short
the reasons are: [1] When the 12/31/2008 valuation was
performed, current business conditions existed and the
weakness that we're currently experiencing was anticipated
and incorporated into that valuation ... [2] Tender offer ...
although offer prices reflect a lower value than our
12/31/[ 08] valuation ... due to current depressed market
outlook ... this is an ongoing process ... no assurance that
the current price is actually what the ultimate price will
be ... Etc.etc ...67
Thereafter, Tilson and Odom exchanged several drafts of such
a memo. By May 15, the Tilson Memo had been finalized.
The final memo states, in part:
[CXR] believes that deteriorated first quarter 2009 results
are for the most part already included in the year-end model
due to the timing of the test and management's knowledge
of this continuing deterioration. As such, the deteriorating
environment currently impacting [CXR]'s stock price and
market cap are taken into account in management's
projections at December 31, 2008. Furthermore, any
revenue declines greater than those projected are largely
offset by expense recoveries such that net cash flows are
comparable. Lastly, [CXR] also believes that future years'
growth is attainable due to recovery in the industry. In
regards to Bond & Pecaro's analysis of historical private
radio market values, although public market values have
declined, private market values have not ever declined
(even during prior recessions) to the level currently
reflected by the public markets.68
This language ignited several rounds of fireworks in this
litigation. Based on it, Petitioners moved to reopen this
Court's judgment approving the class action settlement in
May 2010,69 and requested leave to file a breach of fiduciary
duty complaint. Petitioners accused CXR of withholding
from the Special Committee, from this Court, and from
the Delaware Supreme Court management's beliefs that the
2009 LRP remained relevant and that the radio industry was
recovering. I considered and denied that motion.70 In arguing
the motion, the parties discussed FAS 142 testing extensively.
For purposes of this appraisal action, a brief summary should
suffice.
FAS 142 analysis involves the valuation of a company's
intangible assets. FAS 142 goodwill impairment testing
assumes that the company will sell the groups of assets
being valued to a buyer “for their highest and best use.”71
Odom likened FAS 142 valuations to a private-market value:
“They have attributes of a private-market value, which is very
different and has different assumptions than publicly valuing
a company as a going concern.”72 According to FAS 142,
intangible assets should be tested for impairment once per
year or more frequently if changes in circumstances indicate
that the assets may be impaired.73 The company that owns
the intangible asset in question has the discretion to decide
whether to conduct an interim impairment test. One indicator
of impairment that might lead to an interim test is a decline
in a company's stock price and market capitalization. CXR
experienced such a decline in early 2009.
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*10  Consistent with Odom's initial email to Tilson, the
Tilson Memo purports to explain why CXR elected not to
perform an interim impairment valuation of CXR's FCC
licenses and goodwill as of March 31, 2009, notwithstanding
the decline in the Company's stock price and market
capitalization. Odom explained at trial that, although Bond &
Pecaro's FAS 142 valuation was for the year 2008, it was not
finalized until the middle of February 2009.74 According to
Odom, between February and March 31, 2009, “[t]he private-
market valuation ha[d] been stable and ... ha[d] been within
this band for years and years and years.... And so that would
indicate that the FAS 142 valuation would be substantially
the same.”75 Thus, CXR determined that an interim test was
unnecessary and denominated the Tilson Memo as a memo
“To: File” to document that conclusion and the fact that
management had considered the issue.76
Although the parties strenuously contest this issue, the Tilson
Memo's reference to “management's projections at December
31, 2008” apparently was an ambiguous reference to Bond &
Pecaro's projections, and not to the 2009 LRP. Odom credibly
testified that the disputed reference pertained to the Bond &
Pecaro projections as of December 31, 2008.77 He described
the projections Bond & Pecaro prepared regarding its FA
S 142 valuation. Moreover, his explanation is corroborated
by the Bond & Pecaro report itself, entitled “Fair Market
Valuation of Cox Radio, Inc. as of December 31, 2008” (the
“FAS 142 Analysis”).78 Using sources like Miller Kaplan or
SNL Kagan, Bond & Pecaro assessed how it thought industry
revenues, in the markets CXR operates in, would perform in
the future. In addition, using sources such as Arbitron, Bond
& Pecaro considered what percentage of audience shares the
Company's stations could garner in those markets. Based on
the percent of audience shares a company could secure, the
company would get that percentage of projected revenues.79
The FAS 142 Analysis provides the following explanation of
how Bond & Pecaro arrived at its cash flow projections:
The assumptions used in the cash flow models reflect
historical performance and trends in the [CXR ] market
clusters, as well as industry norms for similar stations.
These assumptions, especially those pertaining to station
revenue shares and operating profit margins, are, in part,
reflective of the actual and forecast performance of [CXR]
as station owner. However, based on radio industry data,
the revenue shares and operating margins used in the cash
flow models all fall within a reasonable range of what could
be expected from a typical market participant.80
In addition to the explanation Bond & Pecaro provided in
its report, Petitioners' expert, D r. Samuel Kursh, opined
in his report that the reference in the Tilson Memo to
“management's projections at December 31, 2008” referred to
“Bond & Pecaro's DCF.”81 At his deposition, Kursh testified
that he was not aware of anything in Bond & Pecaro's FAS
142 Analysis that was predicated on the 2009 LRP, but he
backtracked at trial. On the witness stand, Kursh asserted
that Bond & Pecaro did use the 2009 LRP in its FAS 142
Analysis.82
As noted above, Bond & Pecaro had access to the 2009
LRP when it created its projections. In fact, CMG's Amended
and Restated Offer to Purchase for Cash All Outstanding
Shares of Class A Common Stock, disclosed that Bond &
Pecaro's valuation was “based, in part, with consideration of
the Long Range Plan.”83 In addition, Bond & Pecaro's FAS
142 Analysis explicitly states that its assumptions “especially
those pertaining to station revenue shares and operating profit
margins, are, in part, reflective of the actual and forecast
performance of [CXR] as station owner.”84 Thus, I find that
Bond & Pecaro did use the 2009 LRP to some extent in the
FAS 142 Analysis.
7. Expert valuation reports
a. Petitioners' expert Kursh
*11  Both parties retained proficient experts. Petitioners'
valuation expert, Kursh, provided an expert report and
rebuttal report.85 In his expert report, Kursh relied solely on a
discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis. Kursh used the May
Forecast to project cash flows for 2009 and the 2009 LRP
to project cash flows for years 2010–2013. Because the May
Forecast reflected the current economic crisis and recession,
Kursh anticipated an eventual recovery to the levels projected
in the 2009 LRP for the out-years. Specifically, he projected
that CXR's OCF would return to the levels projected in the
2009 LRP after eighteen months. Based on an equation that
took into account inflation, population growth, and increased
productivity, Kursh chose a terminal growth rate of 2.5%.
Petitioners characterize this choice as conservative in light of
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CXR's strong position in the radio industry and its operating
leverage.86
With these inputs, Kursh determined a fair value for CXR
of at least $11.05 per share. Kursh also identified certain
adjustments to the 2009 LRP that he believed represented
appropriate additions to the cash flow projections. On that
basis, Kursh opined that the $11.05 value he obtained in
his DCF should be increased to reflect those adjustments.
The items of potential additional value include CXR's
retained cushion and omitted deferred taxes.87 Based on these
suggested adjustments, Kursh increased his per-share value
by $1.07 to a total of $12.12 per share.
b. Respondent's expert Gokhale
Respondent's expert is Rajiv B. Gokhale. Gokhale also relied
primarily on DCF analyses. He performed two. In his first
analysis, Gokhale used the May Forecast to project 2009
cash flows and he estimated 2010–2013 cash flows using
the actual EBITDA CAGR CXR experienced in the four
years following the 2000/2001 recession (“May Forecast
DCF”).88 In his second analysis, he constructed projections
for 2009–2010 based on a combination of consensus analyst
EBITDA estimates for CXR and, to project cash flow in
years 2011–2013, Gokhale used the actual EBITDA CAGR
CXR experienced in the three years following the 2000/2001
recession (“Third–Party DCF”).89 Gokhale determined not to
use projections from the 2009 LRP because, by May 2009,
he believed that both CXR management and analysts had
lowered their projections significantly for 2009 and later
years. He did use some inputs from the 2009 LRP in his DCF,
however, such as depreciation and the projected expenditures
for the long-term incentive plan (“LTIP”).90
*12  Gokhale calculated a weighted average cost of capital
(“WACC”) using the capital asset pricing model (“CAPM”)
to determine the cost of equity. Gokhale's model yielded a
range from 5.81 % to 7.65%, if he excluded a small stock
premium, and 7.03% to 9.27%, if he included such a premium.
He ultimately used a WACC of 8.0% to discount CXR's
unlevered free cash flows. Gokhale also selected a perpetuity
growth rate of 1.25% based on analyst projections that ranged
from negative 1 % to positive 2%.
Gokhale performed a comparable companies analysis, but
found that it was of limited value because market values of
debt were unavailable for all but one comparable company.
Furthermore, due to the economic and financial slowdown in
2008, the book values of debt did not provide a good proxy
for market values. Consequently, Gokhale concluded that the
multiples obtained by a comparable companies methodology
were unreasonably high and that using those multiples would
overstate the value of CXR shares. He did not attempt
a comparable transactions analysis because there were no
North American radio broadcasting merger and acquisition
transactions between July 2008 and the end of 2009.
D. Procedural History
After the initial tender offer, holders of CXR stock filed a class
action complaint in this Court alleging direct and indirect
breaches of fiduciary duty against CXR, its board, CEI,
and CMG in connection with the proposed Merger. Those
holders agreed to settle that case and filed a stipulation for
compromise and settlement on September 4, 2009. Petitioners
filed their petition for appraisal on August 14, 2009 (the
“Petition”). They also objected to the class action settlement.
Notwithstanding Petitioners' objection, the Court approved
the settlement on May 6, 2010. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Court's ruling on November 22, 2010. As noted earlier,
Petitioners later filed a motion for leave to file their own
breach of fiduciary duty complaint that this Court denied on
October 26, 2012.
A four-day trial was held on the appraisal Petition on
November 13–16, 2012. After full post-trial briefing, I
heard the parties' final arguments on March 6, 2013. This
Memorandum Opinion constitutes my post-trial findings of
fact and conclusions of law on the Petition. For the reasons
that follow, I conclude that the fair value of CX R stock on
the date of the Merger was $5.75 per share.
E. Parties' Contentions
Petitioners contend that, at the time of the Merger in May
2009, participants in the radio industry, including CXR
management, expected the industry to snap back from the
low the industry was experiencing in early 2009. According
to Petitioners, CXR was the star of the industry. Petitioners
contend that CXR, therefore, was poised to achieve the
best recovery in the industry once that recovery inevitably
occurred. Thus, Petitioners assert that the Court reasonably
can assume that CXR would have rebounded relatively
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quickly to the 2009 LRP. According to Petitioners, the
evidence demonstrates that management continued to rely
on and disseminate the 2009 LRP throughout early 2009.
This, they argue, indicates that management believed that
“recovery” meant an eventual return to the 2009 LRP
projections. In Petitioners' view, the sole question to be
answered here is when one would have expected that cyclical
recovery to occur. Petitioners contend that Kursh's valuation
used proper standards to provide an answer to this question.
Hence, Petitioners aver that Kursh's valuation is appropriate
and urge this Court to adopt his conclusion as to the fair value
of CXR stock on May 29, 2009.
*13  The Company paints an entirely different picture of
the expectations of CX R management and others, such as
industry analysts, in early 2009. Respondent contends that,
when the Merger was completed on May 29, 2009, the 2009
LRP no longer provided a realistic set of financial projections.
According to Respondent, CX R management had rejected
the 2009 LRP and did not expect the radio industry to recover
to pre-recession levels. Although management expected to
achieve some cyclical recovery, Respondent denies that
management foresaw a return to the 2009 LRP projections
within a relevant time horizon. Secular changes in the industry
that pre-dated the 2008/2009 Recession and that Recession
itself, according to Respondent, set a new baseline for the
radio industry.91 Based on its premise that the 2009 LRP
was obsolete, Respondent argues that Gokhale appropriately
relied on CX R's historical recovery from the 2000/2001
recession to estimate CXR's 2010–2013 performance and that
the Court should adopt his value conclusion.
II. ANALYSIS
Under Section 262 of the Delaware General Corporation Law,
stockholders who meet certain requirements are entitled to an
appraisal by the Court of Chancery of the fair value of their
shares of stock.92 During such an appraisal proceeding, the
Court of Chancery
shall determine the fair value of the shares exclusive of
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger or consolidation, together with
interest, if any, to be paid upon the amount determined to
be the fair value. In determining such fair value, the Court
shall take into account all relevant factors.93
The Court's task is to perform an independent evaluation
of “fair value.”94 “It is within the Court of Chancery's
discretion to select one of the parties' valuation models as
its general framework, or fashion its own, to determine fair
value in the appraisal proceeding.”95 Fair value in the context
of an appraisal proceeding is the “value to a stockholder
of the firm as a going concern, as opposed to the firm's
value in the context of an acquisition or other transaction.”96
“Only the speculative elements of value that may arise from
the ‘accomplishment or expectation’ of the merger,” that
is, any synergistic value, should be excluded from a fair
value calculation on the date of the merger.97 “One of the
most important factors to consider is the very ‘nature of the
enterprise’ subject to the appraisal proceeding.”98
In an appraisal proceeding, both sides have the burden of
proving their respective valuations by a preponderance of the
evidence.99 If neither party satisfies its burden, however, the
Court must use its own independent judgment to determine
the fair value of the shares.100 The Court may consider
“proof of value by any techniques or methods which are
generally considered acceptable in the financial community
and otherwise admissible in court.”101 Among the techniques
that Delaware courts have relied on to determine the fair value
of shares are the DCF approach, the comparable transactions
approach, and comparable companies analyses.102
A. The Parties Rely on DCF Analyses
*14  Both experts relied primarily on a DCF analysis.103
The experts agreed that both a comparable transactions
and a comparable companies analysis would be unreliable
for various reasons.104 Kursh also noted that CXR and
CEI “routinely commissioned other valuation experts to
perform valuations for [CXR] for various purposes, and these
consultants, like Bond & Pecaro, relied on DCFs.”105 In
addition, this Court routinely has relied on DCF analyses as a
reliable valuation method in appraisal proceedings.106 Thus,
I find that a DCF analysis is the best valuation method by
which to value Petitioners' CXR stock.
The three main inputs into a DCF analysis are: (1) the OCF
projections; (2) a discount rate; and (3) a terminal value.
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1. OCF projections
The disparity in the experts' value conclusions mainly
results from the differing cash flow projections chosen by
each expert. Pre-merger management projections are an
appropriate starting point from which to derive data in the
appraisal context because they are not tainted by post-merger
hindsight and usually are created by an impartial body.107
Management also is in the best position to forecast the
company's future before the merger.108 Nevertheless, “[i]f
Management forecasts are prepared a significant period of
time before the merger, it may be necessary to make minor
changes to them reflecting actual results as of the merger
date.”109 Here, the 2009 LRP reflects management's thorough
pre-merger five-year projections. The reliability of the 2009
LRP, however, is severely undermined by the changes that
took place in the economy and the radio industry between
the creation of the LRP projections in October 2008 and
the Merger date of May 29, 2009. Significantly, CXR's
management itself recognized these changes and considerably
reduced projections for 2009 in the months leading up to the
Merger.
*15  Both Kursh and Gokhale agree that the May Forecast,
which is management's last forecast before the Merger, is an
appropriate starting point for a valuation of the Company.
The May Forecast projects 2009 only. From there, the experts'
views diverge widely: Kursh assumes that CXR will return
to the 2009 LRP projections sometime between the end of
2010 and 2013. Once CXR's revenues return to the level
specified in the 2009 LRP, Kursh assumes that thereafter
revenues will conform to the projected values in the 2009 LRP
from that time until the end of 2013. In contrast, Gokhale
does not expect CXR's OCF to return to the 2009 LRP levels
at any time before 2013. Nor does he project any dramatic
upswing after the significant decline CXR experienced in the
recession, as reflected in the May Forecast for 2009. Instead,
Gokhale projects that cash flow in 2010–2013 will grow at
a steady rate derived from averaging the EBITDA CAGRs
that CXR experienced in the three or four years after the
2000/2001 recession.
The differences between the approaches of the two experts
are illustrated graphically in the figure below. The solid line
that depicts OCF starting at approximately $160 million in
December 2007 and ending at $138 million in 2013 represents
the 2009 LRP. The dotted line depicts the adjusted forecast
for 2009, i.e., the May Forecast, that both experts adopted.
The line that begins at the low point of the May Forecast,
representing December 2009, and extends to December 2013
with a very modest positive slope, reflects the projections
Gokhale used in his DCF model.110 The steeper dashed lines
leading to the 2009 LRP line show each of four recovery
scenarios Kursh considered. Ultimately, Kursh based his
valuation on the second of those lines, which roughly depicts
a return to the 2009 LRP OCF levels by December 2011.
Tabular or graphic material set at this point is not displayable.
The primary issue I must decide in this appraisal case,
therefore, is how quickly, if at all, the radio industry in
general, and CXR in particular, would have been expected to
recover to pre-recession expectations, i.e., to the 2009 LRP in
the case of CXR. Kursh, on the one hand, assumes a recovery
to the 2009 LRP within eighteen months.111 Gokhale, on the
other hand, assumes no “recovery” from the contraction the
radio industry experienced in 2008 and 2009. In Gokhale's
view, the combination of the secular decline that had been
plaguing the industry for several years and the 2008/2009
Recession had created a new baseline for the industry from
which CXR would have been expected to grow at a steady
rate.
The models Kursh and Gokhale use vary slightly in several
other ways as well. The two experts disagree on inputs such as
LTIP payments, debt, retained cushion, deferred taxes, capital
expenditures and depreciation, and the number of CXR shares
outstanding. I consider first how to project free cash flow and
I then consider the other inputs.
a. Economic recovery; a return to the LRP?
In the months leading up to the Merger, CXR management
believed that the Company would experience some
recovery from the recession.112 CXR believed that the
Company was “well positioned to benefit as the economy
begins to recover.”113 Audiences were growing.114 CXR
management's belief in a “recovery” and a “bright future,”
however, does not necessarily justify an inference that the
Company reasonably would have been expected to be able to
achieve the projections in the 2009 LRP.
*16  The radio industry had undergone, and continued in
early 2009 to experience, a secular decline.115 It had been
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experiencing a steady decline in revenue and stock price since
around 2004 based, in part, on new competition. Notably,
however, the secular concerns began as early as 2006.116
The 2009 LRP was prepared in October 2008 and approved
by the board in December 2008. Therefore, the 2009 LRP
already would have accounted for this secular decline in the
industry to some degree. But, the rapid decline in revenue and
OCF the industry experienced in the early months of 2009
was unanticipated: “the depth of the erosion in the 2008/2009
recession was unusually swift and severe.”117 The severity
of the decline had changed the landscape for CXR.118 By
May 2009, management had reduced its projected EBITDA
for 2009 by 41% compared to the 2009 LRP, and its OCF by
40%.119
In addition, Respondent provided some evidence that CXR's
long range plan was consistently over-optimistic as to the
out-years.120 Comparing, for example, management's LRP
projections in 2002 and 2003 regarding the out-years 2007
and 2008, respectively, the actual EBITDA for 2007 and 2008
was 35% and 43% lower than management had projected
it would be in the 2002 and 2003 LRPs.121 Reducing the
2013 EBITDA figure in Kursh's model of $124 million, which
equals the 2009 LRP projection, by 35% or 43% lowers that
figure to $80.6 and $70.68 million, respectively.122 These
numbers are generally in the same range as the 2013 EBITDA
numbers Gokhale used in his May Forecast DCF model
($76.12 million) and in his Third–Party DCF model ($84.17
million).
Considering the severe 2008/2009 Recession and economic
uncertainty in early 2009, I am wary of accepting Petitioners'
position that a valuation on May 29, 2009 would anticipate
a near-term return to even the 2009 LRP's 2011–2013
cash flow projections. In an appraisal case, this Court is
charged with the difficult task of putting itself back in
time to consider without the benefit of hindsight what the
company's fair value was in light of its “operative reality”
at the time of the merger.123 A valuation in early 2009
inevitably would account for a certain degree of uncertainty
about the future. Indeed, CXR's management's expectations
for the immediate future had plummeted.124 I give some
weight to these sobered expectations and, to a lesser extent,
to the hindsight observation that management's out-year
projections perennially tended to be optimistic. At the same
time, however, I am cognizant of the fact that the percipient
witnesses, e.g., Johnston and Odom, worked for Respondent
both at the time of the Merger and at the time of their
testimony and that their current memories of the relevant
period may be less probative than what CXR's management
actually stated in early 2009. At a minimum, I take with
a grain of salt the clarity with which Respondent's fact
witnesses now claim to have appreciated CXR's prospects in
early 2009. In any event, and notwithstanding the 2008/2009
Recession, Petitioners advanced three main reasons why,
based on all factors known or knowable at the time of the
Merger, a valuation as of May 29, 2009 should be premised
on an eventual return to the 2009 LRP projections. I consider
each argument in turn.
i. Plucking theory
*17  First, Kursh relied on Milton Friedman's “plucking
theory” for the proposition that a “large contraction in output
tends to be followed on the average by a large business
expansion; a mild contraction, by a mild expansion.”125
Based on this theory, Kursh assumes that the steep recession
the radio industry experienced in 2008 and 2009 would
be followed by a steep recovery. Kursh argues that, in
the previous ten business cycles, dating back to 1948, the
economy returned to pre-recessionary real gross domestic
product (“GDP”) levels during the first three quarters of their
recovery, with the two longest recessions of sixteen months
obtaining pre-recessionary real GDP levels in less than three
and two quarters, respectively.126
Kursh conceded, however, that a recession coupled with a
financial crisis, like the 2008/2009 Recession, would show a
sluggish recovery.127 Moreover, the plucking theory relates
to recessions and recoveries in terms of a nation's GDP. Kursh
relies on a correlation between real GDP and advertising
revenue in the radio industry to support his assumption that
the radio industry and CXR, like the economy in general,
would experience a steep recovery, and, thus, would return
to the 2009 LRP. Kursh, however, failed to prove that
a correlation between GDP and radio advertising revenue
exists. He did not address this correlation in his expert or
rebuttal reports. Moreover, Gokhale testified to the contrary.
Gokhale asserted that in the 1990s and early 2000s there
was some correlation between GDP growth and advertising
growth, but that the correlation had broken down by about
2001.128
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In response to Gokhale's criticism, Kursh presented two
articles at trial to support the alleged correlation: an
article from the Journal of Marketing Research which
studied advertising expenditures in business cycles129 and
a document from the White House website, apparently
drafted by the Obama administration's Council of Economic
Advisers.130 Kursh asserts that the Journal of Marketing
Research article indicates that for every 1 % of GDP growth,
radio advertising revenues will grow by 1.69%.131 H e
then used an equation from the White House document
to conclude, based on a 4.69% decline in real GDP from
2007 to 2009,132 that it would have been reasonable in May
2009 to expect 17% growth in nominal GDP in the two
years following the recession.133 From this projected growth
in nominal GDP, Kursh calculated that radio advertising
revenues would have been expected to grow 28.7% by 2011.
Applying this growth rate to the May Forecast's 2009 revenue
projections, Kursh asserts that he would have expected CXR
to have 2011 revenue of $434 million. The 2009 LRP
projected CXR's 2011 revenue of $425.9 million. Thus,
according to Kursh, these articles support his conclusion that
one calculating the fair value of CXR shares in May 2009
should have expected CXR's financial situation to recover to
the 2009 LRP projections by the end of 2011.
*18  There are several problems with Kursh's presentation.
First, the cited White House document does not provide
clear support for a growth rate of 17% in nominal GDP
and there is no additional support for such a growth rate in
the record. The White House document itself projects GDP
growth rates around 2%, significantly less than the rate Kursh
purports to derive from a regression formula presented in that
document.134 Second, Petitioners failed to prove a correlation
existed between GDP growth and advertising revenue growth
as of May 2009. Indeed, one document that Kursh relied
on in his rebuttal report states that “[i]n recent years, the
relationship between advertising growth and GDP has broken
down.”135
Furthermore, Kursh did not reference the Journal of
Marketing Research or White House articles, the underlying
data, or the analysis he proffered at trial in his expert or
rebuttal report. These belatedly introduced documents do
not constitute credible evidence for the propositions for
which Kursh uses them. Although Kursh identified these
sources after completing his expert and rebuttal reports,
he attempted to use them to demonstrate an important
assumption underlying the valuation reflected in his reports.
As previously noted, the documents themselves do not clearly
support the steep growth rates that Kursh advocates. Thus,
even if I accepted the plucking theory, i.e., that real GDP
would be expected to return to pre-recessionary levels in three
quarters, Petitioners have not shown that radio advertising
revenues would grow apace with GDP, let alone at a rate
of 1.69% for every 1% of GDP growth.136 Therefore, I am
not persuaded by Petitioners' plucking theory argument. That
is, I consider it unlikely that in May 2009, a 17% nominal
GDP growth rate would have been expected for 2009 and
that this projected GDP growth rate would have supported a
reasonable belief that CXR's advertising revenues would have
grown nearly 29% between 2009 and the end of 2011 to put
CXR back on track thereafter to achieve the revenue and cash
flow projections for the remaining out-years in the 2009 LRP.
ii. Management's emails
Petitioners' second argument in support of a return to the 2009
LRP projections is that CXR's management continued in early
2009 to believe in the validity of the 2009 LRP as evidenced
by their dissemination of that LRP to auditors, lenders,
appraisers, and controlling stockholders in the normal course
of business. According to Petitioners, this demonstrates
management's belief that these projections remained accurate.
For this assertion, Petitioners rely on three emails sent by
CXR management. The first is from Odom to new CMG
employee Grace Huang;137 the second is from Odom to Harry
Bond, a representative of the Special Committee's financial
advisor Gleacher;138 and the third is from Tilson to Kimberly
Smith, an auditor at Deloitte.139
*19  In the first email, Odom sent the 2009 LRP and
two other documents to CMG's new employee Huang on
January 8, 2009 to give her a strategic overview of the
Company. Notably, the 2009 Budget Meeting PowerPoint,
which discussed the 2009 LRP, was created in October 2008
as an update to the 2009 budget. The other two documents
appear to have been prepared in November 2008. Odom sent
the January 8, 2009 email to Huang before management had
performed its first reforecast for 2009 on January 27, 2009.
According to Petitioners, at least, Huang was CMG's new
senior director of corporate strategy.140 Nevertheless, both
the timing of this email and its purpose, i.e., providing a new
employee a high-level overview of the Company's strategy,
undermine its probative value as evidence of management's
beliefs about CXR's expected financial performance around
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May 29, 2009. At most, Odom's email demonstrates that
management believed in early January 2009 that its opinions
regarding the budget and strategic plan at the end of 2008
still provided a viable basis for communicating “a good
strategic overview of the company” to a new CXR insider. It
provides scant support for an inference that in May 2009, after
management had adjusted the 2009 LRP's projected OCF
downward by 40%, CXR's management expected to recover
to the 2009 LRP levels in the near future.
Odom's March 26, 2009 email to Gleacher representative
Bond likewise gives no indication that, by attaching the 2009
LRP, Odom was advocating its continued applicability. The
2009 LRP was one of nine documents attached to the email.
Odom stated that he would send several more emails to
Bond, presumably with additional attachments. In the Special
Committee's review of CXR's intrinsic value, it is hardly
surprising that the Committee and its investment banker
would request the 2009 LRP. Ultimately, however, the Special
Committee concluded that the 2009 LRP was “no longer
reflective of [CXR]'s current intrinsic value.”141
According to CXR's April 3, 2009 Schedule 14D–9, shortly
after Odom's email to Bond, on March 31, 2009, the Special
Committee, its outside counsel, and Gleacher met with Odom
and Neil and received “an update on the company's current
results of operations as well as an overview of management's
assumptions and qualifications underlying the projections
that management provided to Gleacher.”142 Thereafter, the
Committee concluded that “the decline in the Company's
value is not temporary and, as a consequence, the historical
valuations of the Company are no longer reflective of
its current intrinsic value.”143 In reaching this conclusion,
the Special Committee noted that management prepared a
forecast in February 2009 that reflected estimated 2009
EBITDA of 48% and 55% less than actual EBITDA in 2008
and 2007, respectively.144
Odom credibly testified that he thought the Special
Committee's conclusions were appropriate.145 Management's
communications with the Special Committee and Gleacher
in April and May 2009, therefore, comport with the
position they now take, i.e., that by early 2009 the 2009
LRP no longer represented CXR's future prospects. Based
on the contemporaneous evidence that management had
communicated its decision not to rely on the 2009 LRP to the
Special Committee and the Committee's financial advisor, I
do not consider Odom's failure expressly to disclaim the 2009
LRP in his email to Bond to suggest that Cox management
expected that CXR would return to the 2009 LRP.
The last email, an April 28, 2009 email from Tilson to Smith,
contained no subject line and had no content. Consequently,
Petitioners and this Court can only speculate as to why Tilson
emailed the 2009 LRP to this Deloitte auditor in April 2009.
Without more, the email does not indicate that management
was advocating the accuracy of the 2009 LRP in April 2009.
The emails to Huang, Bond, and Smith, therefore, do not
demonstrate that management believed that the Company
would recover to the 2009 LRP projections.
iii. The Tilson Memo
*20  Lastly, Kursh relies on the Tilson Memo in his
expert report to conclude that “Radio management believed
that the 2009 LRP remained a reliable basis by which
to value the Company as of March 31, 2009.”146 I am
not convinced, however, that the opinion expressed in the
Tilson Memo means that management believed the 2009
LRP provided a reliable basis for valuing the Company as
of May 2009. Indeed, around this time, management was
reforecasting 2009 with revenues dropping by 17% and
EBITDA projections dropping by 41 % compared to the 2009
LRP.147 Management's significantly lower projections in the
May Forecast severely undermine the continued viability of
the 2009 LRP, a point Kursh ignores in his expert and rebuttal
reports.148
Furthermore, the Tilson Memo addressed FAS 142 valuation.
Odom credibly explained the context of the statements made
in the Tilson Memo. In addition, Odom testified that the
reference to “management's projections at December 31,
2008” referred to Bond & Pecaro's projections.149 Although
Bond & Pecaro had access to the 2009 LRP, it produced
its own projections for purposes of the FAS 142 valuation.
Bond & Pecaro's projections were, in fact, notably lower
than the 2009 LRP projections in every market cluster except
one.150 In addition, Odom explained that although the FAS
142 valuation was done “as of December 31, 2008,” the
valuation was not finalized until February 2009, long after the
2009 LRP was created and after CXR had begun to experience
dramatic decreases in revenues in early 2009. Thus, although
the Tilson Memo states that the “deteriorating environment
currently impacting [CXR]'s stock price and market cap are
taken into account in management's projections at December
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31, 2008,” it is likely that the Bond & Pecaro projections
also accounted for the deteriorating environment in January
2009.151
In sum, Petitioners have proven that a recovery was expected
for the industry and that management believed that CXR had
a bright future.152 Even considering management's expressed
optimism, however, I do not consider it reasonable to base
a determination of the fair value of C R as of May 29,
2009 on the assumption that the Company would recover
in the near term to levels reflected in the out-years of the
2009 LRP, which Respondent persuasively has demonstrated
no longer was reliable.153 Rather, the record indicates
that projections based on the depressed environment that
management recognized in the May Forecast for 2009 and
a modest recovery after that, rather than what was reflected
in the five-year 2009 LRP projections, would represent best
CXR's operative reality and perceived prospects.
*21  Thus, the May Forecast provides an appropriate starting
point for projecting CXR's operating free cash flows after
December 2009. I find that, in the circumstances of this case,
a valuation of CXR should include some recognition of a
limited cyclical recovery from the deep low CXR experienced
in early 2009 and that was reflected in the May Forecast. In
this regard, Gokhale's approach provides a more appropriate
starting point. Kursh's approach, which predicts a return to
the 2009 LRP by the end of 2011, is too optimistic and is not
supported by the record. Therefore, I begin with Gokhale's
model as a general framework.154 I consider next Gokhale's
projected recovery scenarios.
b. Gokhale's cash flow projections
As noted previously, Gokhale used two sets of projections.
The first set of projections incorporated the May Forecast for
2009 EBITDA and then estimated 2010–2013 using the actual
EBITDA CAGR that CXR experienced in the four years
following the 2000/2001 recession.155 Gokhale's second set
of projections uses consensus analyst EBITDA estimates for
2009 and 2010 and estimates for 2011–2013 based on the
annual EBITDA CAGR that CXR experienced in the three
years following the 2000/2001 recession.
The number of analysts following the radio industry in early
2009 was approximately three to six.156 With such a low
number of analysts, the accuracy of the analysts' forecasts
is questionable.157 Furthermore, I already have determined
that the May Forecast for 2009 reflects management's best
projections at the time of the Merger and should be used as
a starting point for the DCF analysis.158 Therefore, I adopt
Gokhale's May Forecast DCF as a starting framework.159
*22  Before turning to Gokhale's May Forecast DCF, I
note that Kursh and Petitioners criticized Gokhale's model in
several respects. I carefully considered Petitioners' criticisms
and will address two of them here. First, in his growth rate
calculations, Gokhale evaluates 2001 on an annual basis
rather than a quarterly basis. Kursh asserts that by doing
so, Gokhale understated the recessionary impact because the
2000/2001 recession occurred during only the middle eight
months of 2001. In the other four months, CXR experienced
two months of a “normal” expansionary economy and two
months of a “high-growth” economy in recovery.160 Kursh
did not identify, however, what adjustments, if any, he would
make to Gokhale's growth rates to address his criticism.
Additionally, Gokhale responded to Kursh's criticism at trial:
“It wasn't clear what Dr. Kursh was suggesting [ ] to do with
that information, we tested what happens if you tried some of
the data he had in his table, and it didn't seem to affect my
conclusions.”161 Thus, I reject Kursh's objection to the way
in which Gokhale evaluated the 2001 results.
Second, Petitioners criticize Gokhale for not including a
revenue line in his DCF analyses. Gokhale focused instead
on operating free cash flow. Gokhale asserts that he used
the same “bottom up” approach that CXR's management
used.162 In challenging that approach, Petitioners cited
a reputable valuation treatise by Bradford Cornell.163
Specifically, Petitioners note that, in item “1” of his “Cash
Flow Forecasting Checklist,” Cornell states: “1. The sales
forecast is generally the most critical element of a cash flow
forecast.”164 Cornell goes on to explain that:
Wherever possible, historical data, either for the firm or its
industry, should be examined to assess the reasonableness
of the sales forecasts—which leads to the second point on
the checklist.
2. The sales forecast should be consistent with the firm’s
historical performance and the historical performance of
the industry. While it is always possible that a company
will develop in unexpected ways, so that the future does not
resemble the past, this is not the best way to bet. Appraisals
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based on forecasts that depart markedly from historical
patterns are suspicious165
Although a sales forecast “generally” may be the most
important element in a cash flow forecast, Gokhale's
approach appears reasonable in this case. His model is
based on management's full projections, which included
their sales forecasts. Consistent with management's own
bottom up approach, Gokhale's model begins with OCF from
management's projections and grows them at a rate that
is based on CXR's historical performance. Thus, although
Gokhale's approach may not be warranted in every case, I find
it to be supported adequately by his credible explanations and
by the valuation literature.
Turning now to Gokhale's DCF, the May Forecast DCF begins
with the 2009 OCF projections from the May Forecast and
grows them at a rate of 4.6% each year until 2013. This growth
rate finds support in the record. For example, in the 2009
LRP, management had projected OCF values for 2010–2013
with annual growth rates ranging from 3.4% to 4.1%, and it
projected EBITDA for 2010–2013 with annual growth rates
ranging from 1.4% to 2.7%.166 In addition, the J.P. Morgan
report that both parties relied on projected a 2010 EBITDA
growth rate for CXR of 5.1%.167 Gokhale's steady growth
rate, however, does not factor in any significant recovery
from the depths of the recession which caused management
to adjust its 2009 EBITDA down by 41%.
*23  After the 2000/2001 recession, CXR's OCF grew by
9.28% in 2002, 0.44% in 2003, 5.18% in 2004, and 4.06% in
2005.168 That recession was mild compared to the recession
that affected CXR in 2009.169 Implicit in Gokhale's use
of a steady growth rate of 4.6% for the years 2010–2013
is his apparent assumption that there would be virtually
no cyclical aspect of the recovery commensurate with the
depth or severity of the 2008/2009 Recession compared to
the 2000/2001 recession. He justified this approach largely
based on alleged secular challenges facing CXR and the radio
industry. The evidence supports Respondent's position that
secular concerns existed in the radio industry in May 2009
and that those concerns, among other things, would have
tempered any projected recovery. The record also suggests,
however, that the 2008/2009 Recession was attributable to
cyclical factors or to matters affecting the economy generally,
such as the financial crisis. Relying on the plucking theory,
Petitioners' expert opined that the rebound in CXR's EBITDA
in 2010 would have reflected an increase of 37.6%. I believe
that is too high, but find that some increase in the degree of
projected initial recovery is appropriate. Thus, I conclude that
an appropriate recovery in this case would include a growth
rate comparable to the rate of growth CXR experienced in the
first year after the 2000/2001 recession with growth thereafter
returning to the steady rate of 4.6% that Gokhale projected.
Gokhale identified the recovery CX R experienced after the
2000/2001 recession as an appropriate point of comparison
to evaluate what CXR's expected recovery would be after
the 2008/2009 Recession. Even in the milder 2000/2001
recession, CXR's OCF grew in 2002, the first year coming
out of the recession, by approximately double the rate at
which it grew in the following years when it returned to a
lower somewhat steady rate of growth. Consistent with what
occurred in 2002, I find that some bump in growth would
have been expected in 2010, the first year coming out of the
2008/2009 Recession. The growth rate in 2002 was 9.28%.
This rate is significantly higher than the growth rates in 2003
(0.44%), 2004 (5.18%), and 2005 (4.06%). I recognize that
the 9.28% rate already is factored into Gokhale's CAGR of
4.6% and that that rate would be lower without the first year's
9.28% growth rate. Nevertheless, I find that it is reasonable
to expect that the 4.6% steady growth rate that Gokhale used
would follow some uptick in 2010 to account for the cyclical
aspect of the 2008/2009 Recession.170 Thus, although it may
be an imperfect model,171 I conclude that adopting a 2010
OCF growth rate of 9.28% followed by 4.6% growth in years
2011–2013 appropriately accounts for CXR management's
optimism and the expectations of population growth in its key
markets without resorting to the 2010 growth rate of 37.6%
and the 2011 growth rate of 27.3% that Kursh advanced and
that I find to be unsupportable.172
Gokhale's 4.6% growth rate is higher than the annual growth
rates projected in the 2009 LRP. Thus, a 9.28% rebound
in 2010 followed by steady growth at that rate comports
with some degree of optimism about CXR's future, while
remaining generally conservative. In addition, I make no
adjustments to projected expenses in 2010 related to the
higher growth rate because CXR's projected expenses were
fairly stable due to its relatively high fixed cost base.173 Thus,
any decrease to OCF from a proportional increase in expenses
would be minimal. Based on the complete record, I find these
assumptions to be appropriate and, thus, I adopt the growth
rates indicated.
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c. Other DCF analysis inputs
i. LTIP
*24  Kursh assumes no LTIP payments in 2009–2013
and a $4 million payment in the terminal period.174 The
2009 LRP that Kursh relies on, however, includes LTIP
expenses of approximately $50 million between 2009 and
2013. Management's May Forecast also includes a 2009 LTIP
expense of $3.604 million.175 Kursh explained that he did
not expect CXR to incur any cash expenditure under the
LTIP plan because “[a]ctual LTIP payments over the 2009
LRP period, however, are zero; all grants though 2007 are
projected to be ‘under water.’ ”176 Gokhale, on the other hand,
started with the LTIP payments projected in the LRP and
proportionally scaled them down based on the lower EBITDA
that he projected.177
The record supports Gokhale's approach. Kursh did not
explain sufficiently why he would not expect management
to be compensated with LTIP payments when his models
projected strong performance, e.g., a 2009–2013 EBITDA
CAGR of 16.5%. In contrast, Gokhale began with
management projections and accounted for his projected
decrease in revenue and EBITDA by decreasing LTIP
payments proportionally. In addition, Gokhale's assumptions
better align with management's projections for 2009. For
these reasons, I adopt Gokhale's projected LTIP payments.
ii. Debt
Kursh uses a net debt figure of $380.1 million, which
Petitioners assert was CXR's net debt on the date of the
Merger.178 Gokhale used a slightly higher debt figure of
$385.6 million, but the source of Gokhale's figure is not clear.
He relied either on the Merrill Lynch Corporate Bond Index
or on an internal CXR financial document as of April 30,
2009.179 I also note that Gokhale did not criticize Kursh's use
of $380.1 million. Therefore, I have used $380.1 million as
the amount of CXR's net debt on the date of the Merger.
iii. Retained cushion and deferred taxes
In Kursh's report, he suggests two items of potential additional
value: retained cushion and deferred taxes. But, Kursh did
not adjust his DCF model to demonstrate any changes he
advocates based on these two items.180 Instead, he provides a
number that he opines should be added to the per-share value
derived from his DCF calculation. As for the retained cushion,
Kursh relies on a statement by Odom that management
decreased revenues by $2 million and increased expenses by
$2 million each year to manage CEI's expectations. Kursh
argues that this $4 million dollar figure should be added to
a final fair value calculation. At Kursh's suggested discount
rate of 8.1%, the retained cushion represents additional value
of $0.62 per share.
The evidence Petitioners present, however, does not provide
clear support for adding back their suggested $0.62 per
share of retained cushion. Kursh relies on Odom's deposition
testimony in which Odom states that “on occasion we would
either soften the revenues or add additional expenses in
our consolidation to lower the expectation that we would
communicate to [CEI].”181 Odom explained that the purpose
of this adjustment was because the numbers they received
“from the field ... tended to be overly optimistic.”182 Based
on this testimony, I am not persuaded that the May Forecast
OCF is low by $4 million dollars and that, consequently, it
would be appropriate to add $0.62 per share to a fair value
calculation of CXR stock. That is, Petitioners have not met
their burden of proof on this point. I therefore have not added
any value to the final fair value calculation based on the so-
called retained cushion.
*25  As to the second item, deferred taxes, the add-back
suggested by Kursh for 2009– 2024 is $0.45 per share
assuming an 8.1 % discount rate. Kursh relies on documents
drafted by Gleacher in late March and early April 2009 to
explain this adjustment.183 One of the documents shows
declining deferred taxes from 2014 to 2018 with a net deferred
tax amount of $13.5 million in 2014, $6.9 in 2015, $0.1 in
2016, $0.0 in 2017, and ($0.2) in 2018.184 Kursh admits that
Odom could not explain the offsets that were not CXR's work
product.185 Kursh also stated that the worksheets he relied
on were created later than the 2009 LRP but had “nothing
to do with the LRP other than the deferred tax issue.”186 In
addition, Kursh did not discuss the context of the Gleacher
documents or explain why it would be appropriate to use them
instead of management's projections in his DCF analysis.
Indeed, Kursh admitted that he was “less firm” on the item
of omitted deferred taxes because his valuation was based on
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the 2009 LRP and this change would be a modification to the
LRP.187
Having considered the relevant evidence and arguments
of the parties, I am not convinced by Kursh's report and
testimony that the deferred tax figures Gleacher projected
in its documents support making any change to the deferred
taxes projected by CXR management in the 2009 LRP. Hence,
Petitioners have not proven that $0.45 per share should be
added to the fair value of CXR based on omitted deferred
taxes.
iv. Capital expenditures and depreciation
Gokhale used depreciation figures from the 2009 LRP and
set capital expenditures equal to depreciation.188 Kursh made
the assumption that depreciation would be higher than capital
expenditures into perpetuity. Kursh acknowledged that this
approach was problematic.189 He stated, however, that the
problem did not affect his valuation because the effect this
assumption had on his projected share price was offset by
the value of a tax benefit that he did not include in his
DCF.190 Both parties, therefore, reasonably accounted for
capital expenditure and depreciation projections. Because I
have adopted Gokhale's model as a general framework, I
adopt his treatment of capital expenditures and depreciation,
as well.
v. Number of shares outstanding
Petitioners assert that CXR had 79.1 million shares
outstanding on the date of the Merger, and Kursh used this
number in reaching his conclusion on fair value. The basis
for the Petitioners' number, however, is not clear. According
to Gokhale, CXR had 79.5 million shares outstanding on the
date of the Merger.191 In addition, CXR's 14D–9, dated April
3, 2009, states that CXR had 79.5 million shares outstanding
as of that date. Based on this evidence, I find that the actual
number of shares of CXR stock outstanding as of the Merger
date was 79.5 million.
Gokhale added 4.5% to this number to account for the
dilution that would occur because of shares awarded under the
LTIP.192 Thus, he used 83.07 million as the number of shares
outstanding. Kursh objected to this dilution, arguing that it
was inconsistent with Gokhale's valuation and that it was
inappropriate to divide CXR's value as of May 29, 2009 by the
number of shares that might be outstanding at some undefined
date in the future.193 Indeed, neither Gokhale nor Respondent
explained why it would be appropriate to adjust the value
of CXR shares as of May 29, 2009 based on a potential
future share dilution. Petitioners also highlight that Gokhale's
approach is too speculative “given the LTIP's opacity and the
extremely vague deposition testimony about how it worked
in practice.”194 I find, therefore, that Respondent has not
demonstrated that a deviation from the actual number of
shares outstanding on the Merger date is appropriate here.
Therefore, I will use the figure of 79.5 million shares to value
CXR's stock.195
2. Terminal value
*26  In calculating terminal value, the parties dispute the
appropriate terminal, or perpetuity, growth rate. Kursh opined
that a terminal growth rate of between 2% and 3% would
be appropriate. He used a 2.5% rate in his DCF analysis.
Gokhale chose a perpetuity growth rate of 1.25%. Both
experts expected inflation of around 2–2.5%.1196 “[T]he rate
of inflation is the floor for a terminal value estimate for a
solidly profitable company that does not have an identifiable
risk of insolvency.”197
Respondent argues that the perpetuity growth rate for CX
R should be less than inflation because CXR “was not
a mature, stable company.”198 This argument is without
merit.199 The evidence shows that CXR faced certain secular
challenges around 2009, but there is no evidence that it faced
an identifiable risk of insolvency. Even Respondent's expert
projected a stable future for the Company. Additionally,
to support his proposed growth rate of 1.25%, Gokhale
cites industry analysts and financial advisors who projected
perpetuity growth rates between negative 1% and positive
2%, either for the radio industry in general or, in two of
Gokhale's three sources, in valuing CXR's equity specifically.
Notably, however, two of the three sources Gokhale cites
applied perpetuity growth rates around the expected rate of
inflation of 2%.200
Kursh asserts that his rate of 2.5% is conservative based on
an inflation rate of 2%, an assumed long-term growth rate of
1.7%, and productivity of about 1%.201 According to Kursh,
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these inputs support a “generally regarded” historical growth
rate of 4%–6%.202 Kursh also observed that Bond & Pecaro's
2008 enterprise valuation applied a 2.5% OCF growth rate
from 2014 through 2018.203 Gokhale counters, however, that
Bond & Pecaro used long-term growth rates that ranged from
1.0% to 2.5%, and did not simply apply a 2.5% growth
rate as Kursh suggested.204 In addition, Gokhale asserts that
Kursh's rate is unsupportable and is based on a finding that for
every one percent of revenue growth, CXR's free cash flow
will grow by two percent into perpetuity, an assumption that
Gokhale argues is unreasonable.205 Kursh responds that his
assumption stems, in part, from CXR's operating leverage,
stating that “if revenues simply kept up with inflation, the
fall to the bottom line would be a little bit higher because of
operating leverage, the fall of the free cash flow.”206 A more
reasonable assumption, according to Gokhale, is that free cash
flow would grow at the same rate as revenue indicating that
CXR is stable and maintaining its margins into perpetuity.207
In this regard, Gokhale notes that Kursh's implied expected
revenue growth rate of 1 % to 1.5% is in line with the
perpetuity growth rate of 1.25% that Gokhale applies.208
*27  As noted, the rate of inflation generally is the “floor for a
terminal value.”209 “Generally, once an industry has matured,
a company will grow at a steady rate that is roughly equal to
the rate of nominal GDP growth.”210 Some experts maintain
that “the terminal growth rate should never be higher than
the expected long-term nominal growth rate of the general
economy, which includes both inflation and real growth.”211
Moreover, both experts in this case acknowledged that the
expected long-term inflation rate in 2009 was 2%–2.5%.
There also was some evidence that the expected rate of real
GDP growth was between 2.5% and 2.7%, but this evidence
was not particularly reliable.212 I find that the radio industry
is a mature industry and that CXR was a solidly profitable
company. Thus, a long-term growth rate at least equal to
expected inflation is appropriate here.
The question remains whether the growth rate should
exceed the rate of inflation to some extent. In that regard,
like Respondent, I question the reasonableness of Kursh's
apparent assumption that free cash flow will grow at double
the rate of CXR's revenues forever. Indeed, the radio industry
was experiencing increased competition and fragmentation
in 2009. Thus, I am not willing to use Kursh's 2.5% rate.
Petitioners have demonstrated, however, that, because of
CXR's operating leverage, an increase in revenue would lead
to a slightly higher increase in OCF. In addition, I note that the
increase in the 2010 growth rate from 4.6% to 9.28% leads to
about a 1 % increase in OCF margins using the assumptions
in the demonstrative Petitioners' presented during Gokhale's
cross examination.213
Having carefully considered the parties' competing positions,
I find that it is reasonable to apply a terminal growth rate
of 2.25%, which may be slightly higher than the inflation
rate.214 This number comports with the experts' inflation
expectations and the weight of the other relevant evidence in
the record. I therefore adopt a 2.25% perpetuity growth rate.
3. Discount rate
Petitioners and Respondent virtually agree on the appropriate
discount rate, using rates of 8.1 % and 8.0%, respectively.
This variance of 0.1 % is relatively minor. Because I have
used Gokhale's analyses as a general frame of reference
and because the lower discount rate used by Gokhale favors
Petitioners, I find Respondent's discount rate of 8.0% to be
reliable and I adopt it here.
B. Statutory Interest
Kursh calculated prejudgment interest at the legal rate
compounded quarterly, assuming a placeholder award date
of December 31, 2012. Respondent does not oppose Kursh's
method of calculating the interest due. Therefore, interest is
awarded at the legal rate compounded quarterly.215 Kursh's
calculation should be updated to the date of the final judgment
entered pursuant to this Memorandum Opinion.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion, I adopt
Gokhale's May Forecast DCF analysis as a general framework
for determining the fair value of CXR. I further find that the
following changes should be made to his calculations: (1)
the number of outstanding shares should equal the number of
shares of CXR stock outstanding on the Merger date, i.e., 79.5
million; (2) CXR's debt should be equal to $380.05 million;
(3) the perpetuity growth rate should be 2.25%; and (4) the
growth rate for OCF should be 9.28% in 2010 and 4.6% in
2011–2013. With these adjustments, the Court determines that
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Petitioners are entitled to receive $5.75 per share of CXR
stock, plus interest as stated above from May 29, 2009 to the
date of judgment. Counsel shall work cooperatively to prepare
and file promptly a proposed form of final judgment.
All Citations
Not Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2013 WL 3316186
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discussed with Bond & Pecaro” and that those conditions “were considered in [Bond & Pecaro's] 12/31/08 valuation”).
75 Id.
76 Tr. 535 (Odom). The Tilson Memo contained the heading: “To: File[;] From: Lauren Tilson[;] RE: Impairment Testing
Under FAS 142.” JX 95.
77 Tr. 541
78 See JX 214 at 3–4.
79 Tr. 540 (Odom).
80 JX 214 at 3 (emphasis added).
81 JX 480, Kursh Rep., at 11.
82 Tr. 258.
83 JX 385 at 30.
84 JX 214 at 3.
85 See JX 480; JX 482.
86 See JX 481 at 7 (“[T]he radio business typically run[s] at 35% to 45% operating margins.”). Petitioners assert that the 2009
LRP projected CXR OCF margins around 30% and EBITDA margins around 27%–28%. Tr. 729 (Gokhale) (discussing
Petitioners' calculations on cross examination).
87 JX 480 Ex. G.
88 The only difference between operating cash flow and EBITDA in CXR's financial projections is that the OCF projections are
slightly higher because they include the cost of the Company's noncash long-term incentive plan (“LTIP”). Tr. 497 (Odom);
see also Tr. 325–26 (Johnston). At trial, Gokhale used the terms EBITDA and operating cash flow interchangeably. His
DCF analysis applies historical EBITDA growth rates to project future operating cash flows. Gokhale explained that his
EBITDA numbers grew at a lower rate than his OCF numbers because he assumed LTIP payments would grow from
2009–2014. Tr. 730. Petitioners do not challenge specifically the reasonableness of Gokhale's application of historical
EBITDA growth rates, rather than OCF growth rates, to project future operating cash flows. Furthermore, the difference in
the two sets of numbers is relatively minor. Therefore, Gokhale's use of EBITDA growth rates appears to be appropriate.
See  Tr. 403 (Johnston) (“[E]ssentially, the terms operating cash flow and EBITDA are synonymous.”).
89 In his Third–Party DCF, Gokhale averaged only the first three years coming out of the 2000/2001 recession to calculate
the CAGR he used. As a result, Gokhale used a higher CAGR of 5.3% in the Third–Party DCF compared to the 4.6%
he used in the May Forecast DCF. See Tr. 668–69.
90 Tr. 659.
91 Tr. 37–38 (Cheen); Tr. 650–51 (Gokhale).
92 Del. C. § 262. There is no dispute that Petitioners are entitled to an appraisal under Section 262.
93 Id. § 262(h); see also Tri–Cont'l Corp. v. Battye,  74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del.1950) (“[M]arket value, asset value, dividends,
earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and any other facts which were known or which could be ascertained as
of the date of merger and which throw any light on future prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent to an
inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholders' interest, but must be considered by the agency fixing the value.”).
94 Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Global GT LP, A.3d 214, 217 (Del.2010).
95 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., A.2d 289, 299 (Del.1996).
96 Golden Telecom, Inc., A.3d at 217.
97 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., A.2d 701, 713 (Del.1983); see also Technicolor, 684 A.2d at 299.
98 Rapid–American Corp. v. Harris, A.2d 796, 805 (Del.1992).
99 M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. LeBeau, A.2d 513, 520 (Del.1999).
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100 Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publ'rs, Inc., A.2d 357, 362 (Del.1997); Taylor v. Am. Specialty Retailing Gp.,  2003 WL
21753752, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 25, 2003).
101 Weinberger, A.2d at 713.
102 See Dobler v. Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co., WL 2271592, at *8 (Oct. 4, 2004); see also Cede & Co. v. JRC Acq.
Corp., 2004 WL 286963, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004) (utilizing the DCF approach); Gentile v. Singlepoint Fin., Inc.,
2003 WL 1240504, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 2003) (utilizing the comparable transactions approach); Borruso v. Commc'ns
Telesystems Int'l,  753 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. Ch.1999) (utilizing the comparable company approach).
103 Gokhale used a comparable companies analysis as a reasonableness check on the value he obtained through his DCF
analysis. He concluded, however, that “the comparable companies valuation is of limited use in determining the value
of CXR's Class A shares.” JX 392 at 12. Kursh concluded that neither a comparable companies nor a comparable
transactions approach would be reliable and, therefore, did not attempt either approach. JX 480 at 5.
104 See JX 392 at 10–12 (Gokhale: “[T]he EV/EBITDA multiples used in the [comparable companies] calculation above are
overstated because they are based on the book value of debt, and using these multiples would overstate the value of
CXR's shares.”); JX 480 at 5–8 (Kursh: “[Comparable publicly traded companies and transactions methods] observe and
apply market multiples, and their reliability hinges upon the ability to accurately estimate both the numerators (equity and
market values) and denominators (recurring earnings) of the multiples. [T]he industry focus and timing of this valuation
present challenges to such accuracy.”); see also Tr. 670–75 (Gokhale).
105 JX 480 at 8.
106 See M.G. Bancorp., Inc. v. Le Beau, A.2d 513, 523 (Del.1999) (“The discounted cash flow methodology has been relied
upon frequently by parties and the Court of Chancery in other statutory appraisal proceedings.”); Ryan v. Tad's Enters.,
Inc.,  709 A.2d 682, 702 (Del. Ch.1996) (“The discounted cash flow valuation model is well-established and accepted in
the financial community.”), aff'd,  693 A.2d 1082 (Del.1997) (ORDER).
107 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., WL 23700218, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 9, 2004).
108 Id. (citing Gilbert v. MPM Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 663, 669 (Del. Ch.1997)).
109 Id.
110 Although the slopes from the 2009 LRP and Gokhale's projections after 2009 appear to be the same in this somewhat
simplified graph, they are, in fact, slightly different. Gokhale's projections reflect a CAGR of 4.6%, while the OCF growth
rates for 2010–2013 in the 2009 LRP ranged from 3.4% to 4.1 %.
111 Kursh reasons that expecting a recovery within eighteen months is reasonable because the recession lasted
approximately eighteen months. Tr. 220 (Kursh). He thus selected a return to the LRP in 2011 because 2011 would be
the first full year of recovery after the recession ended in mid–2009 plus eighteen months. Id.
112 JX 95 (“[CXR] also believes that future years' growth is attainable due to recovery in the industry.”).
113 See JX 171 at 34.
114 JX 481 at 6 (“One of the positive indicators sustaining the belief that radio ad revenue would recover was the measurement
of audience, which continued to grow.”); JX 398, Entercom Communications Corp. Reports Fourth Quarter and 2008
Annual Results, at 1 (CXR competitor Entercom Communications Corp.'s CEO stating “[a]t a time of unprecedented
change in media usage that is severely impairing a number of other media, radio posted an all-time record number of
listeners in 2008 and remains the most cost-effective major advertising medium in the nation”).
115 See JX 394 at 2; JX 392 at 3 (Gokhale observing in his expert report that “[i]n the two years prior to [CEI's] tender offer for
CXR's Class A shares, the economic fortunes and public market valuations of radio stations (and companies that owned
such stations) had been in steady decline”); Tr. 649 (Gokhale).
116 See JX 394 at 2; Tr. 37 (Cheen) (stating that the secular decline may have started as early as 2006).
117 JX 481 at 7.
118 JX 480 at 10 (“Standard [CXR] business practice provided for monthly forecasting of current year results, but this process
appeared to receive special attention in January 2009.”(emphasis added)); Tr. 501 (Odom) (“One thing [I did upon
recognizing that revenues were evaporating] is that I advocated that the company do a full and complete reforecast in
January. That would have been something a bit unusual for us because....”).
119 JX 212 at 6692.
120 Tr. 689 (Gokhale); Tr. 626 (Odom) (stating that he never communicated to CMG, outside auditors, or the Special
Committee that the LRP's projections for the out-years were consistently overly optimistic but that those circumstances
were “just factual”).
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121 LRP projections for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 showed similar trends. See Tr. 304 (Johnston) (stating that
“each year, as we got closer, our estimates got better,” but that in each succeeding year between 2002 and 2008, CX R
management lowered its out-year estimates but still missed its projected results).
122 Tr. 689 (Gokhale).
123 See Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., WL 1569818, at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012).
124 See JX 212; Tr. 315–16 (Johnston) (“Given the numbers that we were seeing in January [2009], given my expectation
for the year, I realized that the out years would have no bearing on reality.”); Tr. 503–04 (Odom) (“There was no way
that the [2009] LRP, either the 2009 results or the out-year results, could be anywhere near reality. There is no way to
recover from this dramatic a drop and just bounce right back. It just is not reality. So I didn't believe that the [2009] LRP
had any validity.”); see also JX 180, CMG's March 23, 2009 offer to purchase CXR stock at $3.80 per share, at 11 (“[I]n
light of the continued decline in advertising revenue experienced by [CXR] in the first two months of 2009, as reflected
in the February Forecast, [CEI] and [CMG] senior management believed that the long range plan approved by the Radio
board of directors in December 2008 no longer accurately reflects the prospects of [CXR]. Senior management believed
that [CXR]'s prospects were better modeled using the growth expectations used for the long range plan and applying
those rates to the February Forecast as a baseline....”).
125 JX 482 at 4 (citing Milton Friedman, “Monetary Studies of the National Bureau,” The National Bureau Enters Its 45th
Year, 44th Annual Report 7–25 (1964)).
126 JX 482 at 5.
127 Tr. 281 (“Q. So prior to [Bordo and Haubrich's] test in June 2012, the conventional wisdom was that a recession coupled
with a financial crisis would show a sluggish recovery; right? A. And I effectively assumed the sluggish recovery. If the
longest recovery on record is four quarters and I go six, that's sluggish to me, because there are many recoveries that
occurred much quicker than that.”).
128 Tr. 684 (Gokhale). Petitioners' industry expert, Chachas, asserted in his report that “[t]he radio industry is cyclically highly
correlated to general GDP.” JX 481 at 8. He presented a chart depicting the growth in media and radio advertising versus
growth in nominal GDP between 1990 and 2009 to demonstrate this correlation. Id. at 9, Ex. 5. The chart depicts a
correlation of 80% between nominal GDP and radio revenue in this nineteen-year time span. Chachas's chart, however,
is consistent with Gokhale's testimony that a correlation existed between 1990 and 2001, but that by 2001 the relationship
changed, if not broke down completely.
129 See JX 507.
130 See JX 583.
131 Tr. 181–82 (Kursh).
132 See JX 584. This number is taken from a Bureau of Economic Analysis report.
133 Tr. 190–91.
134 See JX 583 at 1, 4 (stating that the Congressional Budget Office's forecasted GDP growth for 2010 is 2.6% and that
the Federal Reserve's “ ‘central tendency’ is 2.5%–2.7% for long-run growth” compared to the 13% real or 17% nominal
GDP growth suggested by Kursh); Tr. 686–88 (Gokhale).
135 JX 341, J.P. Morgan, Broadcasting/TV and Radio: Is it 2010 Yet? (Dec. 18, 2008), at 13896 (“In recent years, the
relationship between advertising growth and GDP has broken down—with annual ad spending lagging GDP in six of the
past ten years. While there are many potential causes for this (media fragmentation causing a shift to media outlets with
lower CPMs, weakness in the domestic auto business, etc.), the effect is what really matters—media companies have
become more competitive in the chase for ad dollars. For TV and radio in particular, industry revenue growth has lagged
GDP growth in recent years following a significant period of outperformance.”). But see Tr. 244–45 (Kursh) (observing
that the J.P. Morgan report reflects only one analyst's opinion).




140 Pet'rs' Opening Post–Trial Br. 20.
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144 Id. at 9. The Special Committee asked for, and management provided, operating performance and financial conditions
through March 2009. These results indicated that, although the operating environment was stabilizing, the actual March
2009 results were below what had been projected in the February forecast. Id. at 10.
145 Tr. 515–17 (Odom) (stating that he thought the Special Committee's conclusion was reasonable and that he did not recall
the Special Committee having a more bearish view of the future of CX R than management).
146 JX 480 at 10.
147 JX 212 at 6692; Tr. 233 (Kursh).
148 In describing management's budgeting process, Kursh stated: “[A]s the year turned, [management] would continue to
reforecast that particular year. And in our case, while that reforecasting of 2009 was going on, the long-range plan
was unchanged. So they continued to believe it or they didn't bother to change it.” Tr. 171–72. Petitioners provided no
evidence, however, that, historically, management had updated the out-years of its long range plan when it adjusted a
forecast for the current year. To the contrary, all evidence indicates that, in the ordinary course of business, management
regularly would update the current year's monthly budgets and, once a year, would create and present to the board of
directors between October and December a budget for the next year and high-level projections for the four following
years. See Tr. 501 (Odom). Thus, management's failure to update the 2009 LRP in the first or second quarter of 2009
is not inconsistent with Respondent's position that management would not have relied on that forecast in valuing CXR
in May 2009.
149 Tr. 539–41 (Odom).
150 See JX 214; JX 606 at 17–32. In Bond & Pecaro's FAS 142 valuation, it calculated an enterprise value using its DCF
model for each market cluster and then aggregated those values. Tr. 525–25 (Odom).
151 Tr. 528–29 (Odom).
152 See JX 341 (“There are several reasons to expect a nice rebound in 2010”); JX 592 (2008 CX R Letter to Shareholders
in which CXR President Neil states that he sees “a bright future for our industry in general and for [CXR] in particular”).
153 See Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 WL 1152338, at *5 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2004) (finding from a review of all the
evidence that the company's five-year plan “does not provide a reliable basis for forecasting future cash flows,” including
“that management held the strong view that [its] projections should not be relied upon because the industry was so new
and volatile that reliable projections were impossible”).
154 I also find Gokhale's valuation approach to be more reliable generally. Gokhale's expert report not only explains the
calculations in his DCF analyses, but also includes the underlying formulas he used. Kursh's report, on the other hand,
did not explain clearly his calculations or how he arrived at his results. Indeed, Gokhale could not replicate Kursh's DCF
analysis exactly. See JX 393 at 10 n.35 (“Dr. Kursh does not fully explain his DCF calculations, and we did not exactly
replicate his DCF analysis. Our replicated numbers are slightly higher than those reported in Dr. Kursh's Exhibit H.”).
155 Gokhale testified that he used the CAGR for CXR from 2001–2005 to project OCF growth for 2009–2013 because it was
the most recent data of what growth rates looked like coming out of a downturn that would be reflective, in some sense,
of the secular shift that CXR and the radio industry were beginning to experience. Tr. 658; see also JX 481 at 3 (Chachas
likening the radio industry's share price contraction “during the recession following the bursting of the ‘tech bubble’ in
mid–2000” to the contraction the radio industry experienced in the 2008/2009 Recession”); Tr. 64 (Cheen) (discussing
the radio industry's recovery after the 2000/2001 recession).
156 Tr. 62 (Cheen) (number of analysts down to a half dozen or less); Tr. 432 (Chachas) (number of analysts covering the
radio broadcasting space was three or four in 2008 and 2009).
157 Tr. 176 (Kursh) (stating that in one of his valuation books, Damodaran asserts that the number of analysts is absolutely
critical and that if you have a small sample, you're probably not getting a very good result, and that analysts look short
term while valuation looks long term); JX 593, Bloomberg, Analysts' Accuracy on U.S. Profits Worst in 16 years  (Aug.
22, 2008); Tr. 431–32 (Chachas) (stating that analysts' recommendations are not good proxies for value because they
are inherently chasing data and moving as a group).
158 See Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., WL 1152338, at *5 (“Delaware law clearly prefers valuations based
on contemporaneously prepared management projections because management ordinarily has the best first-hand
knowledge of a company's operations.”).
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162 Tr. 662–63 (“I believe various gentlemen here from the company have described it as really a bottom's-up plan that led
to revenues and subtraction of profits. And then what I'm doing is taking the EBITDA, or operating cash flow, that comes
out of this pretty full plan, and growing that EBITDA at a rate that EBITDA grew in similar periods.”).
163 See Bradford Cornell, Corporate Valuation: Tools for Effective Appraisal and Decision Making (1993).
164 Id. at 126 (emphasis in original).
165 Id.
166 JX 392 at 8 n.30.
167 JX 341 at 13950.
168 JX 602. CXR's revenues over the same period grew by 6.4% in 2002, 1.3% in 2003, 2.9% in 2004, and –0.1 % in 2005.
JX 603.
169 See JX 482 at 3–5.
170 See JX 482 Exs. L, M.
171 See Prescott Gp. Small Cap, L.P. v. Coleman Co., Inc., W L 2059515, at * 31 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2004) (“[T]he task of
enterprise valuation, even for a finance expert, is fraught with uncertainty.”); Id. (“Experience in the adversarial[ ] battle of
the experts' appraisal process under Delaware law teaches one lesson very clearly: valuation decisions are impossible to
make with anything approaching complete confidence.”) (quoting Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,  2003 W L 23700218,
at * 2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003)).
172 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., WL 23700218, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003) (The value of a corporation is not
a point on a line, but a range of reasonable values, and the judge's task is to assign one particular value within this
range as the most reasonable in light of all of the relevant evidence and based on considerations of fairness); Tr. 484
(Chachas) (stating that he would classify a four or five percent revenue growth rate in 2010 as a snapback because
“[w]hen you've fallen 19 percent in the preceding year if you're up by 5 in the following, I think the performance is actually
very substantial”).
173 Tr. 324–25 (Johnston).
174 Tr. 222; JX 480 Ex. H.
175 JX 212.
176 JX 480 at 14.
177 Tr. 660.
178 See JX 480 at 19 (citing JX 411 at 17148).
179 Compare Resp't's Opening Post–Trial Br. 22 n.8 (“CXR's debt was not publicly traded, requiring Gokhale to use a proxy
for the cost of CXR's debt. As of May 29, 2009, CXR's credit rating was BBB-; therefore, Gokhale selected the Merrill
Lynch BBB Corporate Bond Index as the proxy.”) and JX 392 at 9 (“[T]he cost of debt we used is based on the yield on
the Merrill Lynch BBB Corporate Bond Index as of May 29, 2009) with Gokhale Dep. 141 (responding in the affirmative
to the question “You get that number [net debt of 385.6 million] from an internal financial document as of April 30, 2009,
correct?”).
180 Kursh and Gokhale both used the deferred tax numbers from the 2009 LRP in their DCF models: approximately $12.80
million for the remainder of 2009, $21.26 million in 2010, $20.79 million in 2011, $19.47 million in 2012, and $16.96
million in 2013.
181 Odom Dep. 302.
182 Id.




187 Id. at 219–20.
188 Tr. 669.
189 Tr. 208, 276.
190 Tr. 215–16.
191 Gokhale Dep. 144–45; see also JX 153 (stating that as of March 31, 2009, CXR had 20.8 Class A and 58.7 Class B
shares outstanding).
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192 Gokhale explained in a footnote that the 4.5% dilution “is based on the median historical percentage of shares available
for stock-based compensation to shares outstanding.” JX 392 at 10 n.38.
193 JX 482 at 11.
194 Pet'rs' Opening Post–Trial Br. 46.
195 Cf. Prescott Gp. Small Cap, L.P. v. Coleman Co., WL 2059515, at * 12 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2004) (declining to address the
petitioners' argument that three million shares of stock had been issued at an unfairly low price and should be disregarded
and using the actual number of shares outstanding as of the merger date in the appraisal proceeding).
196 See Tr. 663 (Gokhale); Tr. 197 (Kursh).
197 Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., A.2d 497, 512 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del.2010).
198 Resp't's Opening Post–Trial Br. 42.
199 See JX 394 at 13 (Respondent's expert referring to the industry as a mature industry); JX 481 at 35 (“[CXR] was a
premium asset in the industry.”); id.  at 7 (“Unlike newspaper publishers, which were perceived to be rapidly losing their
base of customers, radio had not only retained its audience but it had continued to grow listeners.”).
200 JX 392 at 9 (stating that, in DCF analyses of CX R equity, Citi applied a perpetuity growth rate of 1 % to 2% and Gleacher
used a rate of 2%).
201 Tr. 198–99 (Kursh); JX 568 (presenting historical projected population growth for CXR's five largest markets).
202 Tr. 198.
203 JX 480 at 15.
204 JX 393 at 10–11.
205 Id. at 11.
206 Tr. 198–99.
207 JX 393 at 11.
208 Tr. 694.
209 Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., A.2d 497, 512 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del.2010).
210 Id. at 511; see also Bradford Cornell, Corporate Valuation: Tools for Effective Appraisal and Decision Making 146–47
(1993).
211 Shannon P. Pratt & Alina V. Niculita, Valuing a Business: The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held Companies 248
(5th ed.2008).
212 See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
213 See Tr. 727–31; JX 602; JX 603.
214 See Tr. 297–98 (Johnston).
215 See Del. C. § 262(h) (“Unless the Court in its discretion determines otherwise for good cause shown, interest from the
effective date of the merger through the date of payment of the judgment shall be compounded quarterly and shall accrue
at 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate (including any surcharge) as established from time to time during the period
between the effective date of the merger and the date of payment of the judgment.”).
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